

*Vindiciae contra Tyrannos:*

A  
Defence of Liberty against Tyrants.

OR,  
Of the lawfull power of the Prince over  
*the people, and of the people over the Prince.*

BEING  
A Treatise written in Latin and French  
by *Junius Brutus*, and translated out of  
both into ENGLISH.

Questions discussed in this Treatise.

- I. *Whether Subjects are bound, and ought to obey Princes, if they command that which is against the Law of God.*
- II. *Whether it be lawfull to resist a Prince which doth infringe the Law of God, or ruine the Church, by whom, how, and how farre it is lawfull.*
- III. *Whether it be lawfull to resist a Prince which doth oppresse or ruine a publique State, and how farre such resistance may be extended, by whom, how, and by what right, or law it is permitted.*
- IV. *Whether neighbour Princes or States may be, or are bound by Law, to give succours to the Subjects of other Princes, afflicted for the cause of true Religion, or oppressed by manifest tyranny.*

LONDON,

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Smithfield, neer the Queens-head Tavern. 1648.

*This is an abominable & treasonable booke, set for nothing  
but to give us then is y<sup>e</sup> translator worthy of a halter.*





THE  
Emperors, Theodosias *and* Valentinian  
TO  
VOLUSIANUS, Great Provost  
of the Empire.

**I**t is a thing well-becoming  
the Majesty of an Emper-  
our, to acknowledge himself  
bound to obey the Laws. Our  
authority depending on the  
authority of the Laws, and in very deed to  
submit the principallity to Law, is a greater  
thing then to beare rule. We therefore make  
it known unto all men, by the Declaration of  
this our Edict, that Wee doe not allow Our  
selves, or repute it lawfull to doe any thing  
contrary to this.

An Epistle.

Justine in the second Book, speaks thus of Lycargus, Law-giver to the Lacedemonians, He gave Laws to the Spartans which had not any: and was as much renowned for his diligent observing of them himself, as for his discreet Inventing of them: For he made no Laws for others, to the obedience whereof he did not first submit himself. Fashioning the people to obey willingly, and the Prince to Govern uprightly.

The

(1)  
The first Question.

Whether Subjects are bound and ought to obey Princes, if they command that which is against the Law of God.

**T**HIS question happily may seeme at the first view to be altogether superfluous and unprofitable, for that it seems to make a doubt, of an axiome allways held infallible amongst Christians, confirmed by many testimonies in Holy Scripture, divers examples of the histories of all ages, and by the death of all the Holy Martyrs, for it may be well demanded wherefore Christians have endured so many afflictions, but that they were alwayes persecuted, that God must be obeyed simply, and absolutely, and Kings with this exception that they command not that which is repugnant to the law of God. Otherways wherefore should the Apostles have answered, that God must rather be obeyed than men, and also seeing that the only wil of God is always just, and that of men may be, and is, oftentimes unjust, who can doubt but that we must always obey Gods commandements without any exception, and mens ever with limitation. But for so much as there are many Princes in these days, calling themselves Christians, which arrogantly assumes an unlimited power, over which God himselfe hath no command, and that they have no want of flatterers, which adore them as Gods upon earth, many others also, which for feare, or by constraint, either seem, or else do beleeve, that Princes ought to be obeyed in all things, and by all men. And withall, seeing the unhappines of these times is such, that there is nothing so firme, certain, or pure, which is not shaken, disgraced, or polluted; I feare me that whosoever shall neerly, and thoroughly consider these things, will confesse this question to be not only most profitable, but also, the times considered, most necessary. For my owne part when I consider the cause of the many calamities, wherewith Christendome hath been afflicted, for these late yeares, I cannot but remember that of the Prophet Hosea, *The Princes of Judah were like them that remove the bounds: wherefore I will power out myself like water. Ephraim is oppressed, and broken in judgement, because he willingly walked after the Commandement.* Here you see the sin of the Princes, and people dispersed in these two words.

The Princes exceed their bounds, not contenting themselves with that authority which the Almighty, and all good God hath given them, but seeke to usurpe that sovereignty, which he

AG. 4. 19.

Hos. 5. 12.

hath reserved to himselfe over all men, being not content to command the bodys, and goods of their Subjects at their pleasure, but assume licence to themselves to enforce the Consciences, which appertaines chiefly to Jesus Christ, holding the earth not great enough for their ambition, they will climbe and conquer heaven it selfe. The people on the other side walkes after the commandement, when they yeeld to the desire of Princes, who command them that which is against the law of God, and as it were burn incense to, and adore these earthly Gods; and instead of resisting them, if they have means and occasion; suffer them to usurp the place of God, making no conscience to give that to *Cesar*, which belongs properly and only to God. Now is there any man that sees not this, if a man disobey a Prince commanding that which is wicked and unlawful; hee shall presently bee esteemed a Rebel, a Traytor, and guilty of High Treason, our Saviour Christ, the Apostles and all the Christians of the Primitive Church were charged with these Calumnies. If any after the example of *Ezra*, and *Nehemiah*, dispose himselfe to the building of the Temple of the Lord, it will be said he aspires to the Crowne, hatches innovations, and seeks the ruine of the State, then you shall presently see a million of these Minnions, and flatterers of Princes tickling their eares with an opinion, that if they once suffer this Temple to be re-built, they may bid their Kingdome farewell, and never look to raise impost or taxes on these men. But what a madnesse is this? There are no estates which ought to be esteemed firme and stable, but those, in whom the Temple of God is built, and which are indeed the Temple it selfe, and these we may truly call Kings, which reigne with God, seeing that it is by him only that Kings reign: On the contrary what beastly foolishnesse is it to think, that the State and Kingdome cannot subsist if God Almighty be not excluded, and his Temple demolished. From hence proceeds so many Tyrannous enterprises, unhappy and tragick death of Kings, and ruines of people. If these Sicophants knew what difference there is between *God* and *Cesar*, between the King of Kings, and a simple King; between the Lord, and the Vassal, and what tributs this Lord requires of his Subjects, and what authority he gives to Kings over those his Subjects, certainly so many Princes would not strive to trouble the Kingdome of God, and we should not see some of them precipitated from their

Throns

Throns by the just instigation of the Almighty, revenging himselfe of them, in the midst of their greatest strength, and the people should not be so sack't and pillag'd, and troden down.

It then belongs to Princes to know how farse they may extend their authority, and to subjects in what they may obey them, lest the one encroaching on that jurisdiction, which no way belongs to them, and the others obeying him which commandeth further then he ought, they be both chastised, when they shall give an account thereof before another Judge: Now the end and scope of the question propounded, whereof the Holy Scripture shall principally give the resolution, is that which followeth. The question is, if subjects be bound to obey Kings, in case they command that which is against the Law of God: that is to say, to which of the two (God or the King) must we rather obey, when the question shall be resolved concerning the King, to whom is attributed absolute power, that concerning other Magistrates shall be also determined.

First, the Holy Scripture doth teach, that God reignes by his owne proper authority, and Kings by derivation, God from himselfe, Kings from God, that God hath a jurisdiction proper, Kings are his delegates: It followes then, that the jurisdiction of God hath no limits, that of Kings bounded, that the power of God is infinit, that of Kings confin'd, that the Kingdom of God extends it selfe to all places, that of Kings is restrain'd within the confines of certaine countries: In like manner God hath created of nothing both heaven, and earth; wherefore by good right he is Lord; and true Proprietorie, both of the one, and the other: All the Inhabitants of the earth hold of him that which they have, and are but his tenants, and farmers; all the Princes and Governors of the world are his stipendiaries, and vassals, and are bound to take and acknowledge their investitures from him. Briefly, God alone is the owner and Lord, and all men of what degree, or quality soever they be, are his servants, farmers, officers, and vassals, and owe account, and acknowledgement to him; according to that which he hath committed to their dispensation, the higher their place is, the greater their account must be, and according to the rank whereunto God hath rais'd them, must they make their reckoning before his divine Majesty, which the Holy Scripture teacheth in infinit places, and all the faithfull, yea, and the wisest amongst the Heathen have ever acknowledged: The earth is the Lords, and the fulnesse thereof, (so saith King *David*) And to the end that men should not sacrifice to their owne industry; the earth yields

Prov. 8.  
Job 11.  
Wisd. 6.3.

Psal. 14.

no increase without the dew of heaven: Wherefore God commanded that his people should offer unto him the first of their fruits, and the Heathens themselves have consecrated the same unto their gods; to the end, that God might be acknowledged Lord, and they his grangers and vice dressers; the heaven is the Throne of the Lord, and the earth his foot-stoole. And therefore seeing all the Kings of the world are under his feet; it is no marvel, if God be called the King of kings, and Lord of lords; all Kings be termed his Ministers established to judge rightly, and govern justly the world in the quality of Livetnants. By me (so saith the divine Wisdom) Kings reigne, and the Princes judge the earth: If they doe it not he looseth the bonds of Kings, and girdeth their loyns with a girdle. As if he should say, it is in my power to establish Kings in their Thrones, or to thrust them out, and from that occasion the Throne of Kings is called the Throne of God. Blessed be the Lord thy God (saith the Queen of Sheba) to King Solomon which delighted in thee to see thee on his Throne to be King for the Lord thy God, to doe judgement and justice. In like manner we read in another place, that Solomon sat on the Throne of the Lord, or on the Throne of the Lords Kingdome. By the same reason the people is always called the Lords people, and the Lords inheritance, and the Kings Governor of this inheritance, and Conductor or Leader of his people of God, which is the title given to David, to Solomon, to Ezechias, and to other good Princes; when also the Covenant is passed betwixt God and the King, it is upon condition that the people be, and remaine always the people of God, to shew that God will not in any case despoyle himselfe of his propriety, and possession, when he gives to Kings the government of the people, but establish them to take charge of, and well use them, no more nor lesse then he which makes choise of a Shepheard to looke to his flocks; remains nor withstanding himselfe still Master and owner of them. This was always knowne to those good Kings, David, Solomon, Jehosaphat, and others which acknowledged God to bee the Lord of their Kingdomes and nations, and yet lost no priviledge that justly belongs to reall power; yea, they reigned much more happily in that they employed themselves cheertfully in the service of God, and in obedience to his Commandments. Nebuchadnezzar, although hee were a Heathen, and a mighty Emperour, did yet at the end acknowledge this, for though Daniel called him the King of Kings, to whom thee King of Heaven had granted power and Royall Majesty above all others: Yet on the contrary, (saith hee)

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Ifay 66. 1.  
1 Kings 1.  
8.  
Prov. 8. 15  
Job 1. 12.  
Dan. 1. 21.  
2 Chron 9.  
8.  
1 Chron.  
27. 13.  
1 Sam. 9.  
16. and  
10. 1.  
1 Sam. 6.  
21.  
2 Kings  
20. 5.  
2 Chron. 1  
9.  
2 King. 11.  
2 Chron.  
33. 16.  
2 Chron.  
20. 6.  
Dan. 2. 37.  
and 4. 14.

The God O Daniel is truly the God of Gods, and Lord of Lords giving Kingdomes to whom he pleaseth, yea, to the most wretched of the world. For which cause Zerephon said at the Coronation of Cyrus; let us sacrifice to God: And prophane. Writers in many places doe magnifie God the most mighty and Sovereign King. At this day at the Inaugurating of Kings, and Christian Princes, they are called the servants of God, destined to governe his people. Seeing then that Kings are only the Lieutenants of God, established in the Throne of God, by the Lord God himselfe, and the people are the people of God, and that the honour which is done to these Lieutenants proceeds from the reverence which is borne to those, that sent them to this service; it followes of necessity that Kings must bee obeyed for Gods cause, and not against God, and then, when they serve and obey God, and not otherways. It may be that the flatterers of the Court will reply, that God hath resigned, his power unto Kings, reserving Heaven for himselfe, and allowing the Earth to them to reign, and govern there according to their owne phancies; briefly that the great ones of the World hold a divided Empire with God himselfe. Behold a discourse proper enough for that impudent Villaine Cleon the Sicophant of Alexander, or for the poet Martiall which was not ashamed to call the Edicts of Domitian, the Ordinances of the Lord God. This discourse I say is worthy of that execrable Domitian who (as Suetonius recites) would be called God and Lord: But altogether unworthy of the eares of a Christian Prince, and of the mouth of good Subjects, that sentence of God almighty must always remaine irrevocably true, I will not give my glory to any other, that is, no man shall have such absolute authority, but I will always remaine soveraigne. God doth not at any time divest himselfe of his power, he holds a Scepter in one hand to repress and quell the audacious boldnesse of those Princes which mutiny against him, and in the other a ballance to controule those that administer. not justice with equity as they ought, then these; there cannot be expressed more certaine markes of soveraigne command. And if the Emperour in creating a King, reserves always to himselfe the imperiall soveraignty, or a King as he of France in granting the government or possession of a Province to a stranger, or if it be to his Brother or Son reserves always to himselfe appeales, and the

Divinum imperium cum Jove Caesar habet.

Id. 48. 11.

psa. 2. 9. Wild. 6. 4.

knowledge of such things as are the marks of royalty and sovereignty, the which also are always understood of themselves to be excepted, although they were altogether omitted in the grant of investiture, and fealty promised, with much more reason should God have sovereign power and command over all Kings being his servants and Officers, seeing we read, in so many places of Scripture, that he will call them to an account, and punish them, if they do not faithfully discharge their duties. Then therefore all Kings are the Vassals of the King of Kings, invested into their Office by the sword, which is the cognisance of their royall authority, to the end, that with the sword they maintaine the Law of God, defend the good, and punish the evill: Even as we commonly see, that he which is a sovereign Lord, puts his Vassals into possession of their fee, by girding them with a sword, delivering them a buckler, and a standard, with condition that they shall fight for them with those armes if occasion shall serve. Now if we consider what is the duty of Vassalls, we shall find that what may be said of them, agrees properly to Kings: The Vassall receives his fee of his Lord with right of justice, and charge to serve him in his warres. The King is established by the Lord God, the King of Kings; to the end he should administer justice to his people and defend them against all their enemies. The Vassall receives law and conditions from his Sovereigne: God commands the King to observe his laws and to have them always before his eyes, promising that he and his successors shall possess long the Kingdom, if they be obedient, and on the contrary, rebellious to their Sovereigne King. The Vassall obligeth himselfe by Oath unto his Lord, and swears that he will be faithful, and obedient: In like manner the King promiseth solemnly to command, according to the expresse Law of God. Briefly the Vassall looeth his fee, if he commit felony, and by law forfeiteth all his priviledges: In the like case the King looeth his Right, and many times his Realme also, if he despise God, if he complot with his enemies, and if he commit felony against that Royall Majesty, this will appeare more clearly by the consideration of the Covenant which is contracted between God and the King, for God does that honour

1 Sam. 8. and 9 20.

Deu. 17. 19

to his servants to call them his confederats. Now we read of two sorts of Covenants at the Inaugurating of Kings, the first between God, the King, and the People, that the people might be the people of God: The second between the King and the people, that the people shall obey faithfully, and the King command justly, we will treat hereafter of the second, and now speak of the first:

When King Josias was crowned we read that a Covenant was contracted between God, the King, and the People: or, as it is said in another place between Jehojada the High-Priest, all the People, and the King, That God should bee their Lord. In like manner we read that Josias and all the people entred into Covenants with the Lord: we may gather from these testimonies, that in passing these Covenants the High-Priest did Covenant in the name of God in expresse termes, that the King and the people should take order that God might be served purely, and according to his will, throughout the whole Kingdome of Juda, that the King should so reigne that the people were suffered to serve God, and held in obedience to his law: That the people should so obey the King, as their obedience should have principall relation to God. It appeares by this that the King & the people are joyntly bound by promise and did oblige themselves by solemn Oath to serve God before all things. And indeed presently after they had sworn the Covenant, Josias and Josias did ruine the Idolatry of Baal and re-established the pure service of God. The principall poynts of the Covenants were chiefly these.

That the King himselfe, and all the people should be careful to honour and serve God according to his will revealed in his word, which if they performed, God would assit and preserve their estates: as in doing the contrary, he would abandon, and exterminate them, which doth plainly appeare by the conferring of divers passages of holy writ. Moses somewhat before his death propounds these conditions of Covenant to all the people, and at the same time commands that the Law, which be those precepts given by the Lord should be in deposito kept in the Arke of the Covenant. After the decease of Moses, Joshua was established Captaine, and Conductor of the people of God, and according as the Lord himselfe admonished, if hee would have happy success in his affaires

The Alliance between God and the Kings. 11. 2. Chro. 13. 16. 2 king. 23.

Deut. 19. 30. 31. Deut. 31. 26. Joth. 1.

Deut. 17.  
2.  
Jof. 5. &  
24.

(8)

faits: he should nor in any sort estrange himselfe from the Law: *Yehua* also for his part, desiring to make the *Israelites* understand upon what condition God had given them the Country of *Canaan*, as soon as they were entred into it, after due sacrifices performed, he read the Law in the presence of all the people, promising unto them in the Lords name all good things if they persisted in obedience; and threatening of all evil if they wilfully connived in disobedience. Sommarily, he assures them all prosperity, if they observed the Law; as other ways, he exprelly declared, that in doing the contrary they should bee utterly ruined: Also at all such times as they left the service of God, they were delivered into the hands of the *Canaanites*, and reduced into slavery, under their Tyranny. Now this Covenant between God and the people in the times of the Judges, had vigor also in the times of the Kings, and was treated with them. After that *Saul* had been anoynted, chosen, and wholly established King, *Samuel* speaks unto the people in these termes; Behold the King whom you have demanded and chosen; God hath established him King over you, obey you therefore and serve the Lord, as well you, as your King which is established over you, otherwise you and your King shall perish. As if hee should say, you would have a King and God hath given you this here, notwithstanding thinke not that God will suffer any encroachment upon his right; but know that the King is as well bound to observe the Law as you, and if he faile therein, his delinquency shall be punished as severely as yours: Briefly, according to your desires *Saul* is given you for your King, to lead you in the wars, but with this condition annexed, that he himself follow the Law of God: After that *Saul* was rejected, because he kept not his promise, *David* was established King on the same condition, so also was his Son *Solomon*, for the Lord said, If thou keep my Law, I will confirm with thee the Covenant which I contracted with *David*. Now concerning this Covenant, it is inserted into the second book of the *Chronicles*, as followeth. There shall not faile thee a man in my *Levi*, to sit upon the Throne of *Israel*: yet so that thy children take heed to their way to walk in my Law, as thou hast walked before me: But if they serve Idols, I will drive them from the Land whereof I have given them possession. And therefore it was that the book of the Law was called the book of the Covenant of the Lord, (who commanded the Priests to give it the King) according to which *Samuel* put it

2 Sam. 12.

2 King. 2. 4.  
8 & 6. 12.

2 Chron. 6.  
16. & 7. 17.  
2 King. 33.  
21.  
Deut. 17. 19  
1 Sam. 10.  
25.

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(9)

into the hands of *Saul*, and according to the tenure thereof *Josias* yeelds himself *federarie* and vassal of the Lord. Also the Law which is kept in the Ark, is called the Covenant of the Lord with the children of *Israel*: Finally, the people delivered from the captivity of *Babylon*, doe renew the Covenant with God, and do acknowledge throughout that Chapter, that they worthily deserved all those punishments for their falsifying their promise to God. It appears then that the Kings swear as vassals to observe the Law of God, whom they confesse to be Sovereign Lord over all. Now according to that which we have already touched, if they violate their Oath, and transgress the law, we say that they have lost their kingdom, as vassalls loose their fee by committing felony. We have said that there was the same covenant between God and the Kings of *Judah*, as before; between God and the people in the times of *Josias* and the Judges. But we see in many places, that when the people hath despised the Law, or made covenants with *Baal*, God hath delivered them into the hands of *Eglon*, *Jabin*, and other Kings of the *Canaanites*: And as it is one and the same Covenant, to those which do break it, receive like punishment. *Saul* is so audacious to sacrifice, infringing thereby the Law of God, and presently after saves the life of *Agag*, King of the *Amalekites*, against the expresse Commandement of God, for this occasion he is called Rebel by *Samuel*, and finally is chastized for his Rebellion. Thou hast sacrificed, saith he, but thou hast done better to obey God, for obedience is more worthy than sacrifice. Thou hast neglected the Lord thy God, he also hath rejected thee, that thou Reign no more over *Israel*. This hath been so certainly observed by the Lord, that the very children of *Saul* were deprived of their paternall inheritance, for that he having committed high Treason, did thereby incur the punishment of Tyrants, which affect a Kingdom that no way appertains unto them. And not only the Kings, but also their children and successors have been deprived of the Kingdome by reason of such felony. *Solomon* revolted from God to worship Idols. Incontinently the Prophet *Ahijah* foretels that the Kingdome should be divided under his Son *Rehoboam*. Finally, the word of the Lord is accomplished, and ten Tribes which made the greatest portion of the Kingdome, doe quit *Rehoboam*, and adhere to *Jeroboam* his servant: Wherefore is this? for so much (saith the Lord) that they have left me to goe after *Astoroche*, the God of the *Sidopians*, and *Chamos* the God of the *Moabites*, &c. I will also break in

2 Chron. 6  
11.  
Nehem. 9  
38.

Jud. 1. 24  
& 2. 8. c.  
& 9. 33.  
1 Sam. 13.  
13. & 15.  
26.

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peccers their Kingdome: as if he should say, they have violated the Covenant, and have not kept promise, I am no more then tied unto them, they will lessen my majesty, and I will lessen their Kingdome: Although they be my servants, yet notwithstanding they will expel me my Kingdome; but I will drive them out themselves by *Jerobam* which is their servant. Furthermore, for so much as this servant, fearing that the ten tribes for the cause of Religion should returne to *Jerusalem*, set up Calves in *Betel*, and made *Israel* to sin, withdrawing by this means the people far from God, what was the punishment of so ingrattull a Vassall and wicked Traytor towards his Lord? First, his son died, and in the end all his race, even unto the last of the males was taken from the face of the earth by the sword of *Basa*, according to the judgement which was pronounced against him by the Prophet, because he revolted from the obedience of the Lord God: this then is cause sufficient, & often times also propounded, for the which God doth take from the King his see, when he opposeth the Law of God, & withdraws himselfe from him to follow his enemies, to wit Idols, and as like crimes deserve like punishments, we read in the holy Histories that Kings of *Israel* and of *Juda* which have so far forgotten themselves, have in the end miserably perished. Now although the forme both of the Church, and the *Jewish* Kingdome be changed, for that that which was before inclosed within the narrow bounds of *Judea*, is now dilated throughout the whole World, notwithstanding the same things may be said of Christian Kings, the Gospell having succeeded the Law, and Christian Princes being in the place of those of *Jury*: There is the same Covenant, the same Conditions, the same Punishments, and if they faile in the accomplishing, the same God Almighty revenger of all perfidious disloyalty; and as the former were bound to keep the Law, so the other are obliged to adhere to the doctrine of the Gospell, for the advancement whereof these Kings at their anoynting, and receiving, doe promise to imploy the utmost of their means.

*Herod* fearing *Christ*, whose reign he should rather have desired, sought to put him to death, as if he had affected a Kingdome in this World, did himselfe miserably perish, and lost his Kingdome. *Julian* the Apostate did cast off *Christ Jesus* to cleave unto the Impiety and Idolatry of the *Pagans*: but within

within a small time after he fell to his confusion, the force of the arme of *Christ*, whom in mockery he called the *Gallilean*. Ancient histories are replete with such examples, neither is there any want in those of these times. Of late yeares divers Kings drunke with the liquor which the Whore of *Babilon* hath presented unto them, have taken armes, and for the love of the Wolfe, and of Antichrist, have made War against the Lambe of God, which is *Christ Jesus*, and yet at this day some amongst them doe continue in the same course, wee have seen some of them ruin'd in the deed, and in the midst of their wickednesse, others also carried from their triumphs to their graves, those which survive and follow them in their courses have little reason to expect a better issue of their wicked practices, this sentence remaines always most certaine, *That though all the Kings of the earth doe conjure and conspire against Christ and endeavour to cut in peeces our Lambe, yet in the end they shall yield the plate, and mangle their hearts, confesse that this Lambe is the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords.* But what shall wee say of the Heathen Kings? Certainly although they be not anoynted and sacred of God; yet be they his Vassalls and have received their power from him, whether they be chosen by lot or any other means whatsoever. If they have been chosen by the voyces of an Assembly, we say that God governs the heart of man, and addresses the minds and intentions of all persons whether he pleaseth: If it be by lot, the lot is cast in the lap, saith the wise man, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord. It is God only that in all ages establisheth, and takes away, confirms, and overthrowes Kings according to his good pleasure; In which regard *Isay* calls *Cyrus* the anoynted of the Lord, and *Daniel* saith that *Nebuchadnezer* and others have had their Kingdomes committed unto them by God; as also *Saint Paul* maintains that all Magistrates have received their authority from him: For although that God hath not commanded *Pagans* in expresse termes to obey him as he hath don those that have knowledge of him: yet notwithstanding the *Pagans* must needs confesse that it is by the soveraigne God that they reign, wherefore if they will not yeeld the tribute that they owe to God in regard of themselves, at the least let them not attempt nor hinder the Sovereigne to gather that which is due from those people which are in subjection to them; nor that they doe not anticipate, nor appro-

psl. 2. 1.  
psl. 1. 0. 2.  
Apoc. 19.  
15.

pro. 16. 33.

Eccl. 45. 1.  
Dan. 2. 28  
& 4. 24.  
Rom. 13.



private to themselves divine Jurisdiction over them; which is the crime of high treason and true tyrannie, for which occasion the Lord hath grievously punished even the Pagau Kings themselves. It then becomes those Princes that will free themselves from so enormous a mischief, carefully to distinguish their jurisdiction from that of Gods, yea, so much the more circumspectly for that God and the Prince have their right of authority over one and the same Land, over one and the same man, over one and the same thing; man is composed of body and soule, God hath formed the body and infused the soule into him, to him only then may be attributed, and appropriated the commands both over the body and soule of man. If out of his meer grace and favour he hath permitted Kings to employ both the bodies and goods of their subjects, yet still with this Proviso and charge, that they preserve and defend their subjects; certainly Kings ought to thinke that the use of this authority is in such manner permitted, that notwithstanding the abuse of it is absolutely forbidden: First, those which confesse that they hold their soules and lives of God, as they ought to acknowledge, they have then no right to impose any tribute upon soules. The King takes tribute and custome of the body, and of such things as are acquired or gained by the industry and travaile of the body, God doth principally exact his right from the soule, which also in part executes her functions by the body. In the tribute of the King are comprehended the fruits of the earth, the contributions of money and other charges, both real and personal; the tribute of God is in Prayers, Sacraments, Predications of the pure word of God; briefly, all that which is called divine service, as well private as publick; these two tributes are in such manner divers and distinguished, that the one hurts nothing the other, the Exchequer of God takes nothing from that of *Cesar*, but each of them have their right manifestly apart. But to speak in a word, whosoever confounds these things, doth heaven and earth together, and endeavours to reduce them into their first chaos, or later confusion. *David* hath excellently well distinguished these affaires, ordaining officers to look to the right of God, and others for that of the King. *Josaphat* hath followed the same course, establishing certaine persons to judge the causes that belonged to the Almighty, and others to looke to the justice of the King; the one to maintain the pure service of God, the other to preserve the rights of the King. But if a Prince usurpe the right of God, and put himselfe

forward after the manner of the Giants to scale the Heavens, he is no lesse guilty of high treason to his Sovereigne, and commits felonie in the same manner, as if one of his vassals should seize on the rights of his Crown, and puts himselfe into evident danger to be dispoyled of his estates, and that so much the more justly, there being no proportion between God and an earthly King, between the Almighty and a mortall man; whereas yet between the Lord and the vassall there is some relation of proportion. So often therefore as any Prince shall so much forget himselfe, as insolently to say in his heart I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God: I will sit also upon the mount of the congregation in the sides of the North; I will ascend above the heights of the clouds, I will be like the most high. But on the contrary, will the Almighty say I will rise up more high, I will set my selfe against thee; I will raze out thy name and all thy posterity, thy counsels shall vanish into smoak, but that which I have once determined shall remaine firme, and never be annihilated. The Lord said unto *Pharaoh*, let my people go, that they may serve me, and offer sacrifices unto me, and for that this proud man answered, that hee knew not the God of the Hebrews, presently after he was miserably destroyed. *Nebuchadnezar* commanded that his statue should be adored, and would be honoured as God, but within a short time the true God did deservedly chastise his unruly boldnesse, and desiring to be accounted God, he became a brutt beast, wandring through desert places like a wild asse, until (saith the Prophet) that he acknowledged the God of *Israel* to be the Sovereigne Lord over all, his sonne *Belshazer* abused the holy vessels of the Temple in *Jerusalem*, and put them to serve his excesssive and drunkennesse, for that therefore he gave not glory to him, that held in his hands both his soule and his counsels, he lost his Kingdome, and was slaine in that very night of his feasting *Alexander* the great took pleasure in the lies of his Flatterers, who termed him the sonne of *Jupiter*, and not only approv'd, but procur'd his adoration, but a sudden death gave a sad period to those triumphs, being blinded through his excesssive conquests, began with too much affection, to delight in *Antiochus*, under colour of pacifying and uniting his subjects, commanded all men to forsake the Lawes of God, and to apply themselves in obedience to his: hee profaned the Temple of the Jewes, and polluted their Altars, but after divers ruins, defeats, and losse of battels, dispoyled, and disgraced, he dies with griefe, con-

1 Chron.  
26. 29.  
2 Chron.  
19. 11.

Esay 14.  
3. 14.

Exo. 5. &  
8. &c.

Dan. 3. 5. &  
4. 25. &c.

Dan. 5. 2.

2 Mach.  
1. 43.

feeling that he deservedly suffered those miseries, because he would have constrained the Jewes to leave their Religion. If we take into our consideration the death of *Nero*, that inhumane Butcherer of Christians, whom he unjustly slandered with the fiering of *Rome*; being the abhorred act of his detested selfe. The end of *Caligula*, which made himselfe to be adored, of *Domitian* which would be called Lord and God, of *Commodus*, and divers others which would appropriate to themselves the honours due to God alone, we shall find that they have all and alwayes according to their deceits miserably perished; when on the contrary, *Trajan*, *Adrian*, *Antonine* the courteous and others, have finished their dayes in peace, for although they knew not the true God, yet have they permitted the Christians the exercise of *their Religion*. Briefly, even as those rebellious vassals which endeavour to possess themselves of the Kingdom, doe commit felonie by the testimony of all Lawes, and deserve to be extirpated; in like manner those are as really guilty which will not observe the Divine Law, whereunto all men without exception owe their obedience, or which persecute those that desire to conforme themselves thereunto, without hearing them in their *just defenses*; now for that we see that God invests Kings into their Kingdoms, almost in the same manner that vassals are invested into their fees by their Sovereigne, we must needs conclude, that Kings are the vassals of God, and deserve to be deprived of the benefit they receive from their Lord if they commit felony, in the same fashion as rebellious vassals are of their estates. These premises being allowed, this question may be easily resolved; for if God hold the place of Sovereign Lord, and the King as vassall: who dare deny but that we must rather obey the Sovereign; then the vassall? If God commands one thing, and the King commands the contrary, what is that proud man that would terme him a rebel which refuseth to obey the King, when else he must disobey God? But on the contrary he should rather be condemned, and held for truly rebellious, which omits to obey God, or which will obey the King when hee forbids him to yeeld obedience to God. Briefly, if God call us on the one side to enrole us in his service, and the King on the oother, is any man so void of reason as he will not say we must leave the King, and apply our selves to Gods service: so farr be it from us to believe, that we are bound to obey a King, commanding any thing contrary to the Law of God; that contrary in obeying him we become Rebels to God; no more, nor less

then

then we would esteem a country man a Rebel, which for the love he beares to some rich and ancient inferiour Lord, would bear Arms against the Sovereigne Prince, or which had rather obey the writs of an inferiour Judge then of a superiour, the commandements of a Lieutenant of a Province, then of the Prince; to be briefly, the directions of an officer rather then the expresse Ordinances of the King himselfe. In doing this we justly incur the malediction of the Prophet *Micha*, which doth detest and curse in the name of God all those which obey the wicked and perverse Ordinances of Kings. By the Law of God we understand the two Tables given to *Moses*, in the which, as in unremoveable bounds the authority of all Princes ought to be fixed. The first comprehends that which we oweto God, the second that which we must doe to our Neighbours; briefly, they containe piety and justice conjoynd with charity, from which the preaching of the Gospel doth not derogate, but rather authorize and confirme: The first Table is esteemed the principally, as well in order as in dignity. If the Prince commands to cut the throat of an innocent, to pillage and commit extortion, there is no man (provided he have some feeling of conscience) that would execute such a commandement. If the Prince have committed some crime, as Adultery, Parricide, or some other wickednesse, behold amongst the Heathen the learned Lawyer *Papinian* which will reprove *Caracalla* to his face, and had rather die then obey, when his cruell Prince commands him to lie and palliate his offence; nay, although hee threaten him with a terrible death, yet would he not beare false witness; what shall we then doe, if the Prince commands us to be Idolaters, if he would have us againe crucifie Christ Jesus, if he enjoyns to blaspheme and despite God, and to drive him (if it were possible) out of Heaven, is there not yet more reason to disobey him, then to yeeld obedience to such extravagant commands: Yet a little further, seeing it is not sufficient to abstaine from evil, but that we must do good, instead of worshipping of Idols, wee must adore and serve the true God, according as he hath commanded us, and instead of bending our knees before *Baal*, we must tender to the Lord the honor and service which he requires of us; for wee are bound to serve God for his owne sake only: but we honour our Prince, and love our Neighbour, because and for the love of God. Now if it be ill done to offend our neighbour, and if it be a capital crime to rise against our Prince, how shall we intitle those that rise in rebellion against the Majesty of the Sovereigne Lord of all Mankind; briefly,

Mich. 6.  
16.

There is a  
certaine  
Politician  
of our  
time so de-  
testable,  
that hee  
hath dared  
to com-  
demne *Pa-  
pius*, and  
to write in  
his books  
full of ex-  
ors in  
master of  
state, that  
*Papianus*  
because he  
would not  
excuse the  
parricide  
of *Car-  
acalla* did  
bring irre-  
parable  
damages  
to the af-  
fairs of the  
Empire.

as it is a thing much more grievous to offend the Creator, then the creature, man; then the Image he represents; and as in terms of Law, he that hath wounded the proper person of a King, is much more culpable, then another that hath only broken the statue erected in his memory: so there is no question, but a much more terrible punishment is prepared for them, which infringe the first Table of the Law, then for those which only sinne against the second; although the one depend of the other; whereupon it followes (to speake by comparison) that we must take more carefull regard to the observation of the first, then of the second. Furthermore, our Progenitors examples may teach us the rule we must follow in this case. King *Abab* at the instigation of his wife *Jesabel*, killed all the Prophets, and servants of God that could be taken, notwithstanding *Abdias* Steward of *Ababs* house did both hide and feed in a Cave a hundred Prophets, the excuse for this is soon ready; in obligations, oblige they never so neerly, the divine Majesty must always be excepted. The same *Abab* enjoyed all men to sacrifice to *Baal*: *Elias* instead of cooling or relenting did reprove more freely the King, and all the people, convinced the Priests of *Baal* of their impiety, and caused them to be executed. Then in despite of that wicked and furious *Jesabel*, and manger that uxorious King, he doth redresse and reform with a divine and a powerful endeavour the service of the true God. When *Abab* reproach'd him (as the Princes of our times doe) that he troubled *Israel*, that he was rebellious, seditious, titles wherewith they are ordinarily charged, which are no way culpable thereof; nay, but it is thou thy selfe, answered *Elias*, which by thy Apostasie hath troubled *Israel*, which hath left the Lord the true God, to acquaint thy selfe with strange gods his enemies, in the same manner and by the leading and direction of the same spirit did *Sidrac*, *Misack*, and *Abednego* refuse to obey *Nebuchadnezar*, *Daniel Davim*, *Elezazar* *Antiochus*, and infinit others. After the coming of Jesus Christ, it being forbidden the Apostles to preach the Gospel. Judge ye, (said they) whether it be reasonable as in the sight of God to obey men, rather then God; according to this the Apostles, not regarding neither the intendments nor designs of the greatnesse of the world, addressed themselves readily to doe that which their Master Jesus Christ had commanded them. The Jewes themselves would not permit that there should be set up in the Temple at *Jerusalem* the Eagle of silver, nor the statue of *Caligula*: what did *Ambrose* when the Emperour *Valentinian* commanded him to give the Tem-

1 King. 18.  
4.

1 King. 18.  
37.

Dan. 3. 18  
& 6. 10. 13

Act. 4. 19.

*Philo* Indes in his discourse of his Embassy to *Cyrus*. *S. Ambrose* in the Epistle 33.

ple at *Millax* to the *Arrians*? Thy Counsellors and Captains are come unto me, said he, to make me speedily deliver the Temple, saying it was done by the Authority and command of the Emperour, and that all things are in his power. I answered to it, That if he demanded that which is mine, to wit, mine inheritance, my money, I would not in any sort refuse it him, although all my goods belong properly to the poore, but the things divine are not in subjection to the power of the Emperour. What doe we think that this holy man would have answered, if he had been demanded whether the living Temple of the Lord should be enthrall'd to the slavery of Idols. These Examples, and the constancy of a million of Martyrs, which were glorious in their deaths, for not yeilding obedience in this kinde, according as the Ecclesiasticall Histories, which are full of them, do demonstrate, may sufficiently serve for an expresse Law in this case. But for all this we have no want of a Law formerly written: For as often, and ever as the Apostles admonish Christians to obey Kings and Magistrates, they doe first exhort; and as it were by way of advice, admonish every one to subject himself in like manner to God, and to obey him before and against any whatsoever, and there is no where to be found, in any of their writings, the least passage for this unlimited obedience, which the flatterers of Princes do exact from men of small understandings. Let every soule, saith Saint Paul, be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but of God: he makes mention of every soule, to the end it may not be thought, that he would exempt any from this subjection; we may easily gather by divers such speeches, that we must obey God rather than the King: For if we obey the King, because, and for the love of God certainly this obedience may not be a conspiracy against God, But the Apostle will stop the gap to all ambiguity in adding that the Prince is the servant of God for our good, to wit, to doe justice; from this necessarily follows that which we come from touching, that we must rather obey God then him who is his servant: This doth not yet content Saint Paul for he adds in the end, Give tribute, honour, and feare to whom they appertaine, as if hee should say, that which was allegged by Christ, Give to Caesar, that which is Caesars, and to God that which is Gods: To Caesar tribute, and honour; to God feare. Saint Peter faith the same, feare God, honour the King; Servants obey your Masters not only the good and kinde, but also the rigorous, we must practice these precepts according to the order they are set downe in: to wit, that as

Rom. 13. 1.

Math. 22.  
21.  
spec. 2. 17.  
18.

servants are not bound to obey their Masters if they command any thing which is against the lawes and ordinances of Kings: Subjects in like manner owe no obedience to Kings which will make them to violate the Law of God.

