Whether private men may resist by Armes.↩

It remaines now that we speak of particulers which are private persons. [40] First, particulars or private persons, are not bound to take up arms gainst the Prince which would compell them to become Idolaters. The L. sicut 7, 5. 1. D. qu [...] d cujusque [...] nivens. Cove-nant betweene God & all the people who promise to be the people of God, doth not in any sort bind them to that; for as that which belongs to the whole vniversall body, is in no sort proper to particulars: so in like manner that which the body owes and is bound to performe, cannot by any sencible reason be required of particular persons: neither doth their duty any thing obliege them to it; for every one is bound to serve God in that proper vocation, to which this called. Now private persons they have no power, they have no publik command, nor any calling to unsheath the sword of authority; And therefore as God hath not put the sword into the hands of privat men: so doth he not require in any sort that they should strike with it. It is said to them, put up thy sword into thy scabberd. On the contrary the Apostle saies of Majestrates, Mat. 26 52. Rom. 13. 4. they carry not the sword in vaine; If particuler men draw it forth, they make themselves Delinquents; If Majestrates be slow and negligent to use it when just occasion is offered, they are likewise justly blameable of negligence in performing their duties, and equally guilty with the former. But you will say unto me, hath not God made a Covenant, as well with particular persons as with the generality, with the least as well as the higest? To what purpose was Circumcision, and Baptisme ordained? What meaneth that frequent repetition of the Covenant in so many passages of holy writ? All this is true, but the consideration hereof is divers in their severall kinds; For as all the subjects of a good and faithfull Prince, of what degree soever they be are bound to obey him; but some of them notwithstanding have their particuler duty, as Magestrates must hold others in obedience, in like manner all men are bound to serve God; bnt some as they are placed in a higher rancke, have received greater authority in so much as they are accountable for the offences of others, if they attend not the charges of the Communalty carefully.

The Kings, the Communalties of people, the Majestrates into whose hands the whole body of the Common-wealth hath committed the sword of authority, must and onght to take care that the Church be maintained and preserved, particulars ought only to looke that they render themselves members of this Church. Kings and popular Estates are bound to hinder the pollution or ruine of the Temple of God, & ought to free and defend it from all corruption within, and all injury from without. Private men must take order that their bodies the Temples of of God, be pure, that they may be fit recptacles for the Holy-ghoast to [41] dwell in them. If any man defile the Temple of God, saith the Apostle, him 1 Cor. 3. 17. & 6. 19. shall God destroy; for the Temple of God is holy, which Temple ye are, to the former he gives the sword, which they beare with authority: to the other he recommends the sword of the spirit only, to wit, the word of God, wherewith St. Paul armes all Christians, against the assaults of the Ephes. 6. 17. Divell, what shall then private men do? if the King will constraine them to serve Idolls? If the Magistrates into whose hands the people hath consigned their authority, or if the Magistrates of the place, where these particulers dwell, do oppose these proceedings of the King: let them in Gods name obey their leaders, and imploy all their meanes (as in the service of God) to ayd the holy and commendable enterprises of those, which oppose themselves lawfully, against his wicked intention. Amongst others, they have the examples of the Centurions, and men at armes, which readily and cheerfully obeyed the Princes of Iuda, who stirred up by Iehoydas, purged the Church from all prophanation, & delivered the Kingdom from the tyranny of Athiliah. But if the Princes, and Magistrates, approve the courses of an outragious and irreligious Prince, or if they do not resist him, we must lend our eares to the Councell of Jesus Christ, to wit, to retire Mat. 10. 23. our selves into some other place; we have the example of the faithfull mixed amongst the 10. Tribes of Israel, who seeing the true service of God abolished by Ieroboam, and that none made any accompt of it, they retired 2 Chron. 11. 13. & 15. 9. Heb. 6. 6. Mat. 10. 28. Exod. 12. &c. Iud. 3. 16. 2 Kings 9. themselves into the territories of Iuda, where Religion remained in her purity: let us rather forsake our livelihoods and lives, then God, let us rather be crucified our selves, then crucifie the Lord of life: feare not them (saith the Lord) which can only kill the body. He himselfe, his Apostles, and an infinite number of Christian martirs, have taught us this by their examples; shall it not then be permitted to any private person to resist by Armes? what shall we say of Moses, which lead Israel away in despite of King Pharoah? And of Ehua, which after 10. years servitude, when Israel might seeme to belong by right of prescription, to him which held the possession thereof, he killed Eglon, the King of Moab, and delivered Israel from the yoak of the Moabites, and of Iohu, which put to death his Lord the King Ioram, exterpated the race of Ahab, and distroyed the Priests of Baall, were not these particulers? I answer, that if they be considered in themselves, they may well be accounted particuler persons, insomuch as they had not any ordinary vocation; But, seeing that we know that they were called extraordinarily, and that God himselfe hath (if we may so speak) put his sword into their hands, be it far from us to account them particuler or private persons, but rather let us esteeme them by many degrees, excelling any ordinary Magistrates whatsoever. The calling of Moses [42] is approved by the expresse word of God, and by most evident miracles, it is said of Ehud, that God stirred him up to kill the Tyrant, and deliver Israel; for Iehu, he was anointed by the Commandement of the Prophet Elizeus, for to roote out the race of Ahab, besides, that the principall men saluted him King, before he executed any thing. There may as much be said of all the rest, whose examples are propounded in holy writ. But where God Almighty doth not speak with his own mouth, nor extraordinarily by his Prophets, it is there that we ought to be exceeding cautious, and to stand upon our guards; for if any supposing he is inspired by the Holy-Ghost, do attribute to himselfe the before mentioned authority, I would intreat him to looke that he be not puffed up with vaine glory, and least he make not a God to himselfe of his own fancy, and sacrifice to his own inventions, let him not then be conceived with vanity, least instead of fruite he bring forth deluding lies. Let the people also be advised on their parts, least in desiring to fight under the Banner of Jesus Christ, they run not to their own confusion to follow the Army of some Gallilean Thendas, or of Barcezha: as it happened to the Pesants and Anabaptists of Munster, in Germany, in the year 1323. I will not say, notwithstanding that the same God which to punish our offences, hath sent us in these our dayes, both Pharoes and Ahabs, may not sometimes raise up extraordinary deliverances to his people: certainly his justice and his mercy continue to all ages, firme and immutable. Now if these visible miracles appear not as in former times; we may yet at the least full by the effects that God workes miraculously in our hearts, which is when we have our minds free from all ambition, a true and earnest zeale, a right knowledge, and conscience; least being guided by the spirit of errour or ambition, we rather make Idolls of our own immaginations, then serve and worship the true and living God.

Whether it be lawfull to take Armes for Religion.↩

Furthermore to take away all scruple, we must necessarily answer, those which esteeme, or else would, that others should think they hold that opinion, that the Church ought not to be defended by Armes. They say with all that, it was not without a great Mysterie, that God did forbid in Exod. 20. 25. Deut. 27. 3. 1 Kings 6. 7 the Law, that the Alter should be made or adorned with the helpe of any toole of Iron; in like manner, that at the building of the Temple of Solamon: there was not heard any noyse of Axe or Hammer, or other tooles of Iron; from whence they collect that the Church which is the lively Temple of the Lord, ought not to be reformed by Armes; yea, as if the stones of the Alter, and of the Temple, were hewed and taken out of the quarries without any instrument of Iron, which the text of the holy [43] Scripture doth sufficiently cleare. But if we oppose to this goodly Allegory, that which is written in the fourth Chapter of the book of Nehemiah, that one part of the people, caried morter, and another part stood ready with their weapons, that some held in one hand their swords, and with the other carried the materialls to the workmen, for the rebuilding of the Temple: to the end, by this meanes to prevent their enemies from ruining their work, we say also that the Church, is neither advanced, nor edified by these materiall weapons; but by these armes it is warranted, and preserved from the violence of the enemies, which will not by any meanes endure the increase of it. Briefly, there hath been an infinite number of good Kings and Princes, (as Histories do testifie, which by Arms: have maintained and defended the service of God against Pagans. They reply readily to this, that Warres in this manner were allowable under the Law▪ but since the time that grace hath been offered by Jesus Christ, who would not enter into Ierusalem mounted on a brave horse; but meekly sitting on an asse: this manner of proceeding hath had an end, I answer first, that all agree with me in this, that our Saviour Christ during all the time that he conversed in this world, tooke not on him the Office of a Judge, or King; but rather of a private person, and a Delinquent by imputation of our transgressions: so that it is an allegation besides the purpose, to say that he hath not managed Armes. But I would willingly demand of such exceptionists: whether they think that by the coming of Jesus Christ in the flesh, that Magistrates have lost their right in the sword of Authority? If they say so, Saint Paul contradicts them, who saies that the Magistates carries not the sword in vaine, and did not refuse their assistance Rom. 13 4. Acts 23. 17. and power, against the violence of those which had conspired his death. And if they consent to the saying of the Apostle to what purpose should the Magestrates beate the sword, if it be not to serve God, who hath committed it to them, to defend the good and punish the bad? Can they doe better service then to preserve the Church from the violence of the wicked, & to deliver the flock of Christ, from the swords of murtherers? I would demaund of them yet, whether they think that all use of Arms is forbiden to Christians? If this be their opinion, then would I know of them, wherefore Christ did graunt to the Centurian his request? Wherefore did he give Matt. 8. 9. 13. Luc. 3. 14. Act. 10. 47. so excelent a testimony of him? wherefore doth St. Iohn Baptist command the men at Armes to content themselves with their pay, and not to use any extortion and doth not rather perswade them to leave their calling? Wherefore did Saint Peter Baptize Cornellus the Centurian who was the first fruits of the Gentiles? From whence comes it that he did not in any [44] sort whatsoever councell him to leave his charge? Now if to bear arms & to make war be a thing lawfull, can there possibly be found any war more just, then that which is taken in hand by the command of the superiour, for the defence of the Church, and the preservation of the faithfull? Is there any greater tirany, then that which is excercised over the soul? Can there be imagined a war more commendable then that which suppresseth such a tyrany? For the last point, I would willingly know of these men, whether it be absolutely prohibited Christians, to make war upon any occasion whatsoever? If they say that it is forbidden them: from whence comes it then that the men at Armes, Captains, and Centurions, which had no other imployment; but the managing of Armes were alwayes received into the Church? wherefore do the ancient Fathers, and Christian Historians make so horrible mention, of certain legions composed wholly of Christian Souldiers, and amongst others of that of Malta, so renowned; for the victory which they obteyned, and of that of Thebes, of the which St. Mauricious was Generall, who suffered martirdom together with all his Troopes, for the confessing of the name of Jesus Christ? And if it be permitted to make warre (as it may be they will confesse) to keepe the limmits and Townes of a Countrie, and to repulse an invading enemy: Is it not yet a thing much more reasonable, to take Armes to preserve and defend honest men, to suppresse the wicked, and to keepe and defend the limmits and bounds of the Church, which is the Kingdom of Jesus Christ? if it were otherwayes, to what purpose? should St. Iohn have foretold, that the whore of Babylon, shall be finally ruined by Apoc. 27. 26. the 10. Kings, whom she hath bewitched? furthermore, if we hold a contrary opinion, what shall we say of the wares of Constantine, against Maxentius, and Licinius, celebrated by so many publick orations, and approved by the Testimony of an infinite number of learned men, what opinion should we hold of the many voyages, made by Christian Princes, against the Turkes and Sarazins to conquer the holy Land, who had not, or at the least, ought not to have had, any other end in their designes; but to binder the enemy from ruining the Temple of the Land, and to restore the integrity of his service into those Countries. Although then that the Church be not increased by Armes, notwithstanding it may be justly preserved by the meanes of Armes; I say further, that those that dye in so holy a war, are no lesse the Martyrs of Jesus Christ, then their brethren which were put to death for Religion; nay, they which dye in that war seeme to have this inadvantage, that with a free will & knowing sufficiently hazard, into which they cast themselves, notwithstanding, do couragiously expose their lives to death and danger, whereas [45] other do only not refuse death, when it behoveth them to suffer. The Turkes strive to advance their opinion by the meanes of Armes, and if they do subdue a Country, they presently bringin by force the impieties of Mahomet; who in his Alcoran, hath so recommended Armes: as they are not ashamed to say it is the ready way to Heaven, yet do the Turkes constrain no man in matter of conscierce. But he which is a much greater adversary to Christ, and true Religion, with all those Kings whom he hath inchanted, opposeth fire and fagots, to the light of the Gospel, tortures the word of God, compelling by wracking, and torments, as much as in him lieth: all men to become Idolaters, and finally is not ashamed, to advance and maintain their faith and law by perfideous disloyalty, and their traditions by continuall traysons. Now on the contrary, those good Princes and Magistrates, are said properly to defend themselves, which invirone and fortifie by all their meanes and industry the vine of Christ, already planted, to be planted in places where it hath not yet been, least the wild boore of the Forrest should spoyle or devoure it: They do this (I say) in covering with their Buckler, and defending with their sword, those which by the preaching of the Gospel have been converted to true Religion, and in fortifying with their best ability, by ravelins, ditches, and rampers the Temple of God built with lively stones, untill it Have attained the full height, in despite of all the furious assaults of the enemies thereof, we have lengthened out this discourse thus far, to the end, we might take away all scruple concerning this question. Set then the Estates, and all the Officers of a Kingdom, or the greatest part of them, every one established in authority by the people: know, that if they containe not within his bounds (or at the least, imploy not the utmost of their endeavours thereto) a King that seekes to corrupt the Law of God, or hinders the reestablishment thereof, that they offend grievously against the Lord, with whom they have contracted Covenants upon those conditions: Those of a Town, or of a Province, making a portion of a Kingdom, let them know also, that they draw upon themselves the judgement of God, if they drive not impiety out of their walls and confines, if the King seeke to bring it in, or if they be wanting to preserve by all meanes, the pure Doctrine of the Gospel, although for the defence thereof, they suffer for a time bannishment, or any other misery. Finally, more private men must be all advertised, that nothing can excuse them, if they obey any in that which offends God, and that yet they have no right nor warrant, neither may in any sort by their private authority take armes, if it appear not most evidently, that they have extraordinary vocation thereunto, all which our discourse will suppose we have confirmed by pregnant Testimonies drawn from holy writ.

Kings are made by the People.↩

We have shewed before that it is God, that doth appoint Kings, which chuseth them, which gives the Kingdom to them: now we say that the people establish Kings, putteth the Scepter into their hands, and which with their suffrages, approveth the election. God would have it done in this [47] manner, to the end, that the Kings should acknowledge, that after God they held their power and Soveraignty from the people, and that it might the rather induce them, to apply & addres the utmost of their care and thoughts for the profit of the people, without being puffed with any vaine immagination: that they were formed of any matter more excellent then other men; for which they were raised so high above others: as if they were to command over slocks of sheepe, or heards of Cattel; but let them remember and know, that they are of the same mould and condition as others, raised from the earth by the voice and acclamations: now as it were upon the shoulders of the people unto their thrones, that they might afterwards bear on their own shoulders the greatest burthens of the Common-wealth. Divers ages before that, the people of Israel demanded a King. God gave and appointed the Law of royall governmen contained in the 17. Chapter. ver. 14. of Deut. when sayes Moses, thou art come unto the Land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt possesse it, and shalt dwell therein, and shalt say, I will set a King over me like as all the Nations that are about me, thou shalt in any wise set him whom the Lord thy God shall chuse from amongst thy brethren, &c. You see here, that the election of the King is attributed to God, the establishment to the people: now when the practice of this law came in use, see in what manner they proceeded. The Elders of Israel which presented 1 Sam. 8. 5. the whole body of the people, (under this name of Elders, are comprehended the Captains, the Centurions, Commanders over fifties and tenns, Judges, provosts; but principally the chiefest of tribes) came to meete Samuel in Ramah, and not being willing longer to endure the government of the sonnes of Samuel, whose ill carriage had justly drawn on them: the peoples dislike, and withall perswading themselves that they had found the meanes to make their warres hereafter with more advantage they demanded 1 Sam. 9. 16. a King of Samuel, who asking Councell of the Lord, he made known that he had chosen Saul for the Governour of his people. Then Samuel anointed Saul, and performed all those rights which belong to the election of a King required by the people. Now this might perhaps have seemed sufficient, if Samuel had presented to the people the King that was chosen by God, and had admonished them all to become good and obedient subjects. Notwithstanding to the end, that the King might know that he was established 1 Sam. 20. 18. &c. by the people, Samuell appointed the Estates to meet at Mispah, where being assembled as if the businesse were but then to begin, and nothing had allready been done, to be brief as if the election of Saul were then only to be treated of, the lot is cast and falls on the Tribe of Benjamin, after on the family of Matri, and lastly on Saul, born of that family who was the same that God had chosen; Then by the consent of all the people Saul was declared King. Finally, to the that Saul nor any other might attribute the aforesaid 1 Sam. 11. 14. businesse to chance of lot, after that Saul had made some proofe of his valour [48] in raysing the siege of the Ammonites in Iabesh Gilead: some of the people pressing the businesse he was again confirmed King in a full assembly at Gilgal; ye see that he whom God had chosen, and the lot had separated from all the rest, is established King by the suffrages of the people.

And for David, by the Commandement of God, and in a manner more evident [...] Sam. [...] 6. then the former, after the rejection of Saul, Samuel anointed for King over Israel David chosen by the Lord, which being done the spirit of the Lord presently left saul, and wrought in a speciall manner in David; But David notwithstanding raigns not, but was compeled to save himselfe in deserts and rocks, oftentimes falling upon the very brim of destruction, and never raigned as King till after the death of Saul: for then by the suffrages of all the people of Iudah he was first chosen King of Iudah, and seaven yeares after by the consent of all Israell, he was inaugurated King of Israell in Hebron. So then he is annointed first by the Prophet at the commandement of God, as a token he was chosen, secondly by the commandement of the people when he was established King. And that to the end that Kings may alwayes remember that it is from God; but by the people, and for the peoples sake that they 2 Sam. 2. doe raignt, and that in there glorie they say not (as is there custome) that they hold their Kingdome only of God and there sword, but withall add that it was the people which first girt them with that sword. The same order offered in Solomon, although he was the Kings sonne God hath chosen Solomon, to sit upon the Throne of his Kingdome, and by expresse words 2 Sam. 7. 13. 1 Kings 3. Chron. 28. 5 1 Kings 2. 32. 1 Chron. 28. 1. & 20. 22. 24. had promised David to be with him and assist him as a Father his soone. David had with his one mouth designed Solomon to be successor to his Crowne in the presence of some of the principall of his Court. But this was not enough and therefore David assembled at Ierusalem the Princes of Israell, the heads of the Tribes the Captaines of the Souldiers and ordinance officers of the Kings, the centurions & other Magistrates of Towns together with his sons, the noble men and worthiest personages of the Kingdome, to consult and resolve upon the election. In this Assemblie after they had called upon the name of God, Solomon by the consent of the whole congregation proclaimed and annointed for King, and sat (so saith the text) upon the Throne of Israell then and not before the Princes the Noblemen his brothers themselves do him homage, and take the Oath of Allegiance. And to the end, that it may not be said, that that was onely done to avoid occasion of difference, which might arise amongst the brothers the sonnes of David about the succession, we reade 2 Kings 20. 2 Chron. 20. 36. & 22. 1. & 36, 1. that the other following Kings have in the same manner been established in their places it is said, that after the death of Solomon, the people assembled to create his sonne Rehoboam King. After that Amaziah was killed, Ozias his only sonne was chosen King by all the people, Ochosias after Ioram, Ioachim, the sonne of Iosias, after the disease of his Father, whose piety might well seeme to [49] require that without any other solemnity, notwithstanding both he and the other were chosen and invested into the royall Throne by the suffrages of the people. To which also belongs, that which Hushai said to Absolam, nay; but 2 Sam. 16. 18. whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of Israel chuse, his will I be, and with him will I abide, which is as much as to say, I will follow the King lawfully established, and according to the accustomed order; wherefore although that God had promised to his people a perpetuall Lampe, to wit, a King, and a continuall successour of the Line of David, and that the successour Psal. 132. 11. 12. of the Kings of this people were approved by the word of God himselfe. Notwithstanding, since that we see that the Kings have not reigned, before the people had ordained and installed them, with requisite Ceremonies: it may be collected from this, that the Kingdom of Israel, was hereditary, if we consider David and the promise made to him, and that it was wholly elective, if we regard the particuler persons. But to what purpose is this, but to make it apparent, that the election is onely mentioned, that the Kings might have alwayes in their remembrance, that they were raised to their dignities by the people, and therefore they should never forget during life, in what a strict bond of observance they are tyed to those from whom they have received all their greatnesse. We read that the Kings of the Heathen have been established also by the people; for as when they had either troubles at home, or warres abroad, some one in whose ready vallour, and discreete integrity, the people did principally relye and repose their greatest Herodi. lib. 1. Cicero. 1. de offici. Tit. Livi. lib. 1. confidence, him they presently with a universall consent constituted King. Cicero saith, that amongst the Medes, Deioces from a Judge of private controvercies was for his uprightnesse, by the whole people elected King, and in the same manner were the first Kings chosen amongst the Romans. Insomuch, that after the death of Romulus, the interrayde and Government of the hundred senators, being little acceptable to the Quiutes it was agreed that from thence forward, the Kings should be chosen by the suffrages of the people, and the approbation of the senate. Forquius Superbus was therefore esteemed a tyrant, because being chosen neither by the people nor the senate, he intruded himself into the Kingdom only by force and usurpation; Wherefore Iulius Caesar long after though he gained the Empire by the sword, yet to the end he might adde some shaddow or pretence of right to his former intrusion, he caused himself to be declared both by the people and senate perpetually dictator. Augustus his adopted sonne would never take on him as inheriter of the Empire, although he were declared so by the testaments of Cesar; but alwaies held it as of the people and senate. The same also did Tiberius, Caligula and Claudius, and the first that assumed the Empire to himself without any colour of right, was Nero who also by the senate was condemned. Briefly for so much as none were ever [50] born with Crowns one their heads, and sceptes in their hands, and that no man can be a King by himself nor reign without people; whereas on the contrary the people may subsist of themselves, and were long before they had any Kings, it must of necessity follow that Kings were at the first constituted by the people, And although the sons and dependants of such Kings inheriting their fathers vertues, may in a sort seeme to have rendred their Kingdome heriditary to their off-springs and that in some Kingdoms and Countries the right of free election seems in a sort buried; yet notwithstanding in all well ordered Kingdoms this custome is yet remaining, the sons do not succeed the fathers, before the people first have as it were a new established them by their new approbation; neither were they acknowledged in quality as inheriting it from the dead; but approved and accounted Kings then only when they were invested with the Kingdom, by receiving the Scepter and Diadem from the hands of those who represent the Majesty of the people. One may see most evident marks of this in Christian Kingdoms, which are at this day esteemed heriditary; for the French King, he of Spaine and England and others are commonly sacred, and as it were put into posession of their authority by the Peeres, Lords of the Kingdom, and Officers of the Crowne which represent the body of the people; no more nor lesse then the Emperours of Germany are chosen by the Electors, and the Kings of Polonia, by the yavvodes and Pallatines of the Kingdom, where the right of Election is yet in force. In like manner also, the Cities give no royall reception, nor entries unto the King but also their inauguration, and anciently they used not to count the times of their reign but from the day of their coronation, the which was strictly observed in France. But least the continued course of some successions should deceive us, we must take notice that the estates of the Kingdoms have often preferred the cosen before the sonne, the younger brother before the Elder as in France Lewis was preferred before his brother Robert Earle of Eureux: [Annales Gillii] in like manner Henry before Robert nephew to Capet. Nay which is more by authority of the people in the same Kingdom, the Crown hath bin transported (the lawfull inheritors living) from one linage to another as from that of Meroue to that of the Charlemains, and from that of the Charlemains to that of the Capets, the which hath also beene done in other Kingdoms as the best Historians testify; But not to wander from France the long continuance and power of which Kingdom may in some sort plead for a ruling authority, and where succession seems to have obtained most reputation. We read that Pharamond was chosen in the year 419 Pepin in the year 751. Charles the Great and Carleman the sonne of Pepin in the yeare 768 without having any respect to their Fathers former estate. Carleman dying in the yeare 772. his portion fell not presently into the posession of his brother Charles the great, as it ordinarily happens in the succession of inheritances, but by the Ordinance of the people and the estates of [51] the Kingdom he is invested with it. the same authour witnesseth that in the yeare 812 Lewis the Courteous although he were the sonne of Charles the great was also elected: and in the Testament of Charlimane inserted into the history written by Nanclere, Charlemane doth intreate the people to chuse by a geuerall assembly of the Estates of the Kingdom which of his Grandchildren or Nephews the people pleased, and commaunding the Vncles to observe and obey the Ordinance of the people, by meanes whereof Charles the bald nephew to Lewis the courtious and Iudith, doth declare himself to be chosen King, as Aimonius the French historian recites.

