The Editor's Introduction (to come)

 

[A new Editor's Introduction is planned. This is the Introduction which appeared with the French version of the anthology in June 2019.]

 

The DEP is a two volume, 1,854 page, double-columned, nearly two million word encyclopedia of political economy which was published in 1852-53. It is unquestionably one of the most important publishing events in the history of mid-century French classical liberal thought and is unequalled in its scope and comprehensiveness.

The DEP was designed to make political economy more accessible to a range of people who, in the view of the Economists, were confused about the operations of the free market. In this case the people the Guillaumin group had in mind were other economists, business people, elected government officials, and the senior bureaucrats in the Ministries. The Economists believed that the events of the 1848 Revolution had shown how poorly understood the principles of economics were among the French public, especially its political and intellectual elites. One of the tasks of the DEP was to rectify this situation with an easily accessible summary of the discipline.

The project was undertaken by the publisher Gilbert-Urbain Guillaumin (1801-1864) with the assistance of Charles Coquelin (1802-1852) as chief editor who died suddenly from a heart attack in August 1852 after having finished work on volume one. Guillaumin used his considerable editorial and organizational skills to publish what he thought would be an unanswerable riposte to the challenge posed by socialism. With funding organized by Guillaumin and with Coquelin (who was blessed with a near photographic memory) as the main editor the aim was to assemble a compendium of the state of knowledge of liberal political economy with articles written by leading economists on key topics, biographies of important historical figures, annotated bibliographies of the most important books in the field, and tables of economic and political statistics.

In keeping with their habit of calling themselves "The Economists" the editors and publisher of the Dictionary called it the "Dictionary of THE Political Economy."

Molinari was one of the main contributors on the project, writing 25 principal articles (most notably the important articles on "Free Trade" and "Tariffs") and 5 biographical articles. In the acknowledgements he was mentioned as one of the five key collaborators on the project. Other major contributors included the editor Coquelin (with 70 major articles), Horace Say (29), Joseph Garnier (28), Ambroise Clément (22), and Courcelle-Seneuil (21). Maurice Block wrote most of the biographical entries.

A massive undertaking like this would have taken several years to plan, write, and edit so it must have been at least in the planning stage when Molinari was writing Les Soirées during the summer of 1849. It was announced in the Guillaumin catalog of May 1849 as being "in preparation" and in a catalog from 1854 its price was listed as 50 fr.

We have made considerable use of the DEP in our research into French economic thought as it provides a great deal of information about French government policy, economic data on a broad range of topics, contemporary literature on economic thought, and most importantly, the state of mind of the French political economists in the mid-19th century.

What follows are some data about this massive project.

• there were 2 volumes with 1,854 pages of double-column text
• volume 1 was published in late1852, the last article by Coquelin was "Instruments du travail" which appeared at the the end of vol. 1, there is nothing by him in vol. 2, he died 12 Aug. 1852 from a heart attack
• there were 336 "Principal Articles" which were signed: vol. 1 A-I had 185; vol. 2 J-Z had 151
• the main editor Coquelin wrote 70 principle articles out of total of 185, all of which were in vol. 1
• Joseph Garnier wrote the next most principal articles with 28 principle articles [14 in vol. 1; 14 in vol. 2]; and 58 biographical articles [24 in vol. 1; 34 in vol. 2]
• Molinari wrote 24 principal articles [ 8 in vol. 1; 16 in vol. 2]; and 5 biographical articles [1 in vol. 1; 4 in vol. 2]
• most of the "Principal Biographical Articles" were unsigned but probably written by Maurice Block
• 50 of the "Principal Articles" were also "Principal Bibliographical Articles" with extensive annotated bibliographies of key works, of which Molinari wrote 6:
  • Céréales,
  • Colonies,
  • Esclavage,
  • Liberté des échanges (association pour la),
  • Liberté du commerce,
  • Propriété littéraire
• the 6 most prolific contributors to the DEP project were:
  • Charles Coquelin 70
  • the Say family  43 (JBS 7, Horace 29, Léon 7)
  • Joseph Garnier 28
  • Gustave de Molinari 25
  • Ambroise Clément 22
  • Courcelle-Seneuil 21

Announcement of the Publication of the DEP

 

 

PREFACE OF THE EDITOR (Guillaumin)↩

Source

“Préface de l’éditeur (Guillaumin),” DEP, T. 1, pp. v-viii.

Text

[v]

Every science has a certain number of dictionaries of varying comprehensiveness; political economy alone lacked one that met the needs of those who wished to consult it and be enlightened by its insights. This gap is what we sought to fill, and the warm reception our book has received, both in France and abroad, attests that we have produced a work as keenly desired as it is worthy, in every respect, of the eminent writers who have kindly collaborated with us.

To gain clarity on all economic questions and to form a reasoned opinion, there is no shortage of good books: numerous comprehensive or elementary treatises now provide the fundamental knowledge that every individual should possess. However, the didactic form of these works does not offer the advantages of the alphabetical format, which is particularly suited for research and useful for those unfamiliar with technical works or those lacking the time to undertake a specialized study.

Thus, the Dictionary of Political Economy serves as the indispensable complement to the fundamental treatises in the field. Despite the diversity of authors and the nuances of their opinions, all our efforts have been directed towards ensuring that a consistent general doctrine prevails, so that our book may serve as a guide to the reader amidst the sea of contradictory doctrines that have proliferated, particularly in our time. For this reason, we have deliberately titled it Dictionary of "the" Political Economy rather than Dictionary of Political Economy.

We have mentioned that political economy previously lacked a dictionary suited to its needs. Indeed, nothing comparable to what we intended to create and have now accomplished had been attempted, either in France or elsewhere. Ganilh’s Dictionary of Political Economy [1] was merely an incomplete attempt, whose insufficiency needs no demonstration. The General Repertoire of Political Economy, [2] published in The Hague a few years ago, consists of articles borrowed from various treatises or periodicals, and its author never claimed to have created a [vi] doctrinal work. This gave us full confidence in the success of our endeavor.

However, a dictionary limited solely to the terms of the science seemed incomplete to us; we believed that a bibliography of dedicated works, as well as a biography of the authors who wrote them, should serve as its complement.

For the first time, political economy will now have a complete bibliography, methodically arranged both by subject and by author name, allowing scholars, administrators, and all those seeking specific information to find an extensive and precise repository of references. [3]

To accomplish this immense task, it was necessary to examine, page by page, column by column, the ten volumes of La France littéraire by M. Quérard, the five volumes of Littérature contemporaine, which continue that work, and the Tables de la Bibliographie générale de la France. Additionally, we consulted Michaud’s Biographie universelle, the Biographie des contemporains, Custodi’s Collection of Italian Economists, a bibliography of Spanish economists by M. de Bona y Ureta; [4] the bibliographical notes of M. R. de La Sagra; the German biographical works of Ersch, Kaiser, and Hinrichs; Brockhaus’s Dictionnaire de la conversation; the Dictionnaire des sciences de l’État (Staats-Lexicon) by Rotteck and Welcker; the Archives of Political Economy by Rau; and the Journal of State Sciences of Tübingen. Above all, we relied on the highly specialized bibliography by M. MacCulloch, titled Literature of Political Economy.

M. Maurice Block, deputy head of the General Statistics Bureau of France, wrote a large number of biographical and bibliographical articles and translated into French the titles of works published in foreign languages. Other collaborators also participated in this effort: MM. A. Clément, Baudrillart, Gustave de Molinari, Maurice Monjean, and notably M. Joseph Garnier, to whom we owe numerous biographical and bibliographical articles that showcase his passion for erudition and his deep knowledge of economic literature. We take great satisfaction in knowing that readers will particularly appreciate the efforts made for this special section of our Dictionary, where many forgotten works have been brought to light, numerous errors and inaccuracies corrected, and where scholarly economists will find more than one remarkable discovery.

In the bibliographical articles, whether arranged by author names or by subject, we have generally classified the works in chronological order of publication, taking great care to reproduce [vii] their titles accurately and completely. For the most significant or remarkable works, we have added explanatory notes and assessments of their content. To accomplish this, we have borrowed extensively from the bibliographies of M. Blanqui and M. MacCulloch, as well as from critical articles in the Journal des Économistes and other authoritative publications. However, for living authors, for reasons of propriety that are easily understood, we have limited ourselves in the biographical section to brief factual notices, without commentary, and in the bibliographical section to evaluations borrowed from other works. No matter how sincere our desire for impartiality, it would have been difficult to discuss everything with perfect fairness, accuracy, and independence. In this regard, we were sometimes advised to abstain entirely. We did not deem it appropriate to follow this advice; given that a significant portion of economic literature is authored by living writers, our work would have been truly incomplete without details concerning these works and their authors. Moreover, we have observed that the brief biographical notices we have published have been received with great interest.

We entrusted the scientific direction of our Dictionary successively to M. Ambroise Clément and the late Charles Coquelin. M. A. Clément, one of the most esteemed contributors to the Journal des Économistes, whose character and person inspired the deepest respect among all our friends, had to leave Paris, and was succeeded in this honorable task by the late Charles Coquelin. Coquelin brought to the Dictionary the brilliant qualities with which nature had endowed him and the profound knowledge he had acquired: an extraordinary memory, sound reasoning, great diligence, a complete understanding of the masterpieces of political economy, deep respect for the founders of the science, a sharp appreciation of theories, and a remarkable familiarity with industry and economic facts in general.

After his regrettable passing—a loss deeply felt by the scientific community—our collective work was easily completed thanks to the direction established from the outset, and with the guidance and advice of our learned collaborators. We take the liberty of particularly mentioning M. Horace Say, who, through his knowledge and dedication to all matters related to political economy, is so worthy of the name he bears.

It will seem natural, no doubt, that after the success of this work, the publisher should claim for himself the idea and the plan of the book, which represents one of his principal claims to the esteem and affection bestowed upon him by the friends of science in general and by the collaborators of the Dictionary in particular. This new publication is, moreover, the complement of a collection of works whose project was conceived after the founding of the Journal des Économistes, a collection forming a coherent whole, and includes the Collection of Principal Economists, [viii] the Annuaire de l'Économie politique et de la Statistique, the Dictionary of Political Economy, the Universal Dictionary of Commerce and Navigation, and finally, the Library of Contemporary Economists.

Paris, September 10, 1853

GUILLAUMIN.

To allow the reader to grasp at a glance the full scope of the subjects covered in our Dictionary, we have appended a Table listing the principal articles along with their authors, as well as another Table containing all the biographical entries, with the names of their respective contributors.

We believed that the subscribers to the Dictionary would appreciate having portraits of the most eminent economists—those to whom the science owes the most. We were committed to ensuring that these portraits, all engraved on steel and of authentic resemblance, were executed with a degree of finesse worthy of the figures they represent.

The eight portraits included are of:

• François Quesnay, engraved by Outhwaite after the beautiful portrait by François, a renowned engraver of the last century.
• Adam Smith, engraved by Bosselmann after the only known authentic portrait.
• Malthus, engraved by Madame Fournier after the fine English engraving by J. Linnell.
• Turgot, engraved by L. Massard after a photograph of the statue that adorns the meeting hall of the Luxembourg Palace.
• J.-B. Say, engraved by Hopwood after the beautiful painting by Decaisne, owned by M. Horace Say.
• Sismondi, engraved by Eug. Gervais after the portrait by the celebrated engraver Toschi.
• Rossi, engraved by Eug. Gervais after a photograph of the admirable bust by Tenerani, owned by his family.
• Frédéric Bastiat, engraved by Madame Fournier after a daguerreotype print.

EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS

• The abbreviations Bl. and M.C. refer to the bibliographies of MM. Blanqui and Mac Culloch, mentioned earlier.
• Barb. refers to M. Barbier’s Manual of Bookselling.
• Biogr. univ. refers to the Biographie Universelle published by MM. Michaud.
• Fr. litt. and Q. refer to La France littéraire by M. Quérard.

Several contributors signed their work at various points using their initials. These correspond to:

• Ambroise Clément – A. C.
• Ath Gros – G. A.
• Charles Coquelin – Ch. C.
• Courcelle Seneuil – C. S.
• Gustave de Molinari – G. de M.
• Horace Say – H. S.
• Joseph Garnier – Jph G.
• Jules de Vroil – J. V.
• Maurice Block – M. B.
• Jacques de Valserre – J. de V.

Endnotes to the Preface

[1] See GANILH.

[2] See SANDELIN.

[3] Until now, economic bibliography consisted of a short list of major works appended to Skarbeck’s Theory of Social Wealth, a considerably more extensive list compiled by M. Blanqui in his History of Political Economy, which is remarkable for its insightful annotations; and finally, M. Mac Culloch’s Literature of Political Economy, which is much broader still and highly valuable for the scholarly assessments it provides, but far from being as complete as ours.

[4] Clave de los Economistas, Madrid, 1850, octavo volume of 70 pages.

INTRODUCTION BY CLÉMENT↩

Source

“Introduction (Ambroise Clément),” DEP, T. 1, pp. ix-xxvii.

Text

[ix]

I.

In scientific research as in industry, the division of labor is one of the essential conditions of progress. It is therefore reasonable to make each of the various orders of phenomena to which these inquiries apply the object of a distinct and well-defined science, at least insofar as the nature of the facts to be studied allows.

The science whose principles this Dictionary aims to set forth and develop has often been criticised for failing to establish the limits of its domain, or for having frequently overstepped them by extending its investigations into certain orders of facts that belong to other social sciences, such as politics, legislation, and morality. But these criticisms, although sometimes made by eminent minds and even by economists themselves, seem to stem from somewhat confused ideas about the nature or interrelations of social phenomena in general. For upon reflection, one soon recognizes that these phenomena are too closely interconnected to allow for their study to be divided by impenetrable boundaries, and that none of the social sciences can be completely expounded without making some incursions into the domain of the others. [1]

"Political economy, for instance, would not be able to show us the causes of the increase or decrease of wealth if it remained outside of the domain of legislation, if it did not explain the effects of a multitude of laws, regulations, and treaties concerning currency, commerce, manufacturing, banking institutions, and the commercial relations of nations. In turn, the scholar engaged in the study of legislation would treat laws in a very imperfect manner if he did not demonstrate the influence they have on the growth, distribution, or reduction of wealth... It is equally impossible for the scholar who describes the civil or political institutions of a nation, and the moralist who investigates the causes of their virtues or vices, not to trespass alternately on each other’s territory."

The moral sciences are connected to one another, not only through the intimate relationships [x] that exist between the different orders of phenomena they are tasked with revealing but also through a common goal, which we believe can legitimately be assigned to them: to shed as much light as possible on the true interests of societies. The most that can be established regarding their distinct characteristics is that, in pursuing this common goal, each of them is called to focus more particularly on one specific order of social phenomena rather than on all others, without, however, being able to entirely neglect the latter. Thus, politics and legislation are primarily concerned with the organization of societies from the perspective of national defense and the protection of persons and property; they must determine the limits that should be placed on individual liberty in the interest of the liberty of all, establish the rules of justice to be applied in disputes between individuals, etc. But they could not clearly distinguish the interests of societies in these respects without relying on the insights provided by political economy and morality. Likewise, morality, in seeking to determine which habits or principles of private and public conduct are most favorable to the improvement of individuals and societies, could not provide reliable guidance without taking economic truths into account. Finally, political economy, by concentrating its investigations more particularly on the phenomena by which wealth is produced, distributed, and consumed, could not disregard the influence exerted on these phenomena by political institutions, legislation, and customs without confining itself to sterile abstractions.

This interconnectedness of the social sciences will always prevent each of them from being defined in a way that confines it within exclusive and strictly determined boundaries. For, again, to prohibit it from making any excursions beyond the limits assigned to it would be to mutilate it. This is as true for Legislation, Politics, and Morality as it is for Political Economy. But while the scope of each of these sciences cannot be absolutely delimited, they can easily be distinguished by the specificity of their objectives. The aim of Political Economy has been sufficiently determined: it is, as we have indicated, to explain the nature, causes, and results of the phenomena of production, distribution, and consumption of wealth, focusing on the general characteristics of these phenomena without, for instance, delving into the technical processes of various industries. More importantly, its role is to illuminate as fully as possible the social conditions that are favorable or detrimental to the richness of general production, the equitable distribution of products, and their advantageous use.

If this, indeed, is the special task of Political Economy—and we believe it would be difficult to dispute—one will recognize that it would be of little use to seek alternative definitions for it. It is thereby sufficiently distinguished from the other social sciences, without limiting the scope of its investigations beyond the point at which it ceases to find useful assistance for the proper fulfillment of its mission. We therefore believe we may refrain from further elaboration on this point and proceed to other considerations.

[xi]

II.

Under the regime to which public education has been subjected by our governments, the dissemination of knowledge in political economy has proceeded with excessive slowness. As a result, our country ranks among those where such knowledge is least widespread, not only among the general population but even among the more or less educated classes, where the majority have no understanding of this science and are entirely unaware of the importance of the problems it seeks to solve. Yet the studies it encompasses are surely among the intellectual pursuits that should most universally arouse interest, for their results are destined to exert the most considerable and beneficial influence on the fate of nations. No other branch of study can offer societies as much illumination to guide them along the paths of true civilization and to help them avoid those that lead to decline and ruin.

The history of our political revolutions over the past sixty years abounds in lessons that confirm the truth of these assertions. Surely, in a nation less ignorant than ours of economic truths, public opinion would not have allowed national energy to be misdirected into the regressive and ruinous paths it has so often followed since 1793. Had general opinion been less backward or less distorted in this regard, the liberal and genuinely civilizing momentum of 1789 would not have so quickly strayed into the foolish or deplorable directions it soon took. One would not have seen, for instance, a nation seeking to base its existence on free labor striving instead to adopt the ideas and customs of ancient societies that built theirs on war, plunder, and slavery. Later, the warlike dispositions provoked by the necessity of national defense would not have degenerated into a spirit of conquest and domination. We would not have become infatuated with a military glory that consists merely in success on the battlefield, regardless of its purpose or even when it results in a regression toward barbarism—a savage and blind sentiment, the enthusiasm for which has, more than any other cause, delayed the moral and political progress of Europe. We would not have witnessed the laws of maximum prices, the reckless issuance of assignats, the Continental System, licensed trade, and the entire succession of disastrous or absurd measures that betrayed either a complete ignorance ofsociety's interests or a supreme contempt for them. But among all the errors from which the light of political economy could especially have saved us, had it been more widely disseminated, the most consequential has been the establishment of that governmental and administrative system which, by multiplying the powers of public authority to the point of subordinating everything to its direction, seems intent on annihilating individual initiative and strength, leaving only the collective power intact. This system, which has continued to worsen over the past thirty years, increasingly substitutes harmful activity for useful activity by diverting the faculties and efforts of an ever-growing number of individuals from the management of material resources to the management of people themselves. By burdening our governments with responsibilities as unlimited as their powers, it has become the principal cause of their instability and the insecurity that results from it. %%xii%% Finally, in recent times, this system has appeared to reach its extreme limit, presenting as a legitimate question the complete absorption of all labor by the State and the coming of universal communism.

Nor should it be believed that these latest economic aberrations are the product of ignorance peculiar to socialist sects. In this respect, the self-styled conservative parties have not demonstrated greater enlightenment. If they resisted the tendencies that sought to transform labor still partially free into public services, to further expand governmental regulation, and to increasingly weaken individual initiative and responsibility, it was not because they had any fundamental aversion to the system itself, nor because their views were based on principles markedly different from those of their adversaries. For they, too, had long accepted or proclaimed that there are no fixed limits to State intervention, and that it is the government’s role to direct social activity in all its developments. The only difference was that, in adopting this pernicious principle, they wished to retain exclusive control over its applications. Nevertheless, for the needs of the moment, they readily leaned on the truths proclaimed by political economy. They professed, along with it, that there is no productive economy and no equitable distribution of goods except under conditions of free labor and free exchange; that each individual must bear responsibility for his own fate; and that, while the instincts of the heart and the dictates of reason command us to assist the unfortunate to the best of our ability, no one has the right to shift onto others the responsibility of securing work or making a living. They asserted that the public authority exists to protect the person, liberty, and property of all, but that it has no rightful power to dispose of each individual’s faculties or their produce, to take from some to give to others, or to shield by law the idle, the reckless, and the parasitic from the consequences of their own conduct at the expense of those who lead an opposite way of life.

Yet these clear truths suddenly became obscured in their eyes whenever the question arose of applying them to existing abuses. If they declared themselves in favor of freedom of labor, it was with the condition that this freedom would not extend to the numerous professions monopolized or subjected to restrictive regulations. If they rejected the idea that the State should take from some to give to others, they were nonetheless unwilling to tolerate any challenge to the legitimacy of subsidies, grants, or special guarantees bestowed upon various enterprises benefiting from government support. If they denounced parasites, it was without questioning the voracious parasitism they themselves had created by inflating governmental powers and expenditures. If they strongly opposed the authority of the day directing the productive capital of the nation and preventing individuals from freely disposing of their faculties and the fruits of their labor, they defended with equal vigor the commercial legislation which, through prohibitive tariffs and restrictions, produces precisely those effects.

Thus, some demanded privileges, aid, and largesse from the State on behalf of the working classes, from whom they sought political support; others sought them only for those already in possession of wealth. Political economy, by contrast, would have granted them to no one, since one of its fundamental conclusions is that each should retain what belongs to them and that neither authority nor law should ever be used [xiii] to rob some for the benefit of others. Deeply hostile to legal plunder, [2] regardless of the form it takes or the banner under which it is carried out, political economy inevitably displeased all those who sought to profit from it. As a result, it has been alternately proscribed by both opposing camps. After the attempt in 1848 to subordinate its teaching to the perspective of the organization (by state force) of labor, there followed in 1850 an effort by the General Council of Agriculture, Manufacturing, and Commerce to impose upon professors of political economy the obligation to tailor their lessons to align with France’s existing commercial legislation—that is, to justify the protectionist or prohibitive system.

But political economy must be taught from only one perspective: that of the exact observation of the nature of things. It is self-evident that any attempt to impose different foundations on its teaching would transform it into something entirely other than a science. Sciences do not admit of preconceived conclusions; the conclusions they reach are merely the results of understanding facts and their relationships. Surely, it would be no less absurd to demand that astronomy be taught from the perspective of the Ptolemaic system than to insist that the teaching of political economy serve to justify protectionism or any other predetermined system, independent of empirical observation.

III.

Among the various forms that may be used to present political economy, the dictionary format appears particularly suited to the rapid dissemination of its key concepts. A large number of individuals engaged in public or collective affairs, who would find invaluable guidance in these concepts for fulfilling their responsibilities effectively, nevertheless refrain from acquiring them because doing so would require dedicating a great deal of time and attention to the study of systematic treatises. A well-conceived and comprehensive dictionary, by allowing them to break up this study, selecting at will the questions that current events or the course of affairs make particularly relevant, can gradually introduce them to economic truths and inspire in them the desire to understand the subject as a whole.

On the other hand, those who have pursued this study without making it their primary occupation or without returning to it frequently often struggle to retain all its principles and their interconnections. As a result, they may find themselves at a loss when confronted with difficulties or objections that, in reality, have little significance. A dictionary can provide them with the means to quickly retrieve the necessary concepts to resolve such questions.

Such a work thus appears to us more likely to be frequently consulted than systematic treatises, thereby rendering it of more practical and widespread utility. But was it possible, given the current state of the science, to produce a good Dictionary of Political Economy? Was the attempt premature? Have prior works on this subject established a sufficiently coherent set of principles to explain the full range of economic phenomena and to theoretically resolve [xiv] the numerous related questions? Have each principle and each solution been brought to the level of clarity required to be expressed with the conciseness demanded by the dictionary format? We hope that competent judges will find that the collective work we are publishing satisfactorily addresses these concerns. Unfortunately, truly competent judges in political economy are few in number, and even fewer in France than in several other countries. This science is scarcely known to most of our statesmen, administrators, and journalists, except through the self-interested or uninformed attacks that have been directed against it for the past twenty years. Moreover, they generally share the prejudices carefully fostered against it by all those whose interests lead them to fear the enlightenment which comes from its study, and when they do not go so far as to proscribe it outright as a dangerous utopia, they prefer to classify it among purely hypothetical systems. The least hostile among them, while not disputing the truth of its theories, deny it any practical application. Some, however, are willing to concede that several of these theories will need to be applied someday, but they postpone their implementation to such a distant future that it becomes discouraging for the present generation—not merely to allow time for public opinion to evolve toward the necessary reforms, but because they believe that a long-term postponement is necessary to complete and better establish the foundations of the science, which they still consider insufficiently developed.

Despite the deep respect we have for the founders of political economy, we are far from believing that new investigations cannot enhance the utility of their work or even correct any incompleteness or errors in some of their views. Like all other branches of human knowledge, political economy is infinitely perfectible. However, we are convinced that it has now reached a stage where no legitimate doubt remains regarding its essential principles, and that the truths embodied in these principles will no more be shaken by future research or discoveries than the elements of geometry or the laws of universal gravitation have been undermined by the works of Lagrange or Laplace. We believe we can confidently assert that, among all the sciences concerned with man and society, political economy is the most precise and least incomplete; that it is incomparably more advanced than politics proper, more advanced than what is taught today under the name of philosophy, and even more advanced than the sciences of legislation and morality. Without it, one cannot engage in politics, philosophy, legislation, or morality in a way that is useful or true.

Certain disagreements among economists have been noted in their writings and exaggerated as much as possible in order to suggest that none of their principles are firmly established. However, little attention is paid to the vast array of truths on which they are in complete agreement. Or, to find contradictions, the title of economist is conveniently granted to writers who have no rightful claim to it. It is also overlooked that no science, not even pure mathematics, has been or remains entirely free from disagreements among those who study it. The various fields of geology, physics, zoology, chemistry, etc., have all been the subject of differing interpretations by the scientists who have observed them. Yet no one has ever concluded from these disagreements that these sciences [xv] are uncertain or lack established principles. Why, then, is political economy, which is just as rich in confirmed truths, accorded so much less credibility? This can be attributed primarily to two causes, which merit discussion.

First, the principal objects of economic study—labor, exchange, value, capital, etc.—were matters of universal concern long before the science was founded, and even today, most people engage with these topics without understanding the need for scientific guidance. It is therefore unsurprising that many individuals believe themselves competent to form opinions on all the questions raised by these subjects, which are so familiar to them. However, these opinions, based on an incomplete view of economic phenomena, their more or less distant consequences, [3] and their interrelations, often diverge from the truths that only thorough and generalized study can reveal. Once adopted, however, these opinions have resisted scientific demonstration with the usual obstinacy of prejudice.

Secondly, economic legislation in societies was formed in the absence of any true scientific knowledge and in accordance with prevailing prejudices. Thus, political economy could not reveal and denounce the flaws in this legislation without alarming numerous interests that were founded by law on error or injustice.

Political economy was therefore bound to attract not only preconceived opinions against it but also the active and persistent hostility of illegitimate interests that it might threaten. These are the principal obstacles that, by maintaining real or feigned doubts about the certainty or effectiveness of its principles, delay the dissemination and consequently the application of the salutary truths it has brought to light.

However, these obstacles will weaken. The interests that were founded unjustly and that political economy might unsettle are infinitely fewer and less significant in their overall impact than the legitimate interests it is meant to serve. As the latter become more enlightened, they will lend it stronger support, and a day will come when, through their backing, it will acquire an irresistible force.

That day has already arrived in England, where fundamental economic truths have permeated public opinion and are dismantling, with an unexpected ease, abuses that had been deeply rooted for centuries and were upheld by powerful interests.

In the United States, the profound good sense of Franklin and the other founders of the Union had, so to speak, anticipated economic theories. The institutions of that country—except in those states where slavery still exists—seem to have been inspired by the soundest doctrines of the science. No other nation has so completely confined the action of public authority within rational limits, nor founded institutions that afford as much freedom to labor and transactions while protecting the development of useful activity and offering so little scope for or encouragement to harmful activity.

Public opinion, moreover, is beginning to move in the same direction in Belgium, Piedmont, and several parts of Germany and Italy, where political economy holds a notable place in public education. The same is true in Spain and Russia. Of all the states in Europe, France is the one that has participated the least in this civilizing movement over the past twenty years. However, it will inevitably be drawn into it, perhaps sooner than those who strive to keep it lagging behind in this regard might expect—either by the example of more advanced nations or by the very excesses of the abuses it would endure [xvi] if it continued much longer to resist economic truths as recklessly as it has done so far.

IV.

To justify what we have said about the progress of political economy and the magnitude of its mission, we shall recall some of the truths it teaches—without straying from general considerations and without delving into details that properly belong to the articles in this Dictionary.

Had the Earth remained in its primitive state, human beings would neither have multiplied nor progressed in any sense; they would have remained as scattered tribes in the forests, living by living by preying on other creatures like various species of animals. Perhaps they would even have disappeared altogether, unable to overcome the exceptional difficulties of their original existence. But they were endowed with a marvelous faculty: the ability to make use of the elements of creation in ways that increasingly appropriated them to serve the needs of humans. It is through the exercise of this faculty, through the prodigious developments it has undergone over time due to the accumulation of the means of labor and the successive discoveries of human intelligence, that our race has truly become the master of the globe. It has been able to spread its numbers across all habitable regions and elevate the conditions of its physical, intellectual, and moral existence to the heights we now witness among the most advanced nations.

This powerful faculty is what political economy designates by the term industry. The exercise of industry is indicated by the word labor. The results of labor, consisting of all types of utilities applicable to our needs, are called products, and when products are preserved or accumulated, they constitute wealth.

Although wealth has always been ardently sought, the labor that creates it has not always been honored by public opinion. The most famous people of antiquity—including those that our public education system still presents as models for schoolchildren—long regarded it as incomparably more noble and meritorious to rob workers of the wealth they had produced than to engage in production themselves. These peoples valued only sterile or plundering occupations, particularly those associated with war and the exercise of domination. As for productive labor, it was generally an object of their disdain, and nothing seemed more degrading to them than engaging in it. This peculiar contempt for the use of humanity’s highest and most admirable faculty persisted throughout the centuries, gradually weakening, until times not far removed from our own. Even today, it has not been entirely erased among all classes of the European population.

It was the role of political economy to completely rehabilitate productive labor, and it has done so in the most striking manner. On the one hand, it has demonstrated that labor is the source of all wealth, the true foundation of society's existence, the principal agent of civilization, and the essential condition of all progress and prosperity. On the other hand, it has established that intelligent populations [xvii] must henceforth grant to productive labor the esteem and respect long usurped by plundering activities, and that they must make every effort to recognize the latter in all its various disguises so as to brand it with all the contempt and shame it has so long inflicted upon productive activity.

We have stated that one of the objectives of political economy is to elucidate the social conditions that are either favorable or detrimental to the fertility of production and the equitable distribution of wealth. These conditions primarily concern either the degree of freedom granted to industry by political institutions or the manner in which the general products of labor are distributed. We shall briefly outline the conclusions of the science on these two fundamental points.

First, the freedom of labor and economic transactions is one of the essential conditions for productive fertility. This is because, on the one hand, it allows each individual to follow the dictates of personal interest in choosing the occupation best suited to his circumstances, preferences, or particular skills, and personal interest, all things considered, is generally the surest and least fallible guide in this matter. On the other hand, it maintains the broadest possible competition across all branches of productive labor, to the extent permitted by the nature of things, and competition is unquestionably the most powerful stimulant to activity and improvement in labor.

Consequently, anything in social institutions that restricts this freedom is harmful to the fertility of production. This is surely the characteristic of legal monopolies, which grant exclusive rights to certain privileged corporations or governments to engage in specific trades or professions; of regulations whereby public authority seeks to direct the course of particular branches of productive activity; and of legal restrictions on the freedom to trade, which necessarily limit the freedom to work, etc.

Secondly, since our industrial faculties vary in nature and strength from one individual to another, and since their productivity is generally proportional to the vigor with which they are applied—an effort that can have no more powerful incentive than personal interest—it is easy to see that the only just and effective means of distributing the useful things they produce is simply to leave each individual in possession of and with full disposal over the fruits of his labor. In other words, the right to property must be upheld.

Any disruption of this natural distribution of products, whether through violence, fraud, or ignorance, constitutes an obvious injustice, as it deprives some of what they have produced and assigns it to others. At the same time, it reduces the extent or security of the enjoyment that is the general aim of all efforts, inevitably leading to a decrease in productive activity and capability.

For property to be established and wealth to grow, labor alone is not enough, for its results may be consumed more or less quickly. It must be accompanied by saving, which cannot be encouraged unless each individual is guaranteed not only personal enjoyment of his earnings but also full and unrestricted disposal of what he has produced, including above all the ability to transmit it to his children, his family, or those dear to him. Without this guarantee, the incentives [xviii] for labor would lose much of their force, and the accumulation of wealth would be incomparably smaller. Each person would be encouraged to consume during his lifetime all that he had acquired, and successive generations would inherit no increased reserves from their predecessors. Instead, existing accumulations would tend to diminish over time, and industry, soon deprived of capital, would become impotent.

It is true that this ability to transfer property results, over time, in significant inequalities among families. However, when property and productive liberties are fully guaranteed, inequality of wealth can arise—except in rare cases—only from differences in production and accumulation attributable to those who possess them. Such inequality is thus merely the recognition of justice: families that, over multiple generations, have exercised well-directed industry, enlightened foresight, and prudent economy are justly rewarded with the comfort they attain; whereas those that follow the opposite course, whose members give themselves over to laziness, intemperance, and various vices, are justly punished by the poverty that inevitably overtakes them. It is essential that they should not be able to escape this condition except by adopting better conduct. This is useful and indispensable for the improvement of human life, and a social system that either sought to maintain the supremacy of certain classes over others or aimed to establish a forced equality among all classes—thereby preventing the natural consequences of good and bad habits from falling primarily upon those who practice them—would be equally disastrous in both cases.

Experience fully confirms these theoretical results. The history of all times and all nations proves that societies are more prosperous and advanced in proportion to how well they safeguard, through their customs and institutions, productive liberties and property against the infinitely varied threats posed by plundering activity. This has been the principal condition determining the fate of nations thus far; those that have best observed it are the most advanced in all essential respects, while those that have least respected it are the most backward and miserable. If some ancient people managed to achieve a temporary degree of material prosperity while deviating from this condition—by basing their existence on war, pillage, or slavery—or if, within each nation, certain classes managed to organize themselves so as to enslave others and live at their expense, this was only accomplished at the cost of the general misery of the majority, the arousal of widespread hatred, and the development of corruption among the ruling population or classes, which always led to their decline and ruin.

On the other hand, attempts to maintain a false equality among human societies by establishing communal ownership of labor and goods have all failed miserably. By disregarding the natural inequalities among men and treating superior faculties as equal to the lowest ones, such systems have destroyed the essential incentive of personal interest and reduced all activities to the level of the least intelligent and least productive. [4]

"The evils that weigh upon a nation," wrote the profound writer we have already cited, "are always equally grave, whether a portion of the population appropriates the products of the labor of others, or whether the [xix] individuals who compose it aspire to establish among themselves an equality of goods and ills. It follows that inequality among the individuals of a nation is a law of their nature; that men must, as far as possible, be enlightened about the causes and consequences of their actions; but that the most favorable position for all forms of progress is one in which each person bears the consequences of his vices, and no one can take from another the fruits of his virtues or his labor."

The insights of political economy alone have been able to complete the knowledge necessary for this important demonstration. At the same time, they have provided a wealth of indispensable ideas for recognizing, amidst all social complexities—whether in institutions, laws, private or collective actions—the often concealed and sometimes difficult-to-detect presence of that perverse activity that continually seeks to appropriate the fruits of productive labor.

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One of the most concrete and useful branches of political economy is that which explains the social phenomena through which the general exchange of products or services takes place.

It is well known that the division, or rather the specialization, of professions and labor is one of the principal sources of the power of industrial. Without this condition, industry would be entirely incapable of meeting the numerous and diverse needs of civilized societies. However, this necessity obliges each worker to engage in the production of uniform goods, while his needs require a variety of products, thereby making exchange indispensable.

In a primate state of society, exchange consists of direct barter, the trade of one good for another. But as needs develop and goods to be exchanged multiply and become more specialized, the inefficiency of this method becomes apparent. People then feel the necessity of adopting a uniform intermediary, one whose qualities make it universally accepted as an equivalent in transactions. This intermediary, whatever its nature, constitutes money once it is generally accepted. Gold and silver currencies have become universally used; the long habit of evaluating everything by these metals, seeing them as the equivalent of all products, led people for a long time to consider them as the supreme form of wealth, or even as the only form of wealth. From this misconception arose numerous prejudices and errors, which, due to the insufficient dissemination of economic knowledge, still hold a significant place in public opinion.

It is on this false notion of wealth that the still-prevalent belief among many writers and statesmen is based—that taxation cannot be a cause of impoverishment for the country that bears it, on the grounds that the money collected is returned to the nation through government expenditures. This same prejudice still leads people to claim daily that the purchase of foreign goods constitutes a tribute paid to other countries. The same error also underlies the theory of the balance of trade, which maintains that each nation should consider [xx] the excess of its exports over its imports as a gain, while any surplus of imported goods over exported ones should be counted as a loss—since in both cases, the difference is likely settled in money, and money, being wrongly assumed to be the only form of wealth, is thought to be the only thing that can constitute either a loss or a gain.

Nothing is more rigorously exact than the demonstrations of political economy on these various points. It has clearly shown that gold and silver, far from constituting all wealth, make up only a very small part of it (they likely represent no more than one-fiftieth of the total accumulated value). The value of money, moreover, like that of any other product, derives first from its utility as a means of facilitating exchanges and second from the costs required to obtain it. The amount of money commonly exchanged for a hectoliter of wheat has as much value as that quantity of wheat—but no more. There is no justification for assuming that one of these values is inherently more precious than the other. In fact, there are strong reasons to believe that, for a nation as a whole, wealth accumulation in the form of money is less advantageous than in any other form. Money is fundamentally different from all other products in that it serves our needs not in proportion to its quantity, but solely according to its value. Consequently, the value of money necessarily declines in any country where its quantity increases significantly. Thus, there is no reasonable basis for encouraging a nation to prefer money over other equally valuable products.

It is as absurd to claim that we pay tribute to foreigners by purchasing their products as it would be to consider the consumer of bread a tributary of the baker, or the baker a tributary of the flour merchant. The theory of the balance of trade is nothing but folly; it is ridiculous to assert that a nation loses in its commerce with foreigners when it receives more in value than it gives in exchange, and that it gains, on the other hand, when it gives more in exchange for less. Differences between imported and exported values are generally balanced among nations through the use of debt between one country and another, settled via bills of exchange, and they rarely result in substantial balances needing to be paid in money. But even if this were not the case, no conclusion could be drawn about gain or loss from such transactions. It is highly probable that, if customs records accurately reflected the values of imported and exported goods, they would show import surpluses everywhere, as such surpluses are essential to provide profits for merchants, who would soon abandon trade if it yielded more losses than gains. Finally, taxpayers would have to be exceptionally naïve to believe that governments return their taxes simply by spending them, since the money collected for these expenditures is only returned to the country in exchange for goods or services of equivalent value.

The insights of economic science are equally reliable when it comes to the use of banknotes, which to some extent perform the function of money. Political economy demonstrates that these notes, being nothing more than debt instruments, add absolutely nothing to existing wealth; their sole function is to transfer the right to dispose of a portion of that wealth from one person to another. This function is also fulfilled by metallic money, but there is [xxi] a fundamental difference between the two: gold and silver money inherently carry their own value, whereas banknotes or similar instruments only represent a claim to value, which may or may not exist. Nevertheless, as long as these notes are widely accepted with confidence, they can substitute to some extent for real money and thereby provide a significant savings in precious metals, while also serving as a highly convenient medium of exchange.

However, these advantages come at a high cost whenever the issuance of banknotes is not carefully regulated and their redemption in metallic currency on demand is not sufficiently guaranteed. This leads to an excessive and harmful expansion of credit. The credit enjoyed by banks, encouraged by the ease of increasing discounts through increased issues, extends through their notes to many individuals who would not otherwise obtain credit and who often use it not to create but to dissipate wealth. Moreover, the growing abundance of this exchange medium depreciates it progressively, even though the notes retain the same nominal value, causing an artificial rise in the prices of goods and services and serious disruptions in all transactions, especially when banknotes are given forced legal tender status.

In presenting these principles, political economy in no way seeks to prohibit the prudent use of such instruments as a means of facilitating exchanges and credit. Rather, its aim is to protect people from the dangers of excessive or reckless use and from the illusions to which they are too often susceptible in this regard.

After clarifying the nature and true functions of money and its representative symbols, political economy must still provide a complete understanding of the natural laws governing the general exchange of products and services. To this end, it has successfully established firm principles regarding the conditions that determine the value of each good or service.

Not all objects of human need are exchangeable. Many, such as light and warmth of the sun, breathable air, and other naturally abundant resources, are provided freely by nature and are enjoyed without effort or the need to give anything in return. In contrast, other goods, which can only be obtained through personal effort or capability, constitute private property and are not voluntarily given away except in cases of donation, inheritance, or similar circumstances. The quality that distinguishes exchangeable goods from non-exchangeable ones is what political economy defines as value. Value varies among different goods and can be measured in each by the quantity of any other valuable good it can command in exchange. Since money serves as the universal medium of exchange, the value of each product or service is ordinarily expressed in terms of a specific amount of money, and this monetary expression of value is called price.

In general, the difference in price between two valuable objects of different kinds arises from the difference in their production costs—that is, the difference between the values of the services or products required to create each of them. It is understood that, under conditions of complete freedom in labor and transactions, the price of a certain category of goods could not long remain significantly [xxii] above production costs. This is because the exceptional advantage of producing such goods would attract competition, which would soon drive prices down. Conversely, it is evident that a production yielding only losses would not continue under such conditions; its quantity would decrease until prices rose at least to the level of production costs.

With these conditions implied, the market price of products or services depends on the relationship between the quantities supplied and demanded of each: if supply increases more than demand, the price falls; if demand increases more than supply, the price rises.

This is the general law governing the relative value of different products or services.

This law allows free labor to maintain—far better than any system based on coercion could—constant proportionality in each of the many and diverse branches of industrial activity between the quantity of each type of product and the extent of the demand for it. If supply exceeds demand, the resulting surplus is immediately signaled by a price drop, leading to reduced production. Conversely, if production falls short of demand, rising prices indicate this shortage and soon encourage an increase in output.

Another consequence of this law is that the price of industrial services inevitably declines when these services are more widely supplied than they are demanded. Since the services most exposed to competition and most susceptible to being oversupplied are generally those of workers in the poorest classes, political economy concludes that these workers have the greatest interest in exercising prudence and restraint before and during marriage, so as not to recklessly increase their numbers and as a result the supply of their services which are already too low.

Another significant result of this fertile law is that the multiplication of capital tends to lower the cost of its use, making it increasingly accessible to those who can employ it productively. Since workers’ labor is more in demand—and therefore better paid—when capital is abundant, political economy further concludes that the working classes have a strong interest in the growth of capital and in all factors that promote it: the dynamism and progress of industry, the accumulation of savings, and especially the maintenance of public security, which is an indispensable condition for the preservation and expansion of capital.

One of the most elegant and solid theories derived from the study of the social phenomena underlying the general exchange of products and services is the theory of markets, so admirably formulated by J.-B. Say. According to this theory, what is ultimately exchanged are products for other products; therefore, every product serves as a means of exchange and a market for others. It follows that the broader and more prosperous the overall production, the greater and more advantageous the market becomes for each specific type of labor. It also follows that different industries share common interests, as no single industry can experience prosperity or hardship without affecting the others to some degree. It has long been understood that rural areas [xxiii] are interested in the prosperity of cities, just as cities are interested in the prosperity of rural areas, because each finds a more favorable and accessible market for its respective products. However, these interdependent interests extend to all branches of industry and are equally evident in trade relations between nations. When a country is progressing and prospering, all nations engaged in trade with it benefit, either because it provides abundant market opportunities or because it supplies goods at lower prices. For example, the phenomenal economic growth of the United States has benefited many branches of our industry to such an extent that the ruin of that country, if it were possible, would now be a great calamity for a significant portion of our population. Nations are thus bound together in both prosperity and adversity; their true interest lies in expanding mutual services by increasing trade rather than in weakening and harming one another, as blind political policies have too often encouraged them to do.

Relying on these truths and invoking the respect due to property rights, political economy calls for the freedom of international trade. Such freedom would enable all nations to share in the highly diverse natural advantages that God has distributed unequally across the globe. It would expand the network of interests that already connects civilized nations—despite all the legislative barriers to trade—to the point of establishing a solidarity as evident as that which unites the various provinces of a single state. Ultimately, it would render international wars as unpopular and impractical as they would be today between the different regions of France.

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Political economy has improved morality by providing solid foundations for evaluating numerous sentiments, actions, and habits that prejudice had misclassified. Significant moral progress has been achieved through the complete rehabilitation of productive labor and the acquisition of a set of positive notions that allow a clear distinction between useful and harmful activities, giving each its proper place in public esteem. The demonstration of the solidarity that binds the interests of different segments of humanity is another immense moral advance. By exposing the absurdity of national hatreds and rivalries; by showing that these are the blind and unworthy sentiments of civilised human beings, although this ignorance and political charlatanism have often been honored wit the name of patriotism, political economy has significantly weakened the inclination toward war among the most influential classes. This has paved the way for the eventual abandonment of large standing armies, one of the most powerful causes of the poverty of nations and, consequently, of all the moral failings and disorders that this poverty engenders. Another important improvement in morality, owed to the insights spread by political economy, lies in the ability to justly assess the relative merit of different uses of wealth. For example, [xxiv] extravagance and ostentation, long praised because they were confused with generosity or selflessness—and especially because they were mistakenly believed to stimulate industry—have been definitively relegated by economic reasoning to the category of harmful and thus immoral habits. Meanwhile, thrift, often maligned as a sign of selfishness or avarice and also thought to deprive labor of resources, has been definitively recognized as one of the most beneficial and therefore most virtuous habits for humanity. Political economy has made unmistakably clear a truth that seems still largely ignored by most public figures: that the habit of luxury or lavish spending, far from sustaining industry or labor, actually leads to the destruction of what keeps them active. A value saved and consumed productively in an industrial operation provides the working classes with infinitely more employment and a higher standard living than an equal value consumed unproductively on a feast, a ball, a festival, or other similar expense. This is because, in the first case, the consumed value continues to employ workers as long as it is reproduced, potentially indefinitely, whereas in the second case, once consumed unproductively, it disappears forever after having supplied the same amount of labour one time only.

One of the most significant advances that moral sciences owe to the research of economists is the improvement of the concept of freedom.

Freedom has long been a major aspiration among many European people, but they pursue it instinctively, without clearly understanding what constitutes it or the conditions necessary for its maintenance and development. It was left to political economy to demonstrate that freedom is equivalent to actual power and that we become freer as we succeed in expanding our control over raw materials or in better subordinating our own activity to the directions that can make it most effective. This is how we progressively reduce the obstacles that hinder the satisfaction and expansion of our needs, the fruitful use and refinement of our physical, intellectual, and moral faculties—in short, the improvement and diffusion of human life.

These obstacles arise either from nature or from other human beings. Industry's mission is to overcome the former; thus, it has succeeded, for example, in domesticating and multiplying useful animal species while limiting the spread of harmful ones—in replacing, over vast areas, wild vegetation of no use to us with cultivated plants that best meet our needs—in overcoming the barriers that rivers, mountains, and the vastness of the seas once posed to relations between nations, and so on. As for the obstacles stemming from man himself—his ignorance, passions, greed, and inclination to subjugate and dominate his fellows—industry indirectly contributes to their mitigation by providing the indispensable means for the growth and spread of knowledge. [xxv] Nevertheless, such obstacles diminish as we better anticipate all the immediate or distant consequences of our actions and habits and as we adjust our conduct to align with this foresight. They also weaken as the sentiments of dignity and justice spread, as individuals become more willing to resist courageously any form of violence or unjust encroachment on their person or property, and as they develop a scrupulous respect for these same rights in others.

From these combined conditions, it follows that the freedom of nations increase as they become more industrious, enlightened, and moral. Consequently, freedom is proportional to a nation's level of advancement in these respects, and it is futile for any people to aspire to be freer than what their level of industry, knowledge, and morals can sustain. [5]

Since 1789, the French nation has repeatedly found itself in control of its governmental establishment, and although its general inclinations leaned toward liberty, the false notions it had adopted on this point prevented it from successfully establishing institutions capable of achieving that goal. Most of our politicians have always regarded the institutions of government as the primary, and almost the sole, organs of social life, as forces from which society must receive its impetus and to whose direction all forms of activity must submit. Influenced by the example of certain figures whom our historians delight in portraying as great statesmen—merely because they succeeded in imposing their personal will or views, no matter how absurd or disastrous they often were—shaped, sometimes unconsciously, by vague memories of classical Greek and Roman institutions, of the legislative systems of Lycurgus and Solon, or by equally misleading ideas drawn from works such as those of Montesquieu, Rousseau, Mably, and Raynal, they have seen civilized societies only as bodies incapable of thriving and prospering on their own. They have failed to understand that the existence and progress of societies depend primarily on individual efforts, whose principles lie within ourselves rather than in legislation or public authority. These individual efforts, made all the more powerful by Providence in order to ensure the general welfare so long as they are not thwarted by human-devised laws and so long as they exercised with greater freedom in all areas that do not infringe upon the liberty of others. Consequently, the rational mission of the legislator is not to lead men or direct their activities but to safeguard them from unjust infringements on their persons or interests, guaranteeing each individual the free use of his inherent faculties and the fruits of his labor.

This is how the populations of the northern states of the American Union understand political liberty. To them, it consists primarily in an independence of individual faculties and activities as complete as possible—that is, constrained only by the necessity for each person to respect the same rights in others. Liberty has never been understood in this way by our politicians, even those who claimed to belong to the liberal camp. They believed that liberty was sufficiently established once the legislative power, which they charged with directing society in all respects, derived its authority from the suffrage of the majority of the [xxvi] population and the fact that the rules which it imposed were common to all. As long as this power appeared to them to be the expression of the broadest general will, they did not hesitate to sacrifice individual liberty to it. Moreover, when political changes replaced the general will as the basis for legislative power with the will of a more or less restricted fraction of the population—or even that of a single man—the omnipotence of the legislator was no more contested than before.

Under the influence of such ideas—reinforced in France and in other countries that mistakenly imitate us by a universal inclination toward domination and the pursuit of public offices as means of making a living or a fortune—it was inevitable that governmental action would tend to expand continuously. Once legislators, whoever they might be, were entrusted with an unlimited mission, they inevitably had to add to the dictates and regulations necessary to make society function according to their vision. Consequently, those who have successively wielded this supreme mandate have done so so extensively that they have imposed hundreds of thousands of laws and regulations upon us over the past sixty years.

This is how our governmental and administrative system has acquired colossal proportions, unprecedented in any country in the world. It has gradually extended its reach, its regulations, and its restrictions to almost every sector of activity, stifling their development and productivity in proportion to the freedom it has curtailed. To manage the vast numbers of its duties, it has multiplied public services and positions to such an extent that a significant portion of the population now lives off tax revenues, fostering the growth of parasitic groups that seek to live the same way. This has created a dangerously subversive force and one of the primary causes of the unrest and disorder that make security so precarious in our country.

Political economy studies and analyzes all the elements of disruption contained in such a system; it exposes its harmful consequences and identifies the remedy, which consists primarily in reducing and simplifying governmental action by returning to private activity the free exercise of all branches of labor that, by their nature, fall outside the rational functions of public authority but which our governments have sought to control, monopolize, or regulate.

In a country like ours, where so many people are obsessed with governing their fellow citizens, the teaching of such doctrines was bound to provoke numerous adversaries of political economy. Political parties seeking power, the vast army of those already in office, the even larger army of those aspiring to office, and all the reformers who have devised some new scheme for social restructuring—all had to unite against a science that threatens one day to free society from the excessive intervention they are determined to impose upon it. Thus, it is to this aspect of its doctrines that political economy owes most of the attacks it has faced.

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We have attempted to summarize, within a very limited scope, truths and principles that will be found fully developed in the various sections of the Dictionary. This summary is undoubtedly far from complete; however, we believe it faithfully outlines the principal foundations and tendencies of [xvii] the science. Moreover, it seems to us that it sufficiently justifies the assertion that Political Economy is already one of the most positive and advanced sciences, and undoubtedly the one whose dissemination would be most crucial to the progress of civilization, the well-being, and the moral improvement of society.

One cannot reasonably dispute the advanced stage of a science when, within the realm of phenomena it encompasses, it proves capable of predicting with precision the subsequent consequences of unfolding events. Political Economy has recently undergone a twofold test of this nature. All those who have followed the publications of French economists over the past twelve years, and all those who will take the time to review these publications, have been or will easily be convinced that the complete failure of all attempts made in 1848 by socialism to implement its plans for the organization of labor, its systems of association, credit, and social leveling, had been frequently and explicitly predicted several years in advance. On the other hand, England has, in recent times, profoundly modified its economic legislation in the precise direction indicated by the principles of the science. This was a most solemn test, and its results were awaited with anxiety by the general public but with absolute confidence by economists. It is well known that this confidence was justified on all points in the most striking manner, and that the predicted outcomes materialized to an even greater extent than had been anticipated.

It would be hopeless to expect a people to embrace reason if its prejudices and errors could withstand such compelling demonstrations. Thus, we like to believe that these demonstrations will soon lead to favorable changes in the economic opinions that have prevailed in our country until now, and that those among us who understand the truths of the science, who have devoted themselves to their dissemination, and who are deeply convinced of the immense benefits they could bring, will not for much longer find themselves, in the face of the impotence of their efforts and dedication, forced to repeat in sorrow this protest of disregarded truth: E pur si muove!

Ambroise CLÉMENT. 113.August 1853.

Endnotes to Introduction

[1] Traité de législation, by Charles Comte, Volume I, pages 31 and 32.

[2] (Editor's note.) "La spoliation légale" (legal plunder) was a key concept in Bastiat's theory of plunder, especially as developed ini his essay "La Loi" (The Law) (1850).

[3] (Editor's note.) This is a reference to one of Bastiat's key insights into "ce qu'on voit" (that which is close by to the observer and thus immediately seen) and "ce qu'on ne voit pas" (that which is not seen immediately because its impact is remote or will take place in the future). See his book ref??

[4] Traité de législation, by Charles Comte, first edition, Volume IV, page 536.

[5] This beautiful and important demonstration, which we have only been able to indicate here, is presented in the most complete and satisfactory manner in the great work of M. Ch. Dunoyer, De la liberté du travail.

Molinari’s JDE article on the DEP Project↩

Source

Gustave de Molinari, ”Dictionnaire de l’économie politique, par M. G. de Molinari,” JDE, T. 37, N° 152. 15 Décembre 1853, pp. 420-32.

Text

[420]

DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY CONTAINING, IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER,

The exposition of the principles of the science, the opinions of the writers who have most contributed to its foundation and progress, the general bibliography of political economy, by the names of the author and in order by subject, with biographical notices and a reasoned assessment of the principal works, by a group of economists, under the direction of MM. Charles COQUELIN and GUILLAUMIN. [1]

Since the end of the last century, an immense transformation has taken place in production. The ancient equipment of industry, after having remained almost unchanged for centuries, has been replaced by more advanced equipment: mechanical forces, drawn from raw materials of irresistible power, have taken the place of human physical strength in most of the lower tasks of production. At the same time, no less an important and fruitful revolution was taking place in the very organization of industry: the old regulations that hampered the expansion of production—by making each of its branches almost the exclusive monopoly of a few families, even imposing manufacturing processes and methods that could not be deviated from under penalty of fines and confiscation—crumbled into dust. Transformed and expanded, industry broke its age-old mold, just as Rabelais’ infant Pantagruel shattered the cradle that had imprisoned his robust limbs, and the regime of free competition succeeded the outdated regime of privileged industrial corporations. From that moment on, progress multiplied and accumulated in a truly prodigious manner: the sciences applied to the arts of production revealed to man new forces of which he had no suspicion or which he [421] only knew by their destructive effects, and they taught him how to harness them for his use as obedient servants. The fable of the Titans imprisoned in the depths of Etna has been realized for the benefit of modern industry: steam, imprisoned in a boiler and used here to spin or weave fabrics, there to extract ore or fuel from the bowels of the earth, elsewhere to transport at prodigious speed masses of passengers and goods; electricity, confined within a wire and transformed into a messenger a thousand times faster and more efficient than the winged Mercury of pagan mythology; even sunlight, turned into a marvelous draftsman within a darkroom—these are the Titans that man now commands as master, employing them without ever exhausting or tiring their vigor in the production of the things necessary for the sustenance and embellishment of his existence.

But this grand transformation of the old equipment of production, this industrial revolution—vastly greater and deeper than any political revolution—has not taken place without affecting a multitude of interests and lives, nor without raising a host of significant and formidable problems.

Thus, for example, the great factories of modern industry, replacing the small workshops of the old industry, have required the accumulation of considerable capital. This capital was rarely within the means of a single individual to provide. It had to be sought through credit or association. Credit institutions multiplied, and circulation banks, replacing deposit banks, became one of the powerful engines of production. However, depending on whether the action of these engines is well or poorly regulated, they may either invigorate production or disturb it, bringing either health or malaise to the economy.

Likewise, these same factories required, along with the accumulation of capital, the gathering of a multitude of workers, placing them in entirely new conditions. Formerly, the worker, bound by the ties of the guild or serfdom, rarely left the place where he was born. He was compelled to sell his labor at a low price, with little hope of improving his condition; in return, however, his existence had a certain stability. His available market was very limited, and he was at the mercy of a master or a lord, but at least he did not have to fear being supplanted by workers coming from elsewhere. Furthermore, laws or customs observed as laws compensated for the lack of foresight among the laboring classes by imposing restrictions on their excessive multiplication. Now, the worker has access to a much larger market, but one whose extent he can hardly estimate, and it is up to his own foresight alone to ensure that the quantity of his labor matches the available employment. On the other hand, large-scale industry is subject to [422] unforeseen and formidable contingencies, contingencies that can, from one day to the next, upend the lives of all who depend on it unless active and tireless foresight acts to neutralize their effects. It requires an immense market for its products. However, this market rarely has a permanent character. Prohibitive tariffs, wars, and famines frequently and suddenly restrict it. Masses of workers are then cast out from the workshop into the streets. If they have not saved, they are forced to endure the harshest extremes of poverty; they easily succumb to the suggestions of disorderly and utopian ideologies: they form unions, stage riots, and launch revolutions in hopes of improving their lot; yet, at the end of these unions, riots, and revolutions, they find nothing but a worsening of their misfortunes.

Thus, finally, governments, whose resources were incessantly increased by the progress of production and credit, ended up persuading themselves that these resources were unlimited, and they increased their expenditures at an even greater rate. For half a century, they have used and abused public borrowing. They have drained the blood of present generations and mortgaged the resources of future generations to satisfy their insatiable appetites for domination and conquest. These admirable mechanisms that science had created to enhance human well-being, they have turned into instruments of ruin and death.

In the face of such a vast and profound revolution—one whose results were inevitably destined to benefit civilization, but which ignorance in some and harmful passions in others could divert from its natural course and lead into perilous abysses—was it not more necessary than ever to study the organization of society? Men now possessed new forces that their intelligent labor had wrested from nature; but could these forces not bring them more good or more harm, depending on whether they were given the right or wrong direction? A locomotive that carries hundreds of passengers at dizzying speed is more useful than a draft horse; but does a derailed locomotive not cause more disastrous accidents than a runaway horse? As the machine of production grows stronger and larger for the benefit of humanity, does not the misdirection of this machine generate even more formidable catastrophes? The thorough study of social organization—the very object of political economy—has thus become more than ever a necessity since the advent of large-scale industry, for it alone can identify the means to prevent this powerful locomotive from derailing.

And yet, who would believe it? This necessity of studying social organization—a necessity so palpable in our time—has been contested. Not long ago, a distinguished statesman, M. Thiers, declared that [422] the study of political economy seemed to him more harmful than useful. "It is political economy," he claimed, "that has engendered socialism." Is it necessary to refute an accusation so strangely contrary to the truth? No doubt, political economy has stirred a multitude of formidable problems; but if political economy had refrained from addressing these problems, would socialism not have raised them? Was socialism not already discussing them before political economy even began to examine them? Had property not been theoretically attacked by communists and practically by protectionists before economists came to its defense? Had socialists like Thomas More, Campanella, Harrington, and Morelly not imagined new societies before economists demonstrated that "society cannot be remade"? No! Regardless of what the opponents of political economy may say, there are times when certain questions emerge, as if from the very bowels of society itself, and impose themselves irresistibly on men. Such have been the economic questions since the advent of large-scale industry. These questions have, by necessity, become the major concern of the masses, whose existence has been profoundly transformed by the introduction of advanced means of production. Was it not the duty of science to respond to this natural and legitimate concern of the masses? Was it not the economists' mission to bring light into this vast and fertile field of production—a field filled with unknown pitfalls? Would it have been better to leave this task to utopians?

Political economy, therefore, had an important task to fulfill in the face of the progressive transformation of production, and our readers know that it has not failed in this task. Although still a relatively young discipline, it has already rendered significant services to society, whether by urging governments to reform outdated laws or by combating harmful utopias.

In England, for example, the active propagation of sound economic theories has led to the downfall of the protectionist regime. We do not need to revisit here the critique of this regime, which is based on a supposed antagonism of interests between nations and which advocates high prices as a means of enriching people. The admirable results of the commercial reforms successively implemented by Huskisson, Robert Peel, Lord John Russell, and Mr. Gladstone now attest clearly enough how much England has gained by following the advice of economists. The introduction of free trade in this great country is a progress for which political economy can justly take pride.

In France, political economy has not yet achieved more than a partial customs reform; however, it can rightfully claim an honorable share in the defense of society against the threats of socialism. It is [424] ] from the books of economists that all the arguments used since 1848 to demonstrate the folly of new social organization systems have been drawn, and M. Thiers himself, in his remarkable book on Property, [2] did not hesitate to draw upon the masters of the science.

That the teaching of political economy is now more necessary than ever before in history; that this teaching has already borne fruit, both in the progress it has fostered and the mistakes it has helped avoid; that it is destined to bear even greater fruit when it becomes widespread among the masses—this, in summary, can be boldly affirmed.

Deeply convinced of these truths and aware of the importance of their mission in society’s new evolution, economists have devoted themselves for the past half-century to popularizing the principles of their science. In England, France, Germany, and most other civilized countries, elementary treatises on political economy, catechisms, pamphlets, tracts, and journals have been published with the aim of educating the masses in economic matters, [3] and this work of propagating a necessary science has been fortunately aided by associations established to introduce the principle of free trade into customs legislation.

However, a comprehensive work assembling all the acquisitions of the science in a vast synoptic overview was still missing. Political economy lacked a dictionary. M. Ganilh had indeed attempted, some thirty years ago, to provide one; but his effort was unsuccessful. His Dictionary of Political Economy is merely an imperfect sketch, and it could hardly be otherwise. Sciences nurtured by the method of observation are now too vast for any single person to master them in all their aspects. A dictionary written by a single author would inevitably contain numerous gaps; moreover, it would lack the particular appeal that arises from the diversity of perspectives and styles in such works.

M. Guillaumin had the fortunate idea of carrying out, with the collaboration of a large number of contributors, the work that M. Ganilh, relying solely on his own strength, had only been able to sketch; and thanks to him, political economy now possesses its dictionary.

Moreover, M. Guillaumin was in the most favorable position to bring such an important project to fruition.

First, France is indisputably the country best suited for undertaking such a work. Perhaps the German mind is deeper than the French; perhaps the English are better observers; but there is one quality that [[425]] French writers possess, by universal acknowledgment, to a greater degree than others: it is method, the science of exposition. The French mind is essentially lucid and methodical. As a result, it has often been through French popularizers that the scientific discoveries of other nations have spread across the world. To cite just one example from the history of political economy, was it not J.-B. Say’s Treatise that contributed most to disseminating the theories admirably elucidated but somewhat confusedly arranged in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations?

Furthermore, due to a particular conjunction of circumstances, French economists found themselves in the best possible conditions to collectively erect a monument to their science. Excluded from official teaching and still generally regarded, despite its obvious utility, as a science of mere curiosity, political economy in France was cultivated only by a small number of elite minds irresistibly drawn to this too-neglected branch of human knowledge. But precisely because of their small number and the lack of favor their doctrines enjoyed, economists felt the necessity of uniting in order to exert greater influence on public opinion. As early as the eighteenth century, at the very origin of the science, they had formed a school that became famous under the name of the Physiocrats. Gathered around their master, Dr. Quesnay, the Physiocrats, despite their small numbers, exerted considerable influence on minds and events. Could they have acquired this influence if each of them had cultivated the science in isolation, if they had not formed a cohesive group, an organized school? The economists of the nineteenth century followed the example of their predecessors. After the death of J.-B. Say, who had held the scepter of the science for thirty years with such brilliance, his principal disciples came together to collectively continue the propagation of economic truths. The Journal des Économistes was founded with their participation in 1841, and the following year, some of them initiated the monthly meetings of the Société d’Économie Politique. From then on, the science had a meeting place, a home in France. Those who had been working in isolation, mostly unaware of each other, came together through their contributions to the Journal and their participation in the Society’s meetings. Statesmen, administrators, journalists, professors, merchants, and others from diverse political backgrounds thus found themselves engaged in a common effort of propagation. They did not, of course, agree on all points of the science; but their divergences, which also fueled their periodic discussions, were bound over time to diminish, if not disappear. Do not intelligent individuals pursuing a common goal and frequently coming into contact eventually clarify [426] each other’s doubts and, almost unwittingly, develop the habit of thinking in the same way? In science, as in religion, is not the association of efforts supremely effective in bringing unity to theories? Thus, political economy in France has come to possess a school whose members agree on the fundamental principles of the science and present their opponents—whether protectionists or communists—with a battalion that, though small, is united, cohesive, and compact.

This scientific community, which the founding of the Journal des Économistes and the Société d’Économie Politique gradually assembled, was ideally suited, both in the diversity of its knowledge and the unity of its principles, for the task of compiling a dictionary that would summarize the science’s achievements. For twelve years, all questions related to political economy, whether directly or indirectly, had been examined and debated in the Journal des Économistes or within the Société d’Économie Politique. Thus, for the journal’s contributors or the Society’s members, it was enough to summarize their prior work to provide the science with as comprehensive a repository of knowledge as possible.

M. Guillaumin therefore had at his disposal the necessary contributors to erect a monument worthy of political economy. The circumstances were also most favorable for the construction of this scientific monument. The February Revolution had revealed the abysses that the ignorance of governments and people had opened beneath the feet of society. Was this not the moment to present, in a vast and harmonious synthesis, the acquisitions of a science that had explored these abysses and identified the means to fill them? M. Guillaumin understood this, and in the last months of 1850, he began work on the Dictionnaire de l’Économie Politique.

The direction of this important enterprise was initially entrusted to M. Ambroise Clément of Saint-Étienne, who drafted its program and wrote the principal articles for the first two letters of the alphabet. However, M. Clément, recalled to his hometown to resume an administrative position, was forced to abandon the task he had begun so well. He nonetheless remained one of the Dictionary’s most diligent contributors, and it is to him that we owe the excellent Introduction, which provides a general overview of the science as it currently stands, placed at the beginning of the first volume. Charles Coquelin, so lamentably missed, was the worthy successor of M. A. Clément. Unfortunately, death struck him down in the midst of this great work, to which he had devoted vast erudition and sound judgment. He would have been difficult to replace. M. Guillaumin continued the endeavor alone, with the advice of a few of his collaborators, among whom we may cite MM. Horace Say, Joseph Garnier, and Courcelle-Seneuil. [427] Thanks to efforts that nearly cost him his sight, he succeeded in completing the work in less than two years.

[428] 143.Here is how M. Guillaumin presented the plan of his Dictionary in the prospectus for this work:

"The dictionary we are announcing will form an immense repository, a vast encyclopedia of economic knowledge, from both a practical and theoretical perspective. Everything that, directly or indirectly, relates to the science in its various applications will find its place here and be the subject of a dedicated article: taxes, finance, credit, paper money, administration, charity, philanthropy, pauperism, savings banks, pension funds, pawnshops, roads, canals, railways, labor, wages, customs, free trade, protection, agriculture, grain trade and legislation, etc., etc.

"Such a publication would not be complete, in our view, if we did not add two essential sections: biography and bibliography. Despite the immense effort required for a true bibliography and the extraordinary difficulties encountered in its execution, ours will be infinitely more complete than anything previously attempted in this genre, whether in France or abroad.

"To achieve its goal of usefulness—to provide administrators, statesmen, and journalists with a complete list of the principal works written on the subject of their interest or study—this part of our publication had to be presented in two different ways. It needed to provide both a Bibliography by Subject and a Bibliography by Author's Name. For example, anyone wishing to study in depth the question of banks, philanthropy, land credit, foundlings, etc., will find, following the articles dedicated to these topics, a complete list of works published on these various subjects, whether in French or in foreign languages. However, this first form of information would not suffice for many readers if, on the other hand, they could not also find a comprehensive listing of all the works published by a given author on economic matters. To meet this latter need, we have provided, under each author's name, a complete list of their published works; and this list, instead of being a mere dry enumeration of titles, as in most bibliographies, will be accompanied by notes, evaluations, and judgments drawn from the best sources, guiding the reader effectively in their studies and research.

"The name of each author will be followed by a biographical essay of varying length, depending on the importance of the writer and the role they played during their life. As for living authors, one will understand the considerations that lead us to provide a concise account, without praise or criticism, of the main events of their careers, along with a summary list of their publications."

Those who have the Dictionary before them can verify that the promises of the prospectus have been, quite rarely, fulfilled and even surpassed. The bibliographical and biographical section alone could constitute a substantial work. It contains, with very few omissions, everything that has been written and everyone who has written on political economy.

[428]

"To accomplish this immense task," the publisher further states in his Preface, "it was necessary to scrutinize page by page, column by column, the ten volumes of La France littéraire by M. Quérard; the five volumes of Littérature contemporaine, which continue that work; and the Tables de la Bibliographie générale de la France. In addition, we have drawn upon Michaud’s Biographie universelle, Biographie des Contemporains, Custodi’s Collection des Économistes italiens; a bibliography of Spanish economists by M. de Bona y Ureta; the bibliographical notes of M. R. de la Sagra; the German bibliographies of Ersch, Kaiser, and Hinrichs; Brockhaus’s Dictionnaire de la conversation; the Dictionnaire des sciences de l’État (Staats-Lexikon) by Rotteck and Welcker; the Archives d’économie politique by Rau; the Journal des sciences de l’État of Tübingen; and above all, a highly specialized bibliography by M. MacCulloch, entitled Literature of Political Economy.

"Initially entrusted to M. Ath. Gros, now librarian at Draguignan, the biography and bibliography sections were continued, from the letter B onward, by M. Maurice Block, deputy head of the General Statistics Bureau of France, who wrote a large number of articles, compiled biographical and bibliographical notes, and translated into French the titles of works published in foreign languages. Other collaborators also contributed to this effort: MM. A. Clément, Baudrillart, Gustave de Molinari, Maurice Monjean, and especially M. Joseph Garnier, to whom we owe many biographical and bibliographical articles distinguished by his erudition and deep knowledge of economic literature."

Among the most important biographical articles, we highlight J.-B. Say by M. A. Clément, who conducted a thorough study of the works of this illustrious master, of whom he was a disciple; Sismondi, Adam Smith, and Turgot by M. Maurice Monjean, who dedicated to these celebrated figures notices worthy of them; Jean Bodin, Colbert, Condillac, Condorcet, Plato, Rousseau, Destutt de Tracy, Voltaire by M. Henri Baudrillart, who left the field of philosophy and literature for that of political economy, bringing to it an elevated mind and an elegant pen; Jean de Witt by M. Esquirou de Parieu, a statesman who divides his time between political economy and jurisprudence; Droz, Galiani, Genovesi, Godwin, Hume (David), List (Dr.), Malthus, Mably, Quesnay, Ricardo, Roland, Rossi, Saint-Simon, etc., etc., by M. Joseph Garnier, whose solid and versatile talent our readers have come to appreciate. We should make special mention of M. Joseph Garnier’s biographical work on Montchrétien, the author of the first Treatise on Political Economy in 1615, and his notice on Fromenteau, that 16th-century economist who played such a curious role in the General Assembly of the Third Estate, the nobility, and the clergy, and whose too-forgotten works M. Joseph Garnier had the merit of rediscovering in the dust of libraries.

That covers the biographical and bibliographical sections of the work. Let us now turn to the theoretical section.

[429]

In a work of this kind, it was essential to adhere to the Saint-Simonian formula: To each according to his ability, meaning that each contributor was assigned the subjects best suited to their expertise. The editors of the Dictionary adhered to this principle. They distributed the work among their learned collaborators according to their aptitudes and areas of study, ensuring that each produced what they were most capable of executing well.

Thus, M. HIPPOLYTE PASSY, former Minister of Finance and author of the remarkable work On the Influence of Agricultural Systems on Social Economy, wrote the articles Taxation, Agriculture, and Climate. A nearly encyclopedic mind, M. Passy did not limit his contributions to these topics; he also wrote three articles on some of the most complex and least understood questions in the science: Land Rent, Utility, and Value. As if to relax from this rigorous task, he also refuted the aberrations of socialism in the article Utopia. This battle against utopians was continued by M. LÉON FAUCHER, also a former minister like M. Passy, in several important articles such as Right to Work, Interest, Property, and Wages. These articles, each nearly a complete treatise, demonstrate the rare vigor with which M. Léon Faucher dismantled the sophisms that socialists have used to undermine the fundamental institutions of society. In the article Interest, he provided a fascinating historical account of the prejudice against this form of capital remuneration, a prejudice that has persisted from antiquity to the present day. Complemented by the article Usury by M. G. de Molinari, M. Léon Faucher’s work offers a comprehensive overview of a question that has preoccupied Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Calvin, Bossuet, Turgot, Jeremy Bentham, and M. Proudhon.

M. LOUIS REYBAUD, the well-known author of Studies on the Socialists, was naturally assigned the article Socialism. It is well known that this term, which has unfortunately made such a resounding impact on the world, was coined and popularized by M. Reybaud. His article Socialism, along with M. Léon Faucher’s Right to Work, M. Passy’s Utopia, M. Henri Baudrillart’s work on Communism, the article Organization of Labor and the biography of Fourier by M. Courcelle-Seneuil, and the biography of Saint-Simon by M. Joseph Garnier, together provide as complete a view as possible of the false doctrines that have nearly overturned society. The articles Navigation and Quarantine were also written by M. Louis Reybaud, whose position as a deputy for one of France’s major port cities obliged him to study maritime issues in depth.

M. CHARLES DUNOYER brings us back to pure science. The learned author of The Liberty of Work reproduced in the article Production the highly methodical and comprehensive analysis he had provided of the various branches of human industry. In the article Government, which was the subject of an interesting debate at the [430] Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, M. Charles Dunoyer defined and delineated the true functions of government.

M. CHERBULIEZ, now a professor of political economy at Lausanne, contributed the articles Public Charity, Coalitions, Cults, Famine, Pauperism, and Poor Tax. In the first and last two of these articles, M. Cherbuliez, sometimes with a rather severe hand, castigated the false philanthropy—so closely related to socialism—that exacerbates the suffering of the poor by granting a finical incentive to their lack of foresight. The articles Hospitals and Hospices and Public Assistance by M. Vée, inspector of public welfare; Foundlings by M. Frédéric Cuvier, one of the most enlightened minds of the Council of State; Pawnshops by M. Horace Say; Mutual Aid Societies by M. Alfred Legoyt; and Pension Funds by M. Émile Thomas complete the coverage of public assistance in its various branches.

M. MICHEL CHEVALIER, who devoted much of his Collège de France lectures to public works and currency, contributed the articles Canals, Railways, Precious Metals, and Money, filled with skillfully condensed information. His well-reasoned analysis of the factors that, within a more or less short timeframe, are likely to lead to a decline in gold prices (article Precious Metals) is particularly interesting. M. Dupuit, whose original thinking and solid knowledge readers of the Journal des Économistes have long appreciated, and who is Chief Engineer of Bridges and Roads, covered subjects within his specialization, such as Water, Tolls, Weights and Measures, Bridges and Roads, Highways, and Transportation Routes, complemented by the article Public Works by M. Biaise (from Vosges), editor-in-chief of the Journal des Chemins de Fer.

M. WOLOWSKI, professor at the Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers, who was the first to introduce in France the concept of Germany’s land credit institutions and who was one of the principal advocates for mortgage reform, was naturally assigned the articles Land Credit and Mortgages.

CHARLES COQUELIN, who vigorously defended in his remarkable book Credit and Banks the then-novel thesis in Europe of banking freedom, took on the articles Banks, Currency Circulation, and Credit. The Dictionary, which he directed with such expertise and authority until his death, also owes to him several other important contributions, including Navigation Act, Patents, Budget, Cabotage, Capital, Centralization, Commerce, Competition, Commercial Crises, Industrial Harmony, Industry, etc., and especially Political Economy, one of the most outstanding pieces in this collection. The articles Public Credit and Public Loans were written by M. GUSTAVE DUPUYNODE, who has recently published a scholarly work on money, credit, and taxation.

M. HORACE SAY, who brought his vast economic erudition, [431] practical business knowledge, and sound judgment to the Dictionary, wrote the articles Stockbrokers, Speculation, Insurance, Stock Exchange, and Warrants, all of which are closely related to credit. He also contributed the article Customs, which includes a comprehensive history of customs legislation in the principal civilized nations, particularly France; and the article Inquiry, which he was uniquely qualified to write, given his role as the director of the major survey on Parisian industry.

M. RENOUARD, former Pair de France and counselor at the Cour de Cassation, wrote the articles Legislation, Trademarks, Commercial Companies, and Parasites, the latter being one of the most striking sketches in the Dictionary.

M. VIVIEN, former minister, whose Administrative Studies need no praise from us, contributed the article Police, in which one finds, though in a perhaps too limited framework, the qualities that earned his book such an honorable success.

M. ESQUIROU DE PARIEU, former Minister of Public Instruction, provided articles on Marriage, Octroi, Salt, Successions, Stamp and Registration Duties, and Sales. These works stand out for their wide-ranging erudition. One may say, particularly of the articles Marriage and Successions, that they illuminate political economy through law and vice versa.

M. QUÉTELET, the learned director of the Brussels Observatory and president of the Royal Statistical Commission of Belgium—who has made such ingenious applications of probability theory to economic phenomena and to whom Belgium owes a new mortality table—wrote the articles Probabilities and Mortality Tables. The principal mortality tables known at the time are reproduced in the latter article.

M. Alfred LEGOYT, director of the General Statistics Bureau, treated various topics related to his field with knowledge and erudition: Public Domain, Mines, Land Fragmentation, Population (Statistical Analysis), Census, Military Recruitment, Mutual Aid Societies, etc.

MM. JULES DE VROIL, LÉON SAY, DE WATTEVILLE, A. DE CLERCQ, MOREAU CHRISTOPHE, M. BLOCK, N. RONDOT, A. COURTOIS, A. DUMONT, E. DUVAL, etc., provided historical accounts and analyses of various financial, agricultural, commercial, industrial, and charitable institutions in articles such as Amortization, Chambers of Commerce, Discount Houses, Agricultural Societies, Consulates, Mendicancy Institutions, Model Farms, Stud Farms, Hanseatic League, Prisons, Lotteries, Telegraphy, etc.

M. JOSEPH GARNIER, one of the Dictionary’s most dedicated contributors, alongside Charles Coquelin, MM. Horace Say, Ambroise Clément, Courcelle-Seneuil, and G. de Molinari, covered a wide range of subjects. Among his contributions are Population—a topic that none was better suited to address than the learned annotator of Malthus—Statistics, a clear and substantive overview of this auxiliary science of political economy; Continental Blockade, Baking Industry, Exchange Rates, Consumption, Smuggling, Finance, Freedom of Labor, English League, Machines, Price Controls, [432] Physiocrats, Tobacco, and others, where the author of Elements of Political Economy once again demonstrates his deep knowledge.

M. GUSTAVE DE MOLINARI contributed articles on Fine Arts, Cereals, Civilization, Colonies, Emigration, Slavery, Free Trade, Nobility, Peace, Literary Property, Serfdom, Labor, Usury, Cities, etc. [4]

Additionally, we must mention: Industrial Exhibitions by M. ADOLPHE BLANQUI, whose fragile health unfortunately prevented more extensive contributions to the Dictionary; Commercial Treaties by M. CHARLES DE BROUCKÈRE, mayor of Brussels and former president of the Belgian Free Trade Association; Public Education by M. CH. VERGÉ, editor of the Compte Rendu of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences; Wine Taxes by M. LOUIS LECLERC, who has written engaging articles on the wine industry in the daily press; Guarantee of Gold and Silver Materials and Arbitration Courts (Prud'hommes) by M. P. Paillottet; Morality by M. COCHUT, etc.

Lastly, we must not forget the article Abundance, which opens the Dictionary and was one of the last works of a man who left such a brilliant mark on the science—Frédéric Bastiat.

Thirty years ago, M. Guizot said of encyclopedias: [5]

“They are like vast intellectual bazaars, where the results of all human intellectual labor are offered together to anyone who pauses before them, each vying for the curiosity of the passerby.”

The Dictionary of Political Economy covers only one of the many categories of human intellectual labor, but within its naturally limited scope, it is more detailed and complete than any general encyclopedia could be. To borrow M. Guizot’s picturesque expression, it is the “bazaar of political economy,” where the products of this useful branch of human knowledge are accumulated and made accessible to all. In erecting this enduring monument to political economy, M. Guillaumin has fittingly crowned his great series of economic publications—the Dictionary of Commerce and Goods, the Collection of Principal Economists, the Journal des Économistes, the Annuaire de l’Économie Politique et de la Statistique, etc.—thus earning yet another title to the gratitude of the friends of science.

Endnotes to Molinari’s JDE article

[1] Two magnificent large octavo volumes, printed in two columns, each with 900 pages and eight portraits of principal economists. Published by Guillaumin & Co. Price: 50 francs.

[2] (Editor's note.) Ref??

[3] EdNote?? my essay on popularizing economics.

[4] (JDE Editor’s note.) Our contributor limits himself to listing some of his contributions to the Dictionary. It is unnecessary to add, for our readers, that M. de Molinari holds a distinguished place among the most eminent authors of this remarkable publication, both for the clarity of his mind and the elegance of his style.

[5] Progressive Encyclopedia, article Encyclopedia.

Comte (Charles)

Source

"Comte (Charles)," DEP, T. 1, pp. 446-47.

Text

[I-446]

COMTE (François-Charles-Louis), perpetual secretary of the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, deputy of Sarthe, was born on August 25, 1782, in Sainte-Énimie, a small town in the department of Lozère. He began his political life by refusing to vote for the establishment of the empire (1804). Some time later, he moved to Paris, where he was admitted to the bar and took part in the editing of the famous collection of legal decisions published by M. Sirey; but his career as a publicist truly began with the publication of Le Censeur, which he launched on June 12, 1814, three days after the promulgation of the Charter. He founded this journal to resist the reaction that marked the return of the Bourbons, a reaction that ultimately led to the downfall of the Restoration government. After the publication of the second issue of Le Censeur, he enlisted as a collaborator one of his companions from law school, M. Charles Dunoyer, and these two writers, animated by the same love for constitutional liberties and the same faith in the future of representative institutions, stood up for six years against the champions of absolutism.

Nothing is more remarkable than the history of Le Censeur's clashes with the two successive governments of that period; nothing is more honorable, at the same time, for the two independent writers who edited it. When censorship was reinstated by an ordinance in 1814, M. Comte demonstrated that the ordinance was illegal and refused to submit to it. "For several months," says M. Mignet, "he remained alone in possession of the freedom of the press, as if it were a privilege of his courage." [1]However, when a law confirmed the royal ordinance, the editors of Le Censeur complied. Nevertheless, they found a way to bypass censorship by publishing their journal in volumes of more than twenty folios. When Bonaparte landed at Cannes, M. Comte, who above all detested military dictatorship, published a pamphlet filled with wit and indignation under the title: On the Impossibility of Establishing a Constitutional Monarchy Under a Military Leader, and Particularly Under Napoleon. The vehemence of this manifesto did not prevent a royalist newspaper from accusing the editors of Le Censeur of having conspired to bring about Napoleon's return. MM. Comte and Dunoyer, undeterred by the dictator's triumphant march, sued the editor of that newspaper for defamation. The case was heard on March 19, when Napoleon was already entering Fontainebleau. "The position of the judges was delicate," says M. Mignet, from whom we borrow these details; "placed between the government that still existed and the government that was about to exist, they must have found it difficult to rule, since what was a crime today could become a title of honor tomorrow." The prudence of the accused journalist spared them this dilemma. He requested a postponement of the ruling, hoping that it would later be as impossible to issue a verdict as it was to provoke one; he underestimated MM. Comte and Dunoyer and their indomitable tenacity. Summoned to court after the emperor had returned to the throne, to withdraw a complaint that had become obsolete, they persisted, inscribing in the court registry that "if the accusation of having contributed to the restoration of the imperial government did not expose them to any punishment, the accusation of having sought to overthrow the established government exposed them to public contempt." Such actions reveal character. The fifth volume of Le Censeur was temporarily seized by the imperial police, and the seventh was condemned and pulped by the magistrates of the second Restoration. The publication of Le Censeur was suspended for some time but resumed with renewed brilliance in 1817. During the interval, MM. Comte and Dunoyer had turned their full attention to the study of political economy. J.-B. Say became the mentor of Charles Comte, who married the daughter of that illustrious economist. The new publication benefited from the new intellectual direction taken by these two distinguished minds.