1 Object.

Certaine leud companions object, that even in the things themselves that concern the Conscience we must obey Kings, and are so shamelesse as to produce for witness of so wicked an opinion the Apostle. Saint Peter and Saint Paul, concluding from hence, that we must yeeld obedience to all that the King shall ordaine, though it be to inbrace, without reply, any Superstition be shall please to establish. But there is no man so grossly voyde of sense, that sees not the impiety of these men. we reply: that Saint Paul saith in expresse termes, we must be subject to Princes, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. In opposing conscience to wrath, it is as much as if the

Rom. 13.

Apostle had said, that the obedience of which he speaks ought not to proceed for feare of punishment, but from the love of God, and from the reverence which we are bound to beare unto the word, in the same sense Saint Paul enjoyneth servants in such manner to obey their Masters, that it be not with eye

Col. 3. 22.

service for feare of stripes, but in singleness of heart, fearing God, not simply, to acquire the favour of men, whom they may delude, but to beare the burden laid on their shoulders, by him whom no man can deceive.

In brieffe there is manifest difference between these two manners of speech, to obey for conscience sake, and to obey in those things which concerne the conscience: otherways those which had much rather loose their lives with infinite torments than obey Princes which command them things contrary to the will of God, would have taught us that which these seek to persuade us to. Neither doe they expresse themselves lesse impudent in that which they are accustomed to object to those which are not so well able to answer them. That obedience is better than sacrifice, for there is no Text in holy writ that doth more evidently confound them then this, which is contained in Samuels reprehension of King Saul, for his disobedience to the Commandement of God, in sacrificing unfittingly. If then Saul although he were a King ought to obey God, it follows in all good consequence that subjects are not bound to obey their King by offending of God. Briefly, those (which after the barbarous manner of the men of Calcut) seek to intrall the service of God with a necessary dependance

2 Object.

1 Sam. 15.

22.

on the will of a mutable man, and Religion of the good pleasure of the King, as if he were some God on earth, they doubtles little value the testimony of holy Writ: But let them (at the least) yet learn of a Heathen Orator. That in every publique state, there is certain degrees of duty, for those that converse and live in it, by which may appear wherein the one are obliged to the other. Inasmuch that the first part of this duty belongs to the immortal God, the second concerns the Country, which is their common Mother, the third, those which are of our blood, the other parts leading us step by step to our other Neighbours. Now although the crime of High Treason be very heinous, yet according to the Civilians, it alwaies follows after sacrilege, an offence which properly pertaines to the Lord God and his service, inasmuch that they do confidently affirm, that the robbing of a Church, is by their rules esteemed, a greater crime, than to conspire against the life of a Prince. Thus much for this first Question, wherein we persuade our selves, that any man may receive satisfaction, if he be not utterly voyd of the fear of God.

Cicero in the first book of offic.

1. 2. ad leg. Jul. majest. Digest.

The second Question,

Whether it be lawfull to resist a Prince which doth infringe the Law of God, or ruine his Church, by whom, how, and how far it is lawfull.

THIS Question seems at the first view to be of a high and difficult nature, for so much as there being small occasion to speak to Princes that fear God: On the contrary, there will be much danger to trouble the ears of those which acknowledge no other Sovereign but themselves, for which reason few or none have meddled with it, and if any have at all touched it, it hath been but as it were in passing by. The Question is, If it be lawfull to resist a Prince violating the Law of God, or ruining the Church, or hindring the restoring of it? If we hold our selves to the tenure of the holy Scripture, it will resolve us. For, if in this case it have been lawfull to the Jewish people (the which may be easily gathered from the books of the Old Testament) yes, if it have been enjoyned them, I believe it will not be denied, that the same must be allowed to the whole people of any Christian Kingdom or Country whatsoever. In the first place it must be considered, that God having chosen Israel from amongst all the Nations of the Earth, to be a peculiar people to him, and covenanted with them, that they should be the people of God. This is written in divers places of Deuteronomy: the substance and tenor of this alliance was, That all should be careful in their severall lines, tribes, and families in the land of Canaan, to serve God purely, who would have a Church

Peur. 7. 6. & 14. 2.

Church established amongst them for ever, which may be drawn from the testimony of divers places, namely that which is contained in the 27 Chap. of Deuteronomy, there Moses and the Levites covenanting as in the name of God, assembled all the people, and said unto them: *This day Ob Israel art thou become the people of God, obey you therefore his voice, &c.* And Moses said, when thou hast passed the River of Jordan, thou shalt set six Tribes on the mountain of Gerizzim on the one side, and the six other on the Mountain of Ebal, and then the Levites shall read the Law of God, promising the observers all felicity, and threatening woe and destruction to the breakers thereof, and all the people shall answer, Amen. The which was afterwards performed by Joshua, at his entering into the Land of Canaan, and some few days before his death.

We see by this that all the people is bound to maintain the law of God to perfect his Church: and on the contrary to exterminate the Idols of the land of Canaan, a Covenant which can no wayes appertain to particulars, but only to the whole body of the people. To which also it seems the incamping of all the Tribes round about the Ark of the Lord, to have reference, to the end that all should look to the preservation of that which was committed to the custody of all. Now for the use and practise of this Covenant wee may produce examples, the Inhabitants of Gaba of the Tribe of Benjamin ravished the wife of a Levite, which died through their violence. The Levite divided his wife into twelve peeces and sent them to the twelve Tribes, to the end that all the people together might wipe away this so horrible a crime committed in Israel. All the people met together at Mizpah and required the Benjamites to deliver to be punished those that were culpable of this enormous crime, which they refused to performe, wherefore with the allowance of God himselfe, the states of the people with an universall consent renounce and make war against the Benjamites, and by this means the authority of the second Table of the Law was maintained by the detriment and ruine of one entire Tribe which had broken it in one of the precepts. For the first we have an example sufficiently manifest in Joshua. After that the Rubenites, Gadites, & Manassites were returned into their dwellings beyond Jordan, they incontinently built a goodly Alter neer unto the river, this seems to contrary the commandment of the Lord, who expressly forbids to sacrifice any where but in the land of Canaan only, wherefore it was to be feared least these men intended to serve Idols. This business being communicated to the people, inhabiting on this side Jordan: the place assigned for the meetings of the States was at

Silo where the Arke of the Lord was, Tifty all accordingly met, and Phineas the High-Priest the son of Eleazer was sent to the other to treat with them concerning this offence committed against the Law: And to the end they might know all the people had a hand in this business, they sent also the principall men of every Tribe to complain that the service of God is corrupted, by this devise, that God would be provoked by this rebellion, and become an enemy, not only to the guilty, but also to all Israel, as heretofore in Beelphegor. Briefly that they should denounce open warre against them if they desisted not from this their manner of doing: There must of necessity have followed much mischeife, if those Tribes beyond Jordan had not protested, that they erected that Alter only for a memoriall that the Israelites both on the one and the other side of Jordan, both did and do professe one and the same Religion: and at all times whensoever they have shewed themselves negligent in the maintenance of the service of God, wee have seene that they have ever been punished: This is the true cause wherefore they lost two battels against the Benjamites according as it appears in the end of the booke of Judges, for in so carefully undertaking to punish the rape and outrage don to a particular person, they clearly convinced themselves of much negligent prophaneesse in the maintenance of Gods right, by their continually negligence, omission to punish both corporall and spirituall whoredomes, there was then in these first times such a Covenant between God and the People.

Now after that Kings were given unto the people, there was so little purpose of disannulling or disbanding the former contract, that it was renewed and confirmed for ever. Wee have formerly said at the Inaugurating of Kings, there was a double Covenant treated of, to wit, between God and the Kings, and betweene Gods, and the People. The agreement was first passed between God, the King, and the People: On between the High-Priest the People, (which is named in the first place in the 23 Chapter in the 2 booke of the Chronicles,) and the King. The intention of this was, that the people should be the people of God, which is as much as to say that the people should be the church of God, we have shewed before to what end God contracted Covenants with the King: Let us now consider wherefore also he allies himselfe with the people. It is a thing most certaine, that God hath not

A covenant between God the king & the people. 2 king. 11. 17. & 23. 3. 2 chron 23 16.

Jos. 24.  
& 1. 10.  
&c.

Judg. 19.  
20.

Jos. 22

donethis in vain, and if the people had not authority to promise, and to keep promise, it were vanity for time to contract or Covenant with them, It may seem they that God hath done like those creditors, which having to deal with not very sufficient borrowers, take divers jointly bound for one and the same sum, inasmuch as two or more being bound one for another and each of them apart, for the intire payment of the totall sum, he may demand his whole debt of which of them he pleaseth. There was much danger to commit the custody of the Church to one man alone, and therefore God did recommend, and put it in trust to all the people: The King being raised to so slippery a place might easily be corrupted, for feare lest the Church should stumble with him, God would have the people also to be respondents for it. In the Covenant of which we speak, God, or (in his place) the High-Priest, are stipulators, the King and all the people, to wit, *Israel*, doe jointly and voluntarily assume, promise, and oblige themselves for one and the same thing. The High-Priest demands if they promise that the people shall be the people of God, that God shall always have his Temple, his Church amongst them, where he shall be purely served, The King is respondent, so also are the people (the whole body of the people representing as it were the office and place of one man) not severally, but jointly, as the worth themselves make cleare, being incontinent, and not by intermission or distance of time the one after the other. We see here then two undertakers, the King and *Israel*, which by consequence are bound one for another and each for the whole. For as when *Cajus* and *Titus* have promised jointly to pay to their Creditor *Scelus* a certaine sum, each of them are bound for himselfe and his companion, and the Creditor may demand the sum of which of them he pleaseth. In the like manner the King for himselfe, and *Israel* for it selfe are bound with all circumspection to see that the Church be not damaged, if either of them be negligent of their Covenant; God may justly demand the whole of which of the two he pleaseth, and the more probably of the people then of the King, and for that many cannot so easily slip away as one, and have better meanes to discharge the debts then one alone. In like manner, as when two men that are indebted, effectually to the publick Debtor, the one is in such manner bound for the other, that he can

L. Mortuo  
21. D. de  
de con.  
L. si non  
singuly C. of  
ger. Pec. l.  
paulo. D.  
de duo. r. 15.  
28. 2. Reg.  
1. D. de  
dem.

L. cum pot.  
D. de con.  
sb. & ibi  
de actor.

take no benefit of the division granted by the new Constitution of Justice: So likewise the King and *Israel* promising to pay tribute to God, which is the King of Kings; for accomplishment whereof, the one is obliged for the other. And as two Covenanters by promise, especially in contracts, the obligation whereof exposeth the Obligees to forfeitures and hazards, such as this is here, the faulting of the one indammageth the other: so that if *Israel* forsake their God, and the King makes no account of it, he is justly guilty of *Israels* delinquency. In like manner, if the King follow after strange gods, and not content to be seduced himself, seek also to attract his Subjects, endeavouring by all means to ruine the Church, if *Israel* seek not to withdraw him from his rebellion, and contain him within the limits of obedience, they make the fault of their King, their own transgression. Briefly, as when there is danger that one of the debtors by consuming his goods may be disabled to give satisfaction, the other must satisfy the creditor who ought not to be endamaged, though one of his debtors have ill husbanded his estate, this ought not to be doubted in regard of *Israel* toward their King, and of the King towards *Israel* in case one of them apply himselfe to the service of Idols, or breake their Covenant in any other sort, the one of them must pay the forfeiture and be punished for the other. Now that the Covenants of which we at this time treat, is of this nature, it appears also by other testimonies of Holy Scripture. *Saul* being established King of *Israel*, *Samuel* Priest and Prophet of the Lord, speaks in this manner to the people. Both you and your King which is over you serve the Lord your God, but if you persevere in malice (he taxeth them of malice for that they preferred the government of a man before that of God) you and your King shall perish. He adds after the reason, For it hath pleased God to chuse you for his people. You see here both the parties evidently conjoynd in the condition and the punishment: In like manner *Asa* King of *Judab*, by the counsel of the Prophet *Asarie*, assemblenth all the people at *Jerusalem*, to wit, *Juda* and *Benjamin*, to enter into Covenant with God. Thither came also divers of the Tribe of *Ephraim*, *Manasses*, and *Simeon*, which were come thither to serve the Lord according to his own ordinance. After the sacrifices were performed according to the Law, the Covenant was contracted in these termes, Whosoever shall not call upon the Lord God of *Israel*, be he the least or the greatest, let him dye the death: In making mention of the greatest, you see that the King himselfe is not excepted from the designed punishment.

L. cum ap-  
parebit, D.  
locati. L. si  
divisa. C.  
codem.

1 Sam. 13.  
24. 25.

2 king. 23. But who may punish the King, for here is question of corporall and temporall punishment? If it be not the whole body of the people to whom the King sweareth, and obligeth himselfe, no more nor lesse, than the people doe to the King, we read also that King Josias being of the age of twenty and five years, together with the whole people, doth make a Covenant with the Lord, the King and the People promising to keepe the Lawes, and Ordinances of God, and even then for the better accomplishing of the tenour of this agreement, the Idolatry of Baal was presently destroyed. If any will more exactly turne over the holy Bible, he may well finde other testimonies to this purpose.

1 Chron. 4.  
29.

But to what purpose should the consent of the people be required, wherefore should *Israel* or *Juda* be expressly bound to observe the Law of God? for what reason should they promise so solemnly to be for ever the people of God? If it be denied, by the same reason that they had any authority from God, or power to free themselves from perjury, or to hinder the ruine of the Church. For to what end should it serve to cause the people to promise to be the people of God, if they must, and are bound to endure and suffer the King to draw them after strange Gods. If the people be absolutly in bondage wherefore is it commanded then, to take order that God be purely served? if it be so that they cannot properly oblige themselves to God, and if it be not lawfull for them by all to endeavour the accomplishment of their promise, shall we say that God hath made an agreement with them, which had no right neither to promise, nor to keep promise? But on the contrary, in this business of making a Covenant with the people, God would openly and plainly show, that the people hath right to make, hold, and accomplish their promises and contracts. For, if he be not worthy to be heard in publique Court that will bargain or contract with a slave, or one that is under tutillage, shall it not be much more shamefull to lay this imputation upon the Almighty, that he should contract with those which had no power to performe the conditions covenanted? But for this occasion it was, that when the Kings had broken their Covenants, the Prophets always addressed themselves to the house of *Juda* and *Jacob*, and to *Samarita*, to advertise them of their duties. Furthermore, they required the people that they not only

1. quod ar.  
1 nec. 32. 1.  
D. de reg.  
jur.

with-draw themselves from sacrificing to *Baal*, but also that they cast down his Idoll, and destroy his Priests and service; yea, even *maugre* the King himselfe. For example, *Ahab* having killed the Prophets of God, the Prophet *Elias* assembleth the people, and as it were converted the Estates, and doth there taxe, reprehend, and reprove every one of them; the people at his exhortation doe take and put to death the Priests of *Baal*. And for so much as the King neglected his duty, it behoved *Israel* more carefully to discharge theirs without tumult, not rashly, but by publicke authority, the Estates being assembled, and the equity of the cause orderly debated, and sufficiently cleared before they came to the execution of justice. On the contrary, so often, and always when *Israel* hath sayled to oppose their King, which would overthrow the service of God, that which hath been formerly said of the two Debtors, the inability and ill husbandry of the one doth ever prejudice the other, the same hapned to them; for as the King hath been punished for his Idolatry and Disloyaltie, the people have also bene chastised for their negligence, connivencie, and stupidity, and it hath commonly hapned, that the Kings have bin much more often swarved, and drawn others with them then the people, for so much as ordinarily the great ones mould themselves into the fashion of the King, and the people conforme themselves in humours to those that governe them: to be brieffe, all more usually offend after the example of one, then that one will reform himselfe as he seeth all the rest. This which we say will perhaps appeare more plainly by examples; what doe we suppose to have been the cause of the defeat and overthrow of the Army of *Israel* with their King *Saul*. Doth God correct the people for the sinnes of the Prince? Is the child beaten instead of the Father? It is a discourse not easily to be digested, say the Civilians, to maintain that the children should bear the punishments due for the offences of their Fathers; the Laws doe not permit that any one shall suffer for the wickednesse of another. Now God forbid that the Judge of all the world (saith *Abraham*) should destroy the innocent with the guilty: On the contrary (saith the Lord) as the life of the Father, so the life of the sonne is in my hands; the fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sinne. That overthrow then, did it not proceed for that the people opposed not

1 Sam. 31.

Gen. 22.

Deut. 24.

16.

2 King. 14

6.

Ezech. 12.

10.

Saul,

with-

*Saul*, when he violated the Law of God; but applauded that miserable Prince when he wickedly persecuted the best men, as *David* and the Priests of the Lord. Amongst many other examples let us onely produce some few. The same *Saul* to enlarge the possessions of the tribe of *Inda* broke the publick faith granted to the *Gibonites*, at the first entry of the people into the land of *Canaan*, and put to death as many of the *Gibonites* as hee could come by. By this execution *Saul* did break the third Commandement, for God had been called to witness this agreement, and the sixth also, in so much as he murdered the innocent, he ought to have maintained the authority of the two Tables of the Law; and thereupon it is said, that *Saul* and his house have committed this wickedness. In the mean time, after the death of *Saul*, and *David* being established King, the Lord being demanded, made answer, that it was already the third year that the whole country of *Israel* was afflicted with famine, because of this cruelty, and the hand of the Lord ceased not to strike, until that seven men of the house of *Saul* were given to the *Gibonites*, who put them to death; seeing that every one ought to bear his own burden, and that no man is esteemed the inheritor of anothers crime; wherefore they say, that all the whole people of *Israel* deserves to be punished for *Saul*, who was already dead, and had (as it might seem) that controversie buried in the same grave with him, but only in regard that the people neglected to oppose a mischief so publick and apparent, although they ought and might have done it: Think you it reason, not any be punished unless they deserve it? And in what hath the people here sayled, but in suffering the offence of their King. In like manner when *David* commanded *Iosh*, and the Governours of *Israel* to number the people, he is taxed to have committed a great fault; for even as *Israel* provoked the anger of God in demanding a King, one in whose wisdom they seemed to repose their safety; even so *David* did much forget himselfe, in hoping for victory through the multitude of his subjects; for so much as that is prosperly (according to the saying of the Prophet) to sacrifice unto their net, and burn incense unto their drag, a kind of abominable Idolatry; for the Governours, they seeing that it would draw evil on the people, a little draw back at the first; afterwards, as it were, to be rid of the importunity they made the enrolment: in the mean season all the people are punished, and not *David* alone, but also

2 Sam. 21.  
1.

L. Crimen.  
26. D. de  
penis

L. Sancimus c. de  
penis.

1 Sam. 24.  
2.  
2 Chron.  
21. 2.

Abbas. i.  
16.

also the ancients of *Israel*, which represented the whole body of the people, put on sack-cloath and ashes, the which notwithstanding was not done nor practised when *David* committed those horrible finnes of murder and adultery. Who sees not in this last act, that all had sinned, and that all should repent; and finally that all were chastised, to wit *David* that had provoked God by so wicked a commandement, the Governours (as Peers and Assessors of the Kingdome, ought in the name of all *Israel* to have opposed the King) by their connivencie, and over weak resistance; and all the people also which made their appearance to be enrolled. God in this respect did like a chiefe Commander, or Generall of an army, he chastised the offence of the whole camp, by a sudden alarm given to all, and by the exemplary punishments of some particulars to keep all the rest in better awe and order. But tell me wherefore after that the King *Manasse* had polluted the Temple at *Jerusalem*, doe we read that God not only taxed *Manasse*, but all the people also? was it not to advertise *Israel* one of the sareties, that if they keep to the King within the limits of his duty, they should all smart for it; for what meant the Prophet *Jeremy* to say, the house of *Juda* is in subjection to the *Assirians*, because of the impiety and cruelty of *Manasse*? but that they were guilty of all his offences, because they made no resistance: wherefore *S. Augustin* and *S. Ambrose* said, *Herod* and *Pilate* condemned *Jesus Christ*, the Priests delivered him to be crucified, the people seem to have some compassion; notwithstanding all are punished; and wherefore so for so much as they are all guilty of his death, in that they did not deliver him out of the hands of those wicked Judges, and Governours, there must also be adied to this, many other proofes drawne from divers Authors for the further explication of this point, were it not that the testimonies of holy Scripture ought to suffice Christians. Furthermore, in so much as it is the duty of a good Magistrate, rather to endeavour to hinder and prevent a mischief, then to chastise the delinquents after the offence is committed, as good Physicians that prescribe a diet to allay and prevent diseases, as well as medicines to cure them: In like manner a people truly affected to true religion, will not simply consent themselves to reprove and repress a Prince that would abolish the Law of God, but also will have speciall regard, that through malice and wickednesse he immove nothing that may hurt the same, or that in tract of time may corrupt

1 King 24.  
4.  
2 Thron.  
33. 10.  
ker. 15. 4.

S. August.  
upon Psal.  
82.  
Ambro. 29  
offic.



corrupt the pure service of God; and instead of supporting publick offences committed against the divine Majesty, they will take away all occasions wherewith the offenders might cover their faults; wee read that to have been practised by all *Israel* by a decree of Parliament in the assembly of the whole people, to remonstrate to those beyond *Jordan*, touching the Altar they had builded, and by the King *Ezechias*, which caused the brasen Serpent to be broken. It is then lawfull for *Israel* to resist the King, which would overthrow the Law of God, and abolish his Church, and not only so, but also they ought to know that in neglecting to performe this duty, they make themselves culpable of the same crime, and shall beare the like punishment with their King.

If their assaults be verbal, their defence must be likewise verbal, if the sword be drawn against them, they may also take armes, and fight either with tongue or hand, as occasion is: yea, if they be assailed by surprisalls, they may make use both of ambuscadoes, and countermines, there being no rule in lawfull war, that directs them for the manner, whether it be by open assailing their enemy, or by close surprising, provided alwayes, that they carefully distinguish between advantageous stratagemes, and perfidious Treason, which is alwayes unlawfull.

But I see well, here will be an objection made, what will you say? That a whole people, that beate of many heads, must they run in a mutinous disorder, to order the business of the Commonwealth? What addresse or direction is there in an unruly and unbridled multitude? what counsell or wisdom, to manage the affaires of State?

When we speak of all the people, we understand by that, only those which hold their authority from the people, to wit, the Magistrates, which are inferior to the King, and whom the people hath substituted, or established, as it were Consorts in the Empire, and with a kind of Tribunitiall authority, to restrain the encroachments of Sovereignty, and to represent the whole body of the people. We understand also, the Assembly of the Estates, which is nothing else but an Epitomy, or briefe collection of the Kingdome, to whom all publique affaires have speciall and absolute reference, such were the Seventy Ancients in the Kingdome of *Israel*, amongst whom the High Priest was as it were president, and they judged all matters of greatest importance, those seventy being first cho-

ten

fen by six out of each Tribe, which came out of the land of Egypt, then the Heads or Governors of Provinces; In like manner the Judges and Provosts of Towns, the Captains of thousands, the Centurions and others which commanded over Families, the most valiant noble and otherwaies notable personages, of whom was composed the body of the States, assembled divers times as it plainly appears by the words of the holy Scripture. At the election of the first King which was *Saul*, all the Ancients of *Israel* assembled together at Rama. In like manner and all *Israel* was assembled, or all *Judah* and *Benjamin*, &c. Now it is no way probable that all the people one by one met together there. Of this rank there are in every well govern'd Kingdom, the Princes, the Officers of the Crown, the Peers, the greatest and most notable Lords, the Deputies of Provinces, of whom the ordinary body of the Estate is composed, or the Parliament, or the Dier, or other Assembly according to the different names used in divers Countries of the world, in which Assemblies the principall care is had both for the preventing and reforming either of disorder or detriment in Church or Commonwealth. For as the Councils of Basil and Constance have decreed (and well decreed) that the universal Council is in Authority above the Bishop of Rome. As in like manner the whole Chapter may over-rule the Bishop, the Universtie, the Rector, the Court, the President: Briefly he whosoever he is that hath received authority from a Company, is inferior to that whole company, although he be superior to any of the particular Members of it. Also is it without any scruple or doubt, that *Israel* which demanded and established a King as Governor of the Publick must needs be above *Saul* established at their request, and for *Israels* sake as it shall be more fully proved hereafter. And for so much as an orderly proceeding is necessarily required in all affairs discreetly addressed, and that it is not so probably hopefull that order shall be observed amongst so great a number of people; yea, and that there oftentimes occurs occasions which may not be communicated to a multitude, without manifest danger of the Commonwealth. We say, that all that which hath been spoken of priviledges granted, and right committed to the people, ought to be referred to the Officers and Deputies of the Kingdom: and all that which hath been said of *Israel*, is to be understood of the Princes and Elders of *Israel*, to whom these things were granted and committed as the practice also hath verified.

The Queen *Atadiah* after the death of her son *Ahaziah* King of *Chron.* 11.

August. in  
Ioh. 23. q.

Dominus  
I. I. D. de  
dolo malo

What is to  
be under-  
stood by  
this word  
people.

Judah, put to death all those of the royal blood, except little *Joss*, which being yet in the cradle was preserved by the piety and wisdom of his Aunt *Jehoshabeab*. *Athalia* possessed her self of the government, and reigned six year over Judah. It may well be the people murmured between their teeth, and durst not by reason of danger express what they thought in their minds. Finally, *Jehoiada* the High-Priest the husband of *Jehoshabeab*, having secretly made a league and combination with the chief men of the Kingdom, did appoint and Crown King his Nephew *Joss*, being but seven year old, And he did not content himself to drive the Queen-Mother from the royal Throne, but he also put her to death, and presently overthrew the Idolatry of *Baal*. This deed of *Jehoiada* is approved, and by good reason, for he took on him the defence of a good Cause, for he assailed the Tyranny, and not the Kingdom. The Tyranny (I say) which had no Title, as our modern Civilians speak. For by no Law were women admitted to the government of the Kingdom of *Judah*. Furthermore, that Tyranny was in vigor and practice: For *Athalia* had with unbounded mischief and cruelty invaded the Realm of her Nephews, and in the administration of that Government committed, infinite wickedness, and which was the worst of all, had cast off the service of the living God, to adore and compel others with her the Idol of *Baal*. Therefore then was she justly punished, and by him which had a lawful calling and authority to do it. For *Jehoiada* was not a private and particular person, but the High-Priest, to whom the knowledge of civil causes did then belong: And besides he had for his Associates the principal men of the Kingdom the Levites, and being himself the Kings kin-man and ally. Now for so much as he assembled nor the estates at *Mizpah* according to the accustomed manner, he is not reproved for it, neither for that he consulted and contrived the matter secretly, for that if he had held any other manner of proceeding, the business must probably have failed in the execution and success.

A combination or conjunction is good or ill according as the end whereunto it is addressed is good or ill; and perhaps also according as they are affected which are the managers of it. We say then that the Princes of *Judah* have done well, and that in following any other course they had failed of the right way. For even as the guardian ought to take charge and care that the goods of his pupil fall not into losse and detriment, and if he omit his duty therein, he may be compelled to give an account thereof: In like manner, those to

whose custody and tuition the people have committed themselves, and whom they have constituted their Tutors and defenders, ought to maintain them safe & intire in all their rights and privileges. To be short as it is lawfull for a whole people to resist and oppose Tyranny; so likewise the principal persons of the Kingdom, may as heads and for the good of the whole body confederate and associate themselves together, and as in a publick State, that which is done by the greatest part is esteemed and taken as the act of all, so in like manner must it be said to be done which the better part of the most principal have acted, briefly that all the people had their hand in it.

But here presents it self another question the which deserves to be considered, and amply debated in regard of the circumstance of time. Let us put the case that a King seeking to abolish the Law of God; or ruine the Church, that all the people or the greatest part yeild their consents, that all the Princes or the greatest number of them make no reckoning; and notwithstanding, a small handfull of people, to wit, some of the Princes and Magistrates desire to preserve the Law of God entirely and inviolably, and to serve the Lord purely: what may it be lawfull for them to do? if the King seek to compel those men to be Idolaters, or will take from them the exercise of true religion? We speak not here of private and particular persons considered one by one, and which in that manner are not held as parts of the entire body; As the planks, the nails, the pegs, are no part of the Ship, neither the stones, the rafters, nor the rubbish are any part of the house: but we speak of some Town or Province, which makes a portion of a Kingdom, as the prow, the poop, the keel and other parts make a Ship; the foundation, the roof, and the walls make a house. We speak also, of the Magistrature which governs such a Citie or Province. If we must make our defence with producing of examples, although we have not many ready by reason of the backwardness and carelessness of men when there is question to maintain the service of God: notwithstanding, we have some few to be examined and received according as they deserve. *Libna*, a Town of the Priests withdrew it self from the obedience of *Joram* King of *Judah*, and left that Prince, because he had abandoned the God of his Fathers whom those of that Town would serve, and it may be thoughtered also, lest in the end they should be compelled to sacrifice to *Baal*: In like manner when that the King *Antiochus* commanded that all the Jews should embrace his religion, and should forsake that which the

Plp. 2. edo.  
D. de reg. jur.

Whether part of  
a Kingdom may  
make resistance.

Esai. de Tyrannid.  
Deut. 17. 15.

Esai. in mont. de  
Guelph. & Gibel.

John 2. 13.  
1 Chron. 4. 17.  
1 Chron. 21. 26.

God Almighty had taught them, *Mattathias* answered, we will not obey, nor will we do any thing contrary to our religion, neither did he only speak, but also being transported with the zeal of *Rhimeas*, he killed with his own hands a Jew, which constrained his fellow Citizens to sacrifice to Idols; then he took arms, and retired into the mountain, gathered troupes, and made war against *Antiochus*, for Religion, and for his Countrey with such success, that he regained *Jerusalem*, brok and brought to nothing the power of the Pagans which they had gathered to ruine the Church, and then re-established the pure service of God. If we will know who this *Mattathias* was, he was the Father of the *Machabees* of the Tribe of *Levi*; inasmuch as it was not lawfull for him according to the received custome and right of his race to restore the Kingdom by arms from the Tyranny of *Antiochus*. His followers were such as fled to the mountains together, with the inhabitants of *Modin*, to whom had adjoynd themselves divers neighboring Jews, and other fugitives from sundry quarters of *Judeah*; all which sollicitously desired the re-establishment of the Church. Almost all the rest, yea, the principals obeyed *Antiochus*, and that after the rout of his army, and his own miserable death: Although there were then a fair occasion to shake off his yoke, yet the Jewes fought to the sonne of *Antiochus*, and intreated him to take on him the Kingdom, promising him fidelity and obedience. I might here produce the example of *Debora*. The Lord God had subjected *Israel* to *Iabin* King of *Canaan*, and they had remained in this servitude the space of twenty years, which might seem in some sort to have gained a right, by prescription over the Kingdom; and together also that almost all *Israel* followed after strange gods. The principal and most powerful Tribes, to wit, *Reuben*, *Ephraim*, *Benjamin*, *Dan*, *Asher*, and some others adhered wholly to *Iabin*. Yet notwithstanding the Prophetess *Debora* which judged *Israel*, caused the Tribes of *Zebulon*, *Nephthalim*, and *Issachar*, or at the least some of all those Tribes, to take arms under the conduct of *Barac*, and they overthrow *Sisera* the Lieutenant of *Iabin*, and delivered *Israel*, which had no thought of liberty, and was content to remain in bondage; and having shaken off the yoke of *Canaanites* they re-established the pure service of the living God. But for so much as *Debora* seems to have an extraordinary vocation; and that the Scripture doth not approve in expresse terms the doings of them of *Libna*, although that in not disallowing of their proceedings, it may seem

in some sort to allow them, and for that the History of the *Machabees* hath had no great authority in the ancient Church and for that it is comonly held that an assertion must be proved by laws and testimonies, not by examples, let us examine by the effect what we ought to judge according to the right of the matter now in question. We have formerly said that the King did swear to keep the Law of God, and promise to the uttermost of his power to maintain the Church: that the people of *Israel* considered in one body covenanting by the High-Priest, made the same promise to God. Now at this present we say, that all the Towns, and all the Magistrates of these Towns which be parts and portions of the Kingdom, promise each of them in his own behalf, and in expresse terms the which all Towns and Christian Communalities have also done, although it have been but with a tacite consent. *Ioshua* being very old and near to his death, assembled all *Israel* at *Sichem* in the presence of God, to wit, before the Ark of the Covenant which was there. It is said that the Antients of the people, the Heads of the Tribe, the Judges and Governors, and all which had any publick command in the Towns of *Israel* met together there, where they swore to observe and keep the Law of the Lord, and did willingly put on the yoke of the Almighty God: whereby it appears that these Magistrates did oblige themselves in the names of their Towns and Communalities which did send them to take order that God should be served throughout the whole Countrey, according as he had revealed in his Law. And *Ioshua* for his part having passed this contract of agreement between God and the people and inregistered the whole according as it was done, for a perpetual memorial of the matter he incontinently set up a stone.

If there were occasion to remove the Ark of the Lord, The principals of the Countrey and Towns, the Captains the Centurions, the Provosts, and others were summoned by the Decree and Commandment of *David*, and of the Synagogue of *Israel*, if there be a purpose of building the Lords Temple, the same course is observed. And to the end it be not supposed, that some alteration hath been inserted after the creation of Kings: In the times of *Joas* and *Josias*, when there was question of renewing the Covenant between God and the People, all the Estates met together, and all were bound and obliged particularly. Also not onely the King, but the Kingdome, and not onely all the Kingdome,

but also all the Pastors of the Kingdom promise each of them for their selves, fidelity and obedience to God. I say again, that not only the King and the People, but also all the Towns of Israel, and their Magistrates, oblige themselves to God, and as homagers to their liege lord tie themselves to be his for ever, with and against all men, for further proof of the aforesaid, I would entreat the Reader to diligently turn over the holy Bible, especially in the books of the *Kings* and the *Chronicles*. But for a yet more ample explication of this matter, let us produce for example what is in practise at this day. In the Empire of *Germany*, when the Emperor is to be crowned, the Electors and Princes of the Empire, as well Secular as Ecclesiastical, meet together personally, or else send their Ambassadors. The Prelats, Earls, and Barons, and all the Deputies of the Imperial Towns, come thither also, or else send special Proxies; then do they their homage to the Emperor; either for themselves, or for them whom they represent, with and under certain conditions: Now let us presuppose that one of these which hath done homage voluntarily, do afterwards endeavour to depose the Emperor, and advance himself into his place, and that the Princes and Barons deny their Sovereign the succors and tribute which they owe him, and that they have intelligence with that other which conspired and sought to possess himself of the Imperial Throne: Think you that they of *Strasbourg* or of *Nurembergh*, which have bound themselves by faith unto the lawful Emperor, have not lawful right to repress and exclude this trayterous Intruder? Yea, on the contrary, if they do it not, if they give no succors to the Emperor in this his necessity, think you that they have satisfied or performed their fealty and promise, seeing that he which hath not preserved his Governour when he had means to do it, ought to be held as culpable and guilty, as he which offered the violence and injury unto him. If it be so (as every one may sufficiently see it is) is it not then lawful for the men of *Libna* and of *Modin*? and doth not their duty enjoyn them to do as much as if the other Estates of the Kingdom have left God to whose service and pleasure they know and acknowledge themselves to be bound to render obedience. Let us imagine then some *Joram* or *Antiochus* which abolisheth true Religion, and lifts up himself above God, that *Israel* connives and is content, What should that Town do which desires to serve God purely? First, they should say with *Iosua*, for their parts, look whom you desire rather to obey, the living God, or the Gods of the Amorites, for our parts

we and our Families will serve the Lord. Chuse you then I say, if you will obey in this point him, which without any right usurps that power and authority which no way appertains unto him, for my part, hap what may, I will keep my faith to him to whom I promised it: I make no question but that *Iosua* would have done the uttermost of his endeavour to maintain the pure service of the living God in *Thammathe Serathe*, a Town of *Ephraim*, where his house and estate lay: if the Israelites besides had so much forgot themselves as to have worshipped the god of the Amorites in the land of *Canaan*. But if the King should pass yet further, and send his Lieutenants to compel us to become Idolaters, and if he commands us to drive God and his service from amongst us; Shall we not rather shut our gates against the King and his Officers, then drive out of our Town the Lord which is the King of kings? Let the Burgeses and Citizens of Towns, Let the Magistrates and Governours of the People of God dwelling in Towns, consider with themselves that they have contracted two Covenants, and taken two Oaths: The first and most ancient with God, to whom the People have sworn to be his people: the second and next following, with the King, to whom the people hath promised obedience, as unto him which is the Governour and Conductor of the people of God. So then, as if a Vice-Roy conspiring against his Sovereign, although he had received from him an unlimited authority, if he should summon us to deliver the King whom he held besieged within the inclosure of our walls, we ought not to obey him, but resist with the uttermost of our power and means according to the tenour of our oath of Allegiance: In like manner think we that it is not a wickednes of all most detestable, if at the pleasure of a Prince which is the vassal and servant of God, we should drive God from dwelling amongst us, or deliver him (as far as in us lieth) into the hands of his enemies. You will say, it may be that the Towns appertain to the Prince. And I answer, that the Towns consist not of a heap of stones; but of that which we call people, that the people is the people of God, to whom they are first bound by oath: and secondly, to the King. For the Towns, although that the Kings have power over them, notwithstanding the right of inheritance of the Soyl belongs to the Citizens and Owners, for all that which is in a Kingdom, is indeed under the Dominion of the King, but not of his proper Patrimony: God in truth is the onely Lord proprietor of all things, and it is of him that the King holdeth

L. 2. l. Omne d. c.  
lib. 2. c. 1. de d.  
remil.

20 Collat de servit.  
lib. 2. c. 1. de d.  
nova p. lib. form.

his royalties, and the people their Patrimony. This is as much as to say, you will reply, that for the cause of Religion it shall be lawful for the subjects to revolt from the obedience of their King, if this be once granted, it will presently open a gap to rebellion? But hearken I pray you patiently, and consider this matter more thoroughly: I might answer in a word, that of two things, if the one must needs be done, it were much better to forsake the King, then God; or with *S. Augustine* in his fourth book of the *Citie of God*, chap. 4. and in the nineteenth book, and chapter the 21. That where there is no Justice, there is no Common-wealth, That there is no Justice, when he that is a mortal man would pull an other man out of the hands of the immortal God, to make him a slave of the devil, seeing that Justice is a vertue that gives to every one that which is his own, and that those which draw their necks out of the yoke of such Rulers, deliver themselves from the Tyrannie of wicked spirits, and abandon a multitude of robbers, and not the Common-wealth. But to re-assume this discourse a little higher, those which shall carry themselves as hath been formerly said, seem no waies accusable of the crime of revolt. Those are said properly to quit the King or the Common-wealth, which with the heart and purpose of an Enemy withdraw themselves from the obedience of the King or the Common-wealth, by means whereof they are justly accounted adversaries, and are oftentimes much more to be feared then any other enemies. But those of whom we now speak, do nothing resemble them. First they do in no sort refuse to obey, provided that they be commanded that which they may lawfully do, and that it be not against the honour of God. They pay willingly the Taxes, Customs, Imposts, and ordinary payments, provided that with these they seek not to abolish the tribute which they owe unto God. They obey *Cesar* while he commands in the quality of *Cesar*: but when *Cesar* passeth his bounds, when he usurps that Dominion which is none of his own, when he endeavours to assail the Throne of God, when he wars against the soveraign Lord both of himself and the people; they then esteem it reasonable not to obey *Cesar*: and yet after this to speak properly, they do no acts of hostility. He is properly an enemy which stirs up, which provokes another, which out of military insolencie prepareth and seteth forth parties to war. They have been urged and assailed by open war, and close and trecherous surprisalls: when death and destruction environis them round about, then they take armes, and wade

L. s. D. de esp.  
miuor.

their enemies assaults: you cannot have Peace with your enemies when you will; for if you lay down your weapons, if you give over making Warre they will not for all that disarm themselves; and loose their advantage. But for these men, daunce but place and you have it, give over but assaying them, and they will lay down their Armes, cease to fight against God, and they will presently leave the lists, will you take their Swords out of their hands? abstayne you only then from striking, seeing they are not the assaillants, but the defendants, sheath your Sword, and they will presently cast their Buckler on the ground, which hath been the reason that they have been often surprized by perfidious ambuscadoes, whereof these our times have afforded over frequent examples. Now as we cannot call that seruant stubborn or a fugitive, which puts by the blow; which his Lord (striks at him with his Sword, or which withdraws or hides himselfe from his Masters fury, or shuts his Chamber dore upon him, untill his coler and heats be passed over, much lesse ought we to esteeme those seditious, which (holding the name and place of Servants and subjects) shut the gates of a City against their Prince, transported with anger, being ready to do all his just Commandments, after he hath recovered his judgement, and related his former indignation; we must place in this rank, *David* Commander of the Army of *Israel*, under *Saul*, a furious King. *David* oppressed with Calumnies and false Taxations, waiched and way-layed from all parts, he retired unto, and defended himselfe in unaccessible Mountaines, and provided for his defense to oppose the walles of *Ceila* against the fury of the King, yea, he drew unto his party all those that he could, not to take away *Sauls* life from him, as it plainly appeared afterwards; but to defend his own Cause: see wherefore *Ionathan* the Sonnes of *Saul*, made no difficulty, to make alliance with *David*, and to renew it from time to time, the which is called the Alliance of the Almighty. And *Abbigall* saith in expresse words, that *David* was wrongfully assailed, and that he made the War of God. We must also place in this rank the *Machabees*; which having good meanes to maintaine Warres, were content to receive peace from *Demetrius*, and others, which *Antiochus* had offered them before, &c. because by it, they should be secured in the free profession and exercise of their Religion. We may remember that those which in our times have fought for true Religion against *Antichrist*, both in *Germanie* and *France*, have laid down Armes as soone as it was permitted them to serve God, truly according to his Ordinance, and oftentimes having sayre meanes and occasion to advance and continue the War to their much advantage: as had *David* and the *Machabees*, where the *Philistins* constrained *Saul* to

leave David to look to his own defence, and those Clouds of neigh- bearing enemies in Antiochus, saw ready to disclue upon his head, hinder- ed him also from further pursuing the *Macabees*. See then the markes which distinguish and separate sufficiently, those of whom we speak from Rebels or seditions.