To conclude in a word, all Kings at the first were altogeather elected, and those which at this day seeme to have their Crown and Royall authority by inheritance, have or should have first and principally their confirmation from the people. Briefly although the people of some Countries have been accustomed to chuse their Kings of such a linage which for some notable merrits have worthily deserved it ; yet we must believe that they chuse the stock it self and not every branch that proceeds from it neither are they so tied to that election, as if the successour degenerate they may not chuse another more worthy, neither those which come and are the next of that stock are borne Kings but created such, nor called Kings but Princes of the bloud royall.

The whole body of the people is above the King.↩

Now seeing that the people chuse and establish their Kings, it followeth that the whole body of the people is above the King; for it is a thing most evident that he which is established by another is accounted under him that hath established him, & he which receives his authority from an other is lesse then he from whom he denies his power. Potiphar the Egyptian setteth Ioseph over all his House, Nebuchadoezzar Danniel over the Province of Babylon, Darius the sixscore governors over the kingdom. It is cōmonly said that Mrs. establish their servants, Kings their officers: In like manner also the people establish the King as administrator of the Cōmon-wealth. Good kings have not disdained this title; yea, he had ones themselvs have affected it: insomuch, as for the space of divers Ages no Roman Emperor (if it were not some absolute tyrant, as Nero, Domitian, Caligula) would suffer himself to be called Lord; Furthermore, it must necessarily be that Kings were instituted for the peoples sake, neither can it be, that for the pleasure of some hundred of men, and without doubt more foolish and worse then many of the other, all the rest were made, but much rather that these hundred were made for the use and service of all the other, And reason requires that he be preferred above the other, who was made only to and for his occasion: so it is, that for the ships sake, the owner appoints a pylot over her, who sits at the helm, and looks that she keeps her course, nor run nor upon any dangerous sheilf: the pylot doing his duty is obeyed by the Mariners; yea, & of him himself that is owner of the vessel, notwithstanding, the pylot is a servant as well as the [52] least in the ship from whom he only differs in this that he servs in better place then they do. In a Common-wealth commonly compared to a ship the King holds the place of pylot, the people in general are owners of the vessel, obeying the pylot whilest he is carefull of the publique good although this pylot neither is nor ought to be esteemed other then servant to the publique, as a Judge or General in war differs little from other officers, but that he is bound to bear greater burdens, & expose himself to more dangers. By the same reason also which the King gains by acquist of arms, be it that he possesseth himself of Frontier places in warring on the enemy, or that which he gets by escheats or consistations, he gets it to the Kingdom & not to himself; to wit, to the people, of whom the Kingdom is composed; no more, nor less, then the servant doth for his master, neither may one contract or obliege themselvs to him, but by & with reference to the authority derived from the people. Furthermore, there is an infinite sort of people which live with out a King; but we cannot imagine a King without people, And those which have bin raised to the Royal dignity, were not advanced because they excelled other men in beauty & comeliness, nor in some excellency of nature to govern them as shepheards doe their flocks, but rather being made out of the same masse with the rest of the people, they should acknowledge that for them, they as it were borrow their power & authority, The ancient custome of the French represents that exceeding well , for they used to lift up on a buckler, & salute him King whom they had chosen. And wherefore is it said, I pray you that kings have an infinite number of eyes, a million of ears, with extream long hands, and feet exceeding swift? is it because they are like to Argos, Gerion, Midas, & divers others so celebrated by the Poets? No truly, but it is said in regard of all the people, whom the busines principally concerns, who lend to the king for the good of the Common-wealth, their eyes, their ears, their means their faculties. Let the people forsake the king, he presently fals to the ground, although before his hearing & sight seemed most excellent, & that he was strong & in the best disposition that might be, yea that he seemed to triumph in all magnificence, yet in an instant he will become most vile & contemptible, to bee brief, instead of those divine honours wherewith all men adored him, he shal be compelled Dionisius for his Ti [...] a [...]ie driven o [...] t of C [...] cil [...] e was fo [...] s [...] d to ta [...] e that course of lif [...] up [...] n h [...] m. to become a Pedant, & whip children in the school at Corinth. Take away but the basis, to this Giant, & like the Rodian Colosse he presently tumbles on the ground, & fals into pieces. Seeing then that the King is established in this degree by the people & for their sake, & that he cannot subsist without them, who can think it strange then for us to conclude, that the people are aboue the King. Now that which we speak of all the people universally, ought also to be understood as hath been delivered in the 2. question, of those which in every Kingdom or town do lawfully represent the body of the people, & which ordinarily (or at lest should be) called the officers of the Kingdom, or of the crown, & not of the King; For the officers of the king it is he which placeth & displaceth them at his pleasure, yea, after his death they have no more power, & are accounted as dead. On the contrary, the officers of the Kingdom receive their authority from the people in the general Assembly of the states (or at the least were accustomed so anciently to have done) & cannot be disauthorised but by them, so then the one depends of the King, the other of the Kingdom, those of the soveraign officer of the kingdom which is the King himself, these of the soveraignty it self, that is of the people, of which soveraignty both the King, all his officers, and all his officers of the kingdom, ought to depend, the charge of the one hath proper relation to the care of the Kings person: that of the other to look that the common-wealth receive no damage, the first ought to serve and assist the King, as all domestique servants are bound to doe to their masters the other to preserve the rights & priviledges of the people, & to carefully hinder the Prince that he neither omit the things that may advantage the state, nor commit any thing that may endammage the publique.

[55]

Briefly, the one are Servants and domestiques of the Kings, and received into their places to obey his person: the other, on the contrary, are as Associates to the King in the administration of justice, participating of the Royal power and authority, being bound to the utmost of their power, to be assisting in the managing of the affairs of State, as well as the King who is as it were President amongst them, and principall onely in order and degree.

Therefore, as all the whole People is above the King, and likewise taken in one entire body are in authority before him; yet being considered one by one they are all of them under the King. It is easie to know how far the power of the first Kings extended, in that Ephron King of the Hittites could not grant Abraham the Sepulchre, but in the presence and with the consent of the People: neither could Hemor the Hevite Gen. 34. King of Sichem contract an alliance with Iacob, without the Peoples assent, and confirmation thereof; because it was then the custome to refer the most important affairs to be dispensed and resolved in the generall Assemblies of the People. This might easily be practised in those kingdomes, which were then almost confined within the circuit of one towne.

But since that Kings began to extend their limits, and that it was impossible for the People to assemble together all into one place because of their great numbers, which would have occasioned confusion the Officers of the kingdome were established, which should ordinarily preserve the rights of the People, in such sort notwithstanding, as when extraordinary occasion required the People might be assembled, or at the least such an abridgement as might by the principallest Members be a Representation of the whole Body. We see this order established in the kingdome of Israel, which (in the judgment of the wisest Politicians) was excellently ordered. The King had his Cupbearers his Carvers, his Chamberlains and Stewards. The kingdome had her Officers, to wit, the 71. Elders, and the heads and chief chosen out of all the Tribes, which had the care of the Publique Faith in Peace and War.

Furthermore, the kingdome had in every town Magistrates, which had the particular government of them, as the former were for the whole kingdome. At such times as affairs of consequence were to be treated of, they assembled together, but nothing that concerned the publike state could receive any solid determination. David assembled the Officers of 1. Chron. 29. 1 1. Chron. 13. 1. his kingdome when he desired to invest his Son Solomon with the Royal Dignity; when he would have examined and approved that manner of policy, and managing of affairs, that he had revived and restored, and when there was question of removing the Ark of the Covenant.

[92]

And because they represented the whole people, it is said in the History, that all the people assembled. These were the same Officers that delivered Ionathan from death, condemned by the sentence of the King, by which it appeares, that there might be an appeale from the King to the People.

After that the kingdome was divided through the pride of Reoboam, [...] Sam. [...]. 45. the Councel at Ierusalem composed of 71. Ancients, seems to have such authority, that they might judge the King, as well as the King might judge every one of them in particular.

In this Councel was President the Duke of the house of Iuda, to wit, [...] Chron. 1 [...] . Neh. 11. 9. some principall man chosen out of that Tribe; as also, in the City of Ierusalem there was a Governour chosen out of the Tribe of Benjamin residing there. This will appear more manifest by examples, Ieremy sent by God to denounce to the Jewes the destruction of Ierusalem, was therefore condemned first by the Priests and Prophets, in whose hands was [...] or. 16. 9 [...]. the Ecclesiasticall jurisdiction afterwards by all the people of the City; that is, by the ordinary Iudges of Ierusalem, to wit, the Milleniers, and the Centurions: Finally, the matter being brought before the Princes of Iuda, who were the 71. Elders assembled, and set neere to the new Gate of the Temple, he was by them acquitted.

In this very Assembly, they did discreetly condemn, in expresse terms, the wicked and cruell act of the King Ichoiakin, who a little before had caused the Prophet Vriah to be slain, who also fore-told the destruction of Ierusalem.

We read in another place that Ledechias held in such reverence the authority of this Councel, that he was so far from delivering of Ieremy [...] 37. 38. from the dungeon, wherein to the 71. had cast him that he durst scant remove him into a lesse rigorous prison. They perswading him to give his consent to the putting to death the Prophet Ieremy, he answered, that he was in their hands, and that he might not oppose them in my thing. The same King fearing least they might make information against him, to bring him to an account for certain Speeches he had used to the Prophet Ieremy, was glad to feign an untrue excuse It appeares by this, that in the kingdome of Iuda this Councel was above the King, in this kingdome, I say not fashioned or established by Plato or Arictotle, but by the Lord God, himself being Author of all their order, and supreame Moderator in that Monarchy. Such were the seven Magi or Sages in the Persian Empire, who had almost a paraleld dignity with the King, and were tearmed the ears and eyes of the King, who also never dissented from Arist. in Pol. lib. [...] .c. 11. l. 3. c. 7. the judgment of those Sages.

In the kingdom of Sparta there was the Ephori, to whom an appeal [57] lay from the judgment of the King, and who, as Aristotle sayes, had authority also to judge the Kings themselves.

In Egypt the people were accustomed to chuse and give officers to the King, to the end they might hinder and prevent any incroachment, or usurpt authority, contrary to the Laws. Now as Aristotle doth ordinarily tearm those lawfull Kings, which have for their Assistants, such officers Arist. in pol. l. 5. c. 11. or Councellors: so also maketh he no difficulty to say, that where they be wanting, there can be no true Monarchy, but rather a tyranny, absolutely barbarous, or at the least such a Dominion, as doth most neerly approach tyranny.

In the Romane Common-wealth, such were the Senators, and the Magistrates created by the people the tribune of those which were called Celerees, the Preter or Provost of the City, and others, insomuch as there lay an appeal from the King to the People, as Seneca declares by divers testimonies drawne from Ciceroes bookes of the Common-wealth, and the History of Oratius sufficiently shewes, who being condemned by the Iudges for killing his sister, was acquitted by the people.

In the times of the Emperours, there was the Senate the Consults, the Pretors, the great Provosts of the Empire, the Governours of Provinces, attributed to the Senate and the People, all which were called the Magistrates and Officers of the people of Rome. And therefore, when that by the decree of the Senate, the Emperour Maximinus was declared enemy Herodi. [...] 8. of the Common-wealth, and that Maximus and Albinus were created Emperours by the Senate, the men of war were sworn to be faithfull, and obedient to the people of Rome the Senate, and the Emperors. Now for the Empires and publike States of these times (except those of Turquie, Muscovie, and such like, which are rather a rapsody of Robbers, and barbarous intruders, then any lawfull Empires) there is not one, which is not, or hath not heretofore been governed in the manner wee have described. And if through the connivency and sloath of the principall Officers, the successors have found the businesse in a worse condition, those which have for the present the publike Authority in their hands, are notwithstanding bound as much as in them lyeth to reduce things into their primary estate and condition.

In the Empire of Germany which is conferred by election, there is the Electors and the Princes both secular and Ecclesiasticall, the Countesse, Barons, and Deputies of the Imperial Cities, and as all these in their proper places are Solicitors for the publike good likewise in the Diets doe they represent the Majesty of the Empire, being obliged to advise, and carefully fore-see, that neither by the Emperours, partiality, hate nor affection, the publike State do suffer, or be interressed. And for this reason, the [92] [...] [57] [...] [92] [...] [57] [...] [58] Empire hath its Chancellour, as well as the Emperour his, both the one and the other have their peculiar Officers and Treasurers apart. And it is a thing so notorious, that the Empire is preferred before the Emperour, that it is a common saying, That the Emperour does homage to the Empire.

In like manner, in the Kingdom of Polonia, there is for Officers of the Crown, the Bishops, the Palatins, the Castellains, the Nobility, the Deputies Speculum saxonicum. of Towns and Provinces assembled extraordinarily, before whom; and with whose consent, and no where else, they make new Lawes, and determinations concerning wars. For the ordinary Government there, is the Councellours of the kingdom, the Chancellour of the State, &c. although notwithstanding, the king have his Stewards, Chamberlains, Servants and Domestiques. Now if any man should demand in Polonia who were the greater, the King or all the people of the kingdom represented by the Lords and Magistrates; he should do as much, as if he asked at Venice, if the Duke were above the Seigniory. But what shall wee say of Kingdoms, which are said to go by hereditary succession? We may indeed conclude the very same. The kingdom of France heretofore preferred before all other, both in regard of the excellency of their Lawes, and Ai [...] oni. lib. 5. c. 26. in Carolo [...]lv [...] . majesty of their Estate may passe with most as a ruling case. Now although that those which have the publike commands in their hands, doe not discharge their duties as were to be desired, it followes not though, that they are not bound to do it. The King hath his high steward of his Houshold his Chamberlains, his Masters of his games, Cup-bearers, and others, whose offices were wont so to depend on the person of the King, that after the death of their Mast er the offices were void. And indeed at the Funerall of the King, the Lord high Steward in the presence of all the officers and servants of the house-hold, breakes his staffe of office, and sayes, Our Master is dead, let every one provide for himselfe. On the other side, the kingdom hath her officers, to wit, the Mayor of the Palace, which since hath been called the Constable, the Marshals, the Admirall, the Chancellour or great Referendary, the Secretaries, the Treasurers and others, which heretofore were created in the Assembly of the three Estates the Clergy, the Nobility, and the People.

Since that, the Parliament of Paris was made Sedentary, they are not thought to be established in their places, before they have beene first received and approved by that course of Parliament, and may not be dismissed nor deposed, but by the authority and consent of the same. Now all these officers take their oath to the Kingdome, which is as much as to say, to the people in the first place, then to the King which is protector of he Kingdome, the which appears by the tenour of the oath. Above all, the [59] Constable, who receiving the Sword from the King, hath it girded unto him with this charge, That he maintain and defend the Common-wealth, as appears by the words that the King then pronounceth.

Besides, the kingdome of France hath the Peers (so called either for S. Filius fam. instit. quib. mod. jus patriae pot. solvitur. that they are the Kings companions, or because they are the Fathers of the Common-wealth) taking their denominations from the severall Provinces of the kingdome, in whose hands the King at his inauguration takes his oath, as if all the people of the kingdome were in them present, which shews that these twelve Peers are above the King. They on the other side swear, That they will preserve not the King, but the Crown, that they will assist the Common-wealth with their councell, and therefore will be present with their best abilities to councell the Prince both in peace and war, as appears plainly in the Paitentee of their Peership.

And they therefore have the same right as the Peers of the Court, Renatus ch [...] pinus' lib. 3. which according to the Law of the Lombards, were not only associates to the Lord of the Fee in the judgment of causes, but also did take an account, and judge the differences that happened between the Lord and his vassall.

We may also know, that those Peers of France did often discusse suits and differences between the King and his Subjects: Insomuch, that when Charles the 6. would have given sentence against the Duke of Brittain they opposed it, alleadging that the discussing of that businesse belonged properly to the Peers, and not to the king, who might not in any sort derogate from their authority.

Therefore it is, that yet at this day the Parliament of Paris is called the Court of Peers, being in some sort constituted Judge between the king and the people; yea, between the king and every private person, and is bound and ought to maintain the meanest in the kingdome against the kings Attorney, if he undertake any thing contrary to law.

Furthermore, if the king ordain any thing in his Councell, if he treat any agreement with the Princes his neighbours, if he begin a Warre, or make peace, as lately with Charles the 5. the Emperour, the Parliament ought to interpose their authority, and all that which concerns the publike State must be there inregistred; neither is there any thing firm and stable which the Parliament doth not first approve. And to the end, that the Councellours of that Parliament should not fear the king, formerly they attained not to that place, but by the nomination of the whole body of the Court; neither could they be dismissed for any lawfull cause, but by the authority of the said Body.

[59]

Furthermore, if the Letters of the King be not subsigned by a Secretary of the Kingdom, at this day called a Secretary of State, and if the Letters Pattents be not sealed by the Chancellour, who hath power also to cancell them, they are of no force or value. There is also Dukes, Marquesses, Earls. Vicounts, Barons, Seneschabs, and in the cities and good towns Mayors, Baylistes, Lieutenants, Capitols, Consuls, Sindiques, Sheriffs, and others which have speciall authority through the Circuit of some countries or towns to preserve the people of their jurisdiction. Time it is, that at this day some of these dignities ere become hereditary. Thus much concerning the ordinary Magistrates.

The Assembly of the three Estates.↩

Besides all this, anciently every yeer, and since lesse often, to wit, when some urgent necessity required it, the generall or three Estates were assembled, where all the Provinces and Townes of any worth, to wit, the Burgesses Nobles, and Ecclesiasticall persons, did all of them send their Deputies, and there they did publikely deliberate and conclude of that which concerned the publike state. Alwayes the authority of this Assembly was such, that what was there determined, whether it were to treat peace, or make war, or create a Regent in the Kingdom, or impose some new tribute, it was ever held firm and inviolable; nay, which is more by the authority of this Assembly, the Kings convinced of loose intemporancy, or of insufficiency, for so great a charge or tyranny, were disthronized; yes, their whole Races were for ever excluded from their succession to the Kingdome, no more, nor lesse, as their Progenitors were by the same authority formerly called to the administration of the same Kingdome. Those whom the consent and approbation of the Estates had formerly raised, were by the dissent and disallowing of the same afterwards cast down. Those which tracing in the vertuous steps of their Ancestors were called to that dignity, as if it had been their inheritance, were driven out and dis-inherited for their degenerating ingratitude, & for that being tainted with insupportable vices, they made themselves uncapable and unworthy of such honour.

This shews, that succession was tollerated to avoid practises, close and under-hand canvasing, discontents of persons refused; contentions, interraines, and other discommodities of elections. But on the other part, when successiou brought other mischiefes more pernicious, when tyrannie trampled on the Kingdome, and when a Tyrant possessed himselfe of the Royal Throne, the Medicine proving much worse then the Disease: then the Estates of the Kingdome lawfully assembled in the name of all the people, have ever maintained their authority, whether it were to drive out a Tyrant, or other unworthy King, or to establish a good one in [60] his place. The ancient French had learned that of the Gauses, as Caesar shewes in his Commentaries. For Ambiorix King of the Eburons, or Leigeons confesseth, That such were the condition of the Gaulish Empire, that the people lawfully assembled, had no lesse power over the King, then the Caes. l. 5. & 7. de bello Gal. lico. King had over the people. The which appears also in Vircingentorix, who gives an account of his actions before the Assembly of the people.

In the kingdoms of Spain, especially Aragon, Valentia, and Catalonia, there is the very same For that which is called the Iustitia Major in Aragon hath the Soveraign authority in it selfe. And therefore, the Lords which represent the people proceed so far, that both at the inaugaration of the King, as also at the Assembly of the Estates, which is observed every third yeer, to say to the King in expresse words that which follows, We which are as much worth as you, and have more power then you, chuse you King upon these and these conditions, and there is one between you and us which commands over you, to wit, the Iustitia Major of Aragon, which oftentimes refuseth that which the King demands, and forbids that which the King injoynes.

In the kingdoms of England and Scotland the Soveraignty seemes to be in the Parliament, which heretofore was held almost every yeere. They call Parliaments the Assembly of the Estates the kingdome, in the which the Bishops Earles, Barons, Deputies of Towns and Provinces deliver their opinions, and resolve with a joynt consent of the affaires of State, the authority of this Assembly hath been so sacred and inviolable, that the King durst not abrogate or alter that which had been there once decreed.

It was that which heretofore called and installed in their charges all the chief officers of the kingdome; yea, and sometimes the ordinary councellers of that which they call the Kings privie Councels. In sum, the other christian Kingdoms, as Hungary, Bohemia, Denmarke, Swedea, and the rest, they have their officers apart from the Kings; and Histories, together with the examples that we have in these our times, sufficiently demonstrate that these Officers and Estates have knowne how to make use of their authority, even to the deposing and driving out of the tyrannors and unworthy Kings.

We must nor therefore esteem that this cuts too short the wings of Royal authority, and that it is as much as to take the Kings head from his shoulders.

We believe that God is Almighty, neither think we it any thing diminisheth his power, because he cannot sin: neither say we, that his Empire is lesse to be esteemed, because it cannot be neither shaken, nor cast downe: [62] neither also must we judge a King to be too much abused, if he be withheld by others from falling into an errour, to which he is over-much inclined, or for that by the wisdome and discretion of some of his Councellors, his kingdome is preserved and kept intire and safe, which otherwise, happily by his weaknesse or wickednesse might have been ruined. Will you say that a man is lesse healthfull, because he is invironed with discreet Physitians, which councell him to avoid all intemperance, and forbid him to eat such meats as are obnoxious to the stomack, yea, and which purge him many times against his will and when he resists? which will prove his better friends, whether these Physitians which are studiously carefull of his health, or those Sicophants which are ready at every turn to give him that which must of necessity hasten his end? We must then always observe this distinction. The first are the friends of the King: The other are the friends of Francis which is King. The friends of Francis are those which serve him: The friends of the King are the officers & servants of the kingdom. For seeing the King hath this name, because of the kingdom, and that it is the people which give being and consistence to the kingdome, the which being lost, or ruined, hee must needs cease to be a King, or at the least not so truly a King, or else wee must take a shadow for a substance.

Without question, those are most truly the Kings friends, which are most industriously carefull of the welfare of his kingdom, and those his worst enemies which neglect the good of the Common, wealth, and seek to draw the King into the same lapse of errour.

And as it is impossible to separate the kingdom from the people, nor the King from the Kingdome, in like manner, neither can the friends of the King be dis-joyned from the friends of the people, and the Kingdome.

I say further, that those which with a true affection love Francis, had rather see him a King then a Subject. Now seeing they cannot see him a King, it necessarily followes, that in loving Francis, they must also love the Kingdome.

But those which would be esteemed more the friends of Francis, then of the kingdome and the people, are truly flatterers, and the most pernitious enemies of the King and publike State.

Now if they were true friends indeed, they would desire and endeavour that the King might become more powerfull, and more assured in his estate according to that notable saying of Theopompus King of Sparta, after the Ephores or Controllers of the Kings were instituted, Tkemore (said he) are appointed by the People to watch over, and look to the [63] affaires of the Kingdome, the more those that govern shall have credit, and the more safe and happy shall be the State.

Whether prescription of time can take away the right of the people.↩

But peradventure, some one will reply, you speak to us here of Peers, of Lords and Officers of the Crown. But I for my part see not any, but only some shewes and shadows of antiquity as if they were to be represented on a stage I see not for the present searce any tract of that ancient liberty, and authority, nay which is worse a great part, if not all, of those officers take care of nothing but their particular affairs, and almost, if not altogether, serve as flatterers about those Kings who joyntly tosse the poor people like tennice, bals: hardly is there one to be found that hath compussion on, or will lend a helping hand to the miserable subjects, fleaed and scorched to the very bones, by their insolent and insupportable oppression: If any be but houth to have such a desire, they are presently condemned as Rebels and seditious, and are constrained either to fly with much discommodity, or else must run hazard both of life and liberty. What can be answered to this? the businesse goes thus. The outragiousnesse of Kings, the ignorance of the party, together with the wicked connivence of the great ones of the kingdome, hath been for the most part such throughout the World, that the licentious and unbridled power wherewith most kings are transported and which hath made them insupportable, hath in a manner by the length of continuance gained right of prescription, and the people for want of using it hath incitely quit, if not altogether lost their just & ancient authority. So that it ordinarily happens, that what all mens care ought to attend on, is for the most part neglected by every man; for what is commited to the generalty, no man thinkes is commended to his custody. Notwithstanding, no such prescription nor praevarication can justly prejudice the right of the people: It is commonly said that the Exchequers doe admit no rule of prescription against it, much lesse against the whole body of the people, whose power transcends the Kings, and in whose right the King assumes to himself that priviledge; for otherwise, wherefore is the Prince only administrator, and the people true proprietor of the publique Exchequer, as we will prove here presently after. Furthermore, it is not a thing resolved on by all, that no tyrannous intrusion or usurpation, and continuance in the same course, can by any length of time prescribe against lawfull liberty. If it be objected, that Kings were enthronized, and received their authority from the people that lived [64] five hundred yeers ago, and not by those now living. I answer, that the Common-wealth never dyes, although Kings be taken out of this life one after another; for as the continuall running of the water gives the River a perpetuall being; so the alternative revolution of birth and death renders the people (quoad hunc mundum) immortall.