In the second series of Le Censeur, which took the name Le Censeur Européen, most of the great reforms that concern and preoccupy our times were presented and discussed with remarkable superiority of vision. The reduction in the size of the army, the reduction in the number of governmental functions, and the freedom of labor and trade found in the editors of Le Censeur Européen energetic and convinced defenders. Unfortunately, senseless persecution forced MM. Comte and Dunoyer to abandon their work of spreading liberal ideas. Condemned to two months in prison and a fine of 2,000 francs for publishing a forbidden publication, M. Comte, believing his conviction to be unjust, went into exile in Switzerland. In 1820, he was offered a chair in natural law at Lausanne, which he held with distinction until 1823. His expulsion was then demanded by the French government; the authorities of the Canton of Vaud nobly resisted this injunction, but M. Comte did not wish for his presence to become a source of embarrassment and danger for his hosts.

"I would be poorly repaying the trust you have honored me with," he wrote to the Landamman and the State Councillors of the canton, "by calling me to teach the youth of your country if I were to allow such a painful struggle to continue any longer. Under no circumstances would I consent to being the pretext for an aggression against Switzerland; I therefore ask that you allow me to withdraw, thereby putting an end to the debates of which I have been, or could be, the object."

Charles Comte withdrew to England, where he formed a close bond with Bentham. After the period required for the statute of limitations on his sentence, he returned to France, where he completed his Traité de législation, a true scientific monument, for which the Académie française awarded him the Grand Prix Montyon in 1828. In this remarkable work, Charles Comte set out to expound the natural laws that govern the development of society, as well as the causes that may hinder its progress. His goal was to apply to the moral sciences [I-447] the same methods of observation that had enabled the physical sciences to make such rapid advances. He ruthlessly rejected hypotheses and preconceived systems, adhering strictly to the observation of facts. The study of the laws to which a people is subject, he said, is nothing other than the study of the forces that determine how this people exists, maintains itself, and perpetuates itself. These laws or forces must be sought in human nature and in the environment in which man lives. Nothing is more fruitful than this inquiry, undertaken by a positive and discerning mind; nothing is more compelling than the refutation to which he subjects systems conceived outside the observation of facts, particularly Rousseau’s system.

Frédéric Bastiat, who had long intellectually nourished himself on the study of the Traité de législation, also held this fine book in high regard: [2]

"I know of no book," he said, "that stimulates thought more, that casts fresher and more fertile insights on man and society, or that produces to the same degree thinking based upon the evidence. Were it not for the unjust neglect in which studious youth seems to leave this magnificent monument of genius, I might not have the courage to speak so categorically, knowing how much I must mistrust myself, if I could not place my opinion under the authority of two references: one is that of the Académie, which crowned M. Comte’s work; the other is that of a man of the highest merit, to whom I once posed the question that bibliophiles often ask each other: If you were condemned to solitude and were allowed only one modern book, which would you choose? M. Comte’s Traité de législation, he told me; for if it is not the book that says the most, it is the one that makes one think the most."

After the July Revolution, Charles Comte was elected to the Chamber by the voters of Sarthe, then appointed King's Prosecutor at the Tribunal of the Seine. However, his naturally independent character did not allow him to hold this office for long. Called to be a member of the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques upon its reconstitution, he soon became its perpetual secretary. In 1834, he published his Traité de la propriété, which followed his Traité de législation. This book, which describes and justifies, using the criterion of utility, the various applications of the principle of property, serves as an arsenal filled with all the necessary weapons to combat the regressive errors of communism. As perpetual secretary of the Académie, Charles Comte delivered eulogies for Garat and Malthus, whose theories he skillfully evaluated. However, worn down early by the struggles of politics and the demands of science, he died on April 13, 1837, at the age of fifty-five, leaving behind the reputation of a vigorous thinker and a man of loyal and firm character.

"Under somewhat harsh forms and with an appearance of coldness," says M. Mignet, "he possessed that kindness of heart, that warmth of soul, that elevation of sentiment, and that fervor of conviction which are evident both in his writings and in his life. It is through this that he inspired deep affections, earned universal esteem, and ensured that his memory will be honored as long as our country remains faithful to the pursuit of science and remembers those who have served it."

Bibliography.

Le Censeur, ou examen des actes et des ouvrages qui tendent à détruire ou à consolider la constitution de l'État, by MM. Comte and Dunoyer. 6 volumes in-8 (1814 to 1815). The 7th volume was seized and destroyed.

Le Censeur européen, ou examen de diverses questions de droit public et de divers ouvrages littéraires et scientifiques, considérés spécialement avec les progrès de la civilisation, by MM. Comte and Dunoyer. 12 volumes in-8 published from 1817 to 1819.

Among the articles in this collection that are of particular interest to economists, we note the following:

• Considerations on the Moral State of the French Nation, and on the Causes of the Instability of its Institutions.
• Examination of J.-B. Say’s Treatise on Political Economy.
• On Social Organization Considered in its Relations with the Means of Subsistence of Peoples.
• Industry, or Political, Moral, and Philosophical Discussions in the Interest of All Men Engaged in Useful and Independent Work.
• On the 1817 Finance Law. On the Nature and Organization of Armed Forces.
• Essay on the History and Current State of Public Education in France.
• On the Increase of the Poor, Government Employees, and Pensioners.
• On the Proposed Law for the Abolition of the Slave Trade.
• Examination of M. De Laborde’s Book: On the Spirit of Association in All Aspects of Community Interests.
• On the Proposed Law Regarding Gunpowder and Saltpeter.
• On the Proposed Law on the Tobacco Monopoly.
• On Certain Provisions of the Laws of April 28, 1816, and April 21, 1819, on Customs Duties.

Guarantees Offered to Capital and Other Forms of Property by Legislative Chambers' Procedures in Industrial Enterprises, Particularly in the Construction of Canals, and the Influence a Canal from Le Havre to Paris Could Have on the Prosperity of France’s Commercial Cities, by Ch. Comte. Paris, Delaforest. A response to the work by M. Derbigny titled Paris, Seaport.

Traité de législation, ou exposition des lois générales suivant lesquelles les peuples prospèrent, dépérissent ou restent stationnaires. Paris, Sautelet, 1827, 4 volumes in-8, 2nd edition, Paris, Chamerot, Ducollet, 1835, 4 volumes in-8.

"M. Comte’s Treatise on Legislation is a true treatise on social economy, whose fourth volume, entirely devoted to the issue of slavery, is rightly considered the most important part of the work. Nowhere has this question been examined with greater independence of judgment and a richer abundance of facts." (Bl.)

Traité de la propriété. Paris, Chamerot, Ducollet, 1834, 2 volumes in-8.

"The author declares in his preface that this work is merely a continuation of the previous one; he examines the natural relationships that develop between men and the objects through which they sustain themselves. This framework allows him to study and often resolve a multitude of economic questions related to property.

"The book is written with clarity, without any pretension to style, and remains engaging despite the dryness of the subject." (Bl.)

Endnotes to Comte

[1] Historical Notice on the Life and Works of M. Charles Comte, Former Perpetual Secretary of the Academy (read at the annual session of May 30, 1846), by M. Mignet. (Journal des Économistes, June 1846 issue.)

[2] Le Libre-Échange, July 11, 1847 issue.

Necker

Source

"Necker," DEP, T. 2, pp. 272-74.

Text

[II-272]

NECKER (Jacques) was born in Geneva on September 30, 1732, into a family originally from Germany. Destined for commerce, he apprenticed with a banker in Geneva, then was sent to Paris, where he joined the banking house of M. Vernes. In 1772, M. Vernes, whose confidence he had gained, lent him a considerable sum with which Necker began his own business ventures. He established, along with MM. Thélusson, a banking house that, within a few years, became the foremost in France. By the age of forty, Necker had amassed his fortune. His ambition then turned toward loftier pursuits. He published a eulogy of Colbert, which was awarded a prize by the Académie française, and was appointed to represent the Republic of Geneva at the French court. In 1775, he published his notoriously infamous work On the Legislation and Commerce of Grain. In this book, Necker, with a certain fervor of style, opposed the old administrative practices to the liberal doctrines of Turgot and the economists, earning him a great reputation. In 1776, M. de Maurepas proposed appointing Necker as director of the treasury under the Controller-General Taboureau; Maurepas' proposal was approved by the king, thus marking Necker's entry into public affairs. The following year, he became Controller-General of Finances. His administration, which lasted until 1781, was marked by various reforms, the details of which he provided in his famous Compte rendu.

Although M. Necker's reforms were not radical, they nonetheless provoked strong opposition. In 1781, he was forced to resign due to the maneuvers his adversaries had employed to discredit him in the king's eyes. His retirement was considered a public calamity, and several sovereigns offered him the management of their finances; Necker refused and instead wrote his Treatise on Financial Administration. No financial book had ever achieved such popular success; within a short time, 80,000 copies were sold. Meanwhile, the growing insufficiency of treasury revenues was rapidly precipitating the revolutionary crisis. Neither Calonne nor the Archbishop of Brienne had been able to restore balance between the monarchy's revenues and expenditures. Once again, Necker was called upon, and his return to office temporarily revived public confidence. Unfortunately, during the harsh winter of 1789, Necker had the disastrous idea of intervening in grain supplies, in accordance with the principles [II-273] he had outlined in his work On the Legislation and Commerce of Grain. According to Arthur Young, this misguided intervention alone caused the terrible famine that significantly contributed to spreading the spirit of sedition and anarchy. (See CEREALS.) Nevertheless, Necker remained popular, and on May 6, 1789, his entry into the Estates-General was greeted with nearly unanimous applause. On July 11, having refused to attend the royal session on June 23, Necker was dismissed and ordered to leave the kingdom. He traveled to Basel. No sooner had the news of his dismissal spread than riots erupted in Paris; three days later, the Bastille was taken. The king hastened to recall Necker, and his return was met with continuous ovations. However, Necker's character was too indecisive, and his convictions too wavering, for his influence to endure in such tumultuous times. By attempting to reconcile all parties, he succeeded only in alienating them. Disillusioned with politics, he submitted his resignation in September 1790. Retiring to Switzerland, he was insulted and mocked during his journey by the same people who had once triumphantly escorted him. In 1791, from his retreat in Coppet, he published a justification of his ministerial acts under the title On the Administration of M. Necker by Himself. In November 1792, he attempted to defend Louis XVI and published Reflections Offered to the French Nation in the unfortunate king's interest. This plea led to his name being placed on the list of emigrants, and his assets were seized, including a sum of two million francs that he had deposited in the public treasury as security for Paris’ grain supply. This sum was not restored to his family until after 1815. In 1796, Necker published a four-volume work titled On the French Revolution; in 1800, a Course on Religious Morality; and finally, in 1802, his Final Views on Politics and Finance, in which he exposed the First Consul’s ambitious designs. In 1794, Necker lost his wife, Suzanne Curchod, a woman of great merit but whose upright and elevated spirit lacked flexibility and grace. Ten years later, on April 9, 1804, the former minister of Louis XVI passed away, joining the companion he had tenderly loved.

Necker's reckless denunciations of property rights earned him the sympathies of socialist writers. M. Louis Blanc, in particular, hastened to place him on the exalted pedestal of fraternity while relegating Turgot to the depths of individualism. [3]

"In terms of breadth of vision and fervor of sentiment," asserts M. Louis Blanc, "there is no doubt that Necker was superior to Turgot.

Turgot’s ideas significantly eased the burden of government. Removing obstacles and then letting things take their course was, according to Turgot, the essence of governance; and if this required the courage of a man of action, it did not demand the intrepidity of a thinker. Necker, on the other hand, sought to create a grand and laborious role for authority. To follow, with an attentive and compassionate heart, the tumultuous existence of the poor; to ensure the sustenance of all and a place for everyone in the sacred domain of labor; to provide strength for the weak, wisdom for the ignorant; to defend, if not happiness, at least the bread of the masses against the brutal regime of competition and the chaos of universal antagonism... this was how Necker believed he could earn the honor of governing an empire."

As supporting evidence, M. Louis Blanc analyzes Necker’s work On the Legislation and Commerce of Grain, which, unfortunately, lends itself all too well to his praises. This book is essentially a long indictment of property rights. Against the right invoked by economists in favor of free grain trade, Necker opposed, in what he believed to be the people's interest, the "right of humanity." Observing the hardships inflicted upon the lower classes by the privileges still attached to landed property, he mistakenly attributed to the exercise of the right itself the abuses of privilege. Unlike Quesnay, he did not believe that society was governed by natural laws "designed to promote good" and thought that the same ills stemming from privileged property would inevitably manifest in free property as well. Consequently, he advocated for state intervention to assert the "right of humanity" over the right of property. [4]

"It had not escaped him," adds M. Louis Blanc, "that in the midst of a universal struggle, and when the arms are unequal, liberty is simply the hypocrisy of oppression. In the name of liberty, will you allow the strong man to improve his lot at the expense of the weak man? Now, said Necker, the strong man in society is the property owner, the weak man is the man without property."

Elsewhere, Necker compared property owners to lions "always ready to pounce," and he urged the friends of the people to be suspicious of those who invoked the interest of the masses to increase the freedom of these harmful animals. [5]

"It is a great abuse," he exclaimed, "to use compassion for the people as a means to strengthen the prerogatives of property owners: it is almost like imitating the behavior of those terrible animals who, on the banks of Asia’s rivers, imitate the voices of children to devour men."

Finally, he dealt the coup de grâce to this pernicious rabble in the tirade so often quoted and acclaimed by socialist writers: [6]

"It seems as if a small number of men, after dividing the land among themselves, made laws of union and guarantee against the multitude, just as they would have built shelters in the woods to protect themselves from wild beasts. And yet, one dares to say that after establishing the laws of property, of [II-274] justice, and of liberty, almost nothing has yet been done for the most numerous class of citizens. ‘What do your property laws matter to us?’ they might say. ‘We own nothing. Your laws of justice? We have nothing to defend. Your laws of liberty? If we do not work tomorrow, we will die.’"

One can imagine the havoc that this book, written by a man praised for his practical knowledge, must have caused at a time when the abuses of privileged property, through an inevitable reaction, had driven minds to the very edge of communism. It achieved enormous success; more than twenty editions were published in succession. The revolutionary upheaval that erupted fourteen years later, unfortunately, gave the younger generation—imbued with its maxims—the opportunity to put them into practice. It was by relying on the arguments developed by the author of Législation and Commerce des grains that the Jacobins decreed the maximum, the forced loan, and so many other anti-economic and confiscatory measures. M. Louis Blanc thus has good reason to praise Necker, and one must sincerely pity the former minister of Louis XVI for having earned such a compromising approval.

Necker’s work On the Administration of the Finances of France is conceived in the same spirit as the previous one. However, it does contain useful information on France’s economic and financial institutions before the Revolution. It can still be consulted with benefit, and despite numerous inaccuracies and the declamatory tone that pervades it, it remains the best scientific credential of its author.

Bibliography.

Here is a list of Necker's economic and financial works:

Éloge de J.-B. Colbert, a speech that won the prize of the Académie française in 1773. Paris, J.-B. Drunet, 1773, in-8.

De la législation et du commerce des grains. 1775, 1 vol. in-8. Reproduced in Collection des Principaux Économistes, Guillaumin, vol. XV.

Compte rendu présenté au roi au mois de janvier 1781. Paris, royal press, 1781, in-4, 116 pages.

De l'Administration des finances de la France. Paris, Panckoucke, 1784, 3 vols. in-8.

Correspondance de M. Necker avec M. de Calonne, 1787, in-12.

Défense contre M. de Calonne, 1787, in-12.

Sur l'Administration de M. Necker, par lui-même. Paris, Plassan, in-8, 469 pages.

Dernières vues de politique et de finances offertes à la nation française. Geneva, 1802, in-8.

And a large number of memoirs collected in the Œuvres complètes published by Baron de Staël, his grandson. Paris, Treuttel et Würtz, 1820-21, 15 vols. in-8.

Endnotes to Necker

[3] History of the French Revolution, vol. 1, p. 555.

[4] Ibid., p. 557.

[5] On the Legislation and Commerce of Grain, Part 1, Chapter XXVI.

[6] On the Legislation and Commerce of Grain, Part III, Chapter XII.

Peel (Robert)

Source

"Peel (Robert)," DEP, T. 2, pp. 351-54.

Text

[II-351]

PEEL (Robert). This great statesman, who linked his name to one of the most fruitful reforms of our century, was born in Chamber-Hall, near Bury, in 1788, and died in London from a fall from his horse on July 2, 1850. His father, who bore the same first name, Robert, had amassed an immense fortune in the cotton manufacturing industry and had been created a baronet as a reward for his devoted support of Pitt’s policies. The young Peel was sent to Harrow School, where he had Byron as a schoolmate and companion. This passage concerning him has often been cited from the memoirs of the great poet:

"Peel," says Byron, "had always inspired great hopes in both his teachers and his fellow students; he did not disappoint them. In classical studies, he was far superior to me; in public speaking and acting, I was at least his equal. When we went out, I was always in trouble, he never was. At school, he always knew his lessons, I rarely did; but when I did, I knew it almost as well as he did. In general education, history, etc., I believe I was his superior."

Robert Peel completed his studies at Oxford University, where he achieved the most brilliant successes. At the age of 21, he was elected as a member of the House of Commons for Cashel, a rotten borough in Ireland with twelve voters. He spent his first year in Parliament studying the parliamentary terrain and did not deliver his maiden speech until the following year, during the debate on the Address. This speech immediately established him as one of the future statesmen of his party. That same year, he was appointed Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department. His economic education was not yet well developed at that time, for in May 1811, he was part of the majority that voted for the [II-352] infamous resolution of Mr. Vansittart, declaring, despite clear evidence to the contrary, that the banknotes of the Bank of England had not ceased to be equivalent to cash. The following year (1812), he obtained the important position of Chief Secretary for Ireland. In this unfortunate country, he organized a municipal force (constabulary force), which began to establish some level of security. In 1817, Mr. Abbott, the representative of Oxford, having been elevated to the peerage, the renowned university entrusted its former laureate with the honor of representing it. In 1819, he was appointed chairman of the committee of inquiry tasked with examining the question of the resumption of specie payments. This committee also included Mr. Canning, Mr. Tierney, Sir James Mackintosh, and Mr. Huskisson. The influence of these enlightened minds completely altered his opinion on this matter, and he acknowledged it with the utmost honesty:

"I do not blush to admit," he said during the debate, "that I entered the commission with ideas very different from those I hold today; but I entered it with the firm resolution to forget all my past impressions and the vote I had given a few years earlier."

On April 7, he presented the bill that mandated the resumption of specie payments, and he played a decisive role in securing its adoption.

Having become Minister of the Interior following the retirement of Lord Sidmouth (November 1821), Robert Peel distinguished his tenure by reforming criminal legislation, a reform prepared by the writings of Sir Samuel Romilly and Sir James Mackintosh, but which he had the merit of implementing as soon as it had matured in public opinion. In 1826, he began this work by passing two bills: one that allowed any property owner with an income of 10 pounds sterling in land, or possessing a lease for 21 years on land yielding 20 pounds sterling, to serve on a jury; the other that reduced the number of criminal charges and limited the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. On March 9, 1827, he introduced a bill for the revision of statutes concerning theft. He proposed to mitigate penalties in certain cases and to exempt complainants from prosecution costs. This reform was adopted by the House of Commons on April 17 and by the House of Lords on May 18. In the following session, he passed four more bills modifying laws related to offenses against property and crimes against public peace. The death of Lord Liverpool, which occurred at the beginning of 1827, led to the dissolution of the ministry and the rise of Mr. Canning. Robert Peel resigned on April 11, justifying his decision by his opposition to the measure of Catholic emancipation. Less than a year later, Mr. Canning died; the Duke of Wellington was called to form a new ministry, and Robert Peel was reinstated in his position as Secretary of State for the Interior. On May 8, 1828, he once again opposed a proposal by Sir Francis Burdett regarding Catholic emancipation; but the following year, the famous election of O'Connell in the County of Clare made him understand that the time had come to yield to the will of public opinion. Emancipation was announced in the opening speech of Parliament. Immediately, the old Protestants of Oxford University hurled at their representative the accusation of betrayal, an accusation that protectionists would later repeat against him. Unshaken by these unintelligent clamorings, Robert Peel resigned as the university’s representative. Not re-elected (Sir Robert Inglis, the candidate of the old Anglicans, defeated him), he was forced to seek election in Westbury, one of the rotten boroughs controlled by the Crown. On March 5, 1829, he put forward the motion for Catholic emancipation.

The ministry of the Duke of Wellington was forced to resign after the July Revolution (November 17, 1830), and two years later, the Whigs succeeded in passing the Reform Bill. The first elections held after the bill’s adoption (January 29, 1833) were so favorable to the Whigs that for a moment it was believed that the Tory party would never recover. But Robert Peel had been underestimated: through perseverance, skill, and eloquence, he succeeded in reorganizing and reviving his party. On December 9, 1834, the king, tired of the Whigs, was inclined to recall him to office. But it was too soon. Constantly in the minority in the House of Commons, Peel’s ministry lasted only four months.

It was only in 1841 that Robert Peel reaped the rewards of his laborious efforts. But at that time, he came to power, carried by a majority as considerable as that which the Whigs had obtained after the Reform Bill, and which they had not known how to capitalize on. However, the situation was most critical, and a statesman less skilled and less self-assured would have hesitated to take responsibility for it: since 1838, a dreadful crisis had weighed upon British industry and commerce. The Treasury deficit, which had risen to 36 million in 1839, 44 million in 1840, and 36 million in 1841, was set to reach 102 million in 1842. Robert Peel then understood—and this is his immortal title to glory—that the time had come to boldly take the axe to the old and shapeless economic legislation of Great Britain. He grasped that the protectionist regime, the soul of this legislation, was hindering the development of public prosperity and, consequently, the increase in Treasury revenue. Therefore, he began his admirable series of commercial reforms. After reinstating the income tax to ensure the balance of expenses and revenues, he modified or abolished, in his first attempt, 44 items subject to tariffs. The prohibition was lifted on livestock, fresh meat, and fish, and replaced with moderate duties. On exports, coal, books, hides, ores, and pipe clay were freed from any duty. Significant reductions were applied to other articles, including lard, salted beef, earthenware, mahogany wood, olive oil, construction timber, leather, shoes, tar, tallow, rice, and coffee. These reforms continued in 1843 and 1844. Prohibitions [II-353] were abolished, duties on raw materials were lowered to a maximum limit of 50 percent, and duties on most manufactured goods were reduced to 12 or 20 percent. Contrary to the predictions of the old Tories, who lamented seeing the leader of the Conservative Party abandon the sacred ark of protectionism, these reforms benefited both the public Treasury and consumers. Despite, or rather because of, the reduction in duties, the ordinary revenue, which had fallen to 47,917,000 pounds in 1841, rose to 48,125,000 pounds in 1844.

As the Bank's charter expired in 1844, Robert Peel had it renewed by the act that bears his name. This act, whose provisions have been detailed elsewhere (see BANK), was one of his less successful ideas. It did not withstand, as is known, the crisis of 1847: its effects had to be suspended to avoid a commercial and financial catastrophe.

In 1845, emboldened by the success of his initial commercial reforms, Robert Peel advanced further along this useful and glorious path. Duties on raw materials used in manufacturing, on dyeing materials, and on oils were abolished. Glass and crystal manufacturing were simultaneously freed from all excise duties. Sugar received an initial tax relief; cotton and wool were exempted, along with 430 articles (out of 812) of lesser importance. Finally, these reforms were crowned in 1846 by the abolition of the Corn Laws, which the Anti-Corn Law League had been preparing for eight years (see LEAGUE). Given the harvest deficit in Great Britain, the appalling famine that ravaged Ireland, and the agitation of minds stirred by the League’s preachings, the abolition of the Corn Laws had become a necessity. Robert Peel understood this. Nevertheless, he felt that it was not for him, who had long opposed this reform in the name of the protectionist party, to carry it out. He wished to leave this honor to the Whigs, and he tendered his resignation. But when Lord John Russell failed to form a cabinet, he resumed his post with a firm resolution to satisfy public opinion despite the resistance from his own party. At the opening of Parliament (January 22, 1846), he announced the reform of the Corn Laws, and five days later (January 27), he proposed their abolition in his financial plan. This news provoked the highest degree of anger among the protectionists; but Robert Peel did not yield any more to their clamor than he had to that of Protestant zealots during Catholic emancipation. Thanks to the moral authority he had gained by yielding to public opinion and to his persuasive eloquence, he succeeded in having his plan adopted by the House of Commons, and the support of the Duke of Wellington secured the same success in the House of Lords. After winning this glorious victory, Robert Peel left the government to Lord John Russell, whom he consistently supported on commercial issues. The support of the battalion of Peelites , that is, the Conservatives who had abandoned the old banner of protectionism along with Robert Peel, enabled the realization of the sugar tariff reform and the reform of the Navigation Laws. In the last days of June 1850, Robert Peel delivered a speech in which he eloquently justified the disinterested support he gave to the Whig cabinet and expressed his full confidence in the future of commercial reform:

“Far from having made the slightest compromise regarding the principles of free trade with the members who sit beside me and whose confidence I have unfortunately lost, I solemnly repeat that each passing day convinces me more and more that the peace and prosperity of this country are intimately linked to the full and unreserved adoption of these principles.”

Just a few days later, a fall from his horse left Robert Peel battered, mortally wounded, on the cobblestones of Constitution Hill (June 29). Three days later, he breathed his last. In accordance with his final wishes, his body was buried without pomp in the modest cemetery of Drayton-Bassett. However, at the proposal of Lord John Russell, the House of Commons decided that a monument would be erected to his memory in Westminster Abbey. Statues have also been raised in his honor in several English cities.

The success of the great reforms accomplished by Robert Peel has been increasingly confirmed. To grasp the importance of these reforms, one need only consider that out of 1,250 items subject to tariffs, Robert Peel abolished or reduced around 750, and that the total amount of duties reduced or removed by him and Lord John Russell from 1842 to 1850 was no less than 10,251,295 pounds sterling. [7]Yet what was the final loss that such a radical reform caused the Treasury? In the end, it amounted to only 774,000 pounds sterling. Moreover, the reduction of public relief expenditures, the progressive increase in imports and exports, the rising number of marriages, etc., have demonstrated how much commercial reform has benefited the vast majority of the English people. Even the fiercest adversaries of Sir Robert Peel, Lord Derby (formerly Lord Stanley) and Mr. Disraeli, were forced to respect his work when they came to power, and they were overthrown for not having pursued it with enough vigor. The name of Robert Peel has become popular even in the countryside, where he was once cursed by the staunch supporters of protectionism. Both rural and urban workers now gratefully hang in their homes the portrait of the man who gave them the benefits of affordable living. [8]

Thus is [II-354] fulfilled the touching wish that Robert Peel expressed at the height of the struggle for the repeal of the Corn Laws:

"It may be that I leave behind a name that will be remembered with pleasure in the home of the man who earns his daily bread by the sweat of his brow, when he is allowed to restore his exhausted strength with abundant, affordable food, all the more enjoyable because it will no longer be embittered by the feeling of injustice.”

The Life of the Right Honourable Sir Robert Peel, Bart, as Subject and Citizen, as Legislator and Minister, and as Patron of Learning and the Arts. By William Harvey. London, George Routledge, 1850, 1 vol. in-18.

Endnotes to Peel

[7] Customs Duties: £8,218,958; Excise: £1,434,280; Stamp Duties: £598,056. Total: £10,251,294

[8] Speech by Mr. Villiers, House of Commons session, November 23, 1852

Saint-Pierre (abbé de)

Source

"Saint-Pierre (abbé de)," DEP, T. 2, pp. 565-66.

Text

[II-565]

SAINT-PIERRE (Charles-Irénée-Castel, abbé de). The author of the Projet de paix perpétuelle and one of the most ardent friends of humanity, was born on February 18, 1658, at the château of Saint-Pierre-Église near Barfleur. His family was allied to that of Marshal de Villars. Possessing a modest income, he moved to Paris to pursue a career in literature and science after having taken ecclesiastical orders, in accordance with the wishes of his parents. In 1695, he was accepted as a member of the Académie française; but having judged Louis XIV with just severity, reproaching him for having waged unjust wars against his neighbors, crushed the people with taxes, and revoked the Edict of Nantes, he was expelled from this institution at the request of Cardinal de Polignac (1718). Of the twenty-three academicians present at the session where his exclusion was pronounced, only one, Fontenelle, dared to vote in his favor. After his death, Maupertuis, who succeeded him, was unable to obtain authorization to deliver his eulogy. It was only thirty-two years later that the interdiction was lifted, and that d'Alembert was able to pay a well-deserved tribute to the memory of the worthy and courageous predecessor of Maupertuis. In 1702, the abbé de Saint-Pierre purchased the office of premier chaplain to Madame la Duchesse d'Orléans, through whose intervention he obtained the abbey of Tiron. In 1712, Abbé de Polignac took him to the Congress of Utrecht, where the difficulties encountered in concluding peace inspired him with the idea for his famous Projet de paix perpétuelle (Project for Perpetual Peace). The abbé de Saint-Pierre attributed this project to Henry IV in order to make it more readily accepted. The Bishop of Fréjus, later Cardinal de Fleury, to whom he presented it, responded: "You have forgotten an essential article: that of sending missionaries to touch the hearts of princes and persuade them to adopt your views." From that time forward, the abbé de Saint-Pierre dedicated his life to formulating reform projects, which he never failed to submit to princes and ministers, with the rather naive hope of securing their approval. He was the first, according to d'Alembert, to use or revive the word bienfaisance (charity); and he did not merely use the word, but largely practiced the virtue it signifies, dedicating most of his income to relieving the suffering of the unfortunate. To give and to forgive were, in his view, the foundation of all morality. The abbé de Saint-Pierre died in Paris on April 27, 1743, at the age of 85. He left behind several manuscripts. His nephew entrusted them, along with his other writings, to Jean-Jacques Rousseau so that he might make the best use of them. Jean-Jacques limited himself to making extracts from the Projet de paix perpétuelle and Polysynodie, the work for which the abbé de Saint-Pierre had been expelled from the Académie. "I stopped there," he said, "not wanting to expose myself, by repeating the censures of the abbé de Saint-Pierre, to being asked what business it was of mine." (Confessions, Book IX).

Cardinal Dubois was accustomed to saying that the ideas of the author of the Projet de paix perpétuelle were "the dreams of a good man." Without a doubt, the peoples of the world have not yet forgotten [II-566] their centuries-old animosities; nor do they yet fully understand, although bitter experience has taught them, how much they have at stake in maintaining peace. However, who can say whether, thanks to the progress that facilitates the exchange of products and the diffusion of knowledge, thanks to railways, electric telegraphs, and free trade, not to mention the many other advances that each day brings forth, the "dreams of a good man" may not one day become realities?

Here is a list of the principal works of the abbé de Saint-Pierre:

Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe, etc. Utrecht (Paris), 1713-1717, 3 vols. in-12. The same work abridged. Rotterdam (Paris), 1729, in-12. The author proposed the establishment of a kind of senate or arbitration tribunal under the name Diète européenne, composed of members from all civilized nations, tasked with settling disputes between princes without bloodshed.

Mémoire pour l'établissement d'une taille proportionnelle, 1718, in-12 and in-4. Reprinted under the title Projet d'une taille tarifée, 1718, in-4. This project, which substituted a fixed tax for the arbitrary tax usually levied, was adopted by several provincial intendants.

Discours sur la polysynodie, 1718, in-4. In this work, the abbé de Saint-Pierre refused to grant Louis XIV the title of "Great."

Mémoire sur les pauvres mendiants et sur les moyens de les faire subsister, 1724, in-8.

Mémoire pour diminuer le nombre des procès, 1725, in-12. The author recommended, among other remedies, the establishment of a uniform legal code for the entire kingdom.

Mémoire pour augmenter les revenus des bénéfices, 1725, in-8.

Projet pour perfectionner l'éducation, 1728, in-12. It is in the preface of this work that the word bienfaisance appears for the first time.

Projet pour perfectionner l'orthographe des langues de l'Europe, 1730, in-8. The author proposed adopting a spelling system based on pronunciation, marking syllable length, etc. However, as he applied his system to his own writings, he made them extremely difficult to decipher.

Ouvrages de politique et de morale, Rotterdam, 1738-1741, 10 vols. in-12. This is a collection of most of his minor works.

Annales politiques, new edition, Geneva (Lyon, Duplain), 1767, 2 vols. in-8. A summarized extract of his writings and views.

Alletz published Les rêves d'un homme de bien qui peuvent se réaliser, ou les Vues utiles et praticables de l'abbé de Saint-Pierre, Paris, 1775, in-12. This is a compilation arranged alphabetically.

He is also credited with a work entitled Mémoire sur les billets d'État.

Sully (duc de)

Source

"Sully (duc de)," DEP, T. 2, pp. 684-85.

Text

[II-684]

SULLY (Maximilien de BÉTHUNE, duc de), superintendent of finances and grand master of artillery, one of the statesmen who have most honored France, was born in Rosny on December 13, 1560, to François de Béthune and Charlotte d'Auvet. He entered the service of the King of Navarre, later Henry IV, at a young age and formed a close friendship with him. He distinguished himself through his brilliant valour in several battles, notably at Coutras and Ivry. Henry IV, who early recognized the eminent qualities of his companion-in-arms, entrusted him with several important negotiations, and in 1596, appointed him to oversee the finances. A failed attempt to take Arras due to lack of funds had left the king in dire straits. In his characteristically vivid language, he blamed his misery on the financiers: “Their rapacity,” he said, “had reduced him to having barely any horse on which he could fight, not a complete set of armor he could wear, his shirts were torn, his doublets frayed at the elbows, and his pot often overturned.” Sully accepted the difficult mission of restoring his master’s finances, and thanks to his sense of order, strict economy, and tireless activity, he succeeded brilliantly. [9]

“As soon as he was vested with Henry IV’s confidence,” says M. Blanqui, “he began by thoroughly studying the expenses and resources of France and drafted the first budget that served as the basis for public accounting. His investigations revealed a debt of about 300 million francs by the end of 1596; he immediately devoted himself without respite to creating the means necessary to extinguish it. His principal maxim was to allocate each portion of expenditure to a corresponding revenue source, without allowing it ever to be diverted for another use. He curbed the greed of the financiers, who exploited the country so audaciously that, out of the 150 million francs levied from taxpayers, barely 30 million entered the public treasury. He forbade tax collectors from seizing, under any pretext, the livestock and farming tools of peasants in arrears, and the harshest penalties were imposed on soldiers who harassed the peasants, whether during their marches or upon reaching their quarters, which was one of the most horrendous scourges of the time. No less firmness was required to restrain the avarice of provincial governors, who had gone so far as to levy taxes for their own benefit and by their sole authority. The Duke of Épernon, who profited to the tune of 60,000 crowns through such extortions, dared to resist Sully, who, as Forbonnais recounts, defended his financial activity as a man of war would.

“The courageous minister, after bringing to heel all these plunderers of high and low rank, soon understood and often repeated that to enrich the prince, it was necessary to enrich his subjects. All his efforts were therefore directed toward improving agriculture, which he considered the country’s primary industry. He lavished every possible encouragement upon it, and within a few years, much of the land that had fallen into neglect due to the ravages of war had been restored to cultivation. He abolished the most burdensome restrictions on circulation and eliminated the special privileges of every kind that courtly maneuvering had extracted from the king.”

This system of wise financial economy, which founded the prosperity of the public treasury on the relief of taxpayers, inevitably bore good fruit: finances recovered swiftly, and by the time of Henry IV's death, Sully had managed to amass a surplus of 42 million, deposited in cash at the Bastille. He has been criticized for removing such a considerable sum from circulation to let it lie dormant in a fortress, but if one considers, on the one hand, that at that time governments did not have recourse to public loans, and on the other hand, that it would have been difficult to find a secure investment for their savings, one will, we believe, recognize that the accumulation of this reserve was an act of prudent foresight. In twelve years of peace and good administration, the wounds of civil war largely healed, and Henry IV could entertain the hope that even the humblest of his subjects would one day be able to “put a chicken in the pot on Sundays.” However, Sully had to face daily struggles against the courtiers and mistresses of the king. He fiercely and unwaveringly resisted their attempts to appropriate taxpayers' money. One day, when the Duchess of Verneuil was trying to persuade him that it was just and reasonable for the king to grant endowments and gifts to his relatives and mistresses, Sully replied with somewhat blunt frankness:

"All that would be fine, madam, if His Majesty were taking [II-685] the money from his own purse; but to levy it from merchants, artisans, farmers, and shepherds is utterly unreasonable, as they are the ones who feed the king and all of us, and they are content with a single master without having to support so many cousins, relatives, and mistresses."

The king, who understood the worth of such a servant, had the good sense not to sacrifice him to his mistresses. He even gave a harsh reply one day to Gabrielle d'Estrées, who was complaining about Sully: "I could do without ten mistresses like you more easily than without one servant like him."

Sully, a precursor to the school of physiocrats in this respect, valued agriculture above all else, considering it the source of all wealth. "Tillage and pasturage," he was fond of saying, "these are the two breasts that nourish France, the true mines and treasures of Peru." This somewhat overly exclusive focus on agricultural interests led him to neglect industry; he even mistreated certain branches of production that he regarded as parasitic and harmful. As M. Blanqui notes, he was horrified at the thought of allowing silk manufacturing to develop in France and sought to curb the rise of luxury in clothing through sumptuary laws. He reinforced restrictive regulations on guilds and trades, refused to abolish the customs post at Valence that hindered commerce between France and Italy, and introduced measures to prevent foreign currency from circulating in France. However, despite these errors, which were a product of his time, Sully had adopted an economic and financial policy that could still serve as a model today. He brilliantly summarized its principles in a note presented to the king, which is reproduced in his Memoirs:

"To see if my ideas aligned with his own, the king wished me to provide him with a note listing everything I believed capable of undermining or merely tarnishing the glory of a powerful kingdom. I present it here as a summary of the principles that guided me. The causes of the ruin or weakening of monarchies are: excessive taxation; monopolies, especially on grain; neglect of commerce, trade, ploughing the fields, and crafts; the excessive number of offices, the cost of these positions, and the excessive authority of those who hold them; the expense, delays, and iniquity of justice; idleness, luxury, and everything related to them; debauchery and the corruption of morals; the confusion of social ranks; fluctuations in currency; unjust and reckless wars; the despotism of sovereigns; their blind attachment to certain individuals; their bias in favor of certain social classes or professions; the greed of ministers and courtiers; the debasement of the nobility; the disdain and neglect of scholars; the tolerance of bad customs and the violation of good laws; the excessive number of burdensome edicts and unnecessary regulations."

To be fair, Sully did not always adhere to his own maxims, particularly when he refused to abolish the customs post at Valence. But overall, he remained consistent in his policies. It is regrettable that later deviations favored, as Colbert did, the development of manufacturing at the expense of agriculture.

It was while on his way to visit Sully, who resided at the Arsenal as Grand Master of Artillery, that Henry IV fell under the dagger of Ravaillac. Immediately after the death of this monarch, who had valued his services so highly, Sully resigned from his offices and retired to the countryside, where he devoted himself to writing his memoirs. He was then fifty-one years old and had administered the finances for fourteen years. Louis XIII, whom he occasionally advised, conferred upon him the title of Marshal of France in 1634. Sully died on December 22, 1641, at his estate in Villebon, leaving behind the reputation of a great administrator and an honest man, although he was sometimes reproached for being too concerned with increasing his personal fortune. He was married twice: first to Anne de Courtenay, and then to Rachel de Cochefilet, who survived him and had a magnificent tomb built for him in Nogent-le-Rotrou.

Mémoires de Sully, ou Économies royales, arranged by the abbé de l'Écluse.

“We possess few historical monuments as precious as the Mémoires of Sully, to which he gave the title Économies royales. It is an extensive narrative of the events of Henry IV’s reign, the operations of the government, and especially of Sully’s administration. The work provides fascinating details on the private life of the king, that of his minister, and the intrigues of the court. The structure of the narrative is quite unusual: Sully’s secretaries recount to their master the circumstances of his life, which he certainly must have known better than anyone. It has been suggested that these well-informed secretaries are fictional characters introduced to spare Sully the discomfort of recounting his own deeds. Sully published the first two volumes in 1634. The title, undated, claims that the printing took place in Amsterdam, but in reality, it was produced at the Château de Sully. This first edition is known as the édition aux VV verts, due to the green embellishments on the vignette. The third and fourth volumes were published in Paris in 1662, twenty years after Sully’s death, under the supervision of the scholar Jean Le Laboureur. Since then, numerous reprints have appeared.

“In 1743, the abbé de l'Écluse undertook to reorganize these Mémoires according to a new order and in a modern style, as the original text was difficult to read due to its poor composition. This effort is not without merit, particularly because of the accompanying notes; however, historical accuracy is too often altered through omissions, extensive rewriting of facts, ideas, and style. Sully and the figures of his time appear in a modernized guise that distorts their true nature.”

(Biographie universelle, article on SULLY.)

“This book will forever remain worthy of consultation, as it marks the starting point of the economic reforms that put an end to the abuses of the Middle Ages and ultimately led to the French Revolution.” (BLANQUI.)

Endnotes to Sully

[9] Histoire de l'Économie politique, par Blanqui. T. I, chap. XXV.

Cities and Towns↩

Source

“Villes,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 833-38.

In John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill, & Co., 1899). First edition 1881. Vol 1 Abdication-Duty, “Cities and Towns,” pp. 468-73. Trans. E. J. Leonard.

Text

[833]

I. How towns originate. Circumstances which determine the choice of location or lead to its abandonment.

Towns are aggregations of people and of industries, and they are formed under the natural pressure to satisfy certain needs. Their development is in no way arbitrary. Sometimes princes have entertained the illusion that they had only to issue a royal fiat to make a new city rise and flourish; but experience has rarely failed to convince them that they had presumed too much with their power. Without doubt, a monarch may, by changing the seat of his empire, as Peter the Great did, for example, create a center of population and wealth. The public functionaries of all grades and those who aspire to these positions, being obliged to live in the capital and to spend their salaries or incomes there, necessarily attract around them a population of tradesmen, artisans, and domestic servants; but, unless the new city provides a location favorable for certain branches of production (and in this case the intervention of the government is not necessary in order to found it) there will be no significant development. However, here one exception should be made. If the government continually enlarges its functions, if it attempts to pursue of a policy of centralisation and communism [1] at the expense of the liberties of the country, and, in consequence, increases the number of persons in its employ, the town where it has established the seat of its power will not fail to grow and to acquire wealth: but it is questionable whether the country will have a reason, in this case, to be pleased with the prosperity of its capital. If, on the contrary, the government has only limited powers, if it has only a few persons in its employ, its capital, in case no other industry can be advantageously established there, will be forced to occupy a very modest position in comparison with the centers of manufacturing or commercial production. Such is the case with Washington, the capital of the American Union. J. B. Say has clearly shown in his Traité this powerlessness of governments to establish cities and towns and make them prosperous.

“It is not sufficient,” he says, “to lay out a town and to give it a name, for it to exist in fact, it must be furnished by degrees with industrial talents, with tools, raw materials, and everything necessary to maintain the workmen until their products may be completed and sold; otherwise, instead of founding a town, one has only put up theatrical scenery, which will soon fall, because nothing sustains it. This was the case with Yekaterinoslav, in Taurida, as the emperor Joseph II. foreshadowed, when, after having been invited to lay in due form the second stone of that town, he said to those around: ‘I have finished a vast enterprise in one day, with the empress of Russia; she has laid the first stone of a town, and I the last.’

Nor does moneyed capital suffice to establish a large manufacturing business and the active production necessary to form a town and make it grow: a locality and national institutions which favor that growth are also necessary. There are perhaps some deficiencies connected with the location of the city of Washington, which prevent its becoming a great capital; for its progress has been very slow in comparison with what is common in the United States. While the situation of Palmyra, in former times, rendered it populous and rich, notwithstanding the sandy desert by which it was surrounded, simply because it had become the entrepôt of the commerce of the Orient with Europe. The prosperity of Alexandria and Thebes in Egypt was due to the same cause. The decree of its rulers would not alone have sufficed to make it into a city with a hundred gates and as populous as Herodotus represents it. The key to its importance must be sought in its position between the Red Sea and the Nile, between India and Europe. [2]

[834]

Let us now attempt to give a brief outline of the requirements which have determined the establishment of towns and the choice of their location. The necessity of providing for their security must, more than any other cause, have originally prompted men to create towns. They understood that by joining together in fortified places, they would be more secure than if they were scattered over a vast extent of territory. To this necessity, which was felt by mankind in the earlier ages, were joined the special advantages of manufacturers and commerce. While agricultural production extends, from its nature, over a considerable surface, most of the branches of industrial and commercial production require, on the contrary, a certain concentration. Let any one examine them in the various civilized countries, and he will find they have collected about a few centres. Thus, in France, the silk industry has its principal seats at Lyons and Saint Etienne; the cotton industry at Lille, Rouen, and Mulhouse; the wool industry at Rheims, Elbeuf, Sédan, etc.; and the fashion industry is in Paris. What particular causes have determined the establishment of any industry in any particular locality rather than another, is of itself an interesting subject of investigation. Sometimes it has been the vicinity of the raw material, or of a market, sometimes the special aptitudes of the people, and again a combination of these various circumstances.

The location of the industries does not stop here: in the towns where they become established, we see them select certain quarters and certain streets as their centres. This sub-localization by quarters and streets is notably observable in Paris; and one may find some interesting remarks on the subject in the Inquiry into the Industries of Paris undertaken under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce. [3] The same fact is observable in civilizations which have little analogy with ours. To cite only one example: a Spanish traveler, Don Rodrigo de Vivéro, who gave, in 1608, an interesting description of Yeddo, the capital of Japan, mentions this distribution of the industries through certain quarters and streets as the most salient feature which had attracted his attention. [4]

“All the streets,” he says, “have covered galleries, and each one is occupied by persons of the same business. Thus the carpenters have one street, the tailors another, the jewelers another, etc. The tradesmen are distributed in the same manner. Provisions are also sold in places appropriated to each kind. Lastly, the nobles and important personages have a quarter by themselves. This quarter is distinguished by the armorial bearings, sculptured or painted over the doors of the houses.”

With the exception of a few slight differences, is not this description applicable to most of the capitals of Europe? Thus the same economic necessities are felt in the most varied civilizations, and give them a common form.

Numerous causes, however, are constantly at work, to change the location of industries, and in consequences, of the centres of population supported by these industries. The usual result of every industrial or commercial improvement is to move the place where production occurs. When the route around the cape of Good Hope was discovered, Venice lost much of her importance. Later, the invention of machines for spinning and weaving cotton built up the prosperity of Manchester at the expense of that of Benares and other cities of India, which had previously been the centres of cotton manufactures. In like manner we to-day see steam locomotion give rise to new cities or exert sudden pressure on old ones which were remaining stationary. The city of Southampton, for example, acquired in a few years considerable importance, because its port was thought well adapted to be a center to some lines of ocean steamers. Let a [838] new system of navigation appear, and perhaps Southampton will be abandoned for another port whose situation is more in harmony with the particular requirements of the new system. Thus cities and towns experience, to their advantage or detriment, the influence of causes which modify from day to day the conditions of existence and production. We said above that governments have only have a weak power to create new towns, and, above all, to make them prosperous. We might add that neither do they possess to any higher degree the power of destroying existing towns or changing their location. In vain did the victorious barbarians employ fire and sword in the cities they had conquered; in vain did they plow up the ground of these condemned cities and sow them with salt: as it was not in their power to destroy the natural advantages which had led the people to gather there, in a few years the mischief was repaired and life circulated more freely than ever in the very places that a foolish pride had devoted to eternal solitude. Barriers to the free circulation of men and things have unfortunately been more effective than projectiles or incendiary torches, in destroying the centres of population and wealth. Many a flourishing city has been transformed into a veritable necropolis by restrictions depriving it of its commerce or of a market for its products. In the seventeenth century we find a notable instance of this. The Dutch, jealous of the prosperity of Antwerp, succeeded in obtaining the closing of the Scheldt river (by the Treaty of Munster 1648) and this barbarous measure, which was continued in force for two centuries, gave a mortal blow to the commerce of Antwerp and to the industries of the Flemish people, of which the Antwerp merchants had been the active intermediary agents. More recently, we have seen the port of Bordeaux, formerly one of the most frequented in France, deserted as a result of the system of trade prohibition.

Population and wealth are not only changed by being displaced from one town to another; they change from place to place within the same town. New quarters arise within the towns or in their suburbs, while the old ones are abandoned and fall into decay. These local changes are brought about by causes, manifest or latent, whose action modifies in the course of time the requirements or conveniences which had determined the choice of the first location. The general improvement in security [5] may be considered the most important of these causes. Let us dwell a moment on this point.

The old towns of Europe were, for the most part, built on elevated plateaus or on hills more or less steep; so that their inhabitants had constantly to ascend and descend, which occasioned a considerable waste of energy in daily transportation. Besides, these towns were usually restricted to a narrow enclosure, the dwellings pressed upon one another like the cells in a hive. Why was it that our ancestors dwelt in a manner so devoid of economy, so uncomfortable, and sometimes so unhealthy? To explain this curious fact we must take into account the condition of Europe after the invasion of the barbarians. Insecurity was then universal. The conquerors had built retreats for themselves in the most inaccessible places, and they swept down like vultures from their nests, over the neighboring regions, to pillage or make them pay ransom money. Too weak to resist, the former inhabitants of the country, who were the victims of their plundering, came to terms with them, as one comes to terms with bandits in countries where the government is without power. They secured the protection of the most powerful bands by paying them a regular tribute, and they had their dwellings as near as possible to their protectors. They generally settled around strong castles, so as to be able to take refuge in them in case of danger. The first houses were situated just below the castle, and the others were placed lower and lower down the slope, like an amphitheatre. As soon as the inhabitants became sufficiently numerous, they surrounded their city with walls and towers to complete their system of defense. Thus were built most of the towns which originated in the middle ages.

When we consider the necessities of the times, the narrowness of the streets is also explicable. It was due to the fact that the fortifications had been made within as restricted a circle as possible, in order to make the defense easier and less costly. When the population increased, they were consequently obliged to build their houses higher and to reduce the width of the streets, in order to keep within their original limits. Sometimes, indeed, they moved the walls back; but it was only as a last resort that they submitted to a measure so costly.

But by degrees general security increased. The feudal system disappeared, and with it the internal wars ended. Then began a movement which resulted in changing the location of the city population. From the heights to which care for their safety had obliged them to confine themselves, they descended to the plains, where they could dwell more comfortably and at less expense. The faubourgs (suburbs) owe their origin to that increase of security which allowed peaceable men engaged in the industries to live henceforth outside the city fortifications. [6] Accelerated, moreover, by another cause, [836] which we shall consider later, this displacement of the town population has become generally more and more general: everywhere we see the inhabitants of the old towns leave the homes they have dwelt in for ages, to occupy new homes, less expensive, more comfortable, and more healthful.

II. Of the relative size of city or town and country population. Causes which determine and modify it.

The foundation and choice of location of cities and towns are determined, as we have just seen, by the state of civilization and of the technology of production. The same is true of the proportion between the population and wealth of towns and of rural districts. This proportion is essentially diverse and variable. It differs according to the countries and the time. When production has made little progress, when men are obliged, in consequence, to employ the greater part of the productive forces at their disposal in procuring for themselves the necessities of life, the industries which provide for less urgent wants can not be developed, for lack of consumers. The towns where these industries center because of their nature and their special fitness for them, progress in that case only with extreme slowness. It is then in countries and at times when production, and especially agricultural production, has realized the most progress, that the town population must be, and in fact is, the greatest.

Let us take for examples two countries whose positions in the scale of production are very unlike, viz., England and Russia. In England, where the town population exceeds by far the rural population, the number of families engaged in agriculture was estimated in 1840 at only 961,134, while that of families engaged in manufactures, commerce, etc., was 2,453,041.

The 961,134, families engaged in agriculture furnished 1,055,982 effective laborers, who produced enough food to sustain the greater part of the English people. In countries where agriculture is less advanced, two or three times as many hands, relatively, are required to give an equivalent product: and the natural result is that the town population can not be so numerous. [7] Such is the case in France; such is especially the case in Russia, where the agricultural production undertaken by the serfs has remained in its infancy. According to M. Tégoborski, one can only count 733 towns having a population of 5,356,000 inhabitants out of a total population of about 60 million, while in Austria there are 773 towns, in Prussia 979, in France 901, for populations numerically smaller. The backward state of Russian agriculture is certainly the primary cause of the small growth of urban population in Russia. The peculiar organization of the industries there has also had somewhat to do with the result. [8]

“The manufacture of small articles,” says M. Tegoborski, “such as are made in the various trades, is located, in Russia, in the rural districts rather than in the towns: it is carried on by village communities, which take the product of their labor to the fairs: this is why the fairs in Russia are of more importance than in other countries. In other countries the workmen in the towns, for the most part, supply the demands of the rural districts: with us, it is often the reverse, and the shoemakers, joiners, and locksmiths of the villages provide for the wants of the townsmen. … Any one may obtain convincing proof of this lack of artisans in Russia, in most of our towns, by examining the statistics of the trades of other countries and taking some of the most common as a basis of comparison. Thus, for example, in Prussia, the trades of shoemakers, glove makers, joiners, wheelwrights, glaziers, blacksmiths, locksmiths, and braziers numbered, in 1843, 322,760 masters and journeymen for a population of 15,471,765, being 21 workmen to 1,000 inhabitants: and when we take the statistics of the towns, this proportion rises in the large towns, to 40 workmen, masters and journeymen, belonging to these various trades, to 1,000 inhabitants of the total town population, which is three, four, or even more times the proportion we find in the towns of Russia.”

In our day improvements which effect an economic change in production result in a rapid increase of the town population. From what has heretofore been said we may conceive that it would be so. [9]

“In France, for example,” says M. Alf. Legoyt, “the population increased, from 1836 to 1851, 6.68 per cent. For the entire period, or 0.44 per cent. per annum. In 166 towns having 10,000 souls and over, the increase in the same interval was 24.24 per cent. or 1.616 per cent. a year. In 10 years the increase of the town population was then 16 per cent., while that of the total population was only 6 per cent.

The case is similar in England. According to the tables of the last census, the town population of Great Britain (England and Scotland), which was in 1801 only 3,046,371, attained in 1851 the number of 8,410,021. This is an increase of 176 per cent., while the total increase of the population in the same period, was only 98 per cent. And if we observe in what towns the increase has been the most considerable, we find in the first place the great manufacturing towns and the commercial ports. While the population of the county towns increased only 122 per cent., that of the manufacturing ones increased 224 per cent., [837] and that of the seaports, London excepted, 195 per cent. In the towns devoted especially to iron industries, the increase was 289 per cent., and in the centres of cotton manufacture, 282 per cent.

Every improvement in the technology of production can only accelerate this increase of the town population. Should we lament it, or rejoice at it? This is a much contested question, but the economists agree in deciding it in favor of the cities. Adam Smith and J. B. Say, notably, prove that the multiplication and the enlargement of towns are desirable, even looking at the matter with reference to the interests of the rural districts. Adam Smith, who examined this subject with his usual insight, concludes that the rural districts have derived three principal benefits from the development of manufacturing and commercial towns. [10]

1. By affording a great and ready market for the rude produce of the country, they gave encouragement to its cultivation and further improvement. This benefit was not even confined to the countries in which they were situated, but extended to all those with which they had any dealings.
2. The wealth acquired by the inhabitants of cities was frequently employed in purchasing such lands as were to be sold, of which a great part would frequently be uncultivated. Merchants are commonly ambitious of becoming country gentlemen; and when they do, they are generally the best of all improvers. A merchant is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in profitable projects; whereas a mere country gentleman is accustomed to employ it chiefly in expense, etc.
3. and lastly. Commerce and manufacturers gradually introduced order and good government, and, with them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbors, and of servile dependency upon their superiors.
309.

The development of the town population is not then a fact at which we need be troubled. Doubtless temptations are greater and bad examples more numerous in town than in the country; but how much more abundant and within the reach of all are the means of enlightenment and moral improvement! The statistics of criminal justice show, that the town population does not furnish a proportionally greater contingent of criminals than the rural population; and yet it is worthy of note that the police is much more effective in towns than it can be in the rest of the country. [11]

The same improvements which increase the town population, tend also to improve their dwellings. Under the influence of improved security, we have seen towns descend from the summit of plateaus and the sides of hills, to the plains: we shall see them, according to all appearances, extend over a wider and wider surface, as means of communication become less expensive and more rapid. Great improvements have already been realized in this direction. As well as in the cleanliness and repair of streets, and the internal comfort of dwellings and economy in their management. Who can predict what the future may yet have in store for us?

III. The administration of cities and towns. What it is, and what it ought to be.

Towns have commonly an administration of their own. Sometimes each quarter even has its own. This administration sometimes is appointed by a superior authority, in other cases from the inhabitants of the city themselves. This latter way of appointing (an administration), which obliges the administrators to answer for their actions to those who are administered, is usually the better. As to the course to pursue in order to govern a city well, it does not differ from that which should be pursued in the government of a nation. A city administration, like a national one, should exercise only such functions which, by their nature, cannot be left to competition between private individuals. [12] Now these functions are not numerous, and they become less and less so, as progress causes the obstacles to disappear which either prevent or obstruct the action of competition. [13] In fact, whatever the zeal or the devotion of a municipal administration, it is not in the nature of things that the services which are organized in common in the city should be of as much importance as those which are left to private individuals. Doubtless the desire [838] to merit public esteem should press the administrators to do well: but does this motive ever prove as powerful as the interest which stimulates private industry? We may prefer the intervention of municipalities to that of the (central) government for the organization of certain services, and the establishment and maintenance of certain regulations of public utility; but it is well, as far as possible, to dispense with both.

Unfortunately, municipal administrations have the defect of all governments; they like to assume importance, and, with that view, they are constantly enlarging their powers and, in consequence, the amount of their expenses. In our times they are especially possessed with a mania for undertaking public works and buildings. [14] They appear convinced that by demolishing old quarters at the expense of new; by by erecting building upon building; by giving, on the least pretext, balls, concerts, and grand displays of fire works, they contribute effectively to the prosperity and greatness of their cities. Need we say that they are going directly away from the end they wish to attain? These public works, these buildings, these sumptuous entertainments, are very costly, and recourse must always be had at last to taxes, to cover the expenses. Then they tax a multitude of things which serve to feed, clothe, shelter, and warm the population, among whom exists a class, unfortunately the most numerous, who barely possess the means of providing for the absolute necessities of (their) existence. In a word, the expense of city living is artificially increased. And with what result? Population and manufactures relocate as far as possible from a locality where lavishly spending city administrators have permanently established high prices: they settle in preference outside the limits where this economic plague rages. [15] And (and it is a point worthy of note) this change of location, so fatal to landowners in the old towns, has become easier and easier. At a time when lack of security forced people to concentrate in localities which nature had fortified and where technology came to the aid of nature, when, on the other hand, the difficulty of constructing artificial means of communication and maintaining them in good condition rendered the natural ways, such as navigable rivers more valuable, the number of locations suited to become centres of population, was very limited. At the same time the slowness with which private dwellings and public buildings were constructed, (years were sometimes devoted to the building of a house, and centuries to the construction of a cathedral), condemned the people who changed their location, to endless privations and discomforts. Circumstances combined to give existing towns, considered as places of residence, a veritable natural monopoly. But, influenced by the progress already mentioned, this monopoly is disappearing more and more, and as a result, it daily becomes easier for the people to rid themselves of the burden which a bad administration imposes upon them. [16] Nor do they neglect to do so; for we see them abandoning towns where the expenses of living is too great, (commencing in the quarters less favorably situated), and enlarging the faubourgs or creating, farther away, new centres of activity and wealth. [17] Thus, by drawing largely on the wallets of tax payers and unscrupulously issuing any number of bills of credit on future generations, high spending city administrators, far from adding to the prosperity of their cities, end by precipitating them into inevitable ruin. Economy in expenditure should be the supreme rule in the government of cities, as well as in the government of nations. By observing this rule, much more than by increasing the number of old buildings demolished, new ones built, or by holding public festivals, municipal administrations may acquire serious and lasting claims to public gratitude.

Endnotes to Cities and Towns

[1] "Se faire de la centralisation et du communism." Molinari is using the word "communism" in the sense of community or government control instead of private and voluntary activities. He is not using it in the sense given to the word in the late 19th century to mean government ownership and control of "the means of production" as argued by Karl Marx and his followers.

[2] (Molinari's note.) Treatise on Political Economy, by J. B. Say, Book II, chap. 11. [*editor's note*: guillaumin 1841 ed., p. 433. this translation was made e. j. leonard for the lalor edition.]

[3] (Molinari's note.) "When the industries are destined to provide for daily consumption," we read in the Enquête, "they are located within reach of the consumers; when they contribute their products to commerce, they are situated with especial consideration of the means of production. The industries which supply food are almost all of the former class; those which are devoted to the manufacturer of articles known in trade as "articles de Paris" (Parisian luxury goods) are in the second. Among the furniture industries there are also certain ones whose work is offered directly to the consumers, and others which are more particularly devoted to manufacture. Consequently we find upholsterers in all parts of the city, while the manufacture of furniture is situated, on the contrary, almost exclusively in the eighth arrondissement, as the making of bronze wares is located in the sixth and seventh. Of 1,915 cabinet makers, doing a business of 27,982,950 francs, 1,093, with 19,679,835 francs, are in the eighth arrondissement. And of 257 makers of chairs, doing a business of 5,061,540 francs, 197, with 3,373,950 francs, are also in the eighth arrondissement. To the same arrondissement belongs also the preparation of pelts and leather. The tanneries and the places for dressing leather are nearly all situated in the quarter of the Gobelins, on the banks of the little river which takes this name, on entering Paris. Chemical products are not manufactured much in the heart of Paris, but those which are made there and which require space, water, and air, come from the eighth and twelfth arrondissements. Of this number are starch, candles of wax, spermaceti, and tallow. The manufacture of pottery is also found there. Work in metals and in the construction of machinery is found especially in the eighth, sixth, and fifth arrondissements. As to the manufacture of what are generally known as "articles de Paris," it extends through the whole of an important part of the city, on the right bank of the Seine, to the north of the streets of Francs-Bourgeois and Saint Merry, and in the belt comprised between the streets Montorgueil and Poissonnière on the west, and the Place des Voges and Roquette street on the east. It is there that are made articles of gold and silver, fine jewelry as well as imitation; there are manufactured the work boxes, drawstring bags, brushes, toys, artificial flowers, umbrellas and parasols, fans, fancy stationery, combs, portfolios, pocket books, and all the multitude of various small articles." Introduction, pp. 43-44. Undertaken by Horace Say for the Chamber of Commerce of Paris,Statistique de l'Industrie à Paris (1851).

[4] (Molinari's note.) Vivéro, Memorials of the Empire of Japan in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (1850), p. 176.

[5] (Ed. note??) Like everything else Molinari thought "security" was a good which could be "produced" and which would draw interpreters to it in oder to satisfy the needs of "consumers of security." See ref??

[6] (Molinari's note.) This progress has not yet been realized everywhere. The Calabrian peasants, for example, instead of dwelling in the open country, are obliged to remain in the towns, to be safe from the bandits who infest the country. We select the following fact from the correspondence of Paul-Louis Courier: "In Calabria at present," he says, "there are woods of orange trees, forests of olive, hedges of lemon. All these are on the coast and only near towns. Not one village, not one house in the country: it is uninhabitable, for lack of government and laws. But how do they cultivate it, you will ask? The peasant lodges in the city and tills the suburbs; setting out late in the morning, and returning before evening. How could anyone venture to sleep in a house in the country? He would be slain the first night." In Paul-Louis Courier, Pamphlets politiques et littéraires de P.-L. Courier (1839), vol. 2, *"*Letter to M. de Sainte-Croix" (Sept. 12, 1806), pp. 199-200.

[7] The following two sentences were cut from the Lalor translation.

[8] (Molinari's note.) Tegoborski, Etudes sur les forces productives de la Russie (1852), vol. 1, pp. 139-41.

[9] (Molinari's note.) Alf. Legoyt, "Mouvement de la population de la France pendant l'année 1850" and "Dénombrement de la population de 1836 à 1851," in Annuaire de l'Economie politique et de la statistique pour 1853 (1853), p. 20.

[10] (Molinari's note.) Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1904). Vol. 1, book III, chap. 4 "How the commerce of the towns contributed to the improvement of the country," pp. 382-83.

[11] (Molinari's note.) The following are the statistics in regard to this matter, of the administration of justice in France, from 1826 to 1850: "More than three-fifth of those charged with offenses had a place of residence; 612 in 1,000 resided in the rural communes; 388 dwelt in the town communes. In the entire population, the percentage of the inhabitants of towns is not exactly known; but approximate estimates put it at only one-fifth of the total population. The preceding proportions differ according to the nature of the crimes. Of 1,000 charged with offenses against individuals one counts in an average year 706 inhabitants of the countryside and 294 inhabitants of towns. Of 1,000 charged with crimes against property there are now only 566 inhabitants of rural communes and 434 inhabitants of towns. If one goes down the list of the various types of crimes one finds even greater variations than this. Among those charged with arson, the highest number, relatively, is found to be from the inhabitants of the rural districts; next come those charged with poisoning, infanticide, false testimony, parricide, and obtaining titles and signatures by compulsion. These are probably the only crimes in which the country people have a larger share than they should have, considering their total number in the whole population. The proportion of country people charged with political crimes, abortion, robbery, forgery, counterfeiting money, violation of the person and criminal outrages upon children, is, on the contrary, very small. In "Report of the minister of justice," Annuaire de l'Economie politique et de la statistique pour 1853, pp. 108-9.

[12] Molinari says "abandonner à la concurrence des particuliers" (left to competition between individuals). Of course, Molinari had spent considerable time in Les Soirées showing how he thought most, if not all, government supplied public goods and other services could be better supplied privately on the free market.

[13] See the examples of how public goods could be provided privately and competitively in Les Soirées, such as in S3 (forests, canals, waterways), S8 (private banks and money, mail delivery), S9 (bakers, butchers, printers etc.), and S11 (security, police, and defence).

[14] (Ed. Note??) See Molinari's entry in the DEP on "Public Mon=uments".

[15] Molinari was struck by an expression used by J.-B. Say to describe government activities as "ulcerous" and referred to it in his DEP article on "Nations," namely "le gouvernement-ulcère" (see below p. abc). See also my essay on "Ulcerous, Leprous, and Tax-Eating Government".

[16] (Ed. Note??) See his discussion later on how "proprietary communities" might be built by property development companies which build entire suburbs with all public goods and utilizes (including security) provided for an annual fee. Ref

[17] On the economic motives which drove some people to emigrate, see his entry on "Émigration," DEP, T. 1, pp. 765-83.

Civilization↩

Source

“Civilisation,” DEP, T. 1, pp. 370-77.

Lalor: John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill,& Co., 1899). Vol. 1 Abdication-Duty. “Civilization,” pp. 485-93.

Text

[370]

Civilization is made up of the combined material and moral progress that humanity has made and that it continues to make every day. The source of this progress is to be found in the faculty which has been given to man of learning about himself and the world in which he lives, and of accumulating this knowledge, passing it on to others, and combining these all together. Thus material progress is the result of the more and more extended knowledge which observation gives us of the natural resources of our globe, and of the means of developing them; moral progress likewise is developed by means of the more and more exact and complete ideas which observation provides, of our nature, the society in which we live, and our destiny.

Man’s wants are the powerful stimulants which urge him to increase his observation and to accumulate knowledge. Nature furnishes him with the material necessary to satisfy these wants, but this material he must collect and fashion for his use. None of his appetites can be satisfied without effort and labor. Now, this effort, this labor, by the very nature of his constitution, implies suffering. It is his interest, consequently, to reduce his labor as much as possible, while increasing his satisfaction; it is his interest to obtain a maximum of satisfaction with a minimum of labor. How can he reach this end? By one means and by one means only, by applying more and more efficient processes to the production of the things he needs. And how can he discover these processes? Only by observation and experience.

Urged by hunger, primitive man attacked the animals that were least able to defend themselves, and devoured them. He discovered that the flesh of some of these animals was fit to appease his hunger, and agreeable to the taste; but it was hard for him to procure a sufficient quantity of it regularly, for most of these animals were swifter of foot than he was. Spurred on by want, he endeavored to overcome this difficulty, and succeeded. A savage more intelligent than the rest, noticing the property in certain kinds of wood which allowed them to be bent without breaking, and to straiten out again with a violent recoil after being bent, thought of utilizing this force to hurl projectiles. The bow was invented. It at once became easier for man to feed himself. He could now turn his thoughts to observation in another field and combine his observations so as to increase his enjoyments and diminish his pains. At the same time his moral wants, awakened by a multitude of mysterious phenomena, urged him onward in this direction, as well as his physical wants. Must not the terrible phenomenon of death, for instance, by filling his soul with curiosity, dread, and sometimes with grief, have incited him to penetrate the secret of his destiny? Thus, incessantly urged onward by the increasing and irresistible wants of his nature, man has never ceased, since the beginning of the world, to pile observation on observation, one kind of knowledge on another, and thus to improve his material and moral condition.

Civilization, therefore, seems to us a natural fact; it is the result of man’s very nature, of his intelligence, and his needs. Its source is in observation stimulated by self interest, and it has no limit but that of the knowledge which is given to man to accumulate and combine under the pressure of his needs. Now, this limit we can not see; whence it follows that it has been possible to say with truth that progress is indefinite.

Civilization, however, although inherent in human nature, has not equally developed among all nations. Certain peoples have remained, even to our day, plunged in the darkness of primitive barbarism, while at their very side we find civilization arrayed in all its power. To what is this inequality of development to be attributed? [371] We must attribute it to the inequality of the physical and moral faculties of the different races of men; we must attribute it also to the surroundings in the midst of which each race is developed. We must attribute it, to use the language of economists, to the amount of natural goods, both external and internal, [1] which the Creator has bestowed upon each people. Now, these raw materials of civilization are very unequally distributed: between the ignorant Botocudo [2] and the Anglo-Saxon, who has become his neighbor, the distance, from both a physical and a moral point of view, is immense, and between these two varieties of the human species, who seem to form the extreme links in the chain of the varieties, of man, we find a whole multitude of races all unequal, all different; just as, between the sands of the Sahara and the alluvial soil of Senegal there are many degrees of fertility!

We must carefully examine how these natural inequalities have acted upon civilization. If two nations, unequally favored with internal goods, be placed in similar environments, it is evident that the one best provided with this natural capital, [3] will develop more rapidly and more completely than the other. It is also clear that if two nations, equally favored with internal gifts, be placed amid unequal environments, their development also will be unequal. The influence of natural goods, and of their unequal distribution upon civilization, has not as yet, we believe, been sufficiently studied and appreciated. On the other hand, the influence of external surroundings has been much better recognized and more attention has been called to it. Jean Bodin, [4] Montesquieu, [5] and Herder, [6] clearly demonstrated its importance. They might even be accused of having exaggerated it.

However this may be, by taking well into account these natural elements of civilization, we can readily understand how certain races have reached a very high degree of civilization, while others have remained plunged in barbarism. If, for instance, we but study the natural history of the various races of men who inhabit the archipelagoes of the Pacific ocean, and their physical surroundings, we will comprehend why they have remained the most backward of the human species. In the first place, these tribes are generally of very weak intellect; they have but a small share of that faculty of observing, and of accumulating and combining their observations, which constitutes the essential driving force of civilization. In the second place, the mildness of the climate and the natural fertility of the soil enabling them to satisfy, without labor, their most basic needs, leaves their minds without any stimulant to action. Finally, their topographical situation, by isolating them from the rest of mankind, has restricted them to the development of their own resources, to their own limited elements of civilization. To obtain other resources or elements of civilization, they would have had to cross the abyss of the ocean. But to traverse the ocean, they would have had to know the art of navigation, to be acquainted with the compass, etc., a knowledge beyond the reach of their understanding. These tribes of men, lost in the immensity of the ocean, were thus condemned to languish for a longer time than the rest of mankind in the darkness of barbarism. In all probability they would still be plunged in this darkness had not light come to them from without, had not nations already advanced in civilization begun to visit them.

But suppose that these tribes, instead of being separated from civilization by the depths of the ocean, had lived on or near the main land, their condition certainly would have been very different. In the course of time they would have communicated with one another, they could have intermingled, they would have exchanged their discoveries and their products. This contact and this intermingling of tribes differently endowed, would have resulted in a civilization, coarse and incomplete, no doubt, but which would have produced a social state far superior to that of all the isolated tribes of the Polynesian archipelagoes. This is one example of the influence of natural goods, internal and external, upon civilization.

Let us give another illustration. At the opposite extremity of the scale of civilization is Great Britain. The inhabitants of Great Britain are a composite people, the product of six or seven races, which successively invaded British soil, whose different aptitudes united and combined to develop it. The natural conditions of the soil, climate, and topographical situation of Great Britain, admirably assisted the work of civilization. The soil is fertile, but its fertility is not exuberant enough to allow those who cultivate it to become the victims of indolence. The climate, although not exceedingly rigorous, renders clothing and shelter necessary to man. Lastly, Great Britain is separated from the continent by an arm of the sea, which, while it protects the inhabitants from foreign invasion, allows them easy communication with other nations abundantly provided with the elements necessary to progress. Favored by such a combination of natural advantages, civilization could not but develop rapidly.

Let us suppose, however, that the inhabitants of Great Britain had been cast upon the shores of New Zealand; [7] that, consequently, they could not intermingle with such people as those who successively came to settle beside them, nor communicate with a continent on which civilization had already shed its light, is it not likely that they would today differ very little from the natives of New Zealand?

Now that the influence which the distribution of natural goods, both internal and external, exercises on civilization is clearly recognized, let us see what influence the state of the relations which men bear to one another may exercise on their progressive activity; under what social circumstances they are most stimulated to utilize the elements of progress at their disposal.

If civilization is a product of our mind, stimulated by our needs, it is evident that it will develop more rapidly in proportion as man may more freely employ his faculties in channels suitable to them, and in proportion as he is himself certain of enjoying the fruit of his efforts. If I have an aptitude for mathematics, and am forced, without any regard for my talent, [372] to devote myself to painting, the most active and powerful part of my mind will remain almost inactive. I might have been able to solve a number of mathematical problems; but as I was forbidden to devote myself to this work, for which I was naturally fitted, the problems which I might have solved will not be solved at all, or at least they will be solved later, and civilization will be thereby retarded by so much. On the other hand, I may paint, but, as I have little talent for the art of painting, I shall contribute nothing to its progress. A good mathematician has been spoiled in me to make a bad painter. To interfere with the liberty of working, [8] therefore, is to nullify and to suppress the forces which would have stimulated human progress; it is in some sense to amputate that part of the mind which would have contributed most effectively to the advancement of civilization. The progress of civilization is permanently hindered by the restrictions which close the ranks of certain professions to men who might excel in them, or when admission to them is rendered expensive and difficult, when immutable rules prescribe for each the career he must follow. [9]

All attacks on the right of property [10] are another cause which retards civilization. Why does a man condemn his mind to the labor of accumulating, combining, and applying observations to the satisfaction of his needs? Is it not because this labor procures him enjoyment or spares him trouble? He has no other aim. But if he be deprived of this enjoyment, in whole or in part; if the fruit of his self-imposed labor be consumed by others, what reason would he have left to put his mind to work or otherwise? If, for instance, another compels this man to work for him, to cultivate his field, to grind his corn, and leaves him barely enough of the fruit of his own labor to subsist upon; if, in a word, he be a slave, what interest can he have to improve the cultivation of his land or the grinding of corn? What will it avail him? Does he not know that the fruit of his laborious research will belong entirely to his master, that is, to his natural enemy, to the person who each day robs him of his legitimate wages to appropriate them to himself? Why, then, should he add to the gratification of a man who unjustly deprives him of his own? Slavery, therefore, which is, however, but one of the innumerable forms of plunder, appears as one of the most serious obstacles that impede human progress; [11] in like manner, every arbitrary or legal act which injures or menaces property, natural or acquired, delays the progress of civilization, by weakening the incentive which urges men to extend the circle of their knowledge and their acquisition.

Liberty, which allows every man to draw the utmost possible benefit from the gifts with which nature has endowed him, and the right of property, which entitles him to the absolute enjoyment of these gifts, and of the fruit which he can derive from them, are the necessary conditions of human progress. Plunder, under the multitude of forms which it assumes, is the great obstacle that retards, and has, from the beginning of the world, retarded the development of civilization

This being the case, it would seem that men should have, from the very beginning, contrived some means of maintaining inviolable their rights of liberty and property. Unfortunately they have learned only after a long and hard experience, how essential respect for liberty and property is to their well being. If we try to leave this experience out of consideration, and examine the natural conditions in which men were placed in the beginning, taking into account their instincts, their wants, and the means which they had of satisfying them, we will be convinced that they could not begin except by plunder.

Ignorant men, barely having left the state of nature, [12] with no other guide than their instincts, no acquired experience either of the world or of themselves, were obliged to supply needs felt anew every day, and which had to be satisfied under pain of death. Lacking the tools and knowledge necessary to assure them a regular food supply, they were incessantly exposed to the hardship of extreme hunger. When one of these ignorant and famished beings met one of his fellowmen, who, more fortunate than he, had succeeded in getting some prey, a struggle for it was inevitable. Why should not a starving and destitute man attempt to possess himself of the booty which came his way? Having no scruples about robbing the bee of its honey or devouring a sheep, why should he respect man? There is undoubtedly a natural instinct which prompts beings of the same species not to injure one another, but must not this instinct, whose intensity varies in different individuals, have yielded before the all-powerful pressure of want? Let us picture to ourselves what would happen even in our day, notwithstanding the great progress we have made, notwithstanding our acquisitions in the physical and moral order, if there were no superior force established to suppress individual cruelty, and society were abandoned to anarchy. The most frightful disorder would inevitably result from this condition of things. Robberies and murders would increase in a frightful manner, until such time as men had reorganized a force to repress this. For still stronger reasons must not the result have been the same in the first ages of the world?

History proves, moreover, that abuse of power was widespread in these first historical periods, whose innocence has been so loudly vaunted by the poets. The liberty and property of the weak were always at the mercy of the strong. Every one was thus constantly exposed to be robbed of the fruit of his labors. Consequently, no one took any interest in increasing his possessions or accumulating property. Progress was impossible under this system. What was the result? The experience of the evils of anarchy led men to combine together in order to better protect their liberty and property. Associations were formed everywhere, and in them murder and robbery were forbidden and punished. Still the action of restoring peace of these mutual protection companies [13] was at first very limited: if men appreciated clearly [373] enough the necessity of living at peace with their immediate neighbors, the inconveniences of a war with men a little farther away did not impress them so forcibly. They often even believed it to be in their interest to conquer and plunder them. Experience had gradually to extend the domain of peace, that is, the systematized and organized respect for liberty and property. [14] Little by little, people dwelling in close proximity to one another, and nearly equal in strength, became convinced, by the results of their various encounters, that they lost more than they gained by making war. They, therefore, agreed to suspend their hostilities, to make truces, particularly, if they were employed in agriculture, especially during seed-time and harvest. They finally entered into alliances, whether to attack or to defend themselves in common. Between these people who had declared truces or concluded treaties there was regular communication. They imparted to each other the knowledge they had acquired and accumulated. Exchange of products and exchange of ideas took place at the same time. Thus we find that civilization developed in proportion as the experience of the evils of war enlarged the sphere of peace. [15] The same result was obtained when one group extended its dominion over other people, for the conquerors soon perceived that it was to their interest to maintain peace in the regions under their rule. Under the domination of the Romans, for example, the most civilized nations of the world ceased to make war on one another, and magnificent roads united these nations which had so long been strangers and enemies. The progress made by each of them in its isolation extended to all. The Christianity of Judea, the philosophy and arts of Greece, the legislation of Rome spread to Africa, Spain, Gaul, and Germany, and reached even to Great Britain. At the same time commerce was developing, and useful plants, together with the art of cultivating them, passed from one country to another: the cherry was imported from Asia Minor into Europe, the vine was transported into Gaul; in a word, civilization under all its forms progressed from the east to the west

Nevertheless, in these first ages of humanity, peace could be neither general nor lasting: in the midst of the pacified nations, slavery in all its degrees appeared as a permanent cause of conflict. From without, hordes of barbarians coveted the wealth accumulated by these civilized peoples. All the early centres of civilization, Persia, Egypt, the Roman empire, after a thousand intestine struggles, became, as is well known, the prey of barbarians.

The great invasions which occupy so large a place in the history of the world had not everywhere and always the same results. They were, according to circumstances, favorable or disastrous to the progress of humanity. In order to appreciate the influence they exercised from this point of view, we must ascertain first, what amount of material and non-material capital [16] was destroyed in the course of the invasion; we must examine also whether, the conquest once completed, the conquerors and the conquered gained by their contact with each other more liberty and security; whether the forces leading to progress were increased. Anarchy, slavery, and war are the great obstacles in the way of civilization; but frequently these obstacles either destroyed or weakened one another. Sometimes slavery put an end to anarchy, and sometimes war to slavery. There was retrogression wherever the result of the conflict was a decrease in the liberty or security which had been acquired, and, on the other hand, there was progress whenever the sum total of liberty and security in the world was increased by the conflict: at least whenever the destruction of capital caused by the conflict was not great enough to counterbalance the gain which had been made.

We can not say, for instance, whether the invasion of the Roman empire by the barbarians of the north hastened or retarded the progress of civilization; whether or not the immense destruction of material and non-material capital occasioned by this cataclysm was compensated for by acquisitions of another nature; [17] whether or not, if the Roman empire had lasted, the different varieties of men who today inhabit Europe would have been so advantageously intermingled; whether or not slavery would have continued for a longer time. We have not the data necessary to solve this historical problem. We can, however, conjecture that, if the establishment of Roman domination over nations, most of which had adopted slavery, could still serve the cause of civilization by causing peace to reign among these nations, by increasing, consequently, the amount of security which the world enjoyed, without noticeably diminishing the sum total of its liberty; in like manner, the establishment of the barbarians upon the ruins of the Roman domination contributed to the progress of civilization by hastening the abolition of slavery, and thus increasing the amount of liberty possessed by the human race.

Be this as it may, liberty and security have been making constant progress ever since the downfall of the Roman empire, and especially since the end of the feudal barbarism which replaced it. [18] This progress, whether quickened or not by the invasion of the barbarians who overran the old civilized countries, wonderfully aided the development of modern civilization. Thenceforth, as man had greater liberty to employ for the increase of his well-being the elements of progress at his disposal, and felt more assured of being able to preserve the fruit of his labors, he gave greater scope to his activity. He explored the material and the moral world with a power and a success of which he before had no idea. He discovered all at once the means of better preserving the things he had already acquired, and of multiplying and propagating new ones more rapidly. Some of these discoveries have exercised such an influence upon the march of civilization that we must dwell upon them for a moment.

We will mention first the invention of gunpowder. The immediate effect of this discovery was to change the proportion between the labor and capital necessary to the exercise of [374] what we may call the military industry. [19] It required less labor and more capital, fewer men and more machines. One piece of cannon served by eight men took the place of a hundred archers. What was the result? Civilized nations acquired an enormous advantage over barbarous peoples from the point of view both of attack and defense. The superiority of their tools of war, together with their superiority in the capital necessary to put this costly machinery [20] in operation, assured them predominance. Thenceforth new invasions of barbarians coming to destroy the things previously acquired by civilization were no longer to be feared. Moreover, now that they were freed from the corruption of slavery, which might in time render invasions useful, the civilized nations acquired in this respect a security which they did not enjoy in ancient times. Instead of being subjugated anew by the barbarians, they everywhere began to subject the barbarians to their rule. [21]

Thus were the achievements of civilization permanently assured, while a process was soon after discovered whereby to propagate, at small expense and with marvelous rapidity, the knowledge accumulated by the human mind: we refer to the invention of printing. But a short time ago, the diffusion of the non-material capital of humanity was difficult and costly; sometimes even a part of previously acquired knowledge was lost. Thanks to the printing press, it became possible to reproduce indefinitely the same observation, the same thought, and the same invention, and to send it thus multiplied through the immensity of the ages. [22]

Nor is this all. Civilization in ancient times was local. Each nation, separated from neighboring nations, either by physical obstacles, or by the hatred or prejudices of centuries, had its own narrow and isolated civilization. [23] Thus, in the first place, a more and more extended experience of the evils of war, together with the progress of moral and political sciences, began to draw nations together by showing them that it was to their interest to dwell together in peace, and exchange with one another the products of their industry. Thus, again, the application of steam and electricity to locomotion, by annihilating space, so to speak, renders more and more practicable this exchange, which is now recognized as useful. Thus, thanks to this material and moral progress, local civilizations, formerly isolated, hostile, and without regular communication, began to unite, preserving in a general civilization their own peculiar characteristics.