But let us yet see other evident testimonies of the equity of their cause; for their defection is of that nature, that take but away the occasion, if some extreme necessity compell not the contrary, they presently return to their former condition, and then you cannot properly say, they separated themselves from the King, or the Communality; but that they left *Jeram*, and *Antiochus*, or if you will, the Tyranny and unlawfull power of one alone; or if divers particulers, which had no authority nor right to exact obedience in the same manner, as they commanded. The Sorbonists Doctors have taught us the like sundry times: whereof we will alledge some examples.

Annales  
Franciae  
Archives  
Camera  
Rationi-  
num  
Lutetias

About the year 1300. Pope Boniface the 8 seeking to appropriate to his Sea, the copalties that belonged to the Crown of France: Philip the faire, the then King, doth taunt him somewhat sharply: the tenor of whose tart letters are these.

Philip by the Grace of God, King of the French, to Boniface, calling himselfe Sovereign Bishop, hie or no health at all.

Be it known to the great foolishness and unbounded rashness, that in temporal matters we have only God for our superiour, and that the vacancy of certain Churches, and pretends belongs to us by copall prerogative, and that it appertaines to us onely to gather the fruites, and we will defend the possession thereof against all opposers, with the edge of our Swords, accounting them fooles, and without braynes that hold a contrary opinion. In these times all men acknowledged the Pope for Gods Vicar on earth, and head of the universal Church: Inomuch, that (as it is said) common error went instead of a Law, notwithstanding the Sorbonists being assembled, and demanded, made answer, that the King and the Kingdom might falsly without blame or danger of schisme, exempt themselves from his obedience, and flatly refuse that which the Pope demanded; for so much as it is not the separation: but the cause which makes the schisme, and if there were schisme, it should be only in separating from Boniface, and not from the Church, nor from the Pope, and that there was no danger nor offence in so remaining untill some honest man were chosen Pope: Every one knowes into what perplexities, the consciences of a whole Kingdom would fall, which held themselves separated from the Church; if this distinction be not true. I would demand

Bar-  
v. 3.  
Philip D.  
le Senat.

mand now, if it be not yet more lawfull to make use of this distinction, when a King invades and ineroacheth on the jurisdiction of God, and opposeth with hard servitude, the soulers dearly bought with the precious blood of *Jesus Christ*. Let us adde another example.

In the year of our Lord 2408. when Pope *Benedict* the 13. did oppose the French Church by tributes, and exactions, the Clergy assembled; by the Command of King *Charles* the 6. decreed: that the King and Inhabitants of the Kingdom, ought not to obey *Benedict*, which was an Hereticke, a schismaticke, and altogether unworthy of that dignity: the which the Estates of the Kingdom approved, and the Parliament of *Paris* confirmed by a decree. The same Clergy also ordained that those which had been excommunicated by that Pope as forsakers, and enemies of the Church, should be presently absolved, nullifying all such excommunications, and this hath been practis'd not in France onely, but in other places also: as Histories do credibly report. The which gives us just occasion most perspicuously to see and know, that if he which holds the place of a Prince do govern ill, there may be a separation from him without incurring justly the blame of revolt; for that they at things in themselves directly contrary, to leave a bad r ope, and forsake the Church, a wicked King, and the Kingdom. To returne to those of *Lobna*, they seeme to have followed it is before remembered expedient; for after the reestablishment of the service of God, they presently became again the Subjects of King *Azekias*. And if it is distinction be allowed place, when a Pope ineroacheth on the rights of any Prince, which notwithstanding in some cases acknowledged him for his Sovereign: Is it not much more allowable, if a Prince which is a Vassall in that respect, endeavours to assure and appropriate to himselfe the rights of God. Let us conclude then to end this discourse, that all the people by the authority of those, into whose hands they have committed their power, or divers of them may, and ought to reprove and repress a Prince, which Commands things against God. In like manner, that all, or at the least, the principalls of provinces or Towns, under the authority of the chiefe Magistrates, established first by God, and secondly by the Prince, may according to Law and reason, hinder the entrance of Idolatry, within the inclosure of their walles, and maintaine their true Religion: yea further, they may extend the Copines of the Church, which is but one, and in filling hereof, if they have means to do it: they justly incur the penaltie of High-Treason against the Divine Majesty.

Annales  
of France  
monstre-  
let.

2 Kings  
19. 8.

Extran-  
de majo-  
& obed:

Whether private men may resist by Arms.

It remains now that we speak of particulers which are private per-  
sons

L. scut.  
7, 5. 1.  
D. quid  
enju/gue  
universo

sons. First, particulars or private persons, are not bound to take up arms against the Prince, which would compell them to become Idolaters. The Covenant betwene God & all the people who promise to be the people of God, doth not in any sort bind them to that; for as that which belongs to the whole univiersall body, is in no sort proper to particulars: so in like manner that which the body owes and is bound to performe, cannot by any sensible reason be required of particular persons: neither doth their duty any thing oblige them to it; for every one is bound to serve God in that proper vocation, to which this called. Now private persons they have no power, they have no publik command, nor any calling to unsheath the sword of authority; And therefore as God hath not put the sword into the hands of privat men: so doth he not require in any sort that they should strike with it. It is said to them, *put up thy sword into thy scabbard*. On the contrary the Apostle saies of Magistrates, they carry not the sword in vaine; If particular men draw it forth, they make themselves Delinquent; If Magistrates be slow and negligent to use it when just occasion is offered, they are likewise justly blamable of negligence in performing their duties, and equally guilty with the former. But you will say unto me, hath not God made a Covenant, as well with particular persons as with the generality, with the least as well as the highest? To what purpose was Circumcision, and Baptisme ordained? What meaneth that frequent repetition of the Covenant in so many passages of holy writ? All this is true, but the consideration hereof is divers in their severall kinds; For as all the subjects of a good and faithfull Prince, of what degree soever they be are bound to obey him; but some of them notwithstanding have their particular duty, as Magistrates must hold others in obedience, in like manner all men are bound to serve God; but some as they are placed in a higher rancke, have received greater authority in so much as they are accountable for the offences of others, if they attend not the charges of the Community carefully.

The Kings, the Communities of people, the Magistrates into whose hands the whole body of the Common-wealth hath committed the sword of authority, must and ought to take care that the Church be maintained and preserved, particulars ought only to looke that they render themselves members of this Church. Kings and popular Estates are bound to hinder the pollution or ruine of the Temple of God, & ought to free and defend it from all corruption within, and all injury from without. Private men make take order that their bodies the temples of God, be pure, that they may be fit receptacles for the Holy-ghost to dwell

dwell in them. If any man defile the Temple of God, saith the Apostle, him shall God destroy; for the Temple of God is holy, which Temple ye are; to the former he gives the sword, which they beare with authority; to the other he recommends the sword of the spirit only; to wit; the word of God, wherewith St. Paul armes all Christians, against the assaults of the Divell, what shall then private men do? if the King will constrain them to serve Idolls? If the Magistrates into whose hands the people hath assigned their authority, or if the Magistrates of the place, where these particulers dwell, do oppose these proceedings of the King: let them in Gods name obey their leaders, and employ all their meanes (as in the service of God) to ayd the holy and commendable enterprises of those, which oppose themselves lawfully, against his wicked intention. Amongst others, they have the examples of the Centurion, an I man at armes, which readily and cheerfully obeyed the Princes of *Iuda*, who stirred up by *Yehoyas*, purged the Church from all prophanation, & delivered the Kingdom from the tyranny of *Atabiah*. But if the Princes, and Magistrates, approve the courses of an outrageous and irreligious Prince, or if they do not resist him, we must lend our eares to the Councell of Jesus Christ, to wit, to retire our selves into some other place; we have the example of the faithfull mixed amongst the 10. Tribes of Israel, who seeing the true service of God abolished by *Jeroboam*, and that none made any account of it, they retired themselves into the territories of *Iuda*, where Religion remained in her purity: let us rather forsake our livelihoods and lives, then God; let us rather be crucified our selves, then crucifie the Lord of life: let us not them (saith the Lord) which can only kill the body: He himselfe, his Apostles, and an infinite number of Christian martirs, have taught us this by their examples; shall it not then be permitted to any private person to resist by Armes? what shall we say of *Moses*, which led *Israel* away in despite of King *Pharaoh*? And of *Ehud*, which after 10 yeares servitude; when *Israel* might seeme to belong by right of prescription; to him which held the possession thereof, he killed *Eglon*, the King of *Moab*, and delivered *Israel* from the yoke of the *Moabites*, and of *Ieku*, which put to death his Lord the King *Israhel*, extirpated the race of *Abab*, and destroyed the *Briefs* of *Naal*, were not these particulers? I answer, that if they be considered in themselves, they may well be accounted particuler persons, in so much as they had not any ordinary vocation; But seeing that we know that they were called extraordinarily; and that God himselfe hath (if we may so speak) put his sword into their hands, be it far from us to account them particuler or private persons; but rather let us esteeme them by many degrees, excelling any ordinary Magistrates whatsoever. The calling of *Moses*

1 Cor. 3.  
17. & 6.  
19.  
Ephes. 6.  
17.

Mat.  
10. 23.

2 Chron.  
11. 13.  
& 15. 9.  
Heb. 6.

Mat. 10.  
28.

Exod.  
12. &c.  
Jud. 3.

2 Kings  
9.

12. &c.

12. &c.

is approved by the expresse word of God, and by most evident miracles, it is said of *David* that God stirred him up to kill the Tyrant, and deliver *Israel*; so *Achish* was smitten by the Commandement of the Prophet *Eliasa*, to cut out the reer of *Ahab*, besides, that the principall men saluted him King, before he executed any thing. There may as much be said of all the rest, whose examples are propounded in holy writ. But where God Almighty doth not speak with his own mouth, nor extraordinarily by his Prophets, it is there that we ought to be exceedingly cautious, and stand upon our guard; for if any supposing he is inspired by the Holy-Ghost, do attribute to himselfe the before mentioned authority, would intreat him to looke that he be not puffed up with vaine glory, and least he make nor a God to himselfe of his own fancy, and sacrifice to his own inventions, let him not then be conceived with vanity, least instead of fruits he bring forth deluding lies. Let the people also be advised on their parts, least in desiring to fight under the Banner of Jesus Christ, they run not to their own confusion to follow the Army of some Gallilean Theudas, or of *Barabba* as it happened to the *Pesants* and *Assassins* of *Germany*, in the year 1323. I will not say, notwithstanding that the same God which to punish our offences, hath sent us in these our dayes, both *Pharoes* and *Ahabs*, may not sometimes raise up extraordinary deliverances to his people: certainly his justice and his mercy continue to all ages, firme and immutable. Now if these visible miracles appear not at in former times; we may yet at the least fall by the effects that God workes miraculously in our hearts, which is when we have our mindes free from all ambition, a true and earnest zeale, a right knowledge, and consciency; least being guided by the spirit of error or ambition, we rather make Idolls of our own imaginations, then serve and worship the true and living God.

Further more to take away all scruple, we must necessarily answer, those which esteeme, or else would, that others should think they hold that opinion, that the Church ought not to be defended by Armes. They say with all that, it was ooe without a great Mysterie, that God did forbid in the Law, that the Alter should be made or adorned with the helps of any tooles of Iron; in like manner, that at the building of the Temple of *Solomon*: there was not heard any noyse of Axe or Hammer, or other tooles of Iron; from whence they collekt that the Church which is the lively Temple of the Lord, ought not to be reformed by Armes; yes, as if the stones of the Alter, and of the Temple, were hewed and taken out of the quarries without any instrument of Iron, which the text of the holy

Scripture

Scripture doth sufficiently cleare. But if we oppose to this goodly Allegory, that which is written in the fourth Chapter of the book of *Nehemiash*; that one part of the people, carried mortar, and another part stood ready with their weapons, that some held in one hand their swords, and with the other, carried the materials to the workes, for the rebuilding of the Temple: to the end, by this maner to prevent their enemies from raising their work, we say also that the Church is neither advanced, nor edified by these materiall weapons; but by these armes it is warranted, and preserved from the violence of the enemies, which will nor by any meanes endure the increase of it. Briefly, there hath been an infinite number of good Kings and Princes, (as Histories do testify; which by Armes have maintained and defended the service of God against Pagans. They reply readily to this, that Warres in this maner were allowable under the Law; but since the time that grace hath been offered by Jesus Christ, who would not enter into *Jerusalem* mounted on a brayc horse; but meekly sitting on an asse: this maner of proceeding hath had no end, I answer first, that all agree with me in this, that our Saviour Christ during all the time that he dwelt in this world, took no office of him the Office of a Judge, or King; but rather of a private person, and a Delinquent by impuacion of our transgressions: to that it is an allegation besides the purpose, to say that he hath nor managed Armes. But I would willingly demand of such exceptionists; whether they think that by the coming of Jesus Christ in the flesh, that Magistrates have lost their right in the sword of Authority? If they say so, *Saint Paul* contradicts them, who saies that the Magistrate carries not the sword in vaine, and did not refuse their assistance and power against the violence of those which had conspired his death. And if they consent to the saying of the Apostle to what purpose should the Magistrates beare the sword, if it be not to serve God, who hath committed it to them, to defend the good and punish the bad? Can they doo better service then to preserve the Church from the violence of the wicked, & to deliver the flock of Christ from the swords of murderers? I would demand of them yet, whether they think that all use of Armes is forbidden to Christians? If that be their opinion, then would I know of them, wherefore Christ did graunt to the Centurion his request? Wherefore did he give so excellent a testimony of him? Wherefore doth *St. Iohn Baptist* command the men at Armes to content themselves with their pay, and not to use any extortion and doo not rather persuade them to leave their killing? Wherefore did *Saint Peter* baptize *Cornelius* the Centurion who was the first fruite of the Gentiles? Prayd whence comes it that he did not in any

Rom. 13  
4. Alie  
23. 17.  
Matt. 8.  
9. 13.  
Luc. 3.  
14.  
Act. 10.  
47.

Exod.  
20. 25.  
Deut.  
27. 3.  
1 Kings  
6. 7



fort whatsoever counsell him to leave his charge? Now if to bear arms & to make war be a thing lawful, can there possibly be found any war more just, then that which is taken in hand by the command of the superiour, for the defence of the Church, and the preservation of the faithfull? Is there any greater injury, then that which is exercised over the soul? Can there be imagined a war more commendable then that which suppresseth such a tyranny? For the last point, I would willingly know of these men, whether it be absolutely prohibited Christians, to make war upon any occasion whatsoever? If they say that it is forbidden them: from whence comes it then that the men at Armes, Captains, and Centurions, which had no other employment; but the managing of Armes were alwayes received into the Church? wherefore do the ancient Fathers, and Christian Historians make so horrible mention of certain legions composed wholly of Christian Soldiers, and amongst others of that of *Malta*, so renowned for the victory which they obtayned, and of that of *Tebes*, of the which *St. Mauricius* was General, who suffered martirdom together with all his Troop, for the confessing of the name of *Jesus Christ*? And if it be permitted to make wars (as it may be they will confesse) to keepe the limmits and Townes of a Countrey, and to repulse an invading enemy: Is it not yet a thing much more reasonable, to take Armes to preserve and defend honest men, to suppress the wicked, and to keepe and defend the limmits and bounds of the Church, which is the Kingdom of *Jesus Christ*? if it were otherwayes, to what purpose? should *St. Johns* have foretold, that the whore of *Babylon*, shall be finally ruined by the 10. Kings, whom she hath bewitched? Furthermore, if we hold a contrary opinion, what shall we say of the wars of *Constantine*, against *Maxentius* and *Licinius*, celebrated by so many publick orations, and approved by the Testimony of an infinite number of learned men, what opinion should we hold of the many voyages, made by Christian Princes, against the Turkes and Sarazins to conquer the holy Land, who had not, or at the least, ought not to have had, any other end in their designs; but to hinder the enemy from ruining the Temple of the Land, and to restore the integrity of his service into those Countreies. Although then that the Church be not oppressed by Armes, notwithstanding it may be justly preserved by the means of Armes; I say further, that those that dye in to holy a war, are no less the Martyrs of *Jesus Christ*, then their brethren which were put to death for Religion; nay, they which dye in that war seeme to have this advantage, that with a free will & knowing sufficiently hazards, into which they cast themselves, notwithstanding, do courageously expose their lives to death and danger; whereas

the

other do only not refuse death, when it becometh them to suffer. The *Turkes* strive to advance their opinion by the means of Armes, and if they do subscribe Country, they presently bring in by force the impieties of *Mahomet*; who in his Alcoran, hath so recommended Armes: as they are not ashamed to say it is the ready way to Heaven, yet do the *Turkes* constrain no man in matter of conscience. But he which is a much greater adversary to *Christ*, and true Religion, with all those Kirges whom he hath enchanted, opposeth fire and figots, to the light of the Gospel, tortures the word of God, compelling by wracking, and torments, as much as in him lieth: all men to become Idolaters, and finally is not ashamed, to advance and maintain their faith and law by perfidious dissimulation, and their traditions by continuall treasons. Now on the contrary, those good Princes and Magistrates, are said properly to defend themselves, which invitone and fortifie by all their means and industry the vine of *Christ*, already planted, to be planted in places where it hath not yet been, lest the wild boore of the Forrest should speake or devour it: They do this (I say) in covering with their Bucklers, and defending with their sword, those which by the preaching of the Gospel have been converted to true Religion, and in fortifying with their best ability, by ravelins, ditches, and rampers the Temple of God built with lively stones, untill it have attained the full height, in despite of all the furious assaults of the enemies thereof, we have lengthened out this discourse thus far, to the end, we might take away all scruple concerning this question. See then the Estates, and all the Officers of a Kingdom, or the greatest part of them, every one established in authority by the people: know, that if they containe not within his bounds (or at the least, impley not the utmost of their endeavours thereto) a King that seekes to corrupt the Law of God, or hinders the reestablishment thereof, that they offend grievously against the Lord, with whom they have contracted Covenants upon those conditions: Those of a Town, or of a Province, making a portion of a Kingdom, let them know also, that they draw upon themselves the judgement of God, if they drive not impiery out of their walls and confines, if the King seekes to bring it in, or if they be wanting to preserve by all means, the pure Doctrine of the Gospel, although for the defence thereof, they suffer for a time banishment, or any other misery. Finally, more private men must be all advertised, that nothing can excuse them, if they obey any in that which offends God, and that yet they have no right nor warrant, neither may in any sort by their private authority take armes, if it appear not most evidently, that they have extraordinary vocation thereunto, all which our discourse will suppose we have confirmed by pregnant Testimonies drawn from holy writ.

G

THE

## THE THIRD QUESTION.

Whether it be lawfull to resist a Prince which doth oppress or ruine a publique State, and how far such resistance may be extended, by Whom, how, and by what right, or law it is permitted.

FOR so much as we must here dispute of the lawfull authoritie of a lawfull Prince, I am confident that this question will be the lesse acceptable to Tyrants, and wicked Princes; for it is no marvell if those which receive no law, but what their own will, and fancie dictates unto them, be deaf unto the voyce of that law which is grounded upon reason. But I persuade my selfe that good Princes will willingly entertaine this discourse, inasmuch as they sufficiently know that all Magistrates, be they of never so high a rank, are but an insinuated and speaking law, neither though any thing be pressed home against the bad, can it fall within any inference against the good. Tyrants and Kings, as also good and bad Princes are in a direct diametre opposite and contrarie; therefore that which shall be urged against Tyrants, is so farre from detracting any thing from Kings, as one the contrary, the more tyrants are laid open in their proper colours, the more glorious doth the true worth, & dignitie of Kings appear: neither can the vicious imperfections the one be layd open but it gives addition of perfections, and respect to the honour of the other. But for tyrants let them say and thinke what they please, that shall be the least of my care; for it is not to them, but againe them that I write; for Kings I beleve that they will readily consent to that which is propounded, for by true proportion of reason they ought as much to hate Tyrants and wicked governours, as Shepherds must wolves, Physicians, Impoysoners, true Prophets, false Doctors, for it must necessarily oecur that reason infused into good Kings as much hatred against Tyrants, as nature imprinteth in dogs against wolves, for as the one lives by rapine and spoyle, so the other is borne or bred to redresse and prevent all such outrages. It may be the flatterers of tyrants will cast a supercilious aspect on these lines; but if they were not past all grace they would rather blush for shame. I very well know that the friends and faithfull servants of Kings will not onely approve and lovingly entertaine this discourse, but also with their best abilities defend the contents thereof accordingly, when as the reader shall find himselfe moved either with content or dislike in the reading hereof, let him know that by that he shall plainly discover either the affection, or hatred that he beares to Tyrants; let us now enter into the matter.

*Kings are made by the People.*

We have shewed before that it is God, that doth appoint Kings, which chuseth them, which gives the Kingdom to them: now we say that the people establish Kings, putteth the Scepter into their hands, and which with

manner, to the end, that the Kings should acknowledge, that after God they held their power and soveraignty from the people, and that it might the rather induce them, to apply & address the utmost of their care and thoughts for the profit of the people, without being puffed with any vaine imagination: that they were formed of any matter more excellent then other men; for which they were raised so high above others: as if they were to command over flocks of sheepe, or herds of Cattel; but let them remember and know, that they are of the same mould and condition as others, raised from the earth by the voice and acclamations: now as it were upon the shoulders of the people unto their thrones, that they might afterwards bear on their own shoulders the greatest burthens of the Common-wealth. Divers ages before that, the people of *Israel* demanded a King, God gave and appointed the Law of royall government: contained in the 17. Chapter, ver. 14. of *Deut.* when sayes *Moses*, thou art come unto the Land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and shalt possesse it, and shalt dwell therein, and shalt say, I will set a King over me like as all the Nations that are about me, thou shalt in any wise let him whom the Lord thy God shall chuse from amongst thy brethren, &c. You see here, that the election of the King is attributed to God, the establishment to the people: now when the practice of this law came in use, see in what manner they proceeded. The Elders of *Israel* which presented the whole body of the people, (under this name of Elders, are comprehended the Captains, the Centurions, Commanders over cities and towns, Judges, provosts; but principally the chiefe of tribes) came to mee *Samuel* in *Ramah*, and not being willing longer to endure the government of the finnes of *Samuel*, whose ill carriage had justly drawn on them: the peoples dislike, and wishall perswading themselves that they had found a meanes to make their warres hereafter with more advantage they demanded a King of *Samuel*, who asking Councill of the Lord, he made known that he had chosen *Saul* for the Governour of his people. Then *Samuel* anointed *Saul*, and performed all those rights which belong to the election of a King required by the people. Now this might perhaps have seemed sufficient, if *Samuel* had presented to the people the King that was chosen by God, and had admonished them all to become good and obedient subjects. Notwithstanding to the end, that at the King might know that he was established by the people, *Samuel* appointed the Elders to meet at *Mispah*, where being assembled as if the businesse were but then to begin, and nothing had already been done, to be brief as if the election of *Saul* were then only to be treated of, the lot is cast and falls on the Tribe of *Benjamin*, after on the family of *Matri*, and lastly on *Saul*, born of that family who was the same that God had chosen; Then by the consent of all the people *Saul* was declared King. Finally, to the that *Saul* nor any other might attribute the after said businesse to chance of lot, after that *Saul* had made some proofe of his valour, 15  
8.5  
15d  
9.1  
15d  
20.  
&c.

in raising the siege of the *Ammonites* in *Tabesh Gilead*: some of the people presently the business he was again confirmed King in a full assembly at *Gilgal*; yet soe that he whom God had chosen, and the Lot had separated from all the rest, is established King by the suffrages of the people.

And for *David*, by the Commandement of God, and in a manner more evident then the former, after the rejection of *Saul*, *Samuel* anointed for King over Israel *David* chosen by the Lord, which being done the spirit of *Saul* presently left *Saul*, and wrought in a speciall manner in *David*. But *David* notwithstanding reigns not, but was compelled to save himselfe in deserts and rocks, often times falling upon the very brim of destruction, and never resigned as King till after the death of *Saul*: for then by the suffrages of all the people of *Judah* he was first chosen King of *Judah*, and seven yeares after by the consent of all *Israel*, he was inaugurated King of *Israel* in *Hebron*. So then he is anointed first by the Prophet at the commandement of God, as a token he was chosen, secondly by the commandement of the people when he was established King. And that to the end that kings may alwayes remember that it is from God; but by the people, and for the peoples sake that they doe raigne, and that in there glorie they sty nor (as is there custome) that they hold their kingdome only of God and there sword, but will add that it was the people which first giveth them with that sword. The same order offered in *Solomon*, although he was the Kings soane God hath chosen *Solomon*, to sit upon the Throne of his kingdome, and by expresse words had promised *David* to be with him and assist him as a Father his soone. *David* had with his one mouth designed *Solomon* to be successor to his Crowne in the presence of some of the principall of his Court. But this was not enough and therefore *David* assembled at *Jerusalem* the Princes of *Israel*, the heads of the Tribes the Captaines of the Souldiers and ordinance officers of the Kings, the centurions & other Magistrates of Towns together with his sons, the noble men and worthiest personages of the Kingdome, to consult and resolve upon the election. In this Assembly after they had called upon the name of God, *Solomon* by the consent of the whole congregation proclaimed and anointed for King, and sat (so saith the text) upon the Throne of *Israel* then and not before the Princes the Noblemen his brothers themselves do him homage, and take the Oath of Allegiance. And to the end, that it may not be said, that that was onely done to avoid occasion of difference, which might arise amongst the brothers the sonnes of *David* about the succession, we reade that the other following kings have in the same manner been established in their places, it is said, that after the death of *Solomon*, the people assembled to create his sonne *Rhoboam* King. After that *Azariah* was killed, *Ozias* his onely sonne was chosen King by all the people, *Ochisias* after *Ioram*, *Ioachim*, the sonne of *Iosias*, after the deise of his Father, whose piety might well seeme to

require that without any other solemnity, notwithstanding both he and the other were chosen and invested into the royall Throne by the suffrages of the people. To which also belongs, that which *Husbai* said to *Abisalom*, nay; but whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of *Israel* chuse, his will I be, and with him will I abide, which is as much as to say, I will follow the King lawfully established, and according to the accustomed order; wherefore although that God had promised to his people a perpetuall Lampe, to wit, a King, and a continuall successour of the Line of *David*, and that the succession of the Kings of this people were approved by the word of God himselfe, notwithstanding, since that we see that the Kings have not reigned, before the people had ordained and installed them, with requisite Ceremonies: it may be collected from this, that the Kingdome of *Israel*, was hereditary; if we consider *David* and the promise made to him, and that it was wholly elective; if we regard the particuler persons. But to what purpose is this, but to make it apparent, that the election is onely mentioned, that the Kings might have alwayes in their remembrance, that they were raised to their dignities by the people, and therefore they should never forget during life, in what a strict bond of observance they are tyed to those from whom they have received all their greatness. We reade that the Kings of the Heathen have been established also by the people; for as when they had either troubles at home, or warres abroad, some one in whose ready valour, and discrete integrity, the people did principally relye and repose their greatest confidence, him they presently with a universal consent constituted King. *Cicero* saith, that amongst the *Medes*, *Diocees* from a Judge of private controversies was for his uprightnesse, by the whole people elected King, and in the same manner were the first Kings chosen amongst the *Romans*. Inso-much, that after the death of *Romulus*, the interregne and Government of the hundred senators, being little acceptable to the *Quintes* it was agreed that from thence forward, the Kings should be chosen by the suffrages of the people, and the approbation of the senate. *Farquius Suprbius* was therefore esteemed a tyrant, because being chosen neither by the people nor the senate, he intruded himself into the Kingdom only by force and usurpation; Wherefore *Julius Caesar* long after though he gained the Empire by the sword, yet to the end he might add some shadow or pretence of right to his former intrusion, he caused himself to be declared both by the people and senate perpetually dictator. *Augustus* his adopted sonne would never take on him as inheritor of the Empire, although he were declared so by the testaments of *Cesar*; but alwayes held it as of the people and senate. The same also did *Tiberius*, *Caligula* and *Claudius*, and the first that assumed the Empire to himself without any colour of right, was *Nero* who also by the senate was condemned. Briefly for so much as none were ever

2 Sam  
16.1Psal.  
132.  
11.12Heracl.  
lib. 1  
Cicero  
de offi.  
Tit. 1  
vilib.

borne

born with Crowns and their heads, and scepters in their hands, and that no man can be a King by himself nor reign without people; whereas on the contrary the people may subsist of themselves, and were long before they had any Kings, it must of necessity follow that Kings were at the first constituted by the people, And although the sons and dependants of such Kings inheriting their fathers vertues, may in a sort seeme to have rendered their Kingdoms hereditary to their off-springs and that in some Kingdoms and Countries the right of free election seems in a sort buried; yet notwithstanding in all well ordered Kingdoms this custome is yet remaining, the sons do not succeed the fathers, before the people first have as it were a new established them by their new approbation; neither were they acknowledged in quality as inheriting it from the dead; but approved and accounted Kings then only when they were invested with the Kingdom, by receiving the Scepter and Diadem from the hands of those who represent the Majesty of the people. One may see most evident marks of this in Christian Kingdoms, which are at this day esteemed hereditary; for the French King, he of *Spain* and *England* and others are commonly sacred, and as it were put into possession of their authority by the Peeres, Lords of the Kingdom, and Officers of the Crowne which represent the body of the people; no more nor lesse then the Emperours of *Germany* are chosen by the Electors, and the Kings of *Polonia*, by the *yavodes* and *Pallatines* of the Kingdom, where the right of Election is yet in force. In like manner also, the Cities give no royall reception, nor entrie unto the King but afo their inauguration, and anciently they used not to count the times of their reign but from the day of their coronation, the which was strictly observed in *France*. But lest the continued course of some successions should deceive us, we must take notice that the estates of the Kingdoms have often preferred the colen before the sonne, the younger brother before the Elder as in *France Lewis* was preferred before his brother *Robert* Earle of *Ebreux*: [ *Annales GVI* ] in like manner *Henry* before *Roberts* nephew to *Capis*. Nay which is more by authority of the people in the same Kingdom, the Crown hath bin transported (the lawfull inheriters living) from one lineage to another as from that of *Aerone* to that of the *Charlemains*, and from that of the *Charlemains* to that of the *Capets*, the which hath also beene done in other Kingdoms as the best Historians testify; But not to wander from *France* the long continuance and power of which Kingdom may in some sort plead for a ruling authority, and where succession seems to have obtained most equitatively. We read that *Pharamond* was chosen in the year 419 *Pepin* in the year 751. *Charles the Great* and *Carleman* the sonne of *Pepin* in the year 768 without having any respect to their Fathers former estate. *Carleman* dying in the year 772. his portion fell not presently into the possession of his brother *Charles the great*, as it ordinarily happens in the succession of inheritances, but by the Ordinance of the people and the estate of

the Kingdom he is invested with it, the same author witnesseth that in the year 813 *Lewis* the Courteous although he were the sonne of *Charles* the great was also elected: and in the Testament of *Charlmane* inserted into the history written by *Nauclero*, *Charlmane* doth intreae the people to chuse by a generall assembly of the Estates of the Kingdom which of his Grandchildren or Nephews the people please, and commanding the Vales to observe and obey the Ordinance of the people, by meanes whereof *Charles* the bald nephew to *Lewis* the courteous and *Judith*, doth declare himself to be chosen King, as *Ammius* the French historian recites.

To conclude in a word, all Kings at the first were altogether elected, and those which at this day seeme to have their Crowne and Royall authority by inheritance, have or should have first and principally their confirmation from the people. Briefly although the people of some Countries have been accustomed to chuse their Kings of such a lineage which for some notable merits have worthily deserved it; yet we must believe that they chuse the stock it self and not every branch that proceeds from it neither are they so tied to that election, as if the successour degenerate they may not chuse another more worthy, neither those which come and are the next of that stock are borne Kings but created such; nor called Kings but Princes of the blood royall.

*The whole body of the people is above the King.*

Now seeing that the people chuse and establish their Kings, it followeth that the whole body of the people is above the King; for it is a thing most evident that he which is established by another is accounted under him that hath established him, & he which receives his authority from another is lesse then he from whom he denies his power. *Poiphar* the *Egyptian* setteth *Ioseph* over all his House, *Nebuchadnezzar* *Daniel* over the Province of *Babylon*, *Darius* the sixscore governors over the kingdom. It is commonly said that *Mrs* establish their servants, Kings their officers: In like manner also the people establish the King as administrator of the Common-wealth. Good kings have not disdained this title; yea, he had ones himselfe have affected it; inso much, as for the space of divers Ages no Roman Emperor (if it were not some absolute tyrant, as *Nero*, *Domitian*, *Caligula*) would suffer himself to be called Lord; Furthermore, it must necessarily be that Kings were instituted for the peoples sake, neither can it be, that for the pleasure of some hundred of men and without doubt more foolish and worse then many of the other, all the rest were made; but such rather that in so hundred were made for the use and service of all the other, and reason requires that he be preferred above the other, who was made only to and for his occasion; so it is, that for the ships sake, the owner appoints a pilot over her, who sits at the helm, and looks that she keeps her course, nor run nor upon any dangerous shoer; the pilot doing his duty is obeyed by the Mariners; yea, of him himself that is owner of the vessel notwithstanding, the pilot is a servant as well as the least

least in the ship, from whom he on'y differs in this that he sits in better place than they do. In a Common-wealth the same is compared to a ship the King holds the place of Pilot, the people in general are owners of the vessel, obeying the Pilot who sits in the helm of the publique good though this Pilot neither is nor ought to be esteemed other than servant to the publique, as a Judge or General in war differs little from other officers, but that he is bound to bear greater burdens, & expose himself to more dangers. By the same reason also which the King gains by acquit of arms, be it at the possession himself of Frontier places in warring on the enemy, or that which he gets by enrichments or confiscations, he gets it to the Kingdom & not to himself, to wit, to the people, of whom the Kingdom is composed; no more, nor less, than the servant doth for his master, neither may one contract or oblige himself vs to him, but by & with reference to the authority derived from the people. Further more, there is an infinite sort of people which live with out a King; but we cannot imagine a King without people. And those which have bin raised to the Royal dignity, were not advanced, because they excelled other men in beauty & comeliness, nor in some excellency of nature to govern them as shepherds doo their flocks, but rather being raised out of the same mass with the rest of the people, they should acknowledge that for them, as it were borrow their power & authority; This ancient custome of the French represents that exceeding well, for they used to lift up on a buckler, & salute him King whom they had chosen. And wherefore is it said, *I pray you that Kings have an infinite number of eyes, a million of ears, with extream long hands, and feet exceeding swift?* is it because they are like to Argos, Gerion, Midas, & divers others to be created by the Poets? No truly, but it is said in regard of all the people, whom the business principal y concerns, who lend to the king for the good of the Common-wealth, their eye, their ears, their means their faculties. Let the people forsake the king, he presently falls to the ground, although before his hearing & sight seemed most excellent, & that he was strong & in the best disposition that might be, yea that he seemed to triumph in all magnificence, yet in an instant he will become most vile & contemptible, to be brief, instead of those divine honours wherewith all men adored him, he shall be comped to become a Pedant, & whip children in the school; at Corinth, To ke away but the basis, to this Giant, & like the Rodian Colosse he presently tumbles on the ground, & falls into pieces. Seeing then that the King is established in this degree by the people, & for their sake, & that he cannot subsist without them, who can thinke it strange then for us to conclude, that the people are above the King. Now that which we speak of all the people universally, ought also to be understood as hath been delivered in the question, of those which in every Kingdom or town do lawfully represent the body of the people, & which ordinarily (or at least should be) elected officers of the Kingdom, or of the crown, & not of the King; For the officers of the Kingdom it is he which placeth & displaceth them at his pleasure, yea, after his death they have no more power, & are accounted as dead. On the contrary, the officers of the Kingdom receive their authority from the people in the general Assembly of the States (or at least were accustomed so anciently to have done) & cannot be discontinued but by them, so when the one depends on the King, the other of the Kingdom, those of a sovereign officer of the Kingdom which is the King himself, these of a sovereignty it self, that is of the people, of which sovereignty both the King, all his officers, and all his officers of the Kingdom, ought to depend, the charge of the one hath proper relation to the care of the Kings person; that of the other to look that the common-wealth receive no damage the first ought to serve and assist the King, as all domestique servants are bound to doo to their masters, the other to preserve the rights & privileges of the people, & to carefully hinder the Prince that he neither omit the things that may advantage the State, nor commit any thing that may endamage the publique.