And further, as wee have at this day the same Seine and Tiber as was 1000. yeers agoe: in like manner also is there the same people of Germany, France, and Italy (excepting intermixing of Colonies, or such like) neither can the lapse of time, nor changing of individuals, alter in any sort the right of those people. Furthermore, if they say the King receives his kingdom from his Father, and not from the people, and hee from his Grandsa her, and to one from another upward.

I ask, could the Grandfather or Ancestor, transfer a greater right to his Successor, then he had himself? If he could not (as without doubt Vlpian de reg. juris l. 54. it must need be so) is it not plainly perspicuous that what the Successor further arrogates to himself, he may usurp with as sare a conscience, as what a Thiefe goes by the high-way side. The people on the contrary have their right of eviction intire and whole; although then that the officers of the Crown have for a time lost or left their rankes, this cannot in any true right prejudice the people, but rather cleer otherwise as one would not grant audience, or show favour to a slave which had long time held his master prisoner, and did not only vant himself to be free, but also presumptuously assumed power over the life and death of his master: neither would any man allow the excuses of a those, because he had continued in that grade 30. yeers, or for that he had beene bred in that course, of life by his Father, if hee presumed by his long continuance in that function to prescribe for the lawfulnesse, but rather the longer he had continued in his wickednesse, the more grievous should be his punishment: in like manner, the Prince is altogether unsupportable, which because he succeeds a Tyrant, or hath kept the people (by whose suffrages he holds the Crown) in a long slavery, or hath suppressed the Officers of the kingdom (who should be protectors of the publike liberty) that therefore presumes, that what he affects is lawfull for him to effect, and that his will is not to be restrained or corrected by any positive Law whatsoever. For prescription in tyranny detracts nothing from the right of the people; nay it rather much aggravates the Princes on rages. But what if the Peers and principal officers of the Kingdom makes themselves parts with the King? What if betraying the Publique, cause the yoak of tyranny upon the peoples neck? shall it follow, that by this prevatication and treason the authority [65] is devolved into the King? Does this detract any thing from the aight of the peoples liberty, or does it adde any licencious power to the King? Let the people thank themselves, say you, who relyed on the distoyall loyalty of such men.

But I answer, that these officers are indeed those Protectors whose principall care and study should be that the people be maintained in the free and absolute fruition of their goods and liberty. And therefore, in the same manner as if a treacherous Advocate for a sum of money should agree to betray the cause of his Client into the hands of his Adversary, which he ought to have defended, hath not power for all that to alter the course of justice, nor of a bad cause, to make a good one, although perhaps for a time he give some colour of it.

In like manner this conspiracy of the great ones, combined to ruine the inferiours cannot disanull the right of the people; in the meane season, those great ones incur the punishment that the same asors against Prevaricators: and for the people, the same Law allowes them to chuse another Advocate, and afresh to pursue their cause, as if it were then only to begin.

For if the people of Rome condemned their Captains and Generals of their Armies, because they capitulated with their Enemies to their disadvantage (although they were drawn to it by necessity, being on the point to be all overthrown) and would not be bound to performe the Souldiers capitulation: much lesse shall a free People be tyed to bear the yoak of thraldome, which is cast on them by those who should and might have prevented it; but being neither forced nor compelled did for their own particular gain willingly betray those that had committed their liberty to their custody.

Wherefore Kings were created.↩

Now seeing that Kings have been ever established by the people, and that they have had Associates joyned with them to contain them within the limits of their duties, the which Associates considered in particular one by one, are under the King and altogether in one intire Body are above him. We must consequently see wherefore first Kings were established, and what is principally their duty. We usually esteem a thing just and good when it attains to the proper end for which it is ordained.

In the first place every one consents, That men by nature loving liberty, and having servitude, born rather to command, then obey, have not willingly admitted to be governed by another, and renounced as it were the priviledge of nature, by submitting themselves to the commands of others; [67] but for some speciall and great profit that they expected from it. For as Esope sayes, That the horse being before accustomed to wander as his pleasure, would never have received the bit into his mouth, nor the Rider on his back, but that he hoped by that means to overmatch the Bull: neither let us imagine, that Kings were chosen to apply to their own proper use, the goods that are gotten by the sweat of their Subjects; for every man loves and cherisheth his owne, They have not received the power and authority of the People to make it serve as a Pandar to their pleasures. for ordinarily, the inferiours hate, or at least envietheir superiours.

Let us then conclude, that they are established in this place to maintain by justice, and to defend by force of Armes, both the publike State and perticular persons from all dammages and outrages, wherefore Saint Augustine saith, Those are properly called Lords and Masters A [...] ig lib. 16 de civit. dei, c. 15. which provide for the good and profit of others, as the husband for the wife, Fathers for their children. They must therefore obey them that provide for them; although indeed to speak truly, those which governe in this manner, may in a sort be said to serve those, whom they command over.

For, as sayes the same Doctor, they command not for the desire of dominion, but for the duty they owe to provide for the good of those that are subjected to them: nor affecting any Lord like domineering, but with charity and singular affection, desiring the welfare of those that are committed to them.

Seneca in 81 Epistle sayes, That in the Golden Age, wise men onely governed Kingdoms, they kept themselves within the bounds of moderation, and preserved the meanest from the oppression of the greatest. They preserved and disswaded, according as it advantaged or disadvantaged, the publike profit; by their wisdome, they furnished the Publique with plenty of all necessaries, and by their discretion prevented scarcity, by their valour and courage they expelled dangers by their many benefits they encreased and inriched their Subjects, they pleaded not their duty, in making pompeous shews, but in well-governing their People. No man made tryall what hee was able to do against them, because every one received what he was capable of from them, &c.

Therefore, then to govern is nothing else but to provide for. These proper ends of commanding, being far the Peoples commodity; the only duty of Kings and Emperours is to provide for the peoples good, The Kingly dignity to speak properly is not a Title of Honour, but a [67] weighty and burden some offices It is not a discharge or vacation from affaires, to run a licentions course of liberty, but a charge and vocation to all endustrious employments, for the service of the Commonwealth, the which hath some glimpse of honour withit, because in those first and Golden Ages, no man would have tasted of such continuall troubles, if they had not beene sweetned with some relish of honour: insomuch, as there was nothing more true, then that which was commonly said in those times. If every man knew with what turmoyles and troubles the Royall wreath was wrapt withall, no man would vouchsafe to take it up, although it lay at his feet.

When therefore that these words of mine and thine entred into the Meum & tuum. world, and that differences fell amongst fellow Citizens, touching the propriety of goods and wars amongst neighbouring people about the right of their Confines, the people bethought themselves to have recourse to some one, who both could and should take order that the poore were not oppressed by the rich, nor the Patriots wronged by strangers.

Now as wars and suits encreased, they chose some one, in whose wisdome and valour they reposed most confidence. See then wherefore Kings were created in the first Ages to wit, to administer justice at home, and to be Leaders in the Wars abroad, and not only to repulse the incursions of the Enemy but also to reprosse and hinder the devastation and spoyling of the Subjects and their goods at home; but above all, to expell and drive away all devices and debanchments farre from their Dominions.

This may be proved by all Histories, both divine and prophane For the people of God they had at first no other King but God himselfe, who dwelt in the middest of them, and gave answer from betweene the Cherubins, appointed extraordinarily Judges and Captaines for the wars, by meanes whereof, the people thought they had no need of Lieutenants, being honoured by the continuall presence of their Soveraign King.

Now when the people of God began to be a weary of the injustice of the Sons of Samuel, on whose old age they durst no longer rely, they demanded a King after the manner of other people, saying to 1 Sam. 8 5. [...] &. 20. Samuel Give us a King as other people have that he may judge us. There is touched the first and principal point of the duty of a King, a litle after they are both mentioned We will have (said they) a King over us like other Nations. Our King shall judge us, and go in and out before us, & lead our Armies. To do justice is alwaps set in the first place, for so much as it is an ordinary & perpetuall thing: but wars are extraordinary, and happen as it were casually.

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Wherefore, Aristotle sayes that in the time of the Herold, all Kings Arist. de pol. l. 3. c. 11. were Judges and Captains. For the Lavedemonian Kings, they in his time also had Soveraign authority only in the Army, and that confined also to the commandements of the Ephores.

In like manner, the Medes who were ever in perpetuall quarrels amongst themselves, at the length chose Deolces for their Judge, who Herod. l. 1. had carryed himself well in the deciding of some particular differences; presently after they made him King, and gave him Officers and Guards, that he might more easily suppresse the powerfull and insolent.

Cicero saith, that anciently all Kings were established to administer justice, and that their institution and that of the Laws, had one and the same end, which was, that Equity and Right might be duly rendered to all men the which may be verified by the propriety of the words almost in all languages. Kings are called by the Latins, Reges a regendo, for that they must rule and govern the limits and bounds, both of the publike and particulars. The names of Emperours, Princes, and Dukes have relation to their conduct The English word KING is derived from the Ronigen, which signifies either fortitude or wisdome. in the wars, and principall places in Combats, and other places of Command. Likewise the Greekes call them in their Language, Basiles, Archa, Hegemones, which is to say, props of the people, Princes, Conductors. The Germans and other Nations use all significant names, and which expresse, that the duty of a King consists not in making glorious Paradoes: but that it is an office of a weighty charge and continuall care. But in briefe, the Poet Homer calls Kings the Judges of Cities, and in describing of Hom. lib. 1. Head. Ovid. l. 6 meta. Agamemnon, he calls him wise, strong, and valiant. As also, Ovid speaking of Erichtheus, sayes, that Iustia elubi [...] [...] alid [...] sne p [...]enti [...] s armis. it was hard to know, whether Justice or Valour were more transparent in him: in which these two Poets seemes exactly to have described the duties of Kings and Princes. You see what was the Custome of the Kings of the Heathen Nations; after whose examples, the Jewes demanded and established their Kings.

The Queen of Sheba said also to Solomon, that God had made him 2 chron. 9. 8. Wisdome, 9. 7. King over them to do judgment and Justice.

And Solomon himself speaking to God, saith. Thou hast chosen me to be a King over thy People, and a Judge of thy Sonnes and Daughters.

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For this cause also the good Kings, as David, Iosephar, and others, being not able in their own persons to determine all the suits and differences of their Subjects (although in the causes of greatest importance they received an appeal alwayes to themselves, as appears in Samuel) 2 Sam. 15. 2. 1 chrou. 23. 4. & 26, 29 2 Chron. 19. It Rom. 13. had ever above all things a speciall care, to establish in all places just and discreet Judges, and principally still to have an eye to the right administration of justice, knowing themselves to carry the sword, as well to chastise wicked and unjust Subjects, as to repulse forreigne Enemies.

Briefly, as the Apostles sayes, The Prince is ordained by God for the good and profit of the people, being armed with the sword to defend the good from the violence of the wicked, and when he dischargeth his duty therein all men owe him honour and obedience.

Seeing then that Kings are ordained by God and established by no people, to procure and provide for the good of those which are committed unto them, and that this good or profit be principally expressed in two things, to wit, in the administration of justice to their subjects, and in the managing of armes for the repulsing their ennemies: certainly, wee must inferre and conclude from this that the Prince which applies himself to nothing but his peculiar profits, and pleasures, or to those ends which most readily conduce thereunto, which contemnes and perverts all lawes, which useth his subjects more cruelly then the barbarest enimy would do, he may truly and easly be called a Tyrant, and that those which in this manner govern their Kingdomes, be they of never so large an extent, are more properly unjust pillagers and boose-haiers then lawfull governours.

Whether the Kings be above the law.↩

Wee must here yet proceed a little further: for it is demanded whether the King which presides in the administration of justice have power to resolue and determine businesse according to his owne will and pleasure? most the Kings be subject to the law, or doth the law depend August. 1. 4. c. 4. & 6. to [...] ivita Dei. upon the King; the law (saith an ancient) is respected by those which otherwayes contemne vertue for it inforceth obedience and ministreth conduct in warfaring and gives viger and luster to justice and equity. Pausanias the Spartane will answer in a word, that it becomes lawes to direct, and men to yeeld obedience to their authority, Agositaus King of Sparta says that all commanders must obey the commandements of the lawes, But it shall not be amisse to cla [...]ume this matter a little higher, when people began for justice to seek to determine their differences, if they met with any private man that did [70] justly appoint them they were satisfied with it, now for so much as such men were rarely and with much difficulty met withall, and for that the judgements of kings received as lawes were oftentimes found contrary and difficult, then the Magistrates and others of great wisdome invented lawes, which might speak to all men in one and the same voice. This being done it was expressly injoyned to kings that they shold be the gardiens and administrators, And somtimes also for so much as the lawes could not fore, see the perticularities of actions to resolve exactly it was permitted, the king to supply this defect, by the same naturall equity by which the lawes were drawn, and for feare least they should go against law the people appointed them from time to time associates, counsellors, of whom we have formerly made mention, wherefore there is nothing which exemples the King from obedience which he owes to the law, which he ought to acknowledge as his Lady and Mistris esteeming nothing can become him worse then that feminine of which Iurinall speakes; Sic volo, Sic jubeo, sic pro ratione voluntas. I will, I command, my will shall serve instead of reason, neither should they think their authority the lesse because they are confind to laws, for seeing the law is a divine gift comming from above, which human societies are happily governed and adddressed to their best and blesseddest end; those Kings are as ridiculous and worthy of contempts, which repute it a dishonour to conform them selves to law, as those surveyors which think themselvs disgraced, by using of a rule, a compasse, a chaine, or other instruments, which men understanding the art of surveying are accustomed to do, or a Pilot which had rather sayle, according to his fantasie and imagination, then steere his course by his needle and Sea lard, who can double, but that it is a thing more profitable & cōveniēt to obey the law, then the King who is but one man? the law is the soul of a good king it give him motion sence and life. The King is the Organ and as it were the body by which the Law displays her forces exercises her function, and expresses her conceptions; now it is a thing much more reasonable to obey the soule, then the body, the law is the wisdom of divers sages; recollected in few words, but many see more cleere and further then one alone, It is much better to follow the Law then any one mans opinion be he never so acute, the law is reason and wisdom it self, free from all perturbation, not subject to be moved with choller, ambition, hate, or acceptances of persons; Intreaties nor threates cannot make it bow nor, bend on the contrary a man though inducd with reason suffers him selfe to be lead and transported with anger, desire of revenge, [71] and other passions which perplex him in such sort, that he looseth his understanding because being composed of reason and disordered affections he cannot so containe himself but some times his passions becomes his Master Accordingly wee see that Valentinian a good Emperour, permits those of the Empire to have low wines at once, because he was misled by that impure affection. Because Cambises the sonne of Gyms became inamored of his own sister he would therefore have marriages betweene brother and sister, be approved and held lawfull Cabades King of the Persians prohibites the punnishment of adulteries we must looke for such lawes every day if we will have the law subjects to the King. To come to our purpose the law is an, understanding mind or rather an obstacle of many understandings the mind being the seal of all the intelligence faculties is (if I may so terme it) a parcell of divinity: in so much as he who obeys the law seemes to obey God, and receive him for Arbitrator of the matters in controversie.

But on the contrary, insomuch as man is composed of this divine: understanding, and of a number of unruly passions; so losing himselfe in that brutishnesse, as he becomes void of reason: and being in that condition, he is no longer a man, but a beast; he then which desires rather Aristo. lib. de mundo & lib 3 poli. ca [...] . to obey the King, then the Law, seemes to preser the commandement of a heast before that of God.

And furthermore, though Aristotle were the Tutor of Alexander, yet he confesseth, that the divinity cannot so properly be compared to to any thing of this life, as to the ancient Lawes: of well-governed States: he that prefers the Commonwealth applyes himself to Gods Ordinance: but he that leans to the Kings fancies, instead of Law, prefers brutish sensuality before well-ordered discretion. To which also the Prophers seemes to have respect, who in some places describe these great Empires, under the representation of ravening Beasts. But to go on, is not he a very Beast. who had rather have for his guide a blind and mad man then he which sees both with the eyes of the body, and mind, a beast rather then god. Whence it comes, that though kings as saith Aristotle, for a while, at the first, commanded without restraint of Laws, yet presently after civilized people reduced them to a lawfull condition, by binding them to keep and observe the Lawes: and for this unruly absolute authority it remained only amongst, those which commanded over barbarons Nations.

He sayes afterwards, that this absolute power was the next degree to plain tyrannie, and he had absolutely called it tyrannie, had not [62] these beasts like Barbarians, willingly subjected themselves unto it. But it will be replyed, that it is unworthy the majesty of Kings, to have their wills bridled by Laws: but I will say that nothing is more royall then to have our unruly desires ruled by good lawes.

It is much pitty to be restrained from that which we would doe, it is much more worse to will that which we should not do, but it is the worst of all to do that which the Laws forbid.

I hear me thinks a certain Furionius tribune of the people which opposed the passing of a Law that was made against the excesse which then reigned in Rome, saying. My Masters you are bridled, you are idle and settered with the rude bonds of servitude, your liberty is lost, a Law is laid on you, that commands you to be moderate: to what purpose is it to say, you are free, since you may not live in what excesse of pleasure you like. This is the very complaint of many Kings at this day, and of their Mignior and Flatterers.

The Royall Majesty is abolished, if they may not turn the kingdom topsie turvie at their pleasure Kings may go shake their eares, if Laws must be observed.

Peradventure, it is a miserable thing to live, if a mad man may not be suffered to kill himself when he will.

For what else do those things which violate and abolish Lawes, without which, neither Empires, no nor the very Societies of freebooters Cicero I. [...] . ossicii. can at all subsist?

Let us then reject these detestable falsinesse and impious vanities of the Court-Marmonsists, which make kings gods, and receive their sayings as Oracles, and which is worse are so shamelesse, as to perswade Kings, that nothing is just or equitable of it selfe, but takes its true forme of justice or injustice, according as it pleaseth the King to ordain, as if he were some god, which could neither erre nor sinne at all. Certainly, all that which Gods will is iust, and therefore, suppose it is Gods will, but that must be just with the Kings will, before it is his will. For it is not just because the King hath appointed it, but that King is just which appoints that to be held for just, which is so of it self.

We will not then say as Anaxarchus did to Alexander, much perplexed for the death of his friend Clitus, whom he had killed with his own hands, to wit, that Themis the Goddesse of Justice, fits by Kings sides, as she does by Jupiters, to approve and confirme whatsoever to them shal seem good: but rather, she sits as President over kingdoms, to severely chastise those Kings which wrong or violate the majesty [63] of the Laws, we can no wayes approve that saying of Thrasimacus the Chaldoncan, That the profit and pleasure of Princes, is the rule by which all Laws are defined: but rather, that right must limit the profit of Princes, and the Laws restrain their pleasures. And instead of approving that which that villainous woman said to Caracalla, that whatsoever he desired was allowed him: We will maintain that nothing is lawful but what the law permits.

And absolutely rejecting that detestable opinion of the same Caracalla, that Princes gives Laws too hers, but receive none from any; we will say that in all kingdomes well established, the King receives the Laws from the people, the which he ought carefully to consider and maintain, and whatsoever, either by force or fraud he does, in prejudice of them must alwayes be reputed unjust.

Kings receive Lawes from the people.↩

These may be sufficiently verified by examples. Before there was a King in Israel, God by Moses prescribed to him both sacred and evill Deut. 17 Ordinances, which he should have perpetually before his eyes. but after that Saul was elected and established by the people, Samuel delivered it to him written, to the end, he might carefully observe it neither were the succeeding Kings received before they had sworn to keepe those Ordinances.

The Ceremony was this, that together with the setting of the crown on the Kings head, they delivered into his hands the Book of the Testimony, which some understand, to be the right of the people of the Land, others the Law of God, according to which he ought to govern the people. Cirus acknowledging himself conservator of his Countries Lawes, obliegeth himself to opposE any man that would offer to infringe them: and at his mauguration tyes himself to observe them, although some flatterers tickled the eares of his Son Cambises, that all things were lawfull for him.

The Kings of Sparta whom Aristotle calls lawfull Princes, did every moneth renew their oaths, promising in the hands of the Ephori, Zeneph. de Reb. Laced. procures for the kingdome, to rule according to those Lawes which they had from Lieurgus.

Hereupon it being asked Archidamus, the Son of Zeuxidamus, who were the Governours of Sparta, he answered the Laws, and the lawfull Magistrates. [64] and least the lawes might grow into contempt, these people bragged. that they received them from heaven, and that they were inspired from above, to the end that men might beleeve that their determinations were from God and not from man, the Kings of Egypt did in nothing vary from the tennour of the lawes, and confessed that their principall felicity consisted in the obedience they yeelded to them. Romulus at the institution of the Roman kingdome made this agreement with senators, the people should make lawes and he would take both for himselfe and others to see them observed and kept Antiochus the third of that name King of Asia writ unto all the Cities of his [...] of lib 5. ca. 6. kingdome, That if the letters sent unto them in his name there were any thing found repugnant to the lawes, they should beleeve they were no act of the Kings, and therefore yeeld no obedience unto them. Now although some Citizens say, that by decree of Senate the Emperour Augustus was declared to be exempt from obedience to Lawes: yet notwithstanding Theodosius, and all the other good and reasonable Emperours, have professed that they were bound to the Lawes, lest what had been extorted by violence, might be acknowledged and received instead of Law. And for Augustus Caesar in so much as the Roman Common wealth was en thralled by his power and violence she could say nothing freely but that she had lost her freedome. And because they durst not call Augustus a tyrant the senate said he was exempt from all obedience to the lawes, which was in effect as much as if they plainely should have said, the Emperour was an outlaw. The same right hath ever beene of force in all well governed states and Kingdomes of Christendome.

For neither the Emperour the King of France, nor the Kings of Spain, England Polander, Hungarie, and all other lawfull Princes, as the Areh Dukes of Austriae Dukes of Brabante, Earles of Flanders, and Holland, nor other Princes are not recreated to the government of their estates before they have promised to the Electours, Peeres, Palatins, Lords, Barons, and Governours, that they will render to every one right according to the lawes of the Country, yea so strictly that they cannot alter or innovate any thing contrary to the priviledges of the countries without the consent of the townes and provinces, If they do it, they are no lesse guilty of rebellion against the lawes then the people is in their kind if they refuse obedience, when they command according to law; briefly lawfull princes receive the lawes from the people as well as the crown in lieu of honour, and the [65] scepter in liue of power, which they are bound to keep and maintain and therein repose their chiefest glory.

If the Prince may make new lawes.↩

What then? shall it not be lawfull for a Prince to make new lawes and abrogate the old? seeing it belongs to the King not onely to advise that nothing be done neither against nor to defraud the lawes: but also that nothing be wanting to them or any thing to much in them; briefly that neither age nor lapse of time do abolish or entombe them: if there be any thing to abridge, added, or taken away from them, it is his duty to assemble the estates, and to demand their advise and resolution, without presuming to publish any things before the whole have beene, first duly examined and approved by them, after the law is once ennacted and published, there is no more dispute to be made above it, all men owe obedience to it, and the prince in the first place to teach other men their duty, and for that all men are easier led by example then by precepts, the prince must necessarily expresse his willingnesse to observe the lawes or else by what equity can he require obedience in his subjects to that which he himselfe contemnes.

For the difference which is betwixt Kings and subjects ought not to consist in impurity, but in equity and justice. And therefore although Augustus was esteemed to be exempt by the decree of the Senate, notwithstanding reproving of a young man that had broken the Iulian law concerning adultery, he boldly replyed to Augustus that he himself had transgressed the same laws which condemnes adulteries, the Emperour acknowledged his fault and for grief forbore to late. So convenient a thing it is in nature to practise by example Demoth in oratio con. Timocrat. that which we would teach by precipt.

The Lawgicer Solon was wont to compare laws to mony, for they maintain human societies as many preserves traffick, neither improperly then if they Kings may not lawfully or at the least heretofore could not mannace or imbase good mony without the consent of the Common wealth: much more lesse can he have power to make and Innocen. 3. ad regem. Fam. in ca. quado d [...] [...] ure juando. unmake lawes, without the which, not Kings, nor subjects, can cohabite in security but must beforct to live brutishly in caves and deserts like wild beasts wherefore also the Emperour of Germany esteeme it needful to make some law for the good of the empire, first he demands the advise of the estates if it be there approved the Princes, Barons & Deputies of the towns signed and then the law is ratified for he solemnly swears to keep the laws already made, and to introduce no new ones without a generall consent. [66] There is a Law in Poloniae, which hath beene renewed in the yeere, 1454. and also in the yeere 1538. and by those it is decreed, that no new Lawes shall be made, but by a common consent, nor no where else, but in the Generall Assembly of the Estates.

For the Kingdome of France, where the Kings are thought to have greater authority, then in other places, anciently all Lawes were onely made in the Assembly of the Estates, or in the ambulatory Parliament. But since this Parliament hath been Sedentary, the Kings edicts are not received as authentically, before the Parliament hath approved them.

Whereas on the contrary, the decrees of this Parliament, where the Law is defective, have commonly the power and effect of Law. In the Kingdomes of England, Spain, Hungary, and others, they yet enjoy in some sort their ancient priviledges.