But if we seek out the origin of this great progress which has assured and accelerated the march of civilization, we shall find that it comes, like all other progress, from the employment of the human mind in the observation of the phenomena of the moral and physical world; an employment which has become more general and more fruitful in proportion as men have been more interested in engaging in it. The men who have systematized the method of observation, and first among them Sir Francis Bacon, [24] have been objects of great praise, and surely this is only just. We must not, however, forget that this method was known and practiced from the very beginning of the world, since it is to observation, and to experience which is but another form of observation, that all human progress is due. If it was less fruitful in ancient times, it was, primarily, because the collection of previous knowledge which could be used to acquire new knowledge was less; it resulted also from the fact that, as liberty and property were less generally guaranteed than now, fewer men were interested in observing and in utilizing their observations. The use of technology, [25] for instance, which was abandoned for the most part to slaves, remained of necessity at a standstill. What interest would the slaves have had in improving it? But must not this lack of progress in certain essential branches of human knowledge in turn slowing down the rise of all the others? Do we not know that all progress is connected, and that discoveries made in any part of the domain of industry lead to others, frequently in an opposite end of this domain? There is certainly little connection between the manufacture of glass and the observation of celestial bodies; and still, how much has the progress in the art of glass-making advanced the progress of astronomy! In ancient times the lack of progress in technology, which slavery had degraded, deprived men of the ideas and tools necessary to enlarge the circle of their knowledge. In consequence, the method of observation was less effective in their hands, and sometimes even remained sterile. What was the result? Men, pressed for the solution of certain problems, and not perceiving how to solve them, declared the method of observation powerless, and built, upon the fragile basis of hypothesis, systems to which science was destined to do justice at a later day. The method of observation was discredited, especially when certain classes believed themselves interested in maintaining the solutions given by hypotheses; but this discrediting of the method of observation which had its first source in slavery was inevitably bound to disappear with it. In proportion as slavery disappeared, and the gap in the progress of technology began to be filled up, the method of observation, provided with new tools, acquired a range which no one would before have imagined it capable of. Its efficacy in solving problems which had before been regarded as beyond the human mind, then became manifest to all. The honor of being the first to recognize this fact belongs to Bacon; but does not the credit of popularizing and universalizing the method of observation belong still more to liberty than to Bacon? Isn’t it from the very moment when observation acquired liberty as an all-powerful ally and, to the degree that [375] it had more liberty, observation increased its efforts and obtained the most marvelous results? Since the advent of industrial liberty, for example, has not the domain of civilization extended more, in one century, than it had in twenty centuries before?

By becoming more general, under the influence of the progress we have just described, the power of civilization has increased in an incalculable degree. Formerly, each isolated nation was confined almost exclusively to its own resources to develop its knowledge and increase its prosperity. Now, as the aptitudes of men are essentially different, according to race, climate, and circumstances of place; as the qualities of the soil are no less so, and the same piece of land is not equally well adapted for all kinds of crops; each isolated civilization necessarily remained incomplete. Only certain privileged individuals could use for the satisfaction of their wants, products brought from other parts of the globe. [26] The mass of the people were obliged to content themselves with the products of their own country, and the small extent of the market proved an insurmountable obstacle to the progressive developments of these products. The lack of communication was to a certain extent compensated for by artificially increasing the number of national industries, by learning about the industries of foreign nations. Unfortunately, this assimilation, useful when restricted within certain limits, was carried too far. Countries wished to produce everything, even those things which cost less when bought from foreign countries; and in this they partially succeeded by banning the use of imported goods. [27] But they still failed to attain the desired result, which was to increase the amount of things calculated to satisfy the needs of their inhabitants. Instead of increasing the number of their satisfactions, they reduced them. Instead of advancing in civilization, they relapsed into barbarism. We must add, however, that observation and experience are constantly endeavoring to do away with this error, as they have already done away with so many others. The more enlightened nations begin to perceive that it is their interest to obtain the greatest possible amount of satisfaction, for the smallest amount of effort, and that they can never attain this end by barricading themselves against the cheapness of goods. The time will come when they themselves will tear down the artificial barriers with which they have surrounded themselves in place of the natural barriers which the steam engine had broken down. On that day the elements of civilization which God has placed at the disposal of the human race, and the material and non-material capital which man has accumulated in the course of the centuries, will be best and most fruitfully employed; on that day also will the natural division of labor among the different nations, now impeded by artificial restrictions, be fully developed. We do not know, and it would be superfluous to conjecture, to what height civilization thus universalized will rise, and to what degree it will increase man’s moral and material satisfactions, while diminishing his efforts and his suffering. All that we can say is, that considering the progress which civilization has already made, the human mind, provided with a capital which increases so much more rapidly the more it accumulates; provided with all the tools necessary to preserve and propagate what it has required; urged on by needs which have never yet been satisfied, and which seem insatiable, will continue constantly to advance with a more rapid and a surer step until it reaches the undefined limit beyond which it cannot go.

Nevertheless, some minds are still in doubt as to the future of civilization, and present various objections on this point which it will be well to answer. Their principal objection may be thus stated: if civilized nations have no longer to fear the invasions of barbarians from without, are they not, on the other hand, daily more and more exposed to be overrun by the barbarians from within? [28] Do they not run the risk of falling back into barbarism, or at least of remaining for a long time stationary, by becoming the prey of those men who have not ceased to wallow in primitive ignorance. Doubtless civilization may be retarded in a country by ignorance, or, what amounts to the same thing, by the mistaken interest of a ruling class. [29] Nevertheless, this cause, antagonistic to civilization, has not so much influence as is attributed to it. If it is a multitude, imbued with utopian ideas, that seizes control of the government of society, experience, or even the simple discussion of these theories, readily proves to them their emptiness, and, as the multitude is most interested in the good government of society, a reaction takes place in its midst; it divests itself of its dangerous illusions, and civilization at once resumes its onward march. If society is, on the contrary, under the domination of a class attached to the maintenance of old abuses, the evil caused by these abuses after a greater or less delay, according to the more or less advanced state of the communication of ideas finally becomes manifest to every one. Then the pressure of public opinion puts an end to it.

A grave question here presents itself incidentally. Is it well to crush, if necessary, the resistance of the class attached to established abuses, to resort to revolutions to destroy these abuses, or is it better to wait till they disappear of themselves under pressure of the progress made outside the range of their baneful influence? This question plainly admits of two solutions, according to the circumstances of time and place. It may be affirmed, however, that in our day the peaceful solution is generally the better. Think, indeed, with an unprejudiced mind, of the results of certain events of quite recent occurrence, the enormous amount of capital they consumed, the active forces they absorbed, the dire calamities they produced; take into account, at the same time, the progress made since the invention of printing, and [376] the application of steam to locomotion, and be convinced that revolution is too high a price to pay for progress in our day, and that it is best, therefore, to abstain from it, even in the interest of civilization.

A second objection, no less frequently urged, is the following: material wellbeing is not developed except at the expense of public morality; men become morally more corrupt, in proportion as their condition improves materially, and their civilization, so brilliant on the surface, is rotted from within. Nothing could be more false. [30] In the first place, the history of civilization proves that the branches of human knowledge which contribute to improving the moral nature of man, do not develop less rapidly than those which tend to develop his material prosperity. Religion, for instance, has never ceased, in the course of ages, to grow in perfection and purity, and to exercise, for this very reason, a most beneficial influence over human morality. [31] How superior is Christianity to Paganism in this respect! And can we not easily perceive progress in Christianity itself? Is not the Christian religion of today a more perfect instrument of moralization than it was in the days of the St. Dominics and the Torquemadas? [32] Do not the philosophical sciences also, and political economy in particular, labor more effectively every day to improve men’s morals by showing them every day more clearly that the observance of the laws of morality is an essential condition of their existence and well-being? In the second place, ought not material progress of itself, far from being an obstacle to the moral development of the human race, contribute, on the contrary, to sustain it? By rendering man’s labor more fruitful, and his existence easier, must it not tend to diminish the force and frequency of the temptations which impel him to violate the laws of morality in order to satisfy his material appetites? Experience, moreover, confirms these deductions drawn from the observation of our nature. The criminal records prove that the poorer classes commit, other things being equal, a greater number of crimes than the richer classes; they prove also that crime decreases and morals improve in proportion as the comforts of life are extended to the lower strata of society. This objection, based upon a so-called moral erosion of nations occasioned by the development of material prosperity, is therefore at variance with observation and experience.

The third objection claims that the progress of industry has increased inequality among men. It holds that the tendency of industrial progress is to concentrate, on the one hand, masses of capital, and, on the other, multitudes of men whose condition becomes every day more miserable. Historical facts give the lie to this assertion. Compare the social inequality which exists in our day with that which existed in the time of the Roman empire; contrast with the slaves of the latifundia and the powerful head of a patrician family, the poorest workman with the richest of our bankers; and say whether the extremes of the social scale, far from having become more widely separated, have not come nearer together! Progress favors equality, or at least its continual tendency is to reduce social inequalities to the level of natural inequalities. We notice, in fact, that liberty and property are better guaranteed in proportion as civilization gains ground, and that the progress made in guaranteeing liberty and property, is the essential condition of all other progress. Now, if each man is obliged to depend upon his own industry for a livelihood; if there is no longer any plunder, open or hidden, to give to one man the fruits of another’s labor; if, in a word, the most powerful and active causes of inequality disappear, must not social differences inevitably end by coming down to the level of the differences which nature has made between men?

The only cause that could maintain and even aggravate these inequalities, by attributing to those who control the means of subsistence and the tools of labor an unwarranted predominance, is the permanent excess of population. Fortunately, the multiplication of the human species does not depend solely upon man’s power to reproduce; it depends also upon his foresight. Man has the power to control the production of beings like himself; [33] he can speed up or slow down this production, depending upon whether he foresees that his own condition and that of the beings whom he brings into the world will be improved or impaired thereby. [34] But this foresight, which puts a beneficial limit to reproduction, naturally acquires greater strength and greater control in proportion as man becomes more enlightened.

In his Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain, Condorcet demonstrated [35] that there would be less and less reason to fear an excess of population, owing to the natural development of foresight under the influence of civilization. [36]

Suppose,” he says, “the limit (at which population pressed on the means of subsistence) has been reached, no dreadful consequences would result, either to the well-being of the human species, or to its indefinite perfectibility; provided we suppose that before that limit was reached the progress of reason kept pace with the progress of the arts and sciences; … men would then know that, if they had duties to beings not yet in existence, these duties consist, not in giving them existence, but happiness; these duties have for their object the general well-being of the human species, or of the society in which those who are bound by them live or of the family to which they belong; and not the puerile idea of loading down the earth with useless and unhappy beings. There might, therefore, be a limit to the sum total of the means of subsistence, and consequently to the possible maximum of population, without its resulting in the premature destruction of a portion of living beings, which is so contrary to nature and social prosperity.”

We see that the different elements of our nature, and of the world in which we live, are so disposed that civilization appeared [377] as an inevitable and irresistible fact. There is nothing, however, of fatality about it, inasmuch as it continually feels the influence of our free will. If it is not in the power of any one to stop it, or cause it to go backwards, each one can nevertheless exert an influence over its progress, and perhaps also over its end result. Infringe the liberty and property of others; do not utilize as much as you might the productive forces at your disposal; be lazy, ignorant and wasteful; and you will retard civilization. On the contrary, set an example of moral virtue, of respect for liberty and property, of the spirit of research, of diligent and hard work, and you will contribute your share toward advancing it. Each individual acts upon civilization for good or for evil, within the more or less extended sphere of his activity. Only, each one being more and more interested to act in such a manner as to contribute to its progress, the number of the acts which advance it surpass every day more and more the number of those which retard it. The general impulse given to civilization depends upon the sum of the faculties and needs which have been assigned to man, and upon the natural resources which have been placed at his disposal; but nonetheless it still remains subject to the action of man’s free will for any mishaps in its unfolding. Civilisation is a providential not an inevitable matter.

Now that we have described the elements of civilization, and have shown with the aid of what material and moral instruments the great work is carried on, how it can be accelerated and how retarded, let us sum up in a few words the economic characteristics by which civilization is recognized, and the end toward which it tends.

Civilization is seen to be the development of the power of man over nature. Now, there is an external sign by which this development may be recognized: the division of labor. The country in which labor is most divided in all its branches, where, for this very reason, social relations are most developed, is therefore evidently that in which civilization is most advanced.

Civilization has for its end the better satisfaction of our material and moral needs. It leads us, by progressively ameliorating the conditions of our existence, toward the ideal of the power and of the beauty adapted to our nature and the resources which the Creator has placed at our disposal.

The idea of an indefinitely improving civilization is modern. [37] In ancient times, when material progress was impeded by slavery, men could not conceive of any other progress than that of the sciences and the fine arts. Still the sight of the dangers to which civilized people were exposed, the destruction of so many local civilizations by the invasion of barbarians, must have eradicated all ideas of general and uninterrupted progress. This idea could hardly appear until after the invention of gunpowder and of printing. Its germination was slow. Vico prepared the way for it by collecting, in a systematic manner, the observations which he had made upon the development of civilized nations; [38] but Turgot was the first who enunciated it, supporting it by positive data (in his Discours en Sorbonne, and in his Essais de géographie politique). [39] Condorcet, with some differences, amplified the ideas of Turgot. In Germany, Kant discovered civilization in the spread of human liberty; [40] Herder studied, somewhat vaguely perhaps, its natural elements; [41] the economist Storch undertook to propound the theory of it. [42] Although incomplete, and faulty in certain respects, this theory is still worthy of study. At a later period Guizot drew a picture of the progress of civilization in Europe, and especially in France: [43] but the insufficiency of his economic knowledge is seen in his work, which is otherwise one of the most remarkable of the French historical school. [44] Lastly, civilization has also had its fiction writers. Taking no account either of the nature of man, nor of the conditions of his development, as observation and experience reveal them to us; the socialists have built up imaginary civilizations, as false or incomplete as the data upon which they rest. [45] Observation, which is the first tool of civilization, is also the only tool we can use to recognize and describe it.

Endnotes to Civilisation

[1] "Des biens naturels, soit internes, soit externes." Molinari is close to having an idea of human capital which is related to his idea of "internal property" which he discusses in S8 and S9. He got the idea of "internal" and "external" natural goods from the Russian economist Henri Storch, who developed the former idea into a theory of "human capital." See footnote below in "Fine Arts" for more details.

[2] The Botocudo were a native tribe which lived in eastern Brazil, named after their custom of wearing wooden disks or "boutique" (Portuguese for "plug") inserted in their lips and ears.

[3] "Ce capital naturel."

[4] Jean Bodin (1530-1596) was a lawyer and political theorist, and a member of the Parlement of Paris. He is best known for his theory of the sovereignty of the state.

[5] Charles Louis de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755).

[6] Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) was a German philosopher, poet, theologian, literary critic, and historian. Molinari is referring to Herder's unfinished Outline of a Philosophical History of Humanity (1784-91) which was one of the founding texts of German historicism.

[7] New Zealand had been circumnavigated by the British explorer James Cook in 1769 and was occupied and made a separate colony in 1841 following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi with the Maori tribes. The colony of New Zealand was granted a representative government in 1852 when this article was probably being written.

[8] "La liberté du travail" is a key concept for the mid-century political economists. The figure who explored it the most depth is Charles Dunoyer in his book La liberté du travail (1845) Ref??

[9] Molinari discusses the barriers to free entry into many professions in S8 and S9.

[10] See my essays on "Property Rights, the Self, and Self-ownership" and "Liberty and the complete Emancipation of Property."

[11] Molinari wrote the entries on "Esclavage"(Slavery) and "Servage" (Serfdom) for the DEP: T1, pp. 712-31 and T.2, pp. 610-13.

[12] Molinari does not use the term "the state of nature" here but something very similar: "à peine sortis des mains de la nature" (scarcely having left the hands of nature).

[13] "L'action pacificatrice de ces sociétés de protection mutuelle." Another reference to Molinari's idea that security could be provided by private and competing private companies, although here, since he is referring to an early stage in the formation of societies, the word "association" might be better than "company" or "firm." See the discussion of "des compagnies d'assurances sur la propriété" (property insurance companies) in S11, p. abc.

[14] "Le respect systématisé et organisé de la liberté et de la propriété."

[15] See his entry on "Paix. Guerre" in the DEP, T. 2 , pp. 307-14.

[16] "Des capitaux matériels et immatériels." A reference to J.B. Say's idea of the importance of "non-material" things of value which we call today "services." Molinari expanded J.B. Say's idea of "non-material goods" or services to include not just the productive economic activities of lawyers, doctors, teachers, and judges but also those of theater directors and actors and producers of security.

[17] Shortly after this article was probably written (1851-52) Molinari gave a lecture at his new home in Brussels at the Musée royal de l'industrie belge where he had a teaching position, on Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériel. In this work he argued that it was the job of the economist to be "les teneurs de livres de la politique" (the bookkeepers of history) (p. 116) who should weigh up the profits and losses of events such as the French Revolution, the wars of Napoleon, and the 1848 Revolution. In all cases, he thought, the losses far outweighed the profits and thus war and revolution should be avoided. Here he is attempting to do this for the barbarian invasions of Europe.

[18] To explore this progress was the task Molinari set himself in his large two volume work on the historical sociology of the state and the emergence of free political and economic institutions which he published some thirty years later. See, L'évolution économique du XIXe siècle: théorie du progrès (1880) and L'évolution politique et la Révolution (1884).

[19] "L'industrie militaire." One of Molinari's innovations was to view nearly every human activity as an "industry" of some kind, with producers and consumers, prices, profits and losses, and "entrepreneurs" who would be able to bring all these things together in a "market."

[20] Molinari uses the English word "machinery" here.

[21] (Molinari's Note.) "… Force will probably be found in the future on the side of civilization and enlightenment; for civilized nations are the only ones which can have enough wealth to maintain an imposing military force. This fact removes, so far as the future is concerned, the probability of the recurrence of those great upheavals of which history is full, and in which civilized nations became the victims of barbarians." J. B. Say, Traite d'Economie Politique, liv. 3, ch. 7. Guillaumin ed., p. 484.

[22] However, this invention also gave rise to the problem of copyright and intellectual property which he discusses in S2.

[23] He explores the problem of the proper size of nations and how they can get on well with other by means of free trade and communication in the entry in the DEP on "Nations" a translation of which can be found below.

[24] The English philosopher Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who was an early advocate of the scientific method.

[25] "Les arts matériels."

[26] The habit of wealthy aristocrats of opposing international free trade while at the same time enjoying the benefits of access to foreign luxury goods was mocked by free traders like William Fox whose famous 1844 speech on the need to be independent of foreigners was quoted by Molinari and Bastiat. See Molinari's entry in the DEP on "Freedom of Commerce" (below)  and his long quotation of him in S7.

[27] See his discussion of this and other arguments for protectionism in "Freedom of Commerce" (below).

[28] By this Molinari had in mind the socialists who had emerged during the 1848 Revolution. In his mind, there were two kinds of socialists and socialism, "le socialisme d'en haut" (socialism from above) and "le socialisme d'en bas" (socialism from below) which the Economists had to oppose. The latter came from the streets and were led by people like Louis Blanc and Victor Considerant; the former were the wealthy protectionist landowners and manufacturers, and the government interventionists led by Louis Napoléon. His book Les Soirées was designed to counter the socialists from below, while the DEP was designed to oppose the socialists from above.

[29] "Une classe dominante."

[30] Molinari probably has in mind thinkers like the conservative Chateaubriand whose posthumous Memoirs from Beyond the Tomb were published by in 1850. In the conclusion to the Memoirs Chateaubriand states "Material conditions are improving, intellectual progress is increasing and nations, instead of benefiting, are regressing. … This is the explanation for the decline in society and the progress made by individuals. If moral sense developed along with the development of the mind, there would be a counter-weight and the human race would grow free of danger. But exactly the opposite happens. The perception of good and evil is dimmed as the mind becomes enlightened, conscience shrinks as ideas expand." Mémoires d'outre-tombe (1850). T.11, Conclusion "Chute des monarchies. Dépérissement de la société et progrès de l'individu," pp. 462, 464.

[31] Molinari discusses the positive impact of religion on moral and economic development in two later works, Religion (1892, trans. into English 1894) and Science et religion (1894). He believed that only an institution like the Church can encourage people to take a longer term view of their life (i.e. to have longer time preferences) by promising them rewards and punishments in the after-life in exchange for changing their behaviour in the present.

[32] Saint Dominic of Caleruega (1170-1221) founded the order which bears his name in 1215. Tomás de Torquemada (1420–1498) was a Dominican friar who became the first Grand Inquisitor of the Holy Office of the Inquisition (established 1478) which later became known as the "Spanish Inquisition." His task was to purge the church and Spain of heretics and people of other religions who refused to convert to Catholicism (such as Jews and Muslims). Jews were ultimately dispossessed of their property and expelled from Spain in 1492.

[33] (Ed. Note??) "La production des êtres semblables à lui" is another example of GdMidea that everything is an "industry" with markets and entrepreneurs.

[34] He discusses the problem of population growth in S10. See also my essay on "Malthusiansim and the Political Economy of the Family."

[35] Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794) was a mathematician, liberal philosophe and politician during the French Revolution.

[36] (Molinari's note.) Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain, in Condorcet, Oeuvres de Condorcet (1847), vol. 6, "Xe Époque," pp. 257-58.

[37] Molinari's colleague Bastiat was one of the foremost advocates of the possibility of human advancement or "perfectibility" if freedom existed. The idea pervades his unfinished treatise Economic Harmonies (1850, 1851) for which he had planned an entire chapter on the topic (chap. 24).

[38] Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) was an Italian political philosopher, historian, and jurist, whose Scienza Nuova (1725) was an attempt to organize the entire field of the humanities into a coherent science in which history could be explained as a series of cycles of the rise and fall of societies.

[39] See, "Second discours sur les progrès successifs de l'esprit humain, prononcé le 11 décembre 1750 (en Sorbonne)" and "Idées générales sur la géographie politique" (1751), in Oeuvres de M. Turgot (1808-1811). vol. 2, pp. 52-92 and pp. 166-208.

[40] Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Possibly a reference to "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (1784) or "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (1795).

[41] Johann Gottfried Herder, Outline of a Philosophical History of Humanity (1784-91).

[42] The German Russian economists Henri-Frédéric Storch (1766-1835). Possibly a reference to his Cours d'économie politique, ou exposition des principes qui déterminent la prospérité des nations (1815).

[43] The conservative French historian and politician François Pierre Guillaume Guizot (1787-1874) who gave lectures on and turned into books: Histoire générale de la civilization en Europe (1828), and Historie de la civilization en France (1829-32). See Liberty Fund's edition: François Guizot, The History of Civilization in Europe (2013).

[44] (Molinari's note.) On the origins of the idea of civilization, see A. Javary, De l'idée de progrès (1851).

[45] A reminder that a major purpose in publishing the DEP was to oppose the spread of socialist ideas.

Colonies↩

Source

"Colonies", DEP, T. 1, pp. 393-403.

Text

[393]

COLONIES. — COLONIZATION. — COLONIAL SYSTEM.

I. Definitions.

"Colonies," says J.-B. Say, "are settlements established in distant lands by an older nation, called the metropolis. When this nation seeks to expand its relations in a populous country that is already civilized and whose territory it would not be well received to invade, it merely establishes a trading post, a place where negotiations can take place where its agents conduct business in accordance with the country’s laws, as Europeans have done in China and Japan. When colonies throw off the authority of the metropolitan government, they cease to be called colonies and become independent states." [1]

In addition to the notion of a partial emigration of a people to a new region, the words colonies and colonization also convey the idea of a form of patronage exercised by the metropolis over the settlements [394] founded as a result of this emigration. They also imply an expansion of civilization, as the term colony is not applied to settlements established by barbarian conquerors among already civilized peoples. The term colonial system refers to the reciprocal political and commercial subjugation that has governed the relations between European colonies and their metropolises since the discovery of America.

II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

§ 1. Colonies of Antiquity.

Most civilized peoples of antiquity—including the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans—founded numerous colonies. Athens, as is well known, was originally an Egyptian colony, while Carthage was a colony of Tyre. The Greeks spread their settlements mainly across Asia Minor, Sicily, and southern Italy; they even reached the coast of Gaul, where they founded Marseille. Most ancient colonies—except those of the Romans—appear to have been founded through private initiative. When the territory of a city-state became too small for its inhabitants, the most energetic and adventurous members of the population would decide to emigrate and establish a new settlement in a less populated land. At times, this kind of enterprise was a consequence of political strife; the defeated faction would leave their homeland to escape oppression. The Greek metropolises maintained strong connections with their colonies and even received military aid from them at times—particularly during the Persian invasion. However, these ties were not obligatory. Emigrants became independent the moment they left their homeland and were free to establish the institutions that suited them best in their new country. This system, which left emigrants to their own resources—without any expectation of government aid or subsidies but also without restrictive regulations that might hinder their activities—was clearly the most favorable for colonization. The emigrants were forced to make the most of their material and intellectual capital, and—aside from any bad laws they might impose on themselves—nothing prevented them from using these resources in the most beneficial way, given their circumstances. As a result, most colonies founded by the enterprising and industrious Hellenic race—such as Ephesus, Miletus, Syracuse, Agrigento, and Marseille—rose to a high level of prosperity.

Roman colonization had a very different character. The Romans had early on expanded their dominion over neighboring territories, and members of the aristocracy, who benefited most from military conquests, had no incentive to emigrate as ordinary settlers. Only the proletarians, who had been pushed out of industrial occupations by competition from slave labor, were willing to emigrate. However, the metropolis made sure to keep these voluntary emigrants under its control and use them to reinforce Roman rule:

"In general," says Adam Smith, who shed profound light on this issue with his brilliant insights, "Rome assigned lands to these emigrants in the conquered provinces of Italy. However, remaining under the republic's rule, they could never form an independent state; at most, they were a kind of corporate body, always subject to the correction, jurisdiction, and legislative authority of the metropolis. By sending colonies of this nature, Rome not only satisfied its people but often placed a sort of garrison in newly conquered provinces, keeping them in obedience. Whether we consider the nature of the settlement itself or the motives behind it, a Roman colony was therefore vastly different from a Greek one; hence, the words that describe them in both languages have entirely different meanings. The Latin word Colonia simply means 'a plantation,' while the Greek word Apoikía conveys the idea of departure from home—indicating that one leaves the country and abandons one’s homeland." [2]

Roman colonists lost many of the rights of Roman citizenship; they were denied the right to vote and to hold office. [3]

Thus, kept in submission to the metropolis and largely composed of the lower strata of society, Roman colonies could never attain the prosperity and power that had been achieved by the free colonies of Greece.

§ II. Modern Colonies.

A long interval must be crossed before finding new colonies. As we have remarked earlier, the invasions of the barbarians cannot be considered colonization enterprises.

"Colonization presupposes," says M. Rossi with good reason, "if not a bond of dependence, at least active and recognized kinship relations with a mother country; it implies connections that the new states had in no way maintained with the hordes from the forests of Germania." [4]

The feudal system was essentially unfavorable to colonization enterprises: the victors, confined within their fortified castles, were occupied with exploiting their vassals and settling their internal disputes; the conquered, reduced to the status of serfs tied to the land, could not relocate. The great religious movement of the Crusades came at an opportune time to break the stagnation to which the feudal system had condemned European civilization. The Christian colonies that the Crusaders founded in the East eventually succumbed under the force of Islam; but the spirit of adventure that the Crusades had awakened [395] in Europe would not be extinguished. That mysterious East, from which silks, precious metals, pearls, and perfumes arrived, aroused to the highest degree the curiosity and greed of the barbarians of the West. The marvels of India and Cathay became the subject of all conversations and the lure for every ambitious mind; but since India and Cathay were not accessible from the East, where vast territories occupied by enemy peoples protected them from European greed, explorers turned their gaze in another direction: men of genius boldly ventured into an unknown ocean in search of a route to India. This route, the Portuguese Bartolomeu Dias was the first to find by rounding the Cape of Good Hope. The Genoese Christopher Columbus was even more fortunate: while searching for the route to India, he discovered America.

The result of these discoveries was to place immense territories at the disposal of the Europeans, lands inhabited by peoples still half-barbaric and entirely incapable of mounting any serious resistance against the invaders. We know with what ease the Portuguese established their empire in India, and with what ease, too, a few hundred Spanish adventurers destroyed the empires of Mexico and Peru. More often than not, these vast conquests were accomplished by private individuals, whom the metropolis did not subsidize, whose enterprises it even opposed, but whose acquisitions it never failed to claim once they had succeeded.

The exploitation of the new colonies was naturally directed according to the political, economic, and religious principles that then prevailed in Europe. The same jealous and hostile policy that governed the relations among the various nations of Europe was applied to the colonies and dictated their relations with the metropoles. As a product of the ideas, prejudices, and passions of the time, the colonial system had to be more or less smart, more or less liberal, depending on how enlightened the metropoles were.

Spain and Portugal laid the first foundations of the colonial system. The nations that later embarked on colonization merely imitated them. Now, nothing was more restrictive than the political and economic system in force in these two metropoles. This system, they rigorously applied to their overseas establishments. The colonies were initially considered as settlements that the mother country could exploit at will and for its sole benefit; consequently, all relations with foreigners were forbidden, and regulations were established to make their exclusive exploitation as profitable as possible for the metropolis—or, to speak more accurately, for the class that dominated in the metropolis.

Different methods of exploitation were adopted in turn. The Spaniards did not establish privileged companies, but they granted the privilege of trade with the Indies to the merchants of a single port.

"This system," says Adam Smith, "opened colonial trade to all natives of the mother country, provided that they conducted it from the designated port, during the appropriate season, and with suitable vessels. But since all the different merchants who pooled their funds to outfit these authorized ships found it beneficial to act in concert, their trade operated in almost the same manner and according to the same principles as that of a privileged company. Their profit was neither less exorbitant nor less oppressive. The colonies were poorly supplied and forced to buy at very high prices and sell at very low prices. This system has nonetheless been consistently maintained by Spain. Thus, it is said that all European goods are sold at enormous prices in their American possessions. In Quito, a pound of iron costs, according to Ulloa, about 4 shillings 6 pence, and a pound of steel costs 6 shillings and 9 pence. Now, it is primarily to purchase European goods that the colonies part with their own products; the more they pay for the former, the less they receive for the latter, since in any exchange, the high price of one item results in the low price of another." [5]

Every year, two fleets of galleons, each consisting of about twelve ships, were dispatched from Seville to Porto-Bello, while another fleet of fifteen large ships was sent to Veracruz. These merchant fleets were usually escorted by warships, which explains the obligation imposed on shipowners to conduct their expeditions together; but this obligation made their coalitions almost inevitable, and as a result, Spanish colonial trade was effectively monopolized by a single body of merchants acting in concert. A similar situation existed in Portugal, where the port of Lisbon was granted the exclusive privilege of colonial trade.

A multitude of other restrictions were added to this one to ensure the mother country’s exclusive exploitation of its colonies. For example, in the Spanish colonies, maintaining relations with foreigners was considered a capital crime. Only Spanish ships were allowed to dock at colonial ports, and even foreign ships that were forced to stop due to damage were turned away. The inhabitants of different colonies could not trade their products with one another except by complying with burdensome and vexatious formalities. They were also prohibited from producing certain goods that the mother country reserved for its own supply—such as wine, oil, hemp, and flax. The mother country also claimed the monopoly on salt, tobacco, gunpowder, and several other less significant items. High duties were levied on both imports and exports from the colonies. The extraction of precious metals—an industry towards which the prejudices of the time had initially directed the colonists—was subject to a tax of one-fifth, payable to the crown. Additional regulatory and fiscal measures further discouraged those engaged in mining. Since it was believed that precious metals alone constituted wealth, [396] their export was prohibited under the severest penalties. In reality, this prohibition could be easily circumvented. However, it nonetheless had the effect of restricting the market for precious metal producers to some extent, and, since gold and silver are almost indestructible commodities, it made that market increasingly less advantageous. Political and religious privileges compounded the economic restrictions, further slowing the prosperity of colonial establishments. Government positions in the colonies were reserved for natives of Spain. The Catholic religion was established to the exclusion of all others; the Inquisition and tithes flourished alongside it. Finally, as the barbaric destruction of the native population led to a labor shortage in the colonies, black slaves were imported, introducing slavery as a new source of demoralization and economic stagnation.

Examining this system, one can understand the slow development of the Spanish colonies after the initial period of indigenous plundering. Nevertheless, under Philip II—when Portugal and its colonies were united with the Spanish monarchy—Spain possessed an immense colonial empire. Other nations dared not venture into the New World, much of which Spain claimed ownership over, basing its claim on a papal bull. The insurrection of the United Provinces and the destruction of the Invincible Armada changed this situation and made overseas territories accessible to all the nations of Europe. The Dutch, the English, and the French began competing with the Spanish and Portuguese in America and the Indies. But as if the new regions opening up to them had not provided a sufficiently vast arena for their activity, they fiercely contested possession of these territories among themselves. From the sixteenth century until the late eighteenth century—when colonies began to free themselves from their European rulers by declaring independence—colonial trade and the commerce of the Indies and the New World were the cause of bloody wars. Torrents of blood were shed, and immense fortunes were destroyed in these disastrous conflicts. Observing the blind fury with which European nations fought over territories that were still nearly uninhabited, one might wonder whether the great navigators of the sixteenth century had, in fact, bestowed upon them a gift more fatal than beneficial.

The system of privileged companies initially prevailed in the Netherlands, England, and France. However, with the exception of the Dutch East India Company and later the English East India Company, these companies performed poorly, while simultaneously preventing the colonies from conducting profitable trade. (See PRIVILEGED COMPANIES.)

Among the colonizing nations of modern times, the English were the ones who extended their empire the farthest and were the most successful in their colonization efforts. This success was due to the comparatively liberal regime that England introduced or allowed to develop in its colonies. Following the example of most other nations, it initially adopted the system of privileged companies; but when these companies failed—at least in America—England opened its colonies to free competition among its merchants and shipowners. At the same time, it granted or allowed the colonists to claim for themselves the essential privileges of self-government. More independent and freer than the Spanish colonists, the English colonists, particularly those of New England, prospered more quickly due to the very nature of their institutions.

The first charters granted to English colonists also demonstrated a certain degree of economic liberalism. For example, the settlers of Jamestown, Virginia, were initially exempted for seven years from any import duties on necessary goods. They were also permitted to trade directly with foreigners. They made full use of this permission: in 1620, according to historian Robertson, they had tobacco warehouses in several European cities, notably in Middelburg. [6] The colonists retained all the rights of English citizens and, as such, enjoyed the protection of the mother country. In return for these privileges, the mother country merely demanded, as Spain had done, a one-fifth tax on any gold and silver mines discovered and exploited in the colony. Unfortunately, the spirit of monopoly and warfare that prevailed in Europe at the time did not allow this liberal regime to last long. A law of 1650, a precursor to the famous Navigation Act, reserved colonial trade for ships flying the national flag. In 1660, the Navigation Act went further. Trade with foreign nations was partially forbidden to the colonies. Goods were divided into two categories: enumerated goods could only be shipped to Great Britain (Ireland was excluded from colonial trade), while non-enumerated goods could be exported directly to foreign countries but only through ships belonging to the mother country or the colony. (See NAVIGATION ACT.) Adam Smith clearly explained the rationale behind the establishment of these two categories of goods—some destined for shipment to Great Britain, either for domestic consumption or re-export, while others could be exported directly abroad:

"The enumerated goods are of two kinds: first, those that are unique to America and that cannot be, or at least are not, produced in the mother country. These include molasses, coffee, cocoa beans, tobacco, pepper, ginger, whale fins, raw silk, cotton, beaver and other American furs, indigo, scented woods, and other dye woods. Secondly, those that, while not unique to America, are or can be produced in the mother country but only in small quantities [397] compared to what is obtained from foreign sources. These include naval stores such as masts, yards, booms, tar, pitch, and turpentine, as well as pig iron, bar iron, copper ore, hides, leather, and potash. The importation of the first type of goods could not discourage production or harm the sale of any goods produced in the mother country. By restricting their importation to Great Britain, it was believed that our merchants would not only acquire these goods more cheaply from the colonies and thus derive a greater profit at home, but that a profitable transportation trade would develop between the colonies and foreign countries, with Great Britain necessarily serving as the center or warehouse for such commerce. It was also assumed that the importation of the second type of goods could be arranged so as to affect only the sale of similar foreign goods and not that of the mother country's products. To this end, duties were set so that colonial goods would be priced slightly higher than domestic ones, but still cheaper than those from other nations. The goal of this policy was not to discourage British production but rather to target the production of certain foreign countries with which Britain believed it had an unfavorable trade balance." [7]

Non-enumerated goods were those whose English producers feared foreign competition. Initially, these goods could be exported to any country, but later their export was restricted to regions south of Cape Finisterre. This new restriction was justified by the argument that the countries north of Cape Finisterre were manufacturing nations, and that colonial ships returning from them brought goods that competed with those produced in the mother country.

Following Spain’s example, England prohibited the practice of certain industries in its colonies. The manufacture of steel as well as rolled iron were banned. In the North American colonies, the transportation of woolen cloth and hats produced by local industry from one province to another was forbidden. Additionally, prohibitive duties were imposed on the importation of refined sugar into England. On the other hand, bounties were granted for the importation of certain colonial products that the mother country sought to artificially encourage. These included raw silk, flax, hemp, indigo, naval supplies, and construction timber.

Regarding imports, English colonies were treated more liberally than those of other nations. The same duty rebates that were granted on the re-exportation of foreign goods by British shipowners were extended to shipments of these goods to the colonies. As a result, certain European goods were sold in the English colonies at lower prices than in the mother country. National manufacturers complained about this and eventually succeeded in having this liberal measure partially revoked. [8]

Under this system, which was liberal compared to that of the Spanish colonies, England’s North American settlements grew rapidly. However, as the colonists saw their wealth and power increase, their desire for independence also grew. An attempt by the mother country to tax them without their consent became the signal for their emancipation. The colonial system then suffered a mortal blow. Until the proclamation of the United States’ independence, it had been widely believed that European mother countries had the greatest interest in maintaining the system. It was assumed that the emancipation of the colonies would put an end to trade with them. Yet, the opposite occurred. Far from declining as expected, trade between the mother country and the emancipated colonies only increased, [9] and today, the United States has become Great Britain’s primary market. However, there was one industry that suffered a significant setback from the separation of the North American states—namely, the industry of governors and other civil or military officials, which the British aristocracy provided to the colonies. Under the influence of these "industrialists" [10] , who were then dominant, England embarked on the conquest of new territories to compensate for the loss of its emancipated colonies. It did not fail to apply the old errors of the colonial system to its new acquisitions. It was only toward the end of the [398] Continental War that a liberal reaction against this system began to take shape. In 1822 and 1825, Lord Goderich and Mr. Huskisson proposed various modifications to the existing legislation. However, these modifications, which still encountered almost insurmountable resistance from these privileged interests and national prejudices, were of little significance. It took new political and economic events—such as the adoption of the Reform Bill, the abolition of slavery in the colonies, and the campaign for free trade—to bring about the downfall of England’s old colonial system.

It was impossible to ignore how costly this system was. First, enormous sums had been spent to conquer, maintain, and even lose the colonies. The American War of Independence alone had cost Great Britain two billion francs. Then, each year, the mother country had to cover part of the colonies’ governmental expenses, as none of them were entirely self-sufficient. The metropolis had to disburse an annual sum of two million sterling for this purpose, not to mention the cost of maintaining military and naval forces, which had to be constantly increased due to the continuous expansion of colonial possessions. That was not all. In 1833, driven by the most generous humanitarian sentiment, the mother country imposed upon itself a sacrifice of 20 million sterling to emancipate the slaves in its colonies. British taxpayers had to bear the interest on this sum, in addition to the interest on funds spent on colonial wars and the cost of colonial administration. Finally, the inhabitants of the mother country—consumers of sugar, coffee, timber, and other protected colonial products—had to bear the cost of this protection, which was not the least of their burdens. The protection granted to colonial sugar alone cost them more than 80 million francs per year. [11]

In compensation for the burdens that the colonial system imposed on the inhabitants of the mother country, both as taxpayers and consumers, what advantages did it provide them? Only the aristocracy, which found in the colonies a guaranteed market for its governmental industry, derived a net benefit from it. In contrast, did the other classes of the population not suffer more from it than they gained? It is true that they exported approximately 14 million pounds sterling worth of goods to the colonies, [12] but was it not evident that this market would remain and even expand if the colonial system were to disappear? The only remaining task was to convince these classes—now better represented in Parliament—that they were being deceived by the colonial system. The members of the League took on this task, and soon the two main pillars of the system—the privileges granted to colonial products in the markets of the mother country and the Navigation Act—fell under their attacks. This old regime of mutual exploitation is now almost entirely abolished. In the session of the House of Commons on February 8, 1850, Lord John Russell outlined the new principles that would henceforth guide Great Britain’s conduct toward its colonies:

“As regards our commercial policy,” he said, “the entire system of monopoly is no more. The only precaution we must now take is to ensure that our colonies do not grant privileges to one nation to the detriment of another, and that they do not impose duties on our products so high as to amount to a prohibition. I believe we are justified in making this request in return for the security we provide them… We are determined,” Lord John Russell added, “not to go back on this decision—that henceforth, your trade with the colonies is based on this principle: you are free to receive products from any country that can supply them to you at a better price and of better quality than the colonies, and, on the other hand, the colonies are free to trade with all parts of the globe in whatever way they deem most advantageous to their interests. This is the cornerstone of our future policy.

“As for our political relations with the colonies, you will act on the principle of introducing and maintaining political freedom in all your colonies as much as possible. I believe that whenever you assert that political freedom cannot be introduced, it is up to you to provide reasons for the exception; and you must demonstrate that it concerns a race not yet capable of accepting free institutions, that the colony is not composed of British citizens, or that they are present in too small a proportion to uphold such institutions with any security. Unless you provide such proof, and whenever it concerns a British population capable of self-government, if you continue to represent them in matters of [399] foreign policy, you no longer have to intervene in their domestic affairs beyond what is clearly and decisively necessary to prevent conflict within the colony itself.

“I believe these are the two principles on which you must act. I can at least declare that they are the principles adopted by the current government. Not only do I believe these principles can guide us without any immediate danger, but I also think they will help resolve serious future issues without exposing us to an unfortunate conflict like that which marked the end of the last century. Looking back at the origins of that fatal war with the territories that became the United States of America, I cannot help but believe that it resulted not from a single error, not from a simple mistake, but from a repeated series of faults and errors—from an unfortunate policy of belated concessions and untimely demands. I trust that we will no longer have to mourn such conflicts. No doubt, like all sensible people, I foresee that some of our colonies will one day grow so much in population and wealth that they will come to tell you: ‘We are strong enough to be independent of England. The bond that ties us to her has become burdensome, and the time has come when, in friendship and alliance with the mother country, we wish to maintain our independence.’ I do not believe that time is very near, but let us do everything we can to make them fit to govern themselves. Let us give them, as much as possible, the ability to manage their own affairs. Let them grow in number and in prosperity, and whatever happens, we, citizens of this great empire, will have the consolation of knowing that we have contributed to the happiness of the world.” [13]

Such is England’s new colonial policy. There is no doubt that this policy will rapidly lead to the emancipation of the colonies. Once the illusions of the colonial system vanish along with the last remnants of that system, it is unlikely that British taxpayers will continue to bear part of the costs of colonial governments. But if the colonists are henceforth obliged to cover all their expenses themselves, will they not want to decide for themselves how their money is spent? Will they not demand the dissolution of an association in which they no longer reap any benefits? And will the mother country be able to refuse their just request?

Thus, England’s colonial system is coming to an end. Unfortunately, other nations have remained far more backward in this regard. Spain, the Netherlands, and France have continued to largely follow the outdated system of exclusive colonial exploitation. Following the example of the English settlements in North America, Spain’s colonies, weary of an oppressive yoke, have emancipated themselves. Of its vast overseas possessions, Spain has retained only the Philippine Islands, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. The abolition of slavery in the British West Indies has brought considerable prosperity to the latter colony (see SLAVERY). The Spanish government has supported its development by allowing the colonists to trade freely with foreigners. However, it has also imposed an usurious share in the colony’s growing revenue, provoking the discontent of the colonists. They have turned toward the United States, where they have found a strong party willing to support their emancipation, and despite the failure of General Lopez’s attempts, it is foreseeable that Cuba will not remain under Spanish rule for much longer. The Netherlands continues to exploit the island of Java through a company whose interests are closely tied to those of the government. After having made considerable sacrifices to secure possession of the island, the Dutch now derive significant profits from the system of exclusive exploitation to which they have subjected it. However, experience shows that profits of this kind—based on the subjugation and unjust exploitation of indigenous peoples—cannot be lasting.

Finally, France has kept its old colonial system almost intact. However, of its vast possessions in America and the Indian Ocean, it has retained only a few small settlements, whose population does not exceed 600,000 individuals, to which must be added its recent and costly establishment in Algeria.

III. CRITIQUE OF THE COLONIAL SYSTEM. ADVANTAGES OF FREE COLONIZATION.

Colonization has an undeniable utility, recognized by all economists. It is beneficial for nations that find themselves constrained within the limits of their territories to expand outward; it is also useful for them to occupy and cultivate fertile lands that are left fallow by still-barbaric races. William Penn and his companions, by founding a new state in a region where previously only a few nomadic tribes of Native Americans roamed, clearly contributed to the progress of wealth and civilization. They would have contributed to it as well, no doubt, had they remained in Europe, but to a lesser extent, for the exercise of their activity was hindered in the mother country by a multitude of prejudices and abusive regulations, which were either modified or ceased to be felt beyond the ocean. On the other hand, the new land where they settled offered them natural resources far superior to those available in Europe. They thus found themselves placed in economically more favorable conditions.

However, not all colonization efforts have equally served the development of wealth and civilization. It has often happened that emigrants, failing to fully grasp the difficulties of the venture they were undertaking—the costs of transportation and settlement in the new colony, the insalubrity of the climate, the barbarity of the indigenous peoples, etc.—ended up worsening their situation instead of improving it. It has often happened that [400] productive capital was withdrawn from industries in the mother country to be invested with lesser returns in colonization efforts. Like all other ventures, colonization can be either ruinous or profitable; one can fail just as one can succeed. One fails when one ventures, without sufficient resources, into a land where unforeseen difficulties and dangers arise; one also fails when one is not naturally suited to endure the immense hardships and severe privations required by the early work of colonization. Success comes when a settlement is wisely chosen and the colonists possess enough capital, strength, health, and energy to tame the virgin land.

If one fully understands the nature of these ventures, the difficulties, and the risks surrounding them, one will be convinced that governments cannot undertake them usefully. The same arguments used against government intervention in the industries of the mother countries apply equally to their interference in colonization efforts: the best system to follow in this matter—or rather, the only good system—is to let emigrants go wherever they choose, establish themselves, govern themselves, and defend themselves as they see fit and, above all, at their own expense. By preserving their freedom and responsibility in full, they settle in places where colonization presents the greatest advantages and the fewest obstacles; they also employ the methods of exploitation and governing that seem to them the most effective and least costly. Any external protection, by partially relieving them of the responsibility for mistakes they might make, encourages the misallocation and misuse of their productive funds; likewise, any restriction that prevents them from making the most of their capital and labor becomes an obstacle to their prosperity.

By examining the colonial system from this perspective, one can grasp the extent of the damage it has caused. This system aimed to secure for each mother country a colonial market that it could exploit exclusively: no cost was deemed too high for acquiring, maintaining, and defending this market; it was never thought to be too expensive. But once obtained, it was subjected to excessive regulation. Foreigners were forbidden from settling there or bringing in their products; colonists were forced to send their goods to the mother country, which, in turn, excluded similar goods from foreign sources; certain crops and industries that might compete with those of the mother country were prohibited in the colonies, etc., etc. Let us attempt to assess the impact that these various components of the system could have had on the development of wealth.

I. By preventing foreigners from settling in a colony, the total productive forces that could contribute to its development were diminished; the growth of colonial production was hindered by granting it as a monopoly to individuals who did not always possess the necessary skills and knowledge to make it flourish. If English emigrants, for example, had been allowed to settle in Spanish colonies, is it not evident that the wealth of these colonies would have increased?

II. By forbidding colonists from engaging in certain industries, as well as from shipping their goods wherever they wished and in the manner they found most economical, their wealth was prevented from growing as much as it could have. In the first case, productive capital that they could have profitably exploited was rendered useless in their hands; in the second case, the profit they could have obtained from the capital they were permitted to use was restricted.

III. The growth of colonial wealth was further slowed by forcing the colonists to buy goods from the mother country rather than from other countries. This obligation subjected them to an implicit tax equal to the difference in price between the goods from the mother country and similar goods from foreign sources. It is true that excluding foreign goods favored domestic producers, who alone could exploit the colonial market; but the ultimate result was nevertheless a reduction in overall production, as expensive goods were substituted for cheaper ones. Any measure that favored producers in the mother country at the expense of their foreign competitors led to a less advantageous distribution of productive capital in Europe, thereby reducing overall wealth. (See PROTECTIVE SYSTEM.)

IV. By forcing the inhabitants of the mother country to consume certain products from their own colonies rather than similar goods from foreign colonies, they were, in turn, subjected to an implicit tax equal to the difference in price between these two sources. This obligation resulted in a less efficient allocation of productive capital and, as in the previous case, led to a corresponding reduction in overall wealth.

V. By taking on the costs of establishing and securing colonies, the governments of Europe effectively provided subsidies for colonization ventures. What was the result of these subsidies? They artificially directed the capital of the mother country into less efficient and less profitable uses than it would have found naturally. Indeed, the subsidized ventures would not have attracted capital if they had been left to operate independently, or at least they would have done so only when, accounting for all costs, they had become genuinely more profitable.

By subsidizing colonization, what were the governments of Europe actually doing? They were stripping certain branches of labor to favor others that were, in reality, less productive under the conditions in which they were placed; they were provoking a less profitable distribution of productive capital, thereby diminishing overall wealth.

Now, let us suppose that instead of subsidizing [401] colonization and regulating it, the European nations had left it to itself—if they had neither promoted nor hindered it—what would have resulted? First, emigrations of people and capital would have occurred everywhere at the appropriate time, meaning exactly when colonization had become genuinely more profitable than other uses of productive resources. Second, colonies would have been established under the most economical conditions (since the settlers would have been solely responsible for all the costs of their establishment and government), and as a result, European nations would have been able to obtain colonial goods at the lowest prices, while the settlers would have secured European goods under equally favorable conditions. In this way, capital and labor would have been employed to their greatest advantage in both the Old World and the New. One can confidently assert that if the outcome would have been better for the collective of nations, it would not have been any worse for individual nations.

If one wishes to fully understand the results of subsidized and regulated colonization compared to those of free colonization, one need only look at Algeria and California—two regions where the experiments of these two opposing systems are currently unfolding. The French government, as is well known, had the unfortunate idea of conquering and colonizing Algeria. As we write, more than 1,500 million francs have already been spent there; yet, this massive subsidy has not been enough to attract capital and labor to Algeria. After twenty years, Algeria’s imports to France do not exceed 5 million francs, and if France sends a greater quantity of its products to its colony, it is merely to support its soldiers and officials, and sometimes even its settlers (see AGRICULTURAL COLONIES). Why has the enormous subsidy allocated to Algerian colonization not borne better fruit? Because this subsidy has been absorbed, on the one hand, by the exceptional difficulties encountered in establishing security in Algeria, and on the other hand, it has been neutralized by the poor regime that the French government has imposed on the settlers. European emigrants prefer to take their capital and labor to countries like the United States, where the security they must pay for entirely themselves is still more profitable to them than the security granted below cost in Algeria.

While the colonization of Algeria is progressing at a desperately slow pace, that of California, in contrast, is advancing at an almost unbelievable speed. Yet no subsidies have drawn emigrants to this remote coast of the Pacific Ocean; they have been lured there solely by the promise of profits superior to those of other investments. When they arrived in California, they were neither protected nor hindered; they used their capital and labor as they saw fit and organized, at their own expense, the form of government that best suited them. The result has been the astonishing development of this free colony—a colony to which even France sends emigrants, despite Algeria being, so to speak, at its doorstep.

This contrast will inevitably become visible to all, and the old colonial system will suffer a fatal blow; at that point, colonization, freed from being a subsidized and regulated industry, will be able to yield all the beneficial results it holds. It will successfully expand the reach of civilization and provide civilized nations with new markets—markets no longer acquired at an excessively high cost.

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Historical and Political Overview of the Losses Caused by the Revolution and War to the French People in Their Population, Agriculture, Colonies, Manufactures, and Trade, by Sir F. D’Ivernois. London, 1799, in-8.

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On the Colonial System of France in Terms of Politics and Trade, Accompanied by a Table Giving the Technological Nomenclature of All Colonial Establishments and the Trade of Europeans in Other Parts of the World, by Count G. Ch. de Hogendorp. Paris, 1817, Dentu.

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On Colonial Intercourse, etc. — (On Colonial Trade, etc.), by Henry Bliss. London, 1826, in-8. 739. A pamphlet prompted by the proposal to open the colonies to foreign trade to a certain extent, supported by Mr. Robinson (now Lord Ripon) and Huskisson.

Report by the Commission Created by the Ordinance of September 1, 1825, for Compensation to the Colonists of Saint-Domingue. Paris, 1826. 741. Published by the Ministry of the Interior.

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Essay on Rational Statistics of European Tropical Colonies and Colonial Issues, with an Appendix Containing Supporting Documents and Tables on Population, Trade..., and the Movement of Sugar in France..., by Tournachon de Montvéran. Paris, Delaunay, 1833, in-8.

England and America, a Comparison of the Social and Political State of Both Nations — (England and America, a Comparison of the Social and Political State of the Two Nations), by E.-G. Wakefield. London, 1833, 2 vol. in-8. 746. "The author of this work is considered the inventor of what is called the new system of colonization, and his system is extensively treated in this work." (M. C.)

A Summary of Colonial Law, with the Practice of the Court of Appeals from the Plantations, Charter of Justice, Orders in Council, etc. — (Summary of the Laws Relating to the Colonies, with the Jurisprudence of the Special Court of Appeals, Charters of Justice, Orders in Council, etc.), by Ch. Clarke. London, 1834, 4 vol. in-8. 748. "A concise and useful work that would deserve to be expanded." (M. C.)

Summary on the Establishments Formed in Madagascar. 1830, Royal Printing House, in-8.

Essay on the Administration of Colonies, by Mauny. Paris, 1837, in-8.

Statistics of the Colonies of the British Empire, etc. — (Statistics of the Colonies of the British Empire, etc.), by Montgomerie-Martin. London, 1839, 4 vol. 752, large in-8. 753. This work contains the substance of a previous five-volume study by the same author on the same subject.

Foreign Colonies and Haiti, by V. Schœlcher. Paris, Pagnerre, 1843, 1 vol. in-8.

Statistical Notices on the French Colonies, Printed by Order of the Minister of the Navy. Paris, Royal Printing House, 1837-1840, 4 volumes divided as follows: 516.First part: Martinique, Guadeloupe. 756. 517.Second part: Bourbon Island. 757. 518.Third part: Establishments in India, Senegal. 758. 519.Fourth part: Madagascar and the Saint-Pierre Islands. 759. 520.These notices mark the beginning of a series of annual publications issued by the Ministry of the Navy, published under the following title:

⠀Tables and Surveys of Population, Cultivation, Trade, and Navigation for the Years 1839 and Beyond, forming a continuation of the tables included in the Statistical Notices on the French Colonies. Paris, Royal Printing House, 1842 and following years.

Lectures on Colonization and Colonies, Delivered Before the University of Oxford in 1839, 1840, and 1841. — (Course on Colonization Delivered at the University of Oxford in 1839, 1840, and 1841), by Herman Merivale. London, 1841, 2 vol. in-8. 763. "Although it does not achieve everything one might wish, this work is certainly the most comprehensive and best written in English on the subject." (M. C.)

On the Government of Dependencies. — (On the Government of Dependencies or Colonies), by G.-C. Lewis. London, 1841, 1 vol. in-8. 765. "A scholarly and highly meritorious work on a subject that, despite its utmost importance, has been strangely neglected in this country." (M. C.)

Minutes of the Sessions of the Colonization Commission of French Guiana, Published by the Minister of the Navy. Paris, 1842, Royal Printing House, 1 vol. in-4.

Colonization of Algeria, by M. Enfantin. Paris, Bertrand, 1843, 1 vol. in-8.

Colonization of Madagascar, by Désiré Laverdant. Paris, Amyot, 1844, 1 vol. large in-8. 769. Published by the Paris Maritime Society.

Report on Colonial Issues, by M. Jules Lechevalier. Royal Printing House, 1844-45, 2 large vol. in-folio.

Colonization and Agriculture in Algeria, by L. Moll. Paris, Agricultural Bookstore of Dusacq, 1845.

On Slavery and the Colonies, by M. Du Puynode. Paris, Joubert, 1845, 1 vol. in-8.

On the Necessity of Abolishing Slavery in Our Colonies and Modifying Customs Duties on Sugar and Coffee in the General Interest of France, by Ed. de Jullienne. Aix, Veuve Tavernier, 1849, in-8.

Study on the Current State of the Navy and French Colonies, by Louis Estancelin, former deputy, etc. Paris, Veuve Le Normant, 1849, in-8.

Maritime and Colonial Annals, or Collection of Laws, Ordinances, Regulations, etc., and Generally Everything That May Concern the Navy and the Colonies. Paris, from the year 1819 onwards.

See also Trade, Slavery, Navigation.

Endnotes to Colonies

[1] J.-B. Say, Traité d'Économie politique, Book I, Chapter XIX.

[2] Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter VII.

[3] "The reason is evident," says M. Dureau de la Malle; "composed of proletarians who, in Rome itself, were deprived of these political rights, they could not have been granted them without disturbing the order of the comitia by centuries and by tribes, without infringing on the constitution of the republic." (Économie politique des Romains, Volume I, Book IV, Chapter 7, p. 346.)

[4] Cours d’économie politique, 13th lesson.

[5] Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter VII.

[6] Robertson's America, Book IX, p. 104.

[7] Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Chapter VII.

[8] By a statute of the 4th year of the reign of George III (1763), it was decided "that henceforth no rebate would be granted on what is called the old subsidy for goods of European or East Indian origin, production, or manufacture, which were exported from this kingdom to the English colonies or plantations in America, for wines, white cotton cloths, and muslins."

[9] Bristol was the main warehouse for trade with North America. The merchants and principal inhabitants gathered to declare to Parliament in the strongest terms that their city was ruined forever if the independence of the United States was recognized, adding that not enough ships would enter their port to make its maintenance worthwhile. Despite these representations, necessity forced the conclusion of peace and consent to this much-feared separation. Ten years had not passed before the same Bristol merchants petitioned Parliament for a bill authorizing them to dig and expand this port, which, far from being ruined, had become too small to accommodate all the ships brought by the expansion of trade with independent America. (De Lévis, Lettres chinoises.) In 1776, at the beginning of the War of Independence, English exports to North America were 1,300,000 pounds sterling; they rose to 3,000,000 pounds in 1784 after independence was recognized; and they now amount to 12,400,000 pounds sterling, a sum almost equal to the total exports England makes to its forty-five colonies, since these did not exceed 13,200,000 pounds sterling in 1842. (Fr. Bastiat, Cobden et la Ligue, introduction, p. 26.)

[10] (Ed Note) Molinari here is suggesting that seeking and providing government jobs is an "industry" like any other, where those who engage in it seek profits and other benefits. The difference between "les industriels" ("industrialists", or rather those who engage in this "industry of government") and other "industrialists" is that they do so at the expense of taxpayers, not willing customers of their "products". He would explore this approach to analyzing government in several later works. Ref??

[11] At an average price of 49 francs 20 centimes (39 shillings 8 pence) for colonial sugar in bonded warehouses from 1837 to 1841, plus 30 francs in duties (24 shillings), the annual cost to the English people for consuming 3,868,000 quintals of sugar amounted to 306.5 million francs, broken down as follows:

(make into bullet points ??)

103.5 million—what an equal quantity of foreign sugar would have cost at 29 francs 75 centimes (21 shillings 8 pence), the average price of foreign sugar in bonded warehouses from 1837 to 1841.

116 million—tax revenue at 30 francs (24 shillings).

86.5 million—monopoly surplus due to the difference between the colonial and foreign price. (The duty on foreign sugar being 63 shillings, i.e., prohibitive.)

306 million total. (end bullet points)

It is clear that under an equal tax regime, with a uniform tax of 30 francs per quintal, if the English people had chosen to spend 306 million francs on this type of consumption, they would have received, at a price of 26 francs 75 centimes plus 30 francs in tax, 5,400,000 quintals or 22 kilograms per capita instead of 16. If the people had been satisfied with the current level of consumption, they would have saved 86 million annually, which could have provided other satisfactions and opened new markets for their industry. (F. Bastiat, Cobden et la Ligue, Introduction, p. xxxi.)

[12] The average was 14,355,461 pounds sterling in 1842-46. Exports to the East Indies accounted for 6,770,436 of this total.

[13] Journal des Économistes. New Colonial Policy of England, by F. Bastiat, Vol. XXV, p. 8.

Colonies agricoles (Agricultural Colonies)↩

Source

"Colonies agricoles", DEP, T. 1, pp. 403-5.

Text

[403]

Agricultural colonization is a purely philanthropic concept. After so many futile attempts to eradicate begging, it was believed that the solution to the problem had finally been found by granting uncultivated land to beggars for clearing. It was thought that the establishment of agricultural colonies would relieve society of the costs of maintaining able-bodied paupers while simultaneously enriching it with additional production. Unfortunately, one essential element was overlooked in this ideal calculation: the capital required for the establishment and operation of the colonies. Yet the expense could not fail to be exceedingly high, since the lands left for clearing in civilized countries are generally of inferior quality, and, on the other hand, the labor intended for this task was among the least effective.

Experience was bound to dispel the illusions that had been formed about this new remedy proposed for the eradication of begging. Thirty years ago, the Netherlands, and more recently France, undertook large-scale experiments in agricultural colonies, sinking vast sums into them that could certainly have been put to better use.

It was in 1818 that General Vandenbosch founded in the Netherlands a philanthropic society with the aim of diverting the surplus miserable population of the cities into agricultural colonies. This society, placed under the patronage of Prince Frederick of the Netherlands, was composed of an unlimited number of members. One could become a shareholder or member of the society by paying an annual contribution of 2 ½ florins. [1] The society successively established four settlements, namely: 1) the three colonies of Frederiks' Oord, near Steenwijk, on the borders of the provinces of Overijssel, Drenthe, and Friesland; 2) Ommerschans, near Ommers in Overijssel, serving as a depot for mendicants; 3) the three establishments of Veenhuizen, near Assen in Drenthe, of which the first serves as an orphanage and the other two, like Ommerschans, accommodate beggars; 4) an agricultural institution for 70 orphans in Wateren. These four colonies had a combined population of 11,793 inhabitants by the end of 1847. This included 3,465 free colonists, 649 military colonists, 1,511 orphans and abandoned children, 5,145 beggars, and 645 employees (including their families). This population was recruited in the following manner. Free colonists were sent by the society’s subcommittees. Each time a subcommittee collected a sum of 1,700 florins, it had the right to send a poor family to the colonies, where they were granted a small farm of two and a half hectares. The orphans and abandoned children were mostly placed by the large cities of the Netherlands. The beggars consisted of: 1) those who had been convicted of vagrancy and sentenced to imprisonment for three to six months, followed by detention in a depot for mendicants, in accordance with Article 274 of the French Penal Code, which remained in force in the Netherlands; 2) a small number of beggars sent by municipalities seeking to rid themselves of their surplus indigents; 3) destitute individuals who, unable to make a living in their communities, expressed the desire to be transferred to the agricultural colonies. The colonies paid the government for this purpose:

For the cost of admission, by head	15 florins
For a healthy beggar, per year	35 florins
For a semi-healthy beggar, by year	72 1/2 florins
For an invalide beggar, per year	85 florins

They are also required to bear the costs of transporting their poor to the colonies. This obligation to send to the colonies those poor who express the desire to go there is extremely burdensome for them. They are literally [404] crushed under this burden, which has been imposed on them with the aim of promoting agricultural colonization.

However, the subsidies that Dutch municipalities pay for the maintenance of their orphans, their poor, and their beggars are not received directly by the Philanthropic Society. The government acts as an intermediary between the municipalities and the Society. It has entered into the following agreement with the latter:

The Society commits to maintaining annually:

2,000 orphans or abandonned children
1,950 poor people with family	among these poor people there are 650 army veterans
1,250 poor people with family	"
4,000 beggars
9,200 individuals

In return, the government commits to paying the Society annually the sum of 332,000 florins for the upkeep of these 9,200 individuals. If this number is exceeded, the government provides an additional amount per colonist; if it is not reached, the government cannot deduct anything until the number of boarders supplied by it has fallen to 5,800. Below this figure, it has the right to deduct 35 florins per person.

The Society employs its colonists in agriculture and various industries, such as cotton spinning and the manufacture of sacks used for transporting coffee from the island of Java. It sells these sacks to the government, which holds the monopoly; it also sells part of the spun cotton from the colonies to external buyers. The other goods are consumed by the colonists. The Society has devised an ingenious method to compel them to procure their supplies from its stores: it pays their wages in lead tokens, which it accepts at a fixed rate. This is essentially a disguised form of the truck system.

Despite the substantial subsidy allocated by the government and the artificial method it employs to offload its products, the Philanthropic Society is constantly in deficit. In 1848, its movable and immovable capital was valued at no more than 3 million florins, while its debts ranged between 8 and 9 million florins. The experiment can therefore be considered a failure. Had the Dutch government left the municipalities free to provide for their indigent population in another manner, they would undoubtedly have maintained them at a lower cost, assuming they found it appropriate and useful to do so.

The agricultural colony experiment was also conducted in Belgium, but it failed even more quickly than in Holland. In 1822, a society founded in Brussels, also under the patronage of Prince Frederick, established an agricultural colony at Wortel, in the province of Antwerp, modeled after Frederiks’ Oordt. Later, the Society created an agricultural depot for beggars in the heathlands of Merxplas-Ryckewersel, also in the province of Antwerp. Upon the separation of Belgium and the Netherlands, these establishments came under Belgian control, but as the Belgian government did not deem it appropriate to support them, they ultimately collapsed. In 1836, the Society owed 1,908,084 francs and 23 centimes, while its assets amounted to only 915,192 francs and 82 centimes. A few years later, in 1845, its assets had dwindled to 420,000 francs. The population, which initially stood at 127 individuals and had reached 1,431 in 1827, had dropped to 530 by 1830. When the colonies were abandoned, the remaining colonists were transferred to the depots for mendicants. In 1846, the Society's properties were put up for public sale and awarded to Prince Frederick of the Netherlands, the Society's principal creditor.

In France, agricultural colonies remained merely a proposal until 1848. During the Restoration, M. de Villeneuve-Bargemont had praised them highly. After the July Revolution, a commission was appointed to study the system in place in the Netherlands and to prepare a trial in France. A little later, the Academy awarded the Montyon Prize to Treatise on Christian Political Economy by M. de Villeneuve-Bargemont and to a book by M. Huerne de Pommeuse on agricultural colonies. However, no significant trials were attempted until 1848. It was then decided to establish agricultural colonies to employ the unemployed workers who overcrowded the streets of Paris. On September 19, a law was enacted stating that twelve thousand colonists would be settled in Algeria at the expense of the State and that they would be provided for three years with the necessary means for their settlement and upkeep. Here are the results of this new philanthropic experiment. By the end of 1850, forty-two villages had been built or were under construction. They were inhabited by a population of 10,376 individuals; however, this population had already turned over once, as the colonies, after initially receiving 12,666 settlers, had lost 10,217, either through departures or deaths. The expenses incurred or anticipated for this population were estimated at 27,250,000 francs. These expenses included 1,212,000 francs for the transportation of colonists, 10,442,000 francs for construction work, 5,776,000 francs for food rations, 1,582,000 francs for administrative costs, 1,707,000 francs for agricultural tools, 1,416,000 francs for livestock and seeds, etc. These expenditures were made for the benefit of 3,230 concessionaires and their families occupying 57,000 hectares of land. This results in:

Per family	8,374 fr 61 c.
Per individual	2,597 fr. 34 c.

Now, is it not evident that if a similar sum had been given to each family settled in Algeria while remaining in the metropolis, they would have easily managed? At the interest rate of 1848, they could have secured a small income of 700 to 800 francs through this national munificence, with which they could have lived comfortably in any town or village in France. As for the yield obtained in Algeria through this capital of 8,374 francs and 61 centimes spent per concessionaire, it has so far remained almost nil; [405] it was estimated at a maximum of 1,115 francs and 86 centimes in 1851. If this yield does not increase significantly, the agricultural colonies of Algeria will remain indefinitely dependent on the metropolis.

Experience has therefore ruled against agricultural colonies in Algeria as well as in Belgium and Holland. This result is unsurprising if one considers that these colonies lacked the most essential elements for the success of a colonization enterprise. In Holland and Belgium, they had neither good land nor suitable labor for cultivation. In Algeria, they had good land, but the settlers, dispatched without selection to a new country, were entirely incapable of enduring the hardships of colonization. What should be concluded from this? That colonization is too complex an operation to be carried out successfully by randomly chosen workers or by beggars demoralized by poverty, and that neither public nor private philanthropy is any more capable of colonizing profitably than it is of managing any other industry. (For penitentiary colonies, see the article SYSTÈME PÉNITENTIAIRE.)

Bibliography

Des colonies agricoles, by Huerne de Pommeuse. 1 vol. in-8, Paris, 1832.

Économie politique chrétienne, by M. de Villeneuve-Bergemont, 3rd vol.

Les colonies agricoles de la Société néerlandaise de bienfaisance, by M. W.-C. Staring. 30-page pamphlet in French. Arnheim, G.-J. Thiéme, 1849.

Reports on the agricultural colonies of Algeria, by MM. de Riancey, Louis Reybaud, and Th. Lestiboudois.

Report by M. Ducpétiaux on agricultural colonies. Brussels.

Report to the Minister of the Interior on agricultural colonies, by MM. de Lurieu and Romand, general inspectors of charitable institutions. Paris, 1851. In 1849, a commission was appointed, following the report of M. Buffet, Minister of Agriculture, to study the issue of agricultural colonies in its entirety and its details. MM. de Lurieu and Romand, general inspectors of charitable institutions and members of this commission, were tasked with studying on-site the agricultural colonies of France, Holland, Switzerland, and Belgium, to provide the commission with the necessary information for its work.

Colonization of the moors of Brittany with orphans and abandoned children, by M. Achille du Clésieux, 1845.

Des colonies agricoles en France et en Algérie, by Jules Lamarque and Gustave Dugat, 1850.

Colonie agricole de Montmorillon, by M. Emmanuel de Cuizon, 1851.

See the articles by M. P. de Thury on agricultural colonies, in Annales de la charité, 1851.

Endnotes to Colonies agricoles

[1] Fr. 5.32. The Dutch florin is worth 2 francs 12 ½ centimes.

Colonies militaires (Military Colonies)↩

Source

"Colonies militaires", DEP, T. 1, p. 405.

Text

[405]

Several nations have established military colonies to protect their borders from invasion. This was an economical way to secure military services. Under the Roman Empire, for example, legionnaires received land grants in Illyria and Pannonia on the condition that they would defend them. Later, the kings of Hungary and the archdukes of Austria organized a military and sanitary frontier in the same region to protect themselves from Turkish invasions and to guard against the plague. The colonists were required to maintain a permanent force of a certain number of men. In exchange for this obligation, they were granted a specific area of wheat fields and pastures.

In Russia, military colonies were created with the aim of maintaining a significant military force without drawing too many hands away from agriculture. Count Arakcheev was the principal promoter of these enterprises, which began in 1818 on an extremely large scale. Lands were granted to peasants who were serfs of the Crown, with the obligation to support the soldiers sent to the colonies. In return, these soldiers were required to perform labor services for the peasants. The colonies were subjected to the most detailed regulations. According to an English traveler, Mr. Lyall, these regulations filled no fewer than fourteen volumes. They extended even to women, who were permitted to marry only members of the colony to which they belonged and were required to comply with the will of the chiefs in choosing their husbands. After ten years, 60,000 men with 30,000 horses were settled among 400,000 male peasants—the infantry in the Novgorod government, and the cavalry in the districts of the Sloboda Ukraine, Kharkov, Kherson, and Yekaterinoslav. The initial establishment costs and other expenses amounted to 32,482,733 rubles in 1826.

From a financial standpoint, the enterprise did not meet the expectations placed upon it, and later, it came to be seen as dangerous. After 1830, a large number of colonists were disarmed, and the military colonies lost even their name: they were simply referred to as districts of soldier-farmers. Ultimately, and except for specific cases justified by particular circumstances, it seems that agricultural labor does not integrate well with military duties and that it is preferable to maintain a dedicated army rather than impose military services and organization on farmers—this in accordance with the economic principle of the division of labor.

Bibliography

Tableau du système militaire de la Russie, by M. Tanski.

Essai historique sur le système de colonisation militaire de la Russie, by M. Robert Lyall. Translated into French. Paris, 1825.

Encyclopédie des gens du monde, article Colonies militaires, by M. Schnitzler.

Tarifs de douane (Custom Tariffs)↩

Source

"Tarifs de douane", DEP, T. 2, pp. 712-16.

Text

[712]

Customs tariffs have been established with two different, one might even say opposing, objectives: 1. to provide revenue for the treasury; 2. to protect national industry against competition from foreign industry. Except perhaps for the Turkish tariff, which is established solely for revenue purposes, [1] [713] all the tariffs in the world have both a fiscal and a protective character. However, some, among which we may cite the tariffs of France, Austria, Russia, and Spain, are primarily protective in nature, while others, such as those of England and the United States, are rather fiscal. Even in England, protection has become merely incidental, in the sense that taxation has become the primary objective of the tariff.

Originally, customs tariffs seem to have been considered everywhere solely as fiscal instruments. More detailed information on this subject can be found under the entry DOUANE. We will limit ourselves here to adding some details on the transformations that the French tariff has undergone and its current state.

It is well known that before the Revolution of 1789, the French tariff was not uniform. France was then divided into three major customs regions. First, there were the provinces of the cinq grosses fermes, which included most of the northern region, from Picardy and Champagne to Poitou, Berry, and Bourbonnais. These provinces were not separated by internal barriers; they formed a genuine customs union, and it was to them that Colbert’s protectionist tariff applied. Next came the so-called foreign provinces, which consisted first of the southern region, following a horizontal line from La Rochelle; secondly, of Brittany to the west, Franche-Comté to the east, and, in the north, Flanders, Artois, and Hainaut combined. These provinces had tariffs distinct from those of the cinq grosses fermes, from which they were separated by customs barriers. However, there were some duties that they shared in common. Additionally, goods coming from the cinq grosses fermes could enter the other provinces without paying anything more than their own export duties, etc. (See DOUANE.) Finally, there were the provinces d’étranger effectif and free ports. The provinces d’étranger effectif were the governments of Alsace and Lorraine; the free ports were Marseille, Bayonne, Lorient, and Dunkirk; these provinces and ports were considered part of foreign territory: politically united with the rest of the kingdom, they remained commercially separate.

This old legislation, which had the serious flaw of not being uniform, had, in contrast, the merit of not being uniformly protectionist. In the so-called foreign provinces and those of étranger effectif, duties were generally quite moderate. It is therefore understandable that these provinces strongly resisted Colbert’s attempts to impose his protectionist tariff on them, since the advantages they would have gained from the removal of internal barriers would not, in all likelihood, have compensated for the damage that the generalization of protection would have caused them. Their resistance to the establishment of a uniformly protectionist regime was far more justifiable than is commonly admitted. The Assemblée Constituante succeeded in overcoming these objections by taking into account their legitimate concerns, replacing the particular tariffs of the different provinces with a general tariff that was relatively moderate. If the Assemblée Constituante’s commercial policy had continued to prevail, France would certainly have had every reason to applaud the removal of its internal barriers. Unfortunately, this was not the case: the governments of the Republic and the Empire realized that they could use the standardized tariff as an instrument of war, and they did not hesitate to test its effectiveness. The Convention and the Directoire prohibited goods from nations with which France was at war, particularly English goods, and Napoleon conceived the gigantic folly of the Continental Blockade (see that entry). These deplorable missteps could obviously never have occurred if the customs fragmentation of the Ancien Régime had remained in place. Thus, even the most beneficial reforms can become obstacles to progress and instruments of barbarism when they are improvised in a country that is not sufficiently prepared to receive them.

Moreover, if the protectionist regime inaugurated by the French Revolution had not outlived the Continental War, it could rightly be argued that the evils caused by this system were more than offset by the benefits resulting from the standardisation of the tariff. But evil has its own logic, just as good does. Artificial industries had been established under the protection of the obstacles that war had created for international trade. These artificial industries found themselves seriously threatened with extinction upon the restoration of peace. The interests involved were alarmed, and since these interests had gained predominance in the new political organization of the country, the protectionist system was not only maintained but further reinforced.

"Brutal provisions that proscribed colonial commodities and raw materials from tropical regions were erased from the law," says M. Michel Chevalier. "They were complained about from all sides, benefited no one, and no one demanded their [714] retention. The burning of English goods was abandoned; it was an offensive spectacle, and even under the Empire, it had only been carried out in rare circumstances when it was thought to stimulate belligerent sentiment. But everything that constituted a privilege in favor of manufacturers—momentarily softened in the spring of 1814—was restored with even greater severity later that same year by the law of December 17, and then aggravated further. Likewise, the exorbitant means adopted under the Republic and the Empire to enforce, at all costs, the prohibitions against goods manufactured in enemy countries were maintained without any concession. Thus, home searches, paid denunciations, preventive confiscation, and bodily searches remained in the customs arsenal, and they were freely used. In sum, except for some modifications concerning raw cotton, colonial commodities, and other materials from equatorial regions, the tariff of the Restoration was stricter, more exclusive, and more hostile to freedom than that of the Empire—and it was so without excuse." [2]

Perhaps M. Michel Chevalier is too harsh on the government of the Restoration. Without the prohibitionist follies of the Republic and the Empire, and the artificial industries they created, this government would not have ventured so far down the wrong path of the protectionist regime. It is also only fair to acknowledge that it did not go as far in this direction as interested parties would have liked. The debates surrounding the 1822 customs law bear witness to this. Be that as it may, from that point on, the French tariff was designed exclusively with protection in mind, to which the interests of the Treasury were systematically sacrificed. In a series of maxims that deserve to be reproduced, the sponsor of the 1822 law, M. de Bourrienne, elevated this harmful practice to the level of principle.

"A country," he said, "where customs duties serve only as a fiscal measure, would march swiftly toward its decline; if the interests of the treasury took precedence over the general interest, it would result only in a temporary advantage that would come at a heavy price later on.

"A country may enjoy great prosperity while having little revenue from customs; it may also have high customs revenue and yet be in a state of hardship and decline—perhaps one could even prove that the latter is a consequence of the former.

"Customs duties are not a tax; they are a bounty for agriculture, commerce, and industry; and the laws that establish them must be political at times, always protective, and never based on fiscal interest.

"Customs duties (with the distinction I have just made) should not exist for the benefit of the treasury, and any tax resulting from the duty is merely incidental.

"One proof that the tax aspect of customs duties is secondary is that export duties are almost nonexistent, and that when the legislator imposes an import duty on certain items, his intention is that as few of them enter as possible. The increase or decrease in revenue must never be a consideration.

"... If the law before you results in a decrease in customs revenue, you should welcome it. That will be proof that you have achieved your goal: to slow dangerous imports and to encourage useful exports."

Should we then be surprised that the French tariff, designed in accordance with M. de Bourrienne's maxims, yields much less revenue proportionally than England’s fiscal tariff? (See DOUANE.) The protectionists have indeed achieved this result, but should governments and taxpayers truly rejoice in it?

Since the Restoration, the French tariff has undergone only minor modifications, so that it remains today one of the highest and most complex in Europe. It still contains fifty-three prohibitions, forty-eight of which apply to imports, covering prepared skins and leather goods, fine woodcrafts, cutlery, saddlery, most cotton, wool, and horsehair yarns and fabrics, etc., etc. Prohibitive duties are also extremely numerous. Some, such as those on steel, reach an almost unbelievable level.

The goods subject to the tariff number in the hundreds, and yet seven-eighths of the duties are collected from just about twenty items. M. Joseph Garnier recorded this for the year 1844 in his excellent Analyse du tarif français. [3] Out of a total revenue of 152 million francs, 131 million came from twenty items such as sugar, coffee, cotton, wool, olive oil, linen and hemp threads, etc. In the same year, 234 items brought in only 767,000 francs. That a tariff so high and so complex presents a serious obstacle to the development of France’s commercial relations hardly needs demonstrating. The problem is further aggravated by differential duties and trade treaties, which add their complications to those already resulting from the multiplicity of duties, as well as by an arbitrary and often faulty classification of products.

"The duties," says M. Joseph Garnier, "vary according to the origin of each product, according to the nuances of its appearance, its color, or in accordance with ten other prescribed conditions. Sometimes the merchant has an interest in obscuring these distinctions, sometimes it is out of ignorance or oversight that he mislabels his shipments. Then the customs officer intervenes with his inextricable code; he judges and interprets correctly here, arbitrarily there, and elsewhere completely in reverse. Today, in one office, under one [715] interpretation , words mean one thing; tomorrow, in the neighboring office, under another interpretation, the same language has a completely different meaning. The merchant is forced to study all these tendencies; he must know the tolerances and strictness of Le Havre, the tolerances and strictness of Bordeaux, the tolerances and strictness of Marseille. In the end, he is forced to know so many things that he gives up trying to master this science and limits his activity to a small number of products, thereby losing new opportunities brought by the progress of civilization. People search far and wide for the causes of our commercial inferiority, our lack of aptitude for speculation, the length of transactions, and the weakness of our maritime trade; yet they fail to see that, by throwing stones and obstacles into the road, they have ended up discouraging travelers, and that the only way to restore circulation in the obstructed path is to remove the barriers that have been piled upon it." [4]

Unfortunately, organised vested interests carefully and jealously ensure that the path remains obstructed, and despite the efforts of free-trade advocates, the French tariff has remained, up to the time of writing, in perfect harmony with the famous maxims of M. de Bourrienne.

The protectionist regime still predominates in Spain, Austria, Russia, and several other smaller countries. However, in Spain and Austria, a reaction against this system is underway, and significant breaches have already been made in their tariffs. Even in Russia, people are beginning to wonder whether it would not have been better to allow the nation's still scarce capital to develop agriculture, the wool and linen industries, and other natural productions of the country, rather than diverting it—through sweeping prohibitions—toward the more or less artificial industries of cotton, silk, beet sugar, etc. They are realizing, somewhat belatedly, that natural industries have been stunted due to a lack of capital, while the artificial industries, for which such great sacrifices have been made, remain unable to compete with foreign rivals. M. de Tégoborski clearly demonstrates that the protectionist regime must have caused more harm in Russia than elsewhere, due to the inadequacy of national capital.

"Capital and credit," he says, "are the two great levers of industry; where either of these levers is lacking, industry can only survive in a precarious state. This is a fact that cannot and has never been disputed. Now, even in countries abundant in capital and where credit is in a very satisfactory state, it would be unwise to undertake and artificially stimulate all branches of industry at once; the disadvantage would be even more evident in a country where capital is scarce and private credit resources are very limited—and this is precisely the case in Russia, as in all countries still in the early stages of developing their productive forces. Many of our manufacturers, lacking sufficient capital to support fluctuations in their enterprises, work with raw materials purchased at a markup of 12 to 15 percent higher than cash prices, which—independently of other factors—makes our manufactured goods very expensive and the sacrifices required for their consumption all the more burdensome. Except for a few articles, such as ordinary cloth, certain types of linen, and some silks, it can be admitted without the slightest exaggeration that, for nearly all purchases made in Saint Petersburg and Moscow, the silver ruble replaces the florin (the standard currency) in comparison to prices in Germany, creating a difference of 60 to 100 percent; and there are many items that cost 80 percent more, and often even double." [5]

The same author estimates that the annual sacrifice imposed on the public treasury by the protection of domestic sugar amounts to no less than 4,110,000 rubles (16 to 17 million francs), not to mention the additional burden it places on consumers. Finally, he highlights the high cost of iron, largely due to the same cause, as one of the major obstacles hindering agricultural progress.

"Our iron," he says, "is excellent and suitable for all uses, but it is very expensive and inaccessible to the poorer classes of the population, even for ordinary needs... This essential commodity, whose low cost is one of the main conditions for industrial progress, is, for our agricultural populations, almost a luxury item. It is no exaggeration to say that in Russia, as in Poland, more than nine-tenths of all cart and wagon wheels of every kind are not iron-clad, and that, except for luxury carriages, all axles are made of wood. This greatly increases the difficulty of transport and communication, not to mention the other serious technical and agricultural disadvantages resulting from the high cost of iron." [6]

The protectionist regime has therefore failed everywhere. It is thus reasonable to hope that all nations that have endured its disastrous effects will not delay much longer in replacing their protective tariffs with purely fiscal ones.

England and the United States have set a good example in this regard, and the results of their policies are such that they are likely to inspire imitation. (See PEEL and FREEDOM OF COMMERCE.) In England, the country advances daily in customs reforms, and each day also brings more striking success to the new policy. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Gladstone, has this year (1853) completed, or nearly so, the work begun by Huskisson and Robert Peel. More than 260 items on the tariff list have been [716] either abolished or reduced by him. The principles that have guided him in carrying out this final stage of reform are the same that so successfully served as a compass for Sir Robert Peel. As stated in his financial report, he sought: (1) to abolish as much as possible duties on nearly unproductive items that needlessly clutter the tariff; (2) to establish a general maximum duty of 10 percent on manufactured goods; (3) to eliminate differential duties favoring products from British possessions by lowering duties on foreign products to the same level; (4) to abolish, as much as possible, ad valorem duties, which complicate tax collection and make it arbitrary, replacing them with fixed duties. Do not these principles, which will henceforth underpin England’s customs legislation, stand in stark contrast to the economic maxims of M. de Bourrienne?