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Briefly

Briefly, that one are Servants and domestiques of the Kings, and received into their places to obey his person; the other, on the contrary, are as Associates to the King in the administration of justice, participating of the Roys power and authority, being bound to the utmost of their power, to be assisting in the managing of the affairs of State, as well as the Kings, who is as it were President amongst them, and principally onely in order and degree.

Therefore, as all the whole People is above the King, and likewise taken in one entire body are in authority before him; yet being considered one by one they are all of them under the King. It is easie to know how far the power of the first Kings extended, in that Ephron King of the Hittites could not grant Abraham the Sepulchre, but in the presence and with the consent of the People; neither could Hemor the Hevite King of Sichem contract an alliance with Jacob, without the Peoples assent, and confirmation thereof; because it was then the custome to refer the most important affairs to be dispensed and resolved in the generall Assemblies of the People. This might easily be practised in those Kingdomes, which were then almost confined within the circuit of one towne.

Gen. 34

But since that Kings began to extend their limits, and that it was impossible for the People to assemble together all into one place because of their great numbers, which would have occasioned confusion the Officers of the Kingdom were established; which should ordinarily preserve the rights of the People, in such sort notwithstanding, as when extraordinary occasion required the People might be assembled, or at the least such an abridgement as might by the principallest Members be a Representation of the whole Body. We see this order established in the Kingdom of Israel, which (in the judgment of the wisest Politicians) was excellently ordered. The King had his Cupbearers, his Carvers, his Chamberlains and Stewards. The Kingdom had six Officers, to wit, the 72 Elders, and the heads and chief chosen out of all the Tribes, which had the care of the Publique Faith in Peace and War.

Furthermore, the Kingdom had in every town Magistrates, which had the particular government of them, as the former were for the whole Kingdom. At such times as affairs of consequence were to be treated of, they assembled together, but nothing that concerned the publique state could receive any solid determination. David assembled the Officers of his Kingdom when he desired to invest his Son Solomon with the Royal Dignity; when he would have examined and approved that manner of policy, and managing of affairs, that he had revived and restored, and when there was question of removing the Ark of the Covenant.

1. Chron.  
 29. 1  
 1. Chron.  
 13. 8

And because they represented the whole people, it is said in the History, that all the people assembled. These were the same Officers that delivered *Jonathan* from death, condemned by the sentence of the King, by which it appears, that there might be an appeal from the King to the People.

*Sans.*  
4.45. After that the kingdom was divided through the pride of *Rehoboam*, the Council at *Jerusalem* composed of 71. Ancients, seems to have such authority, that they might judge the King, as well as the King might judge every one of them in particular.

*Chron.*  
9. In this Council was President the Duke of the house of *Juda*, to wit, some principall man chosen out of that Tribe; as also, in the City of *Jerusalem* there was a Governour chosen out of the Tribe of *Benjamin* residing there. This will appear more manifest by examples, *Jeremy* sent by God to denounce to the Jews the destruction of *Jerusalem*, was therefore condemned first by the Priests and Prophets, in whose hands was the Ecclesiasticall jurisdiction afterwards by all the people of the City; that is, by the ordinary Judges of *Jerusalem*, to wit, the Milleniers, and the Centurions: Finally the matter being brought before the Princes of *Juda*, who were the 71. Elders assembled, and set were to the new Gate of the Temple, he was by them acquitted.

7. In this very Assembly, they did discreetly condemn, in expresse terms, the wicked and cruell act of the King *Jehoiakin*, who a little before had caused the Prophet *Vriab* to be slain, who also fore-told the destruction of *Jerusalem*.

*Jer. 37.*  
38. We read in another place that *Zedechias* held in such reverence the authority of this Council, that he was so far from delivering *Jeremy* from the dungeon, wherein to the 71. had cast him, that he durst scarce remove him into a lesse rigorous prison. They perswading him to give his consent to the putting to death the Prophet *Jeremy*, he answered, that he was in their hands, and that he might not oppose them in any thing. The same King fearing lest they might make information against him, to bring him to an account for certain Speeches he had used to the Prophet *Jeremy*, was glad to feign an untrue excuse. It appears by this, that in the kingdom of *Juda* this Council was above the King, in this kingdom, I say not fashioned or established by *Plato* or *Aristotle*, but by the Lord God, himself being Author of all their order, and supreme Moderator in that Monarchy. Such were the seven Magi or Sages in the Persian Empire, who had almost a paralell dignity with the King, and were teamed the ears and eyes of the King, who also never dissented from the judgment of those Sages.

by from the judgment of the Kings, and *Ariftole* says, had authority also to judge the Kings themselves.

In *Egypt* the people were accustomed to chuse and give officers to the King, to the end they might hinder and prevent any incoherence, or usurp authority, contrary to the Laws. Now as *Ariftole* doth ordinarily rearm those lawfull Kings, which have for their Assistants, such officers or Councillors: so also maketh he no difficulty to say, that where they be wanting, there can be no true Monarchy, but rather a tyranny, absolutely barbarous, or at the least such a Dominion, as doth most neerly approach tyranny.

In the *Rome* Common-wealth, such were the Senators, and the Magistrates created by the people the tribunes of those which were called *Celeres*, the *Proetor* or *Provost* of the City, and others, in so much as there lay an appeal from the King to the People, as *Seneca* declares by diverse testimonies drawn from *Ciceron*'s bookes of the Common-wealth, and the History of *Oratius* sufficiently shewes, who being condemned by the Judges for killing his sister, was acquitted by the people.

In the times of the Emperours, there was the Senate, the Consults, the *Pretors*, the great *Provosts* of the Empire, the Governours of Provinces, attributed to the Senate and the People, all which were called the Magistrates and Officers of the people of *Rome*. And therefore, when that by the decree of the Senate, the Emperour *Maximian* was declared enemy of the Common-wealth, and that *Maximian* and *Albinus* were created Emperours by the Senate, the men of war were sworn to be faithfull, and obedient to the people of *Rome*, the Senate, and the Emperours. Now for the Empires and publick States of these times (except those of *Turkey*, *Moscovia*, and such like, which are rather a tapody of Robbers, and barbarous intruders, than any lawfull Empire) there is no one, which is nor, or hath not heretofore been governed in the manner we have described. And if through the connivency and sloath of the principall Officers, the successors have found the business in a worse condition, those which have for the present the publick Authority in their hands, are notwithstanding bound as much as in their power to reduce things into their primary estate and condition.

In the Empire of *Germany* which is conferred by election, there is the Electors and the Princes both secular and Ecclesiasticall, the *Counsellors*, *Bishops*, and *Deputies* of the Imperial Cities, and all these in their proper places are Solicitors for the publick good likewise in the *Diet* they represent the Majesty of the Empire, being obliged to advise, and carefully foresee, that neither by the Emperours, partiality, hate, nor affectuosity, such ill Events do befall the Empire, and from this reason the

*Ariftole*  
pol. l. 5.  
11.

*Herid.*  
8.

*Ariftole*  
pol. lib.

Empire hath his Chancellour, as well as the Emperour his, both the one and the other have their peculiar Officers and Treasurers apart. And it is a thing so notorious, that the Emperour is preferred before the Emperour, that it is a common saying, *That the Emperour does homage to his Empire.*

Spec-  
tum Sax-  
nicum.

In like manner in the Kingdom of *Polonia*, there is for Officers of the Crown, the Bishops, the Palatins, the Castellains, the Nobility, the Deputies of Towns and Provinces assembled extraordinarily, before whom, and with whose consent, and no where else, they make new Lawes, and determinations concerning wars. For the ordinary Government there, is the Councellours of the kingdom, the Chancellour of the State, &c. although notwithstanding, the king have his Stewards, Chamberlains, Ser-vants and Domestiques. Now if any man should demand in *Polonia*, who were the greater, the King or all the people of the kingdom represented, by the Lords and Magistrates; he should do as much, as if he asked *Æneas*, if the Duke were above the Seigniorie. But what shall we say of Kingdoms, which are said to go by hereditary succession? We may indeed conclude the very same, The kingdom of *France* heretofore, preferred before all other, both in regard of the excellency of their Lawes and majesty of their Estate, may passe with most as a ruling case. Now although that those which have the publicke commands in their hands, doe not discharge their duties as were to be desired, it follows not, though that they are not bound to do it. The King hath his high Steward of his Household, his Chamberlains, his Masters of his games, Cup-bearers, and others, whose offices were wont to depend on the person of the King, that after the death of their Master, the offices were void. And indeed at the Funerall of the King, the Lord high Steward in the presence of all the officers and servants of the house-hold, breaks his staffe of office, and says; *Our Master is dead, let every one provide for himselfe.* On the other side, the kingdome hath her officers, to wit, the Mayor of the Palace, which since hath been called the Constable, the Marshalls, the Admirall, the Chancellour, or great Referendary, the Secretaries, the Treasurers and others; which heretofore were treated in the Assembly of the three Estates, the Clergy, the Nobility, and the People.

Since that the Parliament of *Paris* was made Sedentary, they are not thought to be established in their places, before they have bene first received and approved by that course of Parliament, and may not be dismissed nor deposed, but by the authority, and consent of the same. Now all these officers take their oath to the Kingdom, which is as much as to say, to the people in the first place, then to the King which is protector of the Kingdom, the which appears by the renoual of the oath. Above all the

Armo-  
is lib. 5.  
26.  
Carol  
150.

Constable, who receiving the Sword from the King, hath it girded unto him with this charge, *That he maintain and defend the Common-wealth*, as appears by the words that the King then pronounceth.

Besides, the kingdom of *France* hath the Peers (so called either for that they are the Kings companions, or because they are the Fathers of the Common-wealth) taking their denominations from the severall Provinces of the kingdom, in whose hands the King at his inauguration takes his oath, as if all the people of the kingdom were in their present, which shews, that these twelve Peers are above the King. They on the other side swear, *That they will preserve not the King, but the Crown, that they will assist the Common-wealth with their counsell, and therefore will be present with their best abilities to counsell the Prince both in peace and war*, as appears plainly in the *Patience* of their Peership.

And they therefore have the same right as the Peers of the Court, which according to the Law of the *Lombards*, were not only associates to the Lord of the Fee in the judgment of causes, but also did take an account, and judge the differences that happened between the Lord and his vassall.

We may also know, that those Peers of *France* did often discusse suits and differences between the King and his Subjects: Inasmuch that when *Charles the 6.* would have given sentence against the Duke of *Brittain* they opposed it, alledging that the discussing of that business belonged properly to the Peers, and not to the king, who might not in any sort derogate from their authority.

Therefore it is that yet at this day the Parliament of *Paris* is called the Court of Peers, being in some sort constituted judge between the king and the people; yes, between the king and every private person; and is bound and ought to maintain the meanest in the kingdom against the kings Attorney, if he undertake any thing contrary to law.

Furthermore, if the king ordain any thing in his Councell, if he treat any agreement with the Princes his neighbours, if he begin a Warre, or make peace, as lately with *Charles the 5.* the Emperour, the Parliament ought to interpose their authority, and all that which concerns the publicke State must be there intregistred; neither is there any thing firm and stable which the Parliament doth not first approve. And to the end, that the Councellours of that Parliament should not fear the king, formerly they attained not to that place, but by the nomination of the whole body of the Court; neither could they be dismissed for any lawfull cause, but by the authority of the said Body.

S. Filis  
fam. in-  
str. quib.  
mod. ins  
patria  
pos. solvi-  
sur.

Renatus  
ch pinus  
ib. 3.

Furthermore, if the Letters of the King be not subsigned by a Secretary of the Kingdom, at this day called a Secretary of State, and if the Letters Patents be not sealed by the Chancellor, who hath power also to capcell them, they are of no force or value. There is also Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Viscounts, Barons, Seneschabs, and in the cities and good towns Mayors, Bayliffes, Lieutenants, Capitols, Consuls, Sindiques, Sheriffs, and others which have special authority through the Circuit of some countries or towns to preserve the people of their jurisdiction. Time it is, that at this day some of these dignities are become hereditary. Thus much concerning the ordinary Magistrates.

*The Assembly of the three Estates.*

Besides all this, anciently every year, and since lesse often, so wit, when some urgent necessity required it, the generall or three Estates were assembled, where all the Provinces and Townes of any worth, towr, the Burgeses, Nobles, and Ecclesiasticall persons, did all of them send their Deputies, and there they did publickly deliberate and conclude of that which concerned the publike state. Always the authority of this Assembly was such, that what was there determined, whether it were to treat peace, or make war, or create a Regent in the Kingdom, or impose some new tribute, it was ever held firm and inviolable; nay, which is more by the authority of this Assembly, the Kings convinced of loose intemperance, or of insufficiency, for so great a charge or tyranny, were dishonored, yea, their whole Races were for ever excluded from their succession to the Kingdom, no more, nor lesse, as their Progenitors were by the same authority formerly called to the administration of the same Kingdoms. Those whom the consent and approbation of the Estates had forrectly raised, were by the dissent and disallowing of the same afterwards cast down. Those which tracing in the vertuous steps of their Ancestors were called to that dignity, as if it had been their inheritance, were driven out, and disinherited for their degenerating ingratitude, & for that being tainted with insupportable vices, they made themselves incapable and unworthy of such honour.

This shews, that succession was tolerated to avoid pretenses, close and under-hand canvassing, discontents of persons refused, contentions, interraines, and other discommodities of elections. But on the other part, when succession brought other mischiefs more pernicious, when tyrannie trampled on the Kingdom, and when a Tyrant possessed himselfe of the Royal Throne, the Medicine proving much worse then the Disease, then the Estates of the Kingdom lawfully assembled in the name of all the people, have ever maintained their authority, whether it were to drive out a Tyrant or other unworthy King, or to establish a good one in

his place. The ancient French had learned that of the Gauls, as Caesar shewes in his Commentaries, For Amblorix King of the Eburins, or Leigeons confesseth, That such were the condition of the Gaulish Empire, that the people lawfully assembled, had no lesse power over the King, than the King had over the people. The which appears also in Virginitricus; who gives an account of his actions before the Assembly of the people:

In the kingdoms of Spain, especially Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia, there is the very same. For that which is called the *Iustitia Major* in Aragon hath the Sovereign authority in it selfe. And therefore, the Lords which represent the people proceed so far, that both at the inauguration of the King, as also at the Assembly of the Estates, which is observed every third year, to say to the King in expresse words that which follows, *We which are as much worth as you, and have more power then you, chuse you King upon these and these conditions; and there is one between you and us which commands over you, so wit the Iustitia Major of Aragon, which will resist that which the King demands, and forbids that which the King enjoynes.*

In the kingdoms of England and Scotland the Sovereignty seems to be in the Parliament, which heretofore was held almost every yeere. They call Parliaments the Assembly of the Estates of the kingdom, in the which the Bishops, Earles, Barons, Deputies of Towns and Provinces deliver their opinions, and resolve with a joynt consent of the affaires of State, the authority of this Assembly hath been so sacred and inviolable, that the King durst not abrogate or alter that which had been there once decreed.

It was that which heretofore called and installed in their charges all the chief officers of the kingdom; yea, and sometimes the ordinary councillers of that which they call the Kings privie Councils. In us, the other christian Kingdoms, as Hungary, Bohemia, Denmark, Sweden, and the rest, they have their officers apart from the Kings; and Histories, together with the examples that we have in these our times, sufficiently demonstrate that these Officers and Estates have known how to make use of their authority, even to the deposing and driving out of the tyrannous and unworthy Kings.

We must not therefore esteem that this cuts too short the wings of Royal authority, and that it is as much as to take the Kings head from the shoulders.

We believe that God is Almighty, neither think we it any thing diminisheth his power, because he cannot sin: neither say we, that his Empire is lesse so be esteemed, because it can not be neither shaken, nor cast downe: neither

Cas. 1. & 7. de bello Gallico.



Shewer also must we judge a King to be too much abused if he be withheld by others from falling into an error, so which he is over-much inclined, or for that by the wisdom and discretion of some of his Councillors, his kingdome is preserved and kept intire and safe, which otherwise happily by his weaknesse or wickednesse might have been ruined. Will you say that a man is lesse healthfull, because he is intreated with discreet Physicians, which counsell him to avoid all intemperance, and forbid him to eat such meats as are obnoxious to the stomack, yea, and which purge him many times against his will, and when he resists? which will prove his better friends, whether these Physitians which are studiously carefull of his health, or those Sicophants which are ready at every turn to give him that which must of necessity hasten his end? We must then always observe this distinction. The first are the friends of the King: The other are the friends of Francis which is King. The friends of Francis are those which serve him: The friends of the King are the officers & servants of the kingdom. For seeing the King hath this name, because of the kingdom, and that it is the people which give being and confidence to the kingdome, the which being lost, or ruined, hee must needs cease to be a King, or at the least not so truly a King, or else wee must take a shadow for a substance.

Without question, those are most truly the Kings friends, which are most industriously carefull of the welfare of his kingdom, and those his worst enemies which neglect the good of the Common-wealth, and seek to draw the King into the same lapse of error.

And as it is impossible to separate the kingdom from the people, nor the King from the Kingdome, in like manner, neither can the friends of the King be dis-joynd from the friends of the people, and the Kingdome.

I say further, that those which with a true affection love Francis, had rather see him a King than a Subject. Now seeing they cannot see him a King, it necessarily followes, that in loving Francis, they must also love the Kingdome.

But those which would be esteemed more the friends of Francis, then of the kingdome and the people, are truly flatterers, and the most pernicious enemies of the King and publike State.

Now if they were true friends indeed, they would desire and endeavour that the King might become more powerfull, and more assured in his estate, according to that notable saying of *Thesopopus* King of *Sparta*, after the Ephores or Controllers of the Kings were instituted, *The more (said he) are appointed by the People to watch over, and look to the*

*affaires of the Kingdome, the more those that govern shall have credit, and the more safe and happy shall be the State.*

*Whether prescription of time can take away the right of the people.*

But peradventure, some one will reply, you speak to us here of Peers, of Lords and Officers of the Crown. But I for my part see not any, but only some shadows and shadows of an antiquity as if they were to be reprinted on a stage I see no. for the present: scarce any tract of that ancient liberty, and authority, nay which is worse a great part, if not all, of those officers take care of nothing but their particular affairs, and almost if not altogether, serve as flatterers about those Kings who joyntly crosse the poor people like tennice-balls: hardly is there one to be found that hath compassion on, or will lend a helping hand to the miserable subjects, steald and scorched to the very bones, by their insolent and insupportable oppression. If any be but thought to have such a desire, they are presently condemned as Rebels and seditious; and are constrained either to fly with much discommodity, or else must run hazard both of life and liberty. What can be answered to this? the businesse goes thus. The outrageousness of Kings, the ignorance of the party, together with the wicked connivence of the great ones of the kingdome, hath been for the most part such throughout the World, that the licentious and unbridled power wherewith most kings are transported, and which hath made them insupportable, hath in a manner by the length of continuance gained right of prescription, and the people for want of using it hath incitely quit, if not altogether lost their just & ancient authority. So that it ordinarily happens, that what all mens care ought to attend on, is for the most part neglected by every man; for what is committed to the generality, no man thinkes it commended to his custody. Notwithstanding, no such prescription nor pravaication can justly prejudice the right of the people: It is commonly said that the Exchequers doe admit no rule of prescription against it, much lesse against the whole body of the people, whose power transcends the Kings, and in whose right the King assumes to himself that privilege; for otherwise, wherefore is the Prince only administrator, and the people true proprietor of the publike Exchequer, as we will prove here presently after. Furthermore, it is not a thing resolved on by all, that no tyrannous intrusion or usurpation, and continuance in the same course, can by any length of time prescribe against lawfull liberty. If it be objected, that Kings were enthronized, and received their authority from the people that lived

five hundred years ago, and not by those now living, I answer, that the Common-wealth never dyes; although Kings be taken out of this life one after another; for as the continuall running of the water gives the River a perpetuall being; so the alternative revolution of birth and death renders the people (*quoad hunc mundum*) immortal.

And further, as wee have at this day the same Seine and Tiber as was 1000. years agoe: in like manner also is there the same people of *Germany, France, and Italy* (excepting intermixing of Colonies, or such like) neither can the lapse of time, nor changing of individuals, alter in any sort the right of those people. Furthermore, if they say the King receives his kingdom from his Father, and not from the people, and hee from his Grandfather, and so one from another upward.

I ask, could the Grandfather or Ancestor, transfer a greater right to his Successor then he had himself? If he could not (as without doubt it must need be so) is it not plainly perspicuous, that what the Successor farther arrogates to himself, he may usurp with as safe a conscience, as what a Thiefe gets by the high-way side. The people on the contrary have their right of eviction intire and whole; although then that the officers of the Crown have for a time lost or left their ranks, this cannot in any true right prejudice the people, but rather clear, otherwise as one would not grant audience, or shew favour to a slave which had long time held his master prisoner, and did not only van himself to be free, but also presumptuously assumed power over the life and death of his master; neither would any man allow the excuses of a thiefe, because he had continued in that trade 30. years, or for that he had bene bred in that course of life by his Father, if hee presumed by his long continuance in that function to prescribe for the lawfulness, but rather the longer he had continued in his wickedness, the more grievous should be his punishment: in like manner, the Prince is al oge her upsupportable, which because he succeeds a Tyrant, or hath kept the people (by whose suffrages he holds the Crown) in a long slavery, or hath suppressed the Officers of the kingdom (who should be protectors of the publike liberty) hat therefore preumes, that what he affects is lawfull for him to effect, and that his will is not to be restrained or corrected by any positive Law whatsoever. For prescription in tyranny detracts nothing from the right of the people; nay, it rather much aggravates the Princes ou rages. But what if the Peers and principall officers of the Kingdom makes themselves parts with the King? What if betraying the Publique, cause the yoke of tyranny upon the peoples neck? shall it follow, that by this prevarication and treason the autho-

*Vlpian de reg. iuris l. 54.*

ty is devolved into the King? Does this detract any thing from the aight of the peoples liberty, or does it adde any licentious power to the King? Let the people thank themselves, say you, who relyed on the disloyall loyalty of such men.

But I answer, that these officers are indeed those protectors whose principall care and study should be, that the people be maintained in the free and absolute fruition of their goods and liberty. And therefore, in the same manner as if a treacherous Advocate for a sum of money should agree to betray the cause of his Client, into the hands of his Adversary, which he ought to have defended, hath not power for all that to alter the course of justice, nor of a bad cause to make a good one, although perhaps for a time he give some colour of it.

In like manner this conspiracy of the great ones, combined to ruine the inferiours, cannot disavall the right of the people; in the meane season, those great ones incur the punishment that the same alots against Prevaricators: and for the people, the same Law allows them to chuse another Advocate, and afresh to pursue their cause, as if it were then only to begin.

For if the people of Rome condemned their Captains and Generalls of their Armies, because they capitulated with their Enemies to their disadvantage (although they were drawn to it by necessity, being on the point to be all overthrow, and would not be bound to performe the Souldiers capitulation: much lesse shall a free People be tyed to bear the yoke of thraldome, which is cast on them by those who should and might have prevented it; but being neither forced nor compelled did for their own particular gain willingly betray those that had committed their liberty to their custody.

*Wherefore Kings were created.*

Now seeing that Kings have been ever established by the people, and that they have had Associates joynd with them, to contain them within the limits of their duties, the which Associates considered in particular one by one, are under the King, and altogether in one intire Body are above him. We must consequently see wherefore first Kings were established, and what is principally their duty. We usually esteeme a thing just and good when it attains to the proper end for which it is ordained.

In the first place every one consents, That men by nature loving liberty, and hating servitude, born rather to command, then obey, have not willingly admitted to be governed by another, and renounced as it were the privilege of nature, by submitting themselves to the commands of others:

but for some speciall and great profit that they expected from it, For as *Esope* sayes, That the horse being before accustomed to wander at his pleasure, would never have received the bit into his mouth; nor the Rider on his back; but that he hoped by that means to overmatch the Bull: neither let us imagine, that Kings were chosen to apply to their own proper use, the goods that are gotten by the sweat of their Subjects; for every man loves and cheriseth his owne. They have not received the power and authority of the People to make it serve as a Pandar to their pleasures: for ordinarily, the inferiours hate, or at least envie their superiours.

Let us then conclude, that they are established in this place to maintain by justice, and to defend by force of Armes, both the publike Scate, and particular persons from all dammages and outrages, wherefore *Saint Augustine* saith, *Those are properly called Lords and Masters, which provide for the good and profit of others, as the husband for the wife, Fathers for their children.* They must therefore obey them that provide for them; although indeed to speak truly, tho' they govern in this manner, may in a sort be said to serve those, whom they command over.

For, as sayes the same Doctor, they command not for the desire of dominion, but for the duty they owe to provide for the good of those that are subjected to them; nor affecting any Lord-like domineering, but with charity and singular affection, desiring the welfare of those that are committed to them.

*Seneca* in 81. Epistle sayes, That in the Golden Age, wise men onely governed Kingdoms, they kept themselves within the bounds of moderation, and preserved the meanest from the oppression of the greatest. They perswaded and disswaded, according as it advantaged or disadvantaged, the publike profit; by their wisdom, they furnished the Publike with plenty of all necessaries, and by their discretion prevented scarcity, by their valour and courage they expelled dangers, by their many Benefits they entreated and enriched their Subjects, they pleaded not their duty, in making pompous shews, but in well-governing their People. No man made cryall what hee was able to do against them, because every one received what he was capable of from them, &c.

Therefore, then to govern is nothing else, but to provide for: These proper ends of commanding, being for the Peoples commodity; the only duty of Kings and Emperours is to provide for the peoples good. **The Kingly dignity to speak properly is not a Title of honour, but a**

*Aug. lib.  
16. de civ.  
vit. lib. 15.*

weighty and burdensome office: It is not a discharge or vacation from affairs, to run a licentious course of liberty, but a charge and vocation to all industrious employments, for the service of the Commonwealth, the which both some glimpse of honour with it, because in those first and Golden Ages, no man would have tasted of such small troubles, if they had not bene sweetned with some relish of honour: inasmuch as there was nothing more true, then that which was commonly said in those times. If every man knew with what turmoyles and troubles the Royall wreath was wrapt withall, no man would vouchsafe to take it up, although it lay at his feet.

When therefore these words of mine and thine entered into the world, and that differences fell amongst fellow-Citizens, touching the propriety of goods and wars amongst neighbouring people about the right of their Confines, the people bethought themselves to have recourse to some one, who both could and should take order that the poore were not oppressed by the rich; nor the Patriots wronged by strangers.

Now as wars and suits increased, they chose some one, in whose wisdom and valour they reposed most confidence. See then wherefore Kings were created in the first Ages to visit and administer justice at home, and to be Leaders in the Wars abroad, and not only to repulse the incursions of the Enemy, but also to repress and hinder the devastation and spoyling of the Subjects and their goods at home; but above all, to expell and drive away all devices and debanchments farre from their Dominions.

This may be proved by all Histories, both divine and prophane. For the people of God they had at first no other King but God himselfe, who dwelt in the midst of them, and gave answer from betweene the Cherubins, appointed extraordinarily Judges and Captaines for the wars, by means whereof, the people thought they had no need of Lieutenants, being honoured by the continuall presence of their Sovereign King.

Now when the people of God began to be a weary of the injustice of the Sons of *Samsun*, on whose old age they durst no longer rely, they demanded a King after the manner of other people, saying to *Samsun*, *Give us a King, as other people have, that he may judge us.* There 5. & 20. is touched the first and principal point of the duty of a King, a little after they are both mentioned. *We will have* (said they) *a King over us like other Nations. Our King shall judge us, and go in and out before us, & lead our Armies.* To do justice is always in the first place, for so much as

*Memo  
& 1111111*

*Arist. de Wences.* Aristotle saies that in the time of the *Philo*, an *Ringer* pol. l. 3. were Judges and Captains. For the *Lacedemonian Kings* they in his time also had Sovereign authority only in the Army, and that consisted also to the commandements of the *Ephores*.

In like manner, the *Medes* who were ever in perpetuall quarrells amongst themselves, at length chose *Darius* for their Judge; who had carryed himself well in the deciding of some particular differences; presently after they made him King, and gave him Officers and Guards, that he might more easily suppress the powerfull and insolent.

*Cicero* saith, that anciently all Kings were established to administer justice, and that their institution; and that of the Laws, had one and the same end, which was, that Equity and Right might be duly rendered to all men, the which may be verified by the propriety of the words almost in all languages. Kings are called by the Latins, *Reges a regendo*, for that they must rule and govern the limits and bounds, both of the publicke and particulars. The names of Emperours, Princes, and Dukes have relation to their conduct in the wars, and principall places in Combats, and other places of Command. Likewise, the Greekes call them in their Language, *Baktes, Archa, Hegemones*, which is to say, props of the people, Princes, Conductors. The Germans and other Nations use all significant names, and which expresse, that

The English word KING is derived from the *Ronigen*, which signifies either fortitude or wisdom.

The duty of a King consists not in making glorious Parades: but that it is an office of a weighty charge and continuall care: But in briefe, the Poet *Homer* calls Kings the Judges of Cities, and in describing of *Agamemnon*, he calls him wise, strong, and valiant. As also, *Ovid*, speaking of *Erichonius*, saies, that it was hard to know, whether Justice or Valour were more transparent in him: in which these two Poets seemes exactly to have described the duties of Kings and Princes. You see what was the Custome of the Kings of the Heaithen Nations; after whose examples, the Jewes demanded and established their King.

The Queen of *Sheba* said also to *Salomon*, that God had made him King over them to do judge, neat and justice. And *Salomon* himself speaking to God, saith, Thou hast chosen me to be a King over thy People, and a Judge of thy Sonnes and Daughters.

*Tom. lib. 1. Hlead. David. 6 vers.*

*Chron. 8. wisdom. 7.*

For this cause also the good Kings, as *David, Iosephus*, and others, being not able in their own persons to determine all the suits and differences of their Subjects (although in the causes of greatest importance they received an appeal alwayes to themselves, as appears in *Samuel*) had ever above all things a speciall care, to establish in all places just and discreet Judges, and principally still to have an eye to the right administration of justice, knowing themselves to carry the sword, as well to chastise wicked and unjust Subjects, as to repulse forreigne Enemies.

2 Sam. 15.2. 1 Chron. 23.4. & 26.29 2 Chron. 19.11 Rom. 13.

Briefly, as the *Apostles* saies, *The Prince is ordained by God for the good and profit of the people, being armed with the sword to defend the good from the violence of the wicked, and when he discharge his duty therein, all men owe him honour and obedience.*

Seeing then that Kings are ordained by God and established by no people, to procure and provide for the good of those which are committed unto them, and that this good or profit be principally expressed in two things, to wit, in the administration of justice to their subjects, and in the managing of armes to the repelling their enemies: certainly, wee must inferre and conclude from this that the Prince which applies himself to nothing but his peculiar profits, and pleasures, or to those ends which most readily conduce thereunto, which contemnes and perverts all laws, which useth his subjects more cruelly then the barbarest enemy would do, he may truly and really be called a Tyrant, and that those which in this manner govern their Kingdomes, be they of never so large an extent, are more properly unjust pillagers and brooke-haiers then lawfull governours.

*Whether the Kings be above the law.*

Wee must here yet proceede a little further: for it is demanded whether the King which presides in the administration of justice have power to resolve and determine businesse according to his owne will and pleasure? must the Kings be subject to the law, or doth the law depend upon the King; the law (saith an ancient) is respected by those which otherwayes contemne vertue for it enforce obedience and ministreth conduct in warfaring and gives viger and iuster to justice and equity. *Pausanias* the *Spartans* will answer in a word, that it becomes lawes to direct, and men to yeeld obedience to their authority. *Aegilian* King of *Sparta* saies that all commanders must obey the commandements of the lawes, But it shall not be amisse to claime this matter a little higher, when people began for justice to seek to determine their differences, if they met with any private man that did

August. l. 4. c. 4. & 6. tit. civita Dei.

justly appoint them they were satisfied with it, now for so much as such men were rarely and with much difficulty met withall, and for that the judgements of kings received as lawes were oftentimes found contrary and difficult, then the Magistrates and others of great wisdom invented lawes, which might speak to all men in one and the same voice. This being done it was expressly enjoyned to kings that they should be the gardens and administrators, And sometimes also for so much as the lawes could not foresee the particularities of actions to resolve exactly it was permitted, the king to supply this defect, by the same naturall equity by which the lawes were drawn, and for feare lest they should go against law the people appointed them from time to time associates, counsellors, of whom we have formerly made mention, wherefore there is nothing which exempts the King from obedience which he owes to the law, which he ought to acknowledge as his Lady and Mistres. esteeming nothing can become him worse then that feminine of which *Jurinall* speaks: *Sic volo, Sic juho, si pro ratione voluntas*. I will, I command, my will shall serve instead of reason, neither should they think their authority the lesse because they are confin'd to laws, for seeing the law is a divine gift coming from above, which humane societies are happily governed and addressed to their best and blestdest end; those Kings are as ridiculous and worthy of contempt, which repute it a dishonour to conform them selves to law, as those surveyors which think themselves disgraced, by using of a rule, a compasse, a chaine, or other instruments, which men understanding the art of surveying are accustomed to do, or a Pilot which had rather sayle, according to his fantasie and imagination, then steere his course by his needle and Sea lard, who can double, but that it is a thing more profitable & coveniēt to obey the law, then the King who is but one man; the law is the toul of a good king, it giveth him motion sense and life, The King is the Organ and as it were the body by which the Law displays her forces, exercises her function, and expresses her conceptions; now it is a thing much more reasonable to obey the Soule, then the body, the law is the wisdom of divers sages, recollected in few words, but many see more cleere and further then one alone. It is much better to follow the Law then any one mans opinion be he never so acute, the law is reason and wisdom it self; free from all perturbation, nor subject to be moved with choller; ambition, hate, or acceptances of persons; Intreaties nor threats cannot make it bow nor bend on the contrary a man though indued with reason suffers him selfe to be lead and transported with anger, desire of re-

venge, and other passions which perplex him in such sort, that he looses his understanding because being composed of reason and disorder'd affections he cannot so con. aine himself but some times his passions becomes his Master. Accordingly wee see that *Valentinian* a good Emperour, permits those of the Empire to have low wines at once, because he was misled by that impure affection. Because Cambises the sonne of Gyms became in more of his own sister he would therefore have marriages betweene brother and sister, be approved and held lawfull *Cabades* King of the Persians prohibits the punishment of adulteries we must make for such lawes every day if we will have the law subjects to the King. To come to our purpose the law is an understanding mind or rather an obstacle of many understandings the mind being the seat of all the intelligence faculties is, if it may so terme it) a part of divinity: in so much as he who obeys the law seems to obey God, and receive him for Arbitrator of the matters in controversie.

But on the contrary, in so much as man is composed of this divine understanding, and of a number of unruly passions; so losing himselfe, in that brutishness, as he becomes void of reason: and being in that condition, he is no longer a man, but a beast; he then which desires rather to obey the King, then the Law, seems to prefer the commandment of a beast before that of God.

And furthermore, though *Aristotle* were the Tutor of *Alexander*, yet he confesseth, that the divinity cannot so properly be compared to any thing of this life, as to the ancient Lawes of well-governed States: he that prefers the Commonwealth, applies himself to Gods Ordinance: but he that leans to the Kings fancies, instead of Law, prefers brutish sensuality before well-ordered discretion. To which also the Prophets seeme to have respect, who in some places describe these great Empires, under the representation of ravning Beasts, But to go on; is not he a very Beast, who had rather have for his guide a blind and mad man, then he which sees both with the eyes of the body, and mind, a beast rather then god. Whence it comes, that though kings as saith *Aristotle*, for a while, at the first, commanded without restraint of Lawes, yet presently after civilized people reduced them to a lawfull condition, by binding them to keep and observe the Lawes: and for this unruly absolute authority it remained only amongst those which commanded over barbarous Nations.

He sayes afterwards, that this absolute power was the next degree to plain tyrannie, and he had absolutely called it *tyrannie*, had not

these beasts like Barbarians, willingly subjected themselves unto it. But it will be replied, that it is unworthy the majesty of Kings, to have their wills bridled by Laws: but I will say that nothing is more royall then to have our unruly desires ruled by good Lawes.

It is much pity to be restrained from that which we would doe; it is much more worie to will that which we should not do, but it is the worst of all to do that which the Lawes forbid.

I hear me thinks a certain Furionius tribune of the people which opposed the passing of a Law that was made against the excesse which then reigned in Rome, saying. My Masters you are bridled, you are idle and fettered with the rude bonds of servitude, your liberty is lost, a Law is laid on you, that commands you to be moderate: to what purpose is it to say, you are free, since you may not live in what excesse of pleasure you like. This is the very complaint of many Kings at this day, and of their Mignior. and Flatterers.

The Royall Majesty is abolished, if they may not turn the kingdom upside-downe at their pleasure, Kings may go shake their eares, if Lawes must be observed.

Peradventure, it is a miserable thing to live, if a mad man may not be suffered to kill himself when he will.

*Cicero l. 2. officii.* For what else do those things which violate and abolish Lawes, without which, neither Empires, nor the very Societies of freebooters can at all subsist?

Let us then reject these detestable falseness and impious vanities of the Court Marmonists, which make kings gods, and receive their sayings as Oracles, and which is worie are so shamelesse, as to perswade Kings, that nothing is just or equitable of it selfe, but takes its true forme of justice, or injustice, according as it pleaseth the King to ordain: as if he were some god, which could neither erre nor sinne at all. Certainly all that which Gods will is just, and therefore, suppose it is Gods will, but that must be just with the Kings will, before it is his will. For it is not just because the King hath appointed it, but that King is just which appoints that to be held for just, which is soe of it selfe.

We will not then say as *Anaxarchus* did to *Alexander*, much perplexed for the death of his friend *Clitus*, whom he had killed with his own hands, to wit that *Themis* the Goddesse of Justice, sits by Kings sides, as she does by Jupiters, to approve and confirme whatsoever to them shal seem good: but rather, she sits as President over kingdoms, to severely chastise those Kings which wrong or violate the majesty

of the Lawes, we can no wayes approve that saying of *Thrasimachus* the *Chaldean*, That: the profit and pleasure of Princes, is the rule by which all Lawes are defined: but rather, that right must limit the profit of Princes, and the Lawes restrain their pleasures. And instead of approving that which that villainous woman said to *Caracalla*, that whatsoever he desired was allowed him: We will maintain that nothing is lawfull but what the Law permits.