For, if the welfare of the Kingdom depends of the observation of the Laws, and the Lawes are enthralled to the pleasore of one man? is it not most certain, that there can be no permanent stability in that government? Must it not then necessarily come to passe, that if the King (as some have been) be infected with Lunacie, either continually or by intervales, that the whole State fall inevitably to ruine? But if the Laws be superiour to the King, as we have already proved, and that the King be tyed in the same respect of obedience to the Lawes, as the Servant is to his Master who will be so senslesse, that will not rather obey the Law, then the King? or will not readily yeeld his best assistance against those that seek to violate or infringe them? Now seeing that the King is not Lord over the Lawes, let us examine how far his power may be justly extended in other things.

Whether the Prince have power of life and death over his Subjects?↩

The Minnions of the Court hold it for an undeniable Maxime, That Princes have the same power of life and death over their Subjects, as anciently, Masters had over their slaves, and with these false imaginations have so bewitched Princes, that many, although they put not in ure with much rigour this imaginary right, yet they imagine, that they may lawfully do it, and in how much they defist from the practise thereof, insomuch, that they quit and relinquisite of their right and due.

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But we affirme on the contrary, that the Prince is but as the Minister and Executor of the Law, and may only unsheath the Sword against those whom the Law hath condemned; and if he do otherwise, he is no more a King, but a Tyrant; no longer a Judge, but a Malefactor, and instead of that honourable Title of Conservatour, he shal be justly branded with that foule terme of Violator of the Law and Equity.

We must here first of all take into our consideration the foundation on which this our disputation is built, which we have resolved into this head, That Kings are ordained for the benefit and profit of the publike State; this being granted, the question is soon discust: For who will believe that men sought and desired a King, who upon any sudden motion might at his pleasure cut their throats: or which in colour or revenge might when he would take their heads from their shoulders.

Briefly, who (as the wise man sayes) carryes death at his tongues end we must not think so idely.

There is no man so vain, which would willingly that his welfare should depend of anothers pleasure; Nay, with much difficulty will any man trust his life in the hands of a friend or a brother, much lesse of a stranger be he never so worthy. Seeing that Envie, Hare, and Rage did so far transport Athanas and Ajax beyond the bounds of reason, that the one killed his children, the other fayling to effect his desire in the same kind against his friends and companions, turned his sury and murtherous intent, and acted the same revenge upon himself. Now it being naturall to every man to love himselfe, and to seek the preservation of his own life.

In what assurance I pray you would any man rest to have a Sword continually hanging over his head by a small threed, with the point towards him? Would any mirth or jollity relish in such a continuall affright? Can you possible make choyce of a more slender threed then to expose your life and welfare into the hands and power of a man so mutable that changes with every puft of wind. Briefly, which almost a thousand times a day, shakes off the restraint of reason and discretion, and yeelds himself slave to his own unruly and disordered passions.

Can there be hoped or imagined any profit or advantage so great or so worthy, which might equalize or counterpose this feare or this danger? Let us conclude then, that it is against Delinquents onely, [68] whom the mouth of the Law hath condemned, that Kings may draw forth the Sword of Authority.

If the King may pardon those whom the Law condemnes?↩

But because life is a thing precious, and to be favoured peradventure it will be demanded, whether the King may not pardon and absolve those whom the Law hath condemned.

I answer, no Otherwise this cruell pitty would maintain Theeves, Robbers Murtherers Ravisters, Poysoners Sorcerers, & other plagues of Mankind, as we may reade Tyrants have done here afore in many places, and to our wofull experience, wee may yet see at this present time; And therefore, the Beast of Law in this kind, will by impurity much encreise the number of offendors.

So that he which received the Sword of Authority from the Law to promise offence; will arme offenders therewith against the Lawes, and put himselfe the Woolfe into the Fold, which hee ought to have warranted from their ravenous outrages.

But for so much that it may chance in some occasions, that the Law being mute, may have need of a speaking Law and that the King being in some cases the aptest Expositor, a king for the Rule of his actions Equity and Reason, which as the soule of the Soule may so cleere the intention thereof, as where the offence is rather commited against the words, then the intendment of the Law, hee may free the innocent Offendor from the guilt thereof, because a just and equitable Exposition of the Law may in all good reason be taken for Law it selfe, as neerest concurring with the intention of the Law makers.

Notwithstanding least passion should preposse the place of reason I. Nomims & res S. verbum ex l [...] ge. D. de verb signif. Kings should in this fashion themselves to the ordinary practise of the Emperour, severns not to determine absolutely any thing before it were maturely discussed by upright and discreet men in that facultie.

And so the King may rigorously punish the Murtherer; and yet notwithstanding pardon him, which casually, and without any such purpose killeth one. He may put to death the Thiefe, and yet pardon that man which in his own defence killeth him that would have robbed him. Briesly in all other occurrences hee may distinguish, as being established Aroitrator and Newter, Chaunce medly from malice, fore-thought a good purpose from the Rigour of the Law, without favouring at any time Malice or Treason, Neither can the [77] omission of this duty gain to him any true esteeme of mercifull: for certainly that Shepherd is much more pitifull which kils the Woolf, then he which lets him escape: the clemencie of that King is more commendable which commits the malefactor to the hangman, then he which delivers him; By putting to death the murtherer, many Innocents are delivered from danger: whereas by suffering him escape, both he and others through hope of the like impunitie, are made more audacious to perpetrate farther mischief, so that the immediate act of saving one Delinquent, arms many hands to murther divers Innocents; there is therefore both truly mildnesse in putting to death some, and as certainly cruelty in pardoning of others. Therefore as it is permitted the King, being as it were Custos of the Law, in some cases to interpret the words thereof: so in all well ordered Kingdoms, it is enjoyned the Counsell of State, and their duty obligeth them to examine the Kings interpretation, and to moderate both his seleritie and facilitle. If through the corruption and weaknes of men this have not been so really and throughly observed as it ought: yet notwithstanding the right alwayes remains intire, and there wants onely integritie and courage in the parties to make it effectuall.

But not to heap up too many examples in a matter so manifestly clear, it hath been in this manner practised in the Realm of France. For we have there oftentimes seen those put to death, to whom the King had granted his Charter of pardon: and those pardoned, whom He commanded should be put to death. And sometimes offences committed in the Kings presence remitted, because there was no other witnesse but himself. The which happened in the time of Hen: 2. to a certain stranger, who was accused by the King himself of a grievous offence. If an offendor by the intercession of friends have his pardon granted by the king, the Chancellor upon sufficient cause may cancell it: if the Chancellor connive, yet must the crimined present it before the Judges, who ought not onely carefully to consider, whether the Pardon were gotten by surreptitious or indirect means, but also if it be legall, and in due form: neither can the De inquent that hath obtained his Charter of Pardon make use of it, untill first he appeal in publick Court-bare headed, and on his knees plead it, submitting himself prisoner untill the Judges have maturely [78] weighed and considered the reasons that induced the King to grant him his pardon: If they be found insufficient, the offendor must suffer the punishment of the Law, as if the King had not granted him any pardon: but if his pardon be allowed, he ought not so much to thank the King, as the equitie of the Law which saved his life. The manner of these proceedings was excellently ordained, both to contain the King within the limits of equitie, lest being armed with publick Authoritie, he should seek to revenge his own particular spleen, or out of fancie or partialitie remit the wrongs and outrages committed against the publick safetie: as partly also to restrain an opinion in the Subject, that any thing could be obtained of the King which might prejudice the Laws. If these things have been ill observed in our times, notwithstanding that which we have formerly said, remains alwaies certain, that it is the Laws which have power over the lives and deaths of the Inhabitants of a Kingdom, and not the King which is but Administrator and Conservator of the Laws.

Subjects are the Kings Brethren, and not his slaves.↩

For truly neither are the Subjects, as it is commonly said, the Kings slaves, or bond men: being neither prisoners taken in the wars, nor bought for money: but as considered in one intire body they are Lords, as we have formerly proved; so each of them in particular ought to be held as the Kings Brothers and kinsmen. And to the end that we think not this strange, let us hear what God himself saith when he prescribes a law to Kings; That they lift Deuc. 17. 15. 20. Barto. in tract. de regi [...] n. civit. not their heart above their brethren from amongst whom they were chosen. Whereupon Bartolus a famous Lawyer, who lived in an age that bred many Tyrants, did yet draw this conclusion from that Law, that Subjects were to be held and used in the qualitie and condition of the Kings brethren, and not of his slaves. Also King David was not ashamed to call his Subjects his brethren. 1 Chron 28. 2 The ancient Kings were called Abimelech, an Hebrew word which fignifies, My father the King. The Almighty and all good God, of whose great gentlenesse and mercie we are daily partakers, and very seldome feel his severitie, although we justly deserve it, yet is it alwayes mercifully mixed with compassion; whereby he teacheth Princes, his Lieutenants, that Subjects ought rather to be held in obedience by love, than by fear.

But lest they should except against me, as if I sought to trench [79] too much upon the Royall Authoritie, I verily beleeve it is so much the greater, by how much it is likely to be of longer continuance. For saith one, servile fear is a bad guardian, for that Authoritie Cicer. l, 2. offic. we desire should continue; for those in subjection hate them they fear, and whom we hate, we naturally wish their destruction: on the contrary, there is nothing more proper to maintain their Authority then the affection of their subjects, on whose love they may safeliest and with most securitie lay the foundation of their greatnesse. And therefore that Prince which governs his Subjects as brethren, may confidently assure himself to live securely in the midst of dangers: whereas he that useth them like slaves, must needs live in much anxietie and fear, and may well be resembled to the condition of that Master which remains alone in some desart in the midst of a great troop of slaves; for look how many slaves any hath, he must make account of so many Enemies, which almost all Tyrants that have been killed by their Subjects have experimented: whereas on the contrary, the Subjects of good Kings are ever as solicitously carefull of their safetie, as of their own welfare.

To this may have reference that which is read in diverse places Plato lib. 8. de repub. Seneca. Aliud est servire, aliud obedire: aliud libertas, aliud licentia. L. 5. D. de parricid. L. 2. ad leg. Corneliam de sicar. vbi vlp. L. 1. c. de parricid. of Aristotle, and was sayd by Agasicles King of Sparta, That Kings command as fathers over their children, and Tyrants as masters over their slaves, which we must take in the same sence, that the civilian Martianus doth, to wit, that paternall authority consists in piety, and not in rigor, for that which was practised amongst the men of the accorne age, that fathers might sell, and put to death their children at their pleasure, hath no authority amongst Christians, yea the very Pagans which had any humanity, would not permit it to be practised on their slaves. Therefore then the father hath no power over the sons life, before first the Law have determined; it, otherwaise he offends the Law, Cornelius against privie murtherers, and by the Law Pompeius against Parricides, the father is no lesse guilty which kills the son, then the son which murthers the father: for the same occasion the Emperor Adrian banished into an Island which was the usuall punishment for notorious offenders, a father which had slain his son, a hurting of whom he had entertained a jealous opinion for his mother in Law, concerning servants or slaves, we are admonished in holy writ to use them like brethren, and by humane [80] constitutions as hierlings, or mercinaries.

By the Civill Law of the Egyptians, and Romans, and by the Ecclesiast. 33. Cicer. lib. 3. offici. Diod. Sic. lib. 2. C. 2. L. 1 D. de his qui sunt sui, vel. al. juris. constitutions of the Antonims, the Master is aswell liable to punishment which hath killed his own slave, as he which killed another mans. In like manner the Law delivers from the power of the Master the slave whom in his sicknesse he hath altogether neglected, or hath not afforded convenient food, and the infranchilde slave whose condition was somewhat better, might for any aparent injurie bring his action against his Patron. Now seeing there is so great difference between slaves, and lawfull children, betwixt Lords and fathers, and notwithstanding heretofore it was not permitted amongst the heathen, to use their slaves cruelly: What shall we say, pray you, of that father of the people, which cries out tragically with Aireus, I will devoure my Children? In what esteeme shall we hold that Prince which takes such pleasure in the massacring his Subjects, (condemned without being ever heard) that he dispatched many thousand of them, in one day, & yet is not glutted with blood: Briefly who after the example of Caligula (surnamed the Phaeton of the world) wisheth that all his people had but one head that he might cut it off at one blow? Shall it not be lawfull to implore the assistance of the Law against such furious madnesse, and to pull from such a Tyrant the sword which he received to maintaine the Law, and defend the good, when it is drawn by him onely for rapine and ruine?

Whether the goods of the people belong to the King,↩

But to proceed, let us now see whether the King whom we have alreadie proved, hath not power over the lives of his Subjects; is not at the least Lord over their Goods. In these dayes there is no language more common in the Courts of Princes, then of those who say all is the Kings. Whereby it follows, that in exacting any thing from his Subjects he takes but his own, and in that which he leaves them, he expresseth the care he hath that they should not be altogether destitute of meanes to maintaine themselves; and this opinion hath gained so much power in the minds of some Princes, that they are not ashamed to say that the paines, sweat and industrie of their Subjects is their proper revenue, as if their miserable Subjects onely kept beasts [81] to till the earth for their insolent masters profit, and luxurie. And indeed, the practise at this day is just in this manner, although in all right & equity it ought to be contrarie, now we must alwaies remember that Kings were created for the good and profit of the people, and that those (as Aristotle sayes) which indeavour and seeke the commoditie of the people, are trusty Kings: whereas those that make their own private ends and pleasures, the onely butt and aime of their desirers are truly Tyrants.

It being then so that every one loves that which is his owne, yea that many covet that which belongs to other men, is it any thing probable that men should seek a master to give him francklie al that they had long laboured for, and gained with the sweat of their browes? may we not rather imagine, that they chose such a man on whose integrity they relied for the administring of justice equally both to the poore and rich, and which would not assume all to himselfe, but rather maintaine every one in the fruition of his own goods? or who like an unprofitable Drone should suck the fruit of other mens labours, but rather preserve the house, for those whose industrie justly deserved it? briefly, who instead of extorting from the true owners their goods, would see them defended from all ravening oppressors? What I pray you skills it sayes the poore Countrie man, whether the King, or the enemy make havok of my goods, since through the spoile thereof I and my poore familie die for hunger? what imports it whether a stranger or home-bred caterpiller ruine my estate, and bring my poore fortune to extream beggery? Whether a forrein Souldier, or a Sicophant Courtier by force or fraud, make me alike miserable? Why shall he be accounted a barbarous enemy, if thou be a friendly Patriot? Why he a Tyrant if thou be a King? Yea certainly by how much parracide is greater then manslaughter, by so much the wickednesse of a King, exceeds in mischiefe the violence of an enemy.

If then therefore in the creation of Kings, men gave not their own proper goods unto them, but onely recommended them to their protection; by what other right then, but that of free booters, can they challenge the propertie of other mens goods to themselves? Wherefore the Kings of Egypt were not (according to Law) at the first the Lords of particular mens estates, but were onely then when they were sold unto them for corne, and [82] yet may there well be question made of the validitie of that contract. Ahab King of Israel could not compell Naboth to sell him his Gen 45. 1 Kings. 21. 1. &c. vineyard; but rather if he had been willing, the Law of God would not permit it. The Roman Emperors which had an unreasonable power, could neither by right have done it. At this day there is with much difficultie any Kingdom to be found, where the meanest Subject may not sue the King, & where many times the L. venditor. 13. D. de com. praed. divid. King is not cast in the sute, which succeeding he must as well as others satisfie the judgment. And to this is not contrarie, although at the first veiw it seeme so, that which some of their most familiars have written of the Emperors. That by the civill Law all things were the Kings, and that Caesar was absolute Lord of all Seneca lib. de benef. 7. C. 4. 5. 6. things, they themselves expound this their opinion in this manner, that the dominion of all things belongs to the King, and the proprietie to the particular persons, insomuch as the one possesseth all by the right of commanding, the other by the Law of inheritance: We know, that it is a common saying amongst the Civilians, that if any make claime to a house, or a Ship, it followes not therefore that he can extend his right to all the furniture L. nave. 36. D. de evictionibus. or lading. And therefore a King may challenge and gaine right to the Kingdome of Germanie, France and England ▪ and yet notwithstanding he may not lawfully take any honest mans estate from him, but by manifest injustice, seeing that they are things diverse, and by Law distinguished, to be possessors of the whole, and of all the particular parts.

Whether the King be the proper owner of the Kingdom.↩

But the King, is he not Lord proprietor of the publick Revenue? We must handle this point somewhat more exactly then we did the former. In the first place, we must consider that the revenue of the publick Excheaquer is one thing, & the proper patrimonie of the Prince an other, of different nature are the goods of the Emperor, King, or Prince; to those of Antonius, Henrie, or Philip, those are properly the Kings, which he injoyes as King, those are Antonious his which he possesseth, as in the right of Antonius, the former he received from the people, the latter from those of his blood, as inheritor to them.

This distinction is frequent in the books of the civill Law, where there is a difference ever made, between the patrimonie of [83] the Empire, and that of the Emperor, the treasurie of Caesar is one L. bene à Zenone. C. de quod. praesc. C. unde quaest. Mag ib. 12. C. l. fiscus. D. de jurefisci. thing, and the Exchequer of the Common-wealth another, and both the one and the other have their severall procurers, there being diverse dispensers of the sacred and publick distributions, and of the particular & private expences, insomuch as he which as Emperor is preferred before a private man, in a grant by deed or chartell, may also sometime as Antonius give place to an inferiour person.

In like manner in the Empire of Germanie, the revenue of Ferdinand of Austria is one thing, and the revenue of the Emperor Ferdinand is another: the Empire, and the Emperor have their severall treasurers: as also there is difference in the inheritances which the Princes derive from the houses of their ancestors, and those which are annexed to the Electorall dignities. Yea amongst the Turks themselves, Selimus his gardens and patrimoniall lands are distinstuished from those of the publick, the one serving for the provision of the Sultans table, the other imploied onely about the Turquish affaires of State. There be notwithstanding Kingdomes as the French and English, and others in which the King hath no particular patrimony, but onely the publick which he received from the people, there this former distinction hath no place. For the goods which belongs to the Prince as a quaere. of what nature the ancient demeane is in England. private person there is no question, he is absolute owner of them as other particular persons are, and may by the civill Law sell, ingage, or dispose of them at his pleasure. But for the goods of the Kingdome, which in some places are commonly called the demeanes, the Kings may not be esteemed nor called in any sort whatsoever, absolute Lords Proprietors of them. For what if a man for the flocks sake have made thee Shepheard, doth it follow L. cum servus 39. Sec vlt. D. de leg. 1. l. universi. 9. & [...] . seq. C de fundo patrim. that thou hast libertie, to flea, pill, sell, and transport the Sheepe at thy pleasure? Although the people have established thee Judge, or Governour of a Citie, or of some Province, hast thou therefore power to alienate, sell, or play away that City or Province? And seeing that in alienating or passing away a Province, the people also are sold, have they raised thee to that authority to the end thou shouldest seperate them from the rest, or that thou shouldest prostitute and make them slaves to whom thou pleasest? Furthermore I demand if the Royall dignity be a patrimony, or an Office? If it be an Office, what Community hath [84] it with any propriety? If it be a Patrimony, is it not such a one that at least the paramount propriety remaines still in the people which were the doners? Briefly if the revenue of the Exchequer, or the demeanes of the Kingdome, be called the dowrie of the Common-wealth, and by good right, and such a dowrie whose dismembring or wasting, brings with it the ruine of the publick State, the Kingdom and the King, by what Law shall it be lawfull to alienate this dowrie? Let the Emperor Wencislaus be infatuated, the French King Charles the sixt lunatick, and give or sell the Kingdom, or part of it to the English, let Malcolme King of the Scots, lavishly dissipate the demeanes and consume the publick treasure, what followes for all this? Those which choose the King to withstand the invasions of forrein enemies, shall they through his madnesse & negligence be made the slaves of strangers, and those meanes & wealth, which would have secured them in the fruition of their own estates and fortunes? Shall they by the election of such a King be exposed to the prey & rapine of all commers, and that which particular persons have saved from their own necessities, and from those under their tutorship and government, (as it hapned in Scotland) to indew the Commonwealth with it, shall it be devoured by some Pandar or Broker, for unclean pleasures.

But if as we have often said, that Kings were constituted for the peoples use, what shall that use be, if it be perverted into abuse? What good can so much mischiefe, and inconvenience bring, what profit can come of such eminent and irreparable dammages and dangers? If (I say) in seeking to purchase my own liberty & wellfare, I ingage my selfe into an absolute thraldome, and willingly subject my self to anothers Yoake, and become a fettered slave to another mans unruly desires, therefore as it is imprinted in all of us by nature, so also hath it by a long custome been approved by all Nations, that it is not lawfull for the King by the counsel of his own fancie and pleasure, to diminish or waste the publick revenue; and those which have run a contrarie course, have even lost that happy name of a King, and stood dranded with the infamous title of a Tyrant.

I confesse that when Kings were instituted, there was of necessity means to be assigned for them, as well to maintain their Royall dignity, as to furnish the expence of their teaine and Officers. [85] Civility, and the wellfare of the publick State, seeme to require it, for it was the duty of a King to establish Judges in all places, who should receive no presents, nor sell Justice: and also to have power readie to assist the execution of their Ordinances, and to secure the waies from dangers, that commerce might be open, and free, &c. If there were likelihood of warrs to fortifie and put Garrisons into the frontier places, and to hold an Armie in the field, and to keep his Magazins well stored with munition. It is commonly said that peace cannot be well maintained without provision for wars, nor warrs managed without men, nor men kept in discipline without pay, nor mony gotten without Subsidies, and Tributes.

To discharge therfore the burden of the State in time of Peace, was the demeane appointed, and in time of warrs the tributes and imposts, yet so as if any extraordinary necessity required it, mony might be raised by Subsidies or other fitting meanes. The finall intendment of all, was ever the publick utility, in so much as he which converts any of these publick Revenues to his own private purposes, much more he which mispends them in anyunworthy or loose occasions, no way merits the name of a King, for the Prince (saith the Apostle) is the minister of God for the good of the people: and for that cause is Tribute paid unto them. Rom. 13.

This is the true originall cause of the customes, and imposts of the Romans, that those rich merchandises which were brought The same reason is recorded for all our imposts in England, with which a Navy was wont to be maintained at Sea. from the Indies, Arabia, Ethiopia, might be secured in their passage by land from theeves and robbers, & in their transportation by Sea from Pirats, insomuch as for their security, the Common-wealth maintained a Navy at Sea. In this rank we must put the Custome which was payd in the red Sea, and other Imposts of gates, bridges, and passages, for the securing of the great road waies, (therfore called the Pretorian consular, and the Kings high-waies,) from the spoile of theeves and free-booters. The care also of the reparation of bridges was referred to Commissaries deputed by the King, as appeares Archi in Ca [...] . fi qois Romi p [...]s & pereg. 24. q 3. B [...] lam c [...]. Sect. conventicula, de pace iure iurfir l. 2. D. ne quid in loto publ. viarum. by the Ordinance of Lewis the Courteous, concerning the 12. bridges over the River of Seyne, commanding also boats to be in a readinesse, to ferrie over passingers, &c.

For the tax laid upon Salt there was none in use in those times, the most of the Salt pits being injoyed by private persons, because it seemed that that which nature out of her own bountie presented unto men, ought no more to be inhaunsed by sale then [86] either the light, the aire, or the water, as a certaine King called L. magis puto D. de [...] ebus corum. Lycurgus in the lesser Asia, began to lay some impositions upon the Salt pits there, nature as it were impatiently bearing such a restraint of her liberality, the springs are said to drie up suddenly. Inv. Sat 4. Si quid palphurio, si credimus Armillato, Quicquid conspicuum palchrum q [...] ex aequo [...] e to [...] o est, Res fisci est ubicunque natat. Now although certain Marmousets of the Court would perswade us at this day, (as Juveral complained in his time) that the Sea affords nothing of worth, or good, which falls not within the compasse of the Kings Prerogative.

He that first brought this taxation into Rome, was the Censor Livius, who therefore gained the surname of Salter, neither was it done but in the Common-wealths extreame necessity. And in France King Philip the long, for the same reason obtained of the Estates the imposition upon Salt for five years onely, what turmoiles and troubles the continuance thereof hath bred every man knowes. To be breife, all Tributes were imposed, and continued for the provision of meanes and stipends for the men of war, so as to make a Province stipendarie or tributarie, was esteemed the same with militarie.

Behold wherefore Solomon exacted Tributes, to wit, to fortifie 1 King. 9. 15. the Towns, and to erect and furnish a publick magazine, which being accomplished, the people required of Reholoam to be freed Post [...] l li. 3 de rep Turc. from that burden. The Turks call the Tribute of the Provinces, the Sacred blood of the people and account it a most wicked crime to imploy it in any thing but the defence of the people. Wherefore by the same reason all that which the King conquers in warre belongs to the people, and nor to the King, because the people bore the charges of the war, as that which is gained by a factor accures to the account of his master. Yea and what advantage he gaines by marriage, if it belongs simplie and absolutely to his wife, that is acquired also to the Kingdom, for so much as it is to be presumed that he gained not that preferment in marriage in quality of Philip or Charles, but as he was King. On the contrarie, in like manner the Queens have interest of indowment in the estates which their husbands gained and injoyed before they attained the Crown, and have no title to that which is gotten after they are created Kings, because that is judged as the acquist of the Common purse, and hath no proper reference to the Kings private estate, which was so determined in France, betwixt Philip of Valoys, and his wife Jedne of Burgundie. But to the end that there be no money drawn from the people to [87] be imployed in private designes, and for particular ends and purposes; the Emperor swears, not to impose any Taxes or Tributes whatsoever, but by the authority of the Estates of the Empire. As much do the Kings of Polonia, Hungarie, and Denmarke promise: the English in like manner enjoy the same unto this day, by the Lawes of Henry the third, and Edward the first.