When the experiences of protectionism on one hand, and free trade on the other, have delivered a verdict so clear that hesitation between the two regimes becomes impossible, when fiscal tariffs have everywhere replaced protective tariffs, the pathways of international trade will be cleared of the main obstacle that still obstructs them, and the prosperity of nations will be enhanced, as it always is whenever a new progress facilitates the coming together of human beings and the exchange of their goods.

Endnotes to Tarif

[1] The Turkish tariff is extremely liberal. Prohibitions and prohibitive duties are unknown in Turkey; since 1838, foreign goods have been subject to a uniform duty of 5 percent, composed as follows: 3 percent for the actual import duty and 2 percent as an additional duty at customs clearance, replacing former internal circulation taxes. National products pay an export duty of 12 percent—9 percent upon the arrival of goods at the port of embarkation and 3 percent at the time of shipment. These 12 percent, says M. Ubicini (Lettres sur la Turquie), are intended first to replace the land tax, which does not exist in Turkey, and second to compensate for the numerous and ever-changing internal duties that goods were previously subject to—when the monopoly did not outright prohibit their purchase and export. European trade has taken full advantage of such a liberal system. For example, England's exports to the Ottoman Empire, which amounted to only 1,440,592 pounds in 1840, rose to 3,548,959 pounds in 1851—three times its exports to Russia (1,372,000 pounds) and four to five times its exports to Austria (812,942 pounds). Thanks to the enlightened liberalism of its customs legislation, Turkey is today a prime market for other nations.

[2] Examen du système commercial connu sous le nom de système protecteur, 2nd edition, p. 171-172.

[3] Annuaire de l’Économie politique et de la statistique for 1847, page 307.

[4] Jos. Garnier, Annuaire de l'Économie politique, page 308.

[5] Études sur les forces productives de la Russie, by M. L. de Tégoborski, Privy Councillor and Member of the Council of the Empire of Russia. Vol. II, p. 198.

[6] Ibid. Vol. I, p. 299.

Union douanière (Customs Union)↩

Source

“Union douanière”, DEP, T. 2, p. 788-89.

Text

[788]

Customs unions are, as their name indicates, associations that bring together provinces or countries previously subject to separate tariffs under a common tariff, eliminating all intermediate barriers. The motives for their formation are political, economic, or financial. We will not concern ourselves here with the first. From an economic perspective, the main advantage of customs unions lies in the expansion of the market. This advantage has become particularly significant since improvements in transportation, combined with increased security, have made it possible to transport even the heaviest and most cumbersome goods over long distances. Furthermore, the progressive transformation of industrial tools has necessitated a corresponding expansion of markets for these production goods. However, it may happen that a customs union does not constitute an economic advance. If, for example, in merging two commercially connected countries—one of which has a liberal customs policy while the other is subject to prohibitive restrictions—the common tariff ends up favoring the more protectionist system, the increase in tariff levels could offset or even outweigh the benefits of extending the customs boundaries. In such a case, it would have been better, in the interest of developing production, not to form the union at all.

From a financial standpoint, customs unions generally have the advantage of increasing government revenue while easing the tax burden on citizens. This result is easily explained. Excessive customs barriers hinder the development of trade. Moreover, they require considerable collection costs. It is therefore possible that by reducing the number of custom collection points, trade will increase and collection costs will decrease, thereby recovering—and even surpassing—the revenue from the eliminated customs points. However, it cannot be stated with certainty that a customs union will necessarily be financially beneficial. Just as excessive customs barriers reduce revenue, an excessive reduction in their number can also lead to financial losses. Suppose, for example, that all of Europe were to form a single customs union; it is evident that the revenues collected at its borders would not be equivalent to those currently collected under the existing system, despite its imperfections. Just as there is an optimal tax rate that maximizes revenue, there is also an optimal placement for customs barriers to achieve the same goal. This rate and this boundary can only truly be determined through experience. However, one can understand that the political boundaries of states are not, or only by chance and exception, the ideal fiscal boundaries. Indeed, as we have noted elsewhere (see LIBERTÉ DU COMMERCE), economic and financial considerations have rarely been taken into account in the major decisions regarding the drawing up of state boundaries. Rather, these decisions have been influenced by the interests of ruling families or the extent of their influence. Marital alliances and the fortunes of war have also played a significant role in shaping current borders. If, therefore, the political boundaries of certain states coincide with their optimal fiscal boundaries, it is purely by chance, and it is unlikely that this coincidence has occurred frequently. Given this, it is evident that customs unions can help correct the economic and financial inefficiencies that political borders often create.

Several customs unions have been established since the end of the last century. Without mentioning the unification of customs within France, accomplished by the Constituent Assembly and discussed elsewhere (see DOUANE and TARIF), one can cite the union of England with Ireland, the German Customs Union, and the recent union of Russia with Poland.

The customs union between England and Ireland began in 1782 but was not fully completed until around 1820, having encountered fierce resistance from English manufacturers and agricultural interests.

"A reform that would put England and Ireland on an equal footing," claimed the protectionists of the time, "would be fatal to English manufacturing and commerce… Our manufacturers, merchants, shipowners, and landowners are alarmed, for they all understand that they will inevitably be ruined if we expose them to competition from a country with almost no debt."

Petitions against the union poured in from all corners of the kingdom. The merchants of Glasgow pleaded with Parliament not to grant Ireland any advantage, either now or in the future, that might harm Great Britain. Manchester strongly condemned the proposed concessions, and Liverpool did not hesitate [789] to declare that if these concessions were granted, its port would soon be reduced to its former insignificance. The union, however, proceeded, and Glasgow, Manchester, and Liverpool continued to see their prosperity grow. [1]

The association of German customs was formed through successive aggregations. (See ZOLL-VEREIN.)

Finally, the customs union between Poland and Russia was established as of January 1, 1851. A new tariff (common to both states) was promulgated at the same time. This tariff introduced significant reductions on certain duties from the Russian tariff, while increasing, in contrast, some of the duties from the Polish tariff.

Before the revolution of February 1848, the abolition of internal barriers was a topic of discussion in Italy. By virtue of a treaty dated November 3, 1847, a customs union had even been agreed upon in principle between the States of the Holy See, the Kingdom of Sardinia, Tuscany, and Lucca. Negotiations were to be opened later with the Kingdom of Naples and the Duchy of Modena to persuade them to join. Unfortunately, political events prevented the realization of this project, which was so important for the future prosperity of Italy.

There were also discussions at various times, particularly in 1840, about a customs union between France and Belgium, but the protectionist forces, so active and powerful in France, succeeded in preventing it from coming to fruition.

Finally, a remarkable plan for a customs confederation was proposed by M. Léon Faucher in his work L'Union du Midi. Here is a spirited overview of this plan, which we borrow from an article in the Annuaire de l'Économie politique:

“In 1815, the arbiters of Europe were absolute sovereigns who organized it according to their passions and whims. They divided the peoples like cheap herds of cattle. The sword, and not the law, traced the borders. Imaginary demarcation lines were erected between populations of the same origin, among whom everything was common. It was as if mountains had been placed where valleys should be, and valleys where mountains belonged. This unnatural structure could not withstand the test of time. The revolution of 1830 made a first breach; customs associations will do the rest.

"Europe will inevitably be divided into several commercial groups—great and powerful confederations that will replace racial divisions. England, Sweden, and Russia, whether due to their insular position, the sheer extent of their territory, or the unique nature of their government, are condemned to isolation and self-sufficiency. The Slavic peoples, who inhabit Poland proper, the Duchy of Posen, Galicia, Volhynia, and Podolia, are destined to combine their interests in a vast association, drawn together by their common religion and their shared customs and language—an association that will merely revive the past from its ashes. Another group will evidently form under Austria’s leadership, encompassing Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, Transylvania, Illyria, Moldavia, and Wallachia. Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, Epirus, and Greece, including the islands, are destined to become a third group, which the enterprising spirit of the Greek race will soon lift out of obscurity. The German Confederation, already strong with 28 million people, will soon annex Denmark, Hanover, and the Hanseatic cities. The future accession of Lombardy and the Venetian states will extend the borders of the Italian union up to the Tyrolean Alps and the Tagliamento. Finally, France is a center of attraction around which Holland, Belgium, the Rhineland provinces, Switzerland, and Spain will sooner or later, simultaneously or successively, come together.” [2]

We do not know whether these various customs associations will ever come into being. However, assuming—as seems quite likely—that customs duties will continue to exist for a long time, if not as a tool of protection, then at least as a fiscal measure, it appears that governments will increasingly strive to solve the problem we outlined earlier: namely, how to derive from this tax the maximum revenue while imposing on industry the least possible restrictions and on consumers the lightest possible burden. And the only way they will succeed in solving this problem is by identifying the fiscal rate of duties and the fiscal limits of customs. Hence the necessity for them to conclude customs unions, which would replace the old political borders with what one might call the economic borders of nations.

Endnotes to Union

[1] Journal des Économistes. L'Irlande. Tome XVI, page 314.

[2] Annuaire de l’Économie politique et de la statistique pour 1848. De l’union des douanes italiennes, par M. Léon Faucher. Page 345.

Émigration (Emigration)↩

Source

"Émigration", DEP, T. 1, pp. 675-83.

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[675]

I.

Emigration can be defined as an export of labor and capital. It occurs when workers or capitalists believe they can improve their condition by relocating—leaving the country where they were born to settle elsewhere. Like all other enterprises, emigration can succeed or fail, depending on the circumstances; however, it is essential for the well-being and, above all, for the independence of people that they not be hindered by any obstacles.

Throughout history, emigration has played a significant role in the economy of societies. It has been driven by various causes: political, religious, or economic.

II. EMIGRATION IN ANCIENT TIMES

At the dawn of civilization, before humans engaged in agriculture, migrations appear to have been numerous. However, historians, starting from the preconceived idea of a single origin of the human race, may have exaggerated the importance of these migrations. For example, one does not observe that the Indigenous tribes of North America, who still subsist by hunting, frequently relocate. Each tribe has its hunting grounds, whose boundaries it rarely exceeds. This immobility in the life of the hunter-gatherer is explained by his economic situation. He possesses only a small amount of capital—his weapons, nets, and minimal food reserves. This meager capital, which barely allows him to survive within the territory of his tribe, is entirely insufficient for undertaking distant expeditions. Undoubtedly, hunting and fishing are possible anywhere; but before knowing where game and fish are abundant, one must undertake explorations—which are often uncertain and difficult. Accumulating a relatively substantial amount of capital is necessary to make such explorations feasible. However, since the hunter-gatherer, naturally improvident, accumulates little, he remains fundamentally sedentary, unless overpopulation or war forces him to leave his original territory. This is how the Indigenous peoples of the New World appear to us, and such must have been those of the Old World as well.

When civilization begins to develop, migration—or, if one prefers, the movement of people—becomes more active, despite the natural or artificial obstacles that may impede it. The reason for this is easy to grasp. With the growth of industry, needs become more numerous and diverse. Production, being more developed, is distributed across different centers, where labor—its primary raw material—is inevitably drawn. In one place, farmers are needed to cultivate wheat; in another, weavers, dyers, and finishers are required to process silk or wool; elsewhere, blacksmiths and armorers must manufacture tools or weapons. However, not all men are equally suited to all trades. Each type of labor is like a particular raw material that must be sought where it exists and brought to the industries that need it. In antiquity, slave traders served as the intermediaries for this distribution and classification of labor. They purchased people in places where jobs were scarce and sold them where workers were in demand. In this way, a current of forced emigration was established—moving from regions where industry had not yet taken root to those where it had already developed. (See SLAVERY.)

Alongside this forced migration, facilitated by slave traders, there emerged the migration of free men. Sometimes, this flow moved from a center of civilization into a still-barbarous region, driven by population growth or political and religious conflicts. At other times, it was a reverse movement—a wave of barbarism pushing into civilization. Numerous waves of emigrants set out from Egypt, Phoenicia, and Greece, gradually encroaching upon the domain of barbarism (See COLONIES.) Others, in contrast, departed from the plateaus of Central Asia, the plains of Germany, or the deserts of Arabia, invading the territories of ancient civilizations. The same causes that motivated civilized peoples to migrate also pushed barbarians to emigrate. It seems certain, for instance, that the population growth in the northern regions of Europe and Asia triggered the massive migrations that ultimately destroyed the Roman Empire. For a long time, the wave of barbarian migration broke against the defenses of Rome; but eventually, it breached them on all sides. The northern emigrants—Goths, Vandals, Franks, Lombards—descended upon the civilized world like a prey, tearing it to pieces and dividing it among themselves.

After these great migrations, for which statistical data is lacking, the expansionist movement of both barbarian and civilized peoples came to a halt. During the Middle Ages, human movement appears to have been less frequent and less extensive than in antiquity. Serfs, bound to the land, were unable to migrate voluntarily. However, they also could not be sold or exported as slaves had been in antiquity. Each lord controlled the population of his domain, authorizing or forbidding marriages at his discretion. Additionally, monasteries provided an outlet for surplus population. In the cities, the regulations of guilds restricted the migration of artisans, just as serfdom blocked the mobility of peasants. The Middle Ages present the image of a social petrification: a man died on the same patch of land where he was born, much like [676] an oyster on its rock. And just as human movement stagnated, so too did the circulation of wealth.

III. EMIGRATION IN MODERN TIMES

§ I. European Emigrations

In the article COLONY, we have already explained the causes that revived, in Europe, the spirit of adventure and migration. Under the influence of these causes, the ties that once kept a person bound to their place of birth gradually loosened. a reawakening of industry began to irresistibly attract both workers and capital from the most distant locations. Emigration occurred both internally and externally, and it continued to expand as the obstacles to the movement of people and goods either disappeared or diminished.

Just like ancient migrations, modern migrations can be divided into two distinct categories: they are either voluntary or forced, free or enslaved.

The discovery of America revived the slave trade, making the exportation of African slaves to the plantations of the New World a highly profitable enterprise. Information regarding the forced migration of enslaved workers can be found elsewhere (see SLAVERY). Here, we will focus exclusively on the emigration of free men.

This free migration can itself be further subdivided into two branches: internal migration and external migration. Since the advent of the freedom of working,[1] internal migration has expanded immensely. Unfortunately, there is a lack of statistical data to accurately measure its magnitude. We do not know the full extent of internal population movements, nor do we know the annual amounts of labor imported and exported by each country. Even more uncertain are the origins of the imported labor force and the destinations of the workers and skilled professionals who leave. However, it is enough to study the composition of the population in a major industrial center to grasp the significance of this ongoing circulation of workers. For example, the working-class population of Paris is composed of highly diverse elements, which is undoubtedly one of the primary reasons for its industrial superiority. Every region of France sends a steady flow of migrants to Paris, who naturally gravitate toward industries that match their particular skills. In addition, this stream of French emigrants is further expanded by a large influx of foreign workers—Belgians, Germans, Swiss, Italians—who bring their specialized skills to the Parisian metropolis.

"The favorable conditions under which labor is carried out," states the Statistical Report on Industry in Paris, [2] "[and] the attraction of life in a great city draw workers from all parts of France and even from abroad. Some of these workers come only for a temporary stay; they seek to earn wages with the hope of saving money to take back home; they do not bring their families with them; they belong to the mobile population. Others, on the contrary, arrive with no intention of returning; they believe in their own skill or talent, sometimes simply in their practical knowledge; some come to hide, blending into the crowd, in order to escape from unfortunate past circumstances. The laboring population absorbs and assimilates these newcomers, and all who form this population then undergo the influence of the general conditions that shape their living standards, customs, and habits."

Other industrial centers function in a similar manner, serving as hubs of attraction, where the constant migration of workers converges.

Certain thinkers have viewed with concern the growth of peaceful migrations; they particularly lament the trend of rural workers moving to cities. Undoubtedly, the movement of people comes with serious drawbacks, and we ourselves believe that the protectionist system has done humanity a great disservice by creating artificial centers of production that have drawn in masses of workers, condemning them to a precarious existence. However, the increasing movement of workers, their tendency to migrate, and their concentration in major centers of production remain inevitable consequences of industrial progress—and, in our view, beneficial ones. In the early stages of industry, each local community provided for most of its own needs. Every village had not only its shepherds and farmers but also its blacksmiths, carpenters, spinners, weavers, etc. Often, the same individual would work as both a farmer and an artisan. Today, however, the manufacture of plowshares and agricultural tools, the spinning and weaving of fabrics, and the production of furniture are no longer scattered across small workshops but are instead carried out on a large scale in vast factories and industrial complexes. These workshops and factories, which have absorbed the fragmented industries of the past, are established in locations most suited to their particular mode of production. The sons of village wheelwrights and weavers, the daughters of spinners, and countless other rural artisans, whose professions have been transformed into large-scale industries, are compelled to follow their trade as it relocates and expands. Industrial progress, therefore, emerges as the constant driving force behind the displacement and concentration of workers. Undoubtedly, this sudden movement of populations—previously accustomed to stability—can cause temporary hardships. However, how much greater are the advantages that arise from the proximity and gathering of large laboring masses, facilitating the spread of knowledge and advancing social progress!

External migrations have also grown considerably, as industry has expanded and transportation has become easier. At times, just as in antiquity, they have been driven by political or religious conflicts. The most regrettable abolition of the Edict of Nantes, for instance, forced 300,000 to 400,000 Protestants—who represented the elite of France’s industrial population [677] —to flee the country. A detailed study by Charles Weiss describes the massive loss of industries and capital that this barbaric decree inflicted upon France: [3]

"The revocation of the Edict of Nantes drove over 70,000 manufacturers and workers into England. The majority originated from Picardy, Normandy, the western provinces, Lyonnais, and Touraine. The industries that were previously unknown or underdeveloped in England, but which these French workers either introduced or advanced, included silk production, paper-making, glass-making, hat-making, fine linen, wool, and silk textiles, brocades, satins, velvets, printed fabrics, batiste, serge, flannel, tapestries (modeled after the Gobelins), clocks, watches, cutlery, and hardware. The skill and experience of these emigrants, combined with the principles enshrined in the 1689 Bill of Rights—guaranteeing individual property—became the foundation of Britain’s industry, commerce, and maritime power. The once-thriving silk and textile industries of France, particularly in Lyon and Tours, suffered immensely. By 1698, Lyon’s silk looms fell from 18,000 to 4,000; in Tours, the number of looms dropped from 8,000 to just 1,200. Its 700 mills dwindled to 70; its 40,000 workers shrank to 4,000; its 3,000 ribbon looms were reduced to fewer than 60. In Touraine, silk consumption plummeted from 2,400 bales to a mere 700 or 800. Within fifteen years, the general population of Tours declined from 80,000 to 33,000."

Similarly, religious persecution in England drove a considerable number of industrious workers to seek refuge in the New World. Later, during the French Revolution, political persecution once again displaced large numbers of people and capital, altering the economic landscape across Europe and beyond.

Nevertheless, the influence of economic causes has acted even more effectively than that of political or religious causes in determining emigration. Over the last quarter of a century especially, voluntary emigrations from Europe to the New World, motivated solely by the desire for increased well-being, have expanded to a truly extraordinary extent.

At the outset, emigrants traveling from Europe to America could be divided into several categories.

There were, first, those from the upper classes who had obtained land grants in the colonies; next came the religious minorities expelled from their homeland by persecution; then followed the adventurers who sought fortune in distant lands, relying not so much on regular labor as on the uncertain opportunities of conquest and plunder. The emigrants belonging to these three categories generally possessed the means to pay for their passage and arrived as free men at their destinations. But there was also a fourth class, made up of artisans and laborers, who emigrated almost entirely without capital and entered into a form of temporary servitude to cover the cost of their passage to the colonies. These poor emigrants sold their labor for a period of three, seven, or even fourteen years to the ship captain who agreed to transport them. Upon arrival, the captain transferred their labor contracts—often at a considerable profit, depending on local demand for workers—to colonial landowners. Frequently, an indentured laborer passed from one planter to another before completing his contract. Once his term of service ended, he regained his freedom and joined the ranks of independent workers in the colony.

Today, this system of indentured servitude has fallen into disuse, at least in Europe. European emigrants now generally possess enough capital to cover the costs of their departure and arrive free at their destinations.

The main contributors to European emigration are the British Isles and Germany. They are followed, at a much lower level, by France, Belgium, Norway, and, in southern Europe, by Malta, Portugal, and Spain. The principal destinations of these emigrants are the central and western United States and Australia. Here is a short discussion of the way in which European emigration works:

According to M. Vanderstraten Ponthoz, who has compiled valuable information on the situation of emigrants in the United States, [4] emigration unfolds in three distinct phases. The first begins with departure and ends with disembarkation. The second covers the journey from the port of arrival to the emigrant’s final destination. The third includes the period of work and initial settlement.

The transport of emigrants has become a major sector of freight shipping for certain ports, such as Bremen, Hamburg, Antwerp, Le Havre, and Liverpool, where emigration services are now organized on a vast scale. Large shipping firms dedicate entire fleets to emigrant transport and employ agents who scout for potential emigrants throughout various parts of Europe, negotiating passage contracts with them. The usual fares for passage to New York are as follows: from Liverpool, 38 francs; from Antwerp, 80 francs; from Le Havre, 90 francs; from Bremen or Hamburg, 106 francs 60 centimes, with the fare from Bremen and Hamburg including provisions for the journey. However, the transport of emigrants has given rise to numerous abuses. Emigration entrepreneurs do not always honor the agreements—usually verbal—made by their agents. [678] Emigrants are frequently left waiting in port for extended periods until the ship’s capacity is filled. They are often packed into unsafe, poorly outfitted vessels, suffering from inadequate provisions and unsanitary conditions. Several governments have attempted to remedy these serious abuses by enacting regulations on ship accommodations and the quantity and quality of provisions; but these regulations often fail to be enforced effectively. It is to the development of competition among shipping companies and the active oversight of governments, ensuring that emigrants receive the services they paid for, that one must look for an improvement in existing conditions. Regulations that impose specific accommodations or compulsory standards for transport, on the other hand, can only serve to increase the price of passage, to the detriment of poor emigrants.

Philanthropic societies have been established at both embarkation and disembarkation points to protect emigrants from fraud and the traps into which they might fall, as well as to guide those seeking work and provide aid to the most destitute. The first of these societies was founded in Philadelphia in 1781, specifically for German emigrants. Others were subsequently created in various ports throughout the Union.

M. Vanderstraten Ponthoz attributes the preference of European emigrants for the United States over all other destinations to two main causes: first, the possibility offered by naturalization laws that allows them to quickly enjoy the rights of American citizens; second, the ease with which they can acquire land promptly and cheaply under federal land alienation laws. In the United States, any free foreigner can be naturalized at the age of twenty-one. Two years after making the declaration required for this purpose, and provided five years have passed since their arrival in the country, an emigrant can obtain American citizenship. The presidency of the Union is the only office from which the U.S. Constitution excludes naturalized foreigners. This liberal legislation, which guarantees European emigrants political advantages greater than those they had in their home countries, has naturally acted as a strong incentive for immigration. Consequently, it has become a constant subject of political controversy in the United States. The Whigs, who fear the agitation that floating masses of immigrants might bring, have attempted to impose more restrictive naturalization conditions. In recent years, they have even found allies among the lower ranks of American democracy. A political movement known as the "Native" party has emerged from the lower classes with the aim of excluding foreigners, purportedly to protect domestic labor. There is nothing more narrow-minded and illiberal than this openly declared goal of the Native party. However, one must admit that restricting the entry of foreign workers would be a more effective way to protect domestic labor than merely prohibiting foreign products. The former would reduce labor competition and temporarily drive wages up, whereas the latter only increases the cost of consumer goods to the great detriment of native workers.

Fortunately, neither the Whigs nor the Natives have thus far succeeded in repealing the hospitable law that grants foreign immigrants the rights of American citizens. In addition to this law, the federal land alienation policy further encourages immigration to the United States. It would take too long to outline all the provisions of this law, but suffice it to say that an emigrant heading west can, without delay or expense, acquire land—often of his own choosing—at the cost of 50 dollars (266.50 francs) for a 40-acre parcel.

"The day after his arrival," says M. Vanderstraten Ponthoz, "he can receive a title securing his position in the country's agricultural industry, while the naturalization law prepares him for full citizenship." [5]

The only burden emigrants must bear upon setting foot in the United States is a capitation tax intended to cover the costs of supporting impoverished immigrants. The mayor of New York has the right to demand that ship captains post a bond ensuring the maintenance of immigrants for two years. However, the law allows captains to avoid providing this security by paying a tax, which varies between a minimum of one dollar and a maximum of ten dollars per person. In Philadelphia, emigrants must pay a capitation tax of two and a half dollars. In Baltimore, the tax is one and a half dollars per person, with the revenue divided among German and Irish immigrant aid societies and the city's charity hospital for the sick and destitute. In New Orleans, emigrants pay one and a half dollars per person to support the hospitals and an additional quarter-dollar to the city's mayor. [6]

Upon arriving in the United States, emigrants generally fall into two categories. Those who possess the necessary skills and capital to establish an agricultural settlement head westward, where railways and canals transport them at very low costs. Others remain in the eastern states, either to settle there permanently or to accumulate enough capital before continuing their journey west. Often, these stragglers of emigration end up swelling the ranks of the transient poor in large cities. The major interior depots for emigrants in the United States are the cities of Buffalo, Cleveland, Toledo, Detroit, Green Bay, Milwaukee, and Chicago, as well as, in another direction, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. From these points, emigrants disperse throughout the West. There are various systems of settlement. Emigrants may form associations, establish group settlements, or remain in isolation. Most communist or socialist systems have been attempted by emigrants, but there has not been a single decisive success, and these experiments have most often resulted in failure. The majority of settlements are either isolated homesteads [679] or small clusters of settlers. The latter method is especially preferred by Germans and other emigrants who do not know enough English to integrate into the already established American communities. [7]

"When an inhabitant of continental Europe," says the author we have already cited, "wishes to emigrate to the United States, if he belongs to a nation whose emigrants have already formed settlements in America, he must head toward those points. If he is the initiator of the enterprise, he must find companions before leaving Europe and secure a predetermined, fertile, and healthy location for settlement in the United States. The settlers must remain close to one another, just as they were in their native village, near the church and the school. Under these conditions, emigration becomes a simple displacement rather than the severe ordeal it was in the past for an emigrant's entire moral and social structure.

The Germans," adds M. Vanderstraten, "typically emigrate in this way. They form groups before embarking. They decide in advance where they will settle. Letters from those who have preceded them, as well as advice from compatriots they meet upon arrival and from protective societies, guide their decisions. The group then stops in one of the inland cities that serve as depots for emigrants. The more experienced members set out to inspect the chosen site, and if it appears favorable, they purchase it from the land office, as Germans believe federal lands should be preferred over others due to the greater security of the title. The purchased land is then divided proportionally according to each emigrant’s capital. This is the first advantage of settlement by forming clusters. Federal land is not sold in parcels smaller than 40 acres at a cost of 50 dollars. Many emigrants do not have this sum left at the end of their journey, and such a large tract of land is not necessarily required for their settlement."

This system of clustered settlements, known as the German system, has also been adopted by Norwegians, who have emigrated to the United States in significant numbers since 1839.

There is no precise data on the amount of capital emigrants bring with them. Statistical documents published in New York indicate that emigrants landing in this port from 1831 to 1842 brought a total of 115 million francs into the United States. Other official records confirm that between 1835 and 1839, 18,937 Bavarians settled in the United States with capital estimated at 15 million francs. This estimate is based on declarations required by the Bavarian government for taxation purposes. [8] Sometimes, the capital used for emigration originates in the United States itself. A large number of Irish emigrants, for instance, have made the journey thanks to financial advances provided by relatives or friends already established in the Union.

Precise data on the number of people emigrating from Europe each year is also lacking. Emigration records have been kept with regularity only in the United Kingdom. These records have shown a steady increase for the past thirty years. The number of emigrants from the United Kingdom was as follows:

1822	12,3439	1832	103,140	1842	128,344
1823	8,860	1833	62,527	1843	57,212
1824	8,210	1834	76,222	1844	70,686
1825	14,891	1835	44,478	1845	93,301
1826	20,900	1836	75,417	1846	129,861
1827	28,003	1837	72,034	1847	258,270
1828	26,092	1838	33,222	1848	248,089
1829	31,198	1839	62,207	1849	299,498
1830	56,907	1840	90,743	1850	280,849
1831	83,160	1841	118,592

As noted by the distinguished statistician J.-T. Danson, the fluctuations observed in this table are the immediate consequences of the state of prosperity or depression in the industry and commerce of the mother country; thus, years of high emigration regularly follow those in which exports have been weak and employment has been depressed. [9] From 1847 onward, emigration from the United Kingdom doubled. This enormous and sudden increase can primarily be attributed to the poverty and famine in Ireland: during the period from 1841 to 1851, emigration removed no fewer than 1,300,000 inhabitants from Ireland. [10] Adding to the United Kingdom’s contingent approximately 100,000 Germans, along with a steadily growing number of Norwegian, Belgian, Basque, Portuguese, and Maltese emigrants, we arrive at an average annual emigration of about half a million people in recent years. This represents a far more substantial movement of people than the great barbarian invasions. The Irish famine, the political events of 1848, and the discovery of gold mines in California have indeed temporarily increased the number of emigrants to an exceptional degree. However, the ever-growing ease of transportation, the natural pull of societies forming on the free lands of the New World, and—without even mentioning the poor political and economic systems of most European states—ensure that the transatlantic emigration current will remain at a high level for a long time to come.

§ I. Inter-Tropical Emigrations

Beyond the great migration that leaves the shores of Europe for the temperate regions of the New World and Australia, another migration has begun, directing the surplus populations of India and China toward the intertropical regions of the Indian Archipelago and the Americas. This movement of Asian populations was primarily triggered by the abolition of slavery in the British colonies. Following emancipation, labor shortages arose in these colonies, and wages increased significantly. (See SLAVERY.) Faced with imminent ruin due to the exorbitant cost of labor, colonial planters sent emigration agents to Europe, Africa, the East Indies, and even China. The West Indies and Guiana received Portuguese, Maltese, and Sierra Leonean emigrants, but most importantly, Indian coolies, who proved to be more industrious than Black laborers and better suited than Europeans to sugarcane cultivation. Over thirteen years (from 1834 to 1846), the number of these emigrants to Jamaica, Trinidad, and British Guiana reached 60,000. However, the largest share of Indian labor migration was directed toward Mauritius.

The emancipation of 68,000 enslaved people in this colony caused a considerable labor deficit in the plantations, prompting speculators to devise a scheme to fill this gap through the importation of Indian coolies. They recruited agricultural workers in Bengal—where regular wages did not exceed 8 to 10 centimes per day—on fixed-term contracts and then sold these contracts to Mauritian planters, much as had previously been done in Europe. Between 1837 and 1839, 25,468 coolies were introduced to Mauritius, 24,566 of whom were men. However, this hastily organized emigration gave rise to the gravest abuses. Emigration entrepreneurs sent agents into the most impoverished towns of Bengal, where these low-level recruiters lured coolies with promises as marvelous as they were false. The recruits were brought to Calcutta, where they were confined in a depot until the ships designated for their transport were ready to sail. They were crammed into vessels much like African slaves had been, with little regard for hygiene or safety. Furthermore, the wage advances stipulated in their contracts were rarely delivered in full to the workers—subordinate agents fraudulently withheld a significant portion.

Upon arrival in Mauritius, coolies were sent to the fields before they had time to recover from the hardships of the voyage, and the planters, exploiting their ignorance and isolation, overworked them while unfairly reducing their rations. Instead of working to eliminate these abuses and ensuring coolies received the protection they were due, the British government found it simpler to prohibit immigration to Mauritius. However, after forceful complaints from interested parties, the government was compelled to lift the ban in 1843. Immigration immediately resumed, and from 1843 to the end of 1848, it amounted to approximately 75,000 individuals. Thanks to this significant influx of labor, Mauritius was able to weather the crisis caused by the abolition of slavery without experiencing major disasters.

Unfortunately, various abuses have continually marred this movement of emigration and corrupted its outcomes. Firstly, the British government and colonial councils made the mistake of intervening in this large-scale operation, shifting the financial burden primarily onto a class of people who should have been the most exempt from it—namely, the colonial laborers themselves, who were forced to compete with the incoming emigrants. The cost of emigration to the West Indies and British Guiana from 1837 to 1848 amounted to £702,857, which was charged to the budgets of these colonies. In Mauritius, the cost of emigration between 1834 and 1844 reached £704,652, including a £324,652 advance from the government, which was to be reimbursed by the colonists. Nothing could be more unjust than forcing the working classes of the colonies to bear the bulk of the costs of an influx of labor specifically intended to lower their wages. Secondly, the colonies began to regard themselves as, in some way, the owners of the people whose emigration they had financed, subjecting them to the most oppressive regulations. [11]

"Although the emigrants are imported at the expense of all," reads an annual report from the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, "in practice, no one except the planters can benefit from their labor. The emigrants are not free to choose their work or their employers unless they agree to pay a poll tax of five shillings per month, payable in advance, from the day of their arrival until they have completed what is called 'five years of industrial residence'—in other words, unless they have worked for a planter during this period. They cannot return home under any pretext, even at their own expense, until they have completed the five-year term unless they pay a fee of £2 sterling for each remaining year and obtain a special passport, which itself is quite costly. Those who work for the planters are registered annually. If they leave the plantation, they are immediately subjected to the poll tax and must also pay a portion of the taxes levied on those who remain. Lastly, they are fined for days of absence. This entire system is reinforced by imprisonment with compulsory labor, at a rate of one day of work for every half-shilling owed by the emigrant. This ingenious combination of poll taxes, passports, registration, fines, and imprisonment with forced labor has been devised for the greatest advantage of the planters and to the extreme detriment of the freedom and well-being of these unfortunate emigrants."

That is not all. In an effort to cut down on the costs of emigration, colonial administrations generally imported only male workers. In Mauritius, an 1847 study revealed that among the population imported from India, there were 87 men for every 13 women. This extreme gender imbalance inevitably led to shocking immorality. Furthermore, many emigrants, lured by the appearance of free transportation, were not always fit for the climate. Thus, among the [681] emigrants attracted to the West Indies and British Guiana between 1846 and 1848, 14,881 were from Madeira, of whom 6,668 perished from yellow fever or other diseases. These appalling facts have prompted repeated protests from the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, [12] and one can only hope that public opinion, once fully informed, will demand the abolition of the system of government intervention and financial incentives that have caused these tragedies.

In addition to coolies, liberated Africans from the West African coast and Chinese laborers are also regularly imported to the West Indies, British Guiana, and Mauritius. The importation of Chinese laborers was authorized and subsidized by Lord Stanley in 1843, with a bounty of 65 dollars per adult, male or female, and half that amount for children under fourteen. Through this subsidy, several thousand Chinese were brought to the West Indies and Mauritius. In Mauritius, their industrious nature, relentless pursuit of profit, and exemplary frugality provoked numerous complaints from the local indolent Creole population, who resented their presence: [13]

"It is impossible for Europeans or Creoles," wrote one of the island’s newspapers, "to compete with such people. They push thrift to the point of miserliness and frugality to the point of extreme parsimony. They drink only water; a bit of rice and salted meat, which they cook themselves, is enough for them. They wash their own clothes and change them only two or three times a year. It is the duty of every government to protect its subjects and ensure their well-being. This obligation necessitates firm and decisive action to put an end to such an outrageous abuse—one that places its own citizens at the mercy of intruders who, under the pretense of aiding agricultural work, end up being dismissed for their insubordination and misconduct, and ultimately compete with us, inch by inch, for the very land they were supposed to cultivate. If they are not stopped, they will soon drive us from our homeland."

Fortunately, these complaints, reminiscent of those made by the nativists in the United States against European immigration, were not heeded, and Mauritius continued to receive Chinese emigrants. Chinese emigration has also extended to the island of Bourbon. This movement could grow to an immense scale, as China remains an inexhaustible source of people, and the Chinese adapt perfectly to intertropical regions. Already, despite the prohibition against emigration imposed on the subjects of the Celestial Empire—a ban strictly enforced only for women—Chinese emigrants have filled the islands of Java, Sumatra, and the Malay Peninsula. Singapore, in large part, is populated by Chinese. Finally, and most notably, Chinese emigrants have crossed the Pacific Ocean, drawn by stories of California's riches, and their industrious communities are beginning to multiply on the land of gold. Who can say whether this migration of a hard-working race might soon provide a peaceful solution to the problem of slavery’s abolition by offering Southern plantation owners an alternative of cheap free labor instead of slave labor?

The emigration of coolies from India has not been limited to Mauritius and the West Indies; it has also extended to the island of Ceylon, driven by both the abolition of slavery and the extraordinary expansion of coffee cultivation. This rapid growth in a key branch of tropical production was a direct result of the beneficial principle of free trade. Until 1835, West Indian coffee had been protected at the expense of East Indian coffee on the British market: the former was taxed at six pence per pound, while the latter paid nine pence. In 1835, both duties were equalized at the lower rate. In 1842, the tariff was further reduced to four pence. Under this new system, coffee cultivation in Ceylon expanded enormously. In 1832, Ceylonese coffee imports into the United Kingdom amounted to 2,824,998 pounds; by 1848, they had soared to 30,521,810 pounds. Native laborers alone could not meet the demands of this booming industry. To supplement them, workers from India were brought in. Between 1839 and 1846, 220,000 coolies migrated to Ceylon, where approximately two-thirds settled permanently.

This substitution of free labor for slave labor in intertropical regions carries immense economic and moral significance. Its full impact will become even more apparent when the free migration of Asian and African workers is finally liberated from the artificial constraints of government intervention—intervention that, while claiming to encourage migration, in reality only stifles its natural expansion.

IV. The Impact and Economic Consequences of Emigration.

The desire to improve their well-being and the need to escape oppression—these have always been the driving forces behind human migration. Throughout history, natural and artificial obstacles have counteracted and sometimes entirely neutralized these motives. Among the foremost natural barriers are the difficulty of transportation and the deep-seated attachment that binds individuals to the land of their birth. Yet these obstacles, too, have gradually diminished under the influence of civilization. The advancement of industrial technology has brought about a sudden and remarkable revolution in locomotion, making possible the movement of people and capital in ways that once seemed unimaginable. As for the sentiment of patriotism, civilization has the paradoxical effect of making it both less intense and more expansive. As civilization spreads and its material and moral benefits are disseminated, a certain commonality of sentiments, ideas, and habits begins to emerge among peoples. The civilized man no longer regards another civilized man as a foreigner, and the concept of homeland, once confined to the limits of a village [682] or the walls of a city, gradually expands to encompass civilization itself.

At the same time, the artificial barriers that once hindered migration have begun to fall. Slavery, which made voluntary migration impossible, and serfdom, which bound individuals to the land, are gradually disappearing. Similarly, the hostilities that once divided cities and nations are fading, and with them, the restrictions that for centuries obstructed the free movement of people and goods are being relaxed or abolished. In antiquity, the foreigner was universally regarded as an enemy, and countless obstacles were placed in the way of his settlement within a city. The constant threat of expulsion loomed over him, and upon his death, his property was confiscated by the state. Even today, our laws regarding foreigners retain traces of these barbaric prejudices. In most civilized nations, acquiring the rights of citizenship remains subject to numerous restrictions. However, the condition of an expatriate today is incomparably better than in the past. His life and property are protected as carefully as those of native citizens, and he is granted access to most professions. He is no longer seen as an enemy but as an ally. Of course, from time to time, old prejudices against foreigners resurface under the influence of particular passions or selfish interests. For example, the question of excluding foreign workers has been raised in the United States and in Mauritius (see above), and it also emerged in France in recent history. In March 1848, victorious crowds sought to exploit their triumph by driving foreign workers from the national labor market. Many English, Belgian, German, and Savoyard workers were forced to leave the country. But this new form of protectionist exclusion fortunately vanished along with the revolutionary fervor that had inspired it. If wage-earning classes were to regain dominant political influence, the exclusion of foreign workers might once again become a subject of debate. Yet, as we have said before, such a ban would be no more absurd or unjust than existing trade prohibitions. That said, it is unlikely that the lower classes will gain decisive control over social policy anytime soon. Moreover, can we not hope that they will eventually come to understand that it is both fair and beneficial to allow labor to circulate as freely as any other commodity?

Thus, the natural and artificial barriers that once restricted human mobility are being dismantled everywhere. Meanwhile, the incentives and pressures that encourage people to migrate are multiplying. Every industry that moves from small-scale workshops to large-scale manufacturing seeks new locations better suited to its present condition, drawing workers from twenty scattered localities into a single one. Every technological advance that replaces human labor with mechanical power forces some workers to relocate. Lastly, the stark disparities in living conditions among laboring classes across different parts of the world—disparities increasingly evident due to improvements in communication—act as a powerful stimulus for migration.

Under the influence of these forces, migration has reached an unprecedented scale, and all indications suggest that it will continue to expand in the future. This trend should be welcomed rather than feared, for these vast displacements of human beings ultimately lead to a more efficient distribution of society’s productive forces, by easing population pressures in regions where labor is abundant and redirecting workers to areas where manpower and skills [14] are scarce. However, while the growing mobility of labor appears as a driver of progress, it is crucial that this movement remains unregulated and unimpeded by governmental intervention. The disastrous consequences of government meddling in intertropical migrations, as seen in the British colonies, have already been made clear. Such intervention has fostered abuses and injustices rather than facilitating migration in any productive way. One need only imagine what would have happened if the English government had also wanted to intervene in an active way in Irish emigration, if it had undertaken to manage and subsidize the emigration of 1.3 million Irish migrants to the United States over the past decade. What staggering sums of money would such an operation have consumed? What disasters might it have caused? Could any government bureaucracy, no matter how well-intentioned, have replaced the thousands of private communications and financial aid sent by already-settled Irish expatriates to their families back home? Could it have allocated migrants to locations across the United States as effectively as they distributed themselves? Finally, would the American government have agreed to accept these waves of immigrants if it had been expedited by English government. Wouldn't it have refused to be the official dumping ground for British pauperism?

In conclusion, governments are no more competent to oversee or subsidize migration than they are to manage agricultural, industrial, or commercial enterprises. Certainly, left to their own devices, emigrants suffer numerous misfortunes: thousands perish after settling in lands where they cannot adjust to the conditions, while others, having misjudged labor market conditions in foreign countries, worsen rather than improve their economic standing. Yet such hardships are an unavoidable reality of all human enterprises, and ultimately, they serve a purpose. [683] These experiences—often painful—help to map out the pitfalls to avoid and the paths to follow, guiding future generations of migrants toward better outcomes.

Endnotes to Emigration

[1] (Ed. Note??) Molinari uses the term "la liberty du travail", the title of Dunoyer's influential work of 1845.

[2] Statistique de l'industrie à Paris was the result of an inquiry made by the Chamber of Commerce for the years 1847 and 1848, p. 61.

[3] Memoir on the State of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce of Protestants in France in the Seventeenth Century, and on Protestant Emigration after the Edict of Nantes, by M. Ch. Weiss.

[4] Research on the Situation of Emigrants in the United States of North America, by Baron Vanderstraten Ponthoz, First Secretary of the Belgian Legation in Washington.

[5] Vanderstraten Ponthoz, I, p. 29.

[6] Idem, p. 40.

[7] Vanderstraten Ponthoz, pp. 110 and 146.

[8] Idem, p. 47.

[9] See on this subject a table drawn up by M. Danson in the Yearbook of Political Economy for 1850, p. 410, and a note included in the Journal des Économistes, vol. XXIX, p. 204.

[10] Economist, p. 410. Reproduced in the Journal des Économistes, vol. XXIX, p. 46.

[11] The Tenth Annual Report of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, 1849, p. 84.

[12] See the annual reports of the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, and in particular a Memoir against the Emigration of the Kroomen from the Coast of Africa, signed by M. John Scoble, Secretary of the Society, in the 10th report (1849).

[13] Mauritius Watchman, cited by the Revue Coloniale, February 1844.

[14] (Ed. Note.) Molinari says here "ou les bras et les intelligences sont rares" (where arms and minds are scarce).

Fashion↩

Source

“Mode,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 193-96.

Lalor: John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill,& Co., 1899). First edition 1881. Vol. 2 East India Co. - Nullification. “Fashions, Political Economy of,” pp. 161-64.

Text

[193]

Fashion exercises considerable influence on a number of industries, particularly on those pertaining to clothing and lodging. Every change in [194] fashion is a source of profit to some persons and of loss to others. A man who invents a new design or a new combination of colors in dry goods, or a new style of furniture or of a coat, and who succeeds in bringing his invention into fashion, may derive great profits from it, especially if his right to it is guaranteed him. [1] (See LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY.) [2] On the other hand, the individuals who possess a supply of articles which are out of fashion, experience a loss. It is the same with the manufacturers and workmen who devote themselves to the production of these articles, when the new fashion varies noticeably from the old.

“It is well known,” said Malthus, “how subject particular manufactures are to fail, from the caprices of taste. The weavers of Spitalfields were plunged into the most severe distress by the fashion of muslins instead of silks; and great numbers of workmen in Sheffield and Birmingham were for a time thrown out of employment, owing to the adoption of shoe strings and covered buttons, instead of buckles and metal buttons” [3]

Thousands of similar examples might be cited.

McCulloch finds in these disturbances occasioned by fashion an argument for the poor-tax.

“It may be observed,” he says, “that owing to changes of fashion, … those engaged in manufacturing employments are necessarily exposed to many vicissitudes. And when their number is so very great as in this country [england], it is quite indispensable that a resource should be provided for their support in periods of adversity.” [4]

We do not wholly share the opinion of Mr. McCulloch on this subject. How, in fact, does fashion operate on certain industries and on certain classes of laborers? It acts as a risk. Now this risk, which may result in losses to the manufacturers and in stoppage of work to the workmen, must necessarily be covered, so that the profits of the one class and the wages of the other may be in just proportion to the average profits and wages in other branches of production. If it were otherwise, if the risk arising from the fluctuations of fashion were not completely covered, capital and labor would soon cease to be directed to branches of industry subject to this particular risk. Then, competition diminishing in these branches, profits and wages would not fail to increase until there was compensation for the risk. This being granted, suppose a law intervenes to guarantee to the workman a minimum amount of food during the time he is thrown out of employment in consequence of the variations of fashion; what will be the result? The risk arising from that cause being partially covered or compensated, the result will be that the wages of the workman will be lowered by an amount precisely equal to the risk covered, that is to say, by the amount of the tax. How then can the tax be an advantage to the workman, since it will not in reality have increased the amount of his resources? Doubtless the workman might have squandered his wages and have found himself destitute when the fashion changed, and the consequences of the risk fell upon him. The poor-tax is nothing but a compulsory savings bank, whose funds are levied from his wages, and on which he has the right to draw when out of employment. But must not a bank of this kind, by freeing the workman from the necessity of foreseeing the critical periods and providing for them, perpetuate his intellectual and moral inferiority? Is it not an insurance for which he pays too high a premium? (See WAGES and the POOR TAX.) [5]

J. B. Say looked at the influence of fashion from a different point of view. According to that eminent economist, the frequency of changes in fashion occasions a ruinous waste.

“A nation and private individuals will give evidence of wisdom,” he says, “if they will seek chiefly articles of slow consumption but in general use. The fashions of such articles will not be very changeable. Fashion has the privilege of spoiling things before they have lost their utility, often even before they have lost their freshness: it increases consumption, and condemns what is still excellent, comfortable and pretty, to being no longer good for anything. Consequently, a rapid succession of fashions impoverishes a state by the consumption it occasions and that which it arrests.” [6]

These words of M. Say are evidently most judicious but we need not because of them, or because of the above-quoted observation of Malthus, condemn fashion from an economic point of view; for if fashion causes a certain harm and certain disturbances, especially when its fluctuations are too frequent, in return, it is one of the prime movers of artistic and industrial progress. This will be apparent from a single hypothetical case.

Let us suppose that fashion should cease to exercise its influence; that the same taste and the same style should continue to prevail indefinitely, in respect to clothing, furniture, and dwellings will not this permanence of fashion give a mortal blow to artistic and industrial progress? Who, pray, will exercise his ingenuity to invent anything new in the line of clothing, furniture, or dwellings, if the consumers have a dread of change, if every modification of fashion is considered an outrage, or even forbidden by law? People, in that case, will always do the same things, and, in all likelihood, will always do them, besides, in the same manner. Let the taste of the consumers, on the other hand, be variable, and the spirit of invention, of improvement, will be powerfully stimulated. Every new combination adapted to please the taste of consumers becoming then a source of profit to the inventor, every one will exercise his ingenuity in devising something new, and the activity thus given to the spirit of invention will be most favorable to the development of industry and the fine arts. It will sometimes happen, doubtless, that ridiculous fashions will replace elegant ones; but under the influence of a desire [195] for change, for flitting about like a butterfly, as a Fourierist would say, [7] which gives birth to fashion, this invasion of bad taste would be transient, and people would continually advance by improvement upon improvement.

On examining the influence which fashion exercises over the development of industry and the fine arts, one becomes convinced that the invigorating impulse which it gives to the spirit of invention and improvement more than compensates for any injury it causes. Besides, fashions have their life expectancy, whose average may be easily calculated, and which the experience of producers, since they do not have have a “table of mortality rates” prepared ad hoc, is skilled in estimating. Rarely does an intelligent manufacturer produce more of any design or shade than the consumption can absorb before this design or this shade is out of fashion; and if, perchance, his forecast has proved incorrect, if the fashion passes by sooner than he had foreseen, he easily finds some way of getting rid of the excess of his merchandise among the large class of consumers who are behind the times. A certain kind of fabric or a certain hat which has become out of date in Paris, may yet, after two or three years, delight the ladies of lower Brittany or of South America.

We have just pointed out the influence fashion has on production. Let us now consider briefly its characteristics and the causes which determine its variations. Fashion is not alone affected by the physical influence of the temperature of a country and the moral influence of the taste and character of the population, it is also largely subject to the influence of the social and economic organization. The institutions of a people are reflected in it as in a mirror. Consequently, in countries where the abuses of privilege and despotism permit a class considered to be superior to maintain their idleness at the expense of the rest of the nation, the fashions are commonly ostentatious and complicated. They are ostentatious, because those who are privileged feel the necessity of dazzling the multitude by the splendor of their external appearance, and of thus convincing them that they are made of superior clay: “from porcelain clay of earth,” as the poet Dryden said. [8] The fashions are also complicated, because the privileged class have all the leisure necessary to devote a long time to their appearance, the sumptuousness of which serves, as has been said, to inspire in the vulgar an exalted idea of those who wear it. But let the condition of society be changed; let those who are privileged disappear; let the upper classes, henceforth subject to the law of competition, be obliged to employ their faculties in earning their living; we at once see fashions become simpler; and the embroidered coats, short clothes, dresses with trains or with paniers, in a word, all the magnificent and complicated apparel of aristocratic fashion are seen to disappear, to give place to attire easily adjustable and comfortable to wear. In a witty pamphlet entitled England, Ireland and America, by a Manchester Manufacturer, [9] Richard Cobden pointed out, in 1835, with much acuteness and humor, the necessities which had operated within a half century to bring about this economic change of fashion. Mr. Cobden depicted the old London merchant with his magnificent costume and his formal manners, and showed how merciless competition caused the disappearance of this model of the good old times, to replace it with a modern type, with dress and habits infinitely more economical. [10]

“Such of our readers,” he says, “as remember the London tradesman of thirty years ago, will be able to call to mind the powdered wig and the queue, the precise shoes and buckles, and the unwrinkled silk hose and tight inexpressibles that characterized the shop-keeper of the old school. Whenever this stately personage walked abroad on matters of trade, however pressing or important, he never forgot for a moment the dignified step of his forefathers, while nothing gratified his self-complacency more than to take his gold-headed cane in hand, and, leaving his own shop all the while, to visit his poorer neighbors, and to show his authority by inquiring into their affairs, settling their disputes, and compelling them to be honest and to manage their establishments according to his plan. His business was conducted throughout upon the formal mode of his ancestors. His clerks, his shopmen and porters, all had their appointed costumes; and their intercourse with each other was disciplined according to established laws of etiquette. Every one had his especial department of duty, and the line of demarcation at the counter was marked out and observed with all the punctilio of neighboring but rival states. The shop of this trader of the old school retained all the peculiarities and inconveniences of former generations; its windows displayed no gaudy wares to lure the vulgar passer-by, and the panes of glass, inserted in ponderous wooden frames, were constructed exactly after the ancestral pattern…

The present age produced a new school of traders, whose first innovation was to cast off the wig, and cashier the barber with his pomatum-box, [11] by which step an hour was gained in the daily toilet. Their next change was, to discard the shoes and the tight unmentionables, whose complicated details of buckles and straps and whose close adjustment occupied another half hour, in favor of Wellingtons and pantaloons, which were whipped on in a trice, and gave freedom, though, perhaps, at the expense of dignity, to the personal movements during the day. Thus accoutered, these supple dealers whisked or flew, just as the momentary calls of business became more or less urgent; while so absorbed were they in their own interests that they scarcely knew the names of their nearest neighbors, nor cared whether they lived peaceably or not, so long as they did not come to break their windows.

Nor did the spirit of innovation end here; [196] for the shops of this new race of dealers underwent as great a metamorphosis as their owners. While the internal economy of these was reformed with a view to give the utmost facility to the labor of the establishment, by dispensing with forms and tacitly agreeing even to suspend the ordinary deferences due to station, lest their observance might, however slightly, impede the business in hand; externally, the windows, which were constructed of plate glass, with elegant frames extending from the ground to the ceiling, were made to blaze with all the tempting finery of the day.

We all know the result that followed from this very unequal rivalry. One by one, the ancient and quiet followers of the habits of their ancestors yielded before the active competition of their more alert neighbors. Some few of the less bigoted disciples of he old school adopted the new-light system; but all who tried to stem the stream were overwhelmed; for with grief we add, that the very last of these very interesting specimens of olden time that survived, joining the two generations of London tradesmen whose shops used to gladden the soul of every Tory pedestrian in Fleet street, with its unreformed windows, has at length disappeared, having lately passed into the Gazette, that Schedule A of anti-reforming traders. [12] ”

From this ingenious and clever sketch we can clearly see the necessity which determined the simplification of the fashions of the old régime. This necessity arose from the suppression of the ancient privileges which permitted a member of the corporate body of tradesmen, or a manufacturing mechanic who had attained the rank of master, to pass his time attending to his appearance, or to meddle in the quarrels of his neighbors, instead of giving his attention to his own business: it arose from the extensive growth of competition, which obliged every merchant, every manufacturer, every head of a business enterprise, to take into account the value of time, under penalty of seeing his name finally inscribed under the fatal heading of a bankrupt. A régime of competition does not permit the same fashions as a régime of privilege; and fashion is as sensitive to modifications arising from the interior economy of society as it is to changes of temperature.

This being so, it is obvious that it is wrong for a government to attempt to influence fashion by obliging, for example, its servants to wear sumptuous and elaborate apparel. In fact, one of two results follow. Either the state of society is such that the ruling classes find it to their advantage to display a certain ostentation in their dress; and in this case it is useless to impose it on them, or even to recommend it to them. Or the state of society is such that people in all ranks of society have something better to do than to spend a long time over their appearance and dress: in this case, what good can result from the intervention of government in matters of fashion? If sumptuousness of attire becomes general, if men accustom themselves to spending part of their time to their way of dressing which is demanded by their business affairs, will not society suffer harm? If, on the contrary, the example given above is not followed, if the magnificence of the costumes of the court and the ante-chamber is not imitated, will not this display form a shocking disharmony in the business world? [13] Will it not produce an impression analogous to that one receives from a masquerade? A government should then carefully avoid interference in this matter, even if it means encouraging lace trimming and embroidery within the nation. It should follow fashions, not guide them.

To recapitulate: Fashion, looked at from an economic point of view, exercises on the improvement of production an influence whose utility more than compensates for the damage which may result from its fluctuations. On the other hand, it is naturally established and modified by various causes, among which economic causes hold an important place. When people do not understand the necessities which determine its changes, they establish artificial fashions, which have the double disadvantage of being anti-economic and ridiculous.

Endnotes to Fashion

[1] Molinari discusses trade marks and the ownership of technical designs in his broader discussion of intellectual property in S2.

[2] A cross-reference to the entry by Molinari, "propriété littéraire et artistique," DEP, T. 2, pp. 473-78.

[3] (Molinari's note.) Essai sur le principe de la population, liv. III, chap. XIII, p. 445 (Guillaumin ed.). [*editor's note*: thomas robert malthus, *an essay on the principle of population* (1826). 6th ed. book iii, chapter xiii: "of increasing wealth, as it affects the condition of the poor," p. 222.]

[4] (Molinari's note.) Principes d'économie politique. Traduction de M. Augustin Planche, T. II, p. 82. [*editor's note*: john ramsay mcculloch, *the principles of political economy*. 5th ed. (1864). p. 370.]

[5] A cross-reference to the entries by Léon Faucher, "Salaires," DEP, T. 2, pp. 570-86, and A.E. Cherbuliez, "Taxes des pauvres," DEP, T. 2, pp. 716-21.

[6] (Molinari's note.) Traité d'économie politique, liv. III, chap. IV. Guillaumin 1841 ed., p. 449. [*editor's note*: molinari has condensed the passage somewhat.]

[7] Molinari says "de la papillonne" (in the manner of a butterfly). Molinari is using a term used by the socialist Charles Fourier in his bizarre theory of harmony: "papillonner" (to flit or move from one object or one extreme to another). This was one of the many terms adopted by Fourier to describe harmonious human behavior in his utopian society which would be harmonious literally and figuratively. See Manuscrits de Fourier, "Des séries mesurées" in La Phalange (1845). pp. 368, 372, 376.

[8] Molinari misquotes John Dryden. The line is "This is the porcelain clay of humankind" from the play Don Sebastian, King Of Portugal (1690). The full quotation is "M. Mol. Ay; these look like the workmanship of heaven; This is the porcelain clay of human kind, And therefore cast into these noble moulds." The Works of John Dryden (1808), vol. 7, p. 315.

[9] (Molinari's note.) Brochure in 8. Londres, 1835. [*editor's note*: richard cobden, *england, ireland and america, by a manchester manufacturer* (1835).]

[10] Cobden, The Political Writings of Richard Cobden (1903). Vol. 1, England, Ireland, and America, Part III America, pp. 98-100.

[11] From the French "la pomade" which was a greasy or waxy product which was applied to the hair as a gel to shape or stiffen it. It was often made of bear fat, lard, or beeswax.

[12] A reference to a public statement of bankruptcy.

[13] "Une société affairée."

Fine Arts↩

Source

“Beaux-arts,” DEP, T. 1, pp. 149-57.

Lalor: John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill,& Co., 1899). First edition 1881. Vol. 2 East India Co. - Nullification. “Fine Arts,” Vol. 2, pp. 206-11.

Text

[149]

The taste for the beautiful, that is to say, the need felt for a certain order and a certain harmony in things which affect the senses and the mind, either in sound, color, form, or movement, gave birth to the fine arts. [1] To arrange sounds, forms, colors, or movements in a manner which shall produce an agreeable impression upon the senses or the mind, is the object of the musician, the painter, the architect, the sculptor, the poet, or, to use a general term, of the artist. In the specialist dictionaries the domain of the fine arts is commonly restricted to painting, sculpture, architecture, and music. Some even give the name of art only to the imitation by mechanical means of all forms in their highest degree of natural or ideal beauty. This is what the Germans call plastic art. This word embraces only such arts as drawing, painting, sculpture, and architecture, together with engraving and mosaic work. [2] But this definition is obviously too narrow. When a musician or a dancer awakens in the mind a sense of the beautiful, the one by harmonious cadences, the other by graceful and expressive movements, they are artists in the same sense that the painter, the sculptor, or the architect is. It is of little importance what may be the material or the instrument which the artist employs to operate upon the senses and the mind, provided he succeeds in pleasing them. The fine arts might, therefore, be defined in a general manner as any application of human labor to the production of the beautiful.

The fine arts are found among all nations, even the most barbarous, but they are more or less perfect, more or less developed, according to the state of civilization and the peculiar aptitudes of the people. The Greeks seem to have possessed in the highest degree the taste for the beautiful, and the faculties necessary to satisfy this elevated need of the senses and the mind. Hence Greece was for a long time a wonderful studio, in which painters, sculptors, architects, musicians, and poets vied with each other in ministering to the ruling passion of an artistic people. Other nations, like the ancient Mexicans, seem to have been entirely destitute of the feeling of the beautiful. The forms of the Grecian statues and monuments are as beautiful as those of the Mexican statues and monuments are hideous.

Man could make no great advance in the fine arts until after his more pressing needs were satisfied. Music and dancing probably were the first. Although the art of the architect and the sculptor could not be developed before the trade of the mason or the stone-worker, man needed only the graceful play of the limbs to invent dancing, and the free use of his voice or to dare blowing into a reed to invent music.

In his little known essay “Of the Nature of that Imitation which takes place in what are called the Imitative Arts,” Adam Smith devotes himself to making some ingenious conjectures concerning the origin of music, danse, and poetry, and also in what way the first steps of progress in these different arts had to have taken place: [3]

After the pleasures which arise from the gratification of the bodily appetites, there seem to be none more natural to man than Music and Dancing. In the progress of art and improvement they are, perhaps, the first and earliest pleasures of his own invention; for those which arise from the gratification of the bodily appetites cannot be said to be his own invention. No nation has yet been discovered so uncivilized as to be altogether without them. It seems even to be amongst the most barbarous nations that the use and practice of them is both most frequent and most universal, as among the negroes of Africa and the savage tribes of America. In civilized nations, the inferior ranks of people have very little leisure, and the superior ranks have many other amusements; neither the one nor the other, therefore, can spend much of their time in Music and Dancing. Among savage nations, the great body of the people have frequently great intervals of leisure, and they have scarce any other amusement; they naturally, therefore, spend a great part of their time in almost the only one they have.

What the ancients called Rhythmus, what we call Time or Measure, is the connecting principle of those two arts; Music consisting in a succession of a certain sort of sounds, and Dancing in a succession of a certain sort of steps, gestures, and motions, regulated according to time or measure, and thereby formed into a sort of whole or system; which in the one art is called a song or tune, and in the other a dance; the time or measure of the dance corresponding always exactly with that of the song or tune which accompanies and directs it.

The human voice, as it is always the best, so it would naturally be the first and earliest of all musical instruments: in singing, or in its first attempts towards singing, it would naturally employ sounds as similar as possible to those which it had been accustomed to; that is, it would employ words of some kind or other, pronouncing them only in time and measure, and generally with a more melodious tone than had been usual in common conversation. Those words, however, might not, and probably would not, for a long time have any meaning, but might resemble the syllables which we make use of in fol-faing, or the derry-down-down of our common ballads; and serve only to assist the voice in forming sounds proper to be modulated into melody, and to be lengthened or shortened according to the time and measure of the tune. This rude form of vocal Music, as it is by far the most simple and obvious, so it naturally would be the first and earliest.

In the succession of ages it could not fail to occur, that in room of those unmeaning or musical words, if I may call them so, might be substituted words which expressed some sense or meaning, and of which the pronunciation might coincide as exactly with the time and measure of the tune, as that of the musical words had done before. Hence the origin of Verse or Poetry.

It was possible to develop painting, sculpture, and, above all, architecture, only by the aid of technology. The trade of building must necessarily have preceded architecture. It was the latter’s mission to give to each individual edifice the kind of beauty appropriate to its purpose and to local exigencies. In architecture, as in literature, the same style would not apply equally well to all kinds of work. The architect is bound to give, for example, a religious character to a church, a secular character to be theatre or ball room. The Gothic style up to the present time seems to be that which is most appropriate to the manifestation of religious sentiment. [151] In the Gothic cathedral, the ethereal height of the arches, the vast depth of the nave, and the mysterious subdued light from the windows, join with the profound and solemn accents of the Gregorian chant and the grave and majestic tones of the organ, in awakening the sentiment of veneration. The colorful style of the renaissance is better calculated to excite mundane and worldly thoughts. Hence it is the one chosen for theatres and ball rooms.

The original propensities of nations have naturally exercised a great influence upon the development of the fine arts. Only a religious and melancholy people could have invented Gothic architecture. In Greek architecture is found that exquisite elegance which marked all the customs as well as all the works of the privileged Hellenic race. The affected and bizarre customs of the Chinese are also found reflected in their architecture as well as in their dress.

The necessities of climate and the configuration of the ground have exercised a great influence upon the development of architecture, and they have often determined the character of it. Necessities of another order have also operated upon the development of architecture and other arts.

Throughout all antiquity is seen the influence which the fine arts exercised over the mind. For a long time they were considered as an instrumentum regni (tool of the king), as a means of appealing to and mastering the imagination by terror or respect. The gigantic constructions of the Assyrians and Egyptians, constructions the utility of which we vainly endeavor to discover to-day, had perhaps no other object. These exterior signs of power were then necessary to make a simple-minded people accept the absolute dominion of a race or caste. Those who claimed to be the representatives of divinity upon earth were obliged to show themselves superior to other men, in everything that was considered to be a manifestation of strength or majesty. The co-operation of the fine arts was indispensable to the display of their power. They needed them to construct their temples and palaces, to ornament them with magnificent decorations, and to fashion their garments and their arms. Architects, painters, sculptors, musicians, and poets were no less necessary to them than soldiers and priests in sustaining the imperfect and vicious structure of their dominion. Hence the particular care which governments in all ages have given to the development of the fine arts, and the ostentatious protection which they have accorded them, very frequently to the great detriment of other branches of production.

Although, in the past, the fine arts were powerful auxiliaries of politics and religion, fortunately, as nations have developed intellectually and morally as their minds and sentiments have broadened and become refined, this display has exercised less influence over the minds of the people, and the fine arts have lost their political and religious importance. The taste for the beautiful has ceased little by little to be used as an instrument of domination.

Economists have asked themselves two main questions on the subject of the fine arts. They have inquired, first, whether the fine arts are a kind of national wealth and second, whether the intervention of the government to protect them is necessary.

Do the products of the fine arts constitute a kind of wealth? As regards all that concerns architecture, painting, and sculpture, there can be no doubt as to the answer. A building, a statue, and a picture are material riches, the accumulation of which evidently augments the capital of a nation. But can as much be said of the products of music and dancing? Can the talent of the musician and the dancer be regarded as productive? Adam Smith says, no; J. B. Say and Dunoyer [4] say, yes. According to Smith’s doctrine, the name “products” can not be given to things which are consumed at the very moment of their creation.

To which J. B. Say answers, and rightly, as we think: [5]

If we descend to things of pure enjoyment, we can not deny that the representation of a good comedy gives as much pleasure as a box of bonbons or an exhibition of fire-works. I do not consider it reasonable to claim that the painter’s talent is productive, and that the musician’s is not so.

But although J. B. Say recognizes the musician’s talent as productive, he does not admit that its products can contribute to the increase of a nation’s capital. He states his reasons for this opinion as follows: [6]

It results from the very nature of immaterial products that there is no way to accumulate them, and that they can not serve to augment the national capital. A nation which contains a great number of musicians, of priests and of clerks, might be a nation well endowed as to amusements and doctrines, and admirably well administered, but its capital would not receive from all the work of these men any increase, because their products would be consumed as fast as they were created.

But does it follow, because a product, material or nonmaterial, is consumed immediately after having been created, that it does not increase the capital of a nation? May it not increase, if not its external capital, at least its internal capital, or, to make use of Storch’s expression, [7] the capital of its physical, intellectual, and moral faculties? Would a population deprived of the services of clergymen, administrators, musicians, and poets, a population, consequently, to which religious, political and artistic education was wanting, be worth as much as one sufficiently provided with those different services? Would not man, considered at the same time as capital and as an agent of production, be worth less under the former circumstances than under the latter?

[152]

In his work, De la liberté du travail, M. Charles Dunoyer has completely demonstrated that the consumption of the material or non-material products of the fine arts develops in man valuable and essential faculties; whence it results that artistic products of the fine arts develops in man valuable faculties; whence it results that artistic production, material or non-material, cannot be considered unproductive. [8]

Let us complete this demonstration of the productiveness of the fine arts by means of a simple hypothesis. Suppose her musicians and singers were taken away from Italy, would she not be deprived of a kind of wealth, even if these artists were replaced by an equal number of laborers, carpenters, and blacksmiths? Italy profits by the work of her musicians and her singers as absolutely as she does from the products of agriculture or of manufacturing industry. [9] In the first place she consumes a part of it herself, and this consumption serves to educate the Italian people by developing their minds, by refining and polishing their manners. Then, another part of the products of the fine arts, of which Italy is the nursery, is exported each year. Italy supplies a great number of foreign theatres with its composers, its musicians, and its singers. In exchange for their non-material products, these art-workers [10] receive other products purely material, a part of which they commonly bring back to their own country. What laborer, for instance, would have added so much as Rossini to the wealth of Italy? What seamstress or dressmaker, however capable or industrious, would have been worth as much as Catalani [11] or Pasta [12] from the same point of view? The production of the fine arts can not then be considered unproductive for Italy.

The fine arts, then, can contribute directly to increase the capital of a nation, whether material capital or non-material capital, which resides in the physical, moral, and intellectual faculties of the population. They are in consequence productive in the same degree and in the same sense that all the other branches of human work are.

Artistic production also, like all others, is effected by previous accumulation, the co-operation of capital and labor. In this respect artistic production offers no particular point of interest, except that it gives birth more frequently than any other kind of production, agricultural industry excepted, to natural monopolies. Great artists possess a natural monopoly, in this sense, that the competition among them is not sufficient to limit the price of their work to the level of what is strictly necessary for them to execute it. Jenny Lind [13] possessed a natural monopoly, for the remuneration which she obtained on account of the rarity of her voice, was very disproportionate to what was strictly necessary for her to exercise her profession of a singer. The difference forms a kind of rent, of the same nature exactly as rent derived from land. [14] If nature and art had produced a thousand Jenny Linds, instead of producing but one, it is evident that the monopoly which she enjoyed would not have existed, or that it would have been infinitely less productive. Painters, sculptors, and architects possess in their reputation a still more extensive monopoly, for it exists and is principally developed after their death. The value of this monopoly depends upon the merit of the artist and upon the quantity of his works. According as the number of works produced by a painter or sculptor is more or less considerable, the price of each one is more or less high. Where the merit is equal, the pictures or statues of the masters who produced the least have a greater pecuniary value than those of the masters whose productions are numerous. Thus, for example, an ordinary picture by the Dutch painter, Hobbema, [15] commonly sells for more than an ordinary picture by Rubens, [16] although Hobbema does not rank so high in art as Rubens. But the former produced only a small number of pictures, while the latter left an enormous number of works. Supposing, also, that the pictures of Ingres [17] and Horace Vernet [18] were equally prized by amateurs, the former would always have a higher monetary value to the latter, simply because they are rarer. The differences in the price of objects of art, and the variations which their value in exchange undergoes, notably when fashion takes up again a style which it had abandoned, are curious to study; some valuable ideas are found here in regard to the influence which the fluctuations of demand and supply exercise upon prices, also some interesting information as to the origin, progress, and end of natural monopolies.

After having examined the question of the productiveness of the fine arts, we must now see if this kind of production should be specially directed and encouraged by the government, or should be abandoned to the free action of individuals, like all other kinds of production.

The Egyptians and almost all the nations of antiquity condemned to slavery their prisoners of war, and sometimes entire nations whom they had subjugated. [19] They employed these slaves to construct their monuments. We know that the Israelites helped to build the pyramids. But the Egyptian monuments are more remarkable for their gigantic proportions than for their beauty. It is plain that the object of the people, or rather of the caste which instructed them, was to inspire the mind with awe rather than to charm it. In Greece the products of the fine arts have quite a different character. They bear above all the imprint of liberty. Greek art was not subject to a government or a caste. [20] The greatest number of Greek monuments were built by means of voluntary contributions. [153] The famous temple of Diana at Ephesus, for instance, was erected by the aid of contributions from the republics and kings of Asia, as later was St. Peter’s at Rome in part by the money of Christendom. When Erostratus reduced it to ashes, a new subscription was made to rebuild it. All the citizens of Ephesus considered it an honor to contribute. The women even sacrificed their jewels. [21] At Delphos, also, the temple was rebuilt, after a fire, at the public expense. The architect, Spantharus of Corinth, was engaged to complete it, for the sum of 300 talents. Three-fourths of this sum was furnished by the different cities of Greece, and the other fourth by the inhabitants of Delphos, who collected money even in the most distant countries to aid in completing their quota. A certain Athenian added a sum of money for the decorations, which were not included in the original plan. The greater part of the ornaments of the temple were offerings from the cities of Greece or from private citizens. Thirteen statues by Phidias were a gift from the Athenians. These statues were the result of a tenth part of the plunder taken by the Athenians from the plains of Marathon. A great number of other objects of art commemorated the victories of the different peoples of Greece in their intestine wars. [22]

A part of the revenue of the Greek temples was applied to the support of the priests, and another part to the support and decoration of the buildings. The priests made the greatest sacrifices to ornament the dwelling place of the gods, and these sacrifices were rarely unproductive, for in Greece, as elsewhere, the best lodged gods were always those which brought in the most revenue. The fine arts were also nurtured by the rivalries of the small states, into which Greek territory was divided, as to which should have the finest temples, statues, and pictures. This competition, pushed to excess gave rise to more than one abuse. Thus it was agreed, after the invasion of the Persians, that henceforth a contribution should be levied upon Greece to defray the common expenses, and that the Athenians should be made the holders of it. Pericles did not hesitate to divert these funds from their proper destination, and employ them for the decoration of Athens. Such an odious abuse of confidence aroused the indignation of all Greece against the Athenians, and was one of the principal causes of the Peloponnesian war.

The Romans, less happily endowed than the Greeks, from an artistic point of view, did not make such considerable sacrifices for the encouragement of the fine arts. At Rome, as in Egypt, the arts were chiefly employed to display to the conquered nations the power and majesty of the sovereign people. The construction of monuments of the arts was still among the Romans a means of keeping their troops in habits of work and of occupying their slaves. The taste for the beautiful did not enter much into these enterprises, and art naturally felt the effects of this. Still, under Augustus, there was at Rome a great artistic movement, a movement which was due in great part to the development of communication between Rome and Greece. Augustus had built the portico of Octavia, the temple of Mars Ultor, the temple of Apollo, the new Forum, and many other monuments of less importance. His friends, L. Cornificius, Asinius Pollion, Marcius Philippus, Cornclius Balbus, and his son-in-law Agrippa, erected at their own expense a great number of monuments. Attributing to himself, as is common among sovereigns, all the merit of the advance which the arts had made under his reign, Augustus said, some time before his death: “I found Rome a city of clay bricks, and left it a city of marble.” [23] At Rome, as in Greece, the statues were innumerable. The greater part of the chief citizens erected statues to themselves at their own expense. The censors endeavored to deprive them of this trifling satisfaction, by forbidding the erection of statues at Rome without their permission. But as this prohibition did not extend to the statues which decorated country houses, the rich citizens evaded the ordinance of the censors, by multiplying their effigies in their splendid villas.

At the time of the downfall of the Roman empire, the barbarians destroyed with stupid rage the finest masterpieces of ancient art. The fine arts then disappeared with the temporary eclipse of civilization. But they soon sprang up again, thanks to the expansion of the religious sentiment supported by municipal liberties. [24] Gothic art owes its birth and progress to the Christian sentiment developed in the emancipated communes of the middle age. A fact which is generally ignored is, that the expense of constructing the greater number of the magnificent cathedrals which adorn European cities, was in great part defrayed by voluntary contributions of residents of the city, nobles, bourgeois, or simple journeymen. Nothing is more interesting, even from the simple economic point of view, than the history of these wonders of Gothic art. At a time when poverty was universal, nothing but religious enthusiasm could have made people decide to impose upon themselves the necessary sacrifices for their erection. And nothing was neglected to rouse and excite this enthusiasm. The bishop and the priests furnished an example by sacrificing a part of their revenues to aid in constructing the cathedral; indulgences without end were promised to those who contributed to the holy work, either by their time or their money. When there was need of it, miracles happened to animate the languishing zeal of the faithful. By casting a glance over the history of the principal cathedrals, one will be convinced that diplomatic skill was no less needed than artistic genius to bring those great religious enterprises to fruition. At Orléans, for instance, Saint Euverte [25] having undertaken the construction of the first cathedral in the fourth century, an angel revealed to this pious bishop the very place where it should be built. In digging the foundations of the building the workmen found a considerable amount of treasure; [154] and the very day of the consecration of the church, at the moment when Saint Euverte was celebrating mass, a dazzling cloud appeared above his head, and from this cloud issued forth a hand, which blessed three times the temple, the clergy, and the assembled people! This miracle converted more than seven thousand pagans, and gave a great reputation to the church of Orléans.

At Chartres, Bishop Fulbert [26] devoted in the first place three years’ income and the income from the abbey, to the construction of the cathedral (1220); afterward he bequeathed a considerable sum to continue the work. The pious Matilda, wife of William the Conqueror, was associated with him in his work, and gave the greater part of the lead roofing of the cathedral. A physician of Henry I. built at his own expense one of the lateral portals. [27] Those who had no money gave their work. Artisans [28] from all professions voluntarily offered their services as workers in this entreprise which had been blessed by heaven. A large number of the inhabitants of Rouen and others dioceses in Normandy, equipped with the blessing of their archbishop or bishop, came to join these workers. The band of pilgrims chose a leader from among selves who allocated to each person the job that he had to carry out. The works was carried out with reverence, and during the night altar candles were placed on the wagons around the church and they stayed awake by singing.

At Strasburg, great indulgences were promised to the faithful who would contribute to the building of the cathedral. Gifts flowed in from all parts. Still the construction of that magnificent cathedral lasted for nearly four centuries. Commenced in the twelfth century, it was not finished till the fifteenth. The construction of the cathedral gave a great reputation to the stone-workers of Strasburg. These workmen, who furnished the greatest architects of the time, formed in the German empire, as well as in France, a body distinct from that of ordinary masons. Up to the time of the French revolution, they continued to be in charge of the repair and preservation of the Strasburg cathedral. [29]

The cathedrals of Europe, therefore, the most magnificent and most original monuments which it possesses, are due, in a great part, to the zeal and the faith of individuals. Sometimes, doubtless, this faith and zeal were excited by pious frauds; [30] sometimes also the pride of the bourgeois and the workmen were appealed to, to induce them to construct a more spacious and more beautiful cathedral than that of a neighboring and rival city; but in general no recourse was had to coercive measures; there was no levying of taxes to be specially devoted to the construction of churches, the sacrifices which the clergy generously imposed upon themselves and the voluntary gifts of the faithful were sufficient, and assured the multiplication of masterpieces of the Gothic art in an age of universal misery and barbarism.

In Italy the constitution of a multitude of small municipal republics was especially favorable to the development of the fine arts. Rivals in commerce, the Italian republics were also rivals in the arts. The rich merchants of Genoa, of Pisa, of Florence, and of Venice made it a point of honor to protect the arts and to endow their cities with magnificent monuments. This spirit of emulation seized the popes, and Rome disputed with Florence for the great artists of Italy. The basilica of St. Peter’s was commenced; but as the ordinary resources of the papacy were insufficient to complete this immense enterprise, recourse was had to a special issue of indulgences; unfortunately this particular kind of paper, having been made too common, depreciated in value, and ended by being refused in a great number of Christian countries. So the gigantic basilica was never completely finished. With the political and commercial decline of the republics, which spread like a network over Italian soil, commenced that of the fine arts in Italy. The encouragement of despotism was never able to restore them to the splendor which they had in the time of the municipal republics of the middle ages and of the renaissance.

In France, Louis XIV, thought that in his own interests it was his duty to protect the arts. So prompted by the great king, Colbert [31] founded the Academy of Fine Arts. [32] Unfortunately, the great king and his minister did not continue to support this innovation. Louis XIV. spent enormous sums upon his royal dwellings. Under his reign the fine arts became the auxiliaries of war in crushing other nations.

In his learned Histoire de la vie et de l’administration de Colbert, M. Pierre Clément [33] estimated at 165,000,000 livres in the money of the period, the sums which Louis XIV. spent on buildings, and in the encouragement of the fine arts and manufactures. The details are as follows:

	Livres
Total expense of Versailles: Churches, Trianon, Clagny, St. Cyr: the Marly machine; the river Eure; Noisv and Molineaux	81,151,414
Pictures, stuffs, silverware, antiques	6,386,674
Furniture and other expenses	13,000,000
Chapel (constructed 1699-1710)	3,260,241
Other expenses of all kinds	13,000,000
Total for Versailles and surroundings	116,796,429
Saint Germain	6,455,561
Marly (not including the machine which figures in the Versailles item)	4,501,279
Fontainebleau	2,773,746
Chambord	1,225,701
Louvre and Tuileries	10,608,969
Arch of Triumph of St. Antoine (demolished in 1716)	513,755
Observatory of Paris (constructed 1667-72)	725,174
Royal Hotel and Church of the Invalides	1,710,332
Place Royal of the Hotel Vendôme	2,062,699
The Val-de-Gràce	3,000,000
Annunciades of Meulan	88,412
Canal of the two seas (not including what was furnished by the estates of Languedoc)	7,736,555
Manufactories of Gobelins and Savonnerie	3,645,943
Manufactories established in many cities	1,707,990
Pensions and gratuities to men of letters	1,979,970
[sub total added by me]	48,736,086
[grand total added by me]	165,532,515
Grand total	165,534,515

[155]

“By taking as a base, adds M. Clément, the mean value of the mark of silver in Louis XIV’s time and in 1846, we shall find that the approximate value of the above is about 350,000,000 francs. But when we remember the wonders of Versailles alone, it is probable that all the buildings of Louis XIV., if executed in our day, would cost not far from a billion.” [34]

Still these ostentatious expenditures contributed in no way to the progress of the fine arts. Under Louis XIV. art was only a reminder of antiquity or of the renaissance. In the eighteenth century, taste in art, fettered by the immutable rules of the state-subsidized academies, became more and more corrupt. The revolution destroyed official protection, but it was wrong in not stopping there; the vandals of that time placed their sacrilegious hands upon the masterpieces of the past, as if they were suspected of royalism. On the other hand, the ridiculous imitations were reproduced no less ridiculously in the arts. To the corrupt taste of Watteau, Boucher and Vanloo, succeeded the false taste of the school of David. [35] Napoleon did not fail to re-establish official protection. “I wish,” he wrote to his minister of the interior, Count Cretet, “I wish the fine arts to flourish in my empire.” But the fine arts did not hasten to obey the injunction of the despot, and the imperial epoch was anything but artistic. [36]

Since this time we haven’t stopped officially protecting the arts in France. Here is what their budget was in 1849: [37]

	Francs
French Académie in Rome	122,000
Special School of Beaux-Arts in Paris	109,000
Conservatory of Music and Drama	165,500
Churches in Lille and Toulouse	6,000
Free Schools of Design	54,800
National Museums (personnel)	158, 700
Id. (physical)	151,700
Works of Art and the Decoration of Public Buildings	900,000
Acquisition of Paintings for the Louvre	50,000
Preservation of Ancient Historical Monuments	745,000
Subsidies and Subscriptions	186,000
Annual Payments and Support given to artists, playwrights, composers, and to their widows	37,700
Subsidies to the National Theatres	1,474,000
[my total - total in dep is incorrect]	4,001,700
Total	4,260,100

The administration of Beaux-Arts depends upon the budget of the Ministry of the Interior. [38] It is made up of one division whose Director is specially charged with the task of “making art flourish in France,” to use the expression of Napoléon. In the budget for the support of religion there are still some paragraphs which more or less directly concern the Beaux-Arts. This is what we find for 1849:

	Francs
For the maintenance and large-scale repair of diocesan buildings	1,700,000
Support for acquisitions or works concerning churches and presbyteries	1,000,000
Restoration of the Cathedral of Paris	550,000
Extraordinary work on diocesan buildings, churches, temples, And presbyteries	1,000,000
[my total]	4,250,000
Total	4,250,000

Outside of the ordinary budget there are frequent votes for allocation of monies to build or finish buildings which are called “national,” whether they are at the expense of the state or the municipal budgets. To cite some figures, the following “extraordinary” amounts have been set aside: 10 million to the construction of the Arc-de-Triomphe de l'Étoile; 11 million 500 thousand to the Palace of the Council of State, 7 million 500 thousand to the Stock Exchange, [39] 13 million 400 thousand francs for the Church of Madeleine, and 2 million for the Notre-Dame-de-Lorette.