And absolutely rejecting that detestable opinion of the same *Caracalla*, that Princes gives Lawes to others, but receive none from any; we will say that in all kingdomes well established, the King receives the Lawes from the people, the which he ought carefully to consider and maintain, and whatsoever, ether by force or fraud he does, in prejudice of them must always be reputed unjust.

*Kings receive Lawes from the people.*

These may be sufficiently verified by examples. Before there was a King in *Israel*, God by *Moses* prescribed to him both sacred and civil Ordinances, which he should have perpetually before his eyes: but after that *Saul* was elected and established by the people, *Samuel* delivered it to him written, to the end, he might carefully observe it, neither were the succeeding Kings received before they had sworn to keepe those Ordinances. Deut. 17

The Ceremony was this, that together with the setting of the crown on the Kings head, they delivered into his hands the Book of the Testimony, which some understand, to be the right of the people of the Land, others, the Law of God, according to which he ought to govern the people. *Cyrus* acknowledging himself conservator of his Countries Lawes, obliged himself to oppose any man that would offer to infringe them: and at his inauguration tyed himself to observe them, although some flatterers tickled the eares of his Son *Gambyses*, that all things were lawfull for him.

The Kings of *Sparta* whom *Aristotle* calls lawfull Princes, did every moneth renew their oaths, promising in the hands of the *Ephori*, to procure for the kingdom, to rule according to those Lawes which they had from *Licurgus*. Zenoph. de Reb. Lacod.

Hereupon it being asked *Archidamus*, the Son of *Zeuxidamus*, who were the Governours of *Sparta*, he answered, the Lawes, and the lawfull Magistrates.

and least the lawes might grow into contempt, these people bragged that they received them from heaven, and that they were inspired from above, to the end that men might believe that their determinations were from God: and not from man, the Kings of Egypt did in nothing vary from the tennour of the lawes, and confessed that their principall felicity consisted in the obedience th y yeilded to them. *Romulus* at the institution of the Roman kingdome made this agreement with senators, the people should make lawes and he would take both for himselfe and others to see them observed and kept. *Antiochus* the third of that name King of *Asia* writ unto all the Cities of his kingdome, That if the letters sent unto them in his name there were any thing found repugnant to the lawes, they should beleve they were no act of the Kings, and therefore yeeld no obedience unto them. Now although some Citizens say, that by decree of Senate the Emperour *Augustus* was declared to be exempt from obedience to Lawes: yet notwithstanding, *Theodosius*, and all the other good and reasonable Emperours, have professed that they were bound to the Lawes, lest what had been extorted by violence, might be acknowledged and received instead of Law. And for *Augustus Caesar* in so much as the Roman Common wealth was en thralled by his power and violence she could say nothing freely but that she had lost her freedome. And because they durst not call *Augustus* a tyrant the senate said he was exempt from all obedience to the lawes, which was in effect as much as if they plainly should have said the Emperour was an outlaw. The same right hath ever bene of force in all well governed states and Kingdomes of Chr. Kingdome.

For neither the Emperour the King in *France*, nor the Kings of *Spain*, *England*, *Polander*, *Hungarie*, and all other lawfull Princes, as the Arch Dukes of *Austria*, Dukes of *Brabant*, Earles of *Flanders*, and *Holland*, nor other Princes are not recreated to the government of their estates before they have promised to the Electours, Peeres, Palatins, Lords, Barons, and Governours, that they will render to every one right according to the lawes of the Country, yea so strictly that they cannot alter or innovate any thing contrary to the priviledges of the countries without the consent of the townes and province, If they do it, they are no lesse guilty of rebellion against the lawes than the people is in their kind if they refuse obedience, when they command according to law; briefly lawfull princes receive the lawes from the people as well as the crown in lieu of honour, and the

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scepter in lieu of power, which they are bound to keep and maintaine and therein repose their chiefest glory.

*If the Prince may make new lawes.*

What then? shall it not be lawfull for a Prince to make new lawes and abrogate the old? seeing it belongs to the King not onely to advise that nothing be done neither against nor to defraud the lawes: but also that nothing be wanting to them or any thing to much in them; briefly that neither age nor lapse of time do abolish or cutombe them: if there be any thing to abridge, added, or taken away from them, it is his duty to assemble the estates, and to demand their advice and resolution, without presuming to publish any things be'ore the whole have bene, first du y examined and approved by them, after the Law is once enacted and published, there is no more dispute to be made above it, all men owe obedience to it, and the prince in the first place to teach other men their duty, and for that all men are easier led by example then by precepts, the prince must necessarily expresse his willingness to observe the lawes or chie by what equity can he require obedience in his subjects to that which he himselfe contemnes.

For the difference which is betwixt Kings and subjects ought not to consist in impurity, but in equity and justice. And therefore although *Augustus* was esteemed to be exempt by the decree of the Senate, notwithstanding reproving of a young man that had broken the Julian law concerning adultery, he boldly replied to *Augustus* that he himself had transgressed the same lawes which condemnes adulteries, the Emperour acknowledged his fault and for grief forbore to late. So convenient a thing it is in nature to practise by example that which we would teach by precept.

The Lawgiver *Solon* was wont to compare lawes to money, for they maintain human societies as many preserves traffick, neither improperly when if they Kings may not lawfully or at the least heretofore could not mansee or imbuse good money without the consent of the Common wealth: much more lesse can he have power to make and unmake lawes, without the which, nor Kings nor subjects, can cohabite in security but must be forced to live brutishly in caves and deserts like wild beasts wherefore also the Emperour of Germany esteeme it needfull to make some law for the good of the empire, first he demands the advice of the estates if it be there approved, the Princes, Barons, & Deputies of the townes signe it and then the law is ratified for he solemnly swears to keep the lawes already made, and to introduce no

*Demosthenes in oratio con. Tyrocrat.*

*Innocent. 3. ad regem. Fam. in ca. quando d. iurejurando.*

There is a Law in *Polonia*, which hath been renewed in the yeere, 1454. and also in the yeere 1538. and by those it is decreed, that no new Lawes shall be made; but by a common consent, nor no where else, but in the Generall Assembly of the Estates.

For the Kingdome of France, where the Kings are thought to have greater authority, then in other places, anciently all Lawes were onely made in the Assembly of the Estates; or in the ambulatory *Parliament*. But since this Parliament hath been Sedentary, the Kings edicts are not received as authentically, before the *Parliament* hath approved them.

Whereas on the contrary, the decrees of this *Parliament*, where the Law is defective, have commonly the power and effect of Law. In the Kingdomes of *England*, *Spain*, *Hungary*, and others, they yet enjoy in some sort their ancient priviledges.

For, if the welfare of the Kingdom depends of the observation of the Lawes, and the Lawes are enthralled to the pleasure of one man? is it not most certain, that there can be no permanent stability in that government? Must it not then necessarily come to passe, that if the King (as some have been) be infected with Lunacie, either continually, or by intervals, that the whole State fall inevitably to ruine? But if the Lawes be superior to the King, as we have already proved, and that the King be tyed in the same respect of obedience to the Lawes, as the Servant is to his Master, who will be so senseless, that will not rather obey the Law, then the King? or will not readily yeeld his best assistance against those that seek to violate or infringe them? Now seeing that the King is not Lord over the Lawes, let us examine how far his power may be justly extended in other things.

*Whether the Prince have power of life and death over his Subjects?*

The Mignons of the Court hold it for an undeniable Maxime, That Princes have the same power of life and death over their Subjects, as anciently, Masters had over their slaves, and with these false imaginations have so bewitched Princes, that many, although they put not in ure with much rigour this imaginary right, yet they imagine, that they may lawfully do it, and in how much they differ from the practise thereof, in so much, that they quit and relinquish of their right and due.

But

But we assure on the contrary, (that the Prince is but as the Minister and Executor of the Law, and may only with cathetick Sword against those whom the Law hath condemned; and if he do otherwise, he is no more a King, but a Tyrant; no longer a Judge, but a Malefactor, and instead of that honourable Title of Conservator, he shall be justly branded with that foule terme of Violator of the Law and Equity.

We must here first of all take into our consideration the foundation on which this our disputation is built, which we have resolved in to this head, *That Kings are ordained for the benefit and profit of the publicke State*; this being granted, the question is soon difficult. For who will believe that men sought and desired a King, who upon any sudden motion might at his pleasure cut their throats; or which in colour or revenge might when he would take their heads from their shoulders.

Briefly, who (as the wise man sayes) carries death at his tongues end, we must not think so idely.

There is no man so vain, which would willingly that his welfare should depend of anothers pleasure; Nay, with much difficulty will any man trust his life in the hands of a friend or a brother, much lesse of a stranger, be he never so worthy. Seeing that Envie, Hate, and Rage did so far transport *Ashanas* and *Ajax* beyond the bounds of reason, that the one killed his children, the other saying to effect his desire in the same kind against his friends and companions, turned his fury and murderous intent, and acted the same revenge upon himself. Now it being naturall to every man to love himselfe, and to seek the preservation of his own life.

In what assurance I pray you would any man rest to have a Sword continually hanging over his head by a small threed, with the point towards him? Would any mirth or jollity relish in such a continuall affright? Can you possibly make choyce of a more slender threed, then to expose your life and welfare into the hands and power of a man so mutable that changes with every puff of wind. Briefly, which almost a thousand times a day, shakes off the restraint of reason and discretion, and yeelds himselfe slave to his own unruly and disordered passions.

Can there be hoped or imagined any profit or advantage so great or so worthy, which might equalize or counterpoise this teare or this danger? Let us conclude then, that it is against Delinquents onely,

whom



whom the mouth of the Law hath condemned, that King may draw forth the Sword of Authority.

*If the King may pardon those whom the Law condemnes?*

But because life is a thing precious, and to be favoured, peradventure it will be demanded, whether the King may not pardon and absolve those whom the Law hath condemned.

I answer, no. Otherwise this cruell pity would maintain Theeves, Robbers, Murtherers, Ravishers, Poysoners, Sockerers, & other plagues of Mankind, as we may reade Tyrants have done hereofore in many places, and to our wofull experience, wee may yet see at this present time; And therefore, the Beast of Law in this kind, will by impurity much encrease the number of offenders.

So that he which received the Sword of Authority from the Law to promise offences, will arme offenders therewith against the Lawes, and put himselfe the Woolfe into the Fold, which hee ought to have warranted from their ravenous outrages.

But for so much that it may chance in some occasions, that the Law being mute, may have need of a speaking Law, and that the King being in some cases the aprest Expositor, asking for the Rule of his actions Equity and Reason, which as the soule of the Soule may so cleere the intention thereof, as where the offence is rather committed against the words, then the intendment of the Law, hee may free the innocent Offendor from the guilt thereof, because a just and equitable Exposition of the Law may in all good reason be taken for Law it selfe, as necesse concurring with the intention of the Law makes.

Notwithstanding, least passion should preposse the place of reason Kings should in this fashion themselves to the ordinary practice of the Emperour, severns not to determine absolutely any thing before it were maturely discussed by upright and discreet men in that facultic.

And so the King may rigorously punish the Murtherer; and yet notwithstanding pardon him, which casually, and without any such purpose killeth one. He may put to death the Thiefe, and yet pardon that man which in his own defence killeth him that would have robbed him. Briefly, in all other occurrences hee may distinguish, as being established Arbitrator and Newtner, Chaunce-medly from malice, fore-thought a good purpose from the Rigour of the Law, without favouring at any time Malice or Treason, Neither can the

omission of this duty gain to him any true esteeme of mercifull: for certainly, that Shepherd is much more pitifull which kills the Woolf, then he which lets him escape: the clemencie of that King is more commoendable which commits the malefactor to the hangman, then he which delivers him: by putting to death the murtherer, many Innocents are delivered from danger: whereas by suffering him escape, both he and others through hope of the like unpunished are made more audacious to perpetrate farther mischiefes, so that the immediate act of saving one Delinquent, avails many hands to murder divers Innocents; there is therefore both faulty wildnesse in picting to death some, and as certainly cruetly in pardoning of others. Therefore as it is permitted the King being as it were *Chifos* of the Law, in some cases to interpret the words thereof: so in all well ordered Kingdoms, it is enjoyed the Counsell of State, and their duty obligeth them to examine the Kings interpretation, and to moderate both his ferelicitie and fatillitie. If through the corruption and weaknes of men this have not been so really and thoroughly observed as it ought: yet notwithstanding the right alwayes remains intire, and there wants onely integritie and courage in the parties to make it effectuall.

But not to heap up too many examples in a matter so manifestly cleare, it hath been in this manner practised in the Realm of France: For we have there oftentimes seen those put to death, to whom the King had granted his Charter of pardon: and those pardoned, whom He commanded should be put to death. And sometimes offences committed in the Kings presence remitted, because there was no other witnesse but himselfe. The which happened in the time of Hen: 2. to a certain stranger, who was accused by the King himselfe of a grievous offence. If an offendor by the intercession of friends have his pardon granted by the King, the Chancellor upon sufficient cause may cancell it: if the Chancellor connive, yet must the crimined present it before the Judges, who ought not onely carefully to consider, whether the Pardon were gotten by surreptitious or indirect means, but also if it be legal, and in due form: neither can the Delinquent that hath obtained his Charter of Pardon make use of it, untill first he appeal in publick Court bare-headed, and on his knees plead it, submitting himselfe prisoner untill the Judges have maturely

L. Nominis & rei  
S. verbum ex  
lege. D. de  
verb. sig-  
nif.

weighed and considered the reasons that induced the King to grant him his pardon: If they be found insufficient, the offender must suffer the punishment of the Law, as if the King had not granted him any pardon: but if his pardon be allowed, he ought not so much to thank the King, as the equitie of the Law which saved his life. The manner of these proceedings was excellently ordained, both to contain the King within the limits of equities, lest being armed with publick Authoritie, he should seek to revenge his own particular spleen, or out of fancie or partialitie remit the wrongs and outrages committed against the publick safetie: as partly also to restrain an opinion in the Subject, that any thing could be obtained of the King which might prejudice the Laws. If these things have been ill observed in our times, note withstanding that which we have formerly said; remains alwaies certain, that it is the Laws which have power over the lives and deaths of the Inhabitants of a Kingdom, and not the King which is but Administrator and Conservator of the Laws.

*Subjects are the Kings Brethren, and not his slaves.*

For truly neither are the Subjects, as it is commonly said, the Kings slaves, or bondmen: being neither prisoners taken in the wars, nor bought for money: but as considered in one intire body they are Lords, as we have formerly proved; for each of them in particular ought to be held as the Kings Brethren and kinsmen. And to the end that we think not this strange, let us hear what God himself saith when he prescribes a law to Kings; That they lift not their heart above their brethren from amongst whom they were chosen. Wherenpon *Bartolus* a famous Lawyer, who lived in an age that bred many Tyrants, did yet draw this conclusion from that Law, that Subjects were to be held and used in the qualitie and condition of the Kings brethren, and not of his slaves. Also King *David* was not ashamed to call his Subjects his brethren. The ancient Kings were called *Abimelech*, an Hebrew word which signifies, My father the King. The Almighty and all good God, of whose great gentleness and mercie we are daily partakers, and very seldome feel his severitie, although we justly deserve it, yet is it alwaies mercifully mixed with compassion; whereby he teacheth Princes, his Lieutenants, that Subjects ought rather to be held in obedience by love, than by fear.

But lest they should except against me, as if I sought to trench

too much upon the Royall Authoritie; I verily belevee it is so much the greater, by how much it is likely to be of longer continuance. For faith once, servile fear is a bad guardian, for that Authoritie we desire should continue; for those in subjection hate them they fear, and whom we hate, we naturally wish their destruction: on the contrary, there is nothing more proper to maintain their Authoritie then the affection of their subjects, on whose love they may safelye and with most securitie lay the foundation of their greatnesse. And therefore that Prince which governs his Subjects as brethren; may confidently assure himself to live securely in the midst of dangers; whereas he that useth them like slaves, must needs live in much anxietie and feare, and may well be resembled to the condition of that Master, which remains alone in some desert in the midst of a great troop of slaves; for look how many slaves any hath, he must make account of so many Enemies, which almost all Tyrants that have been killed by their Subjects have experimented: whereas on the contrary, the Subjects of good Kings are ever as solicitously carefull of their severitie, as of their own welfare.

To this may have reference that which is read in diverse places of *Aristotle*, and was sayd by *Agastotes* King of *Sparta*, That Kings command as fathers over their children, and Tyrants as matters over their slaves, which we must take in the same sense, that the civillian *Arminius* doth, to wite that paternall authority consists in piety, and not in rigor, for that which was practised amongst the men of the accorne age, that fathers might sell, and put to death their children at their pleasure, hath no authority amongst Christians, yea the very Pagans which had any humanity, would not permit it to be practised on their slaves. Therefore then the father hath no power over the sons life, before the Law have determined; it, otherwaise he offends the Law, against *privie murderers*, and by the Law *Pompeius* against *Parricides*, the father is no lesse guilty which kills the son, then the son which murders the father; for the same occasion the Emperor *Adrian* banished into an Island which was the usuall punishment for notorious offenders, a father which had slain his son, a hurting of whom he had emertained a jealous opinion for his mother in Law, concerning servants or slaves, we are admonished in holy writ to use them like brethren, and by humane

constitutions as hierlings, or mercenaries. *Id est* non domo  
 By the Civill Law of the Egyptians, and Romans, and by the  
 constitutions of the Antonins, the Master is as well liable to pun-  
 nishment which hath killed his own slave, as he which killed an-  
 other mans. In like manner the Law delivers from the power of  
 the Master the slave whom in his sicknesse he hath altogether  
 neglected, or hath not afforded convenient food, and the sonne  
 childe slave whose condition was somewhat better, might for a  
 ny parent injurie bring his action against his Patron. Now  
 seeing there is so great difference between slaves, and lawfull  
 children, betwixt Lords and fathers, and notwithstanding here-  
 tofore it was not permitted amongst the heathen, to use their  
 slaves cruelly: What shall we say, propitious, of that father of the  
 people, which cries out tragically with *Aeschylus*; I will desoure my  
 Children? In what esteeme shall we hold that Prince, which takes  
 such pleasure in the massacring his Subjects, (condemned with-  
 out being ever heard) that he hath dispatched many thousand of them,  
 in one day, & yet is not glutted with blood: Briefly who after  
 the example of *Caligula* (surnamed the Phisicon of the world)  
 wisheth that all his people had but one head that he might cut it  
 off at one blow? Shall it not be lawfull to implore the assistance  
 of the Law against such furious madnesse, and to pull from such  
 a Tyrant the sword which he received to maintaine the Law, and  
 defend the good, when it is drawn by him onely for rapine and  
 ruine?

*Whether the goods of the people belong to the King,*

But to proceed, let us now see whether the King, whom we  
 have already proved, hath not power over the lives of his  
 Subjects; is not at the least Lord over their Goods. In these  
 dayes there is no language more common in the Courts of  
 Princes, then of thoe who say all is the Kings. Whereby it  
 follows, that in exacting any thing from his Subjects he takes but  
 his own, and in that which he leaves them, he expresseth the care  
 he hath that they should not be altogether destitute of meanes to  
 maintaine themselves; and this opinion hath gained so much pow-  
 er in the minds of some Princes, that they are not ashamed to  
 say that the paines, sweat and industrie of their Subjects is their  
 proper revenue, as if their miserable Subjects onely kept beasts  
 to

to till the earth for their insolent masters profit, and luxurie. And  
 indeed, the practise at this day is just in this manner, although in  
 all right & equity it ought to be contrarie, now we must alwaies  
 remember that Kings were created for the good and profit of the  
 people, and that thoe (as *Aristotle* sayes) which indeavour and  
 seeke the commoditie of the people, are trusty Kings: whereas  
 thoe that make their own private ends and pleasures, the onely  
 butt and aime of their desires are truly Tyrants.

It being then so that every one loves that which is his owne,  
 yea that many covet that which belongs to other men, is it any  
 thing probable that men should seek a master to give him franck-  
 lie at that they had long laboured for, and gained with the sweat  
 of their browes? may we not rather imagine, that they choose  
 such a man on whose integrity they relied for the administering  
 of justice equally both to the poore and rich, and which would  
 not assume all to himselfe, but rather maintaine every one in the  
 fruition of his own goods? or who like an unprofitable Drone  
 should suck the fruit of other mens labours, but rather preserve  
 the house, for thoe whose Industrie justly deserved it? briefly,  
 who instead of extorting from the true owner their goods, would  
 see them defended from all ravening oppressors? What I pray  
 you skills it sayes the poore Countrey man, whether the King, or  
 the enemy make havock of my goods, since through the spoile  
 thereof I and my poore familie die for hunger? what imports it  
 whether a stranger or home-bred caterpillar ruine my estate, and  
 bring my poore fortune to extream beggery? Whether a forrein  
 Souldier, or a Sitophant Courtier by force or fraud, make me a  
 like miserable? Why shall he be accounted a barbarous enemy,  
 if thou be a friendly Patriot? Why he a Tyrant if thou be a King?  
 Yea certainly by how much parricide is greater then manslaught-  
 er, by so much the wickednesse of a King, exceeds in mischief  
 the violence of an enemy.

If then therefore in the creation of Kings, men gave not their  
 own proper goods unto them, but onely recommended them to  
 their protection; by what other right then, but that of free  
 booters, can they challenge the proprietie of other mens goods  
 to themselves? Wherefore the Kings of Egypt were not (accord-  
 ing to Law) at the first the Lords of particular mens estates, but  
 were onely chosen when they were sold unto them for corne, and

*Ecclesiast.*

33.

*Cicer. lib. 3.*

*offici.*

*Diod. Sic.*

*lib. 2. C. 2.*

*L. 1. D. de*

*his qui sunt*

*frei, vel. al.*

*juris.*

Gen 45.  
1 Kings. 21.  
1. &c.

L. venditor.  
13. D. de  
com. pred. di-  
vid.

Seneca lib.  
de benef. 7.  
C. 4. 5. 6.

L. nave. 36.  
D. de viciisio-  
nibus.

yet may there well be question made of the validity of that con-  
tract. *Ahab* King of *Israel* could not compel *Naboth* to sell him his  
vineyard; but rather if he had been willing, the Law of God would  
not permit it. The Roman Emperors which had an unreasonable  
power, could neither by right have done it. At this day there is  
with much difficulty any Kingdom to be found, where the  
meanest Subject may not sue the King, & where many times the  
King is not call in the suite, which succeeding he maie as well as o-  
thers satisfy the judgement. And to this is not contrary, although  
at the first view it seeme so, that which some of their most fami-  
liars have writen of the Emperors. That by the civill Law all  
things were the Kings, and that *Cesar* was absolute Lord of all  
things, they themselves expound this their opinion in this man-  
ner, that the dominion of all things belongs to the King, and  
the proprietie to the particular persons, in omuch as the one pos-  
sesseth all by the right of commanding, the other by the Law of  
inheritance. We know, that it is a common saying amongst the  
Civilians, that if any make claime to a house, or a ship, it suffi-  
lowes not therefore that he can extend his right to all the furni-  
ture or lading. And therefore a King may challenge and gaine  
right to the Kingdome of *Germanie*, *France* and *England*: and yet  
notwithstanding he may not lawfully take any honest mans es-  
tate from him, but by manifest injustice, seeing that they are  
things diverse, and by Law distinguished, to be possessors of the  
whole, and of all the particular parts.

*Whether the King be the proper owner of the Kingdom.*

But the King, is he not Lord proprietor of the publick Revenue?  
We must handle this point somewhat more exactly then we did  
the former. In the first place, we must consider that the revenue of  
the publick Exchequer is one thing, & the proper patrimonie of  
the Prince an other, of different nature are the goods of the Em-  
peror, King, or Prince; to those of *Antonius*, *Henrie*, or *Philip*, those  
are properly the Kings, which he enjoyes as King, those are *Anto-  
nians* his which he possesseth, as in the right of *Antonius*, the  
former he received from the people, the latter from those of his  
blood, as inheritor to them.

This distinction is frequent in the books of the civill Law,  
where there is a difference ever made, between the patrimonie of  
the

the Empire, and that of the Emperor, the treasure of *Cesar* is one  
thing, and the Exchequer of the Common-wealth another, and  
both the one and the other have their severall procurers, there  
being diverse dispensers of the sacred and publick distributions,  
and of the particular & private expences, in so much as he which  
as Emperor is preferred before a private man, in a grant by deed  
or chartrel, may also sometime as *Antonius* give place to an in-  
feriour person.

In like manner in the Empire of *Germanie*, the revenue of *Ferdi-  
nand* of *Austria* is one thing, and the revenue of the Emperor *Ferdi-  
nand* is another: the Empire, and the Emperor have their se-  
verall treasurers: as also there is difference in the inheritances  
which the Princes derive from the houses of their ancestors, and  
those which are annexed to the Electoral dignities. Yea a-  
mongst the *Turks* themselves, *Selimus* his gardens and patrimon-  
iall lands are distinguished from those of the publick; the one  
serving for the provision of the *Sultans* table, the other imployed  
onely about the *Turquish* affaires of State. There be notwithstanding  
Kingdomes as the *French* and *English*, and others in which  
the King hath no particular patrimonie, but onely the publick  
which he received from the people, there this former distinction  
hath no place. For the goods which belongs to the Prince as a  
private person there is no question, he is absolute owner of them  
as other particular persons are, and may by the civill Law sell,  
ingage, or dispose of them at his pleasure. But for the goods of  
the Kingdome, which in some places are commonly called the  
*demeanes*, the Kings may not be esteemed nor called in any sort  
whatsoever, absolute Lords Proprietors of them. For what if  
a man for the flocks sake have made thee Shepheard, doth it fol-  
low that thou hast libertie, to flea, pill, sell, and transport the  
Sheepe at thy pleasure? Although the people have established  
thee Judge, or Governour of a Citie, or of some Province, hast  
thou therefore power to alienate, sell, or play away that City or  
Province? And seeing that in alienating or passing away a Pro-  
vince, the people also are sold, have they raised thee to that au-  
thority to the end thou shouldst separate them from the rest, or  
that thou shouldst prostitute and make them slaves to whom  
thou pleasest? Furthermore I demand if the Royall dignity be a  
patrimonie, or an Office? If it be an Office, what Community hath  
it

L. bene à  
Zenone. C.  
de quod.  
pres. C. m-  
de quest.  
Mag. ib.  
12. C. l.  
fiscus. D.  
de jurefsci.

quere.  
of what nature  
the ancient  
demeane is in  
England.

L. cum servus  
39. See vit.  
D. de ieg. 1.  
l. universi. 9.  
C. de fundo p-  
trim.



L. magis paco  
D. de rebas  
coram.

Inr. Sat 4.  
S; quid pal-  
phurio, si credi-  
mus Armilla-  
to, Quicquid  
conspicuum  
palchrum q; ex  
arguere co-  
est, Res fisci  
est, ubicunque  
nacet.

1 King. 9. 15

Psalm 113. de  
rep. Jaco. 1

either the light, the air, or the water, as a certain King called  
*Lycogenes* in the lesser *Asia*, began to lay some impositions upon the  
Salt-pits there, nature as it were impatiently bearing such a re-  
straint of her liberty, the Springs are said to drie up suddenly.  
Now although certain *Manucripts* of the Court would persuade  
us at this day, (as *Isaiah* complained in his time) that the Sea  
affords nothing of worth, or good, which falls not within the  
compass of the Kings Prerogative.

He that first brought this taxation into *Rome*, was the *Consul*  
*Livius*, who therefore gained the surname of *Saltus*, neither was  
it done thus in the Common wealths extreme necessity. And in  
France King *Philip* the long, for the same reason obtained of the  
Estates in this position upon Salt for five years onely, what *Isaiah*  
troubles and troubles the continuance thereof hath bred every  
man knows. To be brief, all Tributes were imposed, and con-  
tinued for the provision of bread and breads for the men of  
war, so as to make a *Provincer* dependant or tributary, was to  
diminish the same as it is the duty to you *Provincer* duty to be

hold wherefore *Provincer* troubled Tributes, to wit, to fortifie  
the *Towns*, and to erect and furnish a publick Magazine, which  
being accomplished, the people required of *Provincer* to be freed  
from this burden. The *Towns* call the Tributes of the *Provincer*,  
the *Provincer* of the people send account to a man which is the  
to employ it in any thing but the defence of the people. Where-  
fore by the same reason all that which the King doth in  
warre belongs to the people, and not to the King because the  
people bore the charge of the war, as that which is gained by a  
factor accrues to the account of his master: And what ad-  
vantage he gaires by marriage, is his, belongs simple and abso-  
lutely to his wife, as it is acquired also to the Kingdom, for so  
much as it is to be presumed that he gained not that preference  
in marriage in quality of *Philip* or *Charles*, but as he was King. On  
the contrary, in like manner the *Queens* have interest of in-  
dowment in the estate which their husbands gained and enjoy-  
ed before they attained the Crown, and have no title to that  
which is gotten after they are created Kings, because that is judg-  
ed as the acquit of the Common purse, and hath no proper re-  
ference to the Kings private estate, which was so determined in  
*France*, betwixt *Philip* of *Nabury*, and his wife *Jane* of *Burgundie*.  
But to the end that there be no money drawn from the people to

be employed in private designs, and for particular ends and pur-  
poses, the Emperor swears, not to impose any Taxes or Tributes  
whatsoever, but by the authority of the Estates of the Empire:  
As much do the Kings of *Polonia*, *Hungary*, and *Danmark* promise  
the *English* in like manner: and the same is to this day, by the  
Lawes of *Henry* the third, and *Edward* the first.

The *French* Kings in former times, imposed no Taxes but in the  
Assemblies, and with the consent of the three Estates: from  
thence sprung the Law of *Philip* of *Nabury*, that the people should  
not have any Tribute layd on them but in urgent necessity, and  
with the consent of the Estates. Yea and anciently after these  
monies were collected they were looked in coffers, through every  
Diocese, and recommended to the speciall care of selected men  
(who are the same which at this day are called *Escheqrs*) to  
the end that they should pay the soldiers enroled within the  
Town of their Diocesse: the which was in use in other Coun-  
tries, as in *Flanders* and other neighbouring Provinces.

At this day although many corruptors be crept in, yet without  
the consent and confirmation of the Parliament, no taxation  
may be collected, not withstanding there be some Provinces which  
are not bound to any thing, without the approbation of the Es-  
tates of the Countrey, as *Langueadois*, *Brittainie*, *Provence*, *Dum-  
blie*, and some others. All the Provinces of the *Low* Countries  
have the same priviledge: finally, the *Exchequer* is devowd  
all like the spleen which exhales the spirits from the other mem-  
bers of the body. In all places they have confined the *Exchequer*  
within its proper bounds and limits. Seeing then it is most cer-  
taine that what hath been ordinarily and extraordinarily assign-  
ed to Kings, to wit, Tributes, Taxes, and all the duties which  
comprehend all customes both for importations, and exportati-  
ons, forfeitures, amercements, rovall, scharges, confiscations,  
and other dues of the same nature, were assigned into their  
hands for the maintenance and defence of the people, and the  
State of the Kingdom, in so much as if these duties be cut, the  
people must needs fall to decay, and in demolishing these founda-  
tions the Kingdom will come to utter ruine. It necessarily  
follows, that he which layeth impositions on the people onely to  
oppress them, and by the publick detraiment seeks private profit,  
and with this own sword kills his subject, he truly is unwor-  
thy the name of a King: Whereas contrarily, a true King as he is



Anno 1483.  
1522. 1531.  
1549. 1560.  
By divers  
Orders of the  
Court of Par-  
liamt.

In the Assembly of the Estates at *Tours*, where King *Charles* the 8th. was in person, divers alienations made by *Lewis* 11. were repealed, and annihilated, and there was taken away from the Heirs of *Tombel* of *Shapel* his great Minion, divers places which he had given him by his proper Authority. This was finally ratified in the last Assembly of the Estates held at *Orlens*. Thus much concerning the Kingdoms *Dorman*. But to the end that we may yet more clearly perceive that the Kingdom is preferred before the King, and that he cannot by his own proper Authority diminish the Majesty he hath received from the people, nor infranchise or release from his Dominion any one of his Subjects; nor quit or relinquish the Sovereignty of the least part of his

Paulus Aemilius, lib. 3.

Anno 1195.  
1200. 1269.  
1297. 1303.  
1325. 1330.  
Anno 1360.

Kingdom *Charlemain* in former times endeavoured to subject the Kingdom of *France* to the German Empire: the which the *French* did courageously oppose by the mouth of a Prince of *Gloisunne*; and *Charles* 5th. afterwards had proceeded in that business, it had come to the trial of the Sword. In like manner when any portion of the Kingdom was granted to the *English*, the Sovereignty was almost always reserved. And it sometimes they obtain'd it by force, as at the Treaty of *Brigitie*; by the which King *John* quit the Sovereignty of *Gloisunne* and *Normandy*: that agreement was not kept, neither was he more bound to do it, than a Tutor or Guardian is being prisoner (as he was then) which for his own deliverance should engage the estate of his Pupils. By the power of the same Law the Parliament of *Paris* made void the Treaty of *Combray*, by the which Duke *Charles* of *Burgundie* had drawn from the King *Amiens*, and other Towns of *Picardie*. In our dayes the same Parliament declared void the Agreement made at *Asard*, between *Francis* the 1. then prisoner, and *Charles* the 5. concerning the Duchie of *Burgundie*. But the donation made by *Charles* the 6. unto *Henry* King of *England* of the Kingdom of *France* after his decease is a sufficient testimony for this matter, and of his madness if there had been no other proof. But to leave off producing any further testimonies, examples, or reasons, by what right can the King give or sell away the kingdom, or any part of it; seeing it consisteth of people, and not of earth, or

Anno 1465.

Anno 1525.

Anno 1420.  
M. ultior.  
Cap. 25.

walls; and of Free-men there can be made no sale, nor traffick: yea, and the Patrons themselves cannot compel the infranchis'd servants to make their habitations in other places then themselves like. The which is rather to be allowed, in that Subjects are neither Slaves, nor infranchis'd servants, but brothers: and not onely the Kings be taken one by one, but also consider'd in one body, they ought to be esteem'd absolute Lords, and owners of the Kingdom.

L. liber homo  
107 D. de ver.  
obli. §. emp.  
34. D.  
de decur. imp.  
1. venule C. de  
op. libert.

Whether the King be the usufructuor of the Kingdom.

But if the King be not Lord in propriety, yet at the least we may esteeme him usufructuor of the Kingdom, and of the Demean: may truly we can allow him to have the usufruct, for being usufructuor though the propriety remain in the people, yet may he absolutely dispose of the profits, and engage them at his pleasure. Now we have already proved, that Kings of their own Authority cannot engage the Revenues of the Exchequer, or the Demean of the Kingdom. The usufructuor may dispose of the profits to whom, how, and when he pleaseth. Contrarily the excessive gifts of *Rhines* are ever judg'd void, his unnecessary expences are not allowed, his superfluous to be cut off, and that which is expended by him in any other occasion, but for the publick utilitie, is justly esteem'd to be unjustly extorted. And is no less liable to the Law *Citicoe*, then the meanest *Roman* Citizen formerly was: In *France* the Kings gifts are never of force, until the Chamber of Accounts have confirm'd them: From hence proceed the postills of the ordinarie Chamber in the giving up of the Accounts in the Reigns of prodigall kings, *Stop domus fori regis*, which is excessive gifts must be recalled. The Judges of this Chamber solemnly swear to passe nothing which may prejudice the Kingdom, or the publick State, notwithstanding any letters the King shall write unto them: but they are not always so mindfull of this oath as were to be desired.

Furthermore, the Law takes no care how a usufructuor possesseth, and governs his revenues; but contrariwise she prescribes unto the King, how and to what use he shall employ his. For the ancient Kings of *France* were bound to divide their royall revenues into foure parts. The first was employed in the maintaining of the Ministers of the Church, and providing for the poore: The second for the Kings table: The third for the wages of his Officers, and household servants: The last in the repairing of bridges, castles, and the royall Palaces. And what was remaining was layd up in the treasure, to be bestowed on the necessities of the Common-wealth. And Histories do at large relate the troubles and tumults, which hapned about the year 1412 in the Assembly of the Estates at *Paris*, because *Charles* the first had warred all the money that was rais'd of the revenues and demean, in his own and his minions loose pleasures, and that the expences of the Kings household which before exceeded not the summe of 9000. francs, did amount in that miserable estate of the Common-wealth to five hundred and forty thousand francs. Now as the demean was employed in the before mentioned affairs: so the aydes were one-

Monstr  
in Car. 6.



ly for the war and the taxes assigned for the payment of the men at arms; and for no other occasion: In other Kingdoms the King hath no greater authority, and no more lesse; especially in the Empire of France, and in Spain, where we have made choice of the King some of France, to the end he might through his hath any special prerogative above others, because there perhaps the common wealth receiveth the most damage: But as I have before said, the name of a King himselfe is not an inheritance, nor a Propriety; nor is it subject to a Kings office, and therefore Kings, Bishops, Nobles, and the like, to the wellfare of the King, as to the King established, to take care of the body to far forth as it concerns the publick good: the one is dispensator of the heavenly treasure, the other of the secular; and what right the one hath in the Ecclesiastical revenues, the same hath the other; and no greater in the Kingdoms of men: If the Bishop alien the goods of the Bishoprick, without the consent of the Chapter, this alienation of his goods; if the King alien the demaine without the approbation of the Estates, that is also void: one portion of the Ecclesiastical goods ought to be employed in the redemption of Christian Captives; the second in relieving of the poor; the third in the maintenance of the Church; the fourth for the Bishop himselfe: And having done before that the King ought to divide into four parts the Revenues of the Kingdoms demaine: The abuse of these times cannot in any way be diminished, if the King, for although the most part of the Bishop's wealth is from the poor, that which they profusely take away on their pensions, and unreasonably their lands and woods, the residue, which the Bishop should not for all that altered. Although thus some Emperors have assumed to themselves an absolute power, they cannot invest themselves with any other right, because no man can be judge in his own cause. What if some Emperors would, he will yet want money, which the sword cannot furnish him with: The Emperors of the East will be content in the country, so to discharge his office of Principallitie, that he will always remember that the Common wealth is not his, but the peoples: which one change should distinguish a King from a Tyrant. Neither can the Emperor, or the King, nor the Duke, nor the Count, nor the Lord, nor the Baron, nor the Knight, nor the Gentleman, nor the Citizen, nor the Merchant, nor the Husbandman, nor the Peasant, nor the Craftsman, nor the King of the Damians, which is of his law, directly or indirectly, to have any right or consequence of right, to those which are not his, which by how much the more violent, by how much the equity, and justice of the cause is more perspicuous; for what the *Romans* assumed under the colour of right, they would have made no difficulty if that pretext had been wanting to have taken by force: we have seen almost in our daies how the *Venetians* possess themselves of the Kingdom of *Cyprus*, under pretence of an imaginative adoption which would have proved ridiculous if it had not been seconded by power and armes. To which also may be unjustly resembled the pretended donation of *Constantine* to *Pope Silvester*, for that draw of the decretall *Gratian*, was long since consumed and turned to ashes, neither is of more validity, the grant which *Leovic* the courteous made to *Pope Paschal* of the Citie of *Rome*, and part of *Italy*, because he gave that which hee possessed not, no man opposed it: But when his Father *Charlemain* would have united & subjected the Kingdom of *France* to the *German* Empire, the *French* did lawfully oppose it: and if he had persisted in his purpose, they were resolved to have hindered him, and defended themselves by armes. There can be to as little advantage alledged that act of *Solomon*, whom we read to have delivered twenty Towns to *Hiram* King of *Tyre*: for he did not give them to him but for the securing of the Talents of gold which *Hiram* had lent him, and they were redeemed at the end of the terme, as it appears by the Text. Further, the soile was barren, and husbanded by the remaining *Canaanites*: But *Solomon* having redeemed it out of the hands of *Hiram*, delivered it to the *Israelites* to be inhabited and tilled. Neither serves it to much more purpose to alledge that in some Kingdoms, there is no expresse agreement between the King and the people; for suppose there be no mention made, yet the law of nature teacheth us that Kings were not ordained to ruine, but to govern the Common-wealths; and that they may not by their proper authority alter or change the rights of the publique State, and although they be Lords, yet can they challenge it in no other quality, then as Guardians do in the tuition of their pupills; neither can we account him a lawfull Lord, which deprives the Common-wealth of her liberty, and sells her as a slave. Briefly, neither can we also alledge, that some Kingdoms are the proper acquits of the King himselfe, in so much as they were not conquered by their proper meanes and swords; but by the hands, and with the wealth of the publique; and there is nothing more agreeable to reason, then that which was gained with the joynt faculties, and common danger of the publique, should not be alien'd

Ex concilio Valent. in c. 1. de his que sunt a prelatibus; consensu senicapit.