The French Kings in former times, imposed no Taxes but in the Assemblies, and with the consent of the three Estates; from thence sprung the Law of Philip of Valoys, that the people should not have any Tribute layd on them but in urgent necessity, and with the consent of the Estates. Yea and anciently after these monies were collected they were locked in coffers through every Diocesse and recommended to the speciall care of selected men (who are the same which at this day are called Esleus) to the end that they should pay the souldiers enroled, within the Towns of their Diocesses: the which was in use in other Countries, as namely in Flanders and other neighbouring Provinces. At this day, though many corruptions be crept in, yet without the consent and confirmation of the Parliament, no exactions may be collected, notwithstanding there be some Provinces which are not bound to any thing, without the approbation of the Estates of the Countrey, as Languedoke, Brittannie Province, Daulphinie, and some others. All the Provinces of the Low Countries have the same priviledges: finally lest the Exchequer devour all, like the spleen which exhales the spirits from the other members of the body. In all places they have confined the Exchequer within its proper bounds and limits. Seeing then it is most certaine that what hath been ordinarily and extraordinarily assigned to Kings, to wit, Tributes, Taxes, and all the demeanes which comprehend all customes both for importations, and exportations, forfeitures, amercements, royall escheates, confiscations, and other dews of the same nature, were configned into their hands for the maintainance and defence of the people, and the State of the Kingdom, insomuch as if these sinewes be cut, the people must needs fall to decay, and in demolishing these foundations the Kingdome will come to utter ruine. It necessarily follows, that he which layes impositions on the people onely to oppresse them, and by the publick detriment seeks private profit, and with their own swords kills his subject he truely is unworthy the name of a King: Whereas concrarily, a true King as he is [88] a carefull mannager of the publick affairs, so is he a ready protector of the Common wellfare, and not a Lord in propriety of the Common-wealth, having as little authority to alienate or dissipate the demeans or publick Revenue, as the Kingdom it self. And if he mis-govern the State, seeing it imports the Commonwealth that every one make use of his own talent, it is much more requisite for the publick good, that he which hath the mannaging of it, carrie himself as he ought.

And therefore if a prodigall Lord by the authority of justice, be committed to the tuition of his kinsmen and friends, and compelled to suffer his revenues and means to be ordered, and disposed of by others; by much more reason may those which have interest in the affairs of State, & whose duty obligeth them thereto, take all the Administration and government of the State out of the hands of him which either negligently executes his place, ruines the Common-wealth, if after admonition he indeavours not to performe his duty. And for so much as it is easily to be proved, that in all lawfull Dominions the King cannot be held Lord in propriety of the demeane; without searching into those elder times, whereof we have an apt representation in the Gen. 23. person of Ephron King of the Hittites, who durst not sell the Field to Abraham without the consent of the people. This right is at this day practised in publick States: the Emp: of Germany before his Sleyd. l. 1. & bulla aurea. Coronation doth solemly swear that he will neither alienate, dismember, nor ingage any of the rights or members of the Empire. And if he recover, or conquer any thing with the Arms & means of the publick, it shall be gained to the Empire, and not to himself. Wherfore when Charles the 4th. promised each of the Electors an hundred thousand Crowns to choose his Son Wencislaus Emperor, and having not ready money to deliver them, he morgaged Customs, Taxes, Tributes, and certain Towns unto them, L. 1. & passim c. de con. re. alien. naucler. in Chron. which were the proper appurtenances of the Empire: whereon followed much and vehement contestation, most men holding this ingagement void. And questionlesse it had been so declared, but for the profit that those reaped thereby, which ought principally to have maintained and held intire the rights and dignities of the Empire. And it followed also, that Wencislaus was justly held uncapable of the government of the Empire, chiefly because he suffered the rights of the Empire over the Duchy of Millen to bewrested from him.

[89]

There is a Law very ancient in the Kingdom of Polonia, which prohibits the alienating of any of the Kingdoms Lands; the which also C intellecto de jure jurando in Decretal. Polidor. Virgil. In cod. His. part 5. 1. 5. constis. 9. was renewed by King Lewis in the yeer 1375. In Hungary in anno 1221. there was a complaint made to Pope Honorius, that King Andrew had ingaged the Crown Lands contrary to his oath. In England was the same by the Law of King Edw: in the yeer 1298. Likewise in Spaine by the Ordinance made under Alphonsus, and renewed in the yeer 1560. in the Assemblie of the Estates at Toledo. These Laws were then ratified, although long time before Custome had obtained the vigor and effect of Law. Now for the Kingdom of France whereto I longer confine my self, because she may in a sort passe as a pattern to the rest, this right hath ever remained there inviolable. It is one of the most ancient Laws of the Kingdom, and a right born with the Kingdom it self, that the Demain may not be alienated: the which Law in anno 1566. (although but ill observed) was renewed. There is onely 2. cases excepted, the portions or Apennages of the children and brothers of the King, yet with this reservation, that the right of Vassallage remains Papon Arestor. l. 5. [...]. 10. Act. 4. alwayes to the Crown: in like manner if the condition of War require necessarily an alienation, yet it must be ever with power of redemption. Anciently neither the one nor the other were of validitie, but by the commandment of the States: at this day since the Parliament hath been made sedentarie, the Parliament of Paris which is the Sect 5. 11. & 16. legis regiae 1566. Court of the Peers, and the Chamber of Accounts, and of the Treasurie, must first approve it: as the Edicts of Charles the sixt and ninth do testifie. This is a thing so certain, that if the ancient Kings themselves would endow a Church (although that was a work much favoured in those dayes) they were notwithstanding bound to have an allowance of the Estates: witnes King Childebert, who might not endow the Abbey of St. Vincent at Paris before he had the French and Newstrafians consent. Clovis the 2d. and other Kings have observed the same. They Aimonius l. 4. cha. 41 &c. might neither remit the regalities by granting infranchisements, nor the nomination of Prelates to any Church. And if any of them have done it, as Lewis 11. Philip 4. and Philip surnamed Augustus, did in favour of the Churches of Senis Auxera, and Nevers, the Parliament hath L. peto. 69 Sect praedium. D. de leg. 2. An. 1329. 1360. 1374. 1401. 1583. declared it void. When the King is anointed at Reims, he swears to observe this Law: and if he infringe it, that Act hath as much validitie with it as if he contracted to sell the Empires of the great Turk, or Sophie of Persia. From this spring the Constitutions or Ordinances of Philip 6. of John 2d. of Charles 5th. 6th. and 8th. by which they revoke all alienations made by their Predecessors.

[90]

In the Assemblie of the Estates at Tours, where King Charles the 8th. Anno 1483. 1522. 1531. 1549 1560. by divers Decrees of the Court of Parliament. was in person, divers alienations made by Lewis 11. were repealed, and annihilated, and there was taken away from the Heirs of Tancred of Chastel his great Minnion, divers places which he had given him by his proper Authoritie. This was finally ratified in the last Assemblie of the Estates held at Orleans. Thus much concerning the Kingdoms Demean. But to the end that we may yet more clearly perceive that the Kingdom is preferred before the King, and that he cannot by his own proper Authority diminish the Majestie he hath received from the people, nor infranchise or release from his Dominion any one of his Subjects; nor quit or relinquish the Soveraigntie oft he least part of his Kingdom. Charlemayn in former times endeavoured to subject the Kingdom Paulus Aemilius, lib 3. of France to the German Empire: the which the French did couragiously oppose by the mouth of a Prince of Glasconnie; and it Charlemayn had proceeded in that businesse, it had come to the triall of the Sword. In like manner when any portion of the Kingdom was granted Anno 1195. 1 [...] 60. 1269. 2297. 1303. 1325. 1330. Anno 1360. to the English, the soveraigntie was almost alwayes reserved. And if sometimes they obtain'd it by force, as at the Treatie of Bretignie, by the which king John quitted the Soveraignty of Glasconnie and Poyton that agreement was not kept, neither was he more bound to do it, then a Tutor or Guardian is being prisoner (as he was then) which for his own deliverance should ingage the estate of his Pupils. By the power Anno 1465. of the same Law the Parliament of Paris made void the Treatie of Conlius by the which Duke Charles of Burgundie had drawn from the king Amiens, and other Towns of Picardie. In our dayes the same Parliament declared void the Agreement made at Madrid, between Anno 1525. Francis the 1. then prisoner, and Charles the 5. concerning the Duchie A [...] 1420. M [...] u [...]let. chap. 225. of Burgundie. But the donation made by Charles the 6. unto Hen: king of England of the kingdom of France after his decease is a sufficient testimony for this matter, and of his madnes, if there had been no other proof. But to leave off producing any further testimonies, examples, or reasons, by what right can the King give or sell away the kingdom or any part of it: seeing it consisteth of people, and not of earth or L. liber homo 10 [...] D. de ver. obl [...] . liem [...] t [...] . 34 [...]ct. [...] . D. de co [...] te. [...] mp l [...]e [...]lt C de op [...] r. libert. walls; and of Free men there can be made no sale, nor traffick: yea, and the Patrons themselves cannot compell the infranchisde servants to make their habitations in other places then themselves like. The which is the rather to be allowed, in that Subjects are neither slaves, nor infranchisde servants, but brothers: and not onely the Kings brethren taken one by one, but also considered in one body, they ought to be esteemed absolute Lords, and owners of the Kingdom.

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Whether the King be the usufruictuor of the Kingdom.↩

But if the King be not Lord in proprietie, yet at the least we may esteeme him usufruictuor of the Kingdom, and of the Demean: nay truly we can allow him to have the usufruit, for being usufruictuor though the proprietie remain in the people, yet may he absolutely dispose of the profits, and ingage them at his pleasure. Now we have already proved, that Kings of their own Authority cannot ingage the Revenues of the Exchequer, or the Demain of the Kingdom. The usufroictuor may dispose of the profits to whom, how, and when he pleaseth. Contrarily the excessive gifts of Princes are ever judged void, his unnecessary expences are not allowed, his superfluous to be cut off, and that which is expended by him in any other occasion, but for the publick utilitie, is justly esteemed to be unjustly extorted. And is no lesse liable to the Law Cincea, then the meanest Roman Citizen formerly was: In France the Kings gifts are never of force, untill the Chamber of Accounts have confirmed them. From hence proceed the postils of the ordinarie Chamber in the giving up of the Accounts in the Reigns of prodig all kings, Trop donne: soyt repele, which is, excessive gifts must be recalled. The Judges of this Chamber solemnly swear to passe nothing which may prejudice the Kingdom, or the publick State, notwithstanding any letters the King shall write unto them: but they are not alwayes so mindfull of this oath as were to be desired.

Furthermore, the Law takes no care how a usufruictuor possesseth, and governes his revenues, but contrariwise she prescribes unto the King, how and to what use he shall imploy his. For the ancient Kings of France, were bound to divide their royall revenues into foure parts. The first was imployed in the maintaining of the Ministers of the Church, and providing for the poore: The second for the Kings table: The third for the wages of his Officers and houshold servants: The last in the repairing of bridges, castles, and the royall Palaces. And what was remaining was layd up in the treasurie, to be bestowed Monstrel in Car. 6. on the necessities of the Common-wealth. And Histories do at large relate the troubles and tumults, which hapned about the yeer 1412 in the Assemblie of the Estates at Paris, because Charles the sixt had wasted all the money that was raised of the revenues and demean, in his own and his minnions loose pleasures, and that the expences of the Kings houshold which before exceeded not the summe of 94000. francks, did amount in that miserable estate of the Common wealth to five hundred and fourty thousand francks. Now as the demeane was imploied, in the before mentioned affaires: so the aydes were onely [92] for the war and the taxes assigned for the payment of the men at armes, and for no other occasion. In other Kingdomes the King hath no greater authority, and in divers lesse, especially in the Empire of Germanie, and in Poland. But we have made choise of the Kingdome of France, to the end it be not thought this hath any speciall prerogative above others, because there perhaps the common-wealth receiveth the most detriment. Briefly as I have before said, the name of a King signifies not an inheritance, nor a Propriety, nor a usufruict, but Ex concil. Valem. in c. 1. [...] e his quae fiunt a praelat. ab (que) consenlucapit. a charge, office, and procuration. As a Bishop is chosen to look to the wellfare of the soul, so is the King established to take care of the body so far forth as it concerns the publick good: the one is dispensor of the heavenly treasure, the other of the secular, and what right the one hath in the Episcopall revenues, the same hath the other, and no greater in the Kingdoms demean. If the Bishop alien the goods of the Bishoprick, without the consent of the Chapter, this alienation is of no value, If the King alien the demeane without the approbation of the Estates, that is also void; one portion of the Eclesiasticall goods ought to be imployed in the reparation of the Churches, the second in releiving of the poore, the third for the maintenance of the Church-men, and the fourth for the Bishop himself: We have seen before, that the King ought to divide into foure parts the Revenues of the Kingdoms demeane. The abuse of these times cannot infringe, or annihilate the right, for although the most part of the Bishops steale from the poor that which they profusely cast away on their pandars, and ruine and destroy their lands and woods, the calling of the Bishop is not for all that altered. Although that some Emperors have assumed to themselves an absolute power, that cannot invest them with any further right, because no man can be judge in his own cause. What if some Caracalla vaunt, he will not want money whilest the sword remaines in his custodie: The Emperor Adrian will promise on the contrary, so to discarge his office of Principalitie, that he will alwaies remember that the Common-wealth is not his, but the peoples: which one thing almost distinguisheth a King from a Tyrant. Neither can that act of Attalus King of Pergomus designing the Roman people for heires to his Kingdome, nor that of Alexander for Egypt, nor Ptolomie for the Cyrenians, bequeathing their Kingdomes to the same people nor Praesutagus King of the Icenians, which left his to Caesar, draw any good consequence of right to those which usurpe that which by no just title belongs to them, nay by how much the intrusion is more violent; by so much the equity, & justice of the cause is more perspicuous: [93] for what the Romās assumed under the colour of right, they would have made no difficulty if that pretext had been wanting to have taken by force: we have seen almost in our daies how the Venetians possest themselves of the Kingdom of Ciprus, under pretence of an imaginarie adoption w^ch would have proved rediculous if it had not been seconded by power and armes. To which also may be not unfitly resembled the pretended donation of Constantine to Pope Silvester, for that straw of the decretist Gratian, was long since consumed and turned to ashes, neither is of more validity, the grant which Lewis the courteous made to Pope Paschal of the Citie of Rome, and part of Italy, because he gave that which hee possessed not, no man opposed it. But when his Father Volater. l. Geogr. 3. Charlemain would have united & subjected the Kingdome of France to the Germane Empire, the French did lawfully oppose it: and if he had persisted in his purpose, they were resolved to have hindered him, and defended themselves by armes. There can be to as little advantage alledged that act of Solomons, whom we read to have delivered 1 Kings 9. 11. twenty Towns to Hiram King of Tire: for he did not give them to him but for the securing of the Talents of gold which Hiram 2 Chron. 8. 2. had lent him, and they were redeem'd at the end of the terme, as it appeares by the Text. Further, the soile was barren, and husbanded by the remaining Canaanites: But Solomon having redeemed it out of the hands of Hiram, delivered it to the Israelites to be inhabited and tilled. Neither serves it to much more purpose to alleadg that in some Kingdomes, there is no expresse agreement between the King and the people: for suppose there be no mention made, yet the law of nature teacheth us that Kings were not ordained to ruine, but to govern the Common-wealths, and that they L. 2. §. jus reipub. D. de administral. rer. ad Civit. pert. l. [...]. 27. D. de admut. tut. may not by their proper authority alter or change the rights of the publique State, and although they be Lords, yet can they challenge it in no other quality, then as Guardians do in the tuition of their pupills; neither can wee account him a lawfull Lord, which deprives the Common-wealth of her liberty, and sels her as a slave. Briefly, neither can we also alleadg, that some Kingdomes are the L. si fundum sect. si tut. D. depositi et expr [...] ssuis. Extravag. de rejudicata, c. intellecto. proper acquists of the King himselfe, insomuch as they were not conquered by their proper meanes and swords, but by the hands, and with the wealth of the publique; and there is nothing more agreeable to reason, then that which was gained with the joynt faculties, and common danger of the publique, should not be alien'd [94] dispos'd of, without the consent of the States which represent the Common-wealth: and the necessity of this law is such, that it is of force amongst robbers and free-booters themselves. He which follows a contrary course, must needs ruine humane society. And although the French conquered by force of armes, the Countreyes of Germany and Gaule, yet this before mentioned right remaines still L. 2. et passi [...] . C. de interd. Com. rer. alie [...]t. intire.

To conclude we must needs resolve, that Kings are neither proprietors, nor usu-fructuaries of the royall patrimony: but only administrators: and being so, they can by no just right attribute to themselves the propriety, use or profit of private mens estates, nor with as little reason the publique revennues, which are in truth only the Common-wealths.

But before we passe any further, we must here resolve a doubt. The people of Israel having demanded a King, the Lords said to Samuel: hearken unto the voice of the people: notwithstanding, 1 Sam. 8. 7. &c. give them to understand what shall be the manner of the King which shall reigne over them: he will take your fields, your vineyards, your olive-trees, to furnish his owne occasions, and to enrich his servants: briefly, he will make the people slaves. One would hardly believe in what estimation the Courtiers of our times hold this Text, when of all the rest of the holy Scripture they make but a jest. In this place the Almighty and all good God, would manifest to the Israelites their Levite, when that they had God himselfe even present with them, who upon all occasions appointed them holy Judges, and worthy Commanders for the Wars, would notwithstanding rather subject themselves to the disordered commandements of a vaine mutable man, than to the secure protection of the omnipotent and immutable God. Hee declares then unto them in what a slippery estate the King was placed, and how easily unruly authority fell into disordered violence, and Kingly power was turned into tyrannous wilfulnesse. Seeing the King that he gave them, would by preposterous violence draw the sword of authority against them, and subject the equity of the lawes to his owne unjust desires: and this mischief which they wilfully drew on themselves; they would happily repent of, when it would not be so easily remedied. Briefly, this Text doth not describe the right of Kings, but what right they are accustomed to attribute to themselves: not what by the priviledge of their places they may justly doe: but what power for the [95] satisfying of their owne lusts, they unjustly usurp. This will manifestly appeare from the 17. Chapter of Deuteronomy, where God appoints a law for Kings. Here saies Samuel the King will use his Subjects like slaves: there God forbids the King to lift his heart above his brethren: to wit, over his Subjects, whom he ought not to insult over, but to cherish as his kinsmen. Hee will make Chariots, leavy horse-men, and take the goods of private men, saies Samuel: on the contrary in Deutronomy, he is exhorted not to multiply horse-men, nor to heape up Deut. 17. gold and silver, nor cause the people to returne into Aegypt, to wit, into bondage. In Samuel we see pictured to the life wicked Ahab, which 1 Kings 21. by pernitious meanes gets Naboths Vineyard: there David, who held it not lawfull to drinke that water which was purchased with 2 Sam. 23. 16. the danger of his Subjects lives. Samuel fortels that the King demanded by the Israelites, in stead of keeping the lawes, would governe all according to his own fancie: on the contrary, God commands that his Law should by the Priests be delivered into the hands of the King, to copie it out, and to have it continually before his eyes. Therefore Samuel being high Priest, gave to Saul the royall law contained in the 17. of Deutronomy, written into a book, which certainly had been a frivolous act if the King were permitted to break it at his pleasure. Briefly, it is as much as if Samuel had said. You have asked a King after the manner of other Nations, the most of whom have Tyrants for their Governours: You desire a King to distribute justice equally amongst you: but many of them think all things lawfull which their owne appetites suggests unto them; in the meane season you willingly shake off the Lord, whose only will is equity and justice in the abstract.

In Heroditus there is a history which plainly expresses, bow apt the royall governement is to degenerate into tyranny, whereof Samuel so Herod. l. 2. exactly forewarns the people. Deioces much renowned for his justice, was first chosen Judge amongst the Medes: presently after, to the end hee might the better represse those which would oppose justice, he was chosen King, and invested with convenient authority, then he desired a guard, after a Citadell to be built in Eebatana the principall Citie of the Kingdome, with colour to secure him from conspiracies and machinations of Rebels; which being effected, he presently applies himselfe to revenge the least displeasures which were offered him with the greatest punishments.

Finally, no man might presume to looke this King in the face, [96] and to laugh or cough in his presence, was punished with grievous torments. So dangerous a thing it is, to put into the hands of a weake mind (as all mens are by nature) unlimited power. Samuel therefore teacheth not in that place, that the authority of a King is absolute: on the contrary hee discreetly admonisheth the people not to enthrall their liberty under the unnecessary yoake of a weak and unruly Master: he doth not absolutely exclude the royall authority, but would have it restrain'd within its own limits: he doth not amplifie the Kings right with an unbridled and licentious liberty: but rather tacitely perswades to put a bit into his mouth. It seemes that this advice of Samuels was very beneficiall to the Israelites, for that they circumspectly moderated the power of their Kings, the which most Nations growne wise, either by the experience of their own, or their neighbours harmes, have carefully looked unto, as will plainly appear by that which follows.

We have shewed already, that in the establishing of the King, An alliance or covenant between the K. & the people. Deut. 17. 1 Sam. 10. 27. 2 Sam. 5. 3. there were two alliances or convenants contracted: the first between God, the King, and the people, of which wee have formerly treated: the second between the King and the people, of which wee must now say some-what. After that Saul was established King, the royall Law was givne him, according to which he ought to governe. David made a Covenant in Hebron before the Lord, that is to say, taking God for witnesse, with all the ancients of Israel, which represented the whole bodie of the people, & even then he was made King. Joas 1 Chron. 11. 3. also by the mouth of Jehoiada the High Priest, entered into Covenant with the whole people of the land in the house of the Lord: And 2 King. 11. 17. & 12. 2 Chron. 23. 3. when the Crowne was set on his head, together with it was the law of the Testimony put into his hand, which most expounds to be the law of God: likewise Josias promiseth to observe and keepe the Commandements, Testimonies and Statutes comprized in the booke of 2 King. 23. 3. the Covenant: under which words are contained all which belongs to the duties both of the first and second Table of the law of God. In all the before remembred places of the holy story, it is ever said that a Covenant was made with all the people, with all the multitude, with all the Elders, with all the men of Juda: to the end that we might know, as it is also fully expressed, that not only the principals of the Tribes, but also all the Milleniers, Centurions, and subalterne Magistrates should meete together, each of them in the name, and for their Townes and Communalties, to covenant and [97] contract with the King. In this assembly was the creating of the King determined of: for it was the people that made the King, and not the King the people.

It is certain then, that the people by way of stipulation, require a performance of covenants, the King promises it. Now the condition of a Stipulator is in termes of law more worthy than of a promiser. The people asketh the King, whether he will govern justly and according to the lawes? He promiseth he will. Then the people answereth, and not before, that whilest he governes uprightly, they will obey faithfully. The King therefore promiseth simply and absolutely, the people upon condition: the which failing to be accomplished, the people rest according to equity and reason, quit from their promise.

In the first covenant, or contract, there is onely an obligation to piety: in the second, to justice. In that the King promiseth to serve God religiously: in this, to rule the people justly. By the one he is obliged with the utmost of his endeavours to procure the glory of God: by the other, the profit of the people. In the first there is a condition expressed, If thou keep my commandments: in the second, If thou distribute justice equally to every man. God is the proper revenger of deficiency in the former, and the whole people the lawfull punisher of delinquency in the latter, or the Estates, the representative body thereof, who have assumed to themselves the protection of the people. This hath been alwayes practised in all well-governed Estates. Amongst the Persians, after the due performance of holy Rites, they contracted with Cyrus in manner following.

Thou, O Cyrus, in the first place, shalt promise, That if any make war Zenophon lib. 8. Paed. against the Persians, or seek to infringe the liberty of the Lawes, thou wilt with the utmost of thy power defend and protect this countrey. Which having promised, they presently adde, And we Persians promise to be aiding to keep all men in obedience, whilest thou defendest the countrey. Zenophon calls this agreement, A Confederation; as also Isocrates calls that which he writ of the duties of subjects towards their Princes, A Discourse of Confederation. The alliance Zenoph. in tract. de repub. Lacede. or confederation was renewed every moneth between the Kings, and Ephores of Sparta, although those Kings were descended from the line of Hercules. And as these Kings did solemnly swear, [98] to govern according to the Lawes, so did the Ephores also to maintain them in their authority, whilest they performed their promise. Likewise in the Romane Kingdome there was an agreement between Romulus the Senate, and the people, in this manner: That the people should make Lawes, and the King looke they were kept: The people should decree warre, and the King should manage it. Now although many Emperours rather by force and ambition, than by any lawfull right, were seas'd of the Roman Empire, and by that which they call a Royall Law, attributed to themselves an absolute authority; notwithstanding by the fragments which remain both in books, and in Roman Inscriptions, of that Law, it plainly appeares, that power and authority was granted them to preserve and govern the Common-wealth, not to ruine and oppresse it by tyranny. Nay, all good Emperours have ever professed, that they held themselves tied to the Laws, & received the Empire from the Senate, to whose determination they alwayes referred the most important affairs, and esteemed it a great error without their advice to resolve on the occasions of the publick State.