The grants that the French government gives to the Beaux-Arts is therefore quite considerable. At least if it contributes to making them progress! But in France like everywhere else, progress in the arts is almost always achieved outside of the sphere of government. Among the paintings ordered by the government over the past 20 years can one cite a single work “outside the norm”? Historical and religious genres which are particularly protected have reached a state of complete decadence. Paintings of the countryside, of interiors, the actual genres which the public alone supports by buying them, is progressing. Similarly, if the construction of public buildings leaves much to be desired, [40] that of individual homes has made considerable progress in terms of elegance and comfort. Furthermore one can perfectly explain why the government is not suited to protecting the Beaux-Arts. The government as protector of the arts is personified by the nature of administration and in how one becomes a minister. Administration is routine by its very nature; a minister, usually a former lawyer, professor, or journalist, in taking possession of his portfolio does not inevitably acquire the taste of a Mécène [41] or a Medici. Besides, he has many other concerns to attend to: he has to correspond with the Prefects; to instruct the Mayors of towns, to direct the police (gendarmerie), and to defend the policies of the government in the Chamber. He lacks the time to direct or supervise the use of the funds granted to support the Beaux-Arts. He is forced to leave this task up to his subordinates who are no more accountable than he himself is for the good use of these grants. Should one be surprised [156] after all this, if the support funds which were so painfully snatched from the tax-payers now serve rather to feed bureaucratic intrigue and savoir-faire than to encourage artistic merit and knowledge? [42]

The establishment of a university subsidized by the Beaux-Arts administration again has had the result of perpetuating classical habits of thinking and in provoking an often exaggerated and eccentric reaction against these habits. The celebrated “war of the classics and the romantics” had its main cause in the protection which the government gave to the classics. The latter wanted to preserve at all costs the imitation of the Greek or Roman style, by stating that if one went beyond this one would fall into the most dreadful anarchy. Their adversaries wished on the contrary to innovate at any price, and it didn’t matter in what way since one had to replace the imitation of antiquity with that of the middle ages or the Renaissance: in the presence of the classical “conservatives,” they (the romantics) stood in quite well for the “socialists.” But if the government had not taken upon itself to artificially support the old classical habits, if education and the practice of the Beaux-Arts had been completely left to individuals to face the costs and risks, isn’t it likely that the errors of the past would have been more quickly rectified and that the protest of Romanticism would have been less violent, and less muddled. Without the abuses and habits of our economic and administrative régime, wouldn’t we have seen socialism disappear? Government protection has thus been damaging to the arts in the same way. We have no need to add that it has been even more damaging to the public treasury: we pay first of all for the education and support of artists; then we pay for the buildings erected by them, and these buildings reproduced in the Greek and Roman style, these buildings whose style and layout suit neither the requirements of their particular specification, nor the demands of the climate, have not failed to be very uncomfortable and to be very expensive.

“Architecture,” says M. Horace Say who has seen close up the abuses of this branch of the university and protectionist régime, “is taught at Paris at the School of Fine Arts. In order to gain admission to this school it is necessary to have made a beautiful drawing; anything beyond this is considered to be a very little use. In order to graduate with honors it is necessary to have made an even more beautiful drawing, and thereby to get to be sent at government expense to the School which France runs in Rome. Having arrived under the beautiful sky of Italy, the pupil of architecture, the comrade of the painter, the sculptor, and the musician, feels his imagination blossoming: he grabs his paintbrush; his watercolors take on more vigor; he makes his skies azure blue and reproduces all the ruins he sees. Having reached the age of maturity he finally returns to France. He has especially familiarized himself with the practices of a world which no longer exists but he knows little of the needs of our own time, very little of mathematics, less still of physics, chemistry, mechanics; he has given little thought to how to calculate the forces, measure the weights, or the strength of building materials; and has no idea of the use of wood or iron which has become the common practice in Germany and England, any more than the methods used in Prussia and Russia to properly seal doors and to make homes warm.

The artistic student of architecture, after having thus fulfilled the intentions of the government which has watched over his education and which has demanded of him nothing more than what he has done, looks for a way to create a name for himself through his work, by giving everything he makes the cachet that he has unlocked the secret of architecture by contemplating Greek and Roman ruins. In his turn he wishes to gain entry to the Academy and access to it is made easy by the camaraderie of the School of Rome. While waiting for this appointment he gets all the goodwill of the administration of the office of Beaux-Arts in the Ministry of the Interior. He becomes a member of the Council of Civil Buildings, and from then on he can contribute to stopping by his veto any useful project which deviates from what he considers to be the classical rules of architecture. We know that the tutelage which is imposed on the Communes requires that they cannot erect any kind of structure without having got their plans previously approved by the Minister. Now, the Minister only gives his approval after having received the advice of the Council of Civil Buildings, and the classical school of architecture, which generally provides quite poor plans and very incomplete projects, is thus yet again in a position to get rejected everything which does come from them or which is theirs.” [43]

Thus one can see that a monopoly in matters relating to the arts is not worth any more than one relating to matters in industry or commerce.

It is a common opinion [44] that modern civilization is not favorable to the progress of the fine arts. As proof in support of this opinion, are cited the English and Americans, who, at the head of industrial civilization, are in a state of inferiority from an artistic point of view. But it is forgotten that all nations are not endowed with all aptitudes, any more than all soils are provided with fertility of all kinds. While certain northern nations obtained as their heritage industrial genius, artistic aptitudes fell to the lot of the southern nations. Certain nations have been for centuries the workshops of the fine arts, as others have been the workshops of manufacturing industry. As international exchange becomes more developed, this division of labor will be more marked, and it will facilitate more and more the progress of the fine arts as well as that of the industrial arts. [45] The progress of the arts will be accelerated also by the spread of comfort, which will increase their market, and by the progress of industry, which will place new materials and new tools at their disposal. Fewer palaces, perhaps, will be built, fewer battle pieces painted than in the past, but railway stations and palaces for industrial expositions will be constructed; [46] the splendid and grand landscapes of the new world, which steamships render more and more accessible to European artists, will be painted; and statues will be erected to useful men instead of to conquerors. On the other hand, the use of light materials, of iron and glass for example, renders possible to-day artistic combinations unknown to the ancients. The employment of new tools, invented or perfected by industry, will give birth to progress in other ways. Has not the multiplication of musical instruments already given an immense impetus to instrumental music? [47] In an artistic sense, as in all others, modern civilization is probably destined to surpass ancient civilization. But if liberty was the essential condition of the progress of the arts in the past, it will be no less so in the future. Like all other branches of production, and more still because of the character of spontaneity which is peculiar to them, and which has given to them the name of liberal arts, the fine arts will progress the more rapidly the sooner they are freed from all protection and all shackles.

Endnotes to Fine Arts

[1] (Ed. Note.??) See also his articles on "Fashion" and "Public Monuments" in the DEP.

[2] (Molinari's note.) Dictionnaire de Millin: Article "Beaux-Arts." [*editor's note*: aubin-louis millin, *dictionnaire des beaux-arts* (1806). 3 vols.]

[3] (Molinari's note.) Essai sur la nature de l'imitation dans les arts imitatifs, Oeuvres posthumes, T. II, p. 84. [Editor's Note: Molinari has the title of the book wrong. It was in Essais philosophiques; par feu Adam Smith, précédés d'un précis de sa vie et de ses écrits; par Dugald Stewart . Traduits de l'anglais par P. Prevost (1797), T. 2, p. 84. [An English version can be found in Adam Smith, Essays On, I. Moral Sentiments: II. Astronomical Inquiries; III. Formation of Languages; etc. (1869), pp. 415-16.

[4] Charles Dunoyer (1786-1862).

[5] (Molinari's note.) J.-B. Say, Traité d'économie politique, liv. I, chap. XIII. Guillaumin 1841 ed, p.124.

[6] (Molinari's note.) J. B. Say, Traité d'économie politique, Liv. I, chap. xiii. Guillaumin ed. p. 125.

[7] Molinari is toying with the idea of "human capital" but neither he nor Henri Storch actually use this expression. Storch comes very close with his distinction between "le capital matériel" and "le capital immatériel" (material and non-material capital); "le travail matériel" and "le travail immatériel" (material and non-material work); and "les biens matériels" and "les biens immatériel" (material and non-material goods). Molinari seems to prefer the terms "le capital extérieur" and "le capital intérieur" (exterior and interior capital) which he uses here. According to Storch "non-material capital" is made up of "les biens internes" (internal goods) which in turn are made up of things like "de santé, de dextérité, de lumières, de goût, de mœurs et de sentimens religieux" (health, dexterity, enlightenment, tastes, morals, and religions feelings) as well as "les hommes éclairés, les livres, les idées, les institutions utiles" (enlightened men, books, ideas, and useful institutions." All these he thought could be accumulated over time and reproduced as they were needed. See, Storch, Cours d'économie politique (1823), vol. III, chap. VIII "Du capital immatériel, et de la consommation des biens internes," pp. 300-7.

[8] (Molinari's note.) See the treatise De la Liberté du travail (1845), vol. 1, pp. 349-50.

[9] On the other hand, in S8 Molinari discusses the waste caused by state subsidies to theatres and libraries in France.

[10] Molinari calls them "ces travailleurs de l'art".

[11] Possibly a reference to Angelica Catalani (1780–1849) the Italian soprano opera singer who was the greatest bravura singer of her day.

[12] The Italian mezzo-soprano opera singer Giuditta Angiola Maria Costanza Pasta (1797-1865). Donizetti and Bellini wrote title roles especially for her: Donizetti in "Anna Bolena" (1830); and Bellini in "La somnambula" (1831) and "Norma" (1831).

[13] The Swedish opera singer Johanna Maria "Jenny" Lind (1820-1887) was one of the most highly regarded singers of the 19th century. She was in great demand during the 1840s and decided to retire at the age of 29 in 1849. On several occasions Bastiat uses her and other famous singers of his day (Maria Galibran, Rachel, Rubini) as examples of the kind of non-material services which are voluntarily traded in a free market. See Economic Harmonies, chap. V "On Value.".

[14] On Molinari's theory of rent see my essay on "Rent, Disrupting Factors, and Equilibrium".

[15] The Dutch landscape painter Meindert Hobbema (1638–1709) who was a pupil of the master Jacob van Ruisdael.

[16] The Dutch Baroque painter Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640).

[17] The French neo-classical painter Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres (1780-1867).

[18] The French painter of famous military battles, Émile Jean-Horace Vernet (1789-1863).

[19] (Ed. Note??) See Molinari's entry in the DEP on "Slavery".

[20] (Ed note??) Molinari says that " L'art grec n'était pas inféodé, en effet, à un gouvernement ou à une caste" (Greek art was not enfeoffed (subjegated), in effect, to a government or to a caste).

[21] (Molinari's note.) Jean-Jacques Barthélemy, Voyage du jeune Anacharsis en Grèce dans le milieu du quatrième siècle avant l'ère vulgaire (1843), vol. 1, p. 457.

[22] (Molinari's note.) Barthélémy, Voyage du jeune Anacharsis, vol. 1, p. 331.

[23] A saying attributed to Emperor Augustus that "I found Rome a city of bricks and left it a city of marble."

[24] (Ed Note) See Thierry on this ref??

[25] Saint Euverte or Euverte of Orléans was the fourth bishop of Orléans during the 4th century.

[26] Fulbert de Chartres (970-1028) became Bishop of Chartres in 1006. The Cathedral in Chartres burnt down in 1020.

[27] Some sentences in the rest of this paragraph were left out of the Lalor version for some reason, perhaps because of Molinari's slightly mocking tone..

[28] The following paragraph was cut from the Lalor version perhaps because of Molinari's slightly mocking tone.

[29] (Molinari's note.) Les cathédrales de France, par Chapuy et Jolimont. [*editor's note*: a reference to *cathédrales françaises: dessinées d'après nature et lithographiées par chapuy* (1823-41).]

[30] Molinari's friend and colleague Frédéric Bastiat developed a theory of "theocratic fraud" and "theocratic plunder" in his Economic Sophisms and elsewhere.

[31] Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683) was the Comptroller-General of Finance under King Louis XIV from 1665 to 1683. He epitomized the policy of state intervention in trade and industry known as "mercantilism."

[32] Molinari is using its more modern name the "Academy of Fine Arts" which was founded in 1816. In its earlier incarnation it was comprised of three instituions, the Royal Academy of Painting and Sculpture (founded 1648), of Music ((1669), and Architecture (1671).

[33] (Molinari's note.) Pierre Clément, Histoire de la vie et de l'administration de Colbert (1846), pp. 200-1.

[34] (Molinari's note.) Pierre Clément, Histoire de la vie et de l'administration de Colbert, p. 201.

[35] The French Baroque painter Jean-Antoine Watteau (1684-1721); the French Rococo style painter François Boucher (1703–1770); possibly a reference to the most famous member of the Van Loo family of painters, Charles-André van Loo (1705-1765); and the Neo-classical style French painter Jacques-Louis David (1748-1825).

[36] The following section on French government spending on the fine arts was cut from the Lalor article probably because it was so specific to France. It continues with the paragraph beginning "It is a common opinion …"

[37] For more details on French government expenditure in 1848-49 see Appendix 3 "French Government's Budgets for Fiscal Years 1848 and 1849." The following discussion is very similar to that in S8.

[38] On government spending on the arts see Table 7 "Expenditure by the Ministry of the Interior in 1848," in appendix 3.

[39] (Molinari's note.) The costs of construction of the Stock Exchange have been covered by means of a special tax levied on commercial activities in Paris.

[40] (Ed. Note??) See his entry in the DEP on "Public Monuments."

[41] Mécène Marié de l'Isle (22 May 1811 – 14 August 1879) was a French musician and opera singer, who used the stage name Marié.

[42] Molinari puns on the words bureaucratic "savoir faire" and artistic knowledge ("le savoir").

[43] (Molinari's note.) Horace Say, Études sur l'administration de la ville de Paris et du département de la Seine (1846), pp. 295-97.

[44] The Lalor translation continues with Molinari's text from here.

[45] I.e., technology.

[46] Molinari no doubt has in mind the spectacular class and steel pavilion known as the "Christal Palace" in London for the 1851 Great Exhibition. He would also have witnessed the building of some of large railway stations in Paris in the early and mid-1840s, especially that of La Gare de Saint-Lazare which would be the subject of several paintings by Claude Monet in 1877. The street where this railway station is located was also used in the title of his 1849 book of 1849 Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare.

[47] The fellow Belgian Adolphe Sax, for example, patented his design for a new musical instrument known as the "Saxophone" in 1846.

Freedom Of Commerce and Free Trade↩

Source

“Liberté du commerce, liberté des échanges,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 49-63.

John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill,& Co., 1899). First edition 1881. Vol. 3 Oath - Zollverein. “Protection,” pp. 413-23.

Editor’s Note

Lalor omitted the first part of Molinari’s article “Ses bases naturelles” (Its Foundation in Nature) where he discusses how trade and exchange is an inherent part of human nature (both theoretically and historically), how once exchange between individuals takes place it is soon followed by the practice of the division of labour both domestically and internationally, which results in massive increases in human productivity and wealth. This introductory section has been translated by us and included where it belongs in Molinari’s original article. The long Bibliography of American works which Lalor added has been cut for reasons of space.

Text

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I. Its Foundation in Nature.

If there is any principle which is solidly supported by the evidence it is assuredly that of free trade. [1] In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to cast one’s eye over the nature of man and the environment in which he is found.

Man has physical, intellectual, and moral needs, the satisfaction of which is necessary for the maintenance of his existence and the improvement of his being. He has to feed, clothe, and house himself under the threat of dying; he has to develop his mind and his soul, under the threat of living simply the life of an animal.

To acquire these necessities for his existence, man has at his disposal a part of creation, and he is equipped with faculties with whose assistance he can extract from the environment in which he lives all the elements needed for his material and moral subsistance. The earth with its countless varieties of minerals, plant and animal life, its oceans, its mountains, its fertile soil, the atmosphere which surrounds it, the steady stream of warmth and light which feed the life on its surface, here is the bounty which Providence has put in the service of humanity. However, neither the various elements which make up the natural bounty of subsistence, nor the faculties which mankind has at his disposal to make use of them, have been distributed in an equal and uniform manner. Each region of the globe has its own particular geological make up: here lies immense strata of coal deposits, iron ore, lead, copper; there lie gold, silver, platinum, and precious stones. There is the same diversity in the distribution of plant and animal species: the sun, which warms and lights up the earth unequally, which gives warmth and light lavishly to certain regions, while at the same time leaves others in the freezing cold and darkness, marks out for each species the boundaries of its existence which it cannot escape. Furthermore, there is the same diversity in distribution of human abilities. A brief examination is sufficient to show that all nations have not been endowed with the same aptitudes, that the French, the English, the Italians, the Germans, the Russians, the Chinese, the Indians, the Africans have their own particular skills, whether they come from their race, or the natural circumstance of soil or climate; that the physical, intellectual, and moral strengths of men vary according to one’s race, nation, and family; that there are no two individuals in the world with the same abilities and skills. There is diversity and inequality in the factors of production in the different regions of the globe; and no less pronounced diversity and inequality in the skills among human beings. This then is the spectacle with which creation presents us.

Out of this natural arrangement of things arises the necessity to trade. Since no region of the globe can be the center for all industries, and since no individual can produce in isolation all the things necessary for the satisfaction of his needs, what do men do? Those who are less well endowed, those who are in a transition period between the human race and the other animal species, content themselves with products which they are capable of fabricating themselves and for which they have the raw materials at hand. They remain stuck in primitive barbarism and they find themselves constantly subjected to the harshest privation. Such are the natives of New Holland (Australia) [2] and some of the archipelagos in the South Seas. However, the more intelligent of them came to realize that there is a procedure which will soon put at their disposal all the resources of creation. Instead of producing everything poorly, each person applies himself to doing those things which his particular skills and the kind of raw materials he has at his disposal, allows him to produce easily; and that he exchanges these for the things which he produces with difficulty or of which he is incapable. Thanks to this procedure, which is both so simple and so productive, each person can get a greater and greater quantity of things which are necessary for the satisfaction of his needs, and which will expand and improve his existence without limit. (See, EXCHANGE.) [3]

Thus exchange appears to be a necessity which arises from the nature of man and from the circumstances in which he finds himself; and the freedom to trade is nothing less than the liberty of working, which is a natural institution.

Once the practice of trading has been discovered, the division of labour can be established and industry can be improved. (See, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR). [4] Then exchanges multiply and the sphere in which they can operate is enlarged. This sphere is initially quite limited and it varies considerably according to the kind of goods traded. Heavy and bulky goods can only be traded over a short distance from their place of production; objects which contain a considerable value in a small volume, such as precious metals, food, arms, and luxury goods like jewelry and perfume, they alone can be carried to far off markets. But gradually the obstacle of distance can be overcome. Countries which have the advantage of being criss-crossed by numerous streams of navigable water, and bathed by the ocean, are the first to offer the spectacle of an expanded commerce, and as a result of this very fact they become the principal centres of civilisation itself. Man-made routes into the interior are then opened up and the sphere of exchange is enlarged with each improvement in communication routes and the means of locomotion. In our day, the most ordinary foodstuffs and the most unprocessed material are transported very much further than precious metals, gemstones, and luxury goods could have been previously. Don’t we now go looking for fertilizer and guano even as far as the Pacific Ocean? The result of this steady expansion of the sphere of trade is easy to appreciate. If, as observation proves, the different nations of the earth are endowed with particular skills, and if each region of the globe has its special areas of production, as the sphere of trade is expanded we will see each nation choose to devote themselves to the industries which best suit their skills as well as the nature of their soil and climate. We will see the division of labour extended more and more among the different nations. Each industry will be situated where the best conditions for production are, and the end result will be that all the things which are necessary to satisfy the needs of men will be able to be obtained in the greatest abundance for the least amount of trouble.

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Such is the inevitable result of the unlimited and endless expansion of the sphere within which trade is conducted. That this result conforms with the general plan of creation cannot be denied. If Providence had wanted mankind to remain isolated, without any communication between each other, wouldn’t it have put it (mankind) within the immediate reach all the elements needed for production? Wouldn’t it (Providence) have also endowed mankind with all the necessary skills to the same degree? If it (Providence) has shared out differently and unequally the factors and the tools of production across the surface of the globe, isn’t this proof that the endless expansion of trade is a providential necessity to which men are bound to obey? One might object that man is wrong to give his needs such an importance that it is necessary for him to rope in the entire world in order to satisfy them? One might also object that this life of primitive simplicity which was content with the food, clothing, and other useful objects which their native soil and local industry could supply, is preferable to this frantic search for pleasure which drives men to explore the furthest reaches of the globe in order to satisfy his appetites or his fantasies? But isn’t it enough to push this objection a bit further to show its inanity? Whatever the manner in which mankind governs his needs, whether he prefers his physical appetites, or whether he tips the balance towards his intellectual and moral appetites, doesn’t the beneficial necessity of exchange remain the same? Where would civilisation be if non-material goods, for example, weren’t able to be exchanged between one nation and another? if the philosophy and the fine arts had remained in Greece, the science of legislation in Rome, and the Christian religion in Judea? Haven’t the minds of modern nations become more cultivated and their morality improved by means of these products which had foreign origins? What nation would be able to flatter itself that it had been able to combine the philosophical and artistic skills of the Greeks, the legal science of the Romans, and the religious ideas of the Jews?

Let us imagine that, at the time when exchange began to be practiced, some tyrants who had been indoctrinated by some sophists had completely forbidden free trade; let us imagine they had prohibited the exchange of products, whether material or non-material, and that this prohibition had been maintained: isn’t it obvious that humanity would have remained stuck in a state of barbarism for eternity? Isn’t it obvious that the condition of the nations which at present are found at the head of civilisation, would not have surpassed that of the natives of New Holland (Australia)?

II. The Shackles placed on Free Trade

§ 1. Fiscal Duties.

Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of free trade, it has been restricted by two kinds of measures, fiscal and prohibitory ones. [5] We shall first consider the former.

It is easy to understand why exchanges would be restricted for a fiscal purpose. As soon as new communication routes began to be opened up and exchanges multiplied governments began to realise that it was both possible and profitable to tax goods which came to market via these new routes. At first the tax was a simple toll for meeting the expense of maintaining the roads worn down by the transportation of merchandise: soon it served also to reimburse the treasury for other public services, among which may be counted the security afforded those making the exchanges. But, in imposing a tax of this kind, the end in view was not the restriction of trade, it was simply to procure as much money as possible for the treasury, and this fiscal end could only be attained on condition that exchanges were not too restricted. Unfortunately, good financial practices were rarely followed in this matter. In the middle ages, for example, every country was divided up into a multitude of little seignories or castellanies, [6] whose proprietors seized the right of taxing the exchanges which took place within their territorial limits. One can see in the article DOUANE (Customs Duties) how tolls of all kinds multiplied at this time. [7] This is why, when these artificial obstacles were added to the natural obstacle of distance and thus blocked trade, commerce was not able to expand. This is why industry, now limited to the market of the castellany or the commune, remained for a long time in its infancy. As the means of production could not be developed, wealth and civilization made no progress, except on the seacoasts and along the great rivers, where fewer obstacles impeded free circulation. Later, once the feudal system had disappeared, the number of tolls was reduced, and there was at the same time improved security for transportation. Immediately, the sphere of the exchanges expanded, a better division of labor became possible, and public wealth developed as if by magic. The establishment of the uniform tariff of Colbert in France, [8] and the abolition of internal customs duties by the Constituent Assembly, [9] contributed greatly to these results. (See DOUANE..)

In our day the octroi [10] and excise duties, river tolls, tonnage duties, etc., in Europe, which directly affect the movement of goods, have a purely fiscal character. Until better means have been found for providing for public expenses, or until the government functions which are paid for by taxes are more and more returned to the domain of private industry, it will be difficult to find a substitute for these taxes. It is only to be regretted that they have become so numerous and are so exorbitant; for, by their excess, they hinder the growth of trade, retard progress in the division of labor, and consequently prevent, in no small degree, an increase of revenue to the treasury. (See TAX.) [11]

In spite of the fetters to the development of trade which result from the establishment of fiscal taxes, in principle no objections to these taxes can be raised. If they restrict the sphere of exchanges, it is an unavoidable accident; but it is not their purpose to restrict them.

§ 2. Protective or Prohibitory Duties. Their character and effects.

Protective or prohibitory duties have an entirely different character. The latter are established with a direct view to limiting the scope of exchange. They restrict in order to restrict. The governments which have persistently imposed them, apparently with the idea that the organization and development of trade could not be safely left to the rule of Providence, have intervened “to regulate the matter.” We shall see whether these organizers of trade were well inspired. But let us first ascertain what are the components which constitute the protective or prohibitive system.

Considered as a whole and as they exist in our own day, the protective or prohibitory system includes two kinds of obstacles, viz., prohibitions or protective duties on the importation of goods, and prohibitions or duties on their export. It also includes premiums granted for the import or export of certain goods. Finally, it serves as a basis for the colonial system (see “Colonial System”), [12] as well as for the majority of tariff agreements or commercial treaties.

Prohibitions or protective duties imposed on imported goods are intended to favor the development of certain branches of domestic production at the expense of similar foreign industries.

Prohibitions of exports are sometimes imposed in order to keep at a low price certain foodstuffs which are essential for domestic industry or consumption, or to deprive foreign industries or consumers from having them.

Premiums on export are pecuniary encouragements awarded to certain branches of domestic industry at the expense of other branches. Sometimes their purpose is to hasten the development of an industry deemed necessary, or to counteract to some degree the protective duties imposed by foreign countries. Sometimes, again, they are imposed simply as a remedy for a sudden economic crisis. Drawbacks [13] are premiums to reimburse the exporter of a manufactured good, for the tax paid on the raw materials which were imported. Premiums on imports are ordinarily of a temporary nature; for example, they have been used during periods of shortages in order to encourage imports of food. (See PREMIUMS.) [14]

Customs agreements and commercial treaties are partial and temporary breaches in the wall of prohibitory tariffs, in favor of certain nations with which it is desired to maintain especially friendly relations. (See TRADE TREATIES.) [15]

Prohibitions or protective taxes on imports constitute the principle component of the system. To obtain a clear idea of the manner in which they operate, let us take an example. Suppose that nation A annually supplies nation B with a million kilogrammes of spun cotton. Why does B buy this cotton from A instead of spinning it itself? Because the factories in A are so situated and organized as to produce spun cotton of a better quality and at a lower price than factories in B could possibly do: because nation A is more advantageously situated in respect to the conditions for the manufacture of cotton. If it were not so, cotton would be manufactured in B as well as in A. But a politician in B persuades himself that it would be useful to “kidnap” [16] this industry from the foreigner, and that the importation of cotton thread should be prohibited. Suppose this politician can prevent the people of B from receiving the million kilogrammes of cotton which had been annually supplied to them by A, especially if the the frontier is easy to guard and is provided with a sufficient number of upright and well-paid customs officers. He can also promote with the same measure the building of a certain number of mills in B for spinning cotton. Can he place these spinning mills under conditions of production as favorable as those of the mills of A? Can he cause cotton to be spun as well and as economically as in A? No; for he is not a master who can change the natural conditions of cotton production; all he can do is to prevent cotton which has been spun at low cost from entering B. There his power stops. Nation B now ceases to be “invaded” (this is a sacred term in the prohibitionist’s vocabulary) [17] by the million kilogrammes of spun cotton from A. It makes its own cotton; but this cotton costs more than that from A, and is of a poorer quality; and less of it is consequently consumed. Before prohibition, B consumed a million kilogrammes of spun cotton; after prohibition, it consumed no more than six or seven hundred thousand kilogrammes; as a result the total production of cotton is reduced by the difference. Now let us suppose that nation A imitates the conduct of B, and prohibits, for example, the importation of spun flax, which it formerly received in exchange for its supplies of cotton. Flax will begin to be spun in A; but as it will be spun at greater cost than in B, and not so well, the total production of linen will in turn be reduced. Less will be produced by both nations, though with as great or greater expenditure of effort than before; and one country will not be as well provided with linen, and the other with cotton.

At the time when this destructive policy became the law in international relations, and every nation was trying to “kidnap” industries from foreigners, a very witty pamphlet was published in England, under the title “Monkey Economists.” A cartoon representing a cage of monkeys served as a frontispiece. Half a dozen monkeys in separate cages were about to get their daily food; but, instead of each one consuming in peace the serving which the zookeeper was liberally dispensing, these animals were each mischievously attempting to “kidnap” the servings of their neighbors, without realising that the latter were engaged in the same operation. Thus every one was taking a great of trouble to steal the food which could have been easily found right in front of him; and the common fund of food was reduced [53] by what was wasted or lost in the scramble. [18]

Exactly this has been the conduct of governments which have adopted the errors of the prohibitory system. They have neglected the bounty which Providence bestowed upon them, to steal with great difficulty that which had been allotted to their neighbors. They have, by their mischievous jealousy, made production more difficult and less abundant: they have retarded the growth of prosperity among the people. A politician who imposes a prohibitory or protective duty, acts precisely the reverse of an inventor who discovers a new process for making production better and more economical: he invents a way to make production more expensive and less good: he invents a process which compels people to abandon fertile land and productive mines, to cultivate bad land and work poor mines. He is “an inventor in reverse,” [19] an agent of barbarism, just as an inventor is an agent of civilization.

This becomes even more evident when we examine the influence of the prohibitory régime on the progress of industry in general. The division of labor is, as everyone knows, the principal ingredient for a cheap market; the more labor is divided, the more the cost of production is reduced, and the more, consequently, prices are reduced. The arguments of Adam Smith on this point have become classic. But on what conditions can labor become more and more divided? On condition that it can find a continually widening market: [20]

As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market …

It is impossible there should be such a trade as even that of a nailer in the remote and inland parts of the Highlands of Scotland. Such a workman at the rate of a thousand nails a day, and three hundred working days in the year, will make three hundred thousand nails in the year. But in such a situation it would be impossible to dispose of one thousand, that is, of one day’s work in the year.

The division of labor, then, can be extended only as the market is increased. Hence every reduction in the extent of the market must inevitably reverse the division of labor and slow down industrial progress. Now, by systematically taking away from the most favorably located industries a part of their market, the prohibitory system compels manufacturers to reduce the scale of their production, and to use less of the division of labor. In cotton manufacturing, for example, it would require the spinners to spin coarse and fine grades at the same time, instead of confining themselves to a few grades or to a single one. Thus production would become more costly and less perfect. It is true, however, that if prohibition contracts the business of the established firms, it gives rise to new ones. But what is the situation of these? Placed, relatively to their rivals, in unfavorable condition of production, they cannot create a market for their products outside of the domestic one. Now, this market is limited. An effort is made, it is true, to remedy its insufficiency by establishing premiums on exports, which will permit the protected industries to compete in the markets of their competitors. But, since this method is extremely costly and manifestly unjust (See, PREMIUMS.) [21] it can be employed only to a limited degree. On the one side, then, the industry situated under favorable natural conditions is injured; and on the other, establishments which prohibition has made to spring up artificially, find themselves so situated that they can not extend their market without imposing the most onerous sacrifices on the nation. Thus the artificial breaking up of the markets, caused by the prohibitory régime, has everywhere retarded the development of the division of labor, slowed the progress of industry, and at the same time perpetuated high prices.

This is not all. High prices are not the only evil which the prohibitory régime has perpetuated, if not engendered. To this evil may be added another not less disastrous one, viz., instability. The industries which prohibition makes spring up under unfavorable economic conditions, are continually exposed to fatal wounds. If the prohibitory duty which permits their existence were to be lowered, or if surveillance on the frontiers is relaxed, they will inevitably be deprived of a part of their trade. They then suffer all the disasters which are produced by industrial crises, and their very existence will be compromised. They resemble those hot-house plants which die as soon as one ceases to supply them with the heating necessary to maintain their artificial existence. The condition of the domestic industries is no longer secure. They have nothing to fear, it is true, for their home market, because they are so situated as to stand up to foreign competition; but the markets they have been able to create abroad are largely precarious. At any moment prohibition may “kidnap” these markets away from them, on which their existence in part depends. [22] Haven’t we recently seen France slap prohibitory duties on the importation of linen thread and fabric and thus inflict a heavy blow on the English and Belgian linen industry? Haven’t we also seen the United States change their tariffs four or five times in less than 20 years back and forth from a more liberal one to a more prohibitive one, and to cause as a result of these sudden reversals of policy a series of crises in the industries engaged in supplying their market? Thus there is a permanent risk which the prohibitory regime imposes on production as a whole, and this risk cannot fail to influence in a disastrous way the development of industry as well as the condition of the workers.

Prohibitory duties on exports are generally less important than others, but their effects are no more salutary. One usually [54] resorts to them in order to prevent or to restrict the export of food products and certain raw materials essential to industry. Let us see how they operate. Two cases may occur: 1st, where the production of the good whose export is interfered with, is limited by nature; 2nd, where it may be indefinitely increased. In the former case, which is rarer, prohibition acts at first simply as a tax levied upon certain producers for the benefit of certain consumers. Suppose, for example, the French government should prohibit the export of wine from the Clos-Vougeot [23] or Château-Lafite. [24] What would be the result? It is not likely that a smaller quantity of these wines would be produced; but the producers, obliged henceforth to offer their whole vintage of these exquisite wines in the home market, would no longer derive as much profit from them. They would suffer for the benefit of a certain class of French consumers. Such would be the immediate effect of the imposition of the prohibitory duty. But the consumers would have to suffer in their turn. With the best wines being taxed for the benefit of home consumers, the production of fine wines would be discouraged. No attempt would be made to improve the inferior wines, in case they should also be taxed. The home consumers would obtain, it is true, the best wines at a lower price; but they would have to give up the advantages they might have received from an improvement in the quality of the inferior wines. The final result of this would be that they would be more poorly provided with fine wines, and would have to pay more for them.

In the second case, the prohibition on exports would be immediately followed by a reduction in the production of the prohibited good. If the latter were, for example, wheat or any other article of food, or silk, flax, or raw hemp, the production of these items would be gradually reduced until it had adjusted to the size of the market. Prices would doubtless fall sharply in the meantime; but it would not be long before they would again rise to a level above what they had been previously. In fact, the reduction in the size of the market would compel producers to restrict their operations; they will no longer be able to take advantage of the same level of the division of labour, nor to use as economically their tools and production methods; and the costs of production, which are the definitive regulators of market prices, will rise as a result. As in the first case, and even more quickly, consumers will become the dupes [25] of a measure originally adopted in order to benefit them But if the purpose of the prohibition is to deprive a rival industry of the material it needs, this selfish measure will result in encouraging the production of a similar good abroad. Thus England, by putting a high export duty on coal, contributed to the development of mining in Belgium.

To sum up, then, high prices on the one hand, and instability on the other, are the inevitable consequences of the prohibitory régime; the high prices arising from the bad conditions of production in which this régime places the industries, and the obstacles it erects to the progress of the division of labor; and the instability resulting from modifications in the tariffs, which continually disrupt the markets.

§ 3. Causes which have led to the establishment of the Protective or Prohibitory Régime.

It must seem astonishing that a system so clearly disastrous to the people, so opposed to progress in wealth and civilization, could have become established. Its origin must be principally attributed to certain circumstances inherent in the condition of barbarism and war in the midst of which it arose. Nations, which had been from their beginning hostile to each other, and almost constantly at war, could not exchange their products in any permanent or regular manner. Each was obliged to provide for itself most of consumption goods. War then acted as an artificial obstacle added to the natural obstacle of distance. [26] When peace followed war, this artificial obstacle disappeared. Unfortunately, its removal was only accidental and temporary: a new war soon arose, and the obstacle reappeared at once. Let us endeavor to obtain a clear idea of the effect which sudden changes of this sort might have on the state of production. Suppose two nations, C and D, the first supplying the second with woolen goods while receiving in exchange silk goods. A war arises, and exchanges are immediately interrupted. The consumers of D can no longer receive the woolen goods which the producers of C had been accustomed to supplying them. The consumers of C are deprived, in their turn, of the silk goods they were getting from D. Meanwhile, the demand continues, on the one side for woollen goods, and on the other for silk. This, then, is what will probably happen. The manufacturers of woolen goods in C, whom the war has deprived of their market, will begin to produce silks, and the manufacturers of silks in D will set about producing woolen goods. Each nation will thus succeed in obtaining as before the war, the goods it needs. To be sure, the conditions will be less favorable. The silks which C will manufacture will probably be dearer and not as good as those which D supplied. The woollen goods which D will make will probably be inferior to those it acquired from C; but, on both sides, it will be found more advantageous to employ the capital and the labor whose market the war has cut off, than to leave them idle; on both sides, also, people will prefer to pay a higher price for the goods they need, than to do without them. The war, as we see, brings about a coerced displacement [27] of certain industries, which is a retrograde step. It ruins the most vigorous branches of production, those which had been able to create an external market, and to replace them with artificial industries which only the interruption of international communication allows them to survive. But peace eventually comes: and the protection which the war gave C in the manufacture of silks, and D in the manufacture of woolen goods, immediately vanishes. It is evident that these war industries [28] [55] must fail, unless an equivalent obstacle replaces that of war, in order to protect them. If the condition of the world is such that the peace can be lasting, it will most assuredly be better to let them fail, and thus permit production to resume its natural place; but if war is the natural condition of communities, if peace intervenes only as a short truce, perhaps it will be preferable to renounce relations whose precarious existence is a constant source of disastrous perturbations. Prohibition will then appear as a veritable insurance premium which is granted to the industries to which war has given rise, and whose maintenance it was made necessary.

Thus, for example, the prohibitory system was considerably extended in Europe and America at the end of the continental war. [29] (See CUSTOMS DUTIES.) [30] During the war the general interruption of communication had led to the establishment of a certain number of industries under bad economic conditions. When the war ceased, the manufacturers loudly demanded that the obstacle of trade prohibition replace that of war, to protect them. Governments hastened to defer to their demands. This was unquestionably a great mistake; for, at a time when peace has become the normal condition of communities, prohibition is no longer anything but a costly anachronism. In this new situation it costs less to suffer the disturbances which a temporary war may cause in international relations, than to pay a heavy war premium for twenty or thirty years to avoid them. However, one can understand how the prohibitory régime should have come to prevail to a certain degree at the end of a war which convulsed the world for a quarter of a century, and made communities take a step backward toward barbarism.

On the other hand, it is more difficult to understand how this war régime could have been extended and made worse, as it was, long after peace had become established. This is connected with certain effects of prohibition, of which it is important to take account.

We have spoken above of a politician who would enact prohibitions or protective duties as “an inventor in reverse.” Let us pursue the comparison, and we shall discover the motives which have contributed to extending and making more burdensome the prohibitory régime in a time of peace. Suppose that an inventor discovers a process which permits a saving of 10 per cent in the cost of production of a certain good: by lowering the price of that article 5 per cent, he will obtain an advantage over his competitors, and make a considerable profit. This profit is the difference between the savings realised in production and the quantity of goods sold whose price has been lowered, and this constitutes the profitable premium of his invention. Now, what takes place when a prohibitory duty is imposed? An artificial deficit is immediately produced in the market, and this deficit brings about an increase in the price. A certain good which was purchased at an average price of twenty cents, for example, can no longer be purchased under thirty cents. This is an artificial increase of one-half, and is caused by the rupture of the link between the foreign producers and the domestic consumers. Suppose the prohibited good could be produced in the country at an average price of twenty-two cents: capital would be invested in that new industry; for it would receive, besides the ordinary profits of other branches of production, an extraordinary premium equal to eight cents. This premium would result from the difference between the price at which the good can be produced in the country, and the artificial price which prohibition has created. It is then obvious that if the profits of invention are based on the lowering of prices, those of prohibition are based in just the same way on the increase in their prices.

But is the extraordinary premium arising from prohibition a lasting one? Must not the profits in the protected industries finally fall to the level of those in other branches of production, as a result of domestic competition? That will depend on the nature of the protected industry. If the industry is one whose essential components are not limited in the country, the premium will have only a temporary character; for new factories will be established with a view of obtaining the premium as long as it shall continue. Domestic competition will then lower prices so much as to destroy the premium. Sometimes even the increase of the protected industry will not stop at its necessary limit, and prices will suddenly fall below the costs of production. The result will be an economic crisis, which will swallow up a good part of the profits from the premium gained from the increased prices. Prices will afterward rise again; but the protected industry will have ceased to realize profits greater than those of other branches of production. Its patent will have expired, [31] to use an apt phrase of Mr. Huskisson. [32] It will be otherwise if the protected industry is not capable of unlimited expansion; if it is, for example, food production in a country where land suitable for growing wheat is scarce, or the production of coal, iron, or lead, in countries where mineral deposits are rare. In such cases, the increased price may be obtained for any length of time. If prohibition has increased the price from twenty to thirty, the supply will be sufficiently small not only to maintain this price, but even to increase it gradually along with the increase of population and public wealth. Then the holders of protected natural monopolies, such as land or mines, will see their profits increase every year; they will continually grow rich without having to take the least amount of trouble.

But, whether the premium which raises prices is lasting or temporary, the attraction of that premium is sufficient, and more than sufficient, to increase the number of prohibitions. What is more tempting, in fact? While money is so difficult to make under the abominable law of competition, here a new process has been discovered the use of which will enable one to grow rich in the blink of an eye. Who would not hasten to use and to abuse so marvelous a process? [56] Who would not run a machine to manufacture premiums [33] until resources ran out? To be sure, these premiums can be obtained only at the cost of the ruin or impoverishment of others; they constitute an obvious form of plunder, real robbery. But does one stop for such minor considerations when a fortune is in question? Besides, is not this plunder legal? [34] Is not this robbery consecrated by the practice of all civilized nations? Is it not universally admitted that one may confiscate, by means of a simple statute, the customers of a foreign industry, and impose on the “protected nation” an extra tax to increase the price of the goods, payable into the hands of those who have profited from these “confiscated customers?” [35]

Meanwhile, some theorists dare to denounce so unjust and disastrous a violation of property rights. [36] They demand free trade by invoking justice and basing it upon the interests of the masses. But there is no embarrassment in replying to these theorists. In the first place, they are accused of propounding a mere theory; [37] and, in the eyes of many people, the accusation is enough to condemn them. Then, a search is made in the old arsenal of popular errors and favorite prejudices, for all sorts of formidable weapons which people use to crush so pernicious a theory. By the same reasoning that caused inventors in former times to be persecuted and derided, the promoters of free trade are treated as dangerous dreamers, while the supporters of the prohibitory régime are considered to be benefactors of humanity.

The list is long of the sophisms [38] which have been employed to disguise the true motives for the raising of custom barriers since the establishment of the general peace (after 1815). Often, it is true, these sophisms were employed in good faith by people who thought that, by enriching themselves by means of the international plunder known as trade prohibition, they were contributing to the greatness and prosperity of their homeland. Almost always too, ignorance of sound economic notions has been so general that the act of profiting by premiums, which raised prices while establishing an industry contrary to nature, was considered, even by the victims of prohibition, as a work of patriotic devotion. We do not intend to take up all the sophisms which have been forged to justify prohibition and glorify the prohibitionists. This would be an endless task. We shall confine ourselves to a review of those most frequently employed.

§ IV. Review of the Sophisms of Protectionists.

1.) That a nation should not allow itself to become dependent on foreign countries, especially for goods of prime necessity.

This argument was the most important of those which were brought forward by English prohibitionists against the free traders [39] who advocated the repeal of the corn laws. “Is is not,” they said, “renouncing our political independence, to put ourselves under the obligation of resorting to foreigners for our food? Would not a nation whose enemies cut off food supplies be obliged to surrender at their mercy?” What could be more irrational than such a concern? When two nations trade with each other, is not the dependence which results from this mutual? If England depends today on Russia, France, and the United States for its food supply, do not these three countries in their turn depend upon England for their supplies of iron, coal, cotton goods, woollen fabrics, etc.? Besides, even granting that England should fall out with most of the nations which supply her with wheat, could she not, for a small increase in price, make up the shortfall from other nations? Did not the gigantic folly of the continental blockade demonstrate the impossibility of commercially isolating a powerful nation? And as for a small nation, do not the commercial relations which such a nation establishes abroad furnish it with new guarantees of independence, by linking its cause to all the interests which it has been able to join together to its own through trade?

One of the most brilliant orators of the anti-corn law league in England, Mr. W. J. Fox, [40] shows up with marvelous skill the outdated character of the argument for independence of foreigners, in the following celebrated passage: [41]

To be independent of foreigners is a favorite theme of the aristocracy. But who then is this great lord, this advocate of national independence, this enemy of all reliance on foreigners? Let us look at his life. A French cook prepares dinner for the master, and a Swiss valet dresses the master for dinner. Milady who takes his hand is utterly resplendent in pearls, which you never in find in English oysters, while the feather which flutters from her head never comes from the tail of an English turkey. The meats on his table come from Belgium and his wines from the Rhine or the Rhône. He rests his eyes on flowers from South America and he gratifies his sense of smell with the smoke from a leaf which comes from North America. His favorite horse is of Arab origin, and his dog [p. 188] is a St Bernard. His art gallery abounds in Flemish paintings and Greek statues. Does he want entertainment? He goes to listen to Italian singers performing German music, the whole thing rounded off with a French ballet. Does he rise to distinction as a judge? The ermine which adorns his shoulders had never until then been seen on the back of any British animal. His mind itself is a multicolored weave of exotic elements. His philosophy and poetry come from Greece and Rome, his geometry from Alexandria, his arithmetic from the Arabs, and his religion from Palestine. In his cot he pressed his baby teeth on a teething ring of coral from the Indian Ocean. When he dies, Carrara marble will crown his tomb…and this is the man who says ‘Let us be independent of the foreigner.’

Isn’t this refutation as definitive as it is filled with witty barbs? Lets us only add that England, by making itself dependent for its food on Russia, on France, and [57] on the United States, its “natural enemies”, has dramatically weakened the significance of the sophism of “being independent of foreigners.” [42] (See “Balance of Commerce.”) [43]

2). That a nation should avoid increasing its purchases from foreign countries, in order to prevent an exhaustion of its stock of money.

Here we see the old sophism of the balance of trade. This sophism, formerly on every one’s lips, is now much less employed, English prohibitionists, in particular, seem to be ashamed of using it. That an argument, formerly so general, should have become thus discredited, is due to several causes: in the first place, to the war to the death the economists have waged against the doctrine of the balance of trade; then, to the decrease in the relative importance of the import and export of money in transactions between people of different nations; finally, to experience, which successively demonstrated that the removal of custom barriers between the different provinces of France, between England and Ireland, and between the states of the Zollverein, [44] was followed by none of the monetary disasters predicted by the advocates of the mercantilist system. However, the prejudice has not disappeared; and as long as the laws of the circulation of monetary are not commonly understood, it will be possible to stir up the masses against free trade, by alarming them with the phantom of an exhaustion of the supply of money. (See BALANCE OF TRADE.) [45]

3.) That it is necessary to compensate domestic industry for the taxes imposed on them by protectionist duties.

If the English prohibitionists made little use of the sophism about the exhaustion of money, they made, on the other hand, abundant use of that on compensatory duties. “The English farmers,” they said, “bear taxes more numerous and more severe than those of Russian farmers. Is it not just to make compensation for the difference, by a protective duty? Is it not just to equalize the conditions of domestic production with those of foreign production?” [46] Now, in the first place, do these differences in the data concerning taxes always signify what they seem to signify? It was certainly true that the English farmers did pay more taxes than their Russian competitors. But did they not also enjoy better security and more freedom? Were they not better protected against plunder and arbitrary government? and was not this greater liberty and security worth much more than the higher taxes they had to pay? In the second place, can protection really compensate for the burdens which excessive taxation imposes on a country’s production? To protect domestic agriculture, under the pretext that it is more encumbered by taxes than its rivals, will doubtless provide compensation to farmers, by allowing them to increase the price of their products. But upon whom will fall the burden from which you have relieved them? Upon all the other branches of production, which will pay more dearly for their raw materials and food for their workers. What is gained on one side is lost on another. Unless a way can be found by which a tax which enters the treasury can be paid by nobody, compensatory duties can not relieve the tax burden on production. Now, if they can neither destroy nor reduce the evil which is necessarily connected with the existence of every tax, of what use is it to displace this evil? [47] Wouldn’t it be more worthwhile to displace (or move) the tax itself, if necessary, rather than to displace the effects of the tax by this convoluted and surreptitious procedure?

4.) That “domestic labor” must be protected, to prevent the number of those employed in production falling in number as a result of foreign competition, and thus to guarantee the standard of living of the workers.

This sophism is worthy of notice, because it gives prohibition the attractive appearance of philanthropy. If landholders and manufacturers loudly demand prohibitory legislation, it is not to make extraordinary profits at the expense of their rivals; O no! it is only to insure work and good wages for domestic workers; it is to keep the working classes from the sad results of unlimited competition, etc., etc. But if such were the only aim of the prohibitionists, would they confine themselves to slapping bans on products from abroad? Would they not prohibit, above all, the importation of foreign workers who come to compete with domestic workers? Do we, however, observe that they abstain from employing foreign workmen, even at the times when they most energetically plead the necessity of protecting “domestic labor”? No: they have no scruples of this kind. [48] Isn’t the contradiction between their argument and their conduct striking? (See EMIGRATION.) [49] Now, is it true that the prohibitionist system increases the number of productive jobs in domestic industry? Let us see. We have observed that prohibitions have just the opposite effect on prices from that produced by new machines; that by inducing certain industries to set themselves up in bad economic conditions, and by impeding progress in the division of labor, they bring about an increase of prices, while new machines cause lower prices. Now, do machines have the result of decreasing the number of productive jobs? Does not experience, on the contrary, attest that the end result has been to increase it, by the general increase of consumption? Are there not to-day, for instance, more productive jobs in the cotton industry, than there were before the steam engine and the mule jenny had transformed that industry? A man who proposed breaking the spinning machines and the looms, and replacing them with hand-workers, in order to increase the number of jobs, wouldn’t he rightly qualify as being mad? But if new machines result in the end in increasing in the number of productive jobs, must not prohibition result in reducing the number? If we took at the interests of the working classes, in what respect are the errors of the prohibitionists better than those of the destroyers of machines?

By making all costs greater, the prohibitory system diminishes consumption, and consequently production, and the number of productive jobs. This is how it protects domestic labor. But does it not, at least, tend to give it more stability? Does it not afford security to the worker against industrial crises, as the prohibitionists affirm? However, isn’t it the very opposite of this assertion that we should adopt? Haven’t we already noted that the prohibitory system, by putting industry at the mercy of the changing opinions of legislators, has created permanent instability in all branches of production? Haven’t we noted that any change to tariffs inevitably causes a crisis in the industrial sector? Isn’t it to the constant disturbances in the markets that the prohibitory system has brought about that we have to credit so many of the dreadful crises which have harmed the lives of workers The history of modern industry gives us some sad lessons on this subject. One may read on its every page of the cruel evils which this system for “protecting domestic labor” has brought upon the laboring classes. (See PAUPERISM.) [50]

5.) That nationality should be made the basis of the trading system.

This argument was the basis of Dr. List’s national system of political economy. [51] But in studying the history of the formation of states, and examining the elements which constitute them, one readily perceives that nationality cannot serve as a basis for a trading system. States have been formed, for the most part, by conquest, and enlarged either by royal alliances, by wars, or by diplomacy. No economic consideration has controlled their formation. When the map of Europe was made over at the congress of Vienna (1814-15), for example, did any one consult the interests of the industries and the commerce of the peoples whose nationality they were changing? Did any one ask whether the situation of the Rhine provinces and of the other countries which were then separated from the French empire, made that separation advantageous or injurious to the countries concerned? [52] Were serious studies made of the situation of industry and commerce in Holland and Belgium before uniting these two countries? No: the question was not even mooted. Political considerations and diplomatic intrigues alone decided the new configuration of the states. Why should an attempt he made to establish a national trading system based upon so-called economic necessity, in states whose formation was controlled by no economic views, states of which the hazards of war and of alliances alone decided the boundaries? Is it not the height of absurdity to transform these frontiers, which chance events have alone determined, and which it may enlarge or contract tomorrow, into formal boundaries which limit trade? Is not an economic system which is founded on a political basis and which is politically modifiable, a monstrosity to which good sense objects?

6.) If the protective system did not exist, it would perhaps be well not to invent it; but to attempt to destroy it today would be to pronounce a death sentence on a multitude of industries, to bring about ruinous displacements of capital and of labor, etc., etc.

We have pointed out above the striking analogy between the introduction of a new machine and the removal of a trade prohibition. The result of each is to replace a cheap market with a high-priced one, and abundance with shortages. But all progress, from whatever source, is accompanied by some disturbance, by some economic crisis. All progress displaces capital and lives. Must we renounce permanent progress, to avoid this temporary disturbance? Must we give up new machines, new methods, and new ideas, under the pretense that they upset the old machines, the old methods, and the old ideas? Shall we immobilize humanity, to prevent some displacement of lives? Let us hear Dr. Bowring [53] on this subject, in his speech at the congress of economists, at Bruxelles, in 1847, [54] where he admirably refuted this objection with its paralyzing consequences: [55]

“The displacement of capital,” he said, “the displacement of capital! Why, it is a sign of progress. Has not the plow displaced [59] the spade? What became of the copyists after the invention of printing? … We formerly had thousands of little boats on the Thames: what has become of them, now that the Thames is furrowed by hundreds of steamboats? But are not the interests of the worker himself served by a so rapid and economical means of transportation? The first time I ever went to London I had to pay four shillings to go from one part of the city to the other: today I make the same trip for six pence; and if you ask how this has been brought about, I answer: by the displacement of labor and capital. This displacement may be found everywhere. I was born in a town which figures in the commercial history of my country. I have seen there, at Exeter, an entire industry, the woolen industry, abandoned. I have seen, in the port of that city, ships from all countries, and have heard my ancestors speak of their relations with the most distant lands. But as soon as steam was introduced into the factories, fuel being dear in that part of the country, the industry relocated to where it was cheap. Well, capital was displaced; but the population has nevertheless increased. When I left Exeter the population was 25,000 inhabitants; now it is 40,000. The workers have taken up other employments.

But what has displaced labor? What has displaced capital? What has displaced industries? What has put them on a false basis? What has built them upon sand? The prohibition of trade. What we ask for, is to be able to found industry upon a rock from which no violent infringement could dislodge it?”

But would the displacements that could occur by replacing the old way of trade prohibition with the new way of free trade, take place on the scale as has been attributed to them? Would the introduction of free trade become the signal for the ruin of a multitude of industries? Would one see entire countries deserted for others, as the prohibition pessimists affirm? Observation and experience agree in contradicting these gloomy predictions. The London exposition (of 1851) [56] convinced the most prejudiced minds that the great industries of the various countries of Europe had reached a nearly equal level of progress, and that no nation possessed a decidedly marked superiority over their rivals. [57]

“The crystal palace,” says Michel Chevalier, in his interesting letters on the London exposition, “is a good place to prove this similarity, this fraternity, this equality of the industries of the principal nations of western civilization. It is manifest there, it forces itself upon our attention. When I go from the English department to the French, then to that occupied by the Zollverein, or to the Swiss, or the Belgian, or the Dutch, I find goods of nearly equal merit, which show evidence of nearly the same skill and experience, and at nearly the same prices. This is more especially manifest in regard to England and France, especially if we take the trouble to complete our exhibit at London by recalling the goods we had in Marigny Square in 1849, of which the aggrieved producers refused to send samples to London. In thus speaking of equality, I do not mean that the products of the principal nations are identical, on the contrary, they are diverse, they have their peculiar stamp. They reveal special industrial skills, a distinct originality, but they manifest a nearly equal level of progress. If one is surpassed in one kind of goods, it is first in another, perhaps similar and equally difficult: and we can not doubt, that, with a little incentive, each nation could equal the one which excels it in any particular product. If raw materials were equally cheap everywhere (and they would be if the legislators of certain countries would abolish the wholly artificial causes of high prices which they have agreed to multiply), the cost of production for manufactured goods would be nearly the same, and these diverse countries would be nearly equal to each other with respect to having cheap markets.”

In a recent polemic brought on by the celebrated speech by M. Thiers on the commercial régime of France [58] a distinguished industrialist from Mulhouse, M. Jean Dolfus has corroborated the statements of Chevalier. According to M. Dolfus the prohibitory régime had the unique effect of preventing the coton industry from adopting the progress achieved by its rivals. It acts purely and simply as a cause of our backwardness. [59]

“We do not,” he says, “keep pace with England in industrial progress. A dozen years ago they began to replace the old hand spinning machines with ones which can spin without the help of a worker; today, for certain types of thread, no other machines exist. All have been obliged to follow this progress. With us, on the contrary, people still make money while using very antiquated machines; and the sum appropriated to compensate for the annual depreciation, at least in the spinning of cotton, is scarcely necessary, for it is not generally employed to improve the machines.

Why have not the improvements adopted in England become necessary in France? Because everyone stays with the old way, and continues to make spun goods that could be manufactured at much less expense, by a little additional outlay. My firm has a spinning mill of [60] 25,000 spindles, 20,000 of which are for calico: it could, by replacing its looms, a part of which are nearly forty years old, spin a kilogramme for twenty centimes cheaper than it does today: but domestic competition is not sufficient to compel them to do it. Is not this conclusive? Who pays the twenty centimes? The consumer, the country. The Committee for the Protection of National Labor [60] did not think it best to change our looms, because many spinners might thus be thrown out of employment. But can we with impunity resist progress in this way? On this principle we should return to the spinning wheel, and regret all the mechanical progress made in the last fifty years. If spinning can be done more economically, consumption will increase; more cotton goods will be sold, more machines will be constructed, and more labor will be needed.”

Thus, in the view of manufacturers themselves, the prohibitory régime holds back production. Let this régime be abolished, and every industry which is located under favourable natural conditions will inevitably expand considerably. It will doubtless then be necessary to exercise more intelligence, activity, and energy, in order to preserve and increase one’s trade; for free trade is not such an easy ride as prohibition. Every industry would be at once obliged to employ every new improvement to keep up with its rivals. But would not humanity as a whole profit by the great boost production would have received? Wouldn’t people be more abundantly provided with all things, and wouldn’t their minds, forced to be more alert out of necessity, thus become more receptive to all kinds of enlightenment?

Necessity is a powerful incentive to progress, and the chief result of free trade will be to make progress more and more necessary. Look for example at British agriculture. How many times have the prohibitionists predicted that it could not survive the competition of the United States, Poland, and Russia! How many times have they depicted its fields as devastated, its laborers ruined and dispersed by the storm of free trade, and old England, deprived of this main-stay of her power, disappearing from the list of nations! Well, the corn laws have been abolished, [61] free trade is enthroned, and what has become of British agriculture? Has it sunk in the storm? Has its capital been destroyed, and its fields submerged by the “deluge of foreign grain?” Have land proprietors and farmers carried into effect their threat to emigrate to America, abandoning their fields to the thorn and the briar? No. Scarcely had the corn laws been repealed, when the agriculturists, redoubling their efforts, made improvement the order of the day in every direction. The old tools and the old methods were abandoned; and agriculture, so long given over to routine, assumed a rank among the most progressive industries. Thus transformed under the strong pressure of foreign competition, it now makes light of the efforts of its rivals, and the agriculturalists shrug their shoulders contemptuously at the phantom which formerly terrified them. [62]

“Although the abundance and low price of food had weighed heavily on British agriculture for some time,” wrote recently a skilled British agriculturalist, M. Mechi, “competition has so driven improvements that I think that we will end up beating the world in wheat as well as in calico cloth.”

And this was an industry which was to be inevitably ruined by free trade!

Observing, then, as Chevalier and Blanqui [63] did at the universal exposition in London, the condition of the industries of the civilized world, and investigating carefully the results already obtained by tariff reforms, one becomes convinced that the ruinous displacement of production, the destruction of protected industries, and so many other calamities, which, according to the prohibitionists, were inevitably to accompany the coming of free trade, were true phantoms. One also becomes convinced, that the adoption of the “new way” would strengthen and develop industries everywhere, instead of jeopardizing and ruining them.

Here we bring to an end our review of the sophisms of the prohibitionists, although the subject is far from exhausted. But these unsound arguments have been refuted by all the economists in succession since Adam Smith and Turgot. A refutation which is full of impish and witty eloquence can be found in Bastiat’s Economic Sophisms, to which we refer our readers. [64]

III. Conclusion.Free trade is a factor in the appearance of both cheap markets and economic order.

Free trade appears to be at the same time an ingredient for low prices and for order. Once it becomes established, and once industry has access to an unlimited market, it will undergo all the development of which it is capable. At the same time, it will achieve the maximum amount of stability by no longer being built on a foundation of sand but of solid rock (according to the colourful expression of Dr. Bowring). After the high costs and instability which are inherent in the artificial regime of prohibition will come the low costs and stability which are the natural consequences of a return to the order established by Providence. Now, is it idealistic to expect such beneficial progress? Isn’t free trade an economic ideal which we are forbidden to ever reach? Isn’t it a pure utopian vision, a humanitarian dream as the defenders of prohibition claim? But just look at the signs of the time and then draw your own conclusion. Is not one of the most [61] absorbing interests of our time, the steady improvement of the means of communication? Are not all civilized nations multiplying across their territory canals, railroads, and electric telegraphs at every opportunity? Are not steam and electricity more and more cutting away the natural obstacle of distance? Now, what is the economic result of this marvellous progress which today is the object of emulation across the world? Isn’t it to expand the extent of trade more and more? Aren’t railroads, steam ships, electric telegraphs nothing more than powerful tools which cut away and devour distance to the benefit of trade between city and city, and nation and nation. But, my goodness! While nations are making gigantic sacrifices to multiply the tools which facilitate trade, on the other hand they continue to maintain the prohibitory system which prevents it! With one hand they stimulate the development of trade and hinder it with the other! Such a flagrant contradiction must grab everyone’s attention in the end! Either one gives up steam power and the electric telegraph, or one gives up the prohibitory system, because the simultaneous existence of these forces for civilization and this relic of barbarism is much too absurd a nonsense.

But there is little likelihood that steam locomotion and the electric telegraph will be abandoned. On the contrary, everywhere the prohibitory régime has been under attack. Governments have finally understood that prohibitory duties brought them nothing, and that they could make an excellent deal by replacing them with fiscal duties. Sir Robert Peel took this position as the starting point of his financial policy, and the budget of Great Britain, whose accounts showed a constant deficit before Peel’s reforms, afterward presented a regular surplus revenue. [65] The same reform introduced in the United States produced similar results. [66] Financial necessity thus combines with economic necessity and the progressive tendencies of our age, to breach the walls of the prohibitory régime. Prohibitions may be compared to the chains which were used in the middle ages in difficult times to bar the streets. In our day they are a relic of a system of defense which the progress of civilization has rendered useless and outmoded. Thus, the frontiers will cease to be barred, as the streets have ceased to be barred: and, with apologies to the utopians of old who placed their ideal society in the past, liberty will at last become the universal law which governs human transactions.

Endnotes to Free Trade

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Essai sur le commerce (voyez chap. X et XI), par Melon. Paris, 1734, 1736, 1742, 1761. Reproduit dans le 1er vol. de la Collection des Princ. Écon.

Le commerce et le gouvernement, par Condillac. Dernière édit., Paris, Guillaumin, t. XIV de la Collect. des Princ. Écon. (Voyez Condillac.)

*New and old principles of trade compared; or a treatise on the principles of commerce between nations. — (Les nouveaux et les anciens principes du commerce comparés, etc.). Londres, 1764. « Les anciens principes sont ceux du système mercantile et restrictif, les nouveaux ceux de Quesnay et d'Adam Smith. » (M. C.)

Lezioni di commercio, etc. — (Cours de commerce), par l'abbé Antoine Genovesi. Naples, -1764, 2 vol. in-8.

Der geschlossene Handelstaat. — [L'Etat fermé commercialement), par J.-G. Fichte. Tübingue, 1800, in-8. (Voyez Fichte.)

Opinion de M. Begouen, député de la Seine-Inférieure à l'assemblée nationale, sur le tarif de la prohibition des marchandises étrangères. Imprimé par ordre de l'assemblée nationale. Décembre, 1790, in-8 11 pages.

Il colbertismo, ossia della libertà di commercio de' prodotti della terra. — (Du colbertisme, ou de la liberté du commerce des produits du sol), par Fr. Mengotti. Milan, 1802, 2 vol. Couronné en 1791 par l'Académie des géorgophiles de Florence.

Examen des principes les plus favorables aux progrès de l'agriculture, des manufactures et du commerce de la France, par L.-D. B. Paris, 1815, 2 vol. in-8.

Essai sur les entraves que le commerce éprouve en Europe, par de Tollenare. Paris, 1820, 4 vol. in-8.

Gewerbe- und Handelsfreiheit. — (Liberté de l'industrie et du commerce), par L.-G. Leuchs. Tübingue, 1827, 1 vol. in-8.

Enquête sur les fers. Commission formée avec l'approbation du roi, sous la présidence du ministre du commerce et des manufactures, pour l'examen de certaines questions de législation commerciale. Paris, Imprimerie royale, 1828, petit in-4. (Voy. l'art. Enquêtes.)

Questions commerciales, par Rodet. Paris, 1828,1 vol. in-8.

Du commerce maritime, considéré sous le rapport de la liberté entière du commerce et sous le rapport des colonies, par le comte de Vaublanc. Paris, 1828, 1 vol. in-8.

Du commerce, des douanes et du système des prohibitions, considéré dans ses rapports avec les intérêts respectifs des nations, par Billiet. Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie de Lyon en 1827. Paris, Renard (Guillaumin), 1828, 1 vol. in-8.

[62]

De l’enquète commerciale, par M. Ferrier. Paris, Pélicier et Chatel, 1829, br. in-8 de 72 pages.

Réponse de M. le comte de Polignac à la lettre de MM. Girod (de l'Ain) et vicomte Perrault de Jotemps ... sur la nécessité de la prohibition des laines étrangères. Paris Ve Huzard, 1828, in-4 de 110 pages.

Report of the committee of the house of représentatives on commerce and navigation. — (Rapport de M. Cambreleng sur le commerce et la navigation, adressé à la chambre des représentants). New-York, 1830, in-8. « Exposition d'une évidence frappante de l'influence fâcheuse du système restrictif. » (M. C.)

Mémorial of the committee appointed by « the free-trade convention » held at Philadelphia in september and october 1831.— (Mémoire du comité nommé pur ta convention du libre-échange réunie à Philadelphie.) New-York, 1832, in-8.

Intérêts de l'agriculture, de l'industrie et du commerce français, par M. de Cazaux. Paris, Mme Huzard, 1833, br. in-8.

On commerce, ils principles and history. — (Le commerce, ses principes et son histoire), par M. J.-R. Mac Culloch. Londres, 1833, in-8.

Der Staat und die Industrie. — (L*’État et l'industrie*), par Bülau, professeur à Leipzig. Leipzig, 1834. En faveur du libre-échange.

Contre-enquête par l'homme aux quarante écus, contenant un examen des arguments et des principes mis en avant dans l'enquête commerciale. Paris, Charpentier, 1834, broch. in-8 de 24 pages.

Enquête relative à diverses prohibitions établies à l'entrée des produits étrangers. Paris, imprimerie royale, 3 vol. in-4. (Voy, l'ant. Enquêtes.)

De la liberté commerciale, du crédit et des banques, avec projet d'une banque générale du crédit et de l'industrie, par Gastaldi. Turin, 1840,1 vol. in-8.

Das nationale system der politischen Economie. — (Le système national de l'Economie politique, t. 1, te commerce international, etc.), par Frédéric List. 1e édit., Tübingue, 1841. Traduit de l'allemand, par H. Richelot. Paris, Capelle, 1851,1 fort vol. in-8. Presque entièrement consacré à la question douanière, réfuté dans l'ouvrage suivant:

List’s national-System der polit. Œconomie kritisch beleuchtet. — Critique du système national, etc., de List), par Ch.-U. Brüggemann. Berlin, 1842, 1 vol. in-8. (Voyez List.)

Influencia del systema prohibitivo en la agricultura, industria, comercio y rentas publicas. — (Influence du système prohibitif sur l'agriculture, l'industrie, le commerce et les revenus publics), par D. Manuel Marliani. Madrid, 1842,1 vol. in-8.

Die Nothwendigkeit der Handelsfreiheit für das National-Einkommen mathematisch bewesen. — (La nécessité de la liberté commerciale pour les revenus de l'Etat, prouvée mathématiquement), par Hagen, professeur à Kœniigsbeig. 1844.

Die Bedeutung der Industrie und die Nothwendigkeit von Schutzmassregeln. — (De l'importance de l'industrie, et de la nécessité de la protection), par le Dr. Glaser, professeur à Berlin. Berlin, 1845.

Der deutsche Zollverein und das Schutz-System. — (L'association douanière allemande et le système protecteur, etc.), par Ch.-H. Brüggemann. Berlin, 1845, forte br. in-8. En faveur de la liberté commerciale.

Le Libre-Echange, journal de l'association pour la liberté des échanges, rédige par MM. Anisson-Dupéron, Fréd. Bastiat, Blanqui, Gustave Brunet, Campau, Michel Chevalier, Ch. Coquelin, Dunoyer, Léon Faucher, Alcide Fonteyraud, Joseph Garnier, Louis Leclorc, de Molinari, Paillottet, Horace Say, Wolowski. 1 vol. in-fol. à 3 colonnes, 1846-47.

Trois discours en faveur de la liberté du commerce, par M. d'Harcourt, ancien pair de France. Paris, Guillaumin et comp., 1846, br. in-8.

Du système prohibitif, par H. Fonfrède. Bordeaux, 1846, hr. in-8. (Voyez Fonfréde.)

Sir Robert Peel et la liberté commerciale , par E. Gout-Desmartres. Bordeaux, Chaumas, 1846, in-8 de 38 pages.

Défense du travail national, ou nécessité de la protection commerciale démontrée à l'aide des principes, des faits et des calculs, par Jules Lebaslier. Paris, Capelle, 1846, in-12.

La liberté des échanges et les droits protecteurs, par M. Lebaillif fils, filateur de coton. Falaise, Levasseur, 1846, in-8 de 20 pages.

De la liberté commerciale et d'autres réformes urgentes, par Georges Clermont. Liège, Desoer, 1846, in-8 de 91 pages.

Coup d'œil sur le tarif des douanes belges à propos du libre-échange, par un négociant de Bruxelles. Bruxelles, Perichon, 1846, in-8 de 30 pages.

Quid faciamus nos? Deutschland, England und der freie Handel. — (Que ferons-nous? Allemagne, Angleterre et libre-échange), par C.-W. Aslier, Berlin, Besser, 1846, in-8 de 38 pages.

Sophismes économiques, par Fr. Bastiat. Paris, Guillauinin et comp., 1re édit, de la 1e série, 1845, 1 vol. in-16; id. de la 2e série, 1847,1 vol. in-16. (Voy. Bastiat.)

Les douanes et l'industrie en 1848 : dangers et nécessités, moyens; par M. le baron Rœderer, pair de France. Paris, F. Didot, 1847, br. in-8, 82 pages.

Économie pratique des nations, ou système économique applicable aux différentes contrées, et spécialement à la France, par le Dr. Thém. Lestiboudois. Paris, Colas, 1847, 1 vol. in-8. (Voyez Lestiboudois.) En faveur de la protection.

De la liberté du commerce et de la protection de l'industrie, lettres échangées entre MM. Blanqui et Emile de Girardin en 1846 et 1847. Paris, br. in-8.

Économistes et industriels, ou résumé de la question du libre-échange, par Henri Dotin. Beauvais, Moisand, 1847, br. in-8.

Association pour la défense du travail national. Mémoire présenté aux chambres sur le projet de loi de douanes. Paris, Guiraudet, 1847, in-4.

Questions du libre-échange mises à la portée de toutes les intelligences, par J.-B. Avril Nevers, Fay, 1847, br. petit in-4 de 100 pages.

La comédie du libre-échange, dialogue sur la liberté commerciale, par Ch. Morlot. Le Havre, Brindeau, 1847, br. in-4.

Du libre-échange et du résultat que l'adoption de ce système aurait pour l'agriculture, le commerce, l'industrie et la marine de la France, par Hantule. Paris, Joubert, 1847, 1 vol. in-8.

Libre-échange et protection, par M. G. Goldenberg. Paris, F. Didot, 1847, in-4.

Association pour la défense du travail national. Examen des théories du libre-échange et du résultat du système protecteur. Paris, Guyot, 1847, in-4.

De la protection et du libre-échange, par Ducrocq. Beauvais, Desjardins, 1847, br. in-8 de 43 pages.

Discours prononcés dans le congrès des Economistes réuni à Bruxelles. Paris, Guillaumin, 1847, 1 vol. gr. in-8.

Études d'Économie politique et de statistique, par M. L. Wolowski. Paris, Guillaumin, 1848, 1 vol. in-8. En partie consacré au commerce des grains, à l'union douanière, à la liberté commerciale.

Second appel au gouvernement et aux chambres sur notre marine marchande, par M. Fonmartin de Lespinasse. Paris, Guillaumin, 1847, br. in-8 de 92 pages.

Principes de législation commerciale et financière, par Mac Gregor; traduit de l'anglais par M. Gustave Brunet. Bordeaux, Chaumas, 1847, in-8 de 30 pages.

Un épicier à M. de Brouckère, à propos du libre-échange. Bruxelles, 1847, Decq, grand in-18.

[63]

Ce qu'il adviendrait de l'agriculture avec le libre-échange, à l'occasion du congrès central d'agriculture de 1847, par M. Huzard. 1847, in-8 de 24 pages.

Abolition du système prohibitif des douanes, grande extension du commerce extérieur, ou entretiens sur le commerce extérieur se rattachant au régime protecteur des douanes, etc., etc., par Jouyne. Paris, Guillaumin et comp., 1848, 1 vol. in-8.

De la liberté du commerce, par M. l'abbé Gainet, curé de Cormontreuil. Reims, Reignier, 1849, in-4 de 20 pages.

Discours de M. Thiers sur le régime commercial de la France, prononcé à l'assemblée nationale les 27 et 28 juin 1851. Paris, Paulin et Lheureux, 1851, in-8 de 144pages. Prononcé à l'occasion d'une proposition de M. Sainte-Beuve à l'assemblée législative. Réfuté par le suivant :

Examen du système commercial connu sous le nom de système protecteur, par M. Michel Chevalier, membre de l'Institut. Paris, Guillaumin et comp., 1852, 1e et 2e édit., 1 vol. in-8.

Études sur les deux systèmes opposés du libre-échange et de la protection, par Ant.-Marie Rœderer. Paris, Guillaumin et comp., 1851, 1 vol. iii-8.

Réponse de M. Rœderer à l'article que M. de Molinari a fait insérer dans le Journal des Economistes du 15 septembre 1851, portant réfutation de quelques passages de l'ouvrage ci-dessus. Paris, les mêmes, 1851, br. in-8.

See the response by M. de Molinari in the Journal des Économistes, vol. XXII, p. 159.

With very few exceptions, all general treatises on Political Economy devote one or more chapters to commercial freedom. Supporters of the mercantile system or the balance of trade theory are against it; the physiocrats and the disciples of Adam Smith and J.-B. Say advocate for free trade. See especially Rossi, Volume II, Lessons XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV.

This question is also addressed in a great number of writings related to specific subjects such as iron, steel, sugar, wool, etc.; in publications from chambers of commerce, among which the reports from the Chamber of Bordeaux deserve special mention, followed by those from the chambers of Marseille, Rouen, Le Havre, Lille, etc.; in the publications of associations for free trade, various committees of producers, protectionist associations, and the Industrial Society of Mulhouse. See in particular, in the Journal des Économistes, vol. XVI, p. 81, the Response of the Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce to the circular sent by the Protectionist Committee of Paris in the name of the country's maritime interests; and vol. XXXII, p. 148, a Report by M. Jean Zuber fils to the Industrial Society of Mulhouse on the progress of the wallpaper industry, along with his opinion on prohibition and protection.

The theoretical and practical issue of free trade and protection has often been discussed in the Journal des Économistes. See the triennial analytical tables, vol. IX, p. 405; vol. XVIII, p. 421; vol. XXVII, p. 413. Several articles have been published in the Annuaire de l'Économie politique et de la statistique: — German Customs Union, by M. de La Nourais; — On National Labor, by M. J. Garnier (1845); — On the League in England, by A. Fonteyraud (1846); — French Association for Free Trade, by C. L. (J. Garnier); — Protection, or the Three Aldermen, by Fr. Bastiat; — Analysis of the French Customs Tariff (including tariff confusion, prohibitions, prohibitive duties, export duties, subsidies and drawbacks, smuggling, fraud, and seizures), by M. J. Garnier (1847); — The Mayor of Énios, by M. Bastiat; — On the Union of Italian Customs, by M. Léon Faucher (1848).

Numerous parliamentary debates have taken place regarding trade freedom and protection in connection with tariff revisions, particularly in England, France, and the United States:

• In England, during the 1786 trade treaty negotiations, later with the reductions obtained by Huskisson (see Huskisson), and in 1846, during the major reform by Robert Peel (see the articles on the League and Robert Peel);
• In France, under the first Constituent Assembly, at the beginning of the Restoration when tariffs were increased, on various occasions under the July Monarchy, particularly in 1834 (when M. Thiers, then Minister of Commerce, proposed several tariff reductions and gave a relatively liberal speech on the matter); and in 1851, during the proposal by M. Sainte-Beuve;
• In the United States, during tariff revisions and in 1846, in connection with the reforms advocated by President Polk and M. Walker, Secretary of the Treasury (see two messages from President Polk in theJournal des Économistes, vol. XIX and XXII; a report by M. Walker on finance, vol. XXIII; and a letter from Walker to the Society of Political Economy, vol. XXXII, p. 409).

⠀See also the bibliography of articles under: Commerce, Customs, Huskisson, League, Free Trade (associations for), Customs Unions.

[1] Molinari deals with free trade in S7. He also wrote a two volume history of tariffs in 1847 and the key entries for the DEP on "Céréales" (Grain), T. 1, pp. 301-26; "Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la)" (Free Trade Associations), T. 2, p. 45-49; "Tarifs de douane" (Tariffs), T. 2, pp. 712-16; "Union douanière" (Customs Union), vol. 2, p. 788-89. He would go on to write two more collections of "conversations" about free trade in 1855 and 1885.

[2] New Holland was the name given to the continent of Australia by the first European explorers, such as the Dutch explorer Abel Tasman in 1644. After the establishment of the British colony in Sydney in 1788 the eastern part of the continent was called New South Wales and the western part retained the name of New Holland. This name remained in popular usage until the 1850s even though the western colony of Swan River (Perth) (founded in 1828) had been renamed "Western Australia" in 1832.

[3] Molinari has inserted a cross reference to another article in the DEP: Charles Coquelin, "Échange," DEP, vol. 1, pp. 637-40.

[4] Horace Say, "Division du travail," DEP, vol. 1, pp. 567-69.

[5] Molinari sometimes uses the terms protectionism (and protectionist) and prohibition (and prohibitory) interchangeably, but there was a significant difference between the two. Under "prohibition" goods from another country were banned entry to the home market; under "protectionism" foreign goods would be allowed in but only after tariffs (i.e. taxes) had been paid at the point of entry.

[6] A castellany was a medieval district which was administered by a castellan. The term originated from the Latin for castle "castellum" and the castellan was the appointed administrator of the feudal domain around the castle.

[7] Horace Say, "Douane," DEP, vol. 1, pp. 578-604.

[8] A reference to the tax and tariff reforms introduced by Colbert, the Minister of Finance under King Louis XIV, in 1664.

[9] Tariffs were completely reorganized by a law of August 1791 which abolished most prohibitions on imported material, abolished tariffs on primary products used by French manufacturers and food stuffs for consumers, and reduced tariffs on manufactured goods gradually down to 20-25% by value of the goods imported. See "Tariff Policy," in appendix 2.

[10] The octroi was a tax imposed on certain goods entering a town to pay for various thingsw such as streets and lighting. See the section of "Octroi" in "Taxation," in appendix 2.

[11] Hippolyte Passy, "Impôt," DEP, vol. 1, pp. 898-914.

[12] Molinari wrote the article on "Colonies - Colonisation - Système colonial," DEP, T. 1, pp. 393-403; as well as "Colonies agricoles" and "Colonies militaires," DEP, T. 1, pp. 403-5.

[13] Molinari uses the English word.

[14] Horace Say, "Primes et drawbacks," DEP, T. 2, pp. 433-34.

[15] C. de Brouckère, "Traités de commerce," DEP, T. 2, 759-60.

[16] Molinari puts the word "ravir" in quote marks.

[17] Frédéric Bastiat also noted the militaristic language used by protectionists in ES1 22 "Metaphors" (c. 1845) (CW3, pp. 100-03).

[18] (Molinari's note). Les singes Économistes. Brochure in-8, anonyme, traduit par Benjamin Laroche. [*editor's note*: it was published by one of the leading english defenders of free trade col. thomas perronet thompson as "the article on free trade," *westminster review* (january 1830) with a cartoon drawn by thomas landseer. molinari also refers to this cartoon and pamphlet in s7. see "the monkey economists and free trade," in the glossary.]

[19] Molinari probably got the idea of "un inventeur à rebours" (an inventor in reverse) from his friend and colleague Bastiat who denounced on several occasions the arguments of the protectionists and the socialists as "l'économie politique à rebours" (backwards political economy) which "prendre le moyen pour le but, l'obstacle pour la cause, alpha pour oméga" (mistakes the means for the end, the obstacle for the cause, and the alpha for the omega). See EH VI "Wealth" and "Damn Money!" in Bastiat's Miscellaneous Economic Writings.

[20] (Molinari's note.) Richesses des nations, liv. I, chap. III, pp. 107-8 (Guillaumin ed.). [editor's note: adam smith, *an inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations* (1904), vol. 1, book i, chap. iii "that the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market," pp. 19-20.]

[21] Say, "Primes et drawbacks."

[22] The following two sentences were cut from the Lalor version of the article.

[23] Clos de Vougeot is a famous wine producing "château" in Burgundy. Cistercian monks grew pinot noir grapes there in the early 12th century. The "close" was created when the monks built a wall around the abbey in 1330 and the chateau was constructed in 1551. When land owned by the clergy was confiscated during the revolution the banker Gabriel-Julien Ouvrard acquired the Clos de Vougeot.

[24] Château Lafite is a famous vineyard in the commune of Pauillac near Bordeaux on land originally owned by the La Fite family. The first vines were grown in the late 17th century by Jacques de Ségur. The chateau and vineyards were bought by the wealthy banker James de Rothschild in 1868.

[25] "Dupes" is a term much used by Bastiat to describe the people who have been fooled by the "sophisms" or false arguments of the protectionists. "Bastiat on Enlightening the 'Dupes' about the Nature of Plunder," in the Introduction (CW3, pp. lv-lviii).

[26] See his entries in the DEP on "Paix, Guerre," T. 2, pp. 307-14, and "Nations" (below).

[27] The theory of "le déplacement" (displacement) and "des causes perturbatrices" (disturbing factors was also an important part of Bastiat's economic theory. See my essays on "Theory of Displacement" and "Disturbing and Restorative Factors".

[28] "Ces industries de guerre."

[29] The wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars disrupted trade significantly between 1793 and 1815, especially Napoleon's policy of the "continental blockade" (1806) which was designed to prevent English goods being sold in occupied Europe.

[30] Say, "Douane."

[31] In 1826 Huskisson stated in Parliament that "This was our state, though in a far less degree than at present, when America became independent. She started by applying towards us the system, which we had applied towards Holland. She was then poor, with a very small commercial marine, without manufactures, having corn and raw materials to export;—and we know what her shipping now is. Let Gentlemen reflect on these circumstances, before they decide that it is necessarily wise to enter upon a similar contest with other poor and unmanufacturing countries. Let them seriously consider, whether a system of discriminating duties, now that the exclusive patent by which we held that system is expired,—is not the expedient of such a country as I have described, rather than the resource of one which already possesses the largest commercial marine in the world. They will then see, that it may possibly be a wise policy to divert such countries from that system, rather than to goad them on, or even leave them a pretext for going into it." "Exposition of the State of the Navigation of the United Kingdom" (May 12, 1826) in The Speeches of the Right Honorable William Huskisson (1831), vol. 3, p. 34.

[32] William Huskisson(1770-1830) was a British Member of Parliament who served from 1796 to 1830. He rose to the post of secretary to the treasury 1804-09 and later president of the Board of Trade (1823-27). Huskisson introduced a number of liberal reforms, including the reformation of the Navigation Act. This was eventually abolished in 1849. See "Navigation Acts" in the glossary.

[33] "La machine à fabriquer les primes." This is similar to Bastiat's idea of "la grande fabrique des lois" (the great law factory) which he used to describe the Chamber of Deputies which "manufactured laws" in order to create economic privileges for some at the expense of others. See, WSWNS 7 "Trade Restrictions" (CW3, pp. 427-32).

[34] The major theorists of "legal plunder" was Molinari's friend and colleague Frédéric Bastiat, especially in his pamphlet The Law (June 1850). See my essay on "Theory of Plunder".

[35] "La clientèle confisquée" Since earlier Molinari used the word "ravir" (kidnap) to describe how one country "stole" another country's markets by means of tariffs, it seemed fitting here to talk about their customers in a similar way as "confiscated or abducted" clients or customers.

[36] He means most of the Economists in the Guillaumin network who believed in the natural right to own and dispose of one's property without government interference.

[37] Bastiat made a similar argument about how protectionists opposed free traders by saying that there were "no absolute principles" which should be applied in all cases, that everything was "flexible" and negotiable except them giving up protectionist policies. See, ES1 18 "There Are No Absolute Principles" (c. 1845) (CW3, pp. 83-85).

[38] The master of writing short articles to debunk the "economic sophisms " of the protectionists was Frédéric Bastiat, who Molinari will acknowledge at the end of this section. He wrote about 72 of them, many of which he published in two collections published in 1846 and 1848. The remainder can be found in CW3, "Economic Sophisms "Third Series"," pp. 257-399.

[39] Molinari uses the English word "free traders" here. He means Richard Cobden who helped organize the Anti-Corn Law League which successfully lobbied the British government to end protectionism in 1846.

[40] William Johnson Fox (1786-1864) was a Member of Parliament, a journalist and renowned orator, and became one of the most popular speakers of the Anti-Corn Law League.