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Polster. l. Geogr. 3.

1 Kings 9. 11.

2 Chron. 8. 2.

L. 2. §. jus publici. l. de adm. civ. ut. v. ad Civit. pert. l. tutor. 27. D. de admin. tut.

L. si fundum l. c. si in. D. de off. et expressis. Exstratus. de rejudicata. c. in tellet.

disposed of, without the consent of the States which represent the Common-wealth: and the efficacy of this law is such, that it is of force amongst robbers and free-booters themselves. He which follows a contrary course, must needs ruine humane society. And although the French conquer'd by force of armes, the Countreyes of Germany and Gaul, yet this before mentioned right remains still intire.

To conclude we must needs resolve, that Kings are neither proprietors, nor usu-fructuaries of the royall patrimony: but only administrators: and being so, they can by no just right attribute to themselves the propriety, use or profit of private mens estates, nor with as little reason the publique revenues, which are in truth only the Common-wealths.

But before we passe any further, we must here resolve a doubt. The people of *Israel* having demanded a King, the Lord said to *Samuel*: hearken unto the voice of the people: notwithstanding, give them to understand what shall be the manner of the King which shall reign over them: *he will take your fields, your vineyards, your olive-trees, to furnish his owne occasions, and to enrich his servants: briefly, he will make the people slaves.* One would hardly believe in what estimation the Courtiers of our times hold this Text, when of all the rest of the holy Scripture they make but a jest. In this place the Almighty and all good God, would manifest to the *Israelites* their levitie, when that they had God himselfe even present with them, who upon all occasions appointed them holy Judge, and worthy Commanders for the Wars, would notwithstanding rather subject themselves to the disordered commandements of a vaine mutable man, than to the secure protection of the omnipotent and immutable God. Hee declares then unto them in what a slippery estate the King was placed, and how easily unruly authority fell into disordered violence, and Kingly power was turned into tyrannous wilfulness. Seeing the King that he gave them, would by preposterous violence draw the sword of authority against them, and subject the equity of the lawes to his owne unjust desires: and this mischief which they wilfully drew on themselves, they would happily repent of, when it would not be so easily remedied. Briefly, this Text doth not describe the right of Kings, but what right they are accustomed to attribute to themselves: not what by the privilege of their places they may justly doe: but what power for the

satisfying

satisfying of their owne lusts, they unjustly usurp. This will manifestly appare from the 17. Chapter of *Deuteronomy*, where God appoints a law for Kings. Here saies *Samuel* the King will use his Subjects like slaves: there God forbids the King to lift his heart above his brethren: to wit, over his Subjects, whom he ought not to insult over, but to cherish as his kinsmen. Hee will make Chariots, levy horse-men, and take the goods of private men, saies *Samuel*: on the contrary in *Deuteronomy*, he is exhorted not to multiply horse men, nor to heape up gold and silver, nor cause the people to returne into *Egypt*, to wit, into bondage. In *Samuel* we see pictured to the life wicked *Ahab*, which by pernicious means gets *Nabobs* Vineyard: there *David*, who held it not lawfull to drinke that water which was purchased with the danger of his Subjects lives. *Samuel* foretels that the King demanded by the *Israelites*, in stead of keeping the lawes, would governe all according to his own fancie: on the contrary, God commands that his Law should by the Priests be delivered into the hands of the King, to copie it out, and to have it continually before his eyes. Therefore *Samuel* being high Priest, gave to *Saul* the royall law contained in the 17. of *Deuteronomy*, written into a book, which certainly had been a frivolous act if the King were permitted to break it at his pleasure. Briefly, it is as much as if *Samuel* had said, *You have asked a King after the manner of other Nations, the most of whom have Tyrants for their Governours: You desire a King to distribute justice equally amongst you: but many of them think all things lawfull which their owne appetites suggests unto them; in the meane season you willingly shake off the Lord, whose only will is equity and justice in the abstract.*

In *Herodotus* there is a history which plainly expresses, how apt the royall government is to degenerate into tyranny, whereof *Samuel* so exactly forewarns the people. *Deices* much renowned for his justice, was first chosen Judge amongst the *Medes*: presently after, to the end hee might the better repress those which would oppose justice, he was chosen King, and invested with convenient authority, then he desired a guard, after a Citadell to be built in *Ecbatana* the principall Citie of the Kingdome, with colour to secure him from conspiracies and machinations of Rebels; which being effected, he presently applies himselfe to revenge the least displeasures which were offered him with the greatest punishments.

Finally, no man might presume to looke this King in the face,

L. 2. of *passim*.  
C. de interd.  
Com. rer. alle-  
nat.

1 Sam. 8. 7.  
8c.

Deut. 17.

1 Kings 21.

2 Sam. 23. 16.

Herod. l. 2.

and to laugh or cough in his presence, was punished with grievous torments. So dangerous a thing it is, to put into the hands of a weak mind (as all mens are by nature) unlimited power. *Sammel* therefore teacheth not in that place, that the authority of a King is absolute: on the contrary hee discreetly admonisheth the people not to entrhall their liberty under the unnecessary yoaके of a weak and unruely Master: he doth not absolutely exclude the royall authority, but would have it restrain'd within its own limits: he doth not amplifie the Kings right with an unbridled and licentious liberty: but rather tacitely perswades to put a bit into his mouth. It seemes that this advice of *Sammels* was very beneficiall to the *Israelijes*, for that they circumspetly moderated the power of their Kings, the which most Nations growne wise, either by the experience of their own, or their neighbours harmes, have carefully looked unto, as will plainly appear by that which follows.

We have shewed already, that in the establishing of the King, there were two alliances or covenants contracted: the first between God, the King, and the people, of which wee have formerly treated; the second between the King and the people, of which wee must now say some-what. After that *Saul* was established King, the royall Law was given him, according to which he ought to governe. *David* made a Covenant in *Hebron* before the Lord, that is to say, taking God for witness, with all the ancients of *Israel*, which represented the whole bodie of the people, & even then he was made King. *Joram* also by the mouth of *Jehosada* the High Priest, entered into a Covenant with the whole people of the land in the house of the Lord: And when the Crowne was set on his head, together with it was the law of the Testimony put into his hand, which most expounds to be the law of God: likewise *Josias* promiseth to observe and keep the Commandments, Testimonies and Statutes comprized in the booke of the Covenant: under which words are contained all which belongs to the duties both of the first and second Table of the law of God. In all the before remembered places of the holy story, it is ever said that a Covenant was made with all the people, with all the multitude, with all the Elders, with all the men of *Juda*: to the end that we might know, as it is also fully expressed, that not only the principals of the Tribes, but also all the Milleniers, Centurions, and subalterne Magistrates should meete together, each of them in the name, and for their Townes and Communalities, to covenant and

contract

An alliance  
or covenant  
between the  
K. & the peo-  
ple.

Deut. 17.  
1 Sam. 10. 27.  
2 Sam. 5. 3.

1 Chron. 11. 3.

2 King. 11. 17.  
& 12.

2 Chron. 23. 3.

1 King. 1. 30.

contract with the King. In this assembly was the creating of the King determined of: for it was the people that made the King, and not the King the people.

It is certain then, that the people by way of stipulation, require a performance of covenants, the King promises it. Now the condition of a Stipulator is in termes of law more worthy than of a promiser. The people asketh the King, whether he will govern justly and according to the lawes? He promiseth he will. Then the people answereth, and not before, that whilst he governes uprightly, they will obey faithfully. The King therefore promiseth simply and absolutely, the people upon condition: the which failing to be accomplished, the people rest according to equity and reason, quit from their promise.

In the first covenant, or contract, there is only an obligation to piety: in the second, to justice. In that the King promiseth to serve God religiously: in this, to rule the people justly. By the one he is obliged with the utmost of his endeavours to procure the glory of God: by the other, the profit of the people. In the first there is a condition expressed, If thou keep my commandments: in the second, If thou distribute justice equally to every man. God is the proper revenger of deficiency in the former, and the whole people the lawful punisher of delinquency in the latter, or the Estates, the representative body thereof, who have assumed to themselves the protection of the people. This hath been always practised in all well-governed Estates. Amongst the *Persians*, after the due performance of holy Rites, they contracted with *Cyrus* in manner following.

Thou, O *Cyrus*, in the first place, shalt promise, That if any make war against the *Persians*, or seek to infringe the liberty of the Lawes, thou wilt with the assist of thy power defend and protect this country. Which having promised, they presently add, And we *Persians* promise to be siding to keep all men in obedience, whilst thou defendest the country. *Zenophon* calls this agreement, A Confederation; as also *Isocrates* calls that which he writ of the duties of subjects towards their Princes, A Discourse of Confederation. The alliance or confederation was renewed every moneth between the Kings, and *Ephores* of *Sparta*, although those Kings were descended from the line of *Hercules*. And as these Kings did solemnly swear,

*Zenophon lib. 8. l. 14.*

*Zenob. in tract de republica. Lucid.*

to govern according to the *Laws*, so did the *Emperors* also to maintain them in their authority, whilst they performed their promise. Likewise in the *Roman* Kingdome there was an agreement between *Romulus*, the Senate, and the people, in this manner: *That the people should make Lawes, and the King looke they were kept: The people should decre warre, and the King should manage it.* Now although many Emperours rather by force and ambition, than by any lawfull right, were seafd of the *Roman* Empire, and by that which they call a Royall Law, attributed to themselves an absolute authority; notwithstanding by the fragments which remain both in books, and in *Roman* Inscriptions, of that Law, it plainly appeares, that power and authority was granted them to preserve and govern the Common-wealth, nor to ruine and oppress it by tyranny. Nay, all good Emperours have ever professed, that they held themselves tied to the *Laws*, & received the Empire from the Senate, to whose determination they alwayes referred the most important affaires, and esteemed it a great error without their advice to resolve on the occasions of the publick State.

If we take into our consideration the condition of the Empires, Kingdomes and States of times, there is not any of them worthy of those names, where there is not some such covenant or confederacy between the people and the Prince. It is not long since that in the Empire of Germany, the King of the *Romans* being ready to be crowned Emperour, was bound to doe homage, and make oath of Fealty to the Empire, no more nor lesse than as the vassall is bound to doe to his Lord when he is invested with his fee. Although the form of the words which he is to swear, have been somewhat altered by the Popes, yet notwithstanding the substance still remains the same. According to which we know that *Charles* the fifth of the house of *Austria*, was under certain conditions chosen Emperour, as in the same manner his successors were, the summe of which was, that he should keep the *Laws* already made, and make no new ones without the consent of the Electors, that he should govern the publick affaires by the advice of the generall Estates, nor ingage any thing that belongs to the Empire, and other matters which are particularly recited by the Historians. When the Emperour is crowned at *Aquis-*  
grave,

Specul. Saxoni.  
lib. 3. p. 110. 54.

grave, the Archbishop of *Colten* requires of him in the first place, If he will maintain the Church, if he will distribute justice, if he will defend the Empire, and protect Widowes, Orphans, and all other worthy of compassion: The which after he hath solemnly sworn before the Altar, the Princes also which represent the Empire, are asked, if they will not promise the same; neither is the Emperour anointed, nor receives the other Ornaments of the Empire, before he have first taken that solemn oath. Whereupon it followes, that the Emperour is tied absolutely, and the princes of the Empire, under condition. That the same is observed in the Kingdome of *Polonia*, no man will make question, who had but seen or heard of the ceremonies and rites wherewith *Henry* of *Anjou* was lately chosen and crowned King of that Countrey, & especially then when the condition of maintaining of the two Religions, the Reformed and the *Roman*, was demanded, the which the Lords of the kingdome in expresse termes required of him three severall times, and he as often made promise to perform. The same is observed in the Kingdomes of *Bohemia*, *Hungary*, and others; the which we omit to relate particularly, to avoid prolixity.

Now this manner of stipulation is not only received in those Kingdomes where the right of election is yet entirely observed; but even in those also which are esteemed to be simply hereditary, When the King of *France* is crowned, the Bishops of *Laon* and *Beauvois*, Ecclesiasticall Peeres, ask all the people there present, whether they dissent and command, that he which is there before them, shall be their King? Whereupon he is said even then in the stile of the inauguration, to be chosen by the people: and when they have given the signe of consenting, then the King sweares that he will maintaine all the rights, privileges, and lawes of *France* universally, that he will not aliene the Demeane, and the other Articles, which have been yet so changed and accommodated to bad intentions, as they differ greatly from that copie which remains in the Library of the Chapter of *Beauvois*, according to which it is recorded, that King *Philip*, the first of that name, tooke his Oath at his Coronation; yet notwithstanding they are not unjustly expressed: Neither is he girded with the sword, nor anointed, nor crowned by the Peeres (who at that  
time.

Stylib. 2.  
c. 2.

time wear Coronets on their heads) nor receives the Scepter and rod of Justice, nor is proclaimed King, before first the people have commanded it: neither doe the Peeres take their oaths of allegiance before he have first solemnly sworne to keep the Lawes carefully.

And those be, that he shall not waste the publicke revenue, that he shall not of his own proper authoritie, impose any taxes, customes, or tributes: that he shall not make peace or warre, nor determine of State-affaires, without the advise of the Councell of State. Briefly, that he should leave to the Parliament, to the States, and to the Officers of the Kingdome, their authoritie intire, and all things else which have been usually observed in the Kingdome of France. And when he first enters any Citie or Province, he is bound to confirme their privileges, and sweares to maintaine their Lawes and Customes. This is straitly observed in the Cities of *Tholouse*, and *Rochel*, and in the Countreys of *Daulphinie*, *Province*, and *Britaine*: The which Townes and Provinces have their particular and expresse Covenants and agreements with the Kings, which must needs be voyde, if the condition expressed in the Contract be not of force, nor the Kings tied to the performance.

There is the forme of the Oath of the ancient Kings of *Burgundie*, yet extant in these words: *I will protect all men in their rights, according to Law and justice.*

In *England*, *Scotland*, *Sweden*, and *Denmarke*, there is almost the same custome as in *France*: but in no place there is used a more discreet care in their manner of proceeding, than in *Spaine*. For in the Kingdome of *Arragon*, after the finishing of many Ceremonies, which are used between him, which represents the *Justitia major* of *Arragon*, which comprehends the majestie of the Common-wealth, seated in a higher seate, and the King, which is to be crowned; who sweares fealitie, and does his homage: and having read the Lawes and conditions, to the accomplishment whereof he is sworne.

Finally, the Lords of the Kingdome use to the King these words in the vulgar Language, as is before expressed, page 60. *Wee which are as much worsh as you; and have more power than you; choose you King upon these and these conditions, and there is one be-*

*sweare*

In Annot.  
Burgund.

Nos qui valemus tanto como vos, y poderemos mas que

*sweare you and us, which commands over you. But least the King should thinke he swore onely for fashion sake, and to observe an olde custome, every third yeare in full assemblie of the Estates, the very same words, and in the same manner are repeated unto him.*

And if under pretext of his royall dignitie he become insolent, violating the Lawes, and neglect his publick faith and promise given, then by the privilege of the Kingdome, he is judged, excommunicated, as execrable as *Julian* the Apostata was by the primitive Church: which excommunication is esteemed of that validitie, that instead of praying for the King in their publick oraysons, they pray against him, and the subjects are by the same right acquit from their oath of Allegiance: as the vassall is exempted from obedience and obligation by oath to his Lord which stands excommunicated; the which hath been determined and confirmed both by act of Councell, and Decree of State in the Kingdome of *Arragon*.

In like manner, in the Kingdome of *Castile* in full assembly of the Estates, the King being readie to be crowned, is first in the presence of all advertised of his dutie: and even then are read the Articles discreetly composed for the good of the Common-wealth, the King sweares he will observe and keep them carefully and faithfully; which being done, then the Constable takes his oath of allegiance, after the Princes and Deputies for the Townes swear each of them in their order; and the same is observed in the Kingdomes of *Portugall*, *Leon*, and the rest of *Spaine*. The lesser principallities have their institution grounded on the same right. The contracts which the *Brabanters* and the rest of the *Neiberlanders*, together with those of *Austria*, *Carinthia*, and others, had with their Princes, were alwayes conditionall. But especially the *Brabanters*, to take away all occasion of dispute, have this expresse condition: which is that in the receiving of their Duke, there is read in his presence the ancient Articles, wherein is comprized that which is requisite for the publick good; and thereunto is also added, that if he doe not exactly and precisely observe them, they may choose what other Lord it shall seeme good unto them; the which they dos in expresse words protest unto him. He having allowed and accepted of these Articles, doth in that publick assemblie promise and solemnly sweare to keep them. The which was

In Concil. Tolet. 4. c. 74.  
Et in Tolet. 5. lib. 2. feud. tit. 28. sect. 1.

La Joyeuse  
entree.

Ludovicus  
Guicciard. in  
Descript. Belg.  
sic.

observed in the reception of *Phillip* the second King of *Spain*. Briefly, there is not any man can denie, but that there is a contract mutually obligatorie between the King and the Subjects, which requires the people to obey faithfully, and the King to governe lawfully, for the performance whereof the King swears first, and after the people.

I would aske here wherefore a man doth swear, if it be not to declare, that what he delivers he sincerely intends from his heart? Can any thing be judged more neere to the law of nature, than to observe that which we approve? Furthermore, what is the reason the King swears first, and at the instance, and required by the people, but to accept a condition either tacite or expressed? Wherefore is there a condition opposed to the Contract, if it be not that in saying to performe the condition, the contract according to law remains voyde? And if for want of satisfying the condition by right, the contract is of no force: who shall dare to call that people perjured, which refuseth to obey a King which makes no account of his promise, which he might and ought to have kept, and wilfully breakes those lawes which he did swear to observe? On the contrary, may we not rather esteeme such a King perfidious, perjured, and unworthy of his place? For if the Law free the vassall from his Lord, who deale feloniously with him, although that to speake properly the Lord sweareth not fealitie to his vassall, but he to him: if the Law of the twelve Tables doth detest and hold in execration the protector that defraudeth him that is under his tuition: if the civill Law permit an enfranchised servant to bring his action against his patron, for any grievous usage: if in such cases the same Law delivers the slave from the power of his Master, although the obligation be naturall onely and not civill: is it not much more reasonable that the people be loosed from that oath of allegiance which they have taken, if the King (who may be not unfaithfully resembled by an Attorney sworne to looke to his Clients cause) first breake his oath solemnly taken? And what if all these ceremonies, solemne oaths, nay sacramentall promises had never been taken? Doth not nature her self sufficiently teach that Kings were on this condition ordained by the people, that they should governe well? Judges that they should distribute justice uprightly? Captaines in the warre, that they should lead their Armes against their enemies: If on the contrary, they themselves forrage and spoile their

their subjects, and instead of governors become enemies, as they leave indeed the true and essentiall qualities of a King, so neither ought the people to acknowledge them for lawfull Princes. But what if a people (you will reply) subdued by force, be compelled by the King to take an oath of servitude? And what if a robber, pirate, or tyrant, (I will answer) with whom no bond of humane societie can be effectual, holding his dagger to your throate, constrain you presently to become bound in a great sum of money? Is it not an unquestionable Maxime in Law, that a promise exacted by violence cannot binde? especially if any thing be promised against common reason, or the law of nature? Is there any thing more repugnant to nature and reason, than that a people should manicle and fetter themselves, and to be obliged by promise to the Prince, with their own hands and weapons to be their own executioners? There is therefore a mutual obligation between the King and the people, which whether it be civill or naturall onely, whether tacite, or expressed in words, it cannot by any meanes be annihilated, nor by any Law be abrogated, much lesse by force made voyde. And this obligation is of such power, that the Prince which wilfully violates it, is a tyrant: and the people which purposely breakes it, may be justly termed seditious.

Hitherto we have treated of a King, it now rests wee doe somewhat more fully describe a Tyrant. Wee have shewed that he is a King, which lawfully governes a Kingdome, either derived to him by succession, or committed to him by Election. It follows therefore that he is reputed a tyrant, which as opposite to a King, either gains a kingdome by violence, or indirect meanes, or being invested therewith by lawfull election or succession, governes it not according to law and equitie, or neglects those contracts and agreements, to the observation whereof he was strictly obliged at his reception. All which may very well occurre in one and the same person. The first is commonly called a tyrant without title: the second a tyrant by practise. Now it may well so come to passe, that he which possesseth himselfe of a kingdome by force, to governe justly, and he on whom it descends by a lawfull title, to rule unjustly. But for so much as a kingdome is rather a right than an inheritance, and an office than a possession: he seemes rather worthy the name of a tyrant, which unworthily acquires himselfe of his charge, than he which entered into his place by a wrong dore. In

Cicero. 1. Offic.

Who may  
truly be cal-  
led tyrants?

Aristo. lib. 5.  
polit. c. 10.

Bartol. in  
tract. de ty-  
rannide.

L. 1. D. Ac-  
pass. l. non  
minorum 20.  
D. de transfat

Lib. 2. feudor.  
tit. 26. §. 24.  
et tit. 47.  
Dionys. Halic.  
lib. 2.

the same fence is the Pope called an intruder which entered by indirect means into the papacy; and he an abuser which gover is ill in it.

*Pithagoras* saies, *That a worthy stranger is to be preferred before an unworthy Citizen, yea though he be a Kinsman.* Let it be lawfull also for us to say, that a Prince which gained his Principality by indirect courses, provided hee governe according to law, and administer justice equally, is much to be preferred before him, which carrieth himselfe tyrannously, although hee were legally invested into his government with all the Ceremonies and Rites thereunto appertaining.

For seeing that Kings were instituted to feede, to judge, to cure the diseases of the people: Certainly I had rather that a Thise should feede me, than a Shepherd devour me: I had rather receive justice from a R. abber, than our- rage from a Judge: I had better be healed by an Empirick, than poysoned by a Doctor in Physicke. It were much more profitable for me to have my estate carefully managed by an intruding Guardian, than to have it wasted and dissipated by one legally appointed.

And although it may be that ambition was his first solicitor, to enter violently into the government, yet may it perhaps appeare he affected it the rather to give testimonie of his equity and moderation in governing, witness *Cirus*, *Alexander*, and the *Romans*, which ordinarily accorded to those people they subdued, permission to governe themselves according to their owne laws, customs, and priviledges; yea sometimes incorporated them into the body of their owne state: on the contrary, the Tyrant by practise seemes to extend the priviledge of his legall succession, the better to execute violence and extortion, as may be seene in these dayes, not only by the examples of the *Turkes* and *Moscovites*, but also in divers Christian Princes: therefore the act of one which at the first was ill, is in some reasonable time reitified by justice: whereas the other like an inveterate disease, the elder it growes, the worse it affects the Patient.

Now if according to the saying of Saint *Augustine*, those kingdoms where justice hath no place, are but a rapodie of freebooters; they are in that, both the Tyrant without title, and he by practise alike, for that they are both thieves, both robbers, and both unjust possessors, as he certainly is no lesse an unjust detayner which takes another mans goods against the owners

*Zenophon. Pluta-  
ta thus in A-  
lexand. in A-  
milio, Casare.  
Livius, lib. 1.  
Suetonius in  
Casare, c. 75.*

*August. in lib.  
4. c. 4. de civi.  
de.*

owners will, than hee which employes it ill when it was taken before.

But the fault is without comparison, much more greater of him which possesseth an estate for to ruine it, than of the other which made himselfe Master of it to preserve it.

Briefely, the Tyrant by practise vainely colouring his unjust extortions with the justice of his title, is much more blameable then the Tyrant without title, who recompenceth the violence of his first intusion in a continued course of a legall and upright government.

But to proceed, there may be observed some difference amongst Tyrants without title: For there are some which ambitiously invade their neighbours Countreyes, to enlarge their owne, as *Nimrod*, *Minus*, and the *Canaanites* have done. Although such are term'd Kings by their owne people, yet to those on whose confines they have encroached without any just right, or occasion, they will be accounted Tyrants.

There be others which having attained to the government of an elective Kingdome, that endeavour by deceitfull meanes, by corruption, by present, and other bad practises, to make it become hereditary. For witness whereof, wee neede not make search into elder times; these are worse than the former, for so much as secret fraud, as *Cicero* saith, *is ever more odious than open force.*

There be also others which are so horribly wicked, that they seek to enthrall their own native Countrey like the viperous brood which gnaw through the entralls of their mother: as be those Generals of Armies created by the people, who afterwards by the meanes of those forces make themselves masters of the State, as *Cesar* at *Rome* under pretence of the Dictatorship, and divers Princes of *Italy*.

There be women also which intrude themselves into the government of those kingdoms which the lawes only permit to the males, and make themselves Queenes and Regents, as *Athalia* did in *Judab*, *Semiramis* in *Assyria*, *Agripina* in the *Roman* Empire in the Reign of her sonne *Nero*, *Mamma* in *Alexander Severus* his time, *Semiamira* in *Heliogabalus*; and certaine *Brunnibildes* in the kingdome of *France*, who to educated their sonnes [as the Queenes of the house *Medici* in these latter times] during their minority, that attaining

Tyrants with-  
out title.

attaining to more maturity, their only care was to glut themselves in pleasures and delights: so that the whole management of Affairs remain'd in the hands of their Mothers, or of their Ministers, servants, and Officers. Those also are Tyrants without title, who taking advantage of the sloath, weaknesse, and dissolute courses of those Princes which are otherwise lawfully instituted, and seeking to enwrap them in a sleepey dreaime of voluptuous idleness (as under the *French Kings*, especially those of the *Aleovingian* line, some of the Mayres of the Palace have beene advanc'd to that dignity for such egregious services) transferring into their owne command all the royall authority, and leaving the King only the bare name. All which Tyrants are certainly of this condition, that if for the manner of their government they are not blameable: Yet for so much as they entered into that jurisdiction by tyrannous intrusion, they may justly be termed Tyrants without title.

Tyrants by  
practise.

Concerning Tyrants by practise, it is not so easie to describe them as true Kings. For reason rules the one, and selfe-will the other: the first prescribes bounds to his affections, the second confines his desires within no limits, what is the proper rights of Kings may be easly declared, but the outrageous insolencies of Tyrants cannot without much difficulty be express'd. And as a right angle is uniforme, and like to it selfe one and the same: so an oblique diversifies it selfe into various and sundry species: In like manner is justice and equity simple, and may be deciphered in few words: but injustice and injury are divers, and for their sundry accidents not to be so easly defin'd; but that more will be omitted then express'd. Now although these be certaine rules by which these Tyrants may be represented (though not absolutely to the life: ) yet notwithstanding there is not any more certaine than by conferring, and comparing a Tyrants fraudulent sleights with a Kings vertuous actions.

A Tyrant lops off those eares which grow higher then the rest of the corne, especially where vertue make them most conspicuously eminent, oppresseth by calumnies, and fraudulent practises, the principall officers of the State, gives out reports of intended conspiracies against himselfe, that he might have some colourable pretence to cut them off, witness *Tiberius*, *Maximianus*, & others, which regard not their own kinemen, consues, and brothers.

The

The King on the contrary doth not onely acknowledge, his brothers to be as it were consorts unto him in the Empire: But also holds in the place of brothers all the principall Officers of the Kingdom, & is not ashamed to confesse that of them (Inequality as deputed from the generall Estates) he holds the Crown.

The tyrant advanceth above and in opposition to the ancient and worthy Nobility, mean and unworthy persons; to the end that these base fellows being absolutely his creatures, might applaud and apply themselves to the fulfilling of all his loose and unruly desires. The King maintains every man in his Rank, honours and respects the Grandees as the Kingdoms friends; desiring their good as well as his own.

The tyrant hates and suspects discreet and wise men, and fears no opposition more than vertue, as being conscious of his owne vicious courses, and lessening his owne security to consist principally in a generall corruption of all Estates, introduceth multiplicity of Tavernes, Gaming-houses, Maskes, Stage-plays, Brothel-houses, and all other licentious superfluities, that might effeminate and bastardize noble spirits, as *Cyrus* did, to weaken and subdue the *Sardians*: The King on the contrary uttereth from all places honest and able men, and encourageoth them by pensions and honours; and for seminaries of vertue, erects Schooles and Universities in all convenient places.

A tyrant as much as in his lies, prohibits or avoids all publick Assemblies, seares Parliaments, Diets and meetings of the generall Estates, flies the light, affecting (like the Bat) to converse onely in darknesse; yea, he is jealous of the very gesture, countenance, and discourse of his subjects. The King because he converses alwayes as in the presence of Men and Angels, glories in the multitude, and sufficiency of his Counsellors, esteeming nothing well done which is ordered without their advice; and is so farre from doubting or distasting the publick meeting of the generall Estates, as he honours and respects those Assemblies with much favour and affection.

A tyrant robbeth and seduceth factions and dissensions amongst his subjects, ruines one by the help of another, that he may the easier vanquish the remainder, advancing himselfe by division, like those dishonest Surgeons which lengthen out their cures. Briefly after the manner of that abominable *Vranho* who he is not ashamed to say, that the kill'd all of a dead enemy,

*Machiavil in  
Principe.*

*Arist. lib. 5.  
c. 11. polit.*



especially a subject, yields a good favour. On the contrary, a good King endeavours always to keep peace amongst his subjects, as a father amongst his children, choakes the seeds of troubles, and quickly heals the scarre; the execution even of justice upon rebels, drawing teares from his compassionate eyes; yea, those whom a good King maintains and defends against a forraign enemy, a tyrant (the enemy of nature) compels them to turn the points of their swords into their own proper intrails. A tyrant fills his Garrisons with strange Souldiers, builds Citadels against his subjects, disarms the people, throws down their forts, makes himselfe formidable with guards of strangers, or men onely fit for pillage and spoyle, gives pensions out of the publick Treasury to spies and calumniating informers, disperst through all Cities and Provinces. Contrariwise, a King reposeth more his safety in the love of his subjects, than in the strength of his Fortresses against his enemies, taking care to inroll Souldiers; but accounts every subject as a man at arms to guard him, & builds forts to restrain the intrusions of forraign enemies, and not to constrain his subjects to obedience, in whose fidelity he putteth his greatest confidence. Therefore it is that tyrants, although they have such numberlesse guards about them to drive off throngs of people from approaching them, yet cannot all those numbers secure them from doubts, jealousies and distrusts, which continually afflict and terrifie their timorous consciences; yea in the midst of their greatest strength, the tyrannizer of tyrants, fear, maketh prize of their souls, and there triumphs in their affliction. A good King in the greatest concurrence of people, is freed from doubts or fears, nor troubled with solicitous distrusts in his solitary retirements, all places are equally secure unto him, his own conscience being his best guard. If a tyrant want civill broyles to exercise his cruell disposition in, he makes warres abroad; erects idle and needlesse trophies to continually employ his tributaries, that they might want leisure to think on other things, as Pharaoh did the Jews, and Polierster the Samiens; therefore he always prepares for, or threatens war, or at least seemes so to doe, and so still rather draws mischief on, than puts it further off. A King never makes war, but compelled unto it, and for the preservation of the publick; he never desires to purchase advantage by treason, he never entrencheth into any war that exposeth the Common-wealth to more danger than it affordeth probable hope of commodity.

L'vi. lib. 2. c. 1.  
Dionys. Halic.  
l. 5. de Arumae  
filio Porfennae.

Prov. 14. 28.

Barol. in tract  
de tyrannide.

Regid. Rom. de  
veg. pria.

Cicero de Of.  
fic. lib. 1.

A Tyrant leaveth no designe unattempted by which he may fleece his Subjects of their substance, and turne it to his proper benefit, that being continually troubled in gaining meanes to live, they may have no leisure nor hope how to regaine their liberty: On the contrary, the King knows that every good Subjects purse will be ready to supply the Common-wealths occasion, and therefore believes he is possesst of no small treasure, whilst through his good government his Subjects flow in all abundance.

A Tyrant extorts unjustly from many to cast prodigally upon two or three Minions, and those unworthy; hee imposeth on all, and exacteth from all, to furnish their superfluous and riotous expences: he builds his owne, and followeth fortunes on the ruines of the publique: he drawes out the peoples blood, by the veins of their means, and gives it presently to carouse to his Court-leeches. But a King cuts off from his ordinary expences, to ease the peoples necessities, neglecteth his private state, and furnisheth with all magnificence the publique occasions; briefly is prodigall of his owne blood, to defend and maintain the people committed to his care.

If a Tyrant as heretofore *Tiberius, Nero, Commodus* and others, did suffer his Subjects to have some breathing time from unreasonable exactions, and like sponges to gather some moysture, it is but to squeeze them out afterwards to his owne use: on the contrary, if a King doe sometimes open a vaine, and draw some blood, it is for the peoples good, and not to be expended at his own pleasure in any dissolute courses. And therefore as the holy Scripture compares the one to a *Shepheard*, so doth it also resemble the other to a roaring *Lion*, to whom notwithstanding the *Foxe* is oftentimes coupled, For a Tyrant as saies *Cicero*, is culpable in effect of the greatest injustice that may be imagined, and yet be carrieth it so cunningly, that when hee most deceives, it is then that hee maketh greatest appearance to deale sincerely. And therefore doth hee artificially counterfeit Religion and devotion, wherein saith *Aristotle*, hee expresseth one of the most absolute subtilities that Tyrants can possibly practise: hee doth so compose his countenance to piety, by that meanes to terrifie the people from conspiring against him; who they may well imagine to be especially favoured of God, expressing in all appearance so reverently to serve him. Hee faims also to be exceedingly affected to the publique good; not so much for the love of it, as for feare of his owne safety.

Furthermore he desires much to be esteemed just, and loyall in some affaires,

affaires, purposely to deceive and betray more easily in matters of greater consequence: much like those thieves which maintaine themselves by thefts and robberies, cannot yet long subsist in their trade, without exercising some parcel of justice in their proceedings. He also counterfeits the mercifull, but it is in pardoning of such malefactors, in punishing whereof he might more truly gaine the reputation of a pittifull Prince.

To speake in a word, that which the true King is, the Tyrant would seeme to be, and knowing that men are wonderfully attracted with, and enamoured of vertue, hee endeavours with much subtilty to make his vices appeare yet marked with some shadow of vertue: but let him counte it never so cunningly; All the Fox will be known by his taile: and although he saue and flatter like a Spannell, yet his snarling and grinning will ever bewray his curish kind.

Furthermore, as a well-ordered Monarchy partakes of the principall commodities of all other governments: So on the contrary, where tyranny prevails, there all the discommodities of confusion are frequent.

A Monarchy hath in this, conformity with an Aristocracy, that the most able and discreet are called to consultations: Tyranny and Oligarchy accord in this, that their counsels are composed of the worst and most corrupted. *And as in the Councell Royall, there may in a sort seeme many Kings to have interest in the government, so on the other on the contrary, a multitude of Tyrants always domineer.*

The Monarchy borrowes of the popular government the assemblies of the Estates, whither are sent for Deputies the most sufficient of Cities and Provinces, to deliberate of, and determine matters of State: the tyranny takes this of the Ochlocracy, that if shee be not able to hinder the convocation of the Estates, yet will shee endeavour by factions subtilties and pernicious practices, that the greatest enemies of Order and Reformation of the State be sent to these Assemblies, the which we have known practised in our times. In this manner assumes the Tyrant the countenance of a King, and tyranny the semblance of a Kingdome, and the continuance succeeds commonly according to the dexterity wherewith it is managed: yet, as Aristotle says, we shal hardly reade of any tyranny that hath out-lived a hundred yeares: briefly the King principally regards the publique utility, and a Tyrant chiefly care is for his private commodity.

But seeing the condition of men is such, that a King is with much difficulty

difficulty to be found, that in all his actions only agreeeth at the publique good, and yet cannot long subsist without exprefion of some speciall care thereof, we will conclude that where the Common wealthe advantage is most preferred, there is both a lawfull King and Kingdome; and where particular designs and private ends prevails against the publique professe, there questionlesse is a Tyrant and tyranny.

Thus much concerning Tyrants by practice, In the examining whereof wee have not altogether fixed our discourse on the loose disorders of their wicked and licentious lives, which some say is the character of a bad man: but not always of a bad Prince. If therefore the Reader be not satisfied with this description, besides the more exact representations of Tyrants which he shall finde in histories: he may in these our dayes behold an absolute modell of many living and breathing Tyrants: whereof Aristotle in his time did much complain. Now at the last we are come as it were by degrees to the chiefe and principall point of the question. We have seene how that Kings have beene chosen by God, either with relation to their Families or their persons only, and after installed by the people: In like manner what is the duty of the King, and of the Officers of the Kindome, how farre the authority, power, and duty both of the one & the other extends, and what and how sacred are the Covenants and contracts which are made at the inauguration of Kings, and what conditions are intermixt, both tacite and expresed: finally who is a Tyrant without title, and who by practice, seeing it is a thing unquestionable that we are bound to obey a lawfull King, which both to God and people carrieth himselfe according to those Covenants whereunto he stands obliged, as it were to God himselfe, seeing in a sort he represents his divine Majesty: It now followes that we treat, how, and by whom a Tyrant may be lawfully resisted, and who are the persons that ought to be chiefly actors therein, and what course is to be held, that the action may be managed according to right and reason: we must first speak of him which is commonly called a Tyrant without title. Let us suppose then that some *Ninus* having neither received outrage nor offence, invades a people over whom he hath no colour of pretension: that *Cesar* seeks to oppresse his Countrey, and the Roman Commonwealthe: that *Popolus* endeavours by murders and treasons to make the elective Kingdome of *Polonia* to become hereditary

Theo. Aquin.  
in secund. se-  
cond. q. 12.  
art. 11.