If we take into our consideration the condition of the Empires, Kingdomes and States of times, there is not any of them worthy of those names, where there is not some such covenant or confederacy between the people and the Prince. It is not long since that in the Empire of Germany, the King of the Romanes being ready to be crowned Emperour; was bound to doe homage, and make oath of Fealty to the Empire, no more nor lesse than as the vassall is bound to doe to his Lord when he is invested with his fec. Although the form of the words which he is to sweare, have been somewhat altered by the Popes, yet notwithstanding the substance still remains the same. According to which we know that Charles the fifth of the house of Austria, was under Specul. Saxon. lib. 3. Vrtic. 54. certain conditions chosen Emperour, as in the same manner his successors were, the summe of which was, that he should keep the Lawes already made, and make no new ones without the consent of the Electors, that he should govern the publick affaires by the advice of the generall Estates, nor ingage any thing that belongs to the Empire, and other matters which are particularly recited by the Historians. When the Emperour is crowned at Aquisgrave, [99] the Archbishop of Cullen requires of him in the first place, Sleyd. lib. 2. & 2. If he will maintain the Church, if he will distribute justice, if he will defend the Empire, and protect Widowes, Orphans, and all other worthy of compassion: The which after he hath solemnly sworn before the Altar, the Princes also which represent the Empire, are asked, if they will not promise the same; neither is the Emperour anointed, nor receives the other Ornaments of the Empire, before he have first taken that solemn oath. Whereupon it followes, that the Emperour is tied absoutely, and the princes of the Empire, under condition. That the same is observed in the Kingdome of Polonia, no man will make question, who had but seen or heard of the ceremonies and rites wherewith Henry of Anjoy was lately chosen and crowned King of that Countrey, & especially then when the condition of maintaining of the two Religions, the Reformed and the Roman, was demanded, the which the Lords of the kingdome in expresse termes required of him three severall times, and he as often made promise to perform. The same is observed in the Kingdomes of Bohemia, Hungary, and others; the which we omit to relate particularly, to avoid prolixity.

Now this manner of stipulation is not onely received in those Kingdomes where the right of election is yet entirely observed; but even in those also which are esteemed to be simply hereditary, When the King of France is crowned, the Bishops of Laon and Beauvois, Ecclesiasticall Peeres, ask all the people there present, whether they desire and command, that he which is there before them, shall be their King? Whereupon he is said even then in the stile of the inauguration, to be chosen by the people: and when they have given the signe of consenting, then the King sweares that he will maintaine all the rights, priviledges, and lawes of France universally, that he will not aliene the Demeane, and the other Articles, which have been yet so changed and accomodated to bad intentions, as they differ greatly from that copie which remaines in the Library of the Chapter of Beauvois, according to which it is recorded, that King Philip, the first of that name, tooke his Oath at his Coronation; yet notwithstanding they are not unfitly expressed: Neither is he girded with the sword, nor anointed, nor crowned by the Peers (who at that [100] time weare Coronets on their heads) nor receives the Scepter and rod of Justice, nor is proclaimed King, before first the people have commanded it: neither doe the Peers take their oaths of alleageance before he have first solemnly sworne to keepe the Lawes carefully.

And those be, that he shall not waste the publicke revenue, that he shall not of his own proper authoritie, impose any taxes, customes, or tributes: that he shall not make peace or warre, nor determine of State-affaires, without the advise of the Councell of State. Briefly, that he should leave to the Parliament, to the States, and to the Officers of the Kingdome, their authoritie intire, and all things else which have been usually observed in the Kingdome of France. And when he first enters any Citie or Province, he is bound to confirme their priviledges, and sweares to maintaine their Lawes and Customes. This is straitly observed in the Cities of Tholouse, and Rochel, and in the Countries of Daulphinie, Province, and Britaine: The which Townes and Provinces have their particular and expresse Covenants and agreements with the Kings, which must needs be voyde, if the condition expressed in the Contract be not of force, nor the Kings tied to the performance.

There is the forme of the Oath of the ancient Kings of Burgundie In Annal. Burgund. yet extant in these words: I will protect all men in their rights, according to Law and justice.

In England, Scotland, Sweden, and Denmarke, there is almost the same custome as in France: but in no place there is used a more discreet care in their manner of proceeding, than in Spaine. For in the Kingdome of Arragon, after the finishing of many Ceremonies, which are used between him, which represents the Justitia major of Arragon, which comprehends the majestie of the Common-wealth, seated in a higher seate, and the King, which is to be crowned, who sweares fealtie, and does his homage: and having reade the Lawes and conditions, to the accomplishment whereof he is sworne.

Finally, the Lords of the Kingdome use to the King these words in the vulgar Language, as is before expressed, page 60. Nos qui valemos tanto como vos, y podemos mas que vos, vos elegimos kei con estas è y estat conditiones, entra vos y nos un que manda mas que vos. Wee which are as much worth as you, and have more power than you, choose you King upon these and these conditions, and there is one between [141] you and us, which commands over you. But least the King should thinke he swore onely for fashion sake, and to observe an olde custome, every third yeare in full assemblie of the Estates, the very same words, and in the same manner are repeated unto him.

And if under pretext of his royall dignitie he become insolent, violating the Lawes, and neglect his publick faith and promise given, then by the priviledge of the Kingdome, he is judged, excommunicated, as execrable as Julian the Apostata was by the primitive Church: which excommunication is esteemed of that validitie, that instead of praying for the King in their publick oraysons, they pray against him, and the subjects are by the same right acquit from their oath of Alleageance: as the vassall is exempted from obedience and obligation by oath to his Lord which stands excommunicated; the which hath been determined and confirmed In Concil. Tolet. 4. c. 74. & in Tolet. 6. lib. 2. feud. tit. 28. sect. 1. both by act of Councell and Decree of State in the Kingdome of Arragon.

In like manner, in the Kingdome of Castile in full assembly of the Estates, the King being readie to be crowned, is first in the presence of all advertised of his dutie: and even then are reade the Articles discreetly composed for the good of the Common-wealth, the King sweares he will observe and keepe them carefully and faithfully; which being done, then the Constable takes his oath of alleageance, after the Princes and Deputies for the Townes sweare each of them in their order; and the same is observed in the Kingdomes of Portugall, Leon, and the rest of Spaine. The lesser principallities have their institution grounded on the same right. The contracts which the Brabancers and the rest of the Netherlanders, together with those of Austria, Carinthia, and others, had with La Joyeuse entreè. their Princes, were alwayes conditionall. But especially the Brabancers, to take away all occasion of dispute, have this expresse condition: which is that in the receiving of their Duke, there is read in his presence the ancient Articles, wherein is comprized that which is requisite for the publick good; and thereunto is also added, that if he doe not exactly and precisely observe them, they may choose what other Lord it shall seeme good unto them; the which they doe in expresse words protest unto him. He having allowed and accepted of these Articles, doth in that publick assemblie promise and solemnly sweare to keepe them. The which was [102] observed in the reception of Philip the second King of Spaine. Ludovicus Guicciard. in Discript. Belgiae. Briefly, there is not any man can denie, but that there is a contract mutually obligatorie between the King and the Subjects, which requires the people to obey faithfully, and the King to governe lawfully, for the performance whereof the King sweares first, and after the people.

I would aske here wherefore a man doth sweare, if it be not to declare, that what he delivers he sincerely intends from his heart? Can any thing be judged more neere to the law of nature, than to observe that which we approve? Furthermore, what is the reason L. 1. D. Acpact. l. non minorum 20. D. de transact the King sweares first, and at the instance, and required by the people, but to accept a condition either tacite or expressed? Wherefore is there a condition opposed to the Contract, if it be not that in fayling to performe the condition, the contract according to law remaines voyde? And if for want of satisfying the condition by right, the contract is of no force: who shall dare to call that people perjured, which refuseth to obey a King which makes no account of his promise, which he might and ought to have kept, and wilfully breakes those lawes which he did sweare to observe? On the contrary, may we not rather esteeme such a King perfidious, perjured, and unworthy of his place? For if the Law free the vassall Lib. 2. feudor. tit. 26. §. 24. & tit. 47. Dionys. Halic. lib. 2. from his Lord, who dealt felloniously with him, although that to speake properly the Lord sweareth not fealtie to his vassall, but he to him: if the Law of the twelve Tables doth detest and hold in execration the protector that defraudeth him that is under his tuition: if the civill Law permit an infranchised servant to bring his action against his patron, for any grievous usage: if in such cases the same Law delivers the slave from the power of his Master, although the obligation be naturall onely and not civill: is it not much more reasonable that the people be loosed from that oath of alleageance which they have taken, if the King (who may be not unfitly resembled by an Atturney sworne to looke to his Clients cause) first breake his oath solemnly taken? And what if all these ceremonies, solemne oaths, nay sacramentall promises had never been taken? Doth not nature her selfe sufficiently teach that Kings were on this condition ordained by the people, that they should governe well? Judges that they should distribute justice uprightly? Captaines in the warre, that they should lead their Armes against their enemies: If on the contrary, they themselves forrage and spoile [103] their subjects, and instead of governors become enemies, as they leave indeed the true and essentiall qualities of a King, so neither ought the people to acknowledge them for lawfull Princes. But what if a people (you will reply) subdued by force, be compeld Cicer. 1. Offic. by the King to take an oath of servitude? And what if a robber, pirate, or tyrant, (I will answer) with whom no bond of humane societie can be effectuall, holding his dagger to your throate, constraine you presently to become bound in a great sum of money? Is it not an unquestionable Maxime in Law, that a promise exacted by violence cannot binde? especially if any thing be promised against common reason, or the law of nature? Is there any thing more repugnant to nature and reason, than that a people should manicle and fetter themselves; and to be obliged by promise to the Prince, with their own hands and weapons to be their own executioners? There is therefore a mutuall obligation between the King and the people, which whether it be civill or naturall onely, whether tacite, or expressed in words, it cannot by any meanes be annihilated, nor by any Law be abrogated, much lesse by force made voyde. And this obligation is of such power, that the Prince which wilfully violates it, is a tyrant: and the people which purposely breakes it, may be justly termed seditious.

Hitherto we have treated of a King, it now rests wee doe somewhat more fully describe a Tyrant. Wee have shewed that he is a Who may truly be called tyrants? King, which lawfully governes a Kingdome, either derived to him by succession, or committed to him by Election. It followes therefore that he is reputed a tyrant, which as opposite to a King, either Aristo. lib. 5. polit. c. 10. gaines a kingdome by violence, or indirect meanes, or being invested therewith by lawfull election or succession, governes it not according to law and equitie, or neglects those contracts and agreements, Bartol. in tract. de tyrannide. to the observation whereof he was strictly oblieged at his reception. All which may very well occurre in one and the same person. The first is commonly called a tyrant without title: the second a tyrant by practise. Now it may well so come to passe, that he which possesseth himselfe of a kingdome by force, to governe justly, and he on whom it descends by a lawfull title, to rule unjustly. But for so much as a kingdome is rather a right than an inheritance, and an office than a possession: he seemes rather worthy the name of a tyrant, which unworthily acquits himselfe of his charge, than he which entered into his place by a wrong dore. In [104] the same sence is the Pope called an intruder which entered by indirect means into the papacy: and he an abuser which governs il in it.

Pithagoras sayes, That a worthy stranger is to be preferr'd before an unworthy Citizen, yea though he be a Kinsman. Let it be lawfull also for us to say, that a Prince which gained his Principality by indirect courses, provided hee governe according to law, and administer justice equally, is much to be preferred before him, which carrieth himselfe tyrannously, although hee were legally invested into his government with all the Ceremonies and Rites thereunto appertaining.

For seeing that Kings were instituted to feede, to judge, to cure the diseases of the people: Certainely I had rather that a Thiefe should feede me, than a Shepherd devoure me: I had rather receive justice from a Robber, than out-rage from a Judge: I had better be healed by an Empirick, than poysoned by a Doctor in Physicke. It were much more profitable for me to have my estate carefully managed by an intruding Guardian, than to have it wasted and dissipated by one legally appointed.

And although it may be that ambition was his first solicitor, to enter violently into the government, yet may it perhaps appeare he affected it the rather to give testimonie of his equity and moderation Zenophon. Pluta [...] chus in Alexand. in Aemi [...] co, Caesare. Liv us, lib. 1. Su [...] conius in Caesare, c. 75. in governing, witnesse Circus, Alexander, and the Romans, which ordinarily accorded to those people they subdued, permission to governe themselves according to their owne lawes, customes, and priviledges, yea sometimes incorporated them into the body of their owne state: on the contrary, the Tyrant by practice seemes to extend the priviledge of his legall succession, the better to execute violence and extortion, as may be seene in these dayes, not only by the examples of the Turkes and Moscovites, but also in divers Christian Princes: therefore the act of one which at the first was ill, is in some reasonable time rectified by justice: whereas the other like an inveterate disease, the elder it growes, the worse it affects the Patient.

Now if according to the saying of Saint Augustine, those kingdomes August. in lib. 4. c. 4. de c. vi. [...] es. where justice hath no place, are but a rapsodie of freebooters; they are in that, both the Tyrant without title, and he by practise alike, for that they are both thieves, both robbers, and both unjust possessors, as he certainly is no lesse an unjust detayner which takes another mans goods against the [105] owners will, than hee which employes it ill when it was taken before.

But the fault is without comparison, much more greater of him which possesseth an estate for to ruine it, than of the other which made himselfe Master of it to preserve it.

Briefely, the Tyrant by practise vainely colouring his unjust extortions with the justice of his title, is much more blameable then the Tyrant without title, who recompenceth the violence of his first intrusion in a continued course of a legall and upright government.

But to proceed, there may be observed some difference amongst Tyrants without title. Tyrants without title: For there are some which ambitiously invade their neighbours Countreyes, to enlarge their owne, as Nimrod, Minus, and the Canaanites have done. Although such are term'd Kings by their owne people, yet to those on whose confines they have encroached without any just right, or occasion, they will be accounted Tyrants.

There be others which having attained to the government of an elective Kingdome, that endeavour by deceitfull meanes, by corruption, by present, and other bad practises, to make it become hereditary. For witnesse whereof, wee neede not make search into elder times; these are worse than the former, for so much as secret fraud, as Cicero saith, is ever more odious than open force.

There be also others which are so horribly wicked, that they seeke to enthrall their own native Countrey like the viperous brood which goaw through the entralls of their mother: as be those Generals of Armies created by the people, who afterwards by the meanes of those forces make themselves masters of the State, as Caesar at Rome under pretence of the Dictatorship, and divers Princes of Italy.

There be women also which intrude themselves into the government of those kingdoms which the lawes only permit to the males, and make themselves Queenes and Regents, as Athalia did in Judab, Semiramis in Assyria, Agripina in the Roman Empire in the Reign of her sonne Nero, Mammea in Alexander Severus his time, Semiamira in Heliogabalusses; and certaine Brunichildes in the kingdome of France, who so educated their sonnes [as the Queens of the house Medicis in these latter times] during their minority, that [106] attaining to more maturity, their only care was to glut themselves in pleasures and delights: so that the whole management of affaires remain'd in the hands of their Mothers, or of their Minions, servants, and Officers. Those also are Tyrants without title, who taking advantage of the floath, weakenesse, and dissolute courses of those Princes which are otherwise lawfully instituted, and seeking to enwrap them in a sleepy dreame of voluptuous idlenesse (as under the French Kings, especially those of the Merovingian line, some of the Mayres of the Palace have beene advanc'd to that dignity for such egregious services) transferring into their owne command all the royall authority, and leaving the King only the bare name. All which Tyrants are certainly of this condition, that if for the manner of their government they are not blameable: Yet for so much as they entered into that jurisdiction by tyrannous intrusion, they may justly be termed Tyrants without title.

Concerning Tyrants by practise, it is not so easie to describe Tyrants by practise. them as true Kings. For reason rules the one, and selfe-will the other: the first prescribes bounds to his affections, the second confines his desires within no limits, what is the proper rights of Kings may be easily declared, but the outragious insolencies of Tyrants cannot without much difficulty be express'd. And as a right angle is uniforme, and like to it selfe one and the fame. so an oblique diversifies it selfe into various and sundry species: In like manner is justice and equity simple, and may be deciphered in few words: but injustice and injury are divers, and for their sundry accidents not to be so easily defin'd; but that more will be omitted then express'd. Now although there be certaine rules by which these Tyrants may be represented (though not absolutely to the life:) yet notwithstanding there is not any more certaine than by conferring and comparing a Tyrants fraudulant sleights with a Kings vertuous actions.

A Tyrant lops off those eares which grow higher then the rest of the corne, especially where vertue make them most conspicuously eminent, oppresseth by calumnies, and fraudulent practises, the principall officers of the State, gives out reports of intended conspiracies against himself, that he might have some colourable pretext to cut them off, witnesse Tiberius, Maximinius, & others, which spared not their own kinsmen, cozens, and brothers.

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The King on the contrary doth not onely acknowledge, his brothers to be as it were consorts unto him in the Empire: But also holds in the place of brothers all the principall Officers of the Kingdom, & is not ashamed to confesse that of them (inquality as deputed from the generall Estates) he holds the Crown.

The tyrant advanceth above and in opposition to the ancient and worthy Nobility, mean and unworthy persons; to the end that these base sellowes being absolutely his creatures, might applaud and apply themselves to the fulfilling of all his loose and unruly desires. The King maintains every man in his Rank, honours and respects the Grandies as the Kingdomes friends, desiring their good as well as his own.

The tyrant hates and suspects discreet and wise men, and fears no opposition more than vertue, as being conscious of his owne vitious courses, and esteeming his owne security to consist principally in a generall corruption of all estates, introduceth multiplicity of Tavernes, Gaming-houses, Maskes, Stageplayes, Brothel-houses, and all other licencious superfluities, that might effeminate and bastardize noble spirits, as Cyrus did, to weaken and subdue the Sardiens: The King on the contrary allureth from all places honest and able men, and encourageth them by pensions and honours; and for seminaries of vertue, erects Schooles and Universities in all convenient places.

A tyrant as much as in him lies, prohibites or avoids all publick Machiavil in principe. Assemblies, feares Parliaments, Diets and meetings of the generall Estates, flies the light, affecting (like the Bat) to converse onely in darknesse; yea, he is jealous of the very gesture, countenance, and discourse of his subjects. The King because he converses alwayes as in the presence of Men and Angels, glories in Arist. lib. 5. c. 11. polit. the multitude, and sufficiency of his Councellors, esteeming nothing well done which is ordered without their advice, and is so farre from doubting or distasting the publick meeting of the generall Estates, as he honours and respects those Assemblies with much favour and affection.

A tyrant nourisheth and feedeth factions and dissentions amongst his subjects, ruines one by the help of another, that he may the easier vanquish the remainder, advantaging himselfe by this division, like those dishonest Surgeons which lengthen out their cures. Briefly after the manner of that abominable Vitellius, he is not ashamed to say, that the karkasse of a dead enemy, [108] especially a subjects, yeelds a good savour. On the contrary, a good King endeavours alwayes to keep peace amongst his subjects, as a father amongst his children, choakes the seeds of troubles, and quickly heals the scarre; the execution even of justice upon rebels, drawing teares from his compassionate eyes; yea, those whom a good King maintains and defends against a forrain enemy, a tyrant (the enemy of nature) compels them to turn the points of their swords into their own proper intrails. A tyrant fils his Garrisons with strange Souldiers, builds Citadels against his subjects, disarmes the people, throwes down their forts, makes himselfe formidable with guards of strangers, or men onely fit for pillage and spoyle, gives pensions out of the publick Treasury to spies and calumniating informers, disperst through all Cities and Provinces. Contrariwise, a King reposeth more his safety 1. vi. lib. 2 c. 1. Dionys. [...]ai [...]. l. 5. de Arunte filio Porsennae. in the love of his subjects, than in the strength of his Fortresses against his enemies, taking no care to inroll Souldiers, but accounts every subject as a man at arms to guard him, & builds forts to restrain the irruptions of forraine enemies, and not to constrain his subjects to obedience, in whose fidelity he putteth his greatest confidence. Therefore it is that tyrants, although they have such numberlesse guards about them to drive off throngs of Prov. 14. 28. people from approaching them, yet cannot all those numbers secure them from doubts, jealousies and distrusts, which continually afflict and terrifie their timerous consciencese yea in the middest of their greatest strength, the tyrannizer of tyrants, fear, mamaketh prize of their souls, and there triumphs in their affliction. A good King in the greatest concourse of people, is freest from Bartol. in tract de tyrannide. doubts or fears, nor troubled with solicitous distrusts in his solitary retirements, all places are equally secure unto him, his own conscience being his best guard. If a tyrant want civill broyles to exercise his cruell disposition in, he makes warres abroad; erects idle and needlesse trophees to continually imploy his tributaries, that they might want leasure to think on other things, as Pharaoh did the Jews, and Polierates the Samiens; therefore he alwayes A [...] gid. Rom. de reg. prin. prepares for, or threatens war, or at least seemes so to doe, and so stil rather draws mischief on, than puts it further off. A King never makes war, but compeld unto it, and for the preservation of Cicero de offic. lib. 1. the publick; he never desires to purchase advantage by treason, he never entreth into any war that exposeth the Common-wealth to more danger than it affordeth probable hope of commodity.

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A Tyrant leaves no designe unattempted by which he may fleece his Subjects of their substance, and turne it to his proper benefit, that being continually troubled in gaining meanes to live, they may have no leasure nor hope how to regaine their liberty: On the contrary, the King knowes that every good Subjects purse will be ready to supply the Common-wealths occasion, and therefore believes he is possest of no small treasure, whilst through his good governement his Subjects flow in all aboundance.

A Tyrant extorts unjustly from many to cast prodigally upon two or three Minions, and those unworthy; hee imposeth on all: and exacteth from all, to furnish their superfluous and riotous expences: he builds his owne, and followers fortunes on the ruines of the publique: he drawes out the peoples blood, by the veines of their means, and gives it presently to carouse to his Court-leeches. But a King cuts off from his ordinary expences, to ease the peoples necessities, neglecteth his private state, and furnisheth with all magnificence the publique occasions; briefely is prodigall of his owne blood, to defend and maintain the people committed to his care.

If a Tyrant as heretofore Tiberius, Nero, Commodus and others, did suffer his Subjects to have some breathing time from unreasonable exactions, and like spunges to gather some moysture, it is but to squeese them out afterwards to his owne use: on the contrary, if a King doe sometimes open a vaine, and draw some blood, it is for the peoples good, and not to be expended at his own pleasure in any dissolute courses. And therefore as the holy Scripture compares the one to a Shepheard, so doth it also resemble the other to a roaring Prov. 8. 15. Lion, to whom notwithstanding the Foxe is oftentimes coupled. For a Tyrant as saies Cice, is culpable in effect of the greatest injustice that Cicer. de offic. lib. 1. may be imagined, and yet he carrieth it so cunningly, that when hee most deceives, it is then that hee maketh greatest appearance to deale sincerely. And therefore doth hee artificially counterfeit Religion and devotion, wherein saith Aristotle, hee expresseth one of the most absolute Arist. lib. 5. polit. c. 11. subtleties that Tyrants can possibly practise: hee doth so compose his countenance to piety, by that meanes to terrifie the people from conspiring against him; who they may well imagine to be especially favoured of God, expressing in all appearance so reverently to serve him. He fains also to be exceedingly affected to the publique good; not so much for the love of it, as for feare of his owne safety.

Furthermore he desires much to be esteemed just, and loyall in some [110] affaires, purposely to deceive and betray more easily in matters of greater consequence: much like those thieves which maintaine themselves by thefts and robberies, cannot yet long subsist in their trade, without exercising some parcell of justice in their proceedings. Hee also counterfeits the mercifull, but it is in pardoning of such malefactors, in punishing whereof he might more truly gaine the reputation of a pittifull Prince.

To speake in a word, that which the true King is, the Tyrant would seeme to be, and knowing that men are wonderfully attracted with, and inamoured of vertue, hee endeavours with much subtilty to make his vices appeare yet masked with some shadow of vertue: but let him counterfeit never so cunningly, still the Fox will be known by his taile: and although he fawne and flatter like a Spannell, yet his snarling and grinning will ever bewray his currish kind.

Furthermore, as a well-ordered Monarchy partakes of the principall Tho. Aquin. in secund. secund. q. 12. a [...] t. 11. commodities of all other governements: So on the contrary, where tiranny prevailes, there all the discommodities of confusion are frequent.