[41] (Molinari's note.) Speech given at a Meeting of 26 January 1844. Quoted by Bastiat in Cobden and the League, 1st ed., p. 182. [*editor's note*: molinari also quoted this speech in s11. he uses a translation by bastiat which differs slightly from the original version. this is retranslation of bastiat's version. for the original english version see above, p. **abc**. w.j. fox, speech given at the covent garden theatre on january 25, 1844, *collected works* (1866), vol. 4, pp. 62-63.]

[42] These two sentences were cut from the Lalor version.

[43] Charles Coquelin, "Balance du commerce," DEP, T. 1,  pp. 101-6.

[44] The Zollverein was the German customs union that emerged in 1834 when the southwestern German states of Baden and Württemberg joined the Prussian customs union.

[45] Charles Coquelin, "Balance du commerce," DEP, T. 1, pp. 101-6.

[46] Or in modern parlance, "to create a level playing field."

[47] The following sentence was cut from the Lalor versions.

[48] (This long foot note was cut from the Lalor version):

On this matter one can find some valuable information in the Inquiry into the Iron Industry which was published in 1829. [Note: (Molinari's note.) Enquête sur les fers, p. 70. [*editor's note*: *enquête sur les fers. commission formée avec l'approbation du roi* (1828). molinari also discusses this government inquiry and quotes this passage in his *histoire du tarif* (1847), vol. 1, pp. 25 ff, 37 ff.]: One learns that the iron industry received in 1822 an extraordinary supplement to its tariff protection. Soon afterwards this industry underwent a considerable expansion but, and this is a striking and curious thing, it employed for this development English capital and English workers. The iron forge owners, who were the beneficiaries of this much increased premium paid for by French consumers, thus had to share this premium with the latter, the very people the legislators had wanted to hit. The testimony of M. Boigues, owner of the Fourchambault mines, and M. Wilson, manager of the mines at Le Creusot, confirm in particular that English workers were in the majority in the new establishments. We will limit ourself to quoting the testimony of M. Wilson:

Question: How many and what kind of workers do you employ for the making of iron? What is the proportion of English workers and French workers?

Answer: 126 workers, namely 28 puddlers, 6 fire workers, 42 rollers, and 80 other workers. In the first year of operation, with the exception of simple tasks, all the workers were English. In the second year, we began to employ French puddlers who were quite well trained. After 1824 half of the workers we employed in puddling were French; but we have never employed French workers at Charenton for rolling. The English puddlers earned 14 francs per 1,000 kg, and French puddlers 10 francs; English rollers were paid at the rate of 10 francs per 1,000 kg of iron, and they would produce 80,000 kg per week. Thus they received 800 francs per week, out of which they had to pay the cost of assistants and aids. I estimate that what remained as their wage was about 100 francs per week.

Q: Did the wages of the French workers rise to the level of the English workers, or did the wage of the English workers drop to the level of the French workers?

A: On the contrary, there was a lowering of the wage of the French workers; both now only earn 8 francs for puddling 1,000 kg of iron. [note: (*molinari's note*.) *enquête sur les fers*, p. 70.]:

The same thing occurred in 1841 and 1842 when the tariff on cotton and linen was increased to a prohibitive level. The new “French” factories that prohibition had encouraged to expand had done so principally with the assistance of a large importation of English capital and workers.

[49] Molinari, "Émigration," DEP , T. 1, pp. 675-83.

[50] A.E. Cherbuliez, "Paupérisme," DEP , T. 2, pp. 333-39.

[51] Friedrich List's book Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie (The National System of Political Economy) was published in German in 1841 and translated into French in 1851. It was very critically reviewed by Adolphe Blanqui in the JDE in May 1852, who called him "un véritable transfuge, un renégat de la liberté commerciale" (a veritable defector and renegade from commercial liberty) (p. 78). See also Joseph Garnier, "List (Frédéric)," DEP , T. 2, pp. 76-82. Friedrich List, Système national d'économie politique. Traduit de l'Allemand par Henri Richelot. Avec un préface, une notice biographique et des notes par le traducteur (Paris: Capelle, 1851); "Système national d'économie politique, par Frédéric List." (Compte-rendu par M. BLANQUI, de l'Institut) JDE , T. 32, nos. 133-34, Mai-Juin 1852, pp. 78-82. In English, see, Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy by Friedrich List, trans. Sampson S. Lloyd, with an Introduction by J. Shield Nicholson (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1909).

[52] The following sentence was cut from the Lalor version.

[53] Sir John Bowring (1792-1872) was an English businessman, Member of Parliament (Bolton 1841-49), political economist, translator, and the fourth Governor of Hong Kong (1854-59).

[54] The Congrès des Économistes was founded by the Belgian Free Trade Association. A European-wide congress was held in Brussels in September 1847 which was attended by 170 people who were a "who's who" of the leading advocates of liberal political economy in Europe. It was at this conference that Molinari may have met Karl Marx who also attended.

[55] ( Note by Molinari .) Congrès des Économistes réuni à Bruxelles en 1847 , p. 135-36.

[56] The "Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations" (also known as "The Great Exhibition" was held in Hyde Park, London, between 1 May and 15 October 1851.

[57] ( Note by Molinari .) Examen du système commercial connu sous le nom de système protecteur. — Appendice, p. 280. (Editor: See the second edition, Michel Chevalier, Examen du système commercial connu sous le nom de système protecteur. 2e ed. (Paris: Guillaumin et Ce, 1853), "Lettres sur l'avancement comparé de l'industrie française et de l'industrie étrangère," I. "L'Europe," pp. 326-27.)

[58] ( Note by Molinari .) Discours de M. Thiers sur le régime commercial de la France, prononcé à l'Assemblée Legislative, le 27 juin 1851. [ Editor : Thiers gave two speeches: CLXVII. "Discours sur le régime commercial de la France, discussion de la proposition de M. Sainte-Beuve, prononcé le 27 juin 1851, à la Chambre des députés," pp. 135-244; and CLXVIII. "Discours sur le régime commercial de la France, discussion de la proposition de M. Sainte-Beuve, prononcé le 28 juin 1851, à la Chambre des députés," pp. 245-75. In Adolphe Thiers, Discours parlementaires de M. Thiers. Publiés par M. Calmon. Troisième Partie (1850-1864) (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1880). Vol. IX.

[59] ( Note by Molinari .) Examen du système commercial connu sous le nom de système protecteur. Pièces justificatives, deuxième lettre de M. Jean Dolfus , p. 354. (Editor : Second ed.: "Pièces justificatives, Lettre de M. J. Dolfus de Mulhouse," pp. 381-88. Seconde lettre du même," pp. 388-400.)

[60] Auguste Pierre Mimerel de Roubaix (1786-1872) was a textile manufacturer and politician from Roubaix who was a vigorous advocate of protectionism. He co-founded the protectionist "Association pour la défense du travail national" (Association for the Defense of National Employment) in October 1846 to counter the the French Free Trade Association for which Molinari and Bastiat worked.

[61] The Conservative prime minister Sir Robert Peel announced the repeal of the Corn Laws on 27 January 1846, to take effect on 1 February 1849 after a period of gradual reduction in the level of the duty. The act was passed by the House of Commons on 15 May and approved by the House of Lords on 25 June, thus bringing to an end centuries of agricultural protection in England.

[62] The following quotation was omitted from the Lalor version. ( Note by Molianri .) "Lettre communiquée par M. Natalis Rondot à la Société d'Économie politique de Paris," JDE , no. du 15 avril 1852, t. XXXI, p. 192.

[63] Jérôme Adolphe Blanqui (1798-1854) was a liberal economist and brother of the revolutionary socialist Auguste Blanqui.

[64] Bastiat published his first collection of Economic Sophisms in January 1846 and his second in January 1848. They can be found, along with a third collection in CW3.

[65] Sir Robert Peel (1788-1850) was the leader of the Tories, served as Home Secretary under the Duke of Wellington (1822–27) and was prime minister twice (1834–35, 1841–46). Molinari wrote the entry on Peel for the DEP : "Peel (Robert)," T. 2, pp. 351-54.

[66] ( Note by Molinari .) "My expectations concerning the tariff of 1846," wrote recently M. R.J. Walker, ex-minister of finance in the United States, "my expectations have been surpassed: customs revenue, which had been $26 million in that year under the tariff of 1842, in 1851 under the lower tariff regime were $50 million, and at the same time our exports doubled. Upon request by the Senate, I examined the matter in 1847 and the official report which I produced for them demonstrated that, taking into account the foreign market price, the increase in the price of imported goods, after the introduction of the tariff of 1842, the situation was that, in addition to the taxes levied and paid to the government, there was still a rise in prices which was equivalent to an additional tax imposed on the American consumers, the total cost of which could be estimated at $80 million. This enormous sum represents the cost of protection which resulted from too high a tariff. However," added M. Walker, " our tariff of 1842 was a lot less than your French tariff and it contained no protectionist component. It was clear to me that if your customs duties were cut back to just the amount necessary for fiscal purposes, imports alone would triple the amount of customs and would at the same time take a weight off commerce and even industry." "Lettre écrite à M. Horace Say, vice-président de la Société d'Économie politique, par M. R.-J. Walker," JDE , Aug. 1852, T. XXXII, p. 409.

Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la) (Free Trade Associations)↩

Source

"Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la)," DEP, Vol. 2, pp. 45-49.

Text

[45]

The great economic movement that had been unfolding in England since the reforms of Mr. Huskisson, the formation of the Anti-Corn Law League (See CEREALS/GRAIN) and the solemn repudiation of the protectionist system by Sir Robert Peel, could not fail to exert a considerable influence on the world. Indeed, it was England's example that had long provided protectionists in every country with their most formidable arguments. Since England had advanced ahead of all other nations in the industrial field while adopting the protectionist system, protectionists did not hesitate to affirm that this system was the foundation and safeguard of its prosperity. People were inclined to take their word for it, without considering whether internal security, civil, political, and industrial freedom, which England had enjoyed for a century and a half, did not provide a far better explanation for the extraordinary development of its productive power than the empirical errors of the protectionist system. But then came the economists, who subjected the prevailing system to the test of scientific analysis, only to discover that this so-called "pure gold" was nothing more than base lead. Then, bold agitators, employing the two powerful levers of association and the press, exposed to the masses the great deception of protectionism. Following this, English statesmen, obeying the command of public opinion—which had now been converted—burned what they had once worshiped, and worshiped what they had once burned. England, trampling underfoot the so-called palladium of protectionism, fearlessly entered the realm of international competition. What was to become, after such a radical change, of the irresistible argument that England’s example had provided to protectionists? How could they continue defending a system when the most advanced nation in commerce and industry—the one most enlightened about its true interests—had recognized its futility? By abandoning protectionism, had not England signaled the downfall of this system across the entire world?

These inevitable consequences of England’s economic revolution [46] profoundly struck the few devoted supporters of free trade who remained on the continent. They began closely following the dramatic struggle unfolding in England, anxiously and hopefully observing every development. At the same time, they revived the long-dormant call for commercial freedom in their own countries. In France, in particular, an economist still unknown at the time, but destined to leave a brilliant mark on the field, Frédéric Bastiat, recounted the history of the League and translated the major speeches of its leaders. [1]Another, whose untimely death would cut short a promising career, Alcide Fonteyraud, dedicated two eloquent and vivid sketches to the work of the League. [2] Finally, Léon Faucher explained, in two chapters of his remarkable Études sur l'Angleterre, the nature and significance of the movement against the Corn Laws. [3] The daily press, now fully aware of the importance of the English agitation, began actively covering it: the Journal des Débats, La Patrie, and Le Courrier Français took a decisive stand in favor of free trade. These papers sought to bring into public debate this vital issue, which self-serving and shortsighted interests had long kept in the shadows. In southern France, where protectionists had, for thirty years, inflicted more devastation than even the brutal persecutors of the Albigensians, Peel’s great reforms appeared as a signal of liberation. The leading newspapers of Bordeaux, Lyon, and Marseille revived their fierce polemics against this oppressive system with renewed vigor. Meanwhile, the Society of Economists of Paris sent an address of congratulations to the English League, saluting their courageous initiative and assuring them of the full support of free trade advocates on the continent. At the same time, Frédéric Bastiat outlined in a journal from the South a plan for a French League for free trade. The merchants of Bordeaux had already laid the foundations for such an association on February 10, 1846, and had appointed a commission to organize it. This commission, to which Bastiat was soon added, offered the presidency of the association to M. Duffour-Dubergier, mayor of Bordeaux, who eagerly placed his influence and business expertise at the service of this new movement. On February 23, the Bordeaux association was officially established, and it held its first public meeting. The elite of Bordeaux's commercial world attended, and speakers included M. Duffour-Dubergier, Frédéric Bastiat, Duchon-Doris, and Princeteau. At the end of the meeting, a subscription was opened, yielding a total of 56,000 francs. [4] This first success fueled the enthusiasm of Parisian free-traders. [5]On March 14, a meeting was convened at the offices of the Journal des Économistes, hosted by M. Guillaumin, to discuss the means of forming an association in Paris. The presidency of the future association was offered to a distinguished champion of free trade, the Duke of Harcourt, who accepted. A provisional organizing committee was then appointed to draft the statutes and seek government authorization for the association. The association was formally constituted on July 1, 1846, and held its first public session in the Montesquieu Hall on August 28.[6]

The example of Bordeaux and Paris was quickly followed in other cities: in Marseille, an Association for Free Trade was founded on September 17 under the presidency of M. Lazare Luce, president of the Chamber of Commerce; another was formed in Lyon on October 13, under the presidency of M. Brosset Aîné; finally, on November 28, the free-traders of Le Havre organized a fifth association under the presidency of M. Delaunay.

These various associations gathered a capital of around 200,000 francs, which they used to influence public opinion. They agreed to establish a weekly newspaper, Le Libre-Échange, whose first issue appeared in Paris on November 29, 1846. The newspaper was initially directed by Frédéric Bastiat, then later by M. Charles Coquelin. The publication of Le Libre-Échange and the meetings at the Salle Montesquieu [47] became the main means of propaganda for the Paris association. Meanwhile, the associations in Bordeaux and Marseille launched their own monthly publications.

In one of the first meetings of the provisional committee of the association, the designated secretary-general, Frédéric Bastiat, was tasked with drafting a declaration to define the character of the new commercial movement. This document, whose wording was unanimously approved, demanded free trade in the name of property, justice, peace, and the fraternity of nations.

“Exchange,” wrote the author of the declaration, “is a natural right, just like property. Every citizen who has created or acquired a product must have the choice to either use it immediately or exchange it with anyone, anywhere in the world, willing to offer in return the object of their desires. To deprive him of this freedom, when he does not use it against public order or morality, and solely to satisfy the interests of another citizen, is to legitimize plunder and to violate the law of justice.

“It is also a violation of order, for what kind of order can exist in a society where every industry, aided in this by the law and public force, seeks its success in the oppression of all others

“It is to ignore the providential design that governs human destiny, as manifested in the infinite variety of climates, seasons, natural resources, and abilities—gifts that God has unequally distributed among men precisely to unite them through trade in universal fraternity.

“It is to oppose the development of public prosperity, for one who is not free to trade is not free to choose his work. He is forced to misdirect his efforts, his abilities, his capital, and the natural resources placed at his disposal.

“Finally, it is to endanger peace among nations, for it breaks the ties that unite them and would only make wars impossible by making them too costly.”

The author of the declaration therefore called for customs duties to be reduced to a purely fiscal level. However, he was willing to allow for caution and gradual steps in the reform:

“Even when moving from harm to good, and from an artificial state of affairs to a natural situation, prudence may require certain precautions. These details of implementation belong to the powers of the State; the mission of the association is to spread and popularize the principle.”

The following year, the Board of Directors of the Society dedicated numerous sessions to drafting its reform program; the task of writing this program was entrusted to M. Michel Chevalier. Below is a summary that clearly outlines the goals and limits set by the Free Trade Association:

I. Provisions to be implemented immediately by law.

All commercial prohibitions on imports would be lifted and replaced by a duty equivalent to the premium of smuggling, or, in cases where such a benchmark does not exist, by a specific duty calculated so as not to exceed 20% of the value.

All import duties would likewise be reduced to a level where the maximum would be 20%, except for duties on so-called colonial goods, which, as fiscal duties, could remain higher.

Cereals would be removed from the sliding-scale system and subjected to a fixed duty of 2 francs per hectoliter. The duty on flour would be exactly proportional.

For livestock, the 1816 tariff (3 francs 30 centimes per head of cattle) would be reinstated. All salted meats of any kind would be exempt from duties.

Duties on coal and raw pig iron would be abolished. Iron bars, specifically intended for steel production, would be exempt from any duty; the duty on steel would be reduced to the imperial tariff (99 francs per 1,000 kilograms).

Duties on several hundred items, which generate only insignificant revenue for the treasury, would be eliminated.

Distinctions that vary duties based on the quality and form of similar goods would, in most cases, be abolished.

Zonal and class-based distinctions, which create differences in duties depending on whether products enter via land or sea borders, would be eliminated.

All export duties would be abolished.

II. Provisions for future implementation.

After an advance-determined transition period, specified in the customs reform law, all import duties would be gradually reduced, ensuring that none exceed 10%, except for the previously mentioned exception concerning colonial goods.

Import duties on key raw materials—including raw cotton, bulk wool, hemp, raw and combed flax, iron and steel bars, and dyeing substances—would be subject to immediate reduction and then gradually decreased until they completely disappear within a legally predetermined timeframe.

At the same time, duties on cereals and livestock would be abolished.

III. Drawbacks.

Export bounties and drawbacks would also be gradually eliminated.

IV. Provisions concerning the colonies.

Fiscal duties on so-called colonial goods would be reduced to a level that, through increased consumption, would generate the highest revenue for the treasury.

Customs equality would be progressively established between French colonial products and foreign products.

V. Provisions concerning navigation.

Regulations and tariffs affecting the maritime industry would be modified to allow the merchant navy to [48] freely procure materials and supplies, including fully constructed ships.

Shipowners would be granted full freedom in allocating their capital and in organizing their businesses; to facilitate relations with external markets, especially direct trade with foreign warehouses for imports from Asia, Africa, and America.

A special law would establish the schedule for gradually reducing differential duties on shipping and determine the timeframe for their eventual elimination.

VI. Customs Regulations.

Customs regulations would be revised with the goal of simplifying and expediting formalities and eliminating various needlessly oppressive clauses.

This program was moderate enough to rally the least reactionary protectionists to the cause of customs reform; but the leaders of the party refused to make any concession, and they hastened in turn to establish an association to resist the invasion of free trade. This association, instituted “for the defense of national labor,” strove, by all means possible, to neutralize the effects of free-trade propaganda. Its most zealous members even went so far as to threaten the government with allying themselves with its enemies if it engaged in the path of customs reforms; later, they spread numerous posters in the workshops to denounce the promoters of free trade as salaried agents of England; finally, they demanded the dismissal of professors of political economy, whom they specifically accused of having stirred up against them the tempest of free trade.

Opponents who indulged in such childish excesses were not, in truth, very formidable. The leaders of the reform cause would have had no trouble overcoming them if they had found more sympathetic elements in public opinion and if circumstances had been a little more favorable to them; unfortunately, they were dealing with a people who, long accustomed to a regulatory regime, saw salvation only in “government intervention.” The principal organs of the republican party and socialist democracy, Le National, La Démocratie pacifique, L’Atelier, La Revue nationale, united with Le Constitutionnel and Le Moniteur industriel, organs of the manufacturing party, to denounce free trade. Le National mocked with great wit the apostles of Montesquieu’s Hall, [7] and the newspapers in its wake made every effort to encourage the working classes to be wary of Cobden’s disciples. One of the main journals of the workers, L’Atelier, which was later to provide a vice-president to the National Assembly, did not hesitate to declare that the people of Bordeaux, by taking the initiative in the free trade movement, sought to deliver France to England.

“This is explained,” added this journal (September 1846), “by simply reading the list of the great landowners of Gironde: English names abound… Fortunately, in the South as elsewhere, the people are indifferent to the speculations of the merchant aristocracy, and they will know well how to put obstacles in the way of these anti-national projects.”

Another popular journal, La Revue nationale, went further, comparing the promoters of customs reform to the “beaters” whom the Restoration had employed to divert minds from political preoccupations.

“It is probably,” said this journal (October 1847), “to create a diversion from reform banquets and the events arising on all sides, both at home and abroad, that our Cobdens from Montesquieu’s Hall have traveled through the departments and organized the economic congress in Brussels.”

The author of the article concluded by urging the people to turn away from the “nonsense” of free trade and to devote all their attention to political reforms and the association of workers.

It is therefore not surprising that the members of the association for the freedom of trade did not succeed in stirring the masses in favor of customs reforms; they had had the misfortune of being outstripped by the socialists among the working classes, while they saw rise against them, in the upper ranks of society, the tenacious league of privileged interests. Faced with this alliance of socialism from below and protectionism from above, their propaganda was, if not paralyzed, at least made singularly difficult. With enough energy and perseverance, they would undoubtedly have succeeded in overcoming this coalition of selfishness and ignorance, but the political events of February 1848 suddenly took the floor away from under them. The “nonsense” of free trade was then replaced by the political and economic theories of socialism, the sessions of the Congress of the Economists gave way to those of the Luxembourg Commission; in short, the most extravagant utopias temporarily dominated. In this universal turmoil, the members of the association for the freedom of trade did not, however, lose heart: they resolved to continue their work under the republic as they had pursued it under the monarchy; only they modified their tactics in the sense that they directed their principal efforts against the enemy that was now the most to be feared—against socialism. In a meeting held on March 16 at Montesquieu’s Hall, M. Clappier, former deputy of Marseille, and M. Charles Coquelin, strongly condemned the dangerous “nonsense” of the organization of labor, and their eloquent protests raised storms of applause. Two days later (March 17), a delegation from the association went to request from the provisional government the abolition of import duties on foodstuffs. M. Horace Say spoke on behalf of the delegation, which M. Armand Marrast took it upon himself to dismiss politely. The following month, the association, finally despairing of being heard in the midst of the political turmoil, abandoned the publication of its journal, and some time later, its committee, whose principal members had been scattered [49] by events, ceased to meet; the departmental associations ceased to function around the same time.

The agitation for free trade did not succeed in France. We have just briefly outlined the main causes of its failure. However, the authors of the 1846 movement should not regret their efforts in propaganda: they have sown seeds in a field where, despite the undergrowth of socialism and the weeds of protectionism, freedom will sooner or later sprout and bear fruit. They have sown, others will reap; what does it matter, as long as the harvest benefits humanity?

Associations for free trade were also organized in Belgium, Germany, and the United States. The Belgian association was established under the presidency of one of the veterans of the cause of free trade, M. Ch. de Brouckère; it held its first public session in Brussels on October 12, 1846. Through its efforts, the Congrès des Économistes (see this term) was convened in Brussels on September 16, 17, and 18, 1847. The events of 1848 brought an end to the existence of the Belgian association.

The Prussian association, born around the same time, has continued to exist and has fought vigorously, under the leadership of M. John Prince Smith, against the coalition of manufacturers within the Zollverein. The American association for free trade (Free-Trade League) had as its president in 1850 the Honorable R.-J. Walker, the author of the liberal tariff of 1846.

BIBLIOGRAPHY↩

PUBLICATIONS OF THE BORDEAUX ASSOCIATION

Foundation of the Society. Meeting of February 23, 1846. Manifesto. Bordeaux, Couder, 1846. Pamphlet, in-8, 48 pages. 1126. Contains speeches by Messrs. Duffour, Dubergier (Mayor of Bordeaux), Frédéric Bastiat, Duchon-Doris, and Princeteau, along with the association’s manifesto and action plan.

On the Prohibitive System, by Henri Fonfrède. Paris (Guillaumin); Bordeaux, Chaumas-Gayet, 1846, in-8, 103 pages. (See FONFRÈDE.)

Letter Addressed by M. de Cormenin to the Bordeaux Free Trade Association* (on the Question of Provisions), in-8, 7 pages.

Association for Free Trade. Excerpt from a Report by the Navigation Commission on the Customs Reforms Required by the Interests of the Merchant Navy, in-8, 8 pages.

The Monopoly of Ironmasters, by G. Brunet, Secretary-General of the Association. In-8, 16 pages.

Letter Addressed to Baron Charles Dupin, Peer of France, by the same author, in-8, 8 pages.

The Bordeaux Association had also undertaken the publication of a monthly bulletin composed of the best articles published on the subject. Only two issues appeared, in October and November 1846, in-8, 32 pages.

*PUBLICATIONS OF THE PARIS ASSOCIATION

Association for Free Trade. Declaration. In-4, 4 pages.

Le Libre-Échange, weekly paper of the association. (See FREE TRADE.)

Association, etc. First Public Meeting of the Association for Free Trade, held in the Montesquieu Hall on August 28, 1846; Second Meeting, September 20, 1846. Paris, Guillaumin, 1846, two pamphlets, in-8, 40 pages. Seventh Meeting, January 1, 1848. In-4, 12 pages in two columns. The first pamphlet contains speeches by Messrs. the Duke d’Harcourt (President), Léon Faucher, and Blanqui, along with the above-mentioned declaration signed by the provisional commission and the association’s statutes. The second contains speeches by Messrs. Anisson-Dupéron (President), Michel Chevalier, Horace Say, Wolowski, and Bastiat. The last contains speeches by Messrs. Anisson-Dupéron (President), Joseph Garnier, Ch. Coquelin, and Bastiat. The association held eight public meetings; however, no additional reports were published separately beyond those indicated above. Reports from the last six meetings can be found in Le Libre-Échange. See also excerpts and summaries of these meetings in Journal des Économistes (see the triennial table of contents).

Customs Reform Program Proposed by the Free Trade Association. Paris, Guillaumin, April 1847, in-8, 32 pages; also available in in-18, 18 pages. 1139. This program, signed by the Duke d’Harcourt and Frédéric Bastiat as President and Secretary on behalf of the association, was discussed by the Board of Directors based on a draft explanatory statement written by M. Michel Chevalier and a draft law summarizing the association’s demands, formulated by M. Joseph Garnier. Regarding duties on grain and livestock—which the board sought to abolish for the future—Messrs. Léon Faucher and Wolowski, who did not favor such an absolute decision, parted ways with the board while remaining members of the association.

On the Food Supplies of States and the Duties of Government in the Present Crisis. Extracted from Revue des Deux Mondes, June 1, and reprinted by the Free Trade Association. Paris, Guillaumin, 1847, in-8, 60 pages. Written by M. Michel Chevalier, this text is incorporated into his Examination of the Protective System.

Speech by M. de Lamartine at the Public Meeting of the Free Trade Association in Marseille on August 24, 1847. Paris, Guillaumin, 1847, in-12, 12 pages.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE MARSEILLE ASSOCIATION

Libre-Échange. Marseille Association. Three publications—January, April, and August 1847—containing reports of the association’s meetings and various studies on specific issues, particularly regarding provisions. In-4, two columns, extracted from Courrier de Marseille.

PUBLICATIONS OF THE BELGIAN ASSOCIATION

Belgian Association for Commercial Freedom. First Public Meeting of the Association, etc., October 11, 1846. Sixth Meeting, December 23, 1847. Brussels, Périchon, 1846, 1847, and 1848, 6 pamphlets, in-8. Contains speeches by Messrs. Ch. de Brouckère (President of the Association), Count Arrivabene (Vice-President), Victor Faider, Lehardy de Beaulieu, etc., during their public meetings.

Congress of Economists Convened in Brussels by the Belgian Association for Commercial Freedom. Session of 1847, Meetings of September 16, 17, and 18. Brussels, Deltombe, 1847, in-8, 200 pages. Contains the speeches from this congress, focused on issues related to commercial freedom. (See Economists (Congress of).)

See also the bibliography of Free Trade and an article on this association by M. Joseph Garnier in the Annuaire de l'Économie politique for 1847.

Endnotes to Liberté des Échanges (Associations)↩

[1] Cobden and the League, or the English Agitation for Free Trade, by Frédéric Bastiat, member of the General Council of Landes. Guillaumin, 1843, 1 vol. in-8.

[2] Published in Revue Britannique and in the Annuaire de l'Économie politique for 1846.

[3] Studies on England, by M. Léon Faucher, vol. 2.

[4] The Bordeaux association had the following leadership: President—M. Duffour-Dubergier; Vice-Presidents—Messrs. Bruno-Devès, Durin, Duvergié, Paul Vignes; Secretary-General—M. Gustave Brunet; Secretaries—Messrs. Duchon-Doris, Louis Fabre, Jules Fauché, Hovyn de Tranchère; Treasurer—M. Samazeuilh; Archivist—M. Castéja.

[5] Libres-échangistes (free traders) and libre-échange (free trade) —two new terms that emerged from the movement of 1846.

[6] The board of directors of the association underwent several changes; Messrs. Léon Faucher, Wolowski, and Denière, who were initially members, withdrew. Other members, however, were successively added. As of 1847, the board was composed as follows:

(put in bullet points)

President: The Duke d’Harcourt, Peer of France

Vice-Presidents: Anisson-Dupéron, Peer of France; Dunoyer, Member of the Institut

Members:

Baron de Béville, landowner

Blanqui, Deputy

Bosson, manufacturer in Boulogne

Boullet, Peer of France, President of the Royal Court of Amiens

Michel Chevalier, State Councillor

Calon jeune, banker

David, merchant in Reims

Guillaumin, publisher

Guillemin, merchant

Nicolas Kœcklin, manufacturer

Louis Leclerc, head of an institution

Odiot, goldsmith

Ortolan, Professor at the Law School

Paillottet, Vice-President of the Council of Prud’hommes

Peupin, worker, Prud’homme

Potonié, merchant

Renouard, Peer of France

Louis Reybaud, Deputy

Riglet, bronze manufacturer, former member of the Commercial Court

Horace Say, Member of the Paris Chamber of Commerce

Secretary-General: Frédéric Bastiat, Corresponding Member of the Institut

Assistant Secretaries: Ad. Blaise (of the Vosges), Charles Coquelin, A. Fonteyraud, Joseph Garnier (Editor-in-Chief of Journal des Économistes), G. de Molinari

Treasurer: Adolphe d'Eichthal

Censor: Casimir Cheuvreux

[7] The public meetings of the Paris association were held in the Montesquieu Hall.

Céréales (Grain)↩

Source

"Céréales," DEP, T. 1, pp. 301-26.

Text

[301]

I. DEFINITION AND ORIGIN.

The principal food of many peoples, cereals play a considerable role in the economy of societies. However, there is no consensus on either the number of plants that should be classified under this designation or their origin. The term cereals is commonly used to refer to wheat, spelt, rye, barley, and oats; but some authors also apply this generic term to rice, maize, millet, and buckwheat. According to the oldest records of Egyptian history, it was near Nysa or Bethsané, in the Jordan Valley, that Isis and Osiris found wheat, barley, and the vine growing in the wild. Osiris discovered the vine, and Isis discovered wheat. "It was in Nysa," says Diodorus of Sicily, "that Isis found wheat and barley growing randomly among other plants, but unknown to men." According to Genesis, it was also in Palestine that cereals were discovered and that agriculture began. Whatever the homeland of cereals may be—that is, the region where they naturally grew and multiplied without the aid of cultivation—they have been known for several thousand years. Wheat and even bread have been found in the tombs of Thebes in Egypt; this wheat and bread, which date back thirty or forty centuries, still attest that the species has remained unchanged.

When Isis in Egypt, Ceres and Triptolemus in Greece, discovered the artificial methods of wheat cultivation, the populations—until then nomadic, seeking precarious sustenance—settled on the land, and civilization was born with agriculture. We will not trace the development of agricultural production or the economic phenomena arising from this branch of general production (see AGRICULTURE, SLAVERY, LAND TENURE, LAND RENT). We will limit ourselves to specifically examining the facts related to the trade of cereals and the various legislation that has regulated this commerce.

II. TRADE AND LEGISLATION IN ANTIQUITY.

In antiquity, the trade in cereals was limited: the difficulty of transportation and the insecurity of land and sea routes created nearly insurmountable obstacles to the movement of bulky goods. Most foodstuffs were consumed at the place of production. Under Roman rule, Italy began importing considerable quantities of wheat from Egypt and Sicily. However, much of this wheat was brought to Rome as a tribute and was distributed free of charge to the sovereign people.

In the year 629 of Rome, Gaius Gracchus secured the passage of a grain law (lex frumentaria) to distribute wheat to poor citizens at nearly no cost—that is, at a rate of 5/6 of an as per modius, which weighed 13 1/2 of our modern pounds. [1]This law, whose disadvantages were recognized and lamented by wise men of the time, such as Cicero, Sallust, Julius Caesar, and Augustus, remained in effect until the fall of the Roman Empire. It was justified and, in a sense, necessitated by the expansion of agriculture through slave labor. Before Caesar's dictatorship (in the year 105 of Rome), 320,000 out of 450,000 Roman citizens received free grain distributions, not including the sportula (a daily ration) that clients begged at the doors of wealthy patricians. Caesar reduced the number of recipients of Gaius Gracchus’s law to 150,000, but this strict measure could not be maintained for long. It was necessary to provide sustenance to this mass of destitute citizens whose only occupations were politics and war. The Roman people governed the world—should the world not, in turn, feed the Roman people? Sicily provided a large portion of the grain needed for free distributions. A tithe was levied on part of the land cultivated with wheat; in the year 682 of Rome, this tithe produced 3,000,000 modii of wheat. Another portion of cultivated land was not subject to the tithe, but its owners were compelled to sell and transport 800,000 modii of wheat to Rome annually at their own expense, with the price fixed at 4 sesterces (1.12 francs) per modius. The distribution of this forced sale was divided among all landowners who were exempt from tithes or tributes. M. Dureau de la Malle estimates that 50,000 Roman citizens obtained free food from Sicilian wheat. Other grain-producing provinces contributed similar quotas. These free distributions ultimately had a disastrous effect on the agriculture of the Roman countryside, which found no market for its cereals. [2]

"It became absolutely impossible," says M. de Sismondi, "for small [302] landowners to maintain themselves around Rome, and all the remaining small estates were sold to the rich. The abandonment of agriculture spread from place to place. The true homeland of the Romans, central Italy, just as it had barely completed its conquest of the world, no longer had an agricultural population. In the countryside, there were no peasants to recruit for the legions, no fields to feed them. Vast pastures, where a few enslaved shepherds herded thousands of cattle, replaced the nations that had once prepared new triumphs for the Roman Republic."

Under the combined influence of slavery and free distributions, famines multiplied in Italy; there were terrible ones under Augustus and Tiberius. One of the most notable occurred in the year 759 of Rome. Tiberius set a maximum price for wheat sold to the people and granted merchants, as compensation, two sesterces per modius. These two sesterces were provided by the public treasury. Later, Diocletian devised the idea of establishing a price ceiling on most consumer goods; but since this ceiling was set too low, merchants stopped selling, producers ceased producing, and a general shortage was the consequence of this anti-economic measure. In the year 363 A.D., the Emperor Julian once again experimented with price controls in Antioch, combining them with free distributions. [3]

"He adopted," says Gibbon, "the dangerous and disastrous expedient of fixing the price of wheat, which he ordered to be sold, during a time of famine, at a rate scarcely seen even in the most abundant years. To reinforce his laws with his example, he sent to market 420,000 modii of grain, which he had brought in from the granaries of Hierapolis, Chalcis, and even Egypt. The consequences of this operation were not difficult to foresee, and they were soon felt. Landowners and merchants ceased to supply the city, and the little grain that was brought in was sold above the fixed price."

This new lesson, taught by the very nature of things to ignorant legislators, was, as we shall see, followed by many others.

During the Middle Ages, the trade in cereals was even more restricted than it had been in antiquity. In that era of oppression and poverty, security existed nowhere except in a few municipal republics of Italy. Europe was fragmented into a multitude of small states whose rulers arrogated to themselves the right to tax or obstruct commercial transactions at will. Whenever they thought a speculative opportunity might be profitable, they did not hesitate to undertake it for their own benefit. In 524, the historian Cassiodorus recounts, Theodoric, King of Italy, ordered all provincial magistrates to load state-owned ships with grain and dispatch them to France, where a famine was raging. [4]

"You have," he wrote to them, "more than what you need, and by bringing it to those in distress, you will sell it at whatever price you wish. When one negotiates with those who are well-fed, it is a constant struggle; they want everything on their terms. But take food to those who are hungry, and they will buy it without bargaining."

It seems that this barbarian had a fairly sound understanding of commerce.

III. COMMERCE AND LEGISLATION IN FRANCE.

§ 1. Under the Monarchy.

In France, the baillis and sénéchaux had, from the beginning, arrogated to themselves the right to prohibit or permit, each within his jurisdiction, the export of wheat and other goods. They frequently abused this arbitrary power, either by withholding wheat while famine raged in neighboring provinces or by selling exclusive export privileges to a few individuals. The privileged merchants naturally became unbearable to the people. The jurists, who shared the popular resentment against them, designated them with all sorts of derogatory names, such as dardanarii (from Dardanus, a famous magician who, it was said, could bring about abundance or famine at will), pantopolœ, pantometaboli, sitocapeli, cociatores, cociones sive coquini, ariblatores, directarii, aeruscatores, annonae flagellatores. They were almost always blamed for causing famines. At times, demons were also accused. During a famine in Charlemagne’s time, a rumor spread that demons had devoured the year's harvest and that their voices had been heard denouncing the vices of the time. Charlemagne then ordered the strict collection of tithes to appease divine wrath. [5] Charlemagne also forbade the exportation of wheat and imposed price controls on bread and wheat. When feudal power began to weaken, the kings sought to strip the lords or their delegates of the right to regulate the grain trade. Thus, upon his return from the Holy Land, Saint Louis issued a general decree “to reform the abuses of the grain trade.” One article of this regulation stated that baillis and sénéchaux were not to prohibit the transport of wheat, wine, and other goods outside their jurisdiction, except in cases of great necessity, [6]

“and that this necessity shall be determined by a good and wise council that is not under suspicion; that once such prohibitions have been made, they shall only be revoked by a similar council, and that as long as they remain in effect, no exemptions shall be granted by favor or grace.”

Soon, the provincial governors contested outright the sénéchaux' right to permit or prohibit exportation within their districts; however, in the absence of the lords and their delegates, municipal authorities and parlements continued to intervene frequently in the grain trade.

The regulations of the King of France concerning wheat provide us with an idea of what those of the sénéchaux and baillis must have been, while also illustrating the precarious state of [303] grain supplies throughout the duration of the monarchy. Here is a chronological overview of this legislation.

— Under Philip the Fair, in 1304, a year of famine, a general census of grain was ordered. Following this census, wheat was price-controlled at a maximum of 20 sous per setier, Paris measure. However, when merchants hoarded their grain and the famine worsened, the ordinance was revoked. Authorities merely ordered farmers and merchants to retain only the quantities necessary for their own consumption and to bring the rest to market. At the same time, merchants were prohibited from reselling grain to other merchants. Further, a ban was imposed on removing grain from Paris once it had been brought there.

— In 1391, as regulatory measures became more refined, a new prohibition was added: buying outside official markets was forbidden.

— In 1418, another attempt at price controls appeared: the price of wheat was set at 72 sous parisis per setier, Paris measure; mixed wheat at 60 sous, and rye at 48 sous. But when merchants argued that these prices did not cover their costs and that the provinces were full of soldiers and bandits who looted and ransomed shipments, the price cap was raised: wheat was now set at 5 gold écus, mixed wheat at 72 sous, and rye at 64. It is almost needless to say that the famine continued unabated.

— In 1430, another price cap: wheat was set at 62 sous and small wheat at 54. Bread was priced proportionally.

— In 1436, another year of famine: it was forbidden in Paris to make échaudés (a type of boiled bread), brioches, and white bread. Bakers were instructed to bake only two types of bread.

— In 1531 (ordinance of October 28), the prohibitions on purchasing outside markets were renewed under severe penalties. The reasoning behind the edict is worth quoting:

"As we have been warned and informed that many individuals, driven by greed and rapacity, without regard for God, charity, or the salvation of their souls, have purchased large quantities of all grains, some even before they were harvested and while they were still green in the fields; and others have bought from common people outside the markets and in their homes, to hoard them in granaries, intending to sell them at their own pleasure and will when they see the people in distress. Because of this, as can be publicly seen and known, the price of grain has greatly increased, and the people suffer greatly from it, to our great regret and displeasure, for we desire with all our heart to relieve and support them, to ensure they live in peace, and to prevent them from being oppressed and placed in necessity by such iniquitous and perverse means."

[**this is in french!**]

Ce langage atteste que les marchands de grains étaient aussi mal vus par le souverain que par le peuple. Bientôt on les soumit à des règlements plus sévères encore. Par un édit de 1587, édit inspiré par le chancelier de Lhospital et renouvelé en 1577, il est expressément défendu aux laboureurs, personnes nobles, officiers du roi, principaux officiers des villes, de faire le commerce des grains. Par le même édit, ceux qui se livraient à ce commerce étaient astreints à se faire enregistrer aux greffes royaux des lieux de leur domicile, sous peine d'amende et de confiscation des grains. Dans le siècle suivant, la réglementation fait de nouveaux progrès. En 1621, le lieutenant civil publie une ordonnance spéciale pour la police des grains à Paris. Il ordonne à toutes personnes qui voudront se livrer à ce commerce de faire enregistrer leurs noms et demeures au greffe du Châtelet; de déclarer le lieu et la quantité de leurs achats; de mener leurs grains au marché deux fois par mois au moins. Quant aux marchands forains, ils sont tenus de vendre leurs grains eux-mêmes, ou de se faire remplacer par des gens de leur famille. On leur accordait trois jours pour les vendre. Dans cet intervalle, ils en fixaient le prix, et ce prix une fois fixé, ils ne pouvaient plus l'augmenter. Si les grains n'étaient point vendus le troisième jour, on les mettait au rabais. Défense expresse était faite aux marchands, soit de les remporter, soit de les mettre en dépôt à Paris. Défense était faite en outre à tous marchands d'acheter des grains dans un rayon de dix lieues autour de Paris. D'un autre côté, les boulangers de Paris ne pouvaient aller faire leurs achats qu'à une distance de huit lieues. Il y avait, de la sorte, trois zones d'achats, du moins sur le papier. En dedans du rayon de huit lieues, les laboureurs ou les propriétaires, ne pouvant s'aboucher avec les marchands, venaient apporter eux-mêmes leurs blés au marché. Les boulangers achetaient ou étaient censés acheter directement entre huit et dix lieues; plus loin, les marchands étaient libres de commencer leurs opérations. Cette réglementation compliquée avait pour objet de mieux assurer l'approvisionnement de la capitale, et, comme bien on suppose, elle produisait un résultat tout opposé : Paris était l'endroit de France où les disettes étaient le plus fréquentes. — En 1629, les parlements de Bretagne et de Normandie défendirent de transporter des grains hors de leurs ressorts. Tous les marchands se portèrent dans la Beauce, l'Ile-de-France, le Vexin, le Valois, la Picardie et la Brie, qu'ils épuisèrent par leurs achats. L'approvisionnement de Paris se trouva compromis. Une assemblée générale de police eut lieu. On peut voir dans le Traité de la Police de Delamare le compte rendu de la séance de cette assemblée. Les opinions les plus réglementaires y dominèrent. A la suite de cette séance, une ordonnance fut rendue pour autoriser des commissaires à aller rechercher à Noyon, à Compiègne, à Soissons, les blés appartenant aux marchands de Paris. Il était enjoint à ceux-ci de conduire leurs blés à Paris, dans la quinzaine, sous peine de confiscation. C'est le système des réquisitions dont la révolution devait faire plus tard un si ample usage. En 1660, 61 et 62, années de disette, les ordonnances relatives au commerce des grains se multiplièrent. Le parlement interdit notamment, sous des peines sévères, les coalitions ou associations pour l'achat et la vente des blés. En 1662, le roi fit acheter pour 2 millions de blés dans les ports de la Baltique. Ces blés furent distribués dans Paris à raison d'un setier pour chaque famille pauvre, à 26 liv. le setier, tandis que le prix du commerce était de 50 liv. Des disettes terribles signalèrent la fin de ce siècle, et, [304] comme toujours, elles donnèrent occasion de renforcer encore le régime règlement aire. En 1692 et 93, on ordonna aux propriétaires ou fermiers d'ensemencer leurs terres, faute de quoi il était permis à toute personne étrangère de les ensemencer et de jouir de la récolte sans payer aucun fermage. On renouvelait encore l'obligation imposée aux marchands forains de vendre en personne leurs grains, et l'on motivait cette obligation d'une manière assez curieuse et originale : [7]

« Il leur est défendu sous de grosses peines d'y employer aucuns facteurs ou commissionnaires. Ainsi les marchands de la ville et les forains se rencontrant ensemble sur les mêmes ports ou dans les mêmes marchés, les forains, toujours pressés de retourner à leur commerce ou à leurs affaires, lâchent la main , vendent à meilleur marché ... Cela sert encore à entretenir l'abondance, car plus tôt le marchand forain a débité ses grains, plus tôt il s'en retourne et en amène d'autres. »

Thus harassed, foreign merchants eventually entrusted city merchants with the sale of their goods, so that the competition that had existed between the two classes of merchants, to the advantage of consumers, disappeared entirely. In 1699, another famine struck, and a new edict was issued, renewing and intensifying all previous regulations. The grain trade was prohibited from province to province. But these deplorable measures only worsened the situation, and as Vauban attests, the population found itself reduced to the most extreme destitution. In 1709, another famine, more terrible than any before, occurred: the majority of the wheat crops froze in the fields. However, the damage could have been mitigated. Yet the same authorities who had previously ordered the sowing of uncultivated land now forbade replanting, making famine inevitable.

"At first," writes M. Joly de Fleury, Advocate General to the parlement, who left behind a highly informative note on this matter, "it was believed that the wheat would sprout again, and so it was forbidden to turn over the fields sown with wheat to plant barley instead. But when spring arrived, it became clear that there was no hope for the wheat except in a few provinces, such as Lower Brittany, Lower Normandy, and Guyenne, where, because the land was heavily covered, the snow had resisted the wind and the soil had remained protected. In Perche and Maine, there was also a quarter-year’s worth of wheat, as in some other provinces; but in all the plains—Île-de-France, Beauce, and the principal provinces—the harvest was entirely barren. Thus, while the previous year wheat had been valued at 8 or 10 francs per setier, by July it had risen to 55 francs. When the sterility of the fields became evident, permission was granted in April and March to sow small grains. Despite all precautions, barley was sold for as much as 60 francs per setier. People sowed as much as they could, but until the barley harvest arrived, poverty reached an excessive level—wheat had risen to an exorbitant price, and the war was devastating the people, forcing them to bear unbearable financial burdens."

To these regulations, which were commonly imposed in times of famine but frequently renewed, must be added the prohibition on brewing beer and ale in bad harvest years. We find edicts on this subject dating from 1263, 1416, 1482, and even 1693. By this last edict, the brewing of white and double beers, as well as the distillation of grain-based spirits, was forbidden under penalty of confiscation and a fine of 3,000 francs. One-third of the confiscated grain was awarded to the informant, and the remaining two-thirds were allocated to the poor.

Finally, there was exceedingly complex and ever-changing legislation on exports. As for imports, there was no thought yet of prohibiting them. The state of impoverishment and oppression in which agriculture found itself, along with the numerous obstacles that hindered the circulation and trade of grain, rendered them insignificant. In many cases, imports were even encouraged with subsidies and bonuses. Conversely, exports had been regulated and taxed from time immemorial. Known as traites foraines, they were already subject to a duty under the kings of the first dynasty. In 1488, Charles VIII set this duty at six deniers per livre of the price of goods exported from the diocese of Paris and at one sou for those taken elsewhere. Francis I later adjusted it to one écu d’or per tonneau. The écu, a gold coin of twenty-three carats, weighed 71 1/6 to the marc and was worth, at the time, 45 sous. The tonneau contained six setiers, or approximately 1,300 liters. Any grain exported fraudulently was confiscated. Under Francis II, in 1559, a bureau of eight commissioners was established to grant or deny export permits based on the abundance or scarcity of harvests. In 1567, Charles IX issued a new ordinance on the matter. The king decreed: 1.) that no grain exports were to be conducted outside the kingdom without his permission, granted through royal letters patent, under penalty of corporal punishment, confiscation, and a fine of 500 livres parisis; 2.) that governors, sénéchaux, and baillis were to report annually to the king on the abundance or sterility of their provinces; 3.) that trade from province to province would be unrestricted. In June 1571, yet another edict was issued regarding exportation, in which the king solemnly proclaimed his exclusive right to grant export permits:

"This faculty and power of granting permits and permissions for the transport of grain outside the kingdom is a royal prerogative and part of the domain of the crown, incommunicable to any person whatsoever."

Accordingly, the king strictly forbade all his subjects from granting such permissions or transporting grain fraudulently, under penalty of the crime of lèse-majesté. He then insisted on the necessity of curbing excessive exports:

"Desiring to put an end to the excessive and outrageous transport of grain out of our kingdom, which often cause great shortages and hardship among our subjects, as the boundless license and insufferable greed of such actions have turned the bounty and fertility of our provinces [305] into frequent hardship and dearness, even to the extent that our subjects are sometimes forced to import grain from foreign lands at infinite costs and expenses—this is a matter we wish to regulate to prevent recurrence, if possible, given the great harm and prejudice it causes to us and to our said subjects."

Henri III renewed the prohibition on exporting grain without special permission in 1577 and explicitly forbade exports from Picardy and Champagne, where famine prevailed. Henri IV prohibited exports through an edict dated March 12, 1595, but reinstated them in 1598. Sully, who understood that agriculture would thrive more if it had access to broader markets, was a proponent of export freedom. Writing to Henri IV about a ruling by the magistrates of Saumur that banned grain exports, he stated:

"If every judge in the kingdom does the same, soon your subjects will be without money, and consequently, Your Majesty as well."

Under Louis XIII, in 1631, exports were once again banned. Louis XIV initially permitted exports, and a Conseil d'État decree issued during Fouquet’s administration (January 24, 1657) justified this policy on the grounds that [8]

"the inhabitants of the provinces, being forced to sell their grain at a very low price, could no longer afford to pay their taxes and other levies."

However, under Colbert, regulatory measures prevailed both domestically and internationally. Between 1669 and 1683 alone, twenty-nine decrees were issued concerning exports.

"During this fourteen-year period," writes M. Pierre Clément, "exports were prohibited for fifty-six months. Eight decrees allowed them, provided that 22 livres per muid, as set by the 1664 tariff, were paid; five decrees reduced this duty to half or a quarter; and eight granted full exemption. However, it should be noted that export permits were only granted for three or six months, rarely for an entire year. Most prohibition decrees were justified by the need to maintain abundance within the kingdom and to more easily sustain the troops during winter quarters."

To this, Boisguillebert and Forbonnais rightly objected that by only granting temporary permits and thus making export markets unstable, the government discouraged cultivation and reduced the overall grain supply the country could rely on in times of scarcity.

This legislation, which subjected the domestic grain trade to the most vexatious regulations and the international grain trade to the precarious system of temporary permits, continued to prevail throughout the first half of the eighteenth century. Finally, in 1763, thanks to the new economic insights spread by the physiocrats and the harsh lessons of experience, the need for a more liberal system was recognized. By an ordinance dated May 25, all nobles, bourgeois, and farmers were granted permission to trade freely in grain, flour, and vegetables throughout the kingdom, free from any duties, including tolls. Additional ordinances in July and November 1764 authorized grain exports from the kingdom with a duty of one-half percent, provided that wheat prices did not exceed 12 livres 10 sous per quintal. If prices rose above this threshold, exports were suspended. Only regulations concerning the supply of Paris remained in force. The administration of the "blés du roi" (the King's wheat), established under Louis XIV, was also maintained, though it unfortunately became a source of egregious abuses. The Contrôleur général Laverdy, the same official who had restored freedom to the circulation and trade of grain, leased the management of royal grain supplies to a company. This company had a capital of 180,000 francs, divided into 18 shares baring interest. Operations began on September 1, 1765, under the direction of a former miller and baker named Malisset. In 1766, each share of interest yielded a return of 2,000 livres, equating to a 20 percent profit. While this figure was not exorbitant, the company nevertheless became widely despised—firstly, because it alone was authorized to operate, whereas associations or coalitions among grain merchants remained prohibited; secondly, because it operated with state funds, thereby engaging in ruinous competition against ordinary commerce. Finally, rumors spread that high-ranking officials, and even the king himself, were involved in its dealings. A secretary of the clergy, M. Leprevost de Beaumont, who became aware of certain secret stipulations within the agreement, dared to denounce them before the parlement. However, this denunciation would prove fatal only to himself. Arrested on November 17, 1768, Leprevost de Beaumont was thrown into prison, where he remained until 1789. Turgot abolished the royal grain administration and ordered the sale of all remaining stock (about 170,000 setiers). However, in the meantime, the government’s involvement in the grain trade had caused disastrous disruptions and had earned—perhaps justifiably—the accusation of profiting from the people’s hunger. The so-called "famine pact" would later become a formidable grievance in the rhetoric of the revolutionaries. [9] The liberal policy introduced in 1763 and 1764 remained in effect for six years. But in 1767, following poor harvests, free trade was quickly blamed for the high price of wheat. The parlement, a stronghold of regulatory traditions that had nearly always advocated for restrictive measures, met repeatedly to protest against the newly established grain policies. When its complaints proved ineffective, the prévôt des marchands, under its influence, convened a general assembly of regulators on November 28, 1768—just as similar assemblies had been held to address the same issue in 1630, [306] 1693, and 1694. This assembly was composed of the various chambers of the parlement, the lieutenant de police, the prévôt des marchands and aldermen, fourteen deputies of the clergy, fifteen representatives of Parisian trades and commerce, fourteen notable citizens, the fermiers généraux, and the directors of the hôpital général. The minutes of this meeting, which have been preserved, [10] reveal the extent to which regulatory doctrines were deeply ingrained at the time. The most vehement attacks were directed against the "theorists" who had influenced the change in legislation, particularly the abbé Baudeau. Barely two or three voices were raised in their defense. Admittedly, the physiocrats (see PHYSIOCRATES), focusing primarily on agricultural interests, had made the mistake of claiming that free trade and circulation would naturally lead to higher prices—a misconception that inevitably made their doctrine unpopular among urban consumers. Unsurprisingly, they were accused of wanting to starve the people for the benefit of landowners and merchants. The latter were also harshly criticized by the leading speakers at the assembly, who denounced their greed, avarice, and harmful maneuvers. [11]

"He who, without being a farmer," wrote a master of accounts, M. Clément, "amasses great stores of this commodity, who buys it from all sides to sell it at an excessive price to his fellow citizens, is regarded as guilty by all ordinances... Cruel in himself toward the indigent, whom he drags to a slow and dreadful death, the monopolist presents himself with an air of compassion for his fellow citizens: to hear him speak, he seeks grain from all quarters to aid a province; he even offers it in the markets, but his accomplices return it to his warehouses until he has secured the excessive price dictated by his greed... It is impossible," he concluded, "for the monopoly of avaricious farmers or greedy merchants to exercise its cruelty and remain untamed under the eyes of so many enlightened magistrates and under the authority of a wise and paternal government. It is only right that the poor should triumph over the injustice of the monopolists under the reign of a monarch who would wipe the tears from all his subjects and whose heart is full of tenderness and love for his people."

The avocat général Séguier, the same person who protested on behalf of the parlement against the suppression of maîtrises and jurandes, along with most other speakers, spoke in the same vein. The assembly concluded by almost unanimously demanding the repeal of the laws of 1763 and 1764. Consequently, the parlement presented its most humble remonstrances to the king regarding the established legislation. But in turn, the king—whose revenues had increased due to the freedom of trade—held firm. [12]

"The rise in prices," he replied to the first president, who spoke on behalf of the parlement (December 11, 1768), "is the effect of fears inspired by poor harvests, of the anxieties of weak or misinformed minds, of the artifices of interested or ill-intentioned individuals, and even of the prosperity of the farmers, this most precious portion of my subjects. Given these considerations, I do not find it appropriate to change a law on such a delicate matter, especially at a time when exportation is already prohibited by the very law that authorizes it. Such a change would produce no good and could, in the future, be harmful to my subjects."

However, as high prices persisted, the abbé Terray, then contrôleur général, revoked the previous edicts in 1770 and reinstated the old laws. On this occasion, Turgot, from his post as intendant of Limoges, addressed to him his eloquent Lettres sur le commerce des grains, in which he defended the sound cause with better arguments than most other economists. Putting his doctrine into practice, Turgot maintained the free circulation of grain within his jurisdiction, and this measure effectively spared it from the horrors of famine. In the same year, the famous Dialogues sur le commerce des blés by the abbé Galiani were published. The witty Neapolitan abbé used his subtle and biting pen in service of regulatory doctrines, though not in an entirely absolute manner. One of the economists, the abbé Morellet, took it upon himself to refute Galiani. Unfortunately, while his Réfutation des Dialogues sur le commerce des blés [13] was superior in substance, it lacked the lightness and charm of Galiani’s work and was much less read. A few years later (in 1775), Necker published his book On grain legislation and trade, in which the old regulatory practices of the administration were justified and adorned with a veneer of philanthropy. Further on, one will see the disastrous influence that this book and its author exerted on public food supply at one of the most critical moments in our history. During this fierce pamphlet war, which captivated public interest, Louis XV passed away. No sooner had the new king ascended the throne than, seduced by the pure and progressive doctrines of the economists, he called to office the author of the Lettres sur le commerce des grains. Having become contrôleur général des finances, Turgot hastened to overturn the restrictive ordinances of the abbé Terray. By virtue of an edict dated September 13, 1774, and several subsequent edicts, the freedom of grain and flour trade was reestablished within the kingdom, octroi duties on grain were abolished, along with various other restrictive legislative provisions. As the year had been poor, the government reserved judgment on foreign trade liberalization until circumstances became more favorable. To illustrate the privileges and local monopolies that had gradually been established at the expense of the people's subsistence and which Turgot sought to dismantle, we shall cite two examples: in Lyon, a corporation of [307] bakers had been allowed to form, almost completely preventing the introduction of bread baked outside the city, and it had, with the consent of the municipal authorities, arrogated to itself the privilege of selling its bread at a higher price. In Rouen, a company of one hundred and twelve merchants alone had the right to buy the grain entering the city, and its monopoly extended even to the markets of Andelys, Elbeuf, Duclair, and Caudebec, the most important in the province. Following this was a company of ninety officials responsible for loading and unloading grain, who alone had the right to transport it. Lastly, there was the city itself, which, with a sophisticated system of vexatious regulations, exploited five mills possessing the droit de banalité, of which it was the owner. [14] Turgot put an end to these abuses, but not without provoking intense resentment. The monopolists and courtiers, whose means of subsistence he had jeopardized, eagerly sought an opportunity to discredit and ruin him. That opportunity soon arose. The 1774 harvest had been mediocre. Grain prices rose, though without reaching a particularly high level, at the beginning of 1775. This price increase led to disturbances in Burgundy, then in Pontoise, Versailles, and Paris. The riots appeared to have been planned in advance, with rioters visibly following a coordinated plan: at times they bought food supplies, at other times they seized them by force, but always to destroy them. They burned granaries, sank grain-laden boats, and blocked shipments along the lower Seine and the Oise. One such group arrived in Versailles on May 2, demanding in loud cries that the price of bread be lowered. The king, weak in resolve, yielded to this demand and ordered the price cap to be reduced to two sous per livre. Encouraged by this success, the agitators proceeded to Paris, where they plundered bakers’ shops and threw sacks of grain into the river from the grain boats. The lieutenant de police allowed them to do this, and it was claimed that the parlement, as well as several high-ranking figures, secretly encouraged the disorder. The king had forbidden the troops from firing on the rioters, and the parlement issued a decree posted throughout Paris forbidding assemblies but also stating that the king would be petitioned to lower the price of bread. Turgot understood the necessity of employing firm measures to counteract the ill will of some and the weakness of others. He had an ordinance posted over the parlement’s decree, forbidding any sale of bread below market value. He then forced the parlement itself, in a lit de justice held on May 5, to register a royal proclamation attributing the suppression of the riots to juridiction prévôtale. Finally, he sent a force of 25,000 men under Marshal de Biron to pursue the rioters in all directions, ensuring the capital’s food supply and replacing the lieutenant de police Lenoir—who had colluded with the rioters—with the economist Albert. A grain merchant whose boats had been looted was immediately compensated. [15] Turgot’s decisive actions ended this upheaval, known as the guerre des farines (the flour wars); food supplies could once again flow normally, and abundance was restored. Yet his enemies only intensified their efforts to bring about his downfall. Necker’s empty and declamatory book On grain legislation was praised to the hilt out of hatred for Turgot, and one of the Genevan banker’s friends, the Marquis de Pezai, launched a campaign of pamphlets and caricatures against Turgot and the economists. [16] Voltaire came to the aid of the minister, whom the coalition of privileged elites and envious rivals sought to destroy, and he aimed his sparkling Diatribe à l’auteur des Éphémérides at them. However, despite the support of Voltaire and all liberal-minded thinkers, Turgot succumbed to the formidable coalition arrayed against his reformist policies. Abandoned by the weak Louis XVI, he left office a year after the guerre des farines (May 12, 1776), and most of his reforms disappeared with him.

§ 2. Legislation during the Revolution and the under the Empire.

In 1788, the Archbishop of Brienne, who had embraced the liberal principles of the economists, authorized exportation. The harvests had been good, and abundance reigned in the country. But on July 13, 1788, a hailstorm devastated the crops in the vicinity of Paris, and the winter, which began early, struck with cruel severity. M. Necker, having returned to the ministry, believed the time had come to apply the system he had developed in his deplorable book on the Legislation and commerce of grain. He ordered all provincial authorities to gather information on the yield of the harvest. This hastily compiled survey indicated a deficit, and Necker quickly took measures to secure supply. Exportation was prohibited by an edict on September 7, 1788, followed by additional edicts on November 23, 1788, and April 22, 1789; the old obligation to buy and sell only in markets was reinstated; import subsidies were granted; moreover, commissioners sent to the provinces and police magistrates were authorized, when necessary, to compel those who had grain in their granaries to supply the markets and to gather information on "the supplies that could be relied upon in moments when the freedom of trade would not suffice." These measures were justified by the need to prevent "purchases and hoarding undertaken solely with the aim of profiting from the rising price of grain." At the same time, M. Necker initiated significant purchases on foreign markets on behalf of the government. Yet, if Arthur Young—who was traveling in France at the time—is to be believed, these precautions, which heightened fears everywhere, were aimed at a phantom, for the harvest was not below that of an ordinary year. [17]

"Everywhere I passed," he said, (and I traveled through several provinces), I inquired about the causes of the scarcity, and [306] I was assured in all places that the high price of grain was the most extraordinary thing in the world; that although the harvest had not been abundant, it had nevertheless been an ordinary one, and therefore, the lack of grain must have been caused by exportation. I asked them if they were sure that a large quantity had been exported; they replied that they were not, but that it could have been done secretly: these responses proved well enough that exportation was a chimera."

Indeed, exports and imports had balanced in 1787 with a slight surplus in favor of imports, and in 1788 exports had removed only a relatively insignificant quantity from the country (662,723 q. m., from which 181,174 q. m. must still be deducted for imports). But if scarcity was at first merely a phantom, the minister’s reckless measures soon turned it into a reality. Panic spread universally, and wheat prices quickly rose to 50 and 57 livres per setier. M. Necker then increased his purchases abroad. Within six months, from the autumn of 1788 onward, he spent no less than 45,533,697 livres on grain purchases. In this way, he procured 1,404,863 quintaux of grain, or 585,192 setiers (at 240 livres per setier), a quantity barely sufficient to feed 195,064 individuals for a year. At a rate of 3 setiers per head per year for a population of 26 million souls, said Arthur Young, this much-vaunted relief would not have sufficed to feed France for three days. There would have been a shortfall of 55,908 setiers, for France’s daily consumption at that time was estimated at 213,700 setiers per day. Now, these purchases, which provided such feeble relief but signified "that the king was obliged to feed his people himself," could only serve to intensify the panic, as Arthur Young attested. v [18]

"When M. Necker brought to France three days’ worth of bread provisions," observed this shrewd analyst, "at a time when he was clothed with all the apparatus of authority, the price rose by 25 percent in the markets to my knowledge. What could have been the importance of three days’ worth of supplies added to those of the country, compared to the poverty and famine that these measures caused? Would it not have been infinitely wiser never to have placed any restrictions on the grain trade, which had always been an import trade? Never to have shown any concern? Never to have made any public intervention, but to have quietly allowed need and supply to meet without fuss or ostentation? By following this course, M. Necker would have saved the State 45 million and prevented the death of several thousand people, whom the price increase caused to perish, even though there was in fact no real scarcity; for I am convinced that if no public measures had been taken and if the edict of the Archbishop of Sens had not been revoked, the price of wheat in 1789 would not have exceeded 30 livres anywhere in France, whereas it rose as high as 50 and 57 livres."

It was in the midst of this famine and the riots it provoked across the country [19] that the National Assembly convened. The issue of subsistence had already occupied the minds of the electors, and in most of the cahiers, proposals had been put forward on the matter. Most of these proposals, it must be said, reflected the deepest ignorance. Thus, for example, the tiers état of Meudon demanded "that, since France is exposed to the rigors of famine, each farmer be required to register their harvests of all kinds: sheaves, bundles, muids, etc., along with the quantities they sell each month." The tiers état of Paris wanted "the exportation of grain to be strictly prohibited, as well as its circulation from one province to another, and its importation to always be permitted." The tiers état of Reims requested "that the most severe laws be enacted against the monopolists who are currently devastating the kingdom." No fewer than twelve cahiers called for regulations against exportation, and fifteen advocated the establishment of public granaries or stores of abundance. However, the Constituent Assembly demonstrated more understanding of subsistence matters than the electors who had appointed it and even more than the government itself. As soon as it was formally constituted (June 1789), it appointed a Subsistence Committee to prepare a decree on the subject. This committee chose the economist Dupont de Nemours as its rapporteur. Dupont de Nemours submitted his report on July 4, and on August 29, the Assembly issued a decree that reaffirmed the prohibition on exportation while at the same time guaranteeing freedom of circulation within the country. Further decrees, issued on September 28 and October 5, 1789, and on April 30, 1790, continued in the same direction. A so-called federative oath was required of the National Guards, who swore to ensure the free circulation of provisions everywhere. Except for the prohibition on exportation, these measures were excellent; unfortunately, a Mémoire by M. Necker had just further intensified the panic. This "instructive memorandum, presented on behalf of the king to the Subsistence Committee" (June 1789), painted the situation in the darkest colors, with the evident aim of enhancing the merit of the measures the minister had taken to secure the country's provisions. Grain merchants, already the target of popular suspicion and hatred, were explicitly denounced: "Hoarding," said the minister, "is the first cause to which the masses attribute the high price of grain, and indeed, there has often been reason to complain about the greed of speculators." How reassuring such language must have been, coming from a minister who was then popular! M. Necker further declared that the king no longer ate anything but bread mixed with rye and wheat at his table. "What conclusions," said Arthur Young, "was the people supposed to draw from these assertions [309] if not that France had been reduced to such an extreme that everyone was in imminent danger of famine?"

Soon, the circulation and trade of grain were hindered or entirely halted everywhere. Stories of riots provoked by food shortages were heard throughout the land. [20]

"In March 1789," wrote M. Ed. Fleury, who gathered highly interesting accounts of the famine in the department of Aisne, "the inhabitants of Quessy, driven to desperation, stormed the farmers' estates, the merchants' granaries, and forcibly stopped the convoys heading to Chauny to be shipped off to Paris for the nourishment of its people."

And what did M. Necker do upon hearing news of this riot? Instead of restoring the freedom of circulation, he authorized the department of Soissons "to no longer permit any removal that might harm the subsistence of the local population." The municipalities worsened the disorder by interfering in commercial operations, sometimes even setting grain prices. In Guise, wheat was fixed at 12 livres per jallois, while it was selling for 15 or 16 livres in surrounding markets. "The merchants immediately disappeared," wrote M. Fleury, "and the municipal administration was forced to supply the needs of the city itself, purchasing about twenty muids at great expense and with great difficulty." Everywhere, merchants were hunted like wild animals.

When grain was not taxed, it was plundered. [21]

"Every village," wrote M. Fleury, "was a perilous gauntlet, every mountain a death trap, every sunken road an ambush where merchants risked both fortune and life. There was the bell-ringer of Saint-Thomas, near Corbeny, who had taken it upon himself to ring the tocsin at the sight of any grain trader daring to cross the village."

In many places, the National Guards, forgetting their federative oath, marched armed to intercept convoys and forced sellers to give up their grain at prices below market rates. When farmers or grain merchants dared to resist these odious exactions, they were mistreated and stripped of their goods. [22] In Paris, the insurrectionary municipality, which had been organized at the time of the storming of the Bastille, had established a Subsistence Committee, which hastily proceeded to purchase large quantities of grain from nearby markets, where prices were already undergoing alarming increases due to these irregular purchases, and where the growing insecurity of transport routes subsequently prevented the replenishment of supplies. Large convoys were escorted by vast deployments of armed forces; but it was not so easy, in the presence of an anxious population, to protect the smaller shipments intended to fill the voids caused by these mass extractions. The Paris municipality also made the mistake of setting the price of bread below that of flour and wheat. As a result, the administration was forced to supply the bakers itself at prices below market rates; and since the low price of bread attracted a crowd of consumers from the suburbs, its task became more difficult by the day. On October 5, 1789, bread ran out in the bakeries. Women immediately rushed to the Hôtel de Ville to complain to the municipal representatives. Then Maillard, seeking to defuse the danger, as M. Thiers recounts, urged them to go to Versailles to demand bread from the king, from that king "who had the merit of feeding his people," as M. Necker put it. As we know, they followed Maillard’s advice. After these disastrous days, there was further cause for mourning with the murder of the baker François, assassinated on October 28. But thanks to the firmness of the authorities, who arrested and condemned the assassins; thanks to the measures taken by the Assembly to uphold the freedom of circulation, order was somewhat restored, and anxieties began to subside. The Constituent Assembly consistently endeavored—much to its credit—to maintain the freedom of the grain trade, and it repeatedly annulled municipal decrees that sought to restrict it. Unfortunately, it often lacked the power to enforce its decrees.

In 1792, after the insurrection of August 10, when communications were disrupted everywhere, famine began to set in once more. As soon as it convened, the Convention, failing to grasp the true cause of the crisis, ordered a general inventory of grain stocks. Roland, then Minister of the Interior, tried to prevent the implementation of this disastrous measure, along with several others that had been recommended or were already being executed. In October and November, he addressed several remarkable letters to the National Convention and the Paris municipality in defense of free circulation of grain and against government and municipal intervention in food supplies. [23]

"Perhaps the only thing the Assembly should allow itself to do regarding subsistence," he said, "is to declare that it should do nothing, to remove all restrictions, to proclaim the most absolute freedom of the circulation of goods, to determine no course of action, but to take firm action against anyone who would infringe upon this freedom."

Roland strongly opposed the restrictions being placed on free circulation. In certain departments, he said, the price of grain had risen to 64 livres per setier due to artificial barriers to circulation, while elsewhere it did not exceed 25 to 26 livres. He then argued that the inventory which had been ordered to be done would only heighten public anxiety instead of calming it. [24]

"If the assessment falls far short of reality," he said, "if our grain stocks are undervalued by a third or by half; if, based on this flawed data, it appears that France has only six months of food supply, what a vast field this opens for panic and unrest! Will not the very fears that the Legislative Assembly sought [310] to prevent become even more dangerous and irreversible?"

Roland’s opinion was supported within the Convention by the moderates and the Girondins. Barbaroux, Valazé, Joseph Serre, Julien Souhait, and Lequinio spoke in favor of the freedom of circulation (November 1792). Unfortunately, the Montagnards seized this opportunity to undermine their political adversaries by accusing them of serving the interests of "hoarders." Robespierre delivered one of his typical perfidious and venomous speeches, demanding that the minister account for the people's food supply.

"You must subject to rigorous scrutiny all the laws enacted under royal despotism and under the auspices of noble, ecclesiastical, or bourgeois aristocracy; for so far, you have had no other laws. The most authoritative source we are cited is that of a minister of Louis XVI, opposed by another minister of the same tyrant. I witnessed the birth of the Constituent Assembly's legislation on grain trade; it was nothing more than a continuation of what had preceded it; it has remained unchanged to this day because the interests and prejudices that formed its foundation have not changed... The authors of the theory of free trade," he added, "have placed great value on the profits of merchants and landowners, and almost none on human lives. And why? Because it was the nobles, the ministers, and the rich who governed. If the people had governed, it is likely that this system would have been modified."

Now, here is how the Montagnard orator framed the problem to be resolved regarding subsistence:

"It is necessary," said Robespierre, "to ensure that all members of society have access to the portion of the earth's produce that is essential to their survival, to guarantee landowners and farmers a fair price for their industry, and to leave the surplus to the free market."

To achieve this goal, Robespierre supported two measures that had been proposed: the first consisted in determining the amount of grain produced in each canton and harvested by each landowner or farmer; the second in forcing merchants and farmers to sell their grain exclusively in markets and prohibiting all transportation of purchases at night. Once the subsistence of each citizen had been assured through these two means, and the necessities had been guaranteed to all, the remainder would be left to the free market. Robespierre did not fail to season his argument with the most violent insults against the monopolists, treacherously denouncing the supporters of free trade as accomplices of these "murderers of the people."

"What remedy is proposed to us?" he asked. "The current system. I denounce the murderers of the people, and you reply: Laissez-les faire! (Let them be!) ... I do not deprive the rich and landowners of any legitimate property; I only take from them the right to infringe upon the property of others. I do not destroy commerce, but the plundering of monopolists; I only condemn them to the penalty of allowing their fellow beings to live."

And as a conclusion:

"Selfish rich men, learn to foresee and prevent in advance the terrible outcomes of the struggle between pride and cowardly passions against justice and humanity. Let the example of the nobles and kings instruct you. Learn to taste the charms of equality and the delights of virtue, or at least be content with the advantages that fortune has given you, and leave the people their bread, their labor, and their morals."

Another Montagnard, S.-B. Lejeune, going even further than Robespierre, began his speech as follows:

"Do you want to eliminate the terrible effects of the artificial famine that is being felt all around you? Have the courage to go back to the root cause of this scourge. The cause of the evil lies within the walls of this city; it is in the tower of the Temple: bring the head of Louis XVI to the scaffold, and the people will have bread."

One can imagine the effect that these speeches, printed by order of the Convention and distributed throughout the country by the efforts of the popular societies, must have produced. The majority may have voted in favor of the free circulation of grain, but who would have dared to transport grain after the terrible curses of Robespierre and his followers against the "hoarders, the murderers of the people"? The situation therefore continued to worsen: wheat became increasingly scarce and expensive. Commerce was almost entirely destroyed due to the lack of security, and, on the other hand, it became increasingly difficult to get merchants to accept assignats as payment. A law was passed that imposed a penalty of six years in chains on anyone who sold coinage, meaning anyone who placed a different value on money compared to assignats; but this law only worsened the situation. Everywhere, merchants refused to sell their goods unless they were given a price proportionate to the depreciation of the assignats. There were only two possible courses of action: either to grant them complete freedom in this regard or to force them to sell their goods at a fixed price or maximum rate. The latter course was chosen, and a maximum price was first established for grain. The Convention resisted this disastrous measure for a long time, and even the Jacobins themselves opposed it; but in the end, as always, they were forced to give in to popular clamor. The law of May 4, which established the maximum price, was a summary of all the regulatory laws that had been enacted since the reign of Philip the Fair. Under this law, every merchant, landowner, or farmer was required to declare to the municipality the quantity of grain they possessed. False declarations were punished by confiscation of the grain. Sales could take place only in markets, under penalty of a fine ranging from 300 to 1,000 livres, incurred by both the buyer and the seller. Administrative and municipal bodies were authorized to requisition, within their jurisdiction, all merchants, farmers, or landowners to supply the markets. They could also requisition laborers to thresh the sheaves if the landowners refused to do so. No one could evade requisition, under penalty of confiscation, unless they could prove that they did not have [311] enough grain for their own consumption until the next harvest. Any individual engaged in the grain trade was required to declare it to the municipality. A receipt of this declaration was issued, which had to be presented at markets, where public officials would note in the margins the quantities that had been purchased. Traders were also required to keep registers recording the names of those from whom they had bought and to whom they had sold. In the locations where they purchased grain, they had to obtain a quittance à caution signed by the mayor and the municipal prosecutor. In the places of sale, they were given a discharge with the same formalities, after which they were required to present their quittance à caution in the places of purchase—all under penalty of confiscation and a fine of 300 to 1,000 livres. Apart from this, "free circulation" was maintained. Finally, the law ordered the establishment of a maximum price. To set this maximum, the district directories had sent the price lists of their local markets from January 1 to May 1 to the departmental directories. The average price was to serve as the maximum. This maximum was then to decrease as follows: by June 1, it was to be reduced by one-tenth, by one-twentieth of the remaining price on July 1, by one-thirtieth on August 1, and by one-fortieth on September 1. Any citizen found guilty of selling or buying above the maximum price was subject to a fine of 300 to 10,000 livres. Those found guilty of deliberately spoiling or wasting grain were punished with death; informants were awarded 1,000 francs. As one might expect, this law, which made almost all commerce impossible, did not improve the situation. Complaints continued; but, as usual, all the blame continued to be placed on the "hoarders": an absurd accusation, for at a time when the slightest accumulation of grain was viewed with suspicion, hoarders existed and could only exist in the popular imagination. What proves this, moreover, is that throughout the entire course of the Revolution, not a single case of actual "attempts at hoarding" was ever discovered. [25] Commerce, which is nothing more than a series of "hoardings" ("Accaparements" - see this term), had been destroyed, and the administration had effectively taken over the monopoly of supply. Now, who would have dared to compete with this formidable monopolist? Who would have had the audacity to defy the formidable penalties imposed for the slightest violation of its laws and regulations? Yet, despite this, all the misfortunes were still blamed on the "hoarders", and Collot d’Herbois delivered a thunderous report against these "leeches of the people."

"What could be more harmful," said Collot, "than this barbaric league that meditates day and night on all kinds of murders, and above all, the murder of the poor! For to deprive the poor, through horrendous speculations, of the means to procure their most pressing needs—food and clothing—is to murder them. Nature is abundant and generous, yet hoarders continually strive, through sacrilegious attacks, to render it barren and powerless. Nature has smiled upon our revolution and has constantly protected it; and yet the hoarders, in alliance with our tyrant enemies, conspire daily to bring calamities and counter-revolution: they fear that the true friend of liberty, the virtuous indigent, might have too much blood left to spill for this noble cause, etc., etc."

Following this report, a draconian decree was issued against hoarders (July 27, 1793). Under this decree, hoarding was declared a capital crime; hoarders were punished with death, and their goods were confiscated. One-third of the proceeds from denounced merchandise belonged to the informer. Any holder of essential goods was required to declare them to the municipality and to post a list of them outside their door. They then had to declare whether they agreed to sell these goods at retail, to anyone and without interruption, under the supervision of a commissioner appointed for this purpose. If they refused, the municipal officers put the goods up for sale on their behalf, pricing them at the current market rate. But this law, which was later strengthened (April 1, 1794), was not suited to make supply any easier. Complaints redoubled. Then, under the most severe penalties, the prohibition of exports was renewed; the law of May 4 was made even stricter (decree of September 11, 1793, on food supplies); the price of wheat was uniformly fixed at a maximum of 14 livres per quintal, with transportation costs set at a separate but equally regulated maximum; and finally, a Commission for Subsistence and Supplies was established, tasked with ensuring the nation's food security either through direct purchases or through requisitions and seizures. Initially composed of three members, then increased to five, with a seat on the Council, this commission soon gained extraordinary importance. Forced to replace the commerce that revolutionary decrees had destroyed, it spent up to 300 million per month and employed more than ten thousand workers. It alone had the right to issue requisitions (decree of February 12, 1794) and to direct the distribution of supplies from one department to another. It ordered massive grain purchases abroad, and the grain it bought at an average price of 21 francs in silver, it resold at the fixed maximum price of 17 francs in assignats. Thus, when it was dissolved fifteen months later (January 7, 1795), its deficit had reached 1.4 billion. And yet, its inability to ensure public food supplies was so great that the idea of ordering a general fast and a civic Lenten period was seriously considered. [26] Scandalous embezzlements took place within this immense and disorganized administration. Moreover, either through employee negligence or lack of transport, stockpiles of wheat and other requisitioned foodstuffs rotted in its depots. Never, in short, had a more disastrous experiment been conducted in state-controlled food distribution. Fortunately, the events of 9 Thermidor (July 27, 1794), put an end to this regime, whose continuation would have plunged [312]France back into barbarism. However, the reaction proceeded slowly. The law on the maximum price (see this term), though initially modified, was not abolished until December 25, 1794. Requisitions were maintained, though slightly softened, and the special system for supplying Paris remained intact. The government dismantled parts of its brutal and confiscatory intervention system, but it still did not dare grant trade enough security and freedom for it to resume normal operations. This hesitant and timid approach had the most disastrous consequences. Farmers, decimated by military requisitions and discouraged by price controls, had left much of their land fallow, resulting in an insufficient harvest in many departments. Since trade was still hampered and not reestablished quickly enough to assist deficit regions, extreme suffering persisted throughout the winter, which was particularly harsh. The famine was especially severe in Paris, leading to the terrible riots of 12 germinal (April 1) and the early days of Prairial (May).

Since the beginning of the revolution, Paris had been fed at the government's expense. In 1792, the municipality ensured that between 1,200 and 1,500 sacks of wheat were brought daily to the market to sustain the vast city. This wheat cost the municipality 62 livres per sack, yet it sold it to bakers at 54 livres. It thus lost up to 12,000 livres per day. [27] It goes without saying that grain merchants no longer went to the market, where bakers could source their supplies at below-market rates. Left as the city's sole provider, the municipality was soon forced to resort to the most oppressive measures to prevent neighboring residents from coming to Paris to purchase food supplies. [28]

"The Commune of Paris," says M. Thiers, "had regulated the distribution of bread among the bakers. No one could present themselves without a security card: on this card, issued by the revolutionary committees, was indicated the quantity of bread one could request, and this quantity was proportionate to the number of individuals in each family. Even the manner in which people were to queue at the bakers' doors was regulated. A rope was attached to their door: each person held it in their hand to maintain their place in line and avoid confusion. However, malicious women often cut the rope, causing a dreadful tumult, which required the armed force to restore order."

Through these vexatious precautions and by imposing the most burdensome sacrifices on itself, the municipality maintained the price of bread at three sous per pound in assignats. As long as the Terror lasted, Paris was supplied through requisitions; and since the requisitioned grain was paid for in assignats, at the maximum rate, the municipality’s losses were relatively small. But after Thermidor, as the government’s grip loosened, requisitions were no longer enforced, and at the same time, the rules established for the distribution of food supplies were increasingly violated. Security cards were still required to obtain bread, but everyone exaggerated their needs: Parisian consumers paid their milkmaids and laundresses with bread. Bakers secretly resold flour to rural inhabitants. As a result of these abuses, Parisian consumption had risen from 1,500 sacks to 1,900.

On March 16, 1795, as consumption continued to rise while supplies became increasingly difficult and costly, the government imposed rationing. The number of individuals in each family had to be indicated on the card, and only one pound of bread per person was allocated daily. Upon the proposal of the Montagnard Romme, this quantity was increased to one and a half pounds for workers. On March 17, 1,897 sacks of flour were distributed to feed Paris’s 636,000 inhabitants; 324,000 had received the extra half-pound. This extraordinary measure provoked universal murmurs, and Boissy d'Anglas, accused of being its instigator, was given the nickname Boissy-famine. The situation worsened when, on the morning of 7 Germinal (March 27), only a half-ration was distributed. Women's riots became a daily occurrence. The defeated Jacobins skillfully exploited this public calamity, claiming that all the poverty stemmed from the failure to implement the Constitution of 1793. They successfully roused the populace once more, leading to the disastrous insurrections of April 1 and early May, erupting to the cries of Bread! The Constitution of '93!

Yet this system, which was becoming more burdensome by the day, remained in place until January 1796. Assignats had become so devalued that the government was recouping barely a 200th of the cost it incurred for provisioning Paris. Benezech, the Directory’s Minister of the Interior, then had the courage to propose abolishing rations, except for the indigent, pensioners, and government employees whose incomes or salaries did not exceed 1,000 écus (since pensioners and civil servants continued to be paid in assignats). The Directory approved Benezech’s proposal, and the provisioning of Paris was finally returned to commerce. Curiously enough, all factions united against the minister who had instigated this excellent measure, harassing him to such an extent that he sought to resign. Fortunately, the Directory had the good sense to keep him in office, along with his policy. From that moment on, public food supply ceased to be jeopardized.

The measures concerning food supplies during the revolutionary period have been assessed differently by historians. M. Thiers sought to justify them: [29]

"If, in the general administration of the State before the 9th of Thermidor," he says, "there was anything that was irreproachable and fully justified, it was the management of finances, food supplies, and provisions... The Commission for Commerce and [313] Supplies had ensured the transport of grain, animal fodder, and goods from the countryside to the borders or to large municipalities; and commerce, frightened by war and political turmoil, would never have done this spontaneously. It had to be supplemented by the will of the government, and this extraordinary, energetic will deserved the gratitude and admiration of France, despite the outcries of those small men who, during the nation's peril, knew only how to hide."

Yes, but who had relentlessly contributed to frightening commerce? Who had, from the very start of the Revolution, exploited and inflamed popular prejudices against hoarders? Who had turned the issue of food supply into a political weapon? Was it not the party of the Terrorists? Should we then be grateful to this party for feeding France—and in what manner!—after having deprived it of the means to feed itself?