\* Bartol. in  
tract. de tiran-  
et de regno.  
Civ.

† To whom  
it belongs to  
resist & sup-  
presse Tyrants  
without title.

† Otto Frising.  
Chron. l. 3. c. 7.

*Aimari*. lib. 4.  
c. 1.  
*Gre. Tawon*.  
lib. 4. c. 51.  
lib. 5. c. 39.  
lib. 8. c. 39.

hereditary to him and his posterity: or some *Brunsbilde* draws to her selfe and her Protadius the absolute government of France; or *Ebroinus* taking advantage of *Theodericks* weaknesse and idleness; gaineth the incire administration of the State, and oppresseth the people, what shall be our lawfull refuge herein?

First, The law of nature teacheth, and commandeth us to maintaine and defend our lives and liberties, without which life is scant worth the enjoying, against all injury and violence. Nature hath imprinted this by instinct in Dogs against Wolves, in Bulls against Lions, betwixt Pigeons and Spar-hawkes, betwixt Pullen and Kites, and yet much more in man against man himselfe, if man become a beast: and therefore he which questions the lawfulness of defending ones selfe, doth as much as in him lies question the law of nature. To this must be added the law of Nations, which distinguisheth possessions, and Dominions, fixes limits, and makes out confines, which every man is bound to defend against all invaders. And therefore it is no lesse lawfull to resist, *Alexander* the great, if without any right or being justly provoked, he invades a Countrey with a mighty Navy; as well as *Diomedes* the Pirate which scourres the Seas in a small vessell. For in this case *Alexanders* right is no more than *Diomedes* his, but only hee hath more power to doe wrong, and not so easily to be compelled to reason as the other. Briefely, one may as well oppose *Alexander* in pillaging a Countrey, as a Thiefe in purloining a cloake, as well him when he seekes to batter downe the walls of a Citie, as a robber that offers to break into a private house. There is besides this, the civill law, or municipal laws of severall Countreies which governs the societies of men, by certaine rules, some in one manner, some in another; some submit themselves to the government of one man, some to more; others are ruled by a whole Communalty, some absolutely exclude women from the Royall Throne, others admit them, these here chuse their King descended of such a family, those there make election of whom they please, besides other customes praised amongst severall Nations. If therefore any offer either by fraud or force to violate this law, wee are all bound to resist him, because he wrongs that society to which wee owe all that we have, and would runne our Countrey, to the preservation whereof, all men by nature; by law and by solemne oath are strictly obliged: inso much that feare or negligence, or bad purposes, make us omit

this

this dutie, wee may justly be accounted breakers of the Lawes, betrayes of our Countrey, and contempters of Religion. Now as the Law of Nature, of Nations, and the civill commands us to take Armes against such Tyrants: so is there not any manner of reason that should persuade us to the contrary; neither is there any oath, covenant, or obligation, publicke or private, of power justly to restrain us: therefore the meanest private man may resist and lawfully oppose such an intruding tyrant: The Law justly which condemnes to death those that raise rebellion against their Countrey or Prince, hath here no place: for he is no Prince which without any lawfull title invaleth the Common-wealth; or Constitutes of another: nor he a rebell which by armes defends his Countrey: but rather to this had relation the Oath which all the youth of *Athenes* were accustomed to take in the Temple of *Aglaura*: I will fight for Religion, for the Lawes, for the Altars, and for our possessions, either alone or with others, and will doe the utmost of my endeavour; to leave to posteritie our Countrey, as the least in as good estate as I found it. To as little purpose can the Lawes made against seditious persons be alledged here; for he is seditious which undertakes to defend the people, in opposition of order and publick Discipline; But he is no raiser, but a suppressor of sedition; which restraineth within the limits of reason, the subvertor of his Countreys welfare, and publicke Discipline.

On the contrary to this, hath proper relation the Law of Tyrannicides, which honours the living with great and memorable recompences, and the dead with worthy Epitaphes; and glorious Statues, that have been their Countreys Liberators from Tyrants; as, *Harmodius* and *Aristogiton* at *Athenes*, *Brutus* and *Cassius* in *Greece*, and *Aratus* of *Syracuse*. To these by a publick Decree were erected Statues, because they delivered their Countreys from the tyrannies of *Pisistratus*, of *Cesar*, and of *Nicoles*. The which was of such respect amongst the Ancients; that *Zerxes* having made himselfe Master of the Citie of *Athenes*; caused to be transported into *Persia*; the Statues of *Harmodius* and *Aristogiton*: afterwards *Selucus* caused them to be returned into their former place: and as in their passage they came by *Roades*, those famous Citizens entertained them with publick and stupendous solemnities, and during their abode there, they placed them in the choicest sacrifices of their gods. But the Law made against forsakers, and traytors,

takes

*L. ult. D. ad  
leg. Jul. Ma-  
jestas.*

*Barol. in trac.  
de Gulph. &  
Gibellin.*

*Plin. lib. 4.  
Alexand. ab  
Alex. lib. 6.  
cap. 4.*

*Ziphim. in  
vita Augusti.*

*Plutarch. in  
Arato.*

*Valer. Maxim.  
lib. 2. c. ultim.*

take of his duty, hold on those subjects and negligent and careless  
 to deliver them. Cruelty, oppression, with tyrannie, and consi-  
 deration, that in the first Parliament, as those cowardly Souldiers  
 were, who when they should fight for their own liberties, or  
 call'd their own lives away, were and should be both in  
 respect and regard, ready to stand for their liberties, and  
 that should be such as should be both in respect and regard, and  
 water, and should be such as should be both in respect and regard,  
 the Water, as it is called, nor will the Government of the Towne  
 be come into the hands of a few, but every man deare water and clint  
 to the house, as it is necessary, for Call made that the first disques-  
 ched. For, it should be such as should be both in respect and regard,  
 seeks to scale and surpris the Capitall, the Souldiers be drowne  
 with their former paines, the Watch buried in sleep, the dogges  
 laye to bark, then must the watch play the Sentinells, and with  
 their galling noise give an alarm. And the Souldiers and Watch  
 shall be degraded, yet, and put to death: the gesture for perpetual  
 remembrance of this delivrance, shall be always kept in the Capitall  
 toll, and much esteemed.

This of which we have spoken, is to be understood of a ty-  
 ranny not yet fully posseed, so wit, whilst a tyrant conspires  
 machinings, and layes his plots and practices. But if he be once  
 possessed of the State, and that the people being suddenly, promise  
 and swear obedience: the Common-wealth being oppressed, re-  
 signe their authoritie into his hands, and that the Kingdoms in  
 some formall manner, consent to the changing of their Lawes:  
 for so much certainly as they have gained a title, which before  
 he wanted, and seems as he is well as legal, and shall possesse  
 thereof, although this yoke were laid on the peoples necke by  
 compulsion, yet must they quietly and peaceably resigne the will  
 of the Almighty, who at his pleasure transferr'd Kingdoms from  
 one Nation to another. Otherwise their should be no Kingdome  
 whose jurisdiction might, or should be made in any, all that  
 that he which before was a tyrant, with his unles having obtained  
 the title of a King, may see himselfe becom and rebellious in  
 putation by governing those under him with equity and moderation.  
 Therefore then as the people of Judaea under the authority  
 tie of King *Alexander* did humbly, with the permission of *Seleucus*  
 the *Affir*: So on the contrary was *Seleucus* to hold all the sub-  
 jects

to the  
 Omne  
 Sum. 5. ult.  
 l. de re mil-  
 lit.

2 Kings 24.  
 and 25.  
 Jerem. 37.

jects worshipfully punished, because that without any just occasion  
 after they had done him wrong, and by some fault to themselves  
 they did in rebellion against him. For after proofe of per-  
 formance it is too late to repent: and as it behoves every one ought  
 to give testimony of his foly, but being taken prisoner, must  
 faithfully observe. Government is to be sought, that the people  
 maintains their rights by all possible means: but if it chance that  
 they be brought into the subjection of others, they must  
 then patiently support the dominion of the Victors. So did *Pompey*,  
*Cato*, and *Cicero*, and others, performe the parts of good Patriots  
 then when they tooke arms against *Cesary*, hoping to alter the  
 government of the State, which did those, but they excused  
 without base feare, and did the justly, *Antony* and his par-  
 takers, noble deliquers, *Antony* himselfe said he have reproved  
 one who rayled on *Cato*, affirming that he carried himselfe worth-  
 ily, and exceedingly affected to the greatness of his Countrey in  
 courageously opposing the tyrannies which his Countrymen sought  
 to introduce in the Government of the State, being an innovati-  
 on of that nature and evill effects of much trouble and confu-  
 sion.

Furthermore, no man can justly reprehend *Brutus*, *Cassius*, and  
 the rest, who killed *Cesary*, before his tyrannicall authoritie had  
 taken any more rooting, and so were their Souldiers of brave  
 fight in honour of them by publick decrees, and placed by  
 those of *Harmidus* and *Antony*, then when after the dispatch-  
 ing of *Cesary* they retired from *Rome*, to avayde *Mur*, *Antony*  
 and *Augustus* their revenge. But *Cicero* was certainly guiltie of sedi-  
 tion, who after a legall transferring of the peoples power into  
 the hands of *Augustus*, is said to conspire against him. Likewise  
 when the *Papists* sought to take the Crowne of *France* from the  
*Merovingians*, as also when those of the line of *Capet* endeav-  
 oured to supplant the *Papists*, they might lawfully resist them  
 without incurring the crime of sedition: but when by publick  
 counsell and the unanimous of the *Empire*, the Kingdoms was trans-  
 ferred from one familie to another, it was then unlawful to op-  
 pose it. The same may be said if a Woman possesse her selfe of the  
 Kingdoms, which the *Sakick* Law absolutely prohibites, or if one  
 seek to take a Kingdome away by force, hereditary in his off-  
 spring, while those Lawes stand in force, and are unrepealed by  
 the

the authoritie of the generall Estates, which represent the body of the people. Neither is it necessary, in this respect, to have regard whether faction is the greater, more powerfull or more illustrious. Always those are the greater number who are led by passion, than those that are ruled by reason; and therefore tyranny hath more servants than the Common-wealth. But Rome is there according to the saying of *Pompey*, where the Senate is; and the Senate is where there is obedience to the Lawes, love of libertie, and studious carefulness for the Countreys preservation: And therefore though *Brennus* may seeme to be master of *Rome*: yet notwithstanding is *Rome* at veies with *Camillus*; who prepares to deliver *Rome* from bondage. It behoves therefore all true *Romans* to reapeire to *Camillus*, and assist his Enterprize with the utmost of their power and endeavours. Although *Themistocles*, and all his able and worthiest companions leave *Athenes*, and put to Sea with a navie of two hundred Gallies, notwithstanding it cannot be said that any of these men are banished *Athenes*. But rather as *Themistocles* answered; These two hundred Gallies are more usefull for us than the greatest Citee of all *Greece*: for that they are armed and prepared for the defence of those which endeavour to maintaine and uphold the publick State.

But to come to other examples; it follows not that the Church of God must needs be alwayes in that place where the Arke of the Covenant is: for the *Philistines* may carry the Arke into the Temples of their Idols: It is no good argument, that because wee see the *Roman Eagles* waving in Ensignes, and heare their Legions named, that therefore presently wee conclude that the Armie of the *Romans* Common-wealth is their present: for there is onely and properly the power of the State where they are assembled to maintaine the libertie of the Countrey against the ravenous oppression of Tyrants, to infranchise the people from servitude, and to suppress the impudency of insulting flatterers, who abuse the Princes weaknesse by oppressing his Subjects for the advantaging of their own fortunes, and containe ambitious minds from enlarging their desires beyond the limits of equitie and moderation. Thus much concerning Tyrants without title.

But for Tyrants by practise, whether they at first gained their authoritie by the sword, or were legally invested therewith by a generall consent: It behooves us to examine this point with much

warie

wary circumspection. In the first place we must remember, that all Princes are born men, and therefore reason and passion are as hardly to be separated in them, as the soule is from the body whilst the man liveth: We must not then expect Princes absolute in perfection, but rather repute our selves happy if those that govern us be indifferently good. And therefore although the prince observe not exact mediocrity in State-affaires, if sometimes passion over-rule his reason, if some carelesse omission make him neglect the publick utility, or if he doe not alwayes carefully execute justice with equality, or repulse not with ready valour an invading enemy; he must not therefore be presently declared a tyrant. And certainly, seeing he rules not as a God over men, nor as men over beasts, but is a man composed of the same matter, and of the same nature with the rest: as we would questionlesse judge that prince unreasonably insolent, that should insult over and abuse his subjects, as if they were brut beasts; so those people are doubtlesse as much void of reason, which imagine a prince should be compleat in perfection, or expect divine abilities in a nature so frail and subject to imperfections. But if a prince purposely ruine the Common-wealth, if he presumptuously pervert and resist legall proceedings, or lawfull rights, if he make no reckoning of faith, covenants, justice nor piety, if he prosecute his subjects as enemies; briefly, if he expresse all or the chiefest of those wicked practices we have formerly spoken of; then we may certainly declare him a tyrant, which is as much as an enemy both to God and men. We doe not therefore speak of a prince lesse good, but of one absolute bad; nor of one lesse wise, but of one malicious and treacherous; nor of one lesse able judiciously to discuss legall differences, but of one privately bent to pervert justice and equity; nor of an unwarlike, but of one furiously disposed to ruine the people, and ransack the State. For the wisdom of a Senate, the integrity of a Judge, the valour of a Captain, may peradventure inable a weak prince to govern well: But a tyrant could be content that all the Nobility, the Councillors of State, and Commanders for the warres, had but one head, that he might take it off at one blow: those being the proper objects of his distrust and feare, and by consequence the principall subjects on whom he desires to execute his malice and cruelty. A foolish prince, although (to speak according to right

and

*Plutarch. in vita Themistoc.*

What may lawfully be done against Tyrants by practise.

and equity) he ought to be deposed, yet may he perhaps in some sort be born withall: But a tyrant the more he is tolerated, the more he becomes intollerable.

Furthermore, as the Princes pleasure is not alwayes law, so many times it is not expedient that the people doe all that which may lawfully be done: for it may often-times chance, that the medicine proves more dangerous than the disease. Therefore it becomes wise men to try all wayes before they come to blowes, to use all other remedies before they suffer the sword to decide the controversie. If then those which represent the body of the people, foresee any innovation or machination against the State, or that it be already embarked into a course of perdition, their duty is, first to admonish the Prince, and not to attend, that the disease by accession of time, and accidents, becomes unrecoverable. For tyranny may be properly resembled unto a Feaver Hecke, the which at the first is easie to be cured, but with much difficulty to be known; but after it is sufficiently known, it becomes incurable. Therefore small beginnings are to be carefully observed, and by those whom it concerns diligently prevented.

If the Prince therefore persist in his violent courses, and continue frequent admonitions, addressing his designs onely to that end, that he may oppress at his pleasure, and effect his own desires without feare or restraint, he then doubtlesse makes himselfe liable to that detested crime of Tyranny: and whatsoever either the law, or lawfull authority permits against a tyrant, may be lawfully practis'd against him. Tyrany is not onely a will, but the chiefe, and as it were the complement and abstract of vices. A Tyrant subverts the State, pillages the people, layes stratagems to intrap their lives, breaks promise with all, scoffes at the sacred obligation of a solemne oath, and therefore is he so much more vile than the vilest of usuall malefactors, by how much offences committed against a generality, are worthy of greater punishment: than those which concern onely particular and private persons. If Theeves and those that commit sacrilege, be declared infamous; nay, if they justly suffer corporall punishment by death, can we invent any that may be worthily equivalent for so outrageous a crime?

Furthermore, we have already proved, that all Kings receive their

their Royall authority from the people; that the whole people considered in one body, is above and greater than the King: and that the King and Emperour are onely the prime and supreme governours and ministers of the Kingdome and Empire; but the people the absolute Lord and owner thereof. It therefore necessarily followes, that a tyrant is in the same manner guilty of rebellion against the Majesty of the people, as the Lord of a fee which feloniously transgresseth the conditions of his investitures, & is liable to the same punishment, yea and certainly deserves much more greater than the equity of those lawes inflict on the delinquents. Therefore as *Barclay* sayes, He may either be deposed by those which are Lords in Sovereignty over him, or else justly punished according to the Law *Julian*, which condemnes those which offer violence to the publick. The body of the people must needs be the Sovereigne of those which represent it, which in some places are the Electors, Palatines, Peeres; in other, the Assembly of the generall Estates. And if the tyranny have gotten such sure footing, as there is no other means but force to remove him; then is it lawfull for them to call the people to Arms, to enroll and raise forces, and to employ the utmost of their power, and use against him all advantages and stratagems of warre, as against the enemy of the Common-wealth, and the disturber of the publick peace. Briefly, the same sentence may be justly pronounced against him, as was against *Manlius Capitolinus* at Rome. *Valerius lib. Thou wast to me Manlius, when thou didst tumble down the Gates that sealed the Capitole: But since thou art now become an enemy, like one of them, thou shalt be precipitated down from the same place from whence thou formerly tumbledst those enemies.* 6. c. 3.

The Officers of the Kingdome cannot for this be rightly taxed of sedition: for in a sedition there must necessarily concur but two parts, or sides, the which preemptorily contest together, so that it is necessary that the one be in the right, and the other in the wrong: That part undoubtedly hath the right on their side, which defends the Lawes, and strives to advance the publick profit of the Kingdome. And those on the contrary are questionlesse in the wrong, which breake the Lawes, and protect those that violate justice, and oppress the Common-wealth. Those are certainly in the right way, as saith *Barclay*, which endeavour to suppress tyrannicall government, and those in the wrong which oppose

In tract de tyron. & in tract de Regim. civit.

Valerius lib. 6. c. 3.

Barclay in tract de Guelph. & Gibell. arg. 1. 3. Sect. cum igitur D. de vi & viar.

poſe lawfull authority. And that moſt ever be accounted juſt, which is intended only for the publique benefit, and that unjuſt, which aims chiefly at private commoditie. Wherefore *Thomas Aquinas* ſaith, *That a tyrannicall rule having no proper adreſſe for the publique welfare; but only to ſatiſſie a private will, with increaſe of particular profit to the ruler, cannot in any reaſonable conſtruction be accounted lawfull, and therefore the diſturbance of ſuch a government cannot be eſteemed ſediſion, much leſſe traytors; for that offence hath proper relation only to a lawfull Prince, who indeed is an inanimated or ſpeaking law; therefore ſeeing that he which employes the umoſt of his meanes and power to annihilate the lawes, and quell their vertue and vigour, can no wayes be juſtly intituled therewith: So neither likewiſe can thoſe which oppoſe and take armes againſt him, be branded with ſo notorious a crime. Alſo this offence is committed againſt the Common-wealth: but for ſo much as the Common-wealth is there only where the lawes are in force, and not where a Tyrant devours the State at his owne pleaſure and liking, he certainly is quit of that crime which ruins the Majeſty of the publique State, and thoſe queſtionleſſe are worthily protectors and preſervers of the Common-wealth, who confident in the lawfullneſſe of their authority, and ſummoned thereunto by their duty, do courageouſly reſiſt the unjuſt proceedings of the Tyrant.*

And in this their action we muſt not eſteeme them as private men and Subjects, but as the representative body of the people, yea and as the Sovereignty it ſelfe, which demands of his Miniſter an account of his adminiſtration. Neither can we in any good reaſon account the Officers of the Kingdome diſloyall, who in this manner acquit themſelves of their charge.

There is ever, and in all places, a mutuall and recipocall obligation betweene the people and the Prince, the one promiſeth to be a good and wiſe Prince, the other to obey faithfullly, provided he govern juſtly. The people therefore is obliged to the Prince under condition: the Prince to the people ſimply and purely. Therefore if the Prince faile in his promiſe, the people is exempt from obedience, the contract is made void, the right of obligation of no force. Then the King if he governe unjuſtly is perjur'd, and the people likewiſe forſworne if they obey not his lawfull commands: but that people is truly acquit from all perfidiouſneſſe, which

*Tho. Aquin.*  
ſc. ſecond. q.  
12. art. 11. in  
fine.

*L. 1. D. ad leg.*  
*Jul. n. 3. ff.*

*Cicero. parad. 4.*

which publiquely renounce the unjuſt dominion of a Tyrant, or he ſtriving unjuſtly by ſtrong hand to continue the poſſeſſion, doe conſtantly endeavour to expulſe him by force of armes.

It is therefore permitted the Officers of a Kingdome, either all, or ſome good number of them to ſuppreſſe a Tyrant; And it is not only lawfull for them to doe it, but their duty expreſſely requires it: and if they doe it not, they can by no excuſe colour their baſeneſſe. For the Electors Palatines, Peers and other Officers of State muſt not thinke they were eſtabliſhed only to make pompous paradoes and ſhowes, when they are at the Coronation of the King, habited in their robes of State, as if there were ſome Maſque or Interlude to be repreſented, or as if they were that day to act the parts of *Roland Oliver*, or *Ronald* and ſuch other perſonages on a Stage, or to counterſeit and revive the memory of the Knights of the round Table: and after the diſmiſſing of that dayes aſſembly, to ſuppoſe they have ſufficiently acquit themſelves of their duty, untill a reſeſſe of the like ſolemnity. Thoſe Solemne Rites and Ceremonies were not inſtituted for vaine ostentation, nor to paſſe as in a dumme ſhow to pleaſe the ſpectators, nor in childrens ſports as it is with *Hircos*, to create a King in jeſt, but thoſe Grandees muſt know, that as well for office and duty as for honour, they are called to the performance of thoſe Rites, and that in them the Common-wealth is committed and recommended to the King, as to her ſupream and principall tutor, and protector, and to them as Coadjutors and aſſiſtants to him. And therefore as the Tutors or Guardians (yea even thoſe that are appointed by way of honour) are choſen to have care of, & obſerve the actions and importments of him which holds the principall ranke in the tutor-ſhip, and to looke how he carrieth himſelfe in the adminiſtration of the goods of his pupil: ſo likewiſe are the former ordained to have an eye to the courtes of the King, for with an equivalent authority as the others for the pupil, ſo are they to hinder and prevent the damage and detriment of the people, the King being properly reputed as the prime Guardian, and they his Coadjutors.

In like manner as the faults of the principall tutor who manages the affaires, are juſtly imputed to the coadjoynts in the tutor-ſhip, if when they ought and might, they did not diſcover his errors, and cauſe him to be depoſed, eſpecially falling in the main points

*L. 106. D. de  
reg. jur.*

*Vlp. l. 3. D. de  
aim. et peric.  
tut. et curat.*

*L. 27. D. cod.*

*L. 14. D. de ad-  
miſſiſ. et peric.  
tut. l. 3. D. de  
ſuſcep. tut. et  
cur.*

points of his charge, to wit, in not communicating unto them the affaires of his administration, in dealing unfaithfully in his place, in doing any thing to the dishonour or detriment of his pupill, in imbeisling of his goods or estate, or if hee be an enemy to his pupill: briefly, if either in regard of the worthlesse-ness of his person, or weaknesse of his judgment, he be unable well to discharge so weighty a charge. So also are the Peeres and principall Officers of the Kingdome accountable for the government thereof, and must both prevent, and if occasion require; suppress the tyranny of the Prince, as also supply with their care and diligence his inabilityty and weaknesse.

Finally, If a Tutor omitting or neglecting to doe all that for his pupill, which a discreet Father of a family would and might conveniently performe, cannot well be excused, and the better acquitting him selfe of his charge, hath others as concealers and associates, joyned with him to oversee his actions: with much more reason may and ought the Officers of the Crown restrain the violent irruptions of that Prince, who instead of a father, becomes an enemy to his people; seeing to speake properly, they are as well accountable for his actions wherein the publique hath interests, as for their owne.

Those officers must also remember, that the King holds truly the first place in the administration of the State, but they the second; and so following according to their ranks; not that they should follow his courses, if he transgresse the lawes of equity and justice, not that if he oppress the Common-wealth, they should connive to his wickednesse. For the Common-wealth was as well committed to their care as to his, so that it is not sufficient for them to discharge their owne duty in particular, but it behoves them also to containe the Prince within the limits of reason. Briefly they have both joyntly and severally promised with solemn oaths, to advance and procure the profit of the Common-wealth: although then that he forswore himselfe, yet may not they imagine that they are quit of their promise, no more then the Bishopp, and Patriarks if they suffer an hereticall Pope to ruine the Church: yea they should esteeme themselves so much the more obliged to the observing of their oath: by how much they finde him wilfully disposed to rush on in his perfidious courses. But if there be collusion betwixt him and them, they are prevaricators, if they dissemble  
they

they may justly be called forsakers, and traytors: If they deliver not the Common-wealth from tyranny, they may be truly rancked in the number of Tyrants: as on the contrary they are protectors, tutors, and in a sort Kings, if they keepe and maintain the State safe and intire, which is also recommended to their care and custody.

Although these things are sufficiently certain of themselves; yet may they be in some sort confirmed by examples. The Kings of *Canaan* which pressed the people of *Israel* with a hard, both corporall and spirituall servitude (prohibiting them all meetings and use of armes) were certainly Tyrants by practice, although they had some pretext of title. For, *Eglon* & *Jabin* had peaceably reigned almost the space of twenty yeares, God stirred up extraordinarily *Ehud*, which by a politique stratagem killed *Eglon*, and *Deborah* which overthrew the Armie of *Jabin*, and by this service delivered the people from the servitude of Tyrants, not that it was unlawfull for the ordinary Magistrates, the Princes of the Tribes, and such other Officers to have performed it, for *Deborah* doth reprove the sluggishnesse of some, and flatly detests the disloyalty of others for that they failed to performe their duty herein. But it pleased God, taking commiseration of the distresse of his people, in this manner to supply the defects of the ordinary Magistrates.

*Rehoboam* the sonne of *Solomon* refused to disburthen the people of some unnecessary imposts and burthens: and being petitioned by the people in the generall Assembly of the States; he grew insolent, and relying on the counsell of his Minions, arrogantly threatens to lay heavier burthens on them hereafter. No man can doubt, but that according to the tenour of the contra& first passed betweene the King and the people, the prime and principall Officers of the Kingdome had authority to repress such insolence. They were only blameable in this, that they did that by faction and division, which should more properly have beene done in the generall Assembly of the States: in like manner in that they transferred the Scepter from *Juda* (which was by God onely confin'd to that Tribe) into another lineage: and also (as it chanced in other affaires) for that they did ill and disorderly manage a just and lawfull cause. Prophane histories are full of such examples in other Kingdomes.



*Brunus* Generall of the Souldiers, and *Lucretius* Governour of the Citee of *Rome*, assemble the people against *Tarquinius Superbus*, and by their authority thrust him from the royall Throne; Nay, which is more, his goods are confiscated: whereby it appears that if *Tarquinius* had bene apprehended, undoubtedly hee should have bene according to the publique lawes corporally punished.

The true causes why *Tarquinius* was deposed, were because he altered the custome whereby the King was obliged to advise with the *Senae* on all weighty affaires, that he made Warre and Peace according to his owne fancie, that he treated confederacies without demanding counsell or consent from the people or Senate: that he violated the Lawes whereof he was made Guardian: briefly that he made no reckoning to observe the contracts agreed between the former Kings, and the Nobility and people of *Rome*. For the *Roman* Emperours, I am sure you remember the sentence pronounced by the Senate against *Nero*, wherein he was judged enemie to the Common-wealth, and his body condemned to be ignominiously cast on the dung-hill: and that other pronounced against *Vitellius*, which adjudge him to be shamefully dismembered, and in that miserable estate trayled through the Citee, and at last put to death: another against *Masiminus* who was dispoild of the Empire, and *Masimus* and *Albinus* established in his place by the Senate. There might also be added many others drawne from unquestionable Historians.

The Emperour *Trajan* held not himselfe exempt from lawes, neither desired he to be spared if he became a Tyrant: for in delivering the Sword unto the great Provost of the Empire, he sayes unto him; *If I command as I should, use this sword for mee: but if I doe otherwise, unsheath it against me.* In like manner the French by the authority of the States, and solicited thereunto by the Officers of the Kingdome, deposed *Childeric* the first, *Sigisbert*, *Theodoricke*, and *Childericke* the third, for their tyrannies, and chose others of another Family to sit on the Royall Throne. Yea they deposed some because of their idleness and want of judgment, who exposed the State in prey to Panders, Curtesians, Flatterers, and such other unworthy murtherers of the Court, who governed all things at their pleasure: taking from such rascalls *Phaeton* the bridle of government, left the whole body of the State and people

people should be consumed through their unadvised folly.

Amongst others, *Theodores* was degraded because of *Ebroinus Dagobert* for *Plectude* and *Thibaud* his Pander, with some others: the Estates esteeming the command of an effeminate Prince as insupportable as that of a woman, and as unwillingly supporting the yoke of tyrannous Ministers managing affaires in the name of a loose and unworthy Prince, as the burden of a tyrant alone. To be briefe, no more suffering themselves to be governed by one possessed by a Devill, than they would by the Devill himselfe. It is not very long since the Estates compelled *Lewis* the eleventh (a Prince as subtle, and it may be as wilfull as any) to receive thirde six Overseers, by whose advise he was bound to governe the affaires of State. The descendants from *Charlmaine* substituted in the place of the *Merovingians* for the government of the kingdome, or those of *Capet*, supplanting the *Charlemsins* by order of the Estates, and reigning at this day have no other nor better right to the Crowne, than what wee have formerly described; and it hath ever been according to Law permitted the whole body of the people represented by the counsell of the Kingdome, which are commonly called the Assembly of the States, to depose and establish Princes, according to the necessities of the Common-wealth. According to the same rule wee reade that *Adolph* was removed from the Empire of *Germany* Anno 1296. because for covetousnesse without any just occasion, he invaded the Kingdome of *France*, in favour of the *English*, and *Wenceslaus* was also deposed in the year of our Lord 1400. Yet were not these Princes exceeding bad ones, but of the number of those which are accounted lesse ill. *Elizabeth* the wife of *Edward* the second King of *England*, assembled the Parliament against her husband, who was there deposed, both because he tyrannized in generall over his Subjects, as also for that he cut off the heads of many noble men, without any just or legall proceeding. It is not long since *Christiern* lost the Crowne of *Denmarke*, *Henry* that of *Sweden*, *Mary Steward* that of *Scotland*, for the same, or neere resembling occasions: and the most worthy Histories relate divers alterations and changes which have hapned in like manner, in the Kingdomes of *Polonia*, *Hungarie*, *Spaine*, *Portugal*, *Bohemia*, and others.

But what shall we say of the Pope himselfe? It is generally held that the Cardinalls because they doe elect him, or if they sayle in

Anno 1296.

1400.

Froissard. li. 1.  
cap. 1.Rende the  
manner of  
the deposing  
of Richard  
the second.Ant: de But.  
consil quod pos-  
situm est inter

*consil. Paul.  
de Castro, vel  
antiq. nu. 412.  
incip. vifo  
puncto.*

*Mar. Laudens.  
in tract. de  
Card. in 2. q.  
35. Philip.  
Dei in quodam  
consilio  
cujus verba  
suerunt.*

*Andr. Barb.  
in d. consil. 1.  
Ho. 1. cap. 6.  
Bald. in c. olim.  
est. paul. de  
restr. in De-  
cretal.  
Bonif. 8. de  
major. &  
obed.*

their dutie, the Patriarkes which are next in ranke to them, may upon certaine occasions maugre the Pope, call a Councell, yea, and in it judge him: As when by some notorious offence he scandalizeth the universall Church: if he be incorrigible, if reformation be as necessary in the head as the members, if contrary to his oath he refuse to call a generall Councell. And we reade for certaine that divers Popes have been deposed by general Councells. But if they obstinately abuse their authorities, there must (saith *Baldus*) first be used verball admonitions; secondly, tierball medicaments or remedies; thirdly, stones or compulsion; for where vertue and faire meanes, have not power to perswade, there force and terror must be put in ure to compell. Now if according to the opinions of most of the learned, by decrees of Councels, and by custome in like occasions, it plainly appears that the Councell may depose the Pope, who notwithstanding vaunts himselfe to be the King of Kings, and as much in dignitie above the Emperour, as the Sunne is above the Moone, assuming to himselfe power to depose Kings and Emperours when he pleaseth. Who will make any doubt or question, that the generall Assembly of the Estates of any kingdom, who are the representative body thereof, may not onely degrade and dethronize a tyrant: but also even disauthorize and depose a King, whose weaknesse or folly is hurtfull or pernicious to the State.

*Simile.*

But let us suppose that in this our Ship of State, the Pilot is drunke, the most of his associates are asleepe, or after large and unreasonable tipling together, they regard their imminent danger in approaching a rocke with idle and negligent jollitie; the Ship in the meane season in stead of following her right course, that might serve for the best advantage of the owners profit, is ready rather to split her selfe. What should then a Masters-mate or some other under-Officer doe, who is vigilant and carefull to performe his dutie? Shall it be thought sufficient for him to pinch or poule them which are asleepe? without daring in the meane time to put his helping hand to preserve the Vessell, which runnes on a course to destruction, least he should be thought to intermeddle with that which he hath no authority nor warrant to doe? What mad discretion, may rather notorious impiecie were this? Seeing then that Tyranny, as *Plato* saith, is a drunken frensie or frantick drunkennesse, if the Prince endeavour to ruine the Common-wealth, and the

*Plato lib. 8. &  
9. de repub.*

the principall Officers concurre with him in his bad purposes, or at the least are luld in a dull and drowsie dreame of securitie, and the people (being indeed the true and absolute owner and Lord of the State) be through the pernicious negligence and fraudulent connivency of those Officers brought to the very brim of danger and destruction, and that there be notwithstanding amongst those unworthy Ministers of State, some one that doth studiously observe the deceitfull and dangerous encroachments of tyranny, and from his soule detests it. What opposition doe we suppose best befits such a one to make against it? Shall he consent himselfe to admonish his associates of their dutie, who to their utmost abilitie endeavour the contrary? Besides, that such an advertisement is commonly accompanied with too much danger, and the condition of the times considered, the very solliciting of reformation will be held as a capital crime: so that in so doing he may be not unfitly resembled to one that being in the midst of a desert, environed with theeves, should neglect all meanes of defence, and after he had cast away his Armes, in an eloquent and learned discourse commend justice, and extoll the worth and dignitie of the Lawes. This would be truly according to the Proverbe, *To run mad with reason*. What then? Shall he be dull and deafe to the groanes and cries of the people? Shall he stand still and be silent when he sees the theeves enter? Shall he onely hold his hands in his bosome, and with a demure countenance, idly bewaile the miserable condition of the times? If the Lawes worthily sicke a Souldier, which for feare of the enemies counterfeit sickness, because in so doing he expresth both dilloyalty and treachery. What punishment can we invent sufficient for him, who either maliciously or basely betrayes those whose protection and defence he hath absolutely undertaken and sworne? Nay rather then let such a one cheerfully call one, and commaund the Mariners to the performance of their dutie: let him carefully and constantly take order that the Common-wealth be not indamaged, and if need so require, even in despite of the King, preserve the Kingdom, without which the kingly title were idle and frivolous, and if by no other meanes it can be effected, let him take the King and binde him hand and foote, that so he may be more conveniently cured of his frensie and madnesse. For as we have already said, all the administration of the Kingdom, is not by the people absolutely resigned into the

*Simile.*

*L. 3. & L.  
Omne deli-  
ctum. 9. ult.  
D. de re mi-  
lit.*

*c. Nubus in  
Carthagin.  
Concil. Dollo-  
res pontificii.*

hands of the King; as neither the Bishopricke, nor care of the universall Church, is totally committed to the Pope: but also to the care and custody of all the principall Officers of the Kingdome. Now for the preserving of peace and concord amongst those which governe, and for the preventing of jealousies, factions, and distrusts amongst men of equall ranke and dignitie, the King was created as prime and principall Superintendente in the government of the Common-wealth. The King swears that his most speciall care shall be for the welfare of the Kingdome; and the Officers of the Crowne take all the same oath. If then the King, or divers of them falsifying their faith, ruine the Common-wealth, or abandon her in her greatest necessitie, must the rest also fashion themselves to their base courses, and quit all care of the States safetie; as if the bad example of their companions, absolved them from their oath of fidelitie? Nay, rather on the contrary, in seeing them neglect their promise, they shall best advantage the Common-wealth in carefully observing theirs: chiefly because for this reason they were instituted, as in the steads of *Ephori*, or publick Controllers, and for that every thing gaines the better estimation of just and right in that it is mainly and principally addressed to that end for which it was first ordained.

Furthermore, if divers have joyntly vowed one and the same thing, is the obligation of the one annihilated by the perjurie of the other? If many become bound for one and the same summe, can the banquerouting of one of the obligees quit the rest of their ingagement? If divers tutors adminiter ill the goods of their pupill, and that there be one amongst them that makes conscience of his actions, can the bad dealing of his companions acquit him? Nay rather on the contrary, he cannot free himselfe from the infamie of perjurie, if to the utmost of his power he doe not truly discharge his trust, and perform his promise: neither can the others desalliancy be excused, in the bad managing of the tutorship, if they likewise accuse nor the rest that were joynd with them in the administration, for it is not onely the principall tutor that may call to an account those which are suspected to have unjustly or indiscreetly ordered the affaires of their pupill, but even those which were formerly removed, may also upon just occasion discharge and remove the delinquents therein. Therefore those which are obliged to serve a whole Empire or Kingdome, as the

Constable,

Constable, Marshals, Peeres, and others, or those which have particular obligations to some Provinces, or Cities, which make a part or portion of the Kingdome, as Dukes, Marquisses, Earles, Sheriffes, Mayors, and the rest, are bound by the dutie of their place, to succour the Common-wealth, and to free it from the burden of Tyrants, according to the ranke and place which they hold of the people next after the King. The first ought to deliver the whole Kingdome from tyrannous oppression: the other as tutors, that part of the Kingdome whose protection they have undertaken: the dutie of the former is to suppress the Tyrant: that of the latter, to drive him from their confines. Wherefore *Matthias* being a principall man in the State, when some basely connived, others perniciously consorted with *Antiochus* the tyrannous oppressor of the Jewish Kingdome, he courageously opposing the manifest oppression, both of Church and State, discourageth the people to the taking of Armes, with these words; *Let us restore the decayed estate of our people, and let us fight for our people, and for the Sanctuary.* Whereby it plainly appears, that not for Religion onely; but even for our Countrey, and our possessions, wee may fight, and take armes against a tyrant, as this *Antiochus* was. For the *Macchabites* are not by any questioned, or reprehended for conquering the Kingdome, and expelling the tyrant, but in that they attributed to themselves the royall dignitie, which onely belonged by Gods speciall appointment to the tribe of *Juda*.