A Monarchy hath in this, conformity with an Aristocraty, that the most able and discreet are called to consultations: Tiranny and Oligarchy accord in this, that their counsels are composed of the worst and most corrupted. And as in the Councell Royall, there may in a fort seeme many Kings to have interests in the government, so in the other on the contrary, a multitude of Tyrants alwayes domineers.

The Monarchy borrowes of the popular government the assemblies of the Estates, whither are sent for Deputies the most sufficient of Cities and Provinces, to deliberate of, and determine matters of State: the tiranny takes this of the Ochlocracie, that if shee be not able to hinder the convocation of the Estates, yet will she endeavour by factious subtilties and pernicious practices, that the greatest enemies of Order and Reformation of the State be sent to those Assemblies, the which we have known practised in our times. In this manner assumes the Tyrant the countenance of a King, and tyranny the semblance of a Kingdome, and the continuance succeeds commonly according to the dexterity wherewith it is managed: yet, as Aristotle says, we shal hardly reade of any tyranny that hath out-lasted a hundred yearee: briefely the King principally regards the publique utility, and a Tyrants chiefest care is for his private commodity.

But seeing the condition of men is such, that a King is with much [111] difficulty to be found, that in all his actions only agreeth at the publique good, and yet cannot long subsist without expression of some speciall care thereof, we will conclude that where the Common-wealths advantage is most preferr'd, there is both a lawfull King and Kingdome; and where particular designes and private ends prevaile against the publique profit, there questionlesse is a Tyrant and tiranny.

Thus much concerning Tyrants by practise, in the examining whereof wee have not altogether fixed our discourse on the loose disorders of their wicked and licentious lives, Bartol. in. tract. de tiranct de regim. Civt. which some say is the character of a bad man: but not alwayes of a bad Prince. If therefore the Reader be not satisfied with this description, besides the more exact representations of Tyrants which he shall finde in histories: he may in these our dayes behold an absolute modell of many living and breathing Tyrants: whereof Aristotle in his time did much complaine. Now at the last we are come as it were by degrees to the chiefe and principall point of the question. We have seene how that Kings To whom it belongs to resist & suppresse Tyrāts without title. have beene chosen by God, either with relation to their Families or their persons only, and after installed by the people: In like manner what is the duty of the King, and of the Officers of the Kingdome, how farre the authority, power, and duty both of the one & the other extends, and what and how sacred are the Covenants and contracts w^ch are made at the inauguration of Kings, and what conditions are intermixt, both tacite and express'd; finally who is a Tyrant without title, and who by practise, seeing it is a thing unquestionable that we are bound to obey a lawfull King, which both to God and people carrieth himselfe according to those Covenants whereunto he stands obliged, as it were to God himselfe, seeing in a fort he represents his divine Majestie: It now followes that we treate, how, and by whom a Tyrant may be lawfully resisted, and who are the persons that ought to be chiefely actors therein, and what course is to be held, that the action may be managed according to right and reason: we must first speak of him w^ch is commonly called a Tyrant without title. Let us suppose then that some Ninus having neither received outrage nor offence, invades a people over whom he hath no colour of pretension: that Caesar seekes to oppresse his Countrey, Otto Frising. Chron. l. 3. c. 7. and the Roman Common-wealth: that Popiclus endeavours by murthers and treasons to make the elective Kingdome of Polonia to become [112] hereditary to him and his posterity: or some Brunichilde drawes [...] lib. [...] . c. 1. [...] T [...] u [...] on. lib. 4. c. 51. lib. 5. c. 1 [...] . lib. 8. c. 29. to her selfe and her Protadius the absolute government of France: or Ebroinus taking advantage of Theodericks weaknesse and idlenesse, gaineth the intire administration of the State, and oppresseth the people, what shall be our lawfull refuge herein?

First, The law of nature teacheth, and commandeth us to maintaine and defend our lives and liberties, without which life is scant worth the enjoying, against all injury and violence. Nature hath imprinted this by instinct in Dogs against Wolves, in Buls against Lions, betwixt Pigeons and Spar hawkes, betwixt Pullen and Kites, and yet much more in man against man himselfe, if man become a beast: and therefore he which questions the lawfulnesse of defending ones selfe, doth as much as in him lies question the law of nature. To this must be added the law of Nations, which distinguisheth possessions, and Dominions, fixes limits, and makes our confines, which every man is bound to defend against all invaders. And therefore it is no lesse lawfull to resist, Alexander the great, it without any right or being justly provoked, he invades a Countrey with a mighty Navy; as well as Diomedes the Pirate which scoures the Seas in a small vessell. For in this case Alexanders right is no more than Diomedes his, but only hee hath more power to doe wrong, and not so easily to be compeld to reason as the other. Briefely, one may as well oppose Alexander in pillaging a Country, as a Theefe in purloining a cloake, as well him when he seekes to batter downe the walls of a Citie, as a robber that offers to break into a private house. There is besides this, the civill law, or municipial laws of severall Countreyes which governs the societies of men, by certaine rules, some in one manner, some in another; some submit themselves to the government of one man, some to more; others are ruled by a whole Communalty, some absolutely exclude women from the Royall Throne, others admit them, these here chuse their King descended of such a family, those there make election of whom they please, besides other customes practised amongst severall Nations. If therefore any offer either by fraud or force to violate this law, wee are all bound to resist him, because he wrongs that society to which wee owe all that we have, and would runne our Countrey, to the preservation whereof, all men by nature; by law and by solemne oath are strictly obliged: insomuch that feare or negligence, or bad purposes, make us omit [113] this dutie, wee may justly be accounted breakers of the Lawes, betrayers of our Countrey, and contemners of Religion. Now as the Law of Nature, of Nations, and the civill commands us to take Armes against such Tyrants: so is there not any manner of reason that should perswade us to the contrary; neither is there any oath, covenant, or obligation, publike or private, of power justly to restraine us: therefore the meanest private man may resist and lawfully L. ult. D. ad leg. Jul. Majestatis. oppose such an intruding tyrant. The Law Julia which condemnes to death those that raise rebellion against their Countrey or Prince, hath here no place: for he is no Prince which without any lawfull title invadeth the Common-wealth, or Confines of an other: nor he a rebell which by armes defends his Countrey: but rather to this had relation the Oath which all the youth of Athens were accustomed to take in the Temple of Aglaura: I will fight for Religion, for the Lawes, for the Altars, and for our possessions, either alone or with others, and will doe the utmost of my endeavour, to leave to posteritie our Countrey, at the least in as good estate as I found it. To as little purpose can the Bartol. in trac. de Guelph. & Gibellin. Lawes made against seditious persons be alledged here; for he is seditious which undertakes to defend the people, in opposition of order and publick Discipline; But he is no raiser, but a suppressor of sedition, which restraineth within the limits of reason, the subvertor of his Countries welfare, and publicke Discipline.

On the contrary to this, hath proper relation the Law of Tyranacides, Plin. lib. 4. Alexand. ab Alex. lib. 6. cap. 4. which honours the living with great and memorable recompences, and the dead with worthy Epitaphes, and glorious Statues, that have been their Countries Liberators from Tyrants; as, Harmodius and Aristogiton at Athens, Brutus and Cassius in Greece, and Aratus of Sycione. To these by a publike Decree were Ziphilm. in vita August. erected Statues, because they delivered their Countries from the tyrannies of Pisistratus, of Caesar, and of Nicocles. The which was Plutarch. in Arato. of such respect amongst the Ancients, that Zerxes having made himselfe Master of the Citie of Athens, caused to be transported into Persia the Statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton: afterwards Valer. Maxim. lib. 2, c. ultim. Selcucus caused them to be returned into their former place: and as in their passage they came by Roades, those famous Citizens entertained them with publick and stupendious solemnities, and during their abode there, they placed them in the choicest sacresties of their gods. But the Law made against forsakers, and traytors, [114] takes absolutely hold on those which are negligent and carelesse to deliver their Countrey oppressed with tyrannie, and condemnes them to the same punishment, as those cowardly Souldiers, which when they should fight, either counterfeit sicknesse, or cast off their Armes and run away. Every one therefore both in generall and particular, ought to yeeld their best assistance unto this: as in a publicke fire, to bring both hookes, and buckets, and L. 3. & l. Omne delictum. §. ult. D. de remilit. water: wee must not ceremoniously expect that the Captaine of the Watch be first called, nor till the Governour of the Towne be come into the streets; but let every man draw water and climb to the house-top; it is necessary for all men that the fire be quenched. For if whilest the Gaules with much silence and vigilancie seeke to scale and surprise the Capitoll, the Souldiers be drowsie with their former paines, the Watch buried in sleepe, the dogges fayle to barke: then must the geese play the Sentinells, and with their gagling noyse give an alarum. And the Souldiers and Watch shall be degraded, yea, and put to death: the geese for perpetuall remembrance of this deliverance, shall be alwayes sed in the Capitoll, and much esteemed.

This of which wee have spoken, is to be understood of a tyranny not yet firmely rooted, to wit, whilst a tyrant conspires, machinates, and layes his plots and practises. But if he be once so possessed of the State, and that the people being subdued, promise and sweare obedience: the Common-wealth being oppressed, resigne their authoritie into his hands, and that the Kingdome in some formall manner, consent to the changing of their Lawes: for so much certainly as then he hath gained a title which before he wanted, and seemes to be as well a legall as actuall possessor thereof, although this yoke were laid on the peoples necke by compulsion, yet must they quietly and peaceably rest in the will of the Almightie, who at his pleasure transferres Kingdomes from one Nation to another. Otherways there should be no Kingdome whose juridiction might not be disputed: and it may well chance that he which before was a tyrant without title, having obtained the title of a King, may free himselfe from any tyrannous imputation by governing those under him with equitie and moderation. Therefore then as the people of Jurie under the authoritie 2 Kings 24. and 25. Ierem. 37. of King Ezechias did lawfully resist the invasion of Senacherib the Assyrian: So on the contrary was Zadechias and all his subjects [115] worthily punished, because that without any just occasion after they had done homage and sworne fealtie to Nebuchadnezzar, they rise in rebellion against him. For after promise of performance it is too late to repent: and as in battles every one ought to give testimony of his valour, but being taken prisoner, must faithfully observe Covenants: so it is requisite that the people maintaine their rights by all possible meanes: but if it chance that they be brought into the subjection of anothers will, they must then patiently support the dominion of the Victor. So did Pompey Cato, and Cicero, and others, performe the parts of good Patriots then when they tooke armes against Caesar, seeking to alter the government of the State; neither can those be justly excused whose base feare hindred the happie successe of Pompey and his partakers noble designer. Augustus himselfe is said to have reproved one who rayled on Cato, affirming that he carried himselfe worthily and exceedingly affected to the greatnesse of his Countrey in couragiously opposing the alteration which his contraries sought to introduce in the Government of the State, seeing all innovations of that nature are ever Authors of much trouble and confusion.

Furthermore, no man can justly reprehend Brutus, Cassius, and the rest, who killed Caesar, before his tyrannicall authoritie had taken any firme rooting. And so were there Statues of brasse erected in honour of them by publick decree at Athens, and placed by those of Harmodius and Aristogiton, then when after the dispatching of Caesar they retired from Rome, to avoyde Mar: Antonie and Augustus their revenge. But Cinna was certainly guiltie of sedition, who after a legall transferring of the peoples power into the hands of Augustus, is said to conspire against him. Likewise when the Pepins sought to take the Crowne of France from the Merovingians; as also when those of the line of Capet endeavoured to supplant the Pepins, any might lawfully resist them without incurring the crime of sedition: but when by publick counsell and the authoritie of the Estates, the kingdome was transferred from one familie to another, it was then unlawfull to oppose it. The same may be said if a Woman possesse her selfe of the Kingdome, which the Salick Law absolutely prohibites, or if one seeke to make a Kingdome meerly elective, hereditary to his offspring, while those Lawes stand in force, and are unrepealed by [116] the authoritie of the generall Estates, which represent the body of the people. Neither is it necessary, in this respect, to have regard whether faction is the greater, more powerfull or more illustrious. Alwayes those are the greater number who are led by passion, than those that are ruled by reason, and therefore tyranny hath more servants than the Common-wealth. But Rome is there according to the saying of Pompey, where the Senate is, and the Senate is where there is obedience to the Lawes, love of libertie, and studious carefulnesse for the Countries preservation. And therefore though Brennus may seeme to be master of Rome: yet notwithstanding is Rome at veies with Camillus, who prepares to deliver Rome from bondage. It behoves therefore all true Romans to repaire to Camillus, and assist his Enterprise with the utmost of their power and endeavours. Although Themistocles, and all his Plutarch. in vita Themist. able and worthiest companions leave Athens, and put to Sea with a navie of two hundred Gallies, notwithstanding it cannot be said that any of these men are banished Athens. But rather as Themistocles answered; These two hundred Gallies are more usefull for us than the greatest Citie of all Greece: for that they are armed and prepared for the defence of those which endeavour to maintaine and uphold the publick State.

But to come to other examples; it follows not that the Church of God must needs be alwayes in that place where the Arke of the Covenant is: for the Philistines may carry the Arke into the Temples of their Idols. It is no good argument, that because wee see the Roman Eagles waving in Ensignes, and heare their Legions named, that therefore presently wee conclude that the Armie of the Romane Common-wealth is there present: for there is onely and properly the power of the State where they are assembled to maintaine the libertie of the Countrey against the ravenous oppression of Tyrants, to infranchise the people from servitude, and to suppresse the impudency of insulting flatterers, who abuse the Princes weaknesse by oppressing his Subjects for the advantaging of their own fortunes, and containe ambitious minds from enlarging their desires beyond the limits of equitie and moderation. Thus much concerning Tyrants without title. What may lawfully be done against Tyrants by practise.

But for Tyrants by practise, whether they at first gained their authoritie by the sword, or were legally invested therewith by a generall consent: It behooves us to examine this point with much [117] wary circumspection. In the first place we must rememher, that all Princes are born men, and therefore reason and passion are as hardly to be separated in them, as the soule is from the body whilest the man liveth: We must not then expect Princes absolute in perfection, but rather repute our selves happy if those that govern us be indifferently good. And therefore although the prince observe not exact mediocrity in State-affaires, if sometimes passion over-rule his reason, if some carelesse omission make him neglect the publick utility, or if he doe not alwayes carefully execute justice with equality, or repulse not with ready valour an invading enemy; he must not therefore be presently declared a tyrant. And certainly, seeing he rules not as a God over men, nor as men over beasts, but is a man composed of the same matter, and of the same nature with the rest: as we would questionlesse judge that prince unreasonably insolent, that should insult over and abuse his subjects, as if they were bruit beasts; so those people are doubtlesse as much void of reason, which imagine a prince should be compleat in perfection, or expect divine abilities in a nature so frail and subject to imperfection. But if a prince purposely ruine the Common-weale, if he presumptuously pervert and resist legall proceedings, or lawfull rights, if he make no reckoning of faith, covenants, justice nor piety, if he prosecute his subjects as enemies; briefly, if he expresse all or the chiefest of those wicked pratices we have so merly spoken of; then we may certainly declare him a tyrant, which is as much as an enemy both to God and men. We doe not therefore speak of a prince lesse good, but of one absolute bad; not of one lesse wise, but of one malicious and treacherous; not of one lesse able judiciously to discusse legall differences, but as one perversly bent to pervert justice and equity; not of an unwarlick, but of one furiously disposed to ruine the people, and ransack the State. For the wisdome of a Senate, the integrity of a Judge, the valour of a Captain, may peradventure inable a weak prince to govern well: But a tyrans could be content that all the Nobility, the Councellors of State, and Commanders for the warres, had but one head, that he might rake it off at one blow: those being the proper objects of his distrust and feare, and by consequence the principall subjects on whom he desires to execute his malice and cruelty. A foolish prince, although (to speak according to right [118] and equity) he ought to be deposed, yet may he perhaps in some sort be born withall: But a tyrant the more he is tollerated, the more he becomes intollerable.

Furthermore, as the Princes pleasure is not alwayes law, so many times it is not expedient that the people doe all that which may lawfully be done: for it may often times chance, that the medicine proves more dangerous than the disease. Therefore it becomes wise men to try all wayes before they come to blowes, to use all other remedies before they suffer the sword to decide the controversie. If then those which represent the body of the people, foresee any iunovation or machination against the State, or that it be already imbarked into a course of perdition, their duty is, first to admonish the Prince, and not to attend, that the disease by accession of time, and accidents, becomes unrecoverable. For tyranny may be properly resembled unto a Feaver Hectick, the which at the first is easie to be cured, but with much difficulty to be known; but after it is sufficiently known, it becomes uncurable. Therefore small beginnings are to be carefully observed, and by those whom it concernes diligently prevented.

If the Prince therefore persist in his violent courses, and contemne frequent admonitions, addressing his designes onely to that end, that he may oppresse at his pleasure, and effect his own desires without feare or restraint, he then doubtlesse makes himself liable to that detested crime of Tyranny: and whatsoever either the law, or lawfull authority permits against a tyrant, may be lawfully practised against him. Tyrany is not onely a will, but the chiefe and as it were the complement and abstract of vices. A Tyrant subverts the State, pillages the people, layes stratagems to intrap their lives, breaks promise with all, scoffes at the sacred obligation of a solemne oath, and therefore is he so much more vile than the vilest of usuall malefactors, by how much offences comitted against a generality, are worthy of greater punishment than those which concern onely particular and private persons. If Theeves and those that commit sacriledge, be declared infamous; nay, if they justly suffer corporall punishment by death, can we invent any that may be worthily equivalent for so outragious a crime?

Furthermore, we have already proved, that all Kings receive [119] their Royall authority from the people, that the whole people considered in one body, is above and greater than the King: and that the King and Emperour are onely the prime and supreme governours and ministers of the Kingdome and Empire; but the people the absolute Lord and owner thereof. It therefore necessarily followes, that a tyrant is in the same manner guilty of rebellion against the Majesty of the people, as the Lord of a see which felloniously transgresse the conditions of his investitutes, & is liable to the same punishment, yea and certainly deserves much more greater than the equity of those lawes inflict on the delinquents. Therefore as Barclus sayes, He may either be deposed by In tract. de tyran. & in tract. de Regim. civit. those which are, Lords in Soveraignty over him, or else justly punished according to the Law Julia, which codemnes those which offer violence to the publick. The body of the people must needs be the Soveraigne of those which represent it, which in some places are the Electors, Palatines, Peeres; in other, the Assembly of the generall Estates. And if the tyranny have gotten such sure footing, as there is no other meanes but force to remove him; then is it lawful for them to call the people to Arms, to inroll and raise forces, and to imploy the utmost of their power, and use against him all advantages and stratagems of warre, as against the enemy of the Common-wealth, and the disturber of the publick peace. Briefly, the same sentence may be justly pronounced against him, as was against Manlius Capitolinus at Rome. Valerius lib. 6. c. 3. Thou wast to me Manlius, when thou didst tumble down the Ganles that sealed the Capitole: But since thou art now become an enemy, like one of them, thou shalt be precipitated down from the same place from whence thou formerly tumbledst those enemies.

The Officers of the Kingdome cannot for this be rightly taxed of sedition: for in a sedition there must necessarily concurre but two parts, or sides, the which peremptorily contest together, so that it is necessary that the one be in the right, and the other in the wrong: That partundoubtedly hath the right on their side, which defends the Lawes, and strives to advance the publick profit Bart. in tract de Guclph. & Gibell. arg. l. 3. Sect. cum igitur D. de vi & vior. of the Kingdome. And those on the contrary are questionlesse in the wrong, which breake the Lawes, and protect those that violate justice, and oppresse the Common-wealth. Those are certainly in the right way, as saith Bartolus, which endeavour to suppresse tyrannicall government, and those in the wrong which oppose [120] lawfull authority. And that must ever be accounted just, which is intended only for the publique benefit, and that unjust, which aimes chiefly at private commodity. Wherefore Thomas Aquinas Tho. Aquin. s [...] c s [...] cand. q. 12 [...]t. 11. in s [...] re. saith, That a tyrannicall rule having no proper addresse for the publique welfare, but only to satisfie a private will with increase of particular profit to the ruler, cannot in any reasonable construction be accounted lawfull, and therefore the disturbance of such a government cannot be esteemed seditious, much lesse traytors; for that offence hath proper relation only to a lawfull Prince, who indeed is an inanimated [...] D. ad leg. [...] j [...] st. or speaking law; therefore seeing that he which employes the utmost of his meanes and power to annihilate the lawes, and quell their vertue and vigour, can no wayes be justly intitled therewith: [...] . [...] c. p [...]ad. 4. So neither likewise can those which oppose and take armes against him, be branded with so notorious a crime. Also this offence is committed against the Common wealth: but for so much as the Common-wealth is there only where the lawes are in force, and not where a Tyrant devoures the State at his owne pleasure and liking, he certainly is quit of that crime which ruines the Majesty of the publique State, and those questionlesse are worthily protectors and preservers of the Common-wealth, who confident in the lawsulness of their authority, and summoned thereunto by their duty, do couragiously resist the unjust proceedings of the Tyrant.

And in this their action wee must not esteeme them as private men and Subjects, but as the representative body of the people, yea and as the Soveraignty it selfe, which demands of his Minister an account of his administration. Neither can we in any good reason account the Officers of the Kingdome disloyall, who in this manner acquit themselves of their charge.

There is ever, and in all places, a mutuall and reciprocall obligation betweene the people and the Prince, the one promiseth to be a good and wise Prince, the other to obey faithfully, provided he govern justly. The people therefore is obliged to the Prince under condition: the Prince to the people simply and purely. Therefore if the Prince faile in his promise, the people is exempt from obedience, the contract is made void, the right of obligation of no force. Then the King if he governe unjustly is perjur'd, and the people likewise forsworne if they obey not his lawfull commands: but that people is truly acquit from all perfidiousnesse, [121] which publiquely renounce the unjust dominion of a Tyrant, or he striving unjustly by strong hand to continue the possession, doe constantly endeavour to expulse him by force of armes.

It is therefore permitted the Officers of a Kingdome, either all, L. 106. D. de reg. jur. or some good number of them to suppresse a Tyrant; And it is not only lawfull for them to doe it, but their duty expressely requires it: and if they doe it not, they can by no excuse colour their basenesse. For the Electors Palatines Peers and other Officers of State must not thinke they were established only to make pompeous paradoes and showes, when they are at the Coronation of the King, habited in their robes of State, as if there were some Masque or Interlude to be represented, or as if they were that day to act the parts of Roland Oliver, or Renaldo and such other personages on a Stage, or to counterfeit and revive the memory of the Knights of the round Table: and after the dismissing of that dayes assembly, to suppose they have sufficiently acquit themselves of their duty, untill a recesse of the like solemnity. Those solemne Rites and Ceremonies were not instituted for vaine ostentation, nor to passe as in a dumme show to please the spectators, nor in childrens sports as it is with Horace, to create a King in jest, but those Grandees must know, that as well for office and duty as for honour, they are called to the performance of those Rites, and that in them the Common wealth is committed and recommended to the King, as to her supreame and principall tutor, and protector, and to them as Coajutors and assistants to him. And therefore as the Tutors or Guardlans (yea even those Vlp. l. 3. D. de adm. et peric. tut. et curat. that are appointed by way of honour) are chosen to have care of, & observe the actions and importments of him which holds the principall ranke in the tutor-ship, and to looke how he carrieth himselfe in the administration of the goods of his pupill: so likewise L. 27. D. cod. are the former ordained to have an eye to the courses of the King, for with an equivolent authority as the others for the pupill, so are they to hinder and prevent the dammage and detriment of the people, the King being properly reputed as the prime Guardian, and they his Coadjutors.

In like manner as the faults of the principall tutor who manages L. 14. D. de administ. ct peric. tut. l. 3. D. de suspec. tut. et cur. the affaires, are justly imputed to the coadjoynts in the tutorship, if when they ought and might, they did not discover his errors, and cause him to be deposed, especially failing in the main [122] points of his charge, to wit, in not communicating unto them the affaires of his administration, in dealing unfaithfully in his place, in doing any thing to the dishonour or detriment of his pupill, in imbessilling of his goods or estate, or if hee be an enemy to his pupill: briefly, if either in regard of the worthlessenesse of his person, or weaknesse of his judgment, he be unable well to discharge so weighty a charge. So also are the Peeres and principall Officers of the Kingdome accountable for the government thereof, and must both prevent, and if occasion require, suppresse the tyranny of the Prince, as also supply with their care and diligence his inability and weaknesse.

Finally, If a Tutor omitting or neglecting to doe all that for his pupill, which a discreet Father of a family would and might conveniently performe, cannot well be excused, and the better acquitting him selfe of his charge, hath others as concealers and associates, joyned with him to oversee his actions: with much more reason may and ought the Officers of the Crown restraine the violent irruptions of that Prince, who insteed of a father, becomes an enemie to his people; seeing to speake properly, they are as well accountable for his actions wherein the publique hath interests, as for their owne.