M. Granier de Cassagnac, in his Histoire du Directoire, made an error of a different kind by attributing to revolutionary theorists—Mably, Brissot, etc.—the idea of substituting government intervention for commerce. As we have seen, this idea had long been put into practice, in varying degrees of severity, by the administration. The legislators of the Revolution merely repeated, under different formulas, the royal ordinances that had been issued from the reign of Philippe le Bel to that of Louis XV. If the rhetoric of Robespierre and other proponents of restrictive grain trade laws differs in style from that of the regulatory orators at the 1768 assembly on regulation, it does not differ at all in substance. The revolutionaries invented nothing in terms of regulation and arbitrary measures; they merely copied—but we must admit that they were terrible copyists.

One might have thought that this violent and lamentable experiment in food supply regulation would serve as a permanent lesson to legislators. But alas! The lesson was once again lost: under the Empire, all the old errors that had recently caused such dreadful suffering reappeared, and they produced the same disasters. The year 1811, which had been favorable to the grape harvest, yielded only a mediocre grain harvest. Napoleon, who was preparing for his fateful Russian campaign, was eager to "secure the capital's food supply." Consequently, by a decree of August 28, 1811, he created a subsistence council and ordered grain purchases for Paris's reserves. His plan was to maintain a permanent grain reserve in Paris, a project he had already begun by constructing the monumental warehouse on Boulevard Bourdon. He intended, he said, to influence prices through these reserves and to thwart the maneuvers of speculators (agioteurs). He did not realize that the very presence of a reserve, which the arbitrary decree of a despot could suddenly flood onto the market, would be enough to drive away more grain than his granaries of abundance could ever hold. Whatever the case, he ordered the purchase of large quantities of grain to complete his reserve. The effect of these purchases was, naturally, to drive up prices. Napoleon, not wanting to displease the Parisians as he was about to leave them, ordered that bread be priced below the grain market rate and that bakers be supplied from the reserve. But since the reserve could not provide enough, many bakers went bankrupt and several shut down their shops. People came to Paris, where bread was priced at 18 sous, to buy large quantities and resell them in the surrounding areas, where the price ranged from 26 to 28 sous. The transportation of bread outside of Paris was strictly prohibited, yet significant amounts were smuggled out. Authorities were forced to requisition supplies from commercial warehouses to meet the growing needs of the reserve. Two decrees, issued on May 4 and May 8, completed the regulatory system recommended by the subsistence council. Under the first, anyone purchasing grain for departments in need was required to declare their transactions to the prefect beforehand. It was also forbidden to stockpile grain or flour in warehouses. Consequently, every holder of foodstuffs had to make an immediate declaration and bring the designated quantities to the market specified by authorities. Farmers and landowners were subject to the same declarations and requisitions. The second decree reinforced these measures by establishing a Maximum price. Grain could not be sold above 33 francs in departments where the supply was sufficient for consumption. In others, prefects were required to set a maximum price immediately, taking transportation costs into account. However, the decree explicitly stated that its enforcement could not extend beyond four months (from May to September 1812). These measures were greeted with the usual flattery from courtiers, who had nothing to fear from scarcity, but they only worsened the crisis. Some intelligent prefects, wisely setting a high maximum price, succeeded in attracting grain to their departments. [30]

"But," says M. Vincens, from whom we borrow these details about the 1812 famine, "this was not done—or was not done successfully—everywhere. Many prefects blindly followed the prescribed path, enforcing the decree rigidly, or believed they would earn merit by intensifying its severity. In some places, the harsh enforcement of the law drove grain into hiding. Requisitions to stock markets were in vain; they remained empty. The departments of Mayenne, Cher, Loir-et-Cher, Meuse, and, by extension, Seine-Inférieure and Calvados, found themselves without resources. They sent agents to Paris to request assistance, but nothing could be given to them. In certain rural areas, people survived only on wild herbs and roots, leading to outbreaks of disease."

In Paris, bakers were reduced to making flour out of anything they could find.

The exact cost of this [314] new and disastrous experiment in state intervention in food supplies is unknown, but it appears that in Paris alone, the losses from the reserve amounted to more than 12 million. Under the Empire, the export of grain, which had been prohibited since 1790, remained permitted until the end of 1810; banned at that time, it was again allowed upon the return of the Bourbons, whenever the price exceeded certain limits (royal ordinance of July 26, 1814, converted into law on December 2). The enforcement of the export law was once again suspended during the Hundred Days and was only resumed after the famine of 1816. In that disastrous year, a bounty of 5 francs per hectoliter was granted to importers of foreign grain (see APPROVISIONNEMENTS).

§ 3. LEGISLATION SINCE THE EMPIRE—CEREAL LAWS.

Until then, imports in France had escaped the restrictive provisions of the regulatory system; they had been considered too insignificant to alarm domestic producers. Indeed, only certain coastal areas, such as the shores of Provence and Lower Languedoc, relied on foreign grain supplies; from 1778 to 1790, for example, total imports exceeded exports by only 394,000 hectoliters. The minor significance of imports was primarily due to export prohibitions in most neighboring countries and the instability of international communications, which were almost always entirely or partially suspended due to war. But after 1816, the situation changed: general trade routes reopened, and the prevailing security, combined with the multiplication of transport routes, made it possible to bring substantial quantities of foodstuffs to market. A new type of competition arose that particularly alarmed farmers in the South; this was the competition from Crimean grain. Previously almost unknown in French markets, Odessa wheat now arrived at exceedingly low prices. Since the 1818 harvest had been abundant, landowners in the eastern and southern departments flooded the Chamber with petitions, demanding protection from this new competition. In 1819, the government, which was then entirely devoted to the interests of large landowners, introduced a law to limit grain imports. This law was passed with even stricter provisions by the Chamber of Deputies. Virtually alone, the honorable M. Voyer d’Argenson protested on behalf of the unfortunate consumers, who were being sacrificed to the interests of the landed elite: [31]

"Does one believe," he said, "that wages will rise in proportion to grain prices? I appeal to all those who have lived in the depths of the countryside: they will see what they have seen a thousand times before—as the price of food rises, the poor man's diet becomes coarser; from eating mixed grains, he moves to barley, from barley to potatoes or oats. I do not wish to seek to stir up emotions, yet I cannot forget that I have compiled an herbarium of twenty-two plant species that the inhabitants of the Vosges were tearing from the meadows during the last famine. They knew from the traditions of their forefathers how to use them in such times, and they have passed this knowledge on to their children; those plants are scarcely withered now as we debate whether to legislate against the fall in grain prices."

Despite this eloquent protest, the law passed by a majority of 134 votes against 28. This law was grafted onto the export legislation established in 1814. Here is its framework: in 1814, frontier departments had been divided into three classes and eight sections. In the first class, which included departments where grain prices were habitually highest, exportation ceased to be permitted once prices reached 23 francs per hectoliter. In the second class, where prices were average, it was allowed up to 21 francs. Finally, in the third class, where prices were lowest, export was only free up to 19 francs. These three classes were subdivided into eight sections, each containing several markets whose price data determined the regulatory average. This price, which was to be published in the Moniteur on the first of each month, was calculated based on the price reports from the first two market days of the previous month and the last market day of the month before that. As a result, the tariff could change—and did change—twelve times a year, according to the fluctuating price of the commodity.

The divisions adopted in 1814 were retained in 1819, and the price limits for exportation served as the first threshold for the sliding scale of import duties. Initially, a permanent duty of 0.25 francs per hectoliter of grain and 0.75 francs per metric quintal of flour was imposed on imports via French ships; for foreign ships, the duties were 1.25 francs on grain and 3.75 francs on flour. In addition to these permanent duties, a supplementary tax of 1 franc per hectoliter was levied whenever prices fell to 23 francs in the first class, 21 francs in the second, and 19 francs in the third. Importation thus became subject to additional and variable duties precisely at the point where exportation ceased to be permitted. But that was not all: as prices declined, the supplementary tax increased; for every franc of price decrease, the duty rose by 1 franc. Finally, when prices dropped to 20 francs in the first class, 18 francs in the second, and 16 francs in the third, imports were completely prohibited. The supplementary duties on the metric quintal of flour were set at three times the duties on the hectoliter of grain. The provisions of the law also applied to rye and maize, with import prohibition beginning when prices fell to 17, 15, and 13 francs, respectively. The goal of this legislation, imported from England and known as the sliding scale system, was to force the price of wheat to fluctuate within certain limits, whose extremes were set at 23 and 16 francs, and, as much as possible, to maintain an overall average price of 19 to 20 francs.

The law was further reinforced by a provision in the customs law of June 7, 1820. The [315] permanent import duties on goods transported by French ships were increased to 1.26 francs per hectoliter of grain and 2.50 francs per metric quintal of flour when the importation was not made directly from certain so-called production countries, namely the ports of the Black Sea, Egypt, the Baltic, the White Sea, and the United States. On the other hand, import duties on foreign ships were raised to 2.50 francs whenever prices did not reach the threshold where the additional duty ceased to apply; as soon as they reached this threshold, the differential duty dropped back to 1.25 francs.

Despite this tightening of restrictions, the 1819 law failed to achieve its goal of preventing wheat prices from falling below the 20-franc level, which was considered profitable for agriculture. The 1819 harvest had been abundant, and the 1820 harvest was magnificent. As a result, the average price of wheat, which had been 18.43 francs in 1819, fell to 16.60 francs in 1820.

Once again, landowners became alarmed and demanded stricter legislation. Imports, consisting mainly of wheat from Odessa, had exceeded exports by approximately 700,000 hectoliters; it was argued that such disastrous levels of imports must be prevented from recurring. The government, which could do nothing to refuse the large landowners, introduced a new law in 1821; however, the majority in the Chamber of Deputies, finding it insufficiently restrictive, further strengthened its provisions. Protectionists of the time even went so far as to demand the absolute prohibition of foreign grains. One of them, M. Humblot-Conté, citing the example of England, claimed that absolute prohibition was the only way to ensure abundance in the country: [32]

"It is only," he said, "since the English adopted prohibitive laws and encouraged exports that they have eliminated the causes of the frequent famines that, according to their history, once ravaged that country. The prohibitive legislation that has worked so well in England must be even stricter when applied to France, where only a complete prohibition can prevent famines; for it is only through absolute prohibitions that we can encourage the grain trade and speculation on this commodity."

Under the influence of this protectionist sentiment, the law was passed despite strong opposition from the left, particularly from M. Benjamin Constant, who provoked an outcry by accusing the landowning majority in the Chamber of having imposed this law which increased prices. The law was passed by a majority of 282 votes to 54.

Under this law, dated July 4, 1821, the frontier departments were divided into four classes; exportation was prohibited when the price exceeded 25 francs in the first class, 23 francs in the second, 21 francs in the third, and 19 francs in the fourth. Regarding importation, the first duty became applicable when prices fell to 26 francs in the first class, 24 francs in the second, 22 francs in the third, and 20 francs in the fourth. Below these limits, a second duty of 1 franc per each additional franc of price decline was applied; finally, when prices fell below 24 francs in the first class, 22 francs in the second, 20 francs in the third, and 18 francs in the fourth, all imports were prohibited. Equivalent modifications were introduced in the tariff for lower-quality grains.

However, this law, which at least doubled the protection granted to cereal production, proved even less effective than the previous one. Instead of rising, grain prices continued to decline rapidly: in 1821, the average price per hectoliter had been 18.65 francs, falling to 15.08 francs in 1822; it rose to 17.20 francs in 1823, dropped again to 15.86 francs in 1824, then to 14.80 francs in 1825, rose slightly to 15.23 francs in 1826, and to 15.97 francs in 1827. Only then did prices begin to recover, stabilizing at an average of 21 to 22 francs until 1833. The law thus failed to raise prices, despite being nearly prohibitive; in Marseille, for example, imports were allowed for only one month (February 1828) between 1821 and 1830. It is true that grain traders found ways to circumvent the law by shipping cargoes of Odessa wheat to Nantes, where imports were still allowed, even as they were banned in Marseille, and then re-exporting the wheat from Nantes to Marseille as “Frenchified” goods. However, these shipments, which were sometimes profitable due to disparities in tariff rates between regions, never reached significant volumes. As harvests were poor in 1828 and 1829, the July Monarchy sought to win popular favor by modifying the 1821 law in a more liberal direction. It proposed: (1) temporarily abolishing the additional duties imposed on wheat from so-called non-production countries, as well as on grain imported via land borders (which had been treated the same as imports via foreign ships), and reducing all supplementary duties by 25 centimes; (2) allowing cargoes of wheat that had been shipped in due time but delayed by navigation accidents to be admitted even if they arrived after the import window had closed. Several other secondary provisions completed this provisional law, which remained in effect until July 30, 1831. At that time, a royal ordinance renewed those provisions that could be enacted by simple ordinances. On October 17 of that year, the government introduced a new grain law with relatively liberal provisions; however, a commission of the Chamber of Deputies, with M. Ch. Dupin as its rapporteur, completely rewrote the draft into a protectionist version. Despite the efforts of MM. Duvergier de Hauranne, Alexandre Delaborde, d’Harcourt, and a few other liberal speakers, the modified bill was passed by a majority of 218 votes to 24. It was decided, however, that the law would be temporary, remaining in effect for only one year; but it was subsequently extended indefinitely and, at the time of writing, has yet to be modified. Here is an analysis of its provisions:

In 1821, the country had been divided into four zones [316] for the import and export of grains; the 1832 law maintained this arrangement without any significant alterations. The classification established is as follows: 1st class (single section), Pyrénées-Orientales, Aude, Hérault, Gard, Bouches-du-Rhône, Var, Corsica. Regulatory markets: Toulouse, Gray, Lyon, Marseille; 2nd class (1st section), Gironde, Landes, Hautes and Basses-Pyrénées, Ariège, Haute-Garonne. Regulatory markets: Marans, Bordeaux, Toulouse (2nd section), Jura, Doubs, Ain, Isère, Hautes and Basses-Alpes. Regulatory markets: Gray, Saint-Laurent, Le Grand-Lemps; 3rd class (1st section), Haut and Bas-Rhin. Regulatory markets: Mulhouse and Strasbourg (2nd section), Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Somme, Seine-Inférieure, Eure, Calvados. Regulatory markets: Bergues, Arras, Roye, Soissons, Paris, Rouen (3rd section), Loire-Inférieure, Vendée, Charente-Inférieure. Regulatory markets: Saumur, Nantes, Marans; 4th class (1st section), Moselle, Meuse, Ardennes, Aisne. Regulatory markets: Metz, Verdun, Charleville, Soissons (2nd section), Manche, Ille-et-Vilaine, Côtes-du-Nord, Finistère, Morbihan. Regulatory markets: Saint-Lô, Paimpol, Quimper, Hennebont, Nantes.

Here are the duties levied in each region on imports and exports: When the regulatory price exceeds 28 francs in the 1st class, 26 francs in the 2nd, 24 francs in the 3rd, and 22 francs in the 4th, importation is free for both foreign and French ships, or at most subject only to a nominal balance duty of 0.25 francs per hectoliter. When prices range from 28 to 27.01 francs, from 26 to 25.01 francs, from 24 to 23.01 francs, and from 22 to 21.01 francs, depending on the class, importation remains permitted with a balance duty of 0.25 francs for French ships and by land, but it incurs a duty of 1.50 francs for foreign ships. This differential duty continues to be levied as prices drop further. Below 26, 24, 22, and 20 francs, and down to 23.01, 21.01, 19.01, and 17.01 francs, the balance duty of 0.25 francs increases by 1 franc for every franc of price drop. Below these limits, no matter how low prices fall, the increase is 1.50 francs per franc of decline. Exportation is permitted with a balance duty of 0.25 francs until prices reach 25 francs in the 1st class, 23 francs in the 2nd, 21 francs in the 3rd, and 19 francs in the 4th; above these limits, exportation is subject to a duty of 2 francs for each franc of increase. For flour, the duties per metric quintal at importation are three times those on wheat per hectoliter, minus an insignificant fraction (25 centimes), and only double at exportation. The differential duty, established in favor of the national navy, is 1.66 francs per metric quintal. The duties levied on the entry and exit of lower-quality grains are scaled in proportion to their value. This legislation appears to have exhausted the limits of customs complexities. However, it once again disappointed the expectations of farmers, who had hoped it would maintain prices at a stable and remunerative rate. In 1831, the average wheat price had been 22.71 francs; in 1832, 21.85 francs; in 1833, it fell to 15.62 francs; in 1834 and 1835, to 15.25 francs; and only in 1836 did it rise to 17.32 francs. This phenomenon can be explained naturally by the illusions that protection fosters among protected farmers: convinced that it will allow them to sell their grain at higher prices, they cultivate more, and this surplus inevitably floods the markets and drives prices down; cultivation is then reduced, and harvests become insufficient after having been excessive.

The class system is unique to French legislation; its goal is to compel the southern departments, where the harvest is generally insufficient to feed the population, to seek surplus grain from the northern departments. The exorbitant increase in duties in the southern regions has allowed the northern, eastern, western, and central departments to send their surplus harvests to the south, despite the high cost of transportation. Marseille and the Mediterranean coast receive, along with Languedoc flour, wheat from the Atlantic coast, from Dunkirk to Rochefort, particularly from the various ports of Côtes-du-Nord, Finistère, Morbihan, Loire-Inférieure, and Vendée. While Marseillais could ordinarily receive wheat from Odessa at a price of 16 to 18 francs, they are forced to consume wheat from Brittany and Vendée, which costs them 25 to 26 francs—50 percent more expensive. This is essentially a tribute that the inhabitants of the south are compelled to pay to those in the north for their food supply.

The government still retains in France the power to temporarily suspend import duties and prohibit exports in years of famine. It exercised this power in 1846.

IV. LEGISLATION IN ENGLAND

In England, the legislation on cereals has undergone no fewer vicissitudes than in France. Under the reign of Elizabeth, exportation was permitted upon payment of a duty of 2 shillings when the price of wheat reached 20 shillings per quarter (2 hectoliters 90). James II raised the limit to 32 shillings, and Cromwell to 40; but in 1688, William III, who sought to win the favor of landowners, abolished the export duty and, moreover, granted an export bounty of 5 shillings whenever the price of wheat dropped to 48 shillings or below. The import duty, which had been 16 shillings under Charles II, was raised at the same time to 18 shillings; Queen Anne and George II each added 2 more shillings. However, it seems that the export bounty did not significantly contribute to the development of British agriculture, as there were several consecutive famines, prompting public opinion to call for changes to the grain legislation. Unfortunately, at that time, opinion was not yet well informed and demanded the removal of one prohibition only to replace it with another. By virtue of a law enacted in the third year of the reign of George III, exportation was prohibited whenever the price of wheat reached or exceeded 44 shillings per quarter in the domestic market, and the import duty was reduced to the nominal rate [317] of 6 pence (62 centimes) when the price reached 48 shillings. However, the previous duty (of 22 shillings) remained in effect if the price did not exceed 44 shillings. In 1787, the limit was set at 48 shillings; below this rate, the duty was set at 24 shillings. In 1791, protection was further increased. The so-called profitable price was set at 54 shillings. At this rate, the duty became purely nominal, but it was 2 shillings and a half when the price of wheat did not reach 54 shillings, and 24 shillings if the price remained below 50 shillings per quarter. The maximum duty was successively raised to 30 shillings. Occasionally, when the harvest was exceptionally poor, the law was suspended by an order in council. In 1804, landowners demanded yet another increase in protection: the so-called profitable limit was raised to 66 shillings. Below this rate, the duty was set at 3 shillings, and at 30 shillings below 63 shillings. In 1813, the duty of 30 shillings was increased to 39 shillings and 7 pence. Finally, in 1814, the importation of foreign grains was prohibited whenever domestic wheat had not reached the rate of 80 shillings. In 1822, the limit at which the nominal duty of 1 shilling applied was raised to 85 shillings; the duty was set at 5 shillings for the rate of 80 shillings and at 17 shillings below 80 shillings. Below 70 shillings, importation remained prohibited. Starting from 1822, a reaction began against the excessive demands of the landed aristocracy. Mr. Huskisson devised the system of a decreasing tariff scale, which Mr. Canning implemented in 1828. Mr. Canning sought to guarantee national agriculture a profitable price of 66 shillings per quarter, but this limit, which had been adopted by the House of Commons, was raised to 72 shillings by the House of Lords. The 1828 legislation remained in effect until 1842. At that time, Robert Peel revised the Corn Laws for the last time, maintaining the limit of 72 shillings while lowering the import duties. Here is how these duties were graduated according to the Act of 1828 and the Act of 1842:

(insert table)

These various laws had two objectives: 1254.1. To ensure a more or less high profitable price for farmers; 1255.2. To maintain a certain stability in cereal prices.

However, in England, as in France, the Corn Laws completely failed to meet the expectations of those who had established them in both respects. The prohibitive Act of 1815, says M. Léon Faucher, from whom we borrow these details on British legislation, [33] did not prevent the price of wheat from falling on the English market to 56 shillings in 1821, to 44 shillings in 1822, to 53 shillings in 1823, and to 56 shillings in 1827. Under the restrictive Act of 1828, the price of wheat, which at one point had reached an average of 81 shillings, fell to 58 shillings in 1832, to 52 shillings in 1833, to 46 shillings in 1834, to 39 shillings in 1835, and to 36 shillings in 1836. Despite the law of 1842, wheat in England was worth no more than 45 shillings per quarter (fr. 19.70 per hectoliter). In April 1842, price fluctuations were considerable and sudden. In 1832, the difference between the highest and lowest prices was 30 percent, 27 percent in 1834, 19 percent in 1835, 42 percent in 1836, 31 percent in 1837, and 60 percent in 1838.

If the system adopted in England did not provide farmers with the advantages they had expected, it nonetheless proved to be very costly for the public treasury. It is estimated, says M. Léon Faucher again, that in the eighteenth century, the Exchequer paid nearly 170 million francs in the form of export bounties, and in the early years of the nineteenth century, approximately 72 million francs in the form of temporary import subsidies. Moreover, the import duties established under the sliding scale system yielded only a small revenue. From 1828 to 1840, they generated an average of only 5.5 million francs per year, even though imports were increasing year by year. M. Léon Faucher provides the explanation for this: [34]

"Merchants," he says, "buy large quantities of foreign wheat while prices are low; then, they store them in warehouses until rising market prices lower the import tariff to a nominal rate. More than half of the wheat imported into England before the 1842 law had only paid a duty of 1 shilling."

However, the Corn Laws, which were clearly designed to favor the interests of the landed aristocracy, provoked widespread complaints. In 1838, a league was formed in Manchester to overthrow them and demand the free importation of cereals. This association, whose history will be recounted later (see LEAGUE AGAINST THE CORN LAWS), achieved its goal after eight years of persistent efforts. Poor harvests, the potato blight, and the numerous meetings held by the league forced Sir Robert Peel to repeal the Corn Laws after having temporarily suspended them. Following a memorable debate, the bill for the repeal of the Corn Laws was passed by the House of Commons in June 1846, [318] and came into effect on February 1, 1849. Following England’s example, the Netherlands and Belgium also reformed their grain laws.

V. CRITICISM OF THE REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE

Let us now review the arguments that economists have raised against the regulation of the grain trade and the restrictive provisions of the corn laws. We have seen that restrictions on internal trade took various forms. Sales were prohibited outside of markets; exports beyond certain districts were regulated or forbidden; middlemen—who were popularly vilified under the name of accapareurs (hoarders)—were subjected to the obligation of declaring the quantity of their purchases, along with other equally vexatious formalities; the government or municipalities manipulated grain prices by purchasing wheat, storing it in public granaries, and then suddenly releasing it onto the market; during times of famine, the price of bread was set below the market value of grain; forced requisitions were carried out in rural areas to supply large population centers; price ceilings (maximums) were imposed, and so on. The list of these restrictive measures is long, and although they were generally introduced with the intention of alleviating the suffering of the hungry masses, they have caused more victims than the bloodiest wars.

In his witty Diatribe to the Author of the Éphémérides, Voltaire highlighted, with his usual verve and humor, the drawbacks of banning sales outside of designated markets. Here is an excerpt from this delightful piece of economic critique:

"I am a farmer, and I have about eighty people to feed. My barn is three leagues away from the nearest town; sometimes, I have to buy wheat because my land is not as fertile as that of Egypt or Sicily.

One day, a clerk tells me:

— Go three leagues to buy poor-quality wheat at an expensive price in the market. Take some agents with you, obtain a clearance permit (acquit-à-caution); and if you lose it on the way, the first officer who stops you will have the right to seize your food, your horses, your wife, your person, and your children. If you hesitate about this arrangement, know that twenty leagues away there is a legal trap called a jurisdiction; they will drag you there, you will be sentenced to walk on foot to Toulon, where you can leisurely plow the Mediterranean Sea.

At first, I took this instructive speech as a cold joke. But it was the plain truth. What! I exclaimed, I have gathered settlers to cultivate the land with me, and I am not allowed to buy wheat to feed them and my family? And when I have a surplus, I cannot sell it to my neighbor?

— No, you and your neighbor must wear out your horses running six leagues back and forth.

— Well then, tell me, I have potatoes and chestnuts with which excellent bread can be made for those with a strong stomach; can I sell them to my neighbor without being sent to the galleys by that legal trap you mentioned?

— Yes.

— Why, if I may ask, this enormous difference between my chestnuts and my wheat?

— I do not know. Perhaps because weevils eat wheat but not chestnuts.

— That is a very bad reason.

— Well, if you want a better one, it is because wheat is a primary necessity, whereas chestnuts are only of secondary necessity.

— That reason is even worse. The more necessary a commodity is, the easier its trade should be. If fire and water were for sale, it should be permitted to import and export them freely across all of France."

Let us add that while it is beneficial for grain, like all other commodities, to be centralized in markets where competition among sellers benefits buyers, this concentration should occur naturally. Do not farmers and grain merchants have a vested interest in gathering at designated places where they can meet buyers? And if they do not go there, is it not proof that buyers have preferred to deal with them directly, and that both parties have found it more advantageous to do so? Why then impose a different method upon them? Sales have been prohibited or regulated beyond certain districts, but who does not see the harm these prohibitions or senseless regulations—reintroduced even in 1812—have caused to populations suffering from famine? In France, entire provinces were often reduced to the brink of starvation due to a bad harvest caused by climatic accidents, while neighboring provinces overflowed with grain. In his Letters on the Freedom of the Grain Trade, Turgot cites a particularly striking example: [35]

"During the famine from 1740 to 1744," he writes, "while wheat in Paris was worth 45 livres, it was only 17 livres in Angoulême. And throughout this entire famine, the price difference between Angoulême and Paris remained large enough that it would have been profitable to transport grain from Angoulême to Paris, even by land, and even more so by river or by sea. I ask, why was the abundance of Angoulême and the southern provinces useless to Paris? Is it not evident that if the grain trade had been established, if absurd restrictions and regulations had not destroyed freedom—and with it, commerce itself—no one would have even noticed the famine that followed the 1740 harvest, which was so cruel in certain parts of the kingdom?

Regulations and restrictions do not produce a single additional grain of wheat, but they do prevent surplus grain in one place from being transported to places where it is scarce. Freedom, even if it did not increase the total amount of grain by encouraging production, would at least have the advantage of distributing existing grain as quickly and as evenly as possible."

After so many disastrous [319] experiences, of which we have traced an imperfect outline, governments have generally refrained from restricting or regulating the internal freedom of the grain trade. However, populations do not always show as much progress in this regard as their governments. In 1845 and 1846, disturbances still occurred in several localities in western France over the removal of grain. As was customary in such cases, the crowd rushed upon the convoys and sold the grain at prices below the market rate. [36] The authorities eventually managed to restore order, but in the meantime, frightened merchants had withdrawn their grain from the market, and prices rose as a result of the reduced supply. In truth, the sliding scale system (échelle mobile) played a role in these disturbances. The grain tariff system in France was designed to force populations in the south to procure supplies from the western and central provinces, even though they could obtain their grain more advantageously from Odessa. In years of abundance, this trade certainly benefited the farmers of the west and center; but in years of scarcity, the removal of lower-quality food supplies, such as the black wheat of Brittany, could seriously jeopardize the food supply of the poor population in that province, where private resources were lower than in any other part of the country.

The prejudice against grain merchants, called accapareurs (hoarders), dates back to a time when the grain trade was universally obstructed, and only privileged merchants could buy grain in one district and resell it elsewhere. Since grain formed the basis of the general food supply, such a monopoly inevitably yielded enormous profits at the expense of the very survival of the population. It is therefore understandable that prejudice against accapareurs was extremely strong and, to some extent, justified during periods of oppression and plunder (see MONOPOLY). But this prejudice can no longer be justified in any way under a system of free circulation. The accapareurs, that is, the grain merchants, are indispensable intermediaries who spare both consumers and producers numerous costs and unnecessary efforts, and who alone, through their stockpiling (see this word), can prevent extreme fluctuations in prices. A German economist, Mr. Schmalz, has perfectly demonstrated the usefulness of accapareurs, from both the farmers' and consumers' perspectives: [37]

"Consider," he says, "the situation of a peasant who, in order to sell the produce of his farm or his field, is forced to haul it himself to the town or have it carried on the backs of his family members. He cannot even choose the day that suits him best; he must wait for market day. The day before, he prepares for his trip, as he must arrive at the market very early; he organizes his produce and sets off from his village, either in a cart or on foot. He travels all night, arrives in the town at dawn, stays until midday or even later to complete his sale, then sets off again and returns home in the evening, exhausted. That makes two entire days lost for rural productivity, which allows no moment of rest and constantly demands useful labor. The next day, what work can be done by men and animals who are worn out from the trip?

Suppose twenty women from a village, each carrying a pair of chickens, a dozen eggs, a few pounds of butter, and some cheeses, go to market. During all the time they spend away from their homes, how much work could they have done in the fields, the garden, the barns, and inside their houses? They could have spun or knitted stockings for their children, who now run barefoot, to the detriment of their health—proof of the poverty reigning in the village. A wheelbarrow, a horse, or a so-called accapareur would have sufficed to transport the load of twenty women and would have spared twenty households two days of toil and fatigue.

Moreover, the carts of the peasants traveling to town are often far from fully loaded; and since each carries only a few bushels of grain, it takes ten men and twenty horses to transport a few muids of wheat. An accapareur could have easily transported the same load on a single cart, saving ten men and twenty horses from two days of absence from the necessary work of agriculture.

The claim that the retailer or accapareur buys up goods at the very moment when peasants are short of cash is baseless and senseless. If the peasant sells due to a shortage of money, it is undoubtedly to relieve his difficulties. Does anyone imagine it would be better for him to remain in financial distress? Furthermore, if the merchant offers too low a price, the peasant can always take his goods to market himself. It is true that, in general, the merchant will buy from the peasant at a lower price than the peasant would sell at the market; but this is entirely natural, since the merchant assumes the costs, time, and trouble of transport and sale, thereby allowing the peasant to reclaim two days of labor—far more valuable to him than any slight increase in price he might obtain at the market.

The existence of retail merchants does not make goods more expensive for city dwellers either. If their profit margins are significant, instead of ten merchants, there will soon be twenty, competing to undercut one another. In the countryside, they will strive to outbid one another for the best price to offer the sellers. In the cities, they will compete to attract buyers by selling at the lowest price they can afford. Moreover, city dwellers must also cover the travel and transportation costs of peasants [320] who come to sell their own produce at the market. So when do they pay less? When goods that could have been transported by a single merchant with four horses are instead hauled by ten men and twenty horses?

In every respect, then, nothing is more advantageous than the so-called accaparement, which is so widely detested."

The intervention of accapareurs (hoarders) between producers and consumers is, as we can see, a clear improvement in the division of labor. It is almost unnecessary to add that accaparements (stockpiling), meaning the reserves accumulated by grain merchants, provide the most reliable means of stabilizing prices over time and across different regions—moving surplus grain from a country where the harvest was abundant to one where it was poor, or from a year of plenty to a year of scarcity.

Crop surveys ordered during times of scarcity have never yielded good results. As Minister Roland rightly pointed out in his letter to the National Convention, these surveys rely on declarations that are rendered inaccurate due to various factors—bad faith on the part of some, fear on the part of others. If these declarations underestimate the true supply, what an opportunity for panic and speculative distortions! And if they are exaggerated, won’t they create a false sense of security, which is even more dangerous than unfounded fears? Did we not see, in 1846, the Minister of Commerce, Mr. Cunin-Gridaine, trusting hastily gathered reports from local prefects, declare that nothing indicated a shortfall in the harvest, only to be cruelly contradicted by reality? Generally, those in commerce are much more capable than the government of gathering such information, as they have the greatest vested interest in obtaining accurate data. Why not let commerce enlighten itself, since any official reports it might receive are less reliable than its own?

Governments have intervened even more directly in the supply of food to the people. They have allocated considerable sums to purchasing domestic and foreign grain, created greniers d’abondance (state grain reserves), and authorized municipalities to impose similar financial burdens on themselves. But were these expenditures wisely made? Experience proves otherwise, and reasoning supports this conclusion. When the government buys grain in a year of scarcity, it does not do so as a speculation—it almost always buys with the intention of selling at a loss, with the laudable goal of relieving suffering populations. However, commerce, which does not have the luxury of shifting its deficits onto willing taxpayers, cannot afford to engage in such philanthropic speculation. As soon as the government begins making purchases, private traders are forced to either slow or stop their own. They abandon the market to the government rather than compete with it at a loss. Yet, since the means at the government’s disposal—whether national or municipal—are never comparable to those of private commerce, consumers ultimately suffer from this abnormal intervention: instead of receiving more grain, they receive less. When governments recognize this outcome, they usually react with frustration toward those in commerce, attempting to force merchants to release their stocks. They conduct searches of warehouses, order grain to be brought to market, and enforce price controls through a maximum, among other measures. Under such coercion, commercial activity declines further—precisely when its full effort is needed to meet urgent demand. At that point, the government faces two choices: either to cease interfering in the provision of food and let commerce act freely (laisser faire le commerce"), or to assume sole responsibility for feeding the public. We have already seen the disastrous consequences of the latter system in France. The same experiment has been conducted in smaller states, with equally severe losses. For instance, in Rome, the Cassa Annonaria, established by Pope Paul V in the early seventeenth century, managed the city’s food supply for nearly two centuries. Initially, its mission was to ensure that bread would always be sold at a fixed price, regardless of fluctuations in grain supply. However, it soon became clear that enforcing this rule on private merchants was impossible, so the institution took control of grain distribution itself. For nearly 200 years, it managed to maintain the price of an eight-ounce loaf at one baïoc (a Roman sou, about ten percent stronger than the French sou). But when the Cassa Annonaria was abolished alongside the Papal States’ government, it left behind a colossal financial deficit: [38]

“Regardless of the abundance or scarcity of grain,” writes M. de Sismondi, “the Apostolic Chamber sold it to bakers at the fixed price of 7 Roman écus (37.10 francs) per rubbio, a unit measuring 640 kilograms. This price did not differ significantly from the long-term average, and it allowed bakers to make a reasonable profit when selling their small loaves for one baïoc. Until 1763, the chamber’s revenues covered its losses. But after that time, grain prices began rising steadily throughout the late eighteenth century. Despite mounting losses, the chamber—fearing popular discontent—continued selling bread at the same fixed price. As a result, when the Papal government was overthrown in 1797, the Cassa Annonaria had accumulated a deficit of 3,293,865 écus, or 17,457,485 francs.”

Let us now examine government intervention in the external grain trade. This intervention has taken two main forms: on the one hand, subsidies for imports and exports, and on the other, various restrictions imposed on the entry and [321] exit of grain. The system of export subsidies has the dual drawback of artificially favoring one particular branch of production at the expense of all others and effectively providing foreign consumers with a subsidy at the expense of national taxpayers. (See EXPORT SUBSIDIES.) Moreover, the example of England demonstrates the complete inefficacy of subsidies in promoting agriculture and ensuring food security. Import subsidies, on the other hand, create opportunities for fraudulent schemes. They also tend to drive up prices by artificially stimulating demand for grain in producing countries—often prematurely. (See IMPORT SUBSIDIES.) The system of export restrictions, against which Turgot specifically directed his remarkable Letters on the Grain Trade, raises several objections—whether exports are completely prohibited when domestic grain reaches a certain price or merely subjected to a mobile and increasing tax: 1.) The prohibition of exports prevents the sale of high-quality grain abroad, even though doing so would allow poorer populations to obtain a larger quantity of lower-quality food in exchange. 2.) It discourages the importation of foreign grain by depriving traders of the ability to re-export it if they find a more profitable market elsewhere. However, the widespread adoption of bonded warehouses has fortunately reduced the practical impact of this issue. 3.) It slows the expansion of agriculture by eliminating foreign markets for farmers precisely at the times when such markets would be most beneficial. Imports, in turn, are obstructed by either fixed or variable tariffs. The fixed tariff system is currently in place in Belgium. However, it is worth noting that this system is "fixed" in name only, since governments invariably suspend tariffs whenever a country faces the threat of famine. Conversely, in years of abundance and low prices, the tariff provides only nominal protection to domestic agriculture. Variable tariffs, which rise as domestic prices fall, were designed to maintain a relatively stable a so-called "profitable price." Let us clarify what is meant by this term. It is assumed that in order for a farmer to recover all his costs—paying the necessary rent to the landowner, the required wages to his laborers, and earning his expected profit—he must sell his grain at a certain price, deemed "profitable." In France, this profitable price is estimated at around 20 francs per hectoliter, and lawmakers attempt to calibrate import and export duties in such a way that market prices never stray too far from this figure, which is supposed to reflect production costs. However, historical evidence shows that the objectives of modern grain laws have never been achieved. The reason is not difficult to identify: no grain law can override the whims of the seasons; no grain law can prevent the land from being more fertile one year and less so the next. It has long been observed that even a slight surplus or deficit in the supply of a staple food can cause a significant fluctuation in price. [39]

"The fact," writes Mr. Tooke in his History of Prices, "that a small shortfall in wheat production, compared to the average rate of consumption, results in a price increase that is disproportionate to the size of the deficit, is confirmed by historical price records—at times when no political or commercial factors could have had a distorting influence on the markets. Some writers have even attempted to establish an exact rule of proportion between a given harvest shortfall and the likely increase in price. Mr. Gregory King, in particular, proposed the following proportional rule for wheat prices."

A deficit of:	raises the price by	Above the ordinary price:
1 tenth		3 tenths
2 tenths		8 tenths
3 tenths		1,6 tenths
4 tenths		2,8 tenths
5 tenths		4,5 tenths

But whether this proportion is exact or not, it remains undeniable that variations in the quantity of wheat available on the market result in much more pronounced fluctuations in price.

Given this economic phenomenon, no prohibition on imports or exports can prevent market prices from falling below the profitable price in a year of abundance or rising above it in a year of scarcity. On the contrary, historical evidence shows that laws restricting imports or exports only exacerbate price fluctuations—at times overstimulating wheat production and at other times discouraging it. It is therefore impossible to maintain a consistently profitable price through grain legislation.

However, what such legislation can do is permanently raise the general level of prices. Here is how: When the importation of foreign wheat is prohibited and the quantity of wheat available on the domestic market is thereby reduced, prices naturally rise—especially if population growth increases the demand for foodstuffs. In this situation, it becomes profitable to cultivate inferior land, or in other words, land that is less suited to wheat production than that already in use. The production costs of wheat grown on these inferior lands then determine the profitable price, around which the market price constantly gravitates, while owners of superior lands receive a surplus, or rent (see RENT). If demand continues to rise while imports remain restricted, the price of wheat will continue to increase; still more land, even less suited [322] to cereal production than the previous expansions, will be brought under cultivation, and the rent of other lands will continue to rise. But is it truly advantageous for a nation to produce wheat at great expense on poor soil rather than purchase the necessary supply from countries where it can be produced at a lower cost? Certainly not. If imports were freely permitted, the nation would gain the following benefits: 1.) consumers would pay lower prices for wheat; 2.) owners of fertile lands would be forced to make efforts and adopt improvements to compete with foreign cereals, whereas under an import ban, they can continue using outdated methods, since their rents increase automatically as the population grows. Poorly suited land that is artificially devoted to wheat cultivation could instead be used for other crops. The capital and labor that an import ban diverts into wheat production would instead be allocated to producing other goods more efficiently, which could then be exchanged for wheat grown on fertile lands in grain-producing countries. The nation would gain the difference.

Already in England, the repeal of the Corn Laws has had a significant effect on the cost of wheat production. Since landowners on fertile soils have had to compete not only with local producers operating under unfavorable conditions but also with landowners in Poland and Russia, they have been compelled to improve their agricultural methods—in short, to make advances in their industry to remain competitive. Now, every agricultural improvement necessarily results in lower production costs, and every reduction in production costs leads to a corresponding decrease in the market price.

VI. STATISTICAL INFORMATION ON CEREAL PRODUCTION AND TRADE

Let us conclude with some statistical information on the production and trade of wheat among the world's major nations.

According to M. Moreau de Jonnès, cereal production in France in 1840 amounted to 182,516,848 hectoliters, distributed as follows:

	Hectolitres	percentage
Wheat and spelt	69,694,189	39
Méteil	11,829,448	6
Rye	27,811,700	13
Barley	16,66,46 2	9
Oats	48,899,785	27
Corn	7,620,264	4
Total	182,516,264	100

The average value of this quantity of cereals was 2,055,407,000 francs. Since 13,900,262 hectares were cultivated with cereals, this represents a gross yield of 141 francs per hectare. M. Moreau de Jonnès estimates that in 1700, France produced only 92,856,000 hectoliters, or 472 liters per capita; in 1760, 98,500,000 hectoliters or 450 liters per capita; in 1788, 115,816,000 hectoliters or 484 liters per capita; in 1813, 132,435,000 hectoliters or 441 liters per capita. Finally, by 1840, production had reached 183,516,000 hectoliters, or 541 liters per capita. Thus, the average harvest quantity in France had doubled since the reign of Louis XIV, while the population had increased by only 70 percent. Furthermore, yield per hectare was:

8 hectoliters in 1700, 1299.7 hectoliters in 1760, 1300.8 hectoliters in 1788 and 1813, 1301.13.14 hectoliters in 1840.

France’s current grain consumption amounts to 146,876,000 hectoliters of all types of cereals, leaving an average of 35,640,000 hectoliters—about one-quarter—for seed and reserves. The value of cereals consumed per capita per year is only 51 francs, covering all types of grains, including animal feed.

The annual cereal production of other major countries is estimated as follows:

England: 144,375,000 hectoliters, 1305.Austria: 206,740,000 hectoliters, 1306.Prussia: 79,750,000 hectoliters, 1307.The rest of Germany: 57,705,900 hectoliters, 1308.Russia and Poland: 304,678,000 hectoliters, 1309.All of Europe: 1,171,217,000 hectoliters. 1310.The United States’ production is not well known, but it is estimated that the corn harvest alone reaches 170,000,000 hectoliters.

We present these statistical figures with caution, but one can confidently affirm that food supplies have steadily improved, especially in terms of regularity of supply. In the Middle Ages, famines were frequent. In France alone, historians count:

26 famines in the 11th century,
51 in the 12th century,
33 shortages and 11 famines in the 17th century,
28 shortages and 9 famines in the 18th century,
13 shortages and 1 famine in the first 50 years of the 19th century. [40]

There has thus been a marked improvement in food security.

Regarding food abundance, progress is less visible but is likely just as real. Some writers believe that cereal prices have risen, which would suggest a relative decline in production. For instance, M. Moreau de Jonnès estimates that the average price of a hectoliter of cereals was:

11 francs in 1700, 1316.14 francs in 1840.

However, M. Passy argues that the difference in the purchasing power of money between these two periods equates to the same increase in nominal grain prices. [41] In any case, over the past half-century, prices do not appear to have varied significantly.

From 1797-1807 the average price per hectolitre was 20fr. 20c. 1319.From 1807-1817 the average price per hectolitre was 21fr. 84c. 1320.From 1817-1827 the average price per hectolitre was 19fr. 69c. 1321.From 1827-1837 the average price per hectolitre was 19fr. 3 c. 1322.From 1837-1847 the average price per hectolitre was 20fr. 5c.

According to Mr. Jacob, the price of wheat in antiquity was approximately the same as [323] current prices. "The price of bread in Rome," he states in his book On Precious Metals (Vol. 1, p. 165), "seems to have been, in Pliny’s time, the same or slightly lower than in our days." Mr. Dureau de Lamalle shares this view. He further believes that wheat yields in antiquity were roughly the same as today, averaging between 4 to 6 grains harvested for each grain sown. One should not be surprised by the stability of wheat prices when considering that agricultural production has always been subjected to numerous constraints and heavy, oppressive taxation. For this reason, of all branches of production, agriculture has achieved the least progress, resulting in the exceptional stability of its prices. This price stability has made wheat particularly useful for historical evaluation (see this term, as well as the article MONEY).

The Western European nations—England, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands—generally require foreign cereal imports to meet their food needs. In contrast, Russia, Poland, and the United States are the primary grain-exporting countries. In the 17th and 18th centuries, between 1677 and 1764, England exported 33 million quarters more grain than it imported. However, from 1765 to 1814, the balance shifted, with imports exceeding exports by 31 million quarters. From 1815 to 1844, the balance continued in favor of imports, amounting to approximately 20 million quarters. [42] Since 1844, England's imports have continuously increased: In 1847, England received no less than 9,025,697 quarters of wheat of all kinds, including 3,436,058 quarters of corn from the United States, plus 7,061,000 quintals of flour. In 1849, imports rose to 11,882,900 quarters of various grains (wheat, barley, rye, oats, peas, beans, flour, etc.).

These figures demonstrate that international trade in cereals has the potential for immense expansion. Since food shortages are never universal, global trade will increasingly be able to compensate for shortfalls in one region by redistributing surpluses from another. Thus, the hardships caused by seasonal variability will be mitigated as much as possible, and the food supply for populations will become progressively more stable and secure—provided, of course, that cereal laws no longer obstruct the free circulation of food supplies.

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*Review of the statutes and ordinances of assize which hâve been established in England from the fourth year of king John, 1202, to the 37 of his présent majesty (Georges III), by G. Attwood. Londres, 1804, in-4. Cet ouvrage donne des détails sur le rapport établi par la législation entre le prix des grains, de la farine, et celui du pain ; sur les effets de la taxe, etc., depuis 1202 jusqu'à 1800.

An essay on the impolicy of a bounty on the exportation of grain, and on the principles which ought to regulate the commerce of grain.—(Essai sur les inconvénients d'une prime d'exportation pour le blé, et sur les principes qui devraient régler le commerce des grains), par James Mill, auteur de l'Histoire de l'Inde britannique, Londres, 1804, in-8.

Considérations on the protection required by british agriculture, and on the influence of the price of corn of exportable productions. — (Considérations sur la nécessité d'une protection en faveur de l'agriculture britannique, et sur l'influence du prix du blé sur les marchandises exportées), par William Jacob. Londres, 1814, in-8.

Observations on the effectsof the corn-laws.—(Observations sur l'effet des lois-céréales), par le rév. T.-R. Malthus. Londres, 1814, in-8.

The grounds of an opinion on the policy of restric-ting the importation of foreign corn.—(Raisons en faveur de l'utilité de restreindre l'importation du blé étranger), par le rév. T.-R. Malihus. Londres, 1815, in-8. La brochure suivante est une réponse à celles de Malthus.

An essay on the influence of a low price of corn on the profite of stock, with remarks on Mr. Malthus last two publications. — (Essai sur l'influence du bas prix des g r ains, sur les profits, etc.), par David Ricardo. Londres, 1815, in-8. Ces trois publications se trouvent dans la Collect. des princip. Écon., de Guillaumin.

Reports and evidence from the commitees of the houses of lords and commons on the corn-laws.— (Rapports des comités de la chambre des lords et de celle des communes sur la législation des céréales). Londres, 1814-15, in-folio.

An inquiry into the rise of price in Europe, during the last twenty five years, compared with that which has taken place in England ; with observations on the effects of high and low prices. - (Recherches sur la hausse des prix du blé en Europe dans les dernières vingt-cinq années, comparées à celle qui a eu lieu en Angleterre. Observations sur l'effet du haut et du bas prix), par Arthur Young. Londres, 1815, in-8.

Examen de quelques questions d'économie politique, sur les blés, la population, le crédit public et les impositions, par de Candolle-Boissier. Genève, Pans, Paschoud, 1816, in-8.

Halle aux blés de Nancy, subsistances, boulangers, accapareurs, approvisionnement de réserve, par C.-J .-A. Matthieu Nancy, Vincenot, veuve Bontems, 1818, in-8.

Projet contre la disette des grains, par le marquis de Lastours. Paris, Égron, 1819, in-8.

Essai sur cette question : Quels sont les meilleurs moyens de prévenir, avec les seules ressources de la France, la disette des blés et les trop grandes variations dans les prix, par J.-J. Paris. Paris, Mme Huzard, 1819, in-8.

[325]

Essai historique et critique sur la législation des grains; mémoire sur les moyens de prévenir, avec les seules ressources de la France, les disettes des blés et les trop grandes variations dans leur prix, par Chaillou des Barres. Paris, F. Didot, 1820, in-8.

De la disette et de la surabondance en France ; des moyens de prévenir l'une en mettant l'autre à profit, et d'empêcher la trop grande variation dans le prix des grains, par M. Laboulinière. Paris, 1821-1822, 2 vol. in-8. L. Rousseau a présenté sur cet ouvrage un rapport adressé à la Société d'agriculture d'Etampes; ce rapport a pour titre : Du commerce des grains dans le système général d'économie industrielle. Paris, 1822, in-8.

Examen général et détaillé des récoltes et des consommations de blé en France, avec indication des moyens propres à remédier à la surabondance et aux disettes, par P.-M. Lenoble. Paris, les principaux libraires, 1822, in-8.

Discours contre le projet de loi concernant l'entrepôt des grains étrangers, séance du 7 mai 1825, par P.-L. Roux, 1825. Paris, br. in-8.

Remarks on fair priées and produce-rents, par J.-H. Maclean. Edimbourg, 1825, in-8. Il existe en Ecosse un usage qui date du seizième siècle, et qui consiste à nommer un jury qui, après avoir pris toutes les informations nécessaires pour éclairer sa religion, fixe le prix moyen du blé qui doit servir de base au fermage. C'est ce prix qu'on nomme fair price.

Apologie de l'abondance, ou observations sur la législation actuelle des grains en France, par Alexandre Ruelle. Paris, 1825, in-8.

Prices of corn and wages of labour, with observations. — (Le prix du blé et le taux des salaires, avec des observations), par sir Edward West (auteur d'un ouvrage sur la rente). Londres, 1826, in-8.

A compendium of the laws passed from time to lime for regulating and restricting the importation, exportation and consumption of corn from the year 1660, with tables of price, etc. — (Recueil des lois sur les céréales promulguées depuis 1660, suivi de tableaux des prix du blé, etc.). Londres, 1826, in-8.

Corn and currency. An address to the landowners. — (Le blé et la circulation monétaire), par sir James Graham. Londres, 1827, in-8.

An essay on the externat corn trade. — (Essai sur le commerce extérieur des blés), par le colonel Torrens. 4e édition, Londres, 1827, 1 vol. in-8.

Two reports on the trade in corn and the agriculture of the north of Europe. — (Deux rapports sur le commerce du blé et sur l'agriculture du nord de l'Europe), par William Jacob. Imprimé par ordre de la chambre des communes, en 1826 et 1827, Londres, in-folio.

Report from and évidence taken before the sélect committee of the house of lords on the price of ship-ping foreign grain from foreign ports. — (Rapport sur une enquête ordonnée par la chambre des lords relativement au prix du transport du blé étranger). Londres, 1827, in-folio.

Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée par la chambre des députés d'examiner le projet de loi sur les céréales, par le baron Dupin. Paris, in-4, 1831.

An inquiry into the expediency of the existing restrictions on the importation of foreign corn; with observations on the présent social and political prospects of Great-Britain. — (Examen de l'utilité des restrictions actuellement imposées à l'importation du blé étranger ; suivi d'observations sur l'état social et politique actuel de la Grande-Bretagne), par John Barton. Londres, 1833, in-8.

De la grande variation du prix des grains, des moyens de le fixer entre des limites plus rapprochées, etc., par P.-J. Milori. Paris, Mme Huzard, 1833, in-8.

Archives statistiques du ministère des travaux publics, de l'agriculture et du commerce, publié par le ministre secrétaire d'État de ce département. Paris, imprimerie royale, 1837, in-folio. Cette publication contient de nombreux renseignements sur la production et le prix des céréales.

The history of prices and of the state of the paper circulation from 1798 to 1837, etc. — (Histoire des prix (du blé) et de l'état de la circulation des effets publics de 1798 à 1837), par Thomas Tooke. Londres, 1838, 2 vol. in-8. (Cet ouvrage est une nouvelle édition augmentée des Thoughts and détails of the high and low prices, etc.)

A history of prices and of the state of the circulation in 1838 and 1839, etc., being a sequel to the forgoing work. — (Histoire des prix et de l'état de la circulation en1838 et 1839), par Th. Tooke. London,1840,1 vol. in-8. Ouvrage faisant suite au précédent.

The effect of restrictions on the importation of corn considered with reference to the landowners, farmers and labourers. — (L'effet des restrictions imposées à l'importation du blé, considéré par rapport aux propriétaires, fermiers et ouvriers agricoles), par G.-R. Porter (du bureau du commerce). Londres, 1839, in-8.

Corn-laws : an authentic report of the late important discussions in the Manchester chamber of commerce on the destructive effects of the corn-laws upon the trade and manufactures of the country.— (Lois-céréales : rapport authentique sur les importantes discussions qui ont eu lieu dans la chambre de commerce de Manchester, relativement à l'effet pernicieux des lois-céréales sur le commerce et les manufactures de la contrée). Londres, 1839, in-8.

Influence of the corn laws as affecting all classes of the community, and particularly the landed interests. — (Influence des lois-céréales sur les diverses classes de la société, et surtout sur les intérêts agricoles), par James Wilson. Londres, 1839, in-8.

Statements illustration of the policy and probable consequences of the proposed repeal of the existing corn-laws, and the imposition in their stead of a moderate fixed duty on foreign corn, when entered for consumption. — (Conséquences probables du rappel des lois-céréales, etc.), par J.-B. Mac Culloch. Londres, 1841, in-8. Cette brochure a provoqué plusieurs réponses, notamment de M. le général J.-C. Dalbiac et de M. Taylor.

De la fabrication du pain chez la classe agricole et dans ses rapports avec l'économie politique, par J.-C. Fawtier, fermier élève de Roville, etc. Paris, Mme Bouchard-Huzard. Chamerot, 1845, brochure in-8.

Cobden et la Ligue, ou l'agitation anglaise pour la liberté des échanges, par Frédéric Bastiat. Paris, Guillaumin et comp., 1846, 1 vol. in-8.

Die Folgen der Aufhebung der englischen Korngesetze fur Deutschland und die deutsche Industrie. — (Les conséquences de l'abolition des lois anglaises sur les céréales, relativement à l'Allemagne et à son industrie), par M. François Stromeyer. Stuttgard, 1816. in-8.

Histoire du tarif des céréales, par G. de Molinari. Paris, Guillaumin et comp., 1847, in-8.

Statistique de l'agriculture de la France, contenant la statistique les céréales, etc., etc., par M. Alex. Moreau de Jonnès. Paris, Guillaumin et comp., 1848.

Mémoire sur la meunerie, la boulangerie et la conservation des grains et des farines, contenant une description complète des procédés, machines et appareils appliqués, etc., précédé de considérations sur le commerce du blé en Europe, par Auguste Rollet, directeur des subsistances de la marine. Paris, Carilian-Gœury et Dalmont, 1848, 1 vol. in-4.

Recherches sur l'influence que le prix des grains, la richesse du sol et les impôts exercent sur les systèmes de culture, par Henri de Thünen. Traduit de l'allemand et augmenté de notes explicatives, par M. Jules La-verrière. Paris, Guillaumin et comp., 1851.

Endnotes to Cereals

[1] Dureau de La Malle, Économie politique des Romains, t. Il, p. 307.

[2] De Sismondi, Études sur l'économie politique, t.11, p. 25.

[3] Éd. Gibbon, Histoire de la décadence et de la chute de l'Empire romain, chap. 24.

[4] Cassiodore, liv. IV, ép. 5.

[5] Capitulaires de Baluze, col. 267, année 794.

[6] Traité de la Police, par Delamare, t.11, p. 916.

[7] Traité de la Police, par Delamare, t. II, p. 1069.

[8] Pierre Clément, Histoire de la vie et de l'administration de Colbert, p. 274.

[9] The document referred to as the "famine pact," the agreement made for the management of the king's wheat, signed by Leray de Chaumont, Rousseau, Perruchot, and Malisset, can be found in La Police de Paris dévoilée, de P. Manuel, Prosecutor of the Commune of Paris, t. I, p. 381. The novelist M. Élie Berthet wrote a novel and drama about the famine pact.

[10] Recueil des principales lois relatives au commerce des grains, avec les arrêts, arrêtés et remontrances du parlement sur ces objets, et le procès-verbal de l'assemblée générale de police tenue à Paris le 6 novembre 1768.

[11] Ibid., p. 165-177.

[12] The collection already cited, p. 261.

[13] I vol. in-8, Paris, 1770.

[14] Eug. Daire, Notice historique sur Turgot (Collect. des princ. Econ., t. III, p. 84).

[15] Relation historique de l'émeute arrivée à Paris le 3 mai 1775, et de ce qui l'a précédée et suivie. Insérée à la suite des Mémoires de l'abbé Terray.

[16] Eug. Daire, Notice historique sur Turgot, p. 99.

[17] Arthur Young, Voyage en France, ch. 18. — De la police des grains en France.

[18] Ibid.

[19] In Marseille, particularly, the high price of wheat caused a riot on March 25. The people demanded that the consuls lower the price of bread below the wheat price. Mirabeau demonstrated the absurdity of this demand in an Avis au peuple marseillais, a little masterpiece, and he succeeded in calming the riot.

[20] Ed. Fleury, Études révolutionnaires : famines, misères et séditions, p. 10.

[21] Idem, p. 28.

[22] Lettres de Roland, ministre de l'intérieur, à la convention nationale (4 novembre 1792).

[23] Lettre de Roland au président de l'assemblée nationale (18 novembre 1792).

[24] Ibid. (4 novembre 1792).

[25] Discours de Julien Souhait, député des Vosges à la convention nationale.

[26] Rapport de Barrère sur le maximum, séance de la convention du 21 février 1794.

[27] Lettre de Roland, ministre de l'intérieur, à la municipalité de Paris (18 novembre 1792).

[28] Thiers, Histoire de la révolution française, liv. 46.

[29] Thiers, Histoire de la Révolution française, liv. 24.

[30] Vincens, Notice sur la cherté des grains de 1814 à 1812. — Journal des Économistes, n° d'octobre 1843.

[31] Discours de M. Voyer- d'Argeuson, séance du 7 juillet 1819.

[32] Discours de M. Humblot-Conté, séance du 4 avril 1821.

[33] Études sur l'Angleterre. — Les lois sur les céréales*, t. II, p. 327.

[34] Léon Faucher, Études sur l'Angleterre, tome II, page 343.

[35] Lettres sur la liberté du commerce des grains, Œuvres de Turgot, t. 1, p. 198, édit. Guillaumin.

[36] Le Libre-Échange, n° du 6 décembre 1846.

[37] Économie politique de Schmalz*, traduction de Henry Jouffroy, t. II, p. 73.

[38] Études sur l'économie politique, t. II, p. 44.

[39] Th. Tooke, A history of prices, vol. 1, ch. 2. Effect of quantity on prices, p. 10.

[40] Moreau de Jonnès, Production agricole de la France; Annuaire de l'économie politique cl de la statistique pour 1850, p. 368.

[41] H. Passy, Fixité du prix du blé en France, malgré l'accroissement de la population. Annuaire de 1849.

[42] Léon Faucher, Études sur l'Angleterre, p 345.

Monuments publics (Public Monuments)↩

Source

Monuments publics", DEP, T. 2, pp. 237-8.

Text

[237]

Governments that allocate a large portion of public revenue to the construction of monumental buildings are generally praised. These governments earn the admiration of artists and delight architects; they also provide an inexhaustible theme for the enthusiasm of lyrical poets. But do they deserve the same degree of approval from economists? This is what we shall examine.

Every government is tasked with performing a certain number of functions necessary for society. To properly fulfill these public services, as the established term goes, it must have at its disposal a considerable amount of fixed and circulating capital. It requires buildings and infrastructure for the defense and administration of the country, for education, public works, and so on—this constitutes fixed capital. It also needs supplies and currency to operate and maintain its fixed capital, as well as to pay and sustain its employees—this constitutes circulating capital. Within fixed capital, there are buildings and structures of various types: courthouses, prisons, barracks, administrative offices, schools, museums, hospitals, and so forth. When these buildings are of considerable size or simply constructed with artistic merit, they are designated as public monuments.

What, then, is the economic principle to be observed regarding the construction and proliferation of such edifices? It is that their number and the richness of their construction should be proportionate to the purpose they serve and to the resources available to the nation. If public buildings are too few or inadequately arranged, public services will suffer; if, at the same time, they appear poor and lacking in style compared to buildings used for private industry, the government’s prestige may be diminished as a result. In such cases, it would be beneficial to increase the portion of fixed capital allocated to public services. But can this increase be indefinite? Does a government provide undeniable proof of wisdom and good administration by endlessly multiplying the number of public buildings and sparing no expense to make them luxurious? With all due respect to architects and lyrical poets, we do not believe so. Indeed, if public buildings are more numerous or more expansive than the real needs of public services require, the excess will not be useful. It will represent a portion of capital rendered unproductive, the maintenance of which will also incur additional costs. On the other hand, if government buildings surpass those of private industry in opulence—if the government does not adjust its construction expenditures to the state of national wealth, if it erects marble palaces in countries where the majority of the population conducts business in stalls and lives in huts—can it not rightfully be accused of extravagance? Will the contrast between the splendor of its monuments and the wretched condition of private constructions not stand as damning evidence of its poor administration? The architect and the lyrical poet may marvel at buildings where the precious resources of a poor nation have been squandered to satisfy the ostentatious vanity of the ruler; but the economist will turn away in disgust.

There is, therefore, a necessary proportion that must be observed between, on the one hand, the number and magnificence of public buildings, and on the other, the purpose they serve and the resources of the nation. Unfortunately, this necessary proportion is rarely maintained. Most governments have an unfortunate tendency to multiply monumental constructions beyond what is necessary. This tendency arises from temptations that are sometimes all the more difficult to resist because they are encouraged by popular prejudices or sophisms.For example, when the government of a wealthy nation erects sumptuous buildings, its less fortunate neighbors are naturally tempted to imitate it. They readily convince themselves that "national glory" demands that they not allow themselves to be outdone in this regard, and so they ruin themselves with extravagant buildings. Moreover, the temptation to leave "lasting traces" of their time in power never fails to exert a strong influence on governments. They are generally imbued with the conviction that their future renown will be proportional to the number and size of the piles of stone or brick they bequeath to posterity. And this conviction takes root even more easily in their minds because the costs of constructing these buildings—meant to immortalize their memory—do not fall directly on them. But do we even need to say that this method of achieving immortality is not always infallible? [238] Do we need to point out that piles of stone or brick do not always suffice to perpetuate the name of a monarch? The names of the sovereigns who oversaw the construction of the pyramids of Egypt are barely known today, while legislators and philosophers, who left only moral traces of their passage, have achieved immortal fame. Thus, it is a false and pitiful calculation to exhaust a people merely to bequeath to posterity grand yet useless monuments. These monuments do not proclaim the wisdom or greatness of their founders; rather, they stand as lasting testaments to their ignorance and barbarism—far from earning them admiration and gratitude from humanity.

At the forefront of the sophisms employed to justify this extravagant and unproductive use of public funds, we must highlight the so-called "necessity of providing work for laborers." This common fallacy was masterfully refuted by Frédéric Bastiat in his brief pamphlet Ce qu'on voit et ce qu'on ne voit pas (What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen).

"If a nation," wrote the brilliant author of Economic Sophisms, "after ensuring that a grand enterprise will benefit the community, chooses to finance it through collective taxation, nothing could be more natural. But I must admit, I lose patience when I hear this economic blunder used to justify such a decision: ‘Besides, it is a means of creating jobs for workers.’"

"The State builds a road, erects a palace, straightens a street, digs a canal—thus, it provides work for certain laborers. That is what is seen. But it deprives other laborers of work. That is what is not seen.

"Here is a road under construction; every morning, a thousand workers arrive, they leave in the evening, collecting their wages—this is undeniable. If the road had not been decreed, if the funds had not been allocated, these good people would not have found this work or this salary—this, too, is undeniable.

"But is that all? Does the entire operation not encompass more than just this? The moment when M. Dupin [1] utters the ritual words: ‘The Assembly has adopted,’ do millions suddenly descend miraculously from a ray of moonlight into the coffers of Messrs. Fould and Bineau? To complete the process, must the State not organize revenue collection just as it organizes expenditure? Must it not send out tax collectors and demand contributions from taxpayers?

"So study the question in its entirety. While noting how the State allocates the millions it has appropriated, do not neglect to examine what taxpayers would have done with those same millions—funds they now must forgo. Then you will understand that a public enterprise is a coin with two sides: on one side, an employed worker, with the motto: ‘What is seen’; on the other, an unemployed worker, with the motto: ‘What is not seen.’" [2]

Another sophism: It is claimed that governments are obliged to construct numerous monuments to "encourage the fine arts and refine public taste." We have already taken care to refute this fallacy (see FINE ARTS). [3] We will only add a few words.

If a government allocates to the construction of public buildings sums that are disproportionate to their purpose and to the nation’s resources, what will be the result? Public wealth development will be hindered accordingly; members of the nation will not be able to grow in number and prosperity as quickly as they could have if the government had been more frugal with their money. But everyone knows that the fine arts are a luxury that a nation can only afford once its wealth has reached a certain level of development. Burying a portion of a people's productive capital in useless monuments does not, in reality, accelerate the advancement of the fine arts—it delays it. Ultimately, public buildings and monuments must be proportionate, in number and scale, to the needs of the services under government administration. The costs of their construction must correspond to the state of public wealth. This is to say that governments must allow themselves to be guided in this matter far more by the counsel of economists than by the grand designs of architects or the effusive praise of lyrical poets.

Endnotes to Monuments

[1] The pamphlet we are citing was written in 1850.

[2] What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, page 27.

[3] See also, regarding the influence that government intervention exerts on the construction of public buildings and other structures, an excellent chapter in Études sur l’administration de la ville de Paris, by M. Horace Say; Des travaux d’architecture et des architectes, Chapter XIII, page 291.

Nations↩

Source

“Nations,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 259-62.

John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill,& Co., 1899). First edition 1881. Vol. 2 East India Co. - Nullification. “Nations, in Political Economy,” pp. 956-59.

Text

[259]

From the earliest historical periods humanity has been broken up [1] into a multitude of nations, dissimilar in manners, aptitudes, and language, and possessing different institutions. Each of these nations has its own particular features and its own existence, its own autonomy.

This phenomenon, which is of great interest to all branches of moral and political science, will be considered here only from an economic point of view.

The economist must first inquire whether the breaking up [2] of humanity into a multitude of nations is beneficial, or whether it would not be better, as some declare, for the human race to form only one community, a universal monarchy, or a universal republic. There can be no doubt as to the answer to this question. The splitting up [3] of humanity into nations has utility, because it develops a principle of emulation [4] of considerable power. There is in each nation a feeling of honor, or a kind of collective self-esteem, which, when directed toward useful ends, can accomplish wonders. An example of this was furnished at the universal exposition in London, [5] to which most of the civilized nations brought examples of their industry and each made it a point of honor not to be too far behind its rivals. If humanity formed only a single political unit, wouldn’t the sprit of emulation, thus deprived of the stimulant of national honor, manifest itself to a lesser degree? Another drawback, more serious still, would result from the (political) unification of humanity: the errors made by the government of society would extend much farther than they do in the existing state of affairs. If a bad policy is taken today by a government, if a false theory is applied to the management of the affairs of a nation, the harm which results from it is confined to a certain locality. Other nations can refrain from repeating an experience, the results of which have been disastrous. If all humanity, on the contrary, were subjected to a uniform law, would not the harm resulting from the application of a bad policy be universal? As for the progress which improves [260] the human condition, everybody knows that the (political) fragmentation of society [6] creates no obstacle whatsoever to its spreading. When an experiment has succeeded in one nation, are not all the other nations interested in adopting it themselves? Are they not most frequently obliged to do so by the pressure of competition?

The fragmentation of humanity into autonomous nations may therefore be considered as essentially economic. Besides, this fragmentation is a result of the original arrangement of things; it is a natural phenomenon that no artificial combination can destroy nor even noticeably modify. Conquerors, for instance, have dreamt of the utopia of a universal monarchy. Have they succeeded in realizing it? Have not those who have approached nearest to it, seen their gigantic political establishments dissolve by the very force of things? Has not experience taught them that there are limits which no domination can exceed in any lasting manner? Other utopians have dreamt of having a single religion, and some have wished to impose it by violence; but it was useless for them to employ fire and the sword to achieve their goal, and they failed. Religious beliefs have continued to reflect the diversity of temperaments, of manners, and of the enlightenment of different nations. Others, finally, have dreamt of having a single language, and we have seen governments attempt to impose a uniform language upon peoples of different origin, whom they had united under their rule. [7] Not long ago, the Dutch government, for example, attempted to replace the French language with the Dutch language in some of the southern provinces of the old kingdom of the Netherlands. What was the result? Quite simply, that the legally imposed language was hated by the population on which it was imposed and that this experience, contrary to the nature of things, greatly contributed to the fall of the government which tried to do this. [8] Languages like religious beliefs and political institutions, are the expression of the individual spirit of different nations, and they satisfy the needs or the preferences (of the people) which one might attempt to satisfy in vain by other means. The form of institutions and of language can without doubt be modified in an artificial manner, but their substance will nevertheless remain: even if the words change, the accents remains.

Although it would be absurd to wish to remove, for the sake of a utopian unity, the characteristic marks of nationalities, it does not follow that nations must be isolated from and kept in a permanent state of hostility toward each other. The autonomy of nations implies neither isolation nor hostility. Nations are interested in communicating freely with one another, in order that they may increase in wealth and power; they are still more interested in living in peace with one another.

These truths, too long unrecognized, have been admirably demonstrated by economists, especially by J. B. Say. To those who pretend, for instance, that a nation can only be enriched by the impoverishment of its rivals, the illustrious author of the theory of markets [9] replies correctly that: [10]

“A nation bears the same relation to a neighboring nation that a province does to another province, that a city does to the countryside; it is interested in seeing it prosper, and certain to profit by its wealth. The United States are right, then, for example, it always having tried to encourage industry in the savage tribes which surround them; it has been their purpose to obtain something from them in exchange; for nothing can be gained from people who have nothing to give. It is of advantage to humanity for a nation to conduct itself toward others, under all circumstances, according to liberal principles. It will be shown, by the brilliant results it will obtain from so doing, that vain systems, disastrous theories, are the exclusive and jealous maxims of the old states of Europe, which they with effrontery endow with the name of practical truths, because, unfortunately, they put them in practice.”

Nothing is more deceitful, adds this judicious economist, than the advantage which a nation thinks it gains by encroaching upon the domain of another, by the conquest of a province or a colony of a rival power. [11]

“If France had possessed,” he says, “at any time whatever, an economic government, and had employed for improving the provinces in the centre of the kingdom, the money which she expended for conquering distant provinces and colonies which could not be kept, she would be much more happy and more powerful. Highways, parish roads, canals for irrigation and navigation, are the means which a government has always at its disposal to improve provinces which are unproductive. Production is always expensive in a province, when the expense of the transportation of its products is great. An interior conquest indubitably increases the strength of a state, as a distant conquest almost always weakens it. All that constitutes the strength of Great Britain is in Great Britain itself; it has been made much stronger by the loss of America; it will be more so when it shall have lost India.”

Also J. B. Say is thoroughly convinced that, when economic knowledge is more widely diffused, when the true sources of the prosperity and the greatness of nations shall be better known, the old policy, which consists in conquering new territory in order to tax its people to excess, in taking possession of new markets in order to subject them to a selfish and pitiless exploitation, this evil policy of antagonism and hatred, will end by losing all credit.

“All this old policy will perish,” he says. “Strength will come from meriting (someone’s) favour and not in demanding it by force. The effects which are made to secure domination procure only an artificial greatness, which necessarily makes an enemy of every foreigner. This system produces debts, abuses, tyrants, and revolutions; while the attraction of a reciprocal agreement procures [261] friends, extends the circle of useful relations; and the prosperity which results from it is lasting, because it is natural.” [12]

If, then, economists do not share the illusions of the humanitarian socialists, who would like to unite all nations into a single flock, ruled by an all-governing shepherd; [13] if they do not think that there would be any utility removing, in an artificial manner, the characteristic differences of nations; if they only accept with reservations the beautiful verses of the author of the Marseillaise of Peace: [14]

Nations! mot pompeux pour dire barbarie! … Déchirez ces drapeaux! une autre voix vous crie; L’égoisme et la haine ont seuls une patrie; La fraternité n’en a pas;	Nations! such a pompous word to describe barbarity! … Tear up these flags! another voice cries out to you; Selfishness and hatred alone have a country; Fraternity does not

If they think that nations have their raison d’être even in the bosom of civilization, they do not work less actively to demolish the walls of separation, which old errors, prejudices of centuries, and barbarous hatreds have raised between nations; they show nations that it is in their interest to exchange their ideas and their products in order to increase their wealth, their power, and their civilization; they condemn war as a bad gamble, as an operation in which the risks of loss exceed the chances of gain; and without being humanitarians or advocates of unity, [15] they show nations the true methods of realizing practical fraternity. (See the article on PEACE.) [16]

Errors no less fatal, on the subject of the internal government of nations, have attracted the attention of economists. Just as it was once the common belief that a nation could only become powerful and rich by weakening and impoverishing its rivals, an excessively large share of influence and activity in the life of nations was granted to the government. Because the government and society remained joined together in primitive communities, when the division of labor had not yet separated social functions (from each other), it was thought that it must always be so; it was thought that it was the task of the government to give movement and action to the social organism, and make life flow there; it was thought that nothing could be done except by the impulse of this sovereign driving force. [17] Political economy has put an end such a disastrous an error. Economists have demonstrated that the functions of government should be reduced and made more and more specialized, by virtue of the principle of the division of labor, [18] rather than extended and multiplied; they have demonstrated that communism belonged to the infancy of nations, and that it ceased to be expedient in their maturity. With the coolness of a surgeon who removes a cancer, J.B. Say has shown to what point a government which is not strictly limited to fulfilling its natural functions can cause trouble, corruption, and discomfort in the economy of the social body, and he has stated that in his eyes a government of this kind was a veritable ulcer. [19]

This colorful expression, ulcerous government, [20] employed by the illustrious economist to designate a government which interferes improperly in the domain of private activity, has frequently been used by interventionist and socialist writers to criticise political economy. Some even have taken it as a foundation for the assumption that political economy has misunderstood the importance of the mission with which governments are charged in society, and they have accused it of having given birth to the celebrated doctrine of an-archy. But, nothing is less merited than such criticism. Political economy, rightly understood, leads no more to the abolition of governments [21] than it does to the destruction of nationalities. [22] J. B. Say says:

When authority is not plunderous itself, it procures for nations the greatest of benefits, that of protecting them from plunderers. Without this protection which lends the aid of all to the needs of one alone, it is impossible to conceive any important development of the productive faculties of man, of land, or of capital; it is impossible to conceive the existence of capital itself, since capital is only values accumulated and working under the safeguard of public authority. It is for this reason that no nation has ever arrived at any degree of wealth, without having been subject to a regular government; it is to the security which political organization procures, that civilized nations owe not only the innumerable and varied productions which satisfy their wants, but also their fine arts, their leisure hours, the fruit of accumulation, without which they could not cultivate their intellectual gifts, nor consequently rise to all the dignity that the nature of man admits of.” [23]

Political economy is not therefore an-archic. Economists are perfectly convinced that governments play a necessary part in society, and it is precisely because they appreciate all the importance of this part, that they consider that governments should be occupied with nothing else. [24] Finally, economists think that the same practices of scrupulous economy, which are the rule in private industry, should be the rule also in the government of nations. [25]

Let us again quote J. B. Say, on this subject: [26]

A nation which only respects its prince when he is surrounded with pomp, with glitter, with guards, with horses, with all that is most expensive, has to pay for it. It economizes, on the contrary, when it grants its respect to simplicity rather than to display, and when it obeys the laws without display.

… Causes (which are) purely political, and the form of government which they produce, influence the costs of the salaries of civil and judicial functionaries, of (political) representation, and finally [262] of those costs which public institutions and establishments require. Thus, in a despotic country, where the prince disposes of the property of his subjects, he alone fixing his salary, that is to say, what he uses of the public funds for his own personal benefit, his pleasures, and the maintenance of his household, that salary may be fixed higher than in the country where it is negotiated by the representatives of the prince and those of the tax payers.

The salaries of subordinates depend also either upon their individual influence, or upon the general system of government. The services which they render are costly or cheap, not only in proportion to the price paid for them, but also according as their duties are more or less well performed. A service poorly performed is expensive, although very little may be paid for it; it is expensive if there is but little need of it. It is like a piece of furniture which does not serve the purpose for which it was intended, of which there is no need, and which is a trouble rather than a benefit. Such were, under the old French monarchy, the positions of grand-admiral, grand-master, grand-cupbearer, master of the hounds, and a multitude of others, which served only to add lustre to the crown, and many of which were only methods employed to distribute perquisites and favors.

For the same reason, when the machinery of the administration is complicated, the people are made to pay for services which are not indispensable to the maintenance of public order; this is like giving a useless shape to a product, which is not worth more on that account, and is generally worth less. Under a bad government, which can only support its encroachments, its injustices, its exactions, by means of numerous satellites (hangers-on), of an active system of espionage, and by the multiplication of prisons; these prisons, spies, and soldiers are costly for the people, who are certainly not happier on that account.

To sum up, political economy recognizes that the fragmentation of humanity into nations has its utility and its raison d’être; it recognizes that no nation, unless it be composed of angels, would be able to do without government; but, at the same time, it demonstrates that nations have an interest in establishing their foreign policy upon peace, and their domestic policy upon economy; it demonstrates that nations have an interest in maintaining free and friendly relations with one another, and to be governed as little as possible.

Endnotes to Nations

[1] Molinari uses the terms "fractionner" and "le fractionnement" throughout this entry. We have translated these as "to divide, break up, or fragment" and "division, breaking up, or fragmentation) accordingly.

[2] "Le fractionnement."

[3] Here Molinari uses the word "la morcellement" which was commonly used to describe the breaking or splitting up of holdings of land into smaller and smaller pieces as a result of French inheritance laws. he discusses this problem for French agriculture in S4.

[4] "Un principe d'émulation" might also be translated as "a principle of competition" or "seeking best practice".

[5] The "Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations" (also known as "The Great Exhibition" was held in Hyde Park, London, between 1 May and 15 October 1851. It was the first in a series of so-called "World's Fairs" which became popular in Europe and America in the 19th century to showcase a country's economic development, industry, and culture. It was organized by the inventor Henry Cole and Prince Albert , the husband of the reigning monarch of the United Kingdom, Queen Victoria. See the almost rapturous article on "Expositions des produits de l'industrie" by Blanqui in DEP, vol. 1, pp. 46-51, on how strongly the economists thought such expositions could end national rivalries and promote peace.

[6] "Le fractionnement des sociétés."

[7] Molinari had personal experience of this, having been born in Liège in 1818 which was then part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and which would become part of the new Kingdom of Belgium in 1830. The rivalry between Dutch (Flemish) speakers and French speakers continues to this day.

[8] The Revolution of July 1830 in Paris which saw the overthrow of the Bourbon King Charles X and his replacement by Louis Philippe, sparked an uprising in Brussels and the French-speaking southern provinces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This lead to the secession of these provinces and the formation of the new Kingdom of Belgium.

[9] A reference to Say's Law of Markets, which states that "supply creates its own demand" or "goods are exchanged for other goods." See footnote on p. 476?? ("that "products are bought with other products" which is a variant of "Say's Law" applied to foreign trade, namely that "supply creates its own demand."}

[10] (Molinari's note.) Traité d'Économie politique, liv. I, chap. XV, p. 145 (Guillaumin 1841 ed.)

[11] (Molinari's note.) Idem., liv. II, chap. IX. [*editor's note*: the quote comes from a footnote added to the 6th edition of the *traité,* vol. 2, p. 225. see 1841 guillaumin ed. p. 408. this footnote does not appear to have been translated in the biddle edition.]

[12] (Molinari's note.) Traité d'Économie politique, liv. I, chap. IX, p. 106 Guillaumin 1841 ed.

[13] Molinari uses the colourful expression "réunir toutes les nations en un seul troupeau gouverné par un berger omniarcal." Bastiat had a similar set of colorful terms to describe the would-be socialist planners of society, such as "the great mechanic," or social "gardeners." See my essay on "The Social Mechanism and its Driving Force".

[14] (Molinari's note.) By Alphonse de Lamartine (Saint-Point, 28 mai 1841) in Revue des Deux mondes. [Editor's note: Alphonse de Lamartine, Œuvres complètes de Lamartine (1860), vol. 5, "la Marseillaise de la paix" p. 97.

[15] Literally "sans être humanitaires ou unitéistes" (without being humanitarians or 'unitarians' (or "unity-ists")).

[16] Molinari wrote the entry on "Paix. Guerre," DEP, T. 2, pp. 307-14.

[17] "L'impulsion de ce moteur souverain". Compare this with Bastiat's notion of "Le moteur social". Ref??

[18] As he argued in S11.

[19] See my essay on "Ulcerous, Leprous, and Tax-Eating Government".

[20] "Le gouvernement-ulcère." Molinari discusses this idea at greater length in Cours, vol. 2, p. 530.

[21] In S11 he argues not that government will be abolished by being replaced by private, competing insurance companies, but that its "monopoly" over providing that service will be abolished. He also discusses the issue of nationalism under such a system of "la liberté du gouvernement."

[22] In S11 Molinari argues that in fact the feeling of "nationality" would be stronger in a free society as national boundaries would be "natural" (i.e. not formed coercively).

[23] (Molinari's note.) Traité d'Économie politique, liv. I, chap. XIV. Guillaumin 1841 ed. p. 133.

[24] Here Molinari appears to be backtracking somewhat from his stronger claims made in S11 when speaking as "The Economist." He was criticised for doing this by Charles Coquelin in his review of Les Soirées in the JDE. Perhaps here, in writing this entry for the DEP, he was obliged to speak on behalf of all the economists, not just himself, and so took a more moderate position.

[25] In his treatise the first edition of which appeared three years after this was written, Molinari listed all the ways in which governments "sin" (pécher) against the laws of political economy in their provision of goods and services, such as ignoring the division of labour, growing too large to best be able to satisfy the needs of consumers, prohibiting competition and free trade which keep prices down, and preventing the development of specialisation. See Cours, vol. 2, p. pp. 522-26**.**

[26] (Molinari's note.) Traité d'Économie politique, liv. III, chap. VI, p. 477( Guillaumin 1841 ed.).

Nobility↩

Source

“Noblesse,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 275-81.

John Joseph Lalor, Cyclopaedia of Political Science, Political Economy, and of the Political History of the United States by the best American and European Authors, ed. John J. Lalor (New York: Maynard, Merrill,& Co., 1899). First edition 1881. Vol. 2 East India Co. - Nullification. “Nobility,” pp. 1,033-39.

Text

[275]

NOBILITY. By this, or by some equivalent term, has been designated in all times the body of men who have claimed for themselves in an exclusive manner the higher functions of society. Most frequently this body established its rule by conquest. Thus the nobility of most of the states of Europe owes its origin to the barbarous hordes which invaded the Roman empire, and divided its remains among themselves. At first these troops of emigrants, whom the inadequate supplies of food and the allure of booty drove them down from the regions of the north to those of the south, overran and laid waste the civilized world; but soon, either because the moveable capital which served them as their prey began to be used up, or because the more intelligent understood that a regular exploitation would be more profitable to them than simple pillage, they established a fixed residence for themselves upon the ruins of the world they had laid waste and conquered.

This establishment of the barbarians in the old domain of civilization, and the institution of a feudal nobility which was the result of it, had a utility which it would be unjust to ignore. It must not be forgotten that the Roman empire, internally undermined and corrupted by the cancer of slavery, [1] had ended by falling into ruins, and that the wealth accumulated by the Græco-Roman civilization was at the mercy of the barbarians. In so critical a situation, the establishment of the Goths, the Vandals, the Lombards, and other emigrants from the north upon the territory which they had ravaged, was beneficial. Having become owners of the greatest part of the capital which the conquered nations had accumulated upon the land, these barbarians were henceforth interested in defending it against the hordes which came after them. It was thus that the old enemies of civilization became its defenders, and that the wealth accumulated by antiquity, in passing from the weak hands of its old owners to those of the conquerors of the north, who were more numerous, more courageous, and stronger, was preserved from total annihilation. The destructive wave of invasion stopped before this new rampart, raised up in the place of the dismantled rampart of Roman domination. The Huns, for example, who had come from the depths of Tartary to share the spoils of the old world, were destroyed or repulsed by the coalition of the Goths and Franks, who had settled in Italy and in Gaul; and later the Saracens, no less formidable than the Huns, met the same fate.

If the Goths and the Franks had not appropriated the fixed capital of the nations they had subjugated, would they have risked their lives and their booty to repulse the fierce soldiers of Attila? And what would have remained of the old civilization, if this barbarian chief of a nomadic race had continued to overrun and ravage Europe? Would not Greece, Italy, Gaul, and Spain, dispossessed of their movable and personal wealth, and deprived of the greatest part of their population, have ended by presenting the same spectacle of desolation and ruin as the empire of the Assyrians and the kingdom of Palmyra? When, therefore, we take into account the circumstances which accompanied the establishment of the barbarians in the bosom of European civilization, we see that this violent substitution of a new race of proprietors for the old race presents rather the characteristics of the expropriation of private property in the name of public utility (i.e. eminent domain) [2] than those of plunder properly so called. Hence, this extremely important consequence, that the property of the nobility which had its origin in conquest does not deserve the anathema which certain socialists have launched against it; because the original titles of the nobility to their estates was founded on general utility, that is to say, upon justice.

The conditions for the establishment of the barbarians in the bosom of the civilized world were extremely varied. Historians have nevertheless demonstrated that they generally took for themselves two-thirds of the land; this was, for example, the proportion in Gaul, when it was conquered by the Franks. This proportion, however, was not arbitrary; it was determined by the necessities of the situation. In each subjugated nation there was an aristocracy of land owners, dating most frequently from an earlier conquest, whom the conquerors were interested in treating with a certain restraint, in order not to push them to the dangerous extreme of despair. Depending upon whether this aristocracy had preserved more or less strength and influence, the conquerors left it a more or less considerable portion of its domains, limiting themselves to subjecting it to some modest fees. Hence there were two kinds of domains, and the title of francs alleux (freeholds) was given to lands occupied by the conquerors, as the count de Boulainvilliers explains very clearly. [3]

“The Gallic land owner,” says this learned historian of the French nobility, "was required to pay certain tributes of the fruits and revenues of his lands, according to the demands of the victors. The Frank, who possessed his lands entirely free and unburdened (“franches” - free from taxes), had a more absolute and more perfect ownership of them; hence this distinction [276] was marked by the term salic lands, meaning lands or alleux of the Franks, called also Salians; in a word, francs-alleux, that is to say, absolutely and thoroughly their own, hereditary, and free even from all tribute of the fruits. Terra salica, quae salio militi; aut regi assignata erat, dicta ad differentiam allodialis, quae est subditorum. (Basnage, on the word Alleu.) [4] This method of dividing the conquered lands was imitated by the Goths, who called the lands which they had retained sortes gothicas, and those which they had left to the Romans, sortes romanas. The Normans did the same thing in regard to the old possessors of Neustria when they conquered it, and this was the origin of the greater part of freeholds; for the complete freedom from taxation of these lands, the owners of which only came under the jurisdiction of God alone (as Boutillier says in his Somme), also entitled them to be called francs-alleux (freeholds)."

There were, therefore, two nobilities facing each other after the conquest, the one composed of members of the conquering army, and the other composed of the old land owners not completely dispossessed. The former, whose lands were free from tax, were at first in the ascendency; but after long struggles, of which the fine novel, Ivanhoe, for example, [5] gives a picturesque sketch, these two nobilities, drawn together by common interests, generally ended by merging into one.

It sometimes occurred to the conquerors to make an inventory of the wealth which they had appropriated; this was especially the case in England after the Norman conquest. The results of this curious inquiry were embodied in the Domesday Book. [6]

The division of the booty and of the lands was carried out in an unequal manner between the chiefs and the soldiers of the conquering army. This inequality was based upon the unequal share which each had taken, according to his rank in the army, in the work of conquest. The distinction of rank was determined by the necessities of the enterprise. [277] When the barbarians invaded a country, they chose the chiefs from among the most courageous and capable of their number, and they obeyed them in the common interest. The chiefs chose aids or comrades (comites) to carry out their orders; and a military hierarchy, based upon the necessities of the enterprise which was to be carried out, was thus organized by itself. Once the conquest was accomplished, it was natural that the share in the booty should be proportional to the rank which each man, having any claim to it, held in the army of invasion. The supreme chief had, therefore, the greatest share, both in personal effects and in land; the lesser chiefs and the common soldiers of the conquest obtained shares proportional to their rank, or to the services which they had rendered. These divisions were frequently the occasion of bloody quarrels, which the necessities of common defense alone were able to bring to an end.

When the booty to be divided comprised, besides personal effects, immovable property, land, or houses, the army of invasion dispersed, and each one of its members occupied the share which had fallen to him in the division. But in dispersing across a conquered country which was still a potential enemy, and exposed for that matter to new invasions, the conquerors took care to preserve their military organization; they remained organized in such a way that, at the first appearance of danger, they might immediately assemble their ranks under the banner of the chief. It is thus that the feudal régime was created. The characteristic trait of this system was the rigorous maintenance of the hierarchical organization of the conquering army, and the obligations which flowed from it. At the first call of the supreme chief, emperor, king, or duke, the lesser chiefs assembled the mass of those workers who had participated in the conquest. Each was bound, under pain of forfeiture, to report at the call of his superior in the hierarchy; the army was soon on foot again, in good order, to defend its domains, either against a revolt from within or an aggression from without.

The chiefs thus preserved their rank after the dispersal of the conquering army. Each rank had its particular name, sometimes of barbarian origin, sometimes borrowed from the Roman hierarchy. This name passed from the man to the domain; hence kingdoms, duchies, marquisates, counties, baronies, etc. Those of the conquering army who possessed no rank, but who had obtained a lot of land, simply took the name of “francs tenanciers” ( freeholders), and their lands that of “terres franches” (in English, freeholds), and they formed the lower grade of the nobility. [7] Being obliged to march under the command of the chiefs, they enjoyed as compensation, like the latter, the privilege of being exempt from taxes, and that of sending representatives to the assemblies or parliaments of the nobility, in which the interests of their orders were discussed.

Nevertheless, it was important to assure the longevity of this organization which the care for the common defense required. The right of primogeniture and of entail were introduced to assure this longevity. Each having obtained a portion of the land, on condition of fulfilling certain obligations, it was essential, in the first place, that this share should not be divided up; in the second place, that it should not pass into the hands of a foreign or hostile family. The division of the land would have destroyed the pledge which assured the exact fulfillment of the military services, upon which depended the common security; it would have introduced anarchy into the conquering army, by necessitating a continual reorganization of the hierarchy. The introduction into the ranks of the army of men belonging to the conquered race, which could have taken place after the alienation or sale of the lands occupied by the conquerors, would have been no less dangerous. The law of primogeniture and entail served to preserve the conquerors from this two-fold peril. The law of primogeniture maintained intact the domain, which was the pledge of the fulfillment of the duty of each toward all, by transmitting it from generation to generation to the eldest son of the family. Entail prevented foreigners or enemies from slipping into the ranks of the army, by not allowing the noble proprietors to alienate their domains.

The primitive organization of the conquering army could therefore be perpetuated after the conquest had been accomplished, and the nobility formed itself into a veritable guild at the very top of society.

This organization had the obvious utility, in that it prevented the country, in which the conquering army had established itself, from becoming constantly the prey of new hordes of barbarians. It had its inevitable drawbacks, in that it delivered the industrious population over to the mercy of a greedy and brutal horde, who most frequently used without any restraint its right of conquest.

At first the condition of the subject population [278] was very hard. The conquerors were subject to laws and obligations based upon their common interest; these laws and these obligations, which extended to all, to the chiefs as well as to the soldiers, protected to a certain degree the weak against the strong. But nothing similar existed in favor of the conquered; the latter were the prey which the conquerors disposed of at their pleasure. Perhaps it was good that it was so, at least in the very beginning; for if the conquerors had not had a maximum of interest in assuming the risks to property, which at that time was subject to continual aggression, they would, according to all appearances, have remained ordinary nomadic pillagers, [8] and the capital accumulated by civilization would have been entirely destroyed. But this absolute power of the conquerors over the conquered, whether it was necessary or not, could not fail to produce the most monstrous oppression. The serf or subject of a lord was taxable, and liable to forced labor at his pleasure, which signified that the lord could dispose, according to his will, of the property of the unhappy serf, and sell him, and his family, after having confiscated his goods. Every individual, merchant or other, who crossed the domain of a lord, was also exposed to being pillaged, reduced to slavery, or massacred. Fortunately, this violent state of affairs could not last; order and justice have such utility, that they re-establish themselves in some way, after the most terrible social upheavals. The lords were not slow to see that it was in their interest to grant their serfs, farmers, or artisans, certain guarantees of security, and not to take their property in a violent and arbitrary manner, in order to get more from them. Hence, the emergence of customs. These customs, whose utility for the master as well as for the subject was proved by experience, ended by becoming a solid barrier against the arbitrariness of the lords. The condition of the serf, protected by custom, became more bearable, and the revenue of the lord was increased in consequence; the farmers, being less exposed to plunder, agriculture began to flourish again, and famines, after having been the rule, became each year less frequent. Artisans, who were concentrated in the towns and therefore in a better state than the farmers to look after each other, obtained even more quickly guarantees against arbitrary power; they were allowed, on condition of certain fixed fees, and sometimes even on condition of an indemnity paid only once once, to carry out their occupation in peace, and the by-laws of corporations were at first nothing but records of the customs, agreements, or transactions, which protected them from the rapacity of the lords. The same customs were established and the same arrangements worked for the benefit of commerce. At first the merchants, who had taken the risk of trading from city to city as they had done in the time of Roman domination, had been dispossessed, reduced to slavery, or massacred by the barbarian lords, whose domains they traversed. But soon, all commerce having ceased, the lords themselves realized the inconveniences of this state of things. What did they do? For their capricious and arbitrary acts of plunder, they substituted fixed and regular feudal fees; they guaranteed to the merchants free and safe passage through their domains, on condition of their paying a toll. This was still onerous, without doubt; for each country being divided into a multitude of little seigniorial estates, a merchant, who had to travel through a rather small stretch of country, was obliged to pay a multitude of tolls. But it was less onerous than pillage and murder; and commerce, thus protected by the better understood interest of the lords, again assumed some activity.

Improvements did not stop here. Events and progress of different kinds weakened successively the feudal nobility, either by diminishing the importance of the part it played, or by increasing the power of the classes, which were subordinate to it.

As soon as feudalism was firmly set up and established, the danger of invasions became less; not, however, as the historian Robertson [9] has declared, because the source from where they flowed had dried up. There were still, in the north of Europe and in the centre of Asia, large numbers of people who were greedy for booty, and ready to throw themselves upon the countries in which the arts of civilization had accumulated wealth; but, between these hungry multitudes and the prey which they coveted, the rampart of feudalism had been raised. After having vainly attempted to make a breach in this rampart, which replaced that of the Roman legions, the barbarian hordes drew back one after the other into the heart of Asia, and descended upon India and China. Then the conquerors, established upon the ruins of the Roman empire, could enjoy a little peace. But peace was foreign to their nature. They wore themselves out with internal struggles. The weaker lords were subjugated or dispossessed by the stronger. The supreme chief, who at first had had no authority over his old companions, except when there was question of providing for the common defense, profited by their disagreements to increase his power at their expense. He granted his alliance and his protection to the weak, on condition that they made themselves dependent on him and paid tribute to him. It was in this way that most of the freeholds were changed into fiefs. [10] This modification of the feudal system [279] had very important consequences. The number of internal struggles decreased, because the more powerful lords no longer dared to attack the weak, when the latter had become vassals of the king. On the other hand, the king, who collected tribute from the lands of those whom he protected, saw that they brought in more for him, to the extent that the taxes collected for the benefit of the lords were less numerous and less burdensome. He endeavored, therefore, to diminish the number of individual tolls, and to reduce the demands the lords made on their serfs. His salutary intervention was felt also in the system of money. In the beginning, each lord had assumed for himself the right to coin money, imposing upon the inhabitants of his domains the obligation of using only the coinage stamped with his head. Money soon became as bad as it could possibly be, while the subjects of the lords had no means of protecting themselves from the damage caused them by the debased money. It was quite otherwise, when, the freeholds having been transformed into fiefs, the king levied taxes upon the domains of his vassals. To prevent the loss which the debasement of the money caused in the payment of taxes, he appointed inspectors (juges-gardes) who were charged with the surveillance of the coinage of the lords, and with preventing them from melting down and debasing his own money. Gradually, as the power of these protectors of the weak increased, he confiscated or bought the right of coinage from the lesser lords and appropriated it for himself. The industrious classes did not fail to profit by these changes. Their condition was improved again when the most bellicose and turbulent part of the nobility went to the crusades. The lords, convinced that the conquest of the east would make their fortunes in this world and would assure their salvation in the next, granted their multitudes of serfs liberty at a low price. And as very few of them returned from “that religious California of the middle ages”, [11] the serfs, who had bought their liberty, were able to keep it. Finally, the bourgeoisie of the cities, having become rich and powerful by their industry, undertook to make themselves completely independent of their lords. The communal movement commenced, and this movement, assisted by the kings, who sold their protection to the bourgeoisie of the communes, as they had before sold it to the lesser lords, contributed also to weakening the power of the nobility.

The feudal system thus fell little by little into ruins. The subject classes advanced each day with a more rapid step toward their enfranchisement, inscribing upon their banners the word liberty. (See BOURGEOISIE.) [12] The substitution of fire arms for the old tools of war gave the coup de grâce to feudalism, by permitting thence-forth the industrious classes to protect themselves against the invasions of the strong races of the north. Artillery had considerable advantages over and thus replaced the iron-clad giants of chivalry, and the noble order ceased to be the necessary rampart of civilization. Since the services which it rendered were losing their value, the supremacy and the privileges which it continued to claim for itself were borne with less patience. Above all was this the case in France, where, the royal power having ended by reducing the nobility to the condition of servants of the court, it presented the spectacle of the saddest moral and material decay. Its eldest sons, provided with magnificent sinecures, expended their incomes in idleness, and ran into debt to avoid being eclipsed by an industrious bourgeoisie, whose wealth kept increasing. Its younger sons, too numerous for the employments which the monarch had at his disposal, and too proud to devote themselves to commerce and industry, [13] filled the gaming houses and places of ill repute. The nobility, thus degraded, lost its old ascendency over the masses, and in 1789 the industrious classes rose up against he domination by a caste, which no longer could make arrogance and privileges forgotten through the magnitude of its services. The French nobility disappeared, swallowed up in the whirlpool of the revolution.

The following, according to the learned author of La France avant la révolution, is an account of the rights and feudal privileges which the nobility still enjoyed when the great catastrophe occurred: [14]

“In almost all the rural districts there existed numerous vestiges of the feudal system. Each village had its lord, who, in general, possessed the best lands, and had certain rights over those which did not belong to him. Thus, there was the exclusive right of hunting upon all the territory of the fief; there was the tithe, the extent of which was more or less great; there was, with each transfer of property, the tax on the lot of land and on its sale. The lord could retain, for the price of sale, the land sold in his territory, could force the inhabitants to grind their grain in his mill, to bake their bread in his oven, to make their wine in his press, etc. On the vassal were incumbent also certain personal services, such as the obligation to work a certain number of days without compensation, which were called corvées, to render certain services under certain determined circumstances, etc. In some provinces, like Franche-Comté and Burgundy, mortmain existed still in many of the villages; the peasant could not quit the land or marry without permission of his lord, under pain of losing his property, and if he left no children, the lord was his heir.

But Louis XVI. had abolished mortmain in all the domains of the crown, and many lords followed his example. Justice was administered in the first resort, and sometimes in the last, by judges appointed by the lord. Finally, the clergy took the tithes, the government the villain tax and the tax on salt, and the peasant was subject, besides, to the corvée and the duty to serve in the militia , while all the nobles and almost all the bourgeois functionaries were exempt from it."

Finally, the nobility monopolized most of the great offices of the state, and had at its disposal numerous sinecures.

There are no precise data as to the number of the members of the French nobility, at the time when the revolution deprived them of their privileges. According to Sieyès, their number did not exceed 110,000. This is the way in which Sieyès made his calculation: [15]

“I know," he said, “of one way to estimate the number of individuals of this order: it is to take the province where this number is the best known and compare it with the rest of France. That province is Brittany, and I remark in advance that it has more nobles than the others, either because they do not give up their noble privileges there, or because of the privileges which the families retain, etc., etc. There are in Brittany 1,900 noble families; I will say 2,000. Estimating each family as having five persons, there are in Brittany 10,000 nobles of all ages and of both sexes. The total population is 2,800,000 individuals. The ratio to the entire population of France is one to eleven. We must then multiply 10,000 by eleven, and we have 110,000 nobles at the most for the whole of the kingdom."

The author of La France avant la révolution thinks that the opinion of Sieyès is very near the truth.

Like the French nobility, but with more success, the British nobility has endeavored to maintain its old supremacy. No aristocracy has been able to derive more advantage from its position. With the establishment of the corn laws, it has endeavored to raise the value of the lands belonging to its eldest sons. By expanding the colonial empire of England, it has gradually increased the arena open to its younger sons. [16] Nevertheless the industrious classes have come to understand that the costs of this policy of monopoly fall chiefly upon them, while the aristocracy receives the most evident benefit from it. These classes have fought against the political and economic monopolies of the aristocracy, and thanks to the great agitation of the Anti-Corn Law League, [17] and to the reforms of Sir Robert Peel, [18] continued by Lord John Russell, this work of enfranchisement is very far advanced.

It is necessary to add, however, that if the British aristocracy has shown itself harsh in the matter of monopolies, it has displayed great and solid qualities in the exercise of the functions it has monopolized. It has done even better. Whenever it has discovered a man of eminent ability in the lower strata of society, it has had the intelligence and the skill to make a place for him in its own ranks. It is thus that it has known how to render its monopoly bearable, and to preserve a great and legitimate ascendency over the country.

When the noble classes shall have finally ceased to be privileged in a direct or indirect manner, it is probable that the titles which serve to distinguish them will lose their value. For this value depends much less upon a prejudice of opinion than upon the positive advantages which they can confer. These advantages amount to nothing in the liberal professions: let a merchant, for example, be noble or common, the credit which he enjoys in the market remains the same. [19] But it is quite otherwise in the functions which are connected with the government. It is rare that the nobility is not favored in an exceptional manner in the distribution of offices and of honors. Even in countries where the principle of equality has been proclaimed most emphatically, noble titles are all too often a piece of paper whose value is underwritten by the wallet of the taxpayers. [20] As long as this piece of paper maintains its value, this will be proof that society has still not yet finished with the régime of privilege.

These old qualifications of the nobility constitute besides a peculiar anachronism in the organization of modern society. As has been seen above, the titles of duke, marquis, count, and baron served to designate the grades of the military hierarchy of feudalism; they roughly corresponded to the modern ranks of general, colonel, major, and captain. Would not bankers, manufacturers, scholars, or artists, invested with these titles borrowed from feudal hierarchy, present a somewhat ridiculous spectacle? Would they not have just as much reason for adorning themselves with the titles of mandarin, grand-serpent, or sagamore? How would this last nomenclature be more absurd than the other? Have our bankers, our manufacturers, our scholars, and our artists any more resemblance to the fierce warriors of the middle ages than they have to Indian chiefs or Chinese mandarins?

The privileges, and probably also the titles, of nobility will end by disappearing with so many other remnants of the old régime of servitude. But does this mean that our society is destined some day to undergo the process of egalitarian leveling ? By no means. There will always be, in the work of production, superior and inferior functions, functions requiring in a high degree the cooperation of the moral and intellectual faculties of man, and functions for which lesser skills will be sufficient. The former will always be better remunerated and more honored than the latter. The aristocracy of society will be formed by the former, and this natural nobility, so much more respectable because it will be better founded upon the superiority of merit and upon the greatness of its services, will have no need to make a show of haughty pretensions and superannuated titles in order to obtain public recognition.

Endnotes to Nobility

In virtue of the orders of king William, Henry de Ferrieres, Walter Giffard, Adam, brother of Eudes the seneschal, and Remi, bishop of Lincoln, with other personages selected from among the officers of justice and of the Exchequer, made a progress through the counties of England, establishing a court of inquiry in each place of any importance. They summoned before them the Norman viscount of each province, or of each Saxon shire, a personage whom the Saxons, in their language, still called by the ancient title of shire-reve or sheriff. They then summoned, or caused the viscount to summon, all the Norman barons of the neighbourhood, and called upon them to state the precise limits of their possessions and of their territorial jurisdictions; then some of the inspectors, or commissioners delegated by them, proceeded to each large domain and to each district, or hundred, as the Saxons called it. There they made the French men-at-arms of each seigneur, and every English inhabitant of the hundred, declare upon oath how many free-holders or lease-holders there were on the domain,1 what portion each occupied in full and modified property, the names of the actual holders, the names of those who had possessed them before the conquest, and the various mutations of property that had taken place since. So that they required, say the narratives of the time, three declarations concerning each estate; what it had been in the time of king Edward; what it was when William gave it, and what it was at the time being. Under each particular return was inscribed this form: “This is what has been sworn by all the Frenchmen and all the Englishmen of the hundred.”

In each town they inquired what taxes the inhabitants had paid to the ancient kings, and what the town produced to the officers of the Conqueror; how many houses the war of the conquest or the construction of fortresses had done away with; how many houses the conquerors had taken; how many Saxon families, reduced to utter poverty, were not in a condition to pay anything. In cities, they took the oath from the high Norman authorities, who convoked the Saxon citizens in their old Guildhall, now become the property of the king or of some foreign baron; lastly, in places of less importance, they took the oath of the royal provost, of the priest, and of six Saxons or villeins, as the Normans called them, of each town. This survey occupied six years, during which the commissioners of king William went over all England, with the exception of the mountainous districts, north and west of Yorkshire, that is to say, the five modern counties of Durham, Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmoreland, and Lancashire. …

However this may be, the register, or, to use the old term, the terrier of the Norman conquest, makes no mention of the domains conquered beyond the province of York. The compilation of this roll for each county mentioned in it, was formed on an uniform plan. The king’s name was placed at the head, with the list of his lands and revenues in the county; then followed the names of the chiefs and lesser proprietors, in the order of their military rank and territorial wealth. The Saxons who had been spared by special grace in the great spoliation, figured only in the last ranks; for the few men of that race who remained free proprietors, or tenants, en chef du roi, as the conquerors expressed it, possessed only very small estates. They were inserted at the end of each chapter under the name of thanes of the king, or with various qualifications derived from offices in the royal household. The other names of Anglo-Saxon aspect which occur here and there in the roll, belonged to men who farmed portions, of greater or less extent, of the domains of the Norman earls, barons, knights, sergeants-at-arms or cross-bow-men.

Such is the form of the authentic and still existing book, whence have been derived most of the facts as to expropriations given in the present work. This precious volume, in which the conquest was registered in its entirety, so that its memory might never be effaced, was called by the Normans, le grand rôle, le rôle royale, or le rôle de Winchester, because it was preserved in the treasury of the cathedral of that city. The Saxons called it by a more solemn name, Dom-boc, or Doomsday Book, because it contained their sentence of irrevocable expropriation.

A. Thierry, Histoire de la Conquête d’Angleterre par les Normands, T. II, pp. 237-44. (Editor’s note: In Augustin Thierry, History of the Conquest of England by the Normans (1856), vol. 1, pp. 299-303.)

[1] The words "cancerous" and "ulcerous" played an important part is Molinari's theory of the state. See my essay on "Ulcerous, Leprous, and Tax-Eating Government". Also Molinari's entry on "Esclavage," DEP, T. 1, pp. 712-31.

[2] Molinari dealt with the issue of the injustice of eminent domain in S3. There he took a much more radical position opposing the coercive acquisition of private property by the state on the grounds that it violated the rights of property owners. He was criticized for this position in at the October 1849 meeting of the Political Economy Society. See above, p. abc. Here, he seems to have backtracked by taking a more utilitarian approach to the problem, perhaps because he felt obliged to speak on behalf of all the Economists this time, instead of just himself as he did in S3.

[3] (Molinari's note.) Henri comte de Boulainvilliers, Essais sur la noblesse de France (1732), pp. 4-5.

[4] Perhaps a reference to Jacques Basnage (sieur de Beauval), Annales des Provinces-Unies (1719), pp. 94-99.

[5] Sir Walter Scott's novel Ivanhoe: A Romance (1819). A French translation appeared in 1831.

[6] (Molinari's note.) (Editor’s note: Some sections of the quote were omitted by Molinari. These are indicated in bold. The translation we have used is by William Hazlitt. His footnotes have been omitted.) The Domesday Book is nothing but a great inventory of the Norman conquest. We quote from the excellent history of M. Augustin Thierry some interesting details concerning the origin of this curious inquiry, and upon the way in which it was drawn up:

From this epoch dates a spirit of mutual distrust and secret hostility between the king and his old friends; they accused each other of avarice and selfishness. William reproached the Norman chiefs with caring more for their private interest than for the common safety; with thinking more of building farms, raising flocks, or forming studs, than of holding themselves in readiness against the native or foreign enemy. In their turn, the chiefs reproached the king with being beyond all measure greedy of gain, and with desiring to appropriate to himself, under false pretexts of general utility, the wealth acquired by the labour of all. In order to rest his demand of contributions, or money services, on a fixed basis, (King) William ordered a general territorial inquest to be made, and a register prepared of all the mutations of property brought about in England by the conquest; he desired to know into what hands throughout the country the Saxon domains had passed, and how many of these still retained their possessions in virtue of special agreements with himself or his barons, how many acres of land there were in each domain, how many were sufficient for the maintenance of a man-at-arms, and how many men-at-arms there were in each province or county of England; what was the gross amount derived in various ways from the cities, towns, boroughs and hamlets, what was the exact property of each earl, baron, knight, or sergeant-at-arms; what land, how many men holding fiefs on that land, how many Saxons, how much cattle, and how many ploughs each possessed.

This undertaking, in which modern historians have thought they discerned the stamp of administrative genius, was simply the result of the peculiar position of the Norman king, as chief of a conquering army, and of the necessity of establishing some kind of order in the chaos of the conquest. This is so entirely the case, that in other conquests, the details of which have been transmitted to us, for example, in that of Greece by the Latin crusaders in the thirteenth century, we find the same kind of inquest instituted by the chiefs of the invasion, on a wholly similar plan.

[7] ( Note by Molinari .) Histoire de la Conquête de L'Angleterre par les Normands, T. II, p. 31. (Editor: Molinari cites the 5th edition of 1835, Histoire de la Conquête de L'Angleterre par les Normands: De ses causes et de ses suites jusqu'à nos jours en Angleterre, en Ecosse, en Irlande et sur le continent (Paris: Alexander Mesnier, 1835), T. 1, p. 34. In Hazlitt's translation the quoted passage reads: "This natural and general nobility of all the conquerors at large, increased in proportion to the personal authority or importance of individuals. After the nobility of the Norman king, came that of the provincial governor, who assumed the title of count or earl ; after the nobility of the count came that of his lieutenant, called vice-count or viscount ; and then that of the warriors, according to their grade, barons, chevaliers, ecuyers , or sergents , not equally noble, but all nobles by right of their common victory and their foreign birth. Vol. 1, p. 198.

[8] Bastiat used the terms "la spoliation transitoire" (transitory or temporary plunder) and "la spoliation permanente" (permanent or institutionalised plunder). Mancur Olson would use a similar set of terms to describe the formation of early states, from "roving bandits" to "stationary bandits." See, Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity (2000).

[9] The Scottish historian William Robertson (1721–1793) who wrote History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V, with a View of the Progress of Society in Europe (1769) (4 vols.).

[10] ( Note by Molinari .) Montesquieu has revealed with great clarity the nature of this transformation of the feudal system, as well as the causes which determined it.

"THE manner of changing an allodial estate into a fief, may be seen in a formulary of Marculfus. The owner of the land gave it to the king, who restored it to the donor by way of usufruit, or benefice, and then the latter nominated his heirs to the king.

In order to find out the reasons which induced them thus to change the nature of the allodia, I must trace the source of the ancient privileges of our nobility, a nobility who for these eleven centuries have been ready to undergo every hardship, and to spill their blood in their country’s service.

They who were seized of fiefs enjoyed very great advantages. The composition for the injuries done them was greater than that of freemen. It appears by the formularies of Marculfus, that it was a privilege belonging to the king’s vassal, that whoever killed him should pay a composition of six hundred sous. This privilege was established by the Salic law†, and by that of the Ripuarians; and while these two laws ordained a composition of six hundred sous for the murder of the king’s vassal, they gave but two hundred sous for the murder of a person freeborn, if he was a Frank or Barbarian living under the Salic law; and only a hundred for a Roman. (Note: (Molinari's note.) Montesquieu, chap. VIII "In what Manner the allodial Estates were changed into Fiefs." (Editor's note: Montesquieu, The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (1777), vol. 2, p. 440.))

After having enumerated various other privileges which the vassals of the king enjoyed, the author of the Esprit des lois adds:

It is very natural therefore to think that those Franks who were not the king’s vassals, and much more the Romans, became fond of entering into the state of vassalage; and that they might not be deprived of their demesnes, they devised the usage of giving their allodium to the king, of receiving it from him afterwards as a fief, and of nominating their heirs. This usage was continued, and took place especially during the times of confusion under the second race, when every man being in want of a protector, was desirous to incorporate himself with the other lords, and to enter as it were, into the feudal monarchy, because the political no longer existed. (Note: (Molinari's note.) De l'esprit des lois, book xxxi., chap. 8. (Editor's note: The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu (1777), vol. 2, pp. 441-42.))

[11] Molinari uses a very colorful expression here: "cette Californie religieuses du moyen âge." it should be noted that the California Gold Rush had begun in 1849 while Molinari was probably writing these lines. Molinari also referred to California and its mining laws in S3. He has the Conservative exclaim "Property! That is the real California. Long live property!" See above, pp. abc .

[12] Henri Baudrillart, "Bourgeoisie," DEP , T. 1, pp. 200-6.

[13] (Molinari's note.) Noble prejudice banned poor nobles from entering into industry and commerce, which had formerly been degraded by slavery. It was not till the eighteenth century that there began to be a reaction against this prejudice. A writer, who then enjoyed some notoriety, the abbé Coyer, wrote a work entitled the Noblesse commerçante (The Business-Minded Nobility), [note: gabriel françois abbé coyer, *la noblesse commerçante* (1756).] in which he urged the nobles to have recourse to the useful and remunerative occupations of industry and commerce to restore their patrimonies, which the abuse of luxury had considerably reduced. The work of the abbé Coyer was well received by the young nobility, who were beginning to be impregnated with philosophic ideas; but it excited in the highest degree the indignation of the partisans of the old ideas. An aristocratic writer, the chevalier d'Areq, undertook to refute the unseemly and incongruous propositions which were advanced therein. The arguments of this defender of noble prejudice were not lacking in a certain originality. The chevalier d'Areq stated, in the first place, with a sorrowful horror, that the nobility was only too disposed to follow the degrading counsels of the abbé Coyer, and he begged them, in the name of their honor and of the safety of all, to pause on the brink of so fatal an abyss.

“It would be necessary, on the contrary" he exclaimed with indignation, "to place new barriers between the nobility and the path it is proposed to open. Without such barriers, instead of seeing only one gentleman in a family follow this path, it is to be feared that all, or at least almost all, the members of the family will rush into it, and that we shall see a crowd of nobles upon our merchant vessels, with no other arms than the pen, instead of seeing them upon our war vessels, the sword in their hands to defend the timid trader.

… It is asked, what do you wish a gentleman to do, who only possesses ancient titles, one more reason to make him blush for his misery? Is it in France that they dare to put this question? Is it in France that a gentleman remains idle upon his estate, while victory is waiting to crown the nobility on the battle-fields? Is it in France that a gentleman is advised to give himself over to baseness, to infamy, in short, to dishonor the name of his ancestors, virtuous, without doubt, since they were judged worthy of nobility, with no other pretext than to save him from indigence, while there is a gracious monarch to serve, a country to defend, and arms always ready for whoever wishes to walk down the road of honor?" (Note: (Molinari's note.) Philippe-Auguste de Sainte-Foix Arcq, La noblesse militaire (1756), pp. 73, 87-8.)

The chevalier d'Areq then reprimanded the nobility for its excessive luxury; he begged them to practice economy, and ended by posing this curious dilemma:

“Commerce on a large scale, the only commerce which can be suitable for the nobility, if indeed commerce can be suitable for it, is not carried on without the funds necessary to purchase the raw materials, and without which, desire, zeal, activity and intelligence become useless tools. Either the nobility, which it is wished to make commercial, possesses these funds, or it does not possess them. If it possesses them, it has no need of commerce; these funds should be sufficient for its subsistence, while awaiting the reward which its merit and its services should naturally provide for it. (pp. 97-98)… If the nobility has not the funds necessary for the purchase of the commodities, in what way can it take the first steps in commerce? A gentleman acknowledges no other masters but God, honor, his country, and his king. Is it then into the service of a commoner that one wants to subject him under the title of an apprentice? Is it by laying aside the trappings of war to don the harness of servitude that one claims will lead him to make his fortune? By what means! With what shame! Is not indigence a thousand times preferable to him?" (Note: (Molinari's note.) La noblesse militaire, etc., p. 98. (Editor's note: 1756 ed., pp. 101-2.))

The abbé Coyer replied with two volumes, entitled, Développement et défense du système de la noblesse commerçante; (Note: (Molinari's note.) Coyer, Développement et défense du système de la noblesse commerçante (1757).) and Grimm, giving an account of the quarrel in his correspondence (1757), (Note: Friedrich Melchior baron Grimm, Correspondance littéraire, philosophique et critique (1813). 2 vols.) wrote a plea in favor of the military nobility. The question remained undecided, and in our days there are still many nobles imbued with the prejudice which the abbé Coyer combated. Yet the most obstinate are willingly resigned to "break with tradition” by investing their funds in industry, provided that the investment is remunerative.

[14] (Molinari's note.) La France avant la révolution, par Raudot, p. 103. (Editor's note: Claude Marie Raudot, La France avant la révolution (1841), pp. 75-76. On "la corvée" see the section on "Taxation," in Appendix 2.)

[15] Comte Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Q'uest-ce que le tiers-état? (1839), pp. 75-77.

[16] (Molinari's note.) See, on the subject of this policy of monopoly and of war of the British aristocracy, the introduction to Cobden et la Ligue, ou l'Agitation anglaise pour la liberté du commerce, by Fred. Bastiat.

[17] (Ed Note??) See the entry on the league in the DEP.

[18] (Ed Note??) See Molinari's DEP entry on Peel.

[19] See his comments about the copying by the bourgeoisie and then the gradual disappearance of aristocratic styles of dress in his entry "Fashion" (below).

[20] (Molinari's note.) According to Bentham, no system of rewards is more costly than that which consists in according titles of nobility as a payment for services rendered to the state. The following are the reasons given by the illustrious utilitarian philosopher for his opinion: [note: (*molinari's note*.) bentham, *théorie des récompenses et des peines*, liv. ii, chap. 5. *raisons pour l'économie des récompenses*. guillaumin ed. pp. 142-43.]

“It is commonly said that rewards in honors cost the state nothing. This is an error; for not only do honors render services dearer, but moreover there are burdens which can not be estimated in money. All honor supposes some pre-eminence. Among individuals placed on a level of equality, some can not be favored by a degree of elevation, except by making others suffer by a relative abasement. This is true, above all, of permanent honors, of those which confer rank and privileges. There are two classes of persons at whose expense these honors are conferred: the class from which the new dignitary is taken, and the class into which he is introduced. The more, for example, the number of the nobles is increased, the more their importance is diminished and the more the value of their order is detracted from.

 … Profusion of honors has the two-fold disadvantage of debasing them and of causing also pecuniary expenses. If a peerage is given, a pension must frequently be added to it. If only to maintain the dignity of it.

It is thus that the hereditary nobility has raised the rate of all rewards. If a simple citizen has rendered brilliant services, it is necessary to begin by taking from the common class and raising him to the rank of nobility. But nobility without an independent settlement is only a burden. Therefore it is necessary to add to it gratuities and pensions. The reward becomes so great, so onerous, that it can not be paid all at once. It is necessary to make of it a burden, with which posterity is loaded.

It is true that posterity must pay in part for the services, the fruits of which it shares; but if there were no noble by birth, personal nobility would be sufficient. Among the Greeks a pine branch or a handful of parsley, among the Romans a few laurel leaves, rewarded a hero.

Fortunate Americans, fortunate for so many reasons, if, to have happiness, it is sufficient to possess all that constitutes happiness! This advantage is still yours. Respect the simplicity of your manners and customs; take care never to admit an hereditary nobility. The patrimony of merit would soon become that of birth. Give pensions, raise statutes, confer titles; but let these distinctions be personal. Preserve all the force, all the purity of honor; do not alienate that precious fund of the state in favor of a haughty class, which will not be slow in using it against you." (Note: A slightly different version of this was published in English as The Rationale of Reward (1790s). See The Works of Jeremy Bentham (1838-1843), vol. 2. The Rationale of Reward (1790s), Chapter V.: "Matter of Reward—Reasons for Husbanding," pp. 201 ff.)

Paix, Guerre (Peace and War)↩

Source

"Paix, Guerre", DEP, T. 2, pp. 307-14.

Text

[307]

I.

Saying that peace is essentially beneficial is to state a truth that hardly needs demonstration—a truism. To make this truth entirely clear, it suffices to examine the consequences of breaking the peace, of war, or even of the mere risk of war.

Viewed from an economic perspective, war bears a strong resemblance to floods or fires. The only difference between these calamities is that war is caused by the unchecked passions of man, while floods and fires result from the uncontrolled forces of nature. But they share a common outcome: the destruction of human lives and wealth. Consequently, society is forced to maintain specialized resources to protect itself from the devastation of war, just as it builds dikes against floods and equips itself with fire prevention systems.

One might vainly object that war can be a productive industry—that nations can enrich themselves through war just as they do through agriculture, industry, commerce, and the arts. However, this objection does not withstand serious scrutiny. Suppose that all people devote themselves to peaceful, productive labor: all may grow wealthier. Even better, the progress of some toward prosperity will contribute to the well-being of others. Now suppose, on the contrary, that they divert a portion of their capital from production to the destructive endeavor of war. Will the overall wealth not be diminished, first by the loss of the products that the diverted capital would have created, and second by the additional wealth that this same capital will now be used to destroy?

It is true that war may be profitable—at least temporarily—for those who undertake it. This will be the case if they succeed in seizing a substantial share of the wealth of others, in the form of booty, war contributions, territorial conquests, and so forth. But consider the difference between productive industry and destructive industry: while the gains of the former benefit everyone, those of the latter ultimately benefit no one. The wealth displaced by war is ordinarily squandered in idleness and debauchery. Furthermore, the nations that have been conquered often end up uniting against their plunderers [1] and reclaiming the spoils of their aggressors. If those plunderers had instead continued to engage in peaceful production, the wealth of other nations would have remained intact, while their own security and prosperity would have been far more assured and enduring.

As we can see, merely analyzing the effects of war suffices to establish that it is always, and for everyone, a scourge. But are nations capable of avoiding this scourge? Can they ensure that peace reigns permanently in the world? This is the question we must now examine.

II.

In the earliest ages of humanity, war appeared as an inevitable, even fatal, occurrence. And for those who have studied human nature, it is easy to understand why this was so. Undoubtedly, man has always possessed a notion of justice and right, which fosters peace among all by ensuring respect for each individual's property. However, when we consider the intensity of his baser instincts and the difficulty he faced in satisfying them when the arts of production were still in their infancy—when we also consider that the moral sense that distinguishes right from wrong, justice from injustice, was not distributed equally among all—it becomes clear why violations of others' rights must have been particularly frequent and unavoidable in humanity’s early days, and why war was the prevailing condition of the world.

The consequences of this imperfection in human nature—this initial insufficiency of the concept of justice to maintain peace among [308] men—are fascinating to study. We have attempted to provide an overview of them in the entry CIVILIZATION. We explained how the experience of the harms caused by plunder led families to band together to live in peace and protect themselves from external aggression; how, under the pressure of this urgent need for security—or, in other words, for peace—the first states were formed and the first governments were instituted.

However, the mere experience of the harm caused by plunder could not immediately put an end to war. For many peoples whose reasoning faculties were still undeveloped, this experience was meaningless. These groups saw only the immediate benefit they could gain from war—benefits all the more tempting given that their primitive means of production condemned them to harsh privations, and that the strength of their material desires made them especially sensitive to these privations.

It would have been impossible to persuade such barbarians to respect the wealth accumulated by their more industrious neighbors. These were brute forces, ever ready to invade the domain of civilization, and against which civilized peoples were compelled—on pain of annihilation—to oppose their own forces. From this arose a social situation whose underlying necessities have not always been well understood.

There are, in our time, two opposing ways of assessing the institutions of ancient peoples. According to some, the organization of ancient societies represents an ideal that modern societies must always keep before their eyes. It is from the legislators of Athens, Sparta, and Rome that we must seek models for our institutions; it is from the citizens of these warlike republics that we must draw examples for our conduct. According to others, on the contrary, ancient societies deserve only our disapproval and contempt. The heroes of Athens, Sparta, and Rome were nothing more than bandits, and the legislators of these mighty republics of antiquity were socialists. [2] Both of these extreme views seem equally erroneous to us, and we will attempt to demonstrate their flaws by means of a simple hypothesis.

Let us suppose that a thousand years from now, the ocean will have receded from the shores of the Netherlands. Will it still be necessary to maintain the dikes that today prevent this country from being submerged? Will the land occupied by these dikes, and the capital required for their maintenance, not be better allocated to productive purposes? Will it not be possible to remove from legislation all the provisions established to prevent the destruction of these dikes or to punish such an attack against public safety? Would maintaining the old system of dikes and its accessories intact not be a wasteful misallocation of the nation's resources? Would it not impose unnecessary constraints on its inhabitants? Would not those who insist on keeping the old dikes at all costs deserve to be labeled as backward and obstinate minds, incapable of recognizing the change in the ocean's level? But would their opponents show greater wisdom if they were to claim that the construction of coastal dikes had always been a foolish and useless endeavor? Would it not be a strange misjudgment to lump together in the same condemnation both those who originally built the dikes when they were indispensable and those who now insist on keeping them standing when they no longer serve any purpose?

Well, is not a similar misjudgment made when one evaluates the institutions of antiquity without considering the unavoidable pressures that ancient societies faced, and the means they had to address them? These societies, which formed the earliest repositories of civilization, were, let us not forget, constantly threatened by an onslaught of barbarism. Was it not essential to erect a barrier to protect them from this devastating scourge? If powerful military institutions had not been established for their defense, would they not have been swiftly swept away by the torrent of invasions? And in an era when the tools of warfare were still in their infancy, was it not above all the human being who needed to be transformed into a formidable instrument of destruction? To enable the elite of the population, entrusted with the common defense, to withstand the multitude of barbarians, was it not necessary to instill in them a warrior spirit, to provide them with an education and a way of life entirely devoted to warfare? When one accurately assesses the necessities of ancient societies, even the institutions of Lycurgus appear justified. And far from denouncing this military legislator as a forerunner of socialism—since Sparta was never anything other than a military camp—he should be regarded as one of the individuals who contributed most effectively to the advancement of civilization.

Indeed, let us suppose that the warlike republics of Sparta and Athens had never existed, or that their military organization had been weaker and less effective: would Greek civilization not have been swiftly crushed under the invasions of the Persians and Scythians? Similarly, let us suppose that the strong and militaristic republic of Rome had never existed in Italy: could Latin civilization have withstood the invasions of the vigorous northern races for so many centuries? What would have remained of the achievements of antiquity if Marius, with his legions, had not destroyed or repelled the barbarian hordes of the Teutons and the Cimbri?

The famous Roman maxim, Si vis pacem, para bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war), was perfectly suited to the situation of ancient peoples. It would have been futile to attempt to indoctrinate in favor of peace the barbarian multitudes massing at the borders of civilized regions; futile to try to convince them that production would ultimately be more advantageous than plunder. Such efforts would have been a waste of time and energy. In the interest of civilization—and even of peace itself, which only the supremacy of civilization could guarantee—it was necessary to deploy a formidable defense against the barbarians. It was sometimes even necessary [309] to preempt their attacks in order to more effectively guard against their incursions.

However, gradually—and despite the objections of those who wish to preserve old dikes—the world’s circumstances have changed. The great waves of barbarism have ceased to crash violently against the foundations of civilization; they have receded, leaving vast and fertile lands exposed. At the same time, civilization has acquired increasingly effective means of defense. The tools of warfare have undergone a progressive transformation, and this transformation has secured the definitive superiority of civilized nations over their ancient adversaries. From that point onward, military strength has resided primarily in the power of the machines employed in combat; physical vigor and even sheer bravery have played only a secondary role in battles. Now, in order to manufacture, maintain, and operate the machines of this new system of warfare, a significant advance in capital has been required. Furthermore, it has become necessary to have intelligent individuals with extensive knowledge to oversee them. As a result of this change, military superiority—after having belonged, in the early ages of the world, to the nations distinguished by their physical strength and skill—has now become permanently established in the hands of the wealthiest and most industrious nations. This is what J.-B. Say has so clearly illustrated in the following passage from the third part of his Treatise: [3]

"War, having become a profession," says J.-B. Say, "partakes, like all other arts, in the progress that results from the division of labor. It draws upon all branches of human knowledge. One cannot excel in it—whether as a general, an engineer, an officer, or even as a soldier—without extensive training and constant practice. Thus, except in cases where one has had to contend with the fervor of an entire nation, the advantage has always remained with the most well-trained troops, those for whom war has become a profession.

"The Turks, despite their disdain for the arts of the Christians, are forced to become their students in the art of war—otherwise, they would face extermination. All the armies of Europe have been compelled to imitate the tactics of the Prussians; and when the intellectual momentum spurred by the French Revolution enhanced the application of science in the operations of the republican armies, France’s enemies were left with no choice but to adopt the same advancements.

"All these advancements, this deployment of means, this consumption of resources, have made war far more expensive than it once was. Armies now require prior provisioning of weapons, munitions, food supplies, and all sorts of equipment. The invention of gunpowder has made weapons more complex and costly, and their transport—especially that of cannons and mortars—more difficult. Furthermore, the astonishing progress in naval tactics, the increased number of ships of all ranks (each requiring the full range of human industry to construct), the shipyards, dry docks, factories, warehouses, and so on, have forced warring nations not only to spend during peacetime nearly as much as they do during hostilities, not only to allocate a portion of their national income to warfare, but even to invest a significant share of their capital in it.

"…From this, it follows that wealth has become just as indispensable for waging war as bravery, and that a poor nation can no longer stand against a rich one. Now, since wealth can only be acquired through industry and savings, it is foreseeable that any nation that ruins its agriculture, its manufacturing, and its commerce—whether through bad laws or excessive taxation—will inevitably be dominated by more foresighted nations. It also follows that, in the future, power will likely reside on the side of civilization and enlightenment; for only civilized nations are capable of producing enough wealth to sustain imposing military forces. This, in turn, reduces the likelihood of the great upheavals so prevalent in history, where civilized peoples have fallen victim to barbarian invasions."

One could even go further than J.-B. Say and assert that, in the future, coercion will certainly always be on the side of civilization. Do we not already see, in every conflict between civilized nations and barbarians, the advantage consistently favoring the former? Have the English not, in our own time, subjugated the ancient conquerors of India? Have the French not subdued those of Algeria? Has not a new flood of barbarism overtaking civilization become physically impossible?

What follows from this? It is that, setting aside the incursions of the savage peoples of Asia, Africa, and America—incursions that a few thousand men are sufficient to prevent or repel—the question of peace or war is now merely a matter to be debated between civilized peoples. That is to say, it is debated between nations that are beginning to be guided by the light of reason and to seek, in all things, their well-understood interests. Now, is it not permissible to hope that these nations will one day come to realize how costly war is to them, even when it remains at the stage of a mere risk, and that they will take serious measures to ensure peace everywhere and always? Then, disarmament—which would have been a utopia in antiquity—could it not become a reality?

III.

If the European nations wish to understand to what extent they are interested in maintaining peace, they need only take a look at the expenses of their military apparatus over the last thirty years. The esteemed statistician M. de Reden provided an overview of this expenditure in a letter addressed to the Peace Congress of Frankfurt: [4]

"The current military strength of Europe (and under this term, we include everything funded by the resources allocated for the maintenance [310] of land and naval forces) consists of approximately four million individuals—or roughly 0.5% of the total population, which today is estimated at 267 million souls.

"The annual value of the labor of an adult male cannot be estimated at less than 222.50 francs; in England, the average is 556.60 francs, and in France, 296.80 francs. It follows that by removing four million young men from the useful arts of peace, a total annual value of at least 890 million francs is sacrificed. This amount is roughly half of the sum that Europe dedicates to servicing its national debt.

"The ordinary expenses for the personnel and equipment of the land and naval forces currently account for an additional two billion francs in the budgets of European states. This expenditure, combined with the loss incurred by the annual conscription of four million young men, forms a total sum of nearly three billion francs. The cost of maintaining military forces across the various states of Europe represents 30.24% of their total ordinary expenditures. It amounts to 7.42 francs per capita and 504.56 francs per combatant.

"The total expenditure for this purpose over the last thirty years has been 60 billion francs."

And yet, during these thirty years to which M. de Reden's calculations apply, peace has been maintained almost uninterrupted. Now, military expenditures naturally increase significantly in times of war. They rise under the influence of three causes: First, because armies—decimated in combat, forced marches, etc.—must be replenished more frequently, and this is done at the expense of the working population. Second, because the consumption of military equipment and munitions increases considerably. Third, because armies in the field inevitably engage in pillaging, and, on the other hand, the outbreak of war is always accompanied by an economic crisis that tightens credit and slows production.

An effort has been made to estimate the losses that the wars of the Revolution and the Empire inflicted upon Europe. According to the most credible estimates, the total sum for England alone, in direct expenditures, would not be less than 26 billion francs. And the total human loss for Europe is estimated at 2.1 million individuals. Without claiming absolute accuracy for these figures, we believe that they are not exaggerated. [5] An essential point to note is that the expenses generated by the wars of the Revolution and the Empire did not burden only the past. They also imposed crushing financial burdens on the future. Everyone knows, in fact, that this expenditure was not funded exclusively by the ordinary or extraordinary budgets of the nations between 1793 and 1816, but that it was covered in large part through loans. Of the 26 billion francs that constituted England’s share, for example, approximately 17 billion were borrowed. What was the result? [311] It was that governments, bound to honor their commitments under penalty of losing their credit, were forced to maintain nearly the same tax burdens in peacetime as during wartime. It was that the nations of Europe continue to be taxed—and will remain so for a long time to come—to pay for the wars of 1793 to 1815. At the very least, if they had gained anything in compensation for the sufferings that these calamitous wars inflicted on them! But everyone knows that, at the end of the conflict, the nations found themselves nearly equally weakened and impoverished. Everyone also knows that industry, science, and the arts—the sources of all wealth—suffered a disastrous stagnation during this lamentable period of conflagration.

A day may come when, as the solidarity that binds generations together in both suffering and prosperity becomes better understood, stricter limits will be imposed on their mutual responsibility; when, as Jefferson advised, the legacy of the past will only be accepted under the condition of a stock-taking; when the future will refuse to honor the bills of exchange that have been drawn upon it to finance reckless and ruinous enterprises; and when, consequently, those who squander the resources of the present generation will no longer be able to discount, at an usurious rate, those of the generations to come.

In the meantime, the peoples of Europe must bear both the burden of their current military expenditures and a significant portion of the costs of past wars. Thus, through the folly or the wicked passions of governments and nations, the marvelous instrument of credit has been transformed into an agent of devastation, and the condition of humanity has been worsened by the harmful misuse of one of the very mechanisms that could most effectively contribute to its well-being.

IV.

However, as much as civilized nations may have a vested interest in not repeating the disastrous experiences of war, can they, at present, permanently secure the maintenance of peace among themselves? Does there exist any panacea whose application could instantly achieve this most desirable outcome?

Some eager minds, impatient for the arrival of universal peace, have believed in the possibility of establishing perpetual peace by organizing arbitration tribunals, which would, in a way, act as international justices of the peace. Sully conceived such a project, though the credit for it has often been attributed to Henry IV. The Abbé de Saint-Pierre,[6] remembered for his philanthropic ideas, later took up Sully’s plan and developed it in his voluminous writings. Finally, in modern times, most socialist schools have devised plans—naturally infallible—for organizing peace. For our part, we do not believe that the permanence of peace can arise from an artificial organization, nor do we have great confidence in the effectiveness of international courts of arbitration. Do we not already see that when nations—even the most belligerent—believe it to be in their interest to maintain peace, they resolve their disputes amicably, either through the mediation of an arbitrator or by other means? Does the absence of a formal tribunal prevent them from finding peaceful solutions to their conflicts? On the other hand, if nations were determined to go to war, would such an organised tribunal have the power to stop them? Would not the storm of conflicting passions sweep away this fragile institution, just as a hurricane carries off a straw? And if, finally, one were to attempt to strengthen the arbitration tribunal by placing an executive power at its disposal, would that not create an even greater danger? Would not a refusal to comply with the rulings of this supreme tribunal inevitably lead to war? And would not the nations tasked with enforcing its decisions be forced to remain permanently armed and ready for battle? What a strange way to ensure universal peace!

Thus, the permanence of peace cannot be the result of an artificial organization; rather, it must be the natural product of the gradual weakening of the risk of war. If one wishes to understand the elements that compose this risk, one need only look at the main causes that have historically led to war.

The Massachusetts Peace Society conducted an investigation that provides useful insights on this subject. It examined the causes of the wars that have plagued the civilized world since the reign of Constantine. The total number of these wars is 286, not including insurrections, partial conflicts, or wars against savage peoples. They are classified as follows:

44 wars waged to acquire new territories. 1635.22 wars to impose tribute or financial obligations. 1636.24 wars of reprisal. 1637.8 wars fought over questions of honor or prerogative. 1638.6 wars caused by disputes over territorial claims. 1639.41 wars resulting from dynastic claims, wars of succession, etc. 1640.30 wars begun under the pretext of assisting an ally. 1641.23 wars arising from rivalries of influence. 1642.5 wars caused by commercial disputes. 1643.55 civil wars. 1644.28 wars of religion, including the Crusades against the Turks and heretics.

This survey has the flaw of lacking precision. We also believe that its authors have not given enough weight to wars provoked by commercial rivalries. Even when disguised, such conflicts have often been at the heart of many international struggles. Despite its shortcomings, however, the table compiled by the Massachusetts Peace Society remains a valuable reference.

Ultimately, the wars enumerated in this study can be classified into four main categories:

• Religious wars.
• Commercial wars.
• Political wars.
• Civil wars.

[312]

If one examines each of these categories individually, one will see that at its core, the spirit of monopoly is the force that incites war, while the spirit of liberty is what rises to restore and consolidate peace.

Where have all religious wars originated? From the fact that certain men, professing Religion A, refused to tolerate that others should profess Religion B. At first, they would resort to persuasion to convert them, but when persuasion failed, they turned to force. The followers of A would torture, hang, and burn the followers of B, with the laudable intention of saving their souls. They would rarely fail to confiscate their property as well. When the followers of B felt strong enough to openly resist their converters, they took up arms, and religious war began. Usually, driven by a fanaticism equal to that of their persecutors, they readily imitated their intolerance. Only the complete destruction of one sect or the other could bring the struggle to an end. Everyone knows what bloody wars and abominable crimes have been committed in the name of religion, once it was placed in the service of the spirit of monopoly. Fortunately, the spirit of liberty eventually intervened. In time, people realized that the followers of A had, in reality, no genuine interest in forcing the followers of B to share their beliefs, and vice versa. Religious freedom thus put an end to religious wars.

Where have all commercial wars originated? Again, from the spirit of monopoly. Certain nations have sought to secure exclusive control over particular markets, and, to that end, they have imposed prohibitions, conquered colonies, and forged commercial alliances. From this has arisen countless disputes and endless wars. Fortunately, the same spirit of liberty, which had begun to pacify the religious sphere, also reached the realm of material interests. One day, men imbued with this spirit of liberty and peace said to the nations that were fighting for market dominance:

"Why shed blood and spend vast sums to gain exclusive possession of a market? There is a better way. Instead of fighting over a monopoly that, in all likelihood, will cost the victor more than it will ever bring in profit, why not simply tolerate each other’s presence in the contested market? Place your goods in competition there. Whoever offers the best product at the lowest price will inevitably triumph over his rivals. Most of the time, there will not even be a 'winner' or 'loser' in this peaceful struggle—each of you, with your unique talents, resources, and expertise, will find a place in the disputed market. Each will sell what he is best suited to produce. Thanks to this simple and brotherly arrangement, industrious people across the globe will be able to engage in the kind of production that suits them best, consumers will be better served, and the costly burden of commercial wars will be eliminated—to the great benefit of all."

This wise advice is beginning to be followed, and though free trade is still in its infancy, it has already made commercial wars nearly impossible.

The same spirit of monopoly lies at the heart of all political and civil wars as well. And, just as in the previous cases, its inescapable antidote is the spirit of liberty. Are there conflicts over territorial claims or rights to a throne? Let nations freely choose the government they prefer, instead of having their fate decided without consultation, as if they were mere herds of cattle—and the primary cause of political wars will disappear. Similarly, if, within nations, liberty gradually becomes the foundation of their political, religious, and economic institutions, internal conflicts will fade away. Liberty will bring peace—both among factions and among nations.

Thus, as the spirit of liberty and the institutions of nations advance, the risk of war diminishes, and the premium required to insure against that risk can be lowered. Let us not forget that it is the very existence of risk that makes maintaining this premium necessary, and it would be unwise to eliminate it as long as that risk persists. No doubt, the premium has often been grossly out of proportion to the actual risk. During the long period of peace since 1815, for instance, civilized nations have maintained a military apparatus far greater than necessary. This misuse of a considerable portion of public funds was due, on one hand, to the fact that most governments were under the influence of aristocratic military corps, which had a vested interest in maintaining a bloated military budget; and on the other hand, to the fact that the industrious classes, which bore the main burden of these expenses, were unaware of the full extent of the harm caused by the excessive military expenditures. However, even if they did not understand the causes of their economic suffering, they still felt the consequences. The overblown military budgets from 1816 to 1848 must certainly be counted among the fatal errors that led to the most recent revolutionary upheavals. Indeed, armaments, which are merely an effect of the risk of war, can, when excessive, actually increase that very risk—thus turning the effect into a cause.

Until the conquests of the spirit of liberty have completely annihilated the risk of war that the barbarism of ancient times has bequeathed to the modern world, civilized nations will continue to endure the harsh necessity of devoting a significant portion of their revenues to maintaining their military apparatus. For while the excessive development of this apparatus creates economic distress in the present and exacerbates future dangers, its insufficiency could cause irreparable harm, by leaving industrious and free nations at the mercy of despotism or a military aristocracy. In short, the premium paid for the maintenance of the military apparatus must be as precisely proportioned [313] as possible to the actual risk of war.

V.

But if, as we have tried to demonstrate above, the permanence of peace cannot be "organized" artificially, is it necessary, for peace to be established, that men completely rid themselves of the blind, plundering passions that give birth to monopoly, and with monopoly, to war? No! It is enough that the sum of interests enlisted under the banner of liberty exceeds the sum of interests and passions that the spirit of monopoly can arouse. To clarify this with an example, let us suppose that free trade has united the interests of different nations into a single common cause. Would war not then become almost impossible? Rather than interrupting economic relations, which would now be essential to their very existence, would nations not refuse to succumb to the passions of war? If the spirit of liberty advances far enough to tip the balance of forces in its favor, will the permanence of peace not be secured?

Unfortunately, it must be said that the industrious classes, whose interests are immediately tied to peace, do not always wield influence over public affairs in proportion to their economic importance. Too often, even in our own time, administrative and military influences dominate the councils of government. And these influences are not particularly known for their pacifist tendencies, which is understandable. When it comes to administration, while war shrinks markets for industrialists and merchants while increasing their tax burden, bureaucratic positions and salaries remain unchanged, whether in war or peace. Moreover, for a nation highly adept at military conquest, does the prospect of expansion not present a tempting opportunity for the administration to extend its market? When it comes to the army, can it be expected to harbor a great love for peace? Is it not war that most abundantly provides it with honors and rewards? Do military campaigns not count double in the records of military service? Thus, whenever administrative and military influences prevail over those of the industrious classes in a great State, the risk of war inevitably rises, and at the same time, the military forces of neighboring nations expand in response. If such a state of affairs were to persist, if jobs in the administration continued to replace those in free production, the risk of war would grow increasingly intense, and the military apparatus would swell in size, weight, and cost. Despotism, which is able to have administrative and military influence prevail in the government of States, and socialism, which expands government functions at the expense of free production, are both fundamentally hostile to peace. But it seems unlikely that the future belongs to either despotism or socialism. Suc is the natural force of the expansion of free production that the interests it fosters will inevitably prevail within the political organization of States. When this happens, the risk of war will gradually decline, and significant reductions can be made in the military forces of civilized nations.

Even when the classes who have an immediate interest in maintaining peace are excluded from any participation in controlling public affairs, their opinion can still influence events to prevent war. For instance, they can act by pouring much merited shame upon the men whose reckless ambition endangers world peace. They can also withhold the flattering reward of "glory" from the heroes of a war undertaken against the interests of civilization. On this subject, let us note that no glory is enduring unless it is founded on services rendered to humanity. Why is it that the heroes of antiquity and the Middle Ages are immortalized? Because they defended civilization against a return to barbarism, making their own bodies a bulwark. That is why a grateful posterity has preserved their memory. But would those who, in our time, drag civilized nations backward into barbarism by plunging them needlessly into the horrors of war receive the same recognition? Would these unintelligent imitators of the past not find themselves cruelly disappointed? Would they not be reviled and despised, rather than glorified? Do we not already see, despite the ignorance and prejudices of the masses, that the true aura of glory is beginning to settle upon those who, even at the cost of their own popularity, have labored to preserve peace, while those who are merely winners of battles are finding it increasingly difficult to secure "the smiles of fame"? And if war ceases to guarantee the most coveted reward—glory—will it not lose much of its appeal? Will we not see those who, by virtue of their elevated positions or their abilities as a member of the elite, have the greatest influence over public affairs, choose instead to devote themselves to the cause of peace?

Certainly, war has not ceased to threaten the security and well-being of humanity; certainly, it will once again spread its ravages across the world many times over. For at best, that age of peace glimpsed by the poet is only beginning to dawn on the horizon: [7]

Humanity, reign! Behold your age

Denied to me in vain by the voices of old echoes.

Already the winds, upon the wildest shore

Of thought, have scattered a few words.

Peace to labor! Peace to the soil it enriches!

May men be united through love.

May they raise the world closer to the heavens;

May God say to us: Children, I bless you!

But if one cannot believe, without imprudence or folly, that humanity has already reached this blessed age, on the other hand, when one carefully observes the remarkable expansion of production, when one considers the ever-growing mass of interests that progress throws each day on the side of peace, one becomes less alarmed by the clamor of warlike passions, and one acquires the conviction that peace will ultimately impose itself upon modern societies as irresistibly as war once imposed itself upon ancient societies.

Endnotes to Paix, Guerre

[1] (Editor's note.) Molinari here uses the term "les spoliateurs".

[2] (Editor's note.) Molinari probably has in mind here his recently deceased friend and colleague Frédéric Bastiat whose view about the Romans was as negative as Molinari suggests in this pairing of opposing viewpoints.

[3] J.-B. Say, Traité d’Économie politique, Book III, Chapter VII.

[4] Letter to the Peace Congress (August 1850). Reproduced in the Annuaire de l'Économie politique et de la statistique for 1851, p. 411.

[5] The losses in human lives have often been estimated even higher. For example, Francis d’Ivernois places the casualties for France alone at no less than 1,500,000 individuals by 1799. One can find in his Tableau des pertes que la révolution et les guerres ont causées au peuple français the basis on which he establishes his calculation. At the same time, this author rightly notes that forced conscriptions and requisitions sent to the battlefields men who had far greater value than those whom the recruiters of the old regime had previously enlisted. "One must not forget," he says, "that in modern wars, the men who chose the life of a soldier were, for the most part, drawn from the most vagabond, lazy, and dissipated segment of society—already so impoverished that celibacy was imposed upon them by their very poverty. But the military population that the French have sacrificed over the past seven years on the battlefields was drawn indiscriminately from all social classes, including the wealthier classes, which had the strongest inclination toward marriage and the greatest means to support and educate large families. These blind requisitions forcibly dragged to the armies this invaluable class, which perished by the thousands—most often as mere soldiers. It was this class, above all, that should have been left to repair the population losses caused by war, and instead, it was cut down in its prime, in the age of strength and vigor, between 18 and 35 years old—the period of life most suited for reproduction." (Tableau des pertes que la révolution et la guerre ont causées au peuple français, Vol. 1, p. 28.) Without even mentioning the void that this horrific consumption of useful men left in various industries, the French race itself was so weakened that, according to M. Putigny, the proportion of military exemptions due to short stature and infirmities increased over half a century from 29.5% to 54%. No doubt, other factors also contributed to this result; but is it not obvious that forced conscriptions and requisitions, by cutting down for 25 years the very elite of the youth, played a significant part?

Let us also cite, on the losses in both human lives and wealth caused by war, these insightful observations from J.-B. Say:

"A great loss of mature men," he says, "is a great loss of accumulated wealth; for every adult man is an accumulated capital representing all the investments made over many years to bring him to the point where he is. A newborn does not replace a twenty-year-old man, and the remark made by the Prince of Condé on the battlefield of Senef was as absurd as it was barbaric: 'One night in Paris will make up for all this.' It takes a night plus twenty years of care and expenses to create a man whom the cannon wipes out in an instant. The destruction of men caused by war goes far beyond what is commonly imagined: ravaged fields, the looting of homes, the destruction of industrial establishments, the depletion of capital—by drying up subsistence sources, all of this leads to the death of many far from the battlefield."

One can get a sense of the immense number of people plunged into poverty by Napoleon’s wars by looking at the records of public assistance in Paris:

"From 1804 to 1810, the number of women receiving aid in Paris alone gradually rose from 21,000 to 38,000. In 1810, the number of children receiving public charity in Paris alone was no less than 53,000. Mortality rates were appallingly high in both of these groups." (J.-B. Say, Traité d’Économie politique, Vol. II, Ch. XI.)

[6] Ed note Molinari wrote the entry on Saint-Pierre for the DEP and published a book on his life and work a few years later.

[7] Béranger, Les quatre âges historiques.

Paix (Société et Congrès de la Paix) (Peace Society and Congress of Peace)↩

Source

"Paix (Société et Congrès de la Paix)"", DEP, T. 2, pp. 314-15.

Text

[314]

The propagation of peace has always been advocated by enlightened and benevolent apostles of religion and philosophy; but it is only in recent times that associations have been specifically established for this purpose. It was at the end of the war that had ravaged the world at the beginning of this century that the first peace society was founded in the United States. The idea was first suggested in a pamphlet entitled: Solemn Review of the Custom of War (1814). This pamphlet, which was published anonymously, was authored by Dr. Noah Worcester. In August 1815, the "Society of Friends of Peace of New York" was founded by a small group of benevolent men belonging to the Quaker sect. In the following December, the Ohio Peace Society and the Massachusetts Peace Society were successively established. In 1816, the movement that had just begun among the honorable Quakers of the United States spread to England. On July 14 of that same year, the "Society for the Establishment of Permanent and Universal Peace" was founded in London.

These various associations had as their primary objective:

"To distribute tracts and addresses demonstrating that war is incompatible with the spirit of Christianity and the true interests of humanity, and indicating the most effective means to maintain a permanent and universal peace on the basis of Christian principles."

We cite here the exact wording of their programs. The resources of the London Society amounted, in its first year, to £212. In the same year, its committee distributed 32,000 tracts and 14,000 speeches; it also established regular communication with the societies of New York and Massachusetts. The following year, the number of printed materials distributed reached 100,000; several of these publications were translated into French, Spanish, and German and distributed across the continent. The Massachusetts Society also sent thousands of tracts to France, Russia, India, and the Sandwich Islands. By 1820, this society had no fewer than 12 branches, and 15 similar associations were active in the United States. In 1821, the Society for Christian Morality was established in Paris, in part to promote the idea of peace. In 1830, Count de Sellon founded a peace society in Geneva, which undertook the publication of a journal titled Archives de la Société de la Paix à Genève. For several years already, the London Society had been publishing The Herald of Peace. The propagation of the idea of peace thus gradually gained ground, but without acquiring much notoriety, until in 1843, the peace societies of both hemispheres decided to hold a universal convention in London, in order to give greater unity to the movement and to broaden its publicity. This convention, composed of delegates from peace societies, met in July 1843, under the presidency of Mr. Charles Hindley; M. de La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, president of the Société de la Morale Chrétienne, was present. The members of the convention decided that an address would be sent to all civilized governments, urging them to include in their peace or alliance treaties a clause by which they would commit, in the event of a dispute, to accept the mediation of an impartial third party. This address was presented to King Louis-Philippe, who received the delegates warmly.

"Peace," he told them, "is the need of all nations, and, thanks to God, war has become far too costly today for anyone to engage in it frequently. I am convinced that the day will come when, in the civilized world, wars will no longer be fought."

In January 1848, the same address was presented to the President of the United States by Mr. Beckewith, Secretary of the Central Peace Society of America. The President remarked to the delegates that the natural tendency of democratic governments was to maintain peace.

"Let the people be educated," he said, "and let them enjoy their rights, and they will demand peace as an indispensable condition for their prosperity."

In 1848 (September 20, 21, and 22), a second convention, which this time took the name of the Peace Congress, was held in Brussels under the presidency of M. Aug. Visschers. Various resolutions related to arbitration, the establishment of a congress of nations, etc., were adopted by the Brussels Congress. These resolutions were presented on October 30 to Lord John Russell, then Prime Minister. Lord John Russell warmly applauded the idea that had inspired the formation of the Peace Congress, and he declared that, in the event of a dispute with a foreign nation, if that nation proposed to refer the matter to arbitration, the British government would always consider it their duty to take such a request into consideration. The members of the Brussels Congress had arranged to meet again the following year in Paris. Meanwhile, Mr. Richard Cobden presented a motion to the British Parliament (session of June 12, 1849) advocating the introduction of the principle of arbitration into future treaties between England and other nations. This motion received a minority vote of 79 against 288. The Congress that took place in Paris in the following August (August 22, 23, and 24, 1849), under the presidency of M. Victor Hugo, and which was largely organized through the efforts of M. Joseph Garnier, one of its secretaries, was one of the most remarkable. More than 500 Englishmen, about fifty Americans, some from the remotest western states, not to mention other foreign participants and a large French audience, attended. Victor Hugo, Richard Cobden, Em. de Girardin, Henri Vincent of London, and several other distinguished speakers [315] addressed the congress. In 1850, the friends of peace gathered once again in Frankfurt, under the presidency of M. Jaup, a councillor. Finally, the most recent congress, organized by two tireless apostles of peace, Elihu Burritt and Henri Richard, was held in London under the presidency of the illustrious Dr. Brewster. This congress took place on July 22, 23, and 24, 1851, coinciding with the Universal Exhibition, that other congress of peace! Twenty-two members of the British Parliament, several members of the French Legislative Assembly and Council of State participated, either in person or through letters of support. Six major religious organizations and two municipal corporations were officially represented. Thirty-one delegates from American peace societies, apart from other visitors, crossed the ocean to attend.More than three thousand listeners filled the vast hall of Exeter Hall during its sessions. We reproduce below the resolutions adopted by this latest congress of the friends of universal peace; they provide a concise summary of the goals they pursue and the methods they employ to achieve them:

1. It is the duty of all ministers of religion, educators of youth, writers, and journalists to use all their influence to spread the principles of peace and to eradicate from men's hearts the hereditary hatreds, political jealousies, and commercial rivalries that have been the source of so many disastrous wars;

2. In cases of disputes that cannot be resolved amicably, it is the duty of governments to submit to the arbitration of competent and impartial judges;

3. The standing armies, which, even amid demonstrations of peace and friendship, keep nations in a constant state of anxiety and irritation, have been the cause of unjust wars, suffering among populations, and financial difficulties for states: the congress insists on the necessity of moving towards disarmament;

4. The congress condemns loans whose purpose is to finance wars or to maintain ruinous military armaments;

5. The congress disapproves of any military intervention or threats by governments in the internal affairs of foreign states, as each nation should remain free to manage its own affairs;

6. The congress urges all friends of peace to prepare public opinion in their respective countries to develop and improve international public law;

7. The congress condemns the system of aggression and violence employed by civilized nations against semi-savage tribes, as such acts of violence are contrary to religion, civilization, and the interests of commerce;

8. The best means of ensuring peace is to increase and facilitate friendly relations among nations. The congress expresses its deep sympathy for the great idea that gave birth to the Universal Exhibition of Industrial Products.

Most of these resolutions can only be approved. Perhaps some of the promoters of the peace movement overestimate the effectiveness of the institution of a congress of nations, a tribunal of arbitration, etc.; but all have understood that their primary task is to convert public opinion. To demonstrate clearly, in a simple and accessible form, that war is always an operation that costs more than it yields—this is the goal they pursue with tireless perseverance. And if one considers the prejudices that still prevail in all classes of society regarding the alleged utility of war, if one remembers that some still advocate war in the name of democracy, while others support it in the name of absolutism, one will be convinced that the propaganda efforts of the friends of peace are by no means superfluous. Certainly, they cannot by themselves put an end to war, for the consolidation of peace is a complex undertaking, which depends on a multitude of advancements, not just one. But, even if the friends of peace only contribute modestly to bringing about this much-desired result, would their efforts not deserve to be encouraged and blessed? As Mr. Thomas Carlyle cleverly remarked in a letter of support sent to the London Congress:

"Would not the avoidance of just one battle be enough to cover the costs of many peace congresses?"

Literary and Artistic Property↩

Source

“Propriété littéraire et artistique,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 473-78

Text

[473]

I. Its Nature: Is It Property or a Privilege?

Should the ownership of literary and artistic works be placed on the same level as that of other fruits of human industry, or should it be ranked lower and subjected to a special regime? [1] This is the question that first arises, and as is well known, it divides legal scholars and even economists. Some believe that literary and artistic property should be fully included as part of ordinary property; others, on the contrary, think that it should be classified separately and subjected to special restrictions. The former argue that it is fair and beneficial to guarantee it absolutely in both space and time; the latter assert that it is fair and beneficial to limit it more or less in space and time—that is, to deny its recognition beyond certain territorial boundaries as well as beyond a certain arbitrarily fixed period.

These two opposing views can be summarized in two words: according to the first, literary and artistic property is property; according to the second, literary and artistic property is merely a privilege.

Let us therefore first determine whether literary and artistic property is a property or a privilege.

All property originates in the application of human industry to production. All property implies productive labor performed by the owner or by the individual who transferred the appropriated object to him. This is not the case for a privilege. The existence of a privilege does not in any way imply the idea of productive labor performed by the privileged individual. One can enjoy a privilege without having performed the slightest productive labor, without having made the slightest effort. A privilege is, in reality, nothing more than an arbitrary and abusive delegation of another’s property.

Now, we believe that even a cursory examination suffices to demonstrate that recognizing an author or an artist’s exclusive right to enjoy his work and to transfer its enjoyment to others does not confer upon him any privilege. Literary and artistic production, just like industrial or agricultural production, requires the investment of a certain amount of capital and labor. Like any other producer—more than any other, in fact—the writer, scholar, or artist is compelled to bear the costs of professional training, and he produces only through the sweat of his brow. Guaranteeing him the exclusive enjoyment of his works is therefore, in no case, granting him a privilege at the expense of others’ labor; it is simply recognizing a property that he has acquired through his own labor.

Either literary and artistic property is property, or property does not exist at all, for there is no fundamental difference between an author or artist’s right over his work and a landowner, industrialist, or merchant’s right over his own. In both cases, property is the result of the application of human faculties and acquired capital to production.

Literary and artistic property is therefore indeed a form of property. The question now is to determine what this property consists of and what its natural limits are.

This is the second point we will examine.

A man applies his natural faculties and acquired knowledge, along with a certain amount of capital provided in advance, for the creation of a poem, a play, a treatise on political economy, or perhaps a statue, a painting, or a musical composition. In doing so, he creates a literary or artistic property. What does this property consist of, and how far does it extend? It consists, first, of the physical object that has just been fashioned—manuscript, painting, or statue—and, in this respect, it is no different from other forms of movable property. The law, moreover, classifies it in the same category. A writer or composer may dispose of his manuscript as he pleases, a painter of his painting, a sculptor of his statue; he may keep his work, pass it on to his family in perpetuity, donate it, or sell it. But here is the particular feature that essentially distinguishes literary and artistic property from agricultural, industrial, or commercial property: the immaterial substance of literary and musical works, as well as artistic objects, can be reproduced with greater or lesser fidelity, thereby extending and multiplying their use.

From this arises the right of reproduction, that is, the right to multiply the use of a literary or artistic work through any means of reproduction or execution. Can this right of reproduction be separated from the ownership of the original work—manuscript, painting, or statue—and subjected to special rules, or must it be considered an integral and necessary part of the property itself?

Let us be permitted to quote ourselves [474] to clarify this question, whose solution contains, as we shall see, either the negation or the affirmation of literary and artistic property: [2]

"Is it fair and beneficial to separate the right of reproduction from the ownership of the original work?"

"If these two rights were entirely separated, if the author of a literary work were absolutely denied the exclusive right to have it copied, what would happen? A rather curious phenomenon would occur; the value of the original work would vanish, it would, so to speak, melt away in the hands of its owner; this owner would find himself in a far worse situation than if it were not in the nature of his work to be reproducible, to be copied."

"Indeed, if a literary work were in no way different from purely material works, if its substance could not be multiplied through reproduction, this work, existing in a single copy, could acquire considerable value. A wealthy collector would pay as much, or even more, for a beautiful book than for a precious jewel, a pearl, or a diamond. But this is not the case. Due to its particular nature, the literary jewel can be reproduced indefinitely through copying. Who, then, would care to pay a high price for the original if he could obtain a copy at a trivial cost, one that serves him just as well? Suppose a method were discovered to produce an indefinite number of copies of the famous Koh-i-Noor diamond, each containing its same precious substance—who would still care to pay millions to acquire the original Koh-i-Noor? Wouldn’t the owner of the original diamond lose almost all of its value unless he alone retained the right to produce copies?"

"To completely separate the right to copy a literary work from the ownership of the original work would thus mean altering, if not outright destroying, its value; it would place the writer, in terms of property, in a vastly inferior position compared to other producers."

"An artist’s situation would not be as dire as that of a writer if he were denied the exclusive right to reproduce his works; for while a literary work can be copied in such a way that the reproduction fully replaces the original—sometimes even surpassing it—the same is not true for works of art. It is very rare for a painted copy of a painting to match the original. As for engravings and lithographs, they reproduce the artwork only in an extremely incomplete manner. Thus, a skilled painter would still be able to demand a high price for his paintings, even if everyone had the right to produce copies. But suppose—and this is not impossible—that a method were developed to copy paintings so perfectly that even the keenest connoisseurs could not distinguish between the originals and the reproductions, that the aesthetic satisfaction derived from them was identical. If these copies could be mass-produced at trivial cost, would the originals not lose the vast majority of their value? Who would still be willing to pay 10,000, 20,000, 30,000, or even 100,000 francs for an original painting if they could obtain an equally beautiful copy for two or three francs? If this hypothesis were ever realized, would painters not be ruined, unless they retained the exclusive right to copy or authorize copies of their paintings?"

"Such is already the case for writers today—this is what would happen immediately if the right of reproduction were entirely separated from ownership of the original work, if these two rights were not kept together, at least for a certain period, in the hands of the writer."

Thus, an examination of the nature of the right of reproduction demonstrates that as soon as this right is separated from the ownership of the original work, the latter loses the vast majority of its value, if not all of it; that the condition of owners whose works can be multiplied through copying becomes worse than that of owners whose works can only be used in their original form; in short, that the right of reproduction destroys the ownership of the original work if it is not recognized and guaranteed to the owner.

Given the nature and consequences of the right of reproduction, the only remaining question is whether it is fair and beneficial for literary and artistic property to be partially or completely destroyed through the separation of this right; whether it is fair and beneficial for the writer or artist to suffer from the purely physical nature of his work, which allows its use to be multiplied through reproduction or copying.

This question, Louis Blanc, along with the entire communist herd, [3] does not hesitate to answer in the affirmative: [4]

"Not only," says Louis Blanc, "is it absurd to declare the writer the owner of his work, but it is also absurd to offer him material compensation as a reward. Rousseau copied music to earn a living and wrote books to educate mankind. Such must be the fate of every man of letters worthy of the name. If he is rich, let him devote himself to the worship of thought: he can afford it. If he is poor, let him learn to combine his literary pursuits with a profession that will provide for his needs."

By speaking in this manner, Louis Blanc remains consistent with the rest of his doctrine. He simply fails to realize that by depriving the writer or artist of the compensation due for his labor, he turns the pursuit of literature, science, and art into a privilege of the wealthy. Rousseau, it is true, derived little income from his works, and he copied music to survive. But if Rousseau had been able to earn a sufficient livelihood from his writings, allowing him to live honorably and support his family, where would the harm have been? Would Rousseau, as a property-owning, responsible father, not have lived better and set a better example than Rousseau, dependent on more or less disguised charity, abandoning his children to the care of the public?

[475]

Those who do not admit that society might benefit from men of letters or artists being destined to be beggars and providers for the foundling hospital will obviously resolve the question differently from Mr. Louis Blanc. But first, it is important to understand how it has been resolved in practice.

It has been resolved by a mezzo termine (a compromise). Legislators have generally understood the necessity of recognizing the right of reproduction to some degree; they have understood that, without this guarantee, the fields of literature and the arts would remain closed to men who are obliged to work for a living, that is, to the vast majority of those willing to engage in intellectual labor. Consequently, the right of reproduction and copying has been recognized and guaranteed to writers and artists, but not in an absolute manner. It has been limited, more or less, in both time and space. After a certain period—determined at the whim of the legislator—the right of reproduction and copying falls into the public domain. It also falls into the public domain beyond the borders of most nations.

We shall briefly review the laws governing literary and artistic property in the principal civilized states. We will then examine the consequences of legally limiting the right of reproduction and find within these consequences the elements of an economic solution to the question.

II. A View of the Legislation which regulates Literary and Artistic property.

Everywhere, as we have already noted, the ownership of original works has been recognized without restriction of time or place; everywhere, the ownership of a manuscript, a painting, or a statue has been treated the same as other movable property. However, the right of reproduction has been handled differently.

In France, the right of reproduction was once recognized and guaranteed either in perpetuity or for a fixed time, at the sovereign's discretion. The Ordinance of Moulins (1566), a declaration by Charles IX (1671), and letters patent of Henry III together constituted the legal framework under the Ancien Régime. The king always retained the authority to recognize and guarantee the right of reproduction—or to refuse it altogether—as well as to set conditions for its recognition on whatever terms he deemed appropriate. Generally, no limitations were set. Thus, we find a Council decree dated September 14, 1761, which extended to La Fontaine's grandsons the publishing privilege granted to their grandfather, sixty-six years after his death. However, the author was only granted perpetual ownership of his work on the condition that he did not transfer it to a bookseller; if he did, the right of reproduction would fall into the public domain upon the author's death. [5] The regulation of 1618, the decree of 1665, the decree of 1682, the edict of 1686, and the regulation of February 28, 1723 (Article 109) ensured the protection of the right of reproduction by establishing fines and corporal punishment against counterfeiters. Counterfeiting, which had already grown considerably with the introduction of the printing press, was gradually driven out of the kingdom and relocated to the Netherlands and Switzerland. [6]

The Revolution of 1789 altered this legal framework, though whether for the better or worse is debatable. From that point on, the right of reproduction was legally recognized and declared freely transferable without restriction. However, its duration was arbitrarily limited by the very law that proclaimed it.

The current state of literary property law in major European nations is as follows:

In France, the right of reproduction is guaranteed to authors and their widows for the duration of their lives, to their children for twenty years, and, if they leave none, to other heirs for only ten years. [7]

In England, the right of reproduction is guaranteed to the author for forty-two years from the date of publication. An extension of seven years may also be granted to the heirs, beginning at the author's death, in the event that the forty-two-year period expires during the author's lifetime. [8]

In Belgium and the Netherlands, the French law on literary property has been in effect since 1817. Before the unification of these two countries, the right of reproduction was guaranteed in perpetuity in the Netherlands.

The Zollverein (German Customs Union) has adopted the Prussian law on literary property. Under this law, the right of reproduction belongs to the author for his entire life and to his heirs for thirty years after his death. [9]

The same duration has been adopted in Austria. [10]

In Russia, the right of reproduction is guaranteed to the author for life and to his heirs for twenty-five years. Additionally, it can be extended for ten more years if the heirs or assignees [476] publish a new edition within five years before its expiration. [11]

In Sardinia, the right of reproduction is guaranteed to authors for only fifteen years. [12] Following the convention signed with France on April 22, 1846, the French legal guarantees were adopted in favor of authors from both contracting nations.

In Portugal, the right of reproduction is guaranteed for the author's lifetime, and for thirty years after death, similar to Germany. [13]

In Spain, the right of reproduction was once granted as an exclusive and unlimited privilege, and indeed, it was ordinarily so. However, this privilege was not always granted to the author; it was often given to religious communities at the expense of the legitimate owners. After undergoing several reforms, Spanish law now guarantees the right of reproduction for the author's lifetime and to heirs or assignees for