Humane Histories are frequently stored with examples of this kinde. *Arbaces* Governour of the *Medes* killed effeminate *Sardanapalus*, spinning amongst women, and sparingly distributing all the treasures of the Kingdome amongst those his loose companions. *Vindex* and *Galba* quit the partie of *Nero*, yea though the Senate connived, and in a fort supported his tyrannie, and drew with them *Gallia*, and *Spaine*, being the Provinces whereof they were Governours.

But amongst all, the Decree of the Senate of *Sparta* is most notable, and ought to passe as an undeniable Maxime amongst all Nations. The *Spartans* being Lords of the City *Bizantium*, sent *Olearchus* thither for Governour and Commander for the warres; who took Corn from the Citizens, and distributed it to his Souldiers. In the mean time the families of the Citizens died for hun-

1 Machab. 3.  
43.

*Justin. lib. 1.  
Diodor. lib. 2.  
cap. 37.*

*L. 3. D. de  
admissi. &  
peric. tutor.  
& cur. lib. 3.  
D. de suspic.  
tut. & cura.*

ger 1:

ger: *Anaxilans*, a principall man of the Citie, disdaind that tyrannous usage, entred into treaty with *Alcibiades* to deliver up the Town, who shortly after was received into it. *Anaxilans* being accused at *Sparta* for the delivery of *Bizantium*, pleaded his cause himselfe, and was there acquit by the Judges: for (said they) warres are to be made with enemies, and not with Nature. Nothing being more repugnant to Nature, than that those which are bound to defend a City, should be more cruell to the inhabitants, than their enemies that besiege them.

This was the opinion of the *Lacedemonians*, certainly just Rulers, Neither can he be accounted a just King, which approves not this sentence of abolution: for those which desire to govern according to the due proportion of equity and reason, take into consideration as well what the Law inflicteth on tyrants, as also what are the proper rights and bounds both of the Patrician and Plebeian orders. But we must yet proceed a little further: There is not so mean a Mariner, who must be ready to prevent the ship-wrack of the vessell, when either the negligence or wilfulness of the Pilot casts it into danger. Every Magistrate is bound to relieve, and as much as in him lies, to redresse the miseries of the Common-wealth, if he shall see the Prince, or the principall Officers of State his associates, by their weaknesse or wickednesse, to hazard the ruine thereof. Briefly, he must either free the whole kingdome, or at least that portion especially recommended to his care, from their imminent and incroaching tyranny. But hath this duty proper relation to every one: Shall it be permitted to *Hendonus Sabinus*, to *Ennus Suramus*, or to the Fencer *Spartanus*; or to be brishe, to a meere private person, to present the bonnet to slaves, put Armes into the hands of subjects, or to joyn battell with the prince, although he oppress the people with tyranny? No certainly: The Common-wealth was not given in charge to particular persons considered on by one; but on the contrary, particulars even as Papists, are recommended to the care of the principall Officers and Magistrates: and therefore they are not bound to defend the Common-wealth, which cannot defend themselves. God nor the people have not put the sword into the hands of particular persons: Therefore if without commandment they draw the sword, they are seditious, although the cause seem never so just.

L. 2. de Seditionibus.

Further-

Furthermore, the prince is not established by private and particular persons, but by all in generall considered in one intire body; whereupon it followeth, that they are bound to attend the commandment of all, to wit, of those which are the representative body of a kingdom, or of a Province, or of a Citie, or at the least of some one of them, before they undertake any thing against the prince. For as a Papist cannot bring an action, but being a vovd in the name of his Tutor, although the pupil be indeed the true proprietor of the estate, and the tutor onely owner with reference to the charge committed unto him: so likewise the people may not enterprise actions of such nature, but by the command of those, into whose hands they have resigned their power and authority, whether they be ordinary Magistrates, or extraordinary, created in the Assembly of the Estates; whom, if I may so say, for that purpose, they have girded with their sword, and invested with authority, both to govern and defend them, established in the same kind as the Pretor at *Rome*, who determined all differences between masters and their servants, to the end that if any controversie happened between the King and the subjects, they should be Judges and preservers of the right, lest the subjects should assume power to themselves to be judges in their own causes. And therefore if they were oppressed with tributes, and unreasonable imposts, if any thing were attempted contrary to covenant and oath, and no Magistrate opposed those unjust proceedings, they must rest quiet, and suppose that many times the best Physicians both to prevent and cure some grievous disease, do appoint both letting blood, evacuation of humors, & lancing of the flesh; and that the affaires of this world are of that nature, that with much difficulty one evil cannot be remedied without the adventuring if not the suffering of another, nor any good be achieved, without great pains. They have the example of the people of *Israel*, who during the reign of *Solomon*, refused not to pay those excessive taxes imposed on them, both for the building of the Temple, and fortifying of the Kingdoms, because by a generall consent they were granted for the promulgation of the glory of God, and for an ornament and defence of the publick State.

L. 8. l. 9. D. de aucto. & conf. tit. & cur.

Sueton. lib. 1. de beneficiis.

They have also the example of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, who though he were King of Kings, notwithstanding because

because he converted in this world in another quality, 'to wit, o a private and particular man, paid willingly tribute. If the Magistrates themselves manifestly favour the tyranny, or at the least doe not formally oppose it; let private men remember the saying of Job, *That for the finnes of the people God permits hypocrites to reigne*, whom it is impossible either to convert or subvert, if men repent not of their wayes, to walk in obedience to Gods commandments; so that there is no other weapons to be used, but bended knees and humble hearts. Briefly, let them bear with bad princes, and pray for better, perswading themselves, that an outrageous tyranny is to be supported as patiently, as some exceeding damage done by the violence of tempests, or some excessive over-flowing waters, or some such naturall accidents unto the fruits of the earth, if they like not better to change their habitations, by retiring themselves into some other countries. So David fled into the mountaines, and attempted nothing against the Tyrant *Saul*, because the people had not declared him any publick Magistrate of the Kingdome.

Jesus Christ, whose kingdome was not of this world, fled into Egypt, and so freed himselfe from the pawes of the Tyrant. Saint Paul teaching of the duty of particular Christian men, and not of Magistrates, teacheth that *Nero* must be obeyed. But if all the principall Officers of State, or divers of them, or but one, endeavour to suppress a manifest tyranny, or if a Magistrate seek to free that province, or portion of the kingdome from oppression, which is committed to his care and custody, provided under colour of freedome he bring not in a new tyranny, then must all men with joynt courage and alacrity, run to Armes, and take part with him or them, and assist with body and goods, as if God himselfe from heaven had proclaimed warres, and meant to joynt battell against tyrants, and by all wayes and means endeavour to deliver their Counrey and Common-wealth from their tyrannous oppression. For as God doth oftentimes chastise a people by the cruelty of tyrants: so also doth he many times punish tyrants by the hands of the people. It being a most true saying, verified in all ages: *For the iniquities, violence, and wickednes of Princes, Kingdomes are translated from one Nation to another: but tyranny was never of any durable continuance.*

The *Centurians* and men at armes did freely and courageously execute the commandments of the High Priest *Jehoiada*, in suppressing the tyranny of *Atbalia*. In like manner all the faithfull and generous *Israelites* tooke part and joynt with the *Machabites*, as well to re-establish the true service of God, as also to free and deliver the State from the wicked and unjust oppression of *Antiochus*, and God blessed with happy success their just and commendable enterprise. What then? cannot God when he pleaseth stirre up particular and private persons to ruine a mighty and powerfull tyranny? Hee that gives power and ability to some even out of the dust without any title or colourable pretext of lawfull authority to rise to the height of rule and dominion, and in it tyrannize and afflicte the people for their transgressions? cannot he also even from the meanest multitude raise a liberator? Hee which enthral'd and subjected the people of *Israel* to *Jabin*, and to *Eglon*, did hee not deliver & enfranchise them by the hand of *Ehud*, *Barac* and *Deborah*, whilst the Magistrates & Officers were dead in a dul & negligent extasie of security? What then shall hinder, you may say the same God who in these dayes sends us Tyrants to correct us, that he may not also extraordinarily send correctors of tyrants to deliver us? What if *Abah* cut off good men, if *Jezabel* stubborn false witnesses against *Naboth*, may not a *Jehu* be raised to exterminate the whole line of *Abah*, to revenge the death of *Naboth*, and so cast the body of *Jezabel* to be torne and devoured of dogs? Certainly as I have formerly answered, the Almighty is ever mindfull of his justice, and maintains it as inviolably as his mercy.

But for as much as in these latter times, those miraculous testimonies by which God was wont to confirme the extraordinary vocation of those famous Worthies, are now wanting for the most part: let the people be advis'd, that in seeking to cross the Sea dry foote, they take not some *Impostor* for their guide, that may lead them head-long to destruction (as we may read happened to the *Jews*:) and that in seeking freedome from tyranny, he that was the principall instrument to dis-inthrall them, became not himselfe a more insupportable Tyrant than the former: briefly, left endeavouring to advantage the Common-wealth, they introduce not a common misery upon all the undertakers, participating therein with divers States of *Italy*, who seeking to suppress the present evill, added an accession of greater, and more intollerable servitude.

Finally, that we may come to some period of this third question; Princes are chosen by God, and established by the people: As all particulars considered one by one are inferior to the Prince: so the whole body of the people and Officers of State which represent that body, are the Princes superiours. In the receiving and inauguration of a Prince, there are Covenants and contracts passed between him and the people, which are tacite and expressed, naturall or civill: to wit, to obey him faithfully whilst he commands justly, that he serving the Common-wealth, all men shall serve him, that whilst he governs according to law, all shall be submitted to his government, &c. The Officers of the Kingdome are the Guardians and Protectors of these Covenants and contracts. He that maliciously or wilfully violates these conditions, is questionlesse a Tyrant by practice. And therefore the Officers of State may judge him according to the lawes: and if he support his tyranny by strong hands, their duty bindes them, when by no other means it can be effected, by force of armes to suppress him.

Of these Officers there be two kindes, those which have generally undertaken the protection of the Kingdome: as the Constable, Marshalls, Peers, Palatines, and the rest, every one of which, although all the rest doe either connive or consort with the tyranny, are bound to oppose and repress the Tyrant: and those which have undertaken the government of any Province, Citie, or part of the Kingdome, as Dukes, Marquesses, Earles, Consuls, Mayors, Sheriffes, &c. they may according to right expell and drive tyranny and Tyrants from their Cities, Confines, and governments.

But particular and private persons may not unsheath the sword against Tyrants by practise, because they were not established by particulars, but by the whole body of the people. But for Tyrants which without title intrude themselves for so much as there is no contract or agreement between them and the people, it is indifferently permitted all to oppose and depose them; and in this rank of Tyrants may those be rang'd, who, abusing the weaknesse and sloath of a lawfull Prince, tyrannously insult over his Subjects. Thus much for this, to which for a more full resolution may be added that which hath bene formerly discoursed in the second question.

### The fourth question.

*whether neighbour Princes may, or are bound by law to aide the Subjects of other Princes, persecuted for true Religion, or oppressed by manifest tyranny.*

**W**E have yet one other question to treat of, in the discussing whereof there is more use of an equitable judgement than of a nimble apprehension: and if charity were but in any reasonable proportion prevalent amongst the men of this age, the disputation thereof were altogether frivolous: but seeing nothing in these dayes is more rare nor lesse esteemed than charity; we will speak somewhat of this our question. We have already sufficiently proved that all Tyrants, whether those that seeke to captivate the minds and soules of the people with an erroneous and superstitious opinion in matter of Religion, or those that would enthrall their bodies and estates with miserable servitude and excessive impositions, may justly by the people be both suppress and expulst. But for so much as Tyrants are for the most part so cunning, and Subjects seldome so cautelous, that the disease is hardly known, or at the least not carefully observed before the remedy prove almost desperate, nor thinke of their owne defence before they are brought to those straits; that they are unable to defend themselves, but compeld to implore the assistance of others: Our demand therefore is, if Christian Princes lawfully may and ought to succour those Subjects which are afflicted for true Religion, or oppress by unjust servitude, and whose sufferings are either for the Kingdome of Christ, or for the liberty of their own state? There are many, which hoping to advance their owne ends, and encroach on others rights, that will readily embrace the part of the afflicted, and proclaime the lawfulness of it: but the hope of gaine is the certaine and only aime of their purposes: And in this manner the *Romans*, *Alexander the great*, and divers others, pretending to suppress Tyrants, have oftentimes enlarged their own limits. It is not long since, we saw King *Henry the Second* make Wars on the Emperour *Charles the Fifth*, under colour of defending and delivering the Proteftant Princes. As also *Henry the*

Eighth King of England was in like manner ready to assist the Germans, if the Emperour Charles should molest them. But if there be some appearance of danger, and little expectation of profit, then it is that most Princes doe vehemently dispute the lawfulnessse of the action. And as the former cover their ambition and avarice with the vail of charity and piety: so on the contrary doe the other call their feare and cowardly baseness integrity and justice, although that piety (which is ever carefull of anothers good) love no part in the counsels of the first: nor justice (which affectionately desires the easing of a neighbours griefe) in cooling the charitable intendments of the later. Therefore without leaning either to the one side or the other, let us follow those rules which piety and justice trace us out in matter of Religion.

First, All accord in this, *That there is one only Church, whereof Jesus Christ is the head*, the members whereof are so united and conjoyn'd together, that if the least of them be offended or wronged, they all participate both in the harme and sorrow, as throughout holy Scripture plainly appeares. Wherefore the Church is compared to a body: Now it oftentimes happens that the body is not only overthrowen by a wound in the arme, or thigh, but even also much endangered, yea and sometimes kill'd by a small hurt in the little finger. Vainly therefore doth any man vaunt that this body is recommended to his care and custody, if he suffer that to be dismembred and puld in pieces which he might have preserved whole and intire. The Church is compared to an edifice: on which side soever the building is undermin'd, it many times chances that the whole tumbles downe, and on what raster or piece of timber soever the flame takes hold, it indangers the whole house of burning, he must needs be therefore worthy of scorne who should deferre to quench the fire which had caught his house top, because he dwells most in the Cellar: would not all hold him for a mad man which should neglect by countermining to frustrate a myne, because it was intended to overthrow that wall there, and not this here.

Againe, the Church is resembled to a ship, which as it sailes together, so doth it sinke together: insomuch that in a tempest, those which be in the fore-cast, or in the keele, are no more secure than those which remaine at the stern or on the decke: so that the proverb commonly saies, when men runne the like hazard in matter of danger, that they venture both in one bottome. This being

being granted, questionlesse whosoever hath not a fellow-feeling in commiserating the trouble, danger & distresse of the Church, is no member of that bodie, nor domestick in the family of Jesus Christ, nor hath any place in the Ark of the covenant of grace. He weh hath any sense of Religion in his heart ought no more to doubt whether he be oblig'd to aid the afflicted members of the Church, than he would be assisting to himselfe in the like distresse: for the union of the Church unites us all into one bodie, and therefore every one in his calling must be ready to assist the needy, and so much the more willingly, by how much the Almighty hath bestowed a greater portion of his blessings on us: which were not conferr'd, that we should be made possessors of them, but that we should be dispensers thereof according to the necessity of his Saints.

As this Church is one, so is shee recommended, and given in charge to all Christian Princes in generall, and to every one of them in particular: For so much as it was dangerous to leave the care to one alone, and the unity of it would not by any means permit, that she should be divided into pieces, and every portion assign'd unto one particular: God hath committed it all intire to particulars, and all the parts of it to all in generall, not only to preserve and defend it, but also to amplifye and encrease it as much as might be. Insomuch that if a Prince which hath undertaken the care of a portion of the Church, as that of *Germany* and *England*, and notwithstanding neglect and forsake another part that is oppressed, and which he might succour, he doubtlesse abandons the Church, Christ having but one only Spouse, which the Prince is so bound to preserve and defend that he be not violated or corrupted in any part if it be possible. And in the same manner as every private person is bound by his humble and ardent prayers to God to desire the restoring of the Church: So likewise are the Magistrates tied diligently to procure the same with the utmost of their power and means which God hath put into their hands. For the Church of *Ephesus* is no other than that of *Calossis*: but these two are portions of the universal Church, which is the kingdome of Christ, the encrease and prosperity whereof ought to be the continuall subject of all private mens prayers and desires; but it is the duty of all Kings, Princes, and Magistrates, not only to amplifye and extend the limits and bounds of the Church in all places, but only to preserve and defend it against all men whatsoever. Where-

fore there was but one Temple in *Judea* built by *Solomon*, which represented the unitie of the Church. And therefore ridiculous and worthy of punishment were that Church-warden which had care onely of some small part of the Church, and suffered all the rest to be spoiled with raine and weather. In like manner, all Christian Kings when they receive the sword on the day of their Coronation, solemnly sweare to maintaine the Catholick or universall Church, and the ceremony then used doth fully expresse it, for holding the sword in their hands, they turne to the East, West, North, and South, and brandish it, to the end that it may be knowne that no part of the world is excepted. As by this ceremony they assume the protection of the Church, it must be questionlesse understood of the true Church; and not of the false: therefore ought they to employ the utmost of their abilitie to reforme and wholly to restore that which they hold to be the pure and truly Christian Church, to wit, ordered and governed according to the direction of the Word of God. That this was the practise of godly Princes, we have their examples to instruct us. In the time of *Ezechias* King of *Juda*, the Kingdome of *Israel* had been a long time before in subjection to the *Assyrians*, to wit, ever since the King *Osea* his time; And therefore if the Church of *Juda* onely, and not the whole universall Church had been committed to the custodie of *Ezechias*: and if in the preservation of the Church the same course were to be held, as in the dividing of lands, and imposing of tributes, then questionlesse *Ezechias* would have contained himselfe within his own limits, especially then when the exorbitant power of the *Assyrians* lorded it every where. Now wee reade that he sent expresse Messengers throughout *Israel*, to wit, to the subjects of the King of *Assyria*, to invite them to come to *Jerusalem* to celebrate the paschall feast: yea and he ayded the faithfull *Israelites* of the tribes of *Ephraim* and *Manasses*, and others the subjects of the *Assyrians*, to ruine the high places which were in their quarters.

Wee reade also that the good King *Josias* expeld Idolatry, noe onely out of his own Kingdome, but also even out of the Kingdome of *Israel*, which was then wholly in subjection to the King of *Assyria*. And no marvell, for where the glory of God, and the kingdome of Christ are in question, there no bounds or limits can confine the zeale and fervent affection of pious and godly Princes. Though the opposition be great, and the power of the opposers greater, yet the

2 Chron. 30.

2 Kings 22.  
2 Chron. 34.  
& 35.

the more they feare God, the lesse they will feare men. These generous examples of divers godly Princes have since been imitated by sundry Christian Kings, by whose meanes the Church (which was heretofore restrained within the narrow limits of *Palestine*) hath been since dilated throughout the universall world. *Constantine* and *Licinius* governed the Empire together, the one in the Orient, the other in the Occident, they were associates of equal power and authority. And amongst equals, as the Proverb is, there is no command. Notwithstanding, because *Licinius* doth every where banish, torment, and put to death the Christians, and amongst them divers of the nobilitie, and that for and under pretence of Religion. *Constantine* makes warre against him, and by force compels him to give free libertie of Religion to the Christians, and because he broke his faith and relapsed into his former cruelty, he caused him to be apprehended and put to death in the Cite of *Theffalonica*. This Emperours pietie was with so great an applause celebrated by the Divines of those times, that they suppose that saying in the Prophet *Isaiah*, to be meant by him; *Thou Kings shall be Pastors and nursing Fathers of the Church*. After his death the Roman Empire was divided equally between his sonnes, without advantaging the one more than the other. *Constantine* favoured the orthodox Christians, *Constantinus* being the elder, leaned to the *Arrianis*, and for that cause banished the learned *Athanasius* from *Alexandria*; the greatest professed adversary of the *Arrians*. Certainly, if any consideration in matter of confines be absolutely requisite, it must needs be amongst brethren. And notwithstanding *Constantine* threatens to warre on his brother, if he restore not *Athanasius*, and had without doubt performed it, if the other had long deferred the accomplishment of his desire. And if he proceeded so farre for the restitution of one Bishop: had it not been much more likely and reasonable, for him to have assisted a good part of the people, if they implored his ayde against the tyranny of those that refused them the exercise of their Religion, under the authority of their Magistrates and Governours? So at the perswasion of *Atticus* the Bishop, *Theodisius* made warre on *Cosmos* King of *Persia* to deliver the Christians of his Kingdome from persecution, although they were but particular and private persons. Which certainly those most just Princes, who instituted to many worthy Lawes, and had so great and speciall care of justice, would not have done, if by that

Par in partem  
non habet ins-  
perium.

Sergo. lib. 7.  
cap. 18.

fact:



fact they had supposed any thing were usurpt on another mans right, or the Law of Nations violated. But to what end were so many expeditions undertaken by Christian Princes into the holy Land against the *Saracens*? Wherefore were demanded and raised so many of those Saladine tenths? To what purpose were so many confederacies made, and croyfadoes proclaimed against the *Turkes*, if it were not lawfull for Christian Princes, yea those furthest remote, to deliver the Church of God from the oppression of tyrants, and to free captive Christians from under the yoke of bondage? What were the motives that led them to those warres? What were the reasons that urged them to undergoe those dangers? But onely in regard of the Churches union, Christ summons every man from all parts with a unanimous consent, to undertake the defence thereof. For all men are bound to repulse common danger: with a joynt and common opposition: all which have a naturall consent and relation with this wee now treat of. If this were lawfull for them against *Mahomet*, and not onely lawfull, but that the backward and negligent were ever made liable to all infamous contempt, and the forward and readie undertakers alwayes recompenced with all honourable respect and reward, according to the merit of their vertues: wherefore not now against the enemy of Christ & his Saints? If it be a lawfull warre to fight against the *Greekes* (that I may use that phrase) when they assaile our *Troy*: wherefore is it unlawfull to pursue and prevent that incendiary *Sinon*? Finally, if it have been esteemed an heroicall act to deliver Christians from corporall servitude, (for the *Turkes* enforce none in point of Religion) is it not a thing yet much more noble to infranchise and set at libertie soules imprisoned in the mists of error?

These examples of so many religious Princes, might well have the directive power of Law. But let us heare what God himselfe pronounces in many places of his Word by the mouth of his Prophets, against those which advance not the building up of his Church, or which make no reckoning of her afflictions. The *Gadites*, the *Reubenites*, and halfe tribe of *Manasses*, desire of *Moses* that he would allot them their portion on the other side of *Jordan*. *Moses* grants their request, but with this proviso and condition: That they should not onely assist their other brechren the *Israelites* to conquer the land of *Canaan*, but also that they should march the first, and serve as vauntgard to the rest, because they had their por-

Numb. 32.  
Iosh. 4. 12.  
Deut. 3. 20.

tions first set them forth, and if they faile to performe this duty, he with an anathema, destines them to destruction, and compares them to those which were adjudged rebels at *Cadishbarnes*. And what? sayes he, your brethren shall fight, and you in the meane season rest quiet at home? Nay on the contrary, you also shall passe *Jordan*, and not returne into their houses, before first the Lord have driven his enemies out from before his face, and granted place to your brethren as well as you, then shall you be innocent before the Lord and his people *Israel*. He shews by this that those which God first blesteth with so great a benefit, if they help not their brethren, if they make not themselves sharers in their labours, companions in their travells, and leaders in their dangers, they must questionlesse expect a heavie punishment to fall upon them.

Likewise when under the conduct of *Deborah*, the *Nephtalites* and *Zabulonites* took armes against the tyrant *Jabin*: and that in the meane season the *Reubenites* which should have been first in the field took their ease and played on their pipes, whilest their flockes and herds fed at libertie: the *Gadites* held themselves secured with the rampire of the river; the *Danites* gloried in their command at Sea; And *Ashur*, to be brieve, was confident in the difficult accessse of their mountaines: The Spirit of the Lord speaking by the Prophetesse, doth in expresse termes condemne them all; *Curse yee Moab* (said the Angel of the Lord) *curse yee bitterly the inhabitants thereof: because they came not to the helpe of the Lord, to the helpe of the Lord against the mightie. But blessed above women shall be the wife of Heber the Kenite be*, who though shee might have alledged the alliance which her husband had with the *Canaanites*, did notwithstanding kill *Sisera* the Generall of the enemies armie. And therefore *Uriah* spake religiously, and like a true Patriarke, when he said, *The Arke of the Lords, and Israel, and Judah abide in tents, and my Lord Joab, and the servants of my Lord are encamped in the open fields; Shall I then goe into mine house, to eate and to drinke, and to lie with my wife? as thou livest, and as thy soule liveth, I will not doe this thing.* But on the contrary, impious and wicked were the Princes of *Israel*, who supposing themselves secured by the craggy mountaines of *Samaris*, and strong fortifications of *Sion*, tooke libertie to loose themselves in luxurious feasts, loose delights, drinking delicious wines, and sleeping in perfum'd beds of Ivorie, despising in the meane season poore *Joseph*, to wit, the Lords flocke tormented and miserably vext

Judges 5.

Judges 6. 23.

2 Sam. 11. 1.

Amos 6.

on all sides, nor have any compassion on their affliction. *The Lord God hath sworn by himself, saith the Lord God of Hosts, I abhor the excellency of Jacob, and hate his palaces: therefore will I deliver up the City, with all that is therein, and those that walk therein in pleasures, shall be the first that shall goe into captivity.* Wickedly therefore did those Ephraimites, who in stead of congratulating and applauding the famous and notable victories of *Gideon* and *Jephtha*, did envie and traduce them, whom notwithstanding they had forsaken in dangers.

As much may be said of the *Israelites*, who seeing *David* overcome the difficulty of his affairs, and remain a peaceable King, say aloud, *We are thy flesh and thy bones*: and some years after, seeing him imbroil'd again in troubles, cried out, *We have no part in David, neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse.* Let us rank also with these, all those Christians in name only, w<sup>ch</sup> wil communicate at the holy table, and yet refuse to take the cup of affliction with their brethren, which look for salvation in the Church, and care not for the safety and preservation of the Church, & the members thereof. Briefly, which adore one and the same God the Father, acknowledge and avow themselves of the same household of faith, and profess to be one and the same body in Jesus Christ, and notwithstanding yeeld no succour nor assistance to their Saviour afflicted in his members. What vengeance doe you thinke will God inflict on such impiety? *Moses* compares those which abandon their brethren to the rebels of *Cadesbarnea*: Now none of those by the decree of the Almighty, entred into the land of *Canaan*. Let not those then pretend any interest in the heavenly *Canaan*, which will not succour Christ when he is crucified, and suffering a thousand times a day in his members, and as it were begging their almes from door to door. The Son of God with his owne mouth condemnes them to everlasting fire, that when he was hungry, gave him no meat; when he was thirsty, gave him no drink; when he was a stranger, lodged him not; naked, and clothed him not; sick, and in prison, and visited him not. And therefore let those expect punishments without end, which lend a deafe eare to the complaints and groan: of our Saviour Jesus Christ, suffering all these things daily in his members; although otherwise they may appeare both to others and themselves to be jolly Christians, yet shall their condition be much more miserable than that

of

of many Infidels. For why; were they the *Jews* onely, & *Scribes* and *Pharises*, to speak properly, that crucified Christ? or were they *Ethnicks*, *Turks*, or some certain pernicious Sects of Christians, which crucifie, torment, and persecute him in his members? No certainly, the *Jews* hold him an impostor, the *Ethnicks* a malefactor, the *Turks* an Infidel, the others an heretick, inasmuch as if we consider the intention of these men, as the censuring of all offences ought to have principall relation thereunto, we cannot conclude that it is properly Christ that they persecute with such hatred, but some criminal person, which in their opinion deserves this usage: But they doe truly and properly persecute and crucifie Christ Jesus, which professe to acknowledge him for the *Messias*, God and Redeemer of the world, and which notwithstanding fail to free him from persecution and vexation in his members, when it is in their power to do it. Briefly, he w<sup>ch</sup> omits to deliver his neighbour from the hands of the murderer, when he sees him in evident danger of his life, is questionlesse guilty of the murder, as well as the murderer. For seeing he neglected when he had means to preserve his life, it must needs necessarily follow, that he desired his death. And in all crimes the will and intention ought principally to be regarded. But questionlesse these Christian princes which do not receive and assist the true professors, which suffer for true religion, are much more guilty of murder than any other, because they might deliver from danger an infinite number of people, which for want of timely succours, suffer death and torments under the cruel hands of their persecuters: and to this may be added, that to suffer ones brother to be murdered, is a greater offence than if he were a stranger. Nay, I wil say further, those forsakers of their brethren in their time of danger and distresse, are more vile, and more to be abhorred than the tyrants themselves that persecute them. For it is much more wicked, and worthy of greater punishment to kill an honest man that is innocent & fearing God (as those which consent with them in the faith must of necessity know the true professors to be) than a chiefe, an impostor, a magician or an heretick, as those which persecute the true Christians do commonly believe them to be, it is a greater offence by many degrees to strive with God than man. Briefly, in one and the same action it is a much more grievous crime perfidiously to betray, than ignorantly to offend. But may

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Judg. 8 &amp; 12.

2 Sam. 5. 2.  
2 Sam. 20. 1.

Numb. 32.

Aug. in Ps. 32  
Amb. lib. 1. de  
Offic.  
Gratian in  
Decret.

the same also be said of them which refuse to assist those that are oppressed by tyranny, or defend the liberty of the Commonwealth again: Is the oppression of tyrants? For in this case the conjunction or confederacy seems not to be of so strict a condition between the one and the other, here we speak of the Commonwealth diversly governed according to the customs of the countries, and particularly recommended to these here, or those there, and not of the Church of God, which is composed of all, and recommended to all in general, and to every one in particular. The Jew saith, our Saviour Christ is not only neighbour to the Jew, but also to the Samaritan, and to every other man. But we ought to love our neighbour as our selves; and therefore an Israelite is not only bound to deliver an Israelite from the hand of theevs, if it be in his power, but every stranger also; yea, though unknown, if he will rightly discharge his duty: neither let him dispute whether it be lawfull to defend another, which believe he may justly defend himself. For it is much more just, if we truly consider the concomitants, to deliver from danger and outrage another than ones selfe; seeing that what is done for pure charity, is more right and allowable, than that which is executed for colour, or desire of revenge, or by any other transport of passion: in revenging our own wrongs we never keep a mean, whereas in other mens, though much greater, the most intemperate will easily observe moderation. Furthermore, the heathens themselves may teach us what humane society, and what the law of nature requires of us in this business; wherefore Cicero sayes, *That Nature being the common mother of mankind, prescribes and ordaines, that every man endeavour and procure the good of another whatsoever be, only because he is a man: otherwise all bonds of society, yea and mankind it self must needs goe to ruine.* And therefore as Justice built on these two Basis, or pillars, First, that none be wronged: secondly, that good be done to all if it be possible. So also is there two sorts of injustice; the first, in those which offer injury to their neighbours; the second, in them which when they have means to deliver the oppressed, doe notwithstanding suffer them to sink under the burthen of their wrongs: For whosoever doth wrong to another, either mov'd thereunto by anger, or any other passion, he may in a sort be truly said to lay violent hands on his companion; but he which hath means and defends not the afflicted

Cicero lib. 1. &  
3. offic.

sisted, or to his power wards not the blowes that are struck at him, is as much faulty, as if he forsook his parents, or his friends, or his country in their distresse. That which was done by the first, may well be attributed to choler, which is a short madness; the fault committed by the other, discovers a bad minde, and a wicked purpose, which are the perpetuall tormentors and tyrants of the conscience. The fury of the first may be in some sort excused, but the malice of the second admits no colour of defence. Peradventure you will say, I feare in aiding the one, I shall doe wrong to the other. And I answer, You seek a Cloak of justice wherewith to cover your base remission: and if you lay your hand on your heart, you will presently confesse, that it is somewhat else, and not justice, that with-holds you from performing your duty. For as the same Cicero sayes in another place, *Either thou wilt not make the wrong-doeur thine enemy, or not take paines, or not be at so much charge, or else negligence, sloth, or the hindring of thine own occasions, or the crossing of other purposes, takes thee off from the defence of those who otherwise thou art bound to relieve.* Now in saying thou only attends thine own affaires, fearing to wrong another, thou fallest into another kind of injustice: for thou abandonest humane society, in that thou wilt not afford any endeavour either of mind, body, or goods, for the necessary preservation thereof. Read the Directions of the heathen Philosophers and Politicians who have written more divinely herein, than many Christians in these dayes. From hence also proceeds, that the Roman law designes punishment to that neighbour which will not deliver the slave from the outrageous fury of his master.

1. Amongst the Egyptians, if any man had seene another assailed and distressed by thieves and robbers, and did not according to his power presently aid him, he was adjudg'd worthy of death, if at the least he discover'd or delivered not the delinquents into the hand of the Magistrate. If he were negligent in performing this duty for the first mulct, he was to receive a certaine number of blowes on his body, and to fast for 3. dayes together. If the neighbour be so firmly oblig'd in this mutuall duty of succour to his neighbour, yea to an unknowne person in case hee be assailed by thieves: shall it not be lawfull for a good Prince to assist, not slaves to an imperiour Master, or children against a turbulent Father; but a Kingdome against a Tyrant, the Commonwealth against the private spleene

Diodor. Sicul.  
lib. 1. 2. c. 2.

of one, the people (who are indeed the true owners of the State) against a ministering servant to the publique. And if he carelessly or wilfully omit this duty, deserves he not himselfe to be esteem'd a Tyrant, and punished accordingly, as well as the other a robber, which neglected to assist his neighbour in that danger? *Theocidides* upon this matter saies, that those are not only Tyrants which make other men slaves, but much more those who having means to suppress and prevent such oppression, take no care to performe it. And amongst others, those which assumed the title of Protectors of Greece, and defenders of the Countrey: and yet stirre not to deliver their Countrey from oppression of strangers, and truly indeed. For a Tyrant is in some sort compeld to hold a straight and tyrannous hand over those, who by violence and tyranny, he hath constrain'd to obey him, because as *Tiberius* saith, he holds the Wolfe by the eares, whom he can neither hold without paine and force, nor let goe without danger & death. To the end then that he may blot out one sin with another sinne, he files up one wickedness to another, and is forced to do injuries to others, lest hee should prove by remissness injurious to himselfe. But the Prince which with a negligent and idle regard lookes on the outrageousness of a Tyrant, and the massacring of Innocents, that he might have preserved, like the barbarous spectacles of the *Roman* sword-playes is so much more guilty than the Tyrant himselfe, by how much the cruel and homicidious directors and appointers of these bloody sports, were more justly punishable by all good laws than the poore and constrain'd actors in those murdering tragedies: and as he questionlesse deserves greater punishment, which out of insolent jollity murders one, than hee which unwillingly for feare of a further harme kills a man. If any object that it is against reason and good order to meddle in the affaires of another: I answer with the olde man in *Terrence*, I am a man, and I believe that all duties of humanity are fit and convenient for me. If others seeking to cover their base negligence, and carelesse unwillingness, alledge that bounds and jurisdictiones are distinguish one from another, and that it is not lawfull to thrust ones sickle into anothers harvest. Neither am I also of that opinion, that upon any such colour or pretence, it is lawfull for a Prince to encroach upon anothers jurisdiction or right, or upon that occasion to usurp anothers countrey, and so carry another mans come into his barn, as divers have taken such shadows to make their bad intentions. I will

not

not I say, that after the manner of those arbitrators which *Cicero* speaks of, thou adjudge the things in controversie to thy selfe. But I require that you repress the Prince that invades the kingdome of Christ, that you containe the Tyrant within his owne limits, that you stretch forth your hand of compallion to the people afflicted, that you raise up the Common-wealth lying groveling on the ground, and that you so carry your selfe in the ordering and managing of this, that all men may see your principall aime and end was the publique benefit of humane society, and not any private profit or advantage of your owne; For seeing that justice respects only the publique, and that which is without, and injustice fixes a man wholly on himselfe: it doubtlesse becomes a man truly honest so to dispose his actions, that ever private interests give place, and yield to publique commoditie.

Briefly to epitomize what hath bin formerly said if a Prince outrageously over-passe the bounds of piety & justice. A neighbour Prince may justly and religiously leave his owne Countrey, not to invade and usurp anothers, but to containe the other within the limits of justice and equity: and if he neglect or omit his duty herein, hee shewes himselfe a wicked and unworthy Magistrate. If a Prince tyrannize over the people, a neighbour Prince ought to yield succours as freely and willingly to the people, as he would doe to the Prince his Brother if the people mutined against him: yea he should so much the more readily succour the people, by how much there is more just cause of pity to see many afflicted, than one alone. If *Porcenus* brought *Tarquinius Superbus* backe to Rome, much more justly might *Constantine*, requisited by the Senate, and *Roman* people, expell *Marcinius* the Tyrant from Rome. Briefely, if man become a Wolfe to man, who hinders that man (according to the proverb) may not be instead of God to the needy? And therefore the Ancients have ranckt *Hercules* amongst the gods, because he punisht and tam'd *Procrustes*, *Bufris*, and other Tyrants, the plagues of man kind, and monsters of the earth. So whilst the *Roman* Empire retaind her freedom, she was truly accounted the safe-guard of all the world against the violence of Tyrants, because the Senate was the port and refuge of Kings, people, and Nations. In like manner *Constantine*, called by the *Romans* against *Maximian*, had God Almighty for the leader of his Army: and the whole Church doth with exceeding commendations celebrate his enterprize, although

Cicero. 2. offic.

Theocid. lib. 1.

Pompon. de leg. jur. leg. 35.

though that *Mazentius* had the same authority in the West, as *Constantine* had in the East. Also *Charlemaine* undertooke War against the *Lombards*, being requested to assist the Nobility of *Italy*: although the Kingdome of the *Lombards* had been of a long continuance, and he had no just pretence of right over them. In like manner when *Charles* the bald, King of *France*, had tyrannously put to death the Governour of the Country between the River of *Seyne* and *Loyre*, with the Duke *Lambert*, and another Noble man call'd *Jametus*, and that other great men of the Kingdome were retired unto *Lewis* King of *Germany*, brother, (but by another mother) unto *Charles*, to request aid against him, and his mother called *Judith*, one of the most pernicious women of the world, *Lewis* gave them audience in a full Assembly of the *German* Princes, by whose joynt advice it was decreed, that Warres should be made against *Charles* for the re-establishing in their goods, honours, and estates, those whom he had unjustly dispossess.

Finally, as there hath ever been Tyrants disperst here and there, so also all histories testifie that there hath been neighbouring Princes to oppose tyranny, and maintain the people in their right. The Princes of these times by imitating so worthy examples, should suppress the Tyrants both of bodies and soules, and restrain the oppressors both of the Common-wealth, and of the Church of *Christ*: otherwise they themselves may most deservedly be branded with that infamous title of Tyrant.

And to conclude this discourse in a word, piety commands that the Law and Church of God be maintain'd: Justice requires that Tyrants and destroyers of the Common-wealth be compell'd to reason: Charity challenges the right of relieving and restoring the oppressed. Those that make no account of these things, doe as much as in them lies to drive piety, justice and charity out of this world, that they may never more be heard of.

FINIS.