Those officers must also remember, that the King holds truly l. 10. ct 33. D. de adm. et peric. tutor et Cur. the first place in the administration of the State, but they the second, and so following according to their ranks; not that they should follow his courses, if he transgresse the lawes of equity and justice, not that if he oppresse the Common-wealth, they should connive to his wickednesse. For the Common-wealth was as well committed to their care as to his, so that it is not sufficient for them to discharge their owne duty in particular, but it behoves them also to containe the Prince within the limits of reason. Briefly they have both joyntly and severally promised with solemn oaths, to advance and procure the profit of the Common-wealth: although then that he forsweare himselfe, yet may not they imagine that they are quit of their promise, no more then the Bishops, and Patriarks if they suffer an hereticall Pope to ruine the Church: yea they should esteeme themselves so much the more obliged to the observing of their oath: by how much they finde him wilfully dispos'd to rush on in his perfidious courses. But if there be collufion betwixt him and them, they are prevaricators, if they dissemble [123] they may justly be called forsakers, and traytors: If they deliver not the Common-wealth from tiranny, they may be truly ranckt in the number of Tyrants: as on the contrary they are protectors, tutors, and in a sort Kings, if they keepe and maintain the State safe and intire, which is also recommended to their care and custody.

Although these things are sufficiently certain of themselves, yet may they be in some sort confirmed by examples. The Kings of Canaan which pressed the people of Israel with a hard, both corporall and spirituall servitude (prohibiting them all meetings and use of armes) were certainly Tyrants by practice, although they had some pretext of title. For, Eglon & Jabin had peaceable reigned almost the space of twenty yeares, God stirred up extraordinarily Iudg. 4. & 3. Ehud, which by a politique stratagem killed Eglon, and Debora which overthrew the Armle of Jabin, and by this service delivered the people from the servitude of Tirants, not that it was unlawfull for the ordinary Magistrates, the Princes of the Tribes, and such other Officers to have performed it, for Debora doth reprove the sluggish idlenesse of some, and flatly detests the disloyalty of others for that they failed to perforforme their duty herein. But it pleased God, taking commiseration of the distresse of his people, in this manner to supply the defects of the ordinary Magistrates.

Rehoboam the sonne of Solomon refused to disburthen the people 1 King. 12. 6, &c. of some unnecessary imposts and burthens: and being petitioned by the people in the generall Assembly of the States, he grew insolent, and relying on the counsell of his Minions, arrogantly threatens to lay beavier burthens on them hereafter. No man can doubt, but that according to the tenour of the contract first passed betweene the King and the people, the prime and principall Officers of the Kingdome had authority to represse such insolence They were only blameable in this, that they did that by faction and division, which should more properly have beene done in the generall Assembly of the States: in like manner in that they transferred the Scepter from Juda (which was by God onely confin'd to that Tribe) into another linage: and also (as it chances in other affaires) for that they did ill and disorderly manage a just and lawfull cause. Prophane histories are full of such examples in other Kingdomes.

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Brutus Generall of the Souldiers, and Lueretius Governour of the Citie of Rome, assemble the people against Tarquinius Superbus, Titus Livi. lib. 1. and by their authority thrust him from the royall Throne: Nay, which is more, his goods are confiscated: whereby it appeares that if Tarquinius had beene apprehended, undoubtedly hee should have beene according to the publique lawes corporally punished.

The true causes why Tarquinius was deposed, were because he altered the custome whereby the King was obliged to advise with the Senate on all weighty affaires, that he made Warre and Peace according to his owne fancie, that he treated confederacles without demanding counsell or consent from the people or Senate: that he violated the Lawes whereof he was made Guardian: briefly that he made no reckoning to observe the contracts agreed between the former Kings, and the Nobility and people of Rome. For the Roman Emperours, I am sure you remember the sentence pronounced by the Senate against Nero, wherein he was judged enemie to the Common-wealth, and his body condemned to be ignominiously cast on the dung-hill: and that other pronounced against Vitellius, which adjudge him to be shamefully dis-membred, and in that miserable estate trayled through the Citie, and at last put to death: another against Maximinius who was dispoild of the Empire, and Maximus and Albinus established in his place by the Senace. There might also be added many others drawne from unquestionable Historians.

The Emperour Trajan held not himselfe exempt from lawes, neither desired he to be spared if he became a Tyrant: for in delivering the Sword unto the great Provost of the Empire, he sayes unto him; If I command as I should, use this sword for mee: but if I doe otherwayes, unsheath it against me. In like manner the French by the authority of the States, and solicited thereunto by the Officers of the Kingdome, deposed Childerick the first, Sigisbert, Theodoricke, and Childericke the third, for their tyrannies, and chose others of another Family to sit on the Royall Throne. Yea they deposed some because of their idlenesse and want of judgment, who exposed the State in prey to Panders, Curtesans, Flatterers, and such other unworthy mushromes of the Court, who governed all things at their pleasure: taking from such rash Phaetous the bridle of government, left the whole body of the State and [125] people should be consumed through their unadvised folly.

Amongst others, Theodoret was degraded because of Ebroinus Dagobert for Plectude and Thiband his Pander, with some others: the Estates esteeming the command of an effeminate Prince as insupportable as that of a woman, and as unwillingly supporting the yoke of tyrannous Ministers managing affaires in the name of a loose and unworthy Prince, as the burden of a tyrant alone. To be briefe, no more suffering themselves to be governed by one possessed by a Devill, than they would by the Devill himselfe. It is not very long since the Estates compeld Lewis the eleventh (a Prince as subtile, and it may be as wilfull as any) to receive thirtie six Overseers, by whose advise he was bound to governe the affaires of State. The descendants from Charlemaine substituted in the place of the Merovingiens for the government of the kingdome, or those of Capet, supplanting the Charlemains by order of the Estates, and raigning at this day have no other nor better right to the Crowne, than what wee have formerly described; and it hath ever been according to Law permitted the whole body of the people represented by the counsell of the Kingdome, which are commonly called the Assembly of the States, to depose and establish Princes, according to the necessities of the Common-wealth. According to the same rule wee reade that Adolph was removed from the Empire of Germany Anno 1296. because for covetousnesse without Anno 1296. any just occasion, he invaded the Kingdome of France, in favour of the English, and Wenceslaus was also deposed in the yeare of our Lord 1400. Yet were not these Princes exceeding bad ones, 1400. but of the number of those which are accounted lesse ill. Elizabeth the wife of Edward the second King of England, assembled the Parliament Froisard. li. 1. cap. 1. against her husband, who was there deposed, both because he tyrannized in generall over his Subjects, as also for that he cut Reade the manner of the deposing of Richard the second. off the heads of many noble men, without any just or legall proceeding. It is not long since Christierne lost the Crowne of Denmarke, Henry that of Sweden, Mary Steward that of Scotland, for the same, or neere resembling occasions: and the most worthy Histories relate divers alterations and changes which have hapned in like manner, in the Kingdomes of Polonia, Hungarie, Spaine, Portugall, Bohemia, and others.

But what shall we say of the Pope himselfe? It is generally held Ant: de But. confil quod positum est inter consil. Paul. de Castro, vel antiq. nu. 412. incip viso puncto. that the Cardinalls because they doe elect him, or if they fayle in [126] their dutie, the Patriarkas which are next in ranke to them, may upon certaine occasions maugre the Pope, call a Councell, yea, and in it judge him: As when by some notorious offence he scandalizeth the universall Church: if he be incorrigible, if reformation be as necessary in the head as the members, if contrary to his oath he refuse to call a generall Councell. And we reade for certaine that Mar. Laud [...] ns. in tract. de Card. 1. l. 2. q. 35. Ph [...] lip. Deci [...] s in quodan. co. [...] i [...] o cujus verbs suerunt. Andr. B [...]h. in d. con [...] 1. lib. 1. [...]. 6. [...] de major. & obed. divers Popes have been deposed by generall Councells. But if they obstinately abuse their authoritie, there must (saith Baldus) first be used verball admonitions; secondly, herball medicaments or remedies; thirdly, stones or compulsion; for where vertue and faire meanes, have not power to perswade, there force and terror must be put in ure to compell. Now if according to the opinions of most of the learned, by decrees of Councels, and by custome in like occasions, it plainly appeares that the Councell may depose the Pope, who notwithstanding vaunts himselfe to be the King of Kings, and as much in dignitie above the Emperour, as the Sunne is above the Moone, assuming to himselfe power to depose Kings and Emperours when he pleaseth. Who will make any doubt or question, that the generall Assembly of the Estates of any kingdome, who are the representative body thereof, may not onely degrade and disthronize a tyrant: but also even disauthorize and depose a King, whose weaknesse or folly is hurtfull or pernicious to the State.

But let us suppose that in this our Ship of State, the Pilot is Simile. drunke, the most of his associates are asleepe, or after large and unreasonable tipling together, they regard their imminent danger in approaching a rocke with idle and negligent jollitie; the Ship in the meane season in stead of following her right course, that might serve for the best advantage of the owners profit, is ready rather to split her selfe. What should then a Masters-mate or some other under-Officer doe, who is vigilant and carefull to performe his dutie? Shall it be thought sufficient for him to pinch or poule them which are asleepe? without daring in the meane time to put his helping hand to preserve the Vessell, which runnes on a course to destruction, least he should be thought to intermeddle with that which he hath no authoritie nor warrant to doe? What mad discretion, nay rather notorious impietie were this? Seeing then that Tyranny, as Plato saith, is a drunken frenfie or frantick drunkennesse, Plato lib. 8. & 9. de repub. if the Prince endeavour to ruine the Common-wealth, and [127] the principall Officers concurre with him in his bad purposes, or at the least are luld in a dull and drowsie dreame of securitie, and the people (being indeed the true and absolute owner and Lord of the State) be through the pernicious negligence and fraudulent connivency of those Officers brought to the very brim of danger and destruction, and that there be notwithstanding amongst those unworthy Ministers of State, some one that doth studiously observe the deceitfull and dangerous encroachments of tyranny, and from his soule deteste it. What opposition doe wee suppose best befits such a one to make against it? Shall he consent himselfe to admonish his associates of their dutie, who to their utmost abilitie endeavour the contrary? Besides, that such an advertisement is commonly accompanied with too much danger, and the condition of the times considered, the very solliciting of reformation will be held as a capitall crime: so that in so doing he may be not unfitly Simile. resembled to one that being in the middest of a desert, environed with theeves, should neglect all meanes of defence, and after he had cast away his Armes, in an eloquent and learned discourse commend justice, and extoll the worth and dignitie of the Lawes. This would be truly according to the Proverbe, To run mad with reason. What then? Shall he be dull and deafe to the groanes and cries of the people? Shall he stand still and be silent when he sees the theeves enter? Shall he onely hold his hands in his bosome, L. 3. & l. Omne delictum [...]ult. D. de re milit. and with a demure countenance, idlely bewaile the miserable condition of the times? If the Lawes worthily condemne a Souldier, which for feare of the enemies counterfeits sicknesse, because in so doing he expresseth both disloyaltie and treachery. What punishment can we invent sufficient for him, who either maliciously or basely betrayes those whose protection and defence he hath absolutely undertaken and sworne? Nay rather then let such a one cheerefully call one, and command the Mariners to the performance of their dutie: let him carefully and constantly take order that the Common-wealth be not indamaged, and if need so require, even in despite of the King, preserve the Kingdome, without which the kingly title were idle and frivolous, and if by no other meanes it can be effected, let him take the King and binde him hand and foote, that so he may be more conveniently cured of his frensie and madnesse. For as wee have already said, all the administration of the Kingdome, is not by the people absolutely resigned into the [128] hands of the King; as neither the Bishopricke, nor care of the universall C. Nullus in Carthagin. Council. Doctores pontificii. Church, is totally committed to the Pope: but also to the care and custody of all the principall Officers of the Kingdome. Now for the preserving of peace and concord amongst those which governe, and for the preventing of jealousies, factions, and distrusts amongst men of equall ranke and dignitie, the King was created as prime and principall Superintendent in the government of the Common-wealth. The King sweares that his most speciall care shall be for the welfare of the Kingdome; and the Officers of the Crowne take all the same oath. If then the King, or divers of them falsifying their faith, ruine the Common-wealth, or abandon her in her greatest necessitie, must the rest also fashion themselves to their base courses, and quit all care of the States safetie; as if the bad example of their companions, absolved them from their oath of fidelitie? Nay, rather on the contrary, in seeing them neglect their promise, they shall best advantage the Common-wealth In carefully observing theirs: chiefly because for this reason they were instituted, as in the steads of Ephori, or publick Controllers, and for that every thing gaines the better estimation of just and right in that it is mainly and principally addressed to that end for which is was first ordained.

Furthermore, if divers have joyntly vowed one and the same thing, is the obligation of the one annihilated by the perjurie of the other? If many become bound for one and the same summe, can the banquerouting of one of the obligees quit the rest of their ingagement? If divers tutors administer ill the goods of their pupill, and that there be one amongst them that makes conscience of his actions, can the bad dealing of his companions acquit him? Nay rather on the contrary, he cannot free himselfe from the infamie of perjurie, if to the utmost of his power he doe not truely dilcharge his trust, and perform his promise: neither can the others defalliancy be excused, in the bad managing of the tutorship, if they likewise accuse not the rest that were joyned with them in the administration, for it is not onely the principall tutor that may call to an account those which are suspected to have unjustly L 3. D. de administ. & peric. tutor. & cur. lib. 3. D. de suspect. tus. & cura. or indiscreetly ordered the affaires of their pupill, but even those which were formerly removed, may also upon just occasion discharge and remove the delinquents therein. Therefore those which are obliged to serve a whole Empire or Kingdome, as the [129] Constable, Marshals, Peeres, and others, or those which have particular obligations to some Provinces, or Cities, which make a part or portion of the Kingdome, as Dukes, Marquisses, Earles, Sheriffes, Mayors, and the rest, are bound by the dutie of their place, to succour the Common-wealth, and to free it from the burden of Tyrants, according to the ranke and place which they hold of the people next after the King. The first ought to deliver the whole Kingdome from tyrannous oppression: the other as tutors, that part of the Kingdome whose protection they have undertaken: the dutie of the former is to suppresse the Tyrant: that of the latter, to drive him from their confines. Wherefore Mattathias being a principall man in the State, when some basely connived, others pernitiously consorted with Antiochus the tyrannous oppressors of the Jewish Kingdome, he couragiously opposing the manifest oppression, both of Church and State, incourageth 1 Machab. 3. 43. the people to the taking of Armes, with these words; Let us restore the decayed estate of our people, and let us fight for our people, and for the Sanctuarie. Whereby it plainly appeares, that not for Religion onely; but even for our Countrey, and our possessions, wee may fight, and take armes against a tyrant, as this Antiochus was. For the Machabites are not by any questioned, or reprehended for conquering the Kingdome, and expelling the tyrant, but in that they attributed to themselves the royall dignitie, which onely belonged by Gods speciall appointment to the tribe of Juda.

Humane Histories are frequently stored with examples of this Justin. lib. 1. Diodor. lib. 2. cap. 37. kinde. Arbactus Governour of the Medes killed effeminate Sardanapalus, spinning amongst women, and sportingly distributing all the treasures of the Kingdome amongst those his loose companions. Vindex and Galba quit the partie of Nero, yea though the Senate connived, and in a sort supported his tyrannie, and drew with them Gallia, and Spaine, being the Provinces whereof they were Governours.

But amongst all, the Decree of the Senate of Sparta is most notable, and ought to passe as an undeniable Maxime amongst all Nations. The Spartans being Lords of the City Bizantium, sent Olearchus thither for Governour and Commander for the warres; who took Corn from the Citizens, and distributed it to his Souldiers. In the mean time the families of the Citizens died for hunger: [130] Anaxilaus, a principall man of the Citie, disdaining that tyrannous usage, entred into treaty with Alcibiades to deliver up the Town, who shortly after was received into it. Anaxilaus being accused at Sparta for the delivery of Bizantium, pleaded his cause himselfe, and was there acquit by the Judges: for (said they) warres are to be made with enemies, and not with Nature. Nothing being more repugnant to Nature, than that those which are bound to defend a City, should be more cruell to the inhabitants, than their enemies that besiege them.

This was the opinion of the Lacedemonians, certainly just Rulers, Neither can he be accounted a just King, which approves not this sentence of absolution: for those which desire to govern according to the due proportion of equity and reason, take into consideration as well what the Law inflicts on tyrants, as also what are the proper rights and bounds both of the Patritian and Plebeian orders. But we must yet proceed a little further: There is not so mean a Mariner, but must be ready to prevent the ship-wrack of the vessell, when either the negligence or wilsulnesse of the Pilot casts it into danger. Every Magistrate is bound to relieve, and as much as in him lies, to redresse the miseries of the Common-wealth, if he shall see the Prince, or the principall Officers of State his associates, by their weaknesse or wickednesse, to hazard the ruine thereof. Briefly, he must either free the whole kingdome, or at least that portion especially recommended to his care, from their imminent and incroaching tyranny. But hath this duty proper relation to every one: Shall it be permitted to Hendonius Sabinus, to Ennus Suranus, or to the Fencer Spartanus; or to be briefe, to a meere private person, to present the bonnet to slaves, put Armes into the hand of subjects, or to joyn battell with the prince, although he oppresse the people with tyranny? No certainly: The Common wealth was not given in charge to particular persons considered one by one; but on the contrary, particulars even as Papists, are recommended to the care of the principall Officers and Magistrates; and therefore they are not bound to defend the Common-wealth, which cannot defend themselves. God nor the people have not put the sword into the L. 2. de Sedi [...]sis. hands of particular persons: Therefore if without commandment they draw the sword, they are seditions, although the cause seem never so just.

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Furthermore, the prince is not establisht by private and particular persons, but by all in generall considered in one intire body; whereupon it followes, that they are bound to attend the commandment of all, to wit, of those which are the representative body of a kingdom, or of a Province, or of a Citie, or at the least of some one of them, before they undertake any thing against the prince. For as a pupill cannot bring an action, but being avowd L. 8. l. 9. D. de aucto. & constict. & cur. in the name of his Tutor, although the pupill be indeed the true proprietor of the estate, and the tutor onely owner with reference to the charge committed unto him: so likewise the people may not enterprise actions of such nature, but by the command of those, into whose hands they have refigned their power and authority, whether they be ordinary Magistrates, or extraordinary, created in the Assembly of the Estates; whom, if I may so say, for that purpose, they have girded with their sword, and invested with authority, both to govern and defend them, establisht in the same kind as the Pretor at Rome, who determined Sencea lib. 1. de Benefic. all differences between masters and their servants, to the end that if any controversie happened between the King and the subjects, they should be Judges and preservers of the right, lest the subjects should assume power to themselves to be judges in their own causes. And therefore if they were opprest with tributes, and unreasonable imposts, if any thing were attempted contrary to covenant and oath, and no Magistrate opposed those unjust proceedings, they must rest quiet, and suppose that many times the best Physitians both to prevent and cure some grievous disease, do appoint both letting blood, evacuation of humors, & lancing of the flesh; and that the affaires of this world are of that nature, that with much difficulty one evill cannot be remedied without the adventuring if not the suffering of another, nor any good be atchieved, without great pains. They have the example of the people of Israel, who during the reigne of Solomon, refused not to pay those excessive taxes imposed on them, both for the building of the Temple, and fortifying of the Kingdome, because by a generall consent they were granted for the promulgation of the glory of God, and for an ornament and desence of the publick State.

They have also the example of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, who though he were King of Kings, notwithstanding [132] because he conversed in this world in another quality, to wit, o a private and particular man, paid willingly tribute. If the Magistrates themselves manifestly favour the tyranny, or at the least doe not formally oppose it; let private men remember the saying of Job, That for the sinnes of the people God permits bypocrites Iob. 34. to reigne, whom it is impossible either to convert or subvert, if men repent not of their wayes, to walk in obedience to Gods commandments; so that there is no other weapons to be used, but bended knees and humble hearts. Briefly, let them bear with bad princes, and pray for better, perswading themselves, that an outragious tyranny is to be supported as patiently, as some exceeding dammage done by the violence of tempests, or some excessive over-flowing waters, or some such naturall accidents unto the fruits of the earth, if they like not better to change their habitations, by retiring themselves into some other countries. So David fled into the mountaines, and attempted nothing against the Tyrant Saul, because the people had not declared him any publick Magistrate of the Kingdome.

Jesus Christ, whose kingdome was not of this world, fled into Egypt, and so freed himselfe from the pawes of the Tyrant. Saint Paul teaching of the duty of particular Christian men, and not Rom. 13. of Magistrates, teacheth that Nero must be obeyed. But if all the principall Officers of State, or divers of them, or but one, endeavour to suppresse a manifest tyranny, or if a Magistrate seek to free that province, or portion of the kingdome from oppression, which is committed to his care and custody, provided under colour of freedome he bring not in a new tyranny, then must all men with joynt courage and alacrity, run to Armes, and take part with him or them, and assist with body and goods, as if God himselfe from heaven had proclaimed warres, and meant to joyn battell against tyrants, and by all wayes and means endevour to deliver their Countrey and Common-wealth from their tyrannous oppression. For as God doth oftentimes chastise a people by the cruelty of tyrants: so also doth he many times punish tyrants by the hands of the people. It being a most true saying, Ecclus 10. verified in all ages: For the iniquities, violences, and wickednesses of Princes, Kingdomes are translated from one Nation to another: but tyranny was never of any durable continuance.

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The Centurians and men at armes did freely and couragiously execute the commandments of the High Priest Jehoiada, in suppressing the tyranny of Athalia. In like manner all the faithfull and generous Israelites tooke part and joyned with the Machabites, as well to re-establish the true service of God, as also to free and deliver the State from the wicked and unjust oppression of Antiochus, and God blessed with happy successe their just and commendable enterprize. What then? cannot God when he pleaseth stirre up particular and private persons to ruine a mighty and powerfull tyranny? Hee that gives power and ability to some even out of the dust without any title or colourable pretext of lawfull authority to rise to the height of rule and dominion, and in it tyrannize and afflict the people for their transgressions? cannot he also even from the meanest multitude raise a liberator? Hee which enthral'd and subjected the people of Israel to Jabin, and to Eglon, did hee not deliver & enfranchise them by the hand of Ebud, Barac and Debora, whilst the Magistrates & Officers were dead in a dul & negligent extasie of security? What then shall hinder, you may say the same God who in these dayes sends us Tyrants to correct us, that he may not also extraordinarily send correctors of tyrants to deliver us? What if Adab cut off good men, if Jezabel subborn false witnesses against Naboth, may not a Jehu be rais'd to exterminate the whole line of Arab, to revenge the death of Naboth, and to cast the body of Jezabel to be torne and devoured of dogs? Certainly as I have formerly answered, the Almighty is ever mindfull of his justice, and maintains it as inviolably as his mercy.

But for as much as in these latter times, those miraculous testimonies by which God was wont to confirme the extraordinary vocation of those famous Worthies, are now wanting for the most part: let the people be advis'd, that in seeking to crosse the Sea dry foote, they take not some Impostor for their guide, that may lead them head-long to destruction (as we may read happened to the Jewes:) and that in seeking freedome from tyranny, he that was the principall instrument to dis-inthrall them, became not himselfe a more insupportable Tyrant than the former: briefly, lest endeavouring to advantage the Common-wealth, they introduce not a common misery upon all the undertakers, participating therein with divers States of Italy, who seeking to suppresse the present evill, added an accession of greater, and more intollerable servitude.

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Finally, that we may come to some period of this third question; Princes are chosen by God, and establisht by the people: As all particulars considered one by one are inferiour to the Prince: so the whole body of the people and Officers of State which represent that body, are the Princes superiours. In the receiving and inauguration of a Prince, there are Covenants and contracts passed between him and the people, which are tacite and expressed, naturall or civill: to wit, to obey him faithfully whilst he commands justly, that he serving the Common-wealth, all men shal serve him, that whilst he governs according to law, all shall be submitted to his government, &c. The Officers of the Kingdome are the Guardians and Protectors of these Covenants and contracts. He that maliciously or wilfully violates these conditions, is questionlesse a Tyrant by practice. And therefore the Officers of State may judge him according to the lawes: and if he support his tyranny by strong hands, their duty bindes them, when by no other meanes it can be effected, by force of armes to suppresse him.

Of these Officers there be two kindes, those which have generally undertaken the protection of the Kingdome: as the Constable, Marshalls, Peers, Palatines, and the rest, every one of which, although all the rest doe either connive or consort with the tyranny, are bound to oppose and represse the Tyrant: and those which have undertaken the government of any Province, Citie, or part of the Kingdome, as Dukes, Marquesses, Earles, Consuls, Mayors, Sheriffes, &c. they may according to right expell and drive tyranny and Tyrants from their Cities, Confines, and governments.

But particular and private persons may not unsheath the sword against Tyrants by practise, because they were not establisht by particulars, but by the whole body of the people. But for Tyrants which without title intrude themselves for so much as there is no contract or agreement betweene them and the people, it is indifferently permitted all to oppose and depose them; and in this rank of Tyrants may those be rang'd, who, abusing the weakenesse and sloath of a lawfull Prince, tyrannously insult over his Subjects. Thus much for this, to which for a more full resolution may be added that which hath beene formerly discoursed in the second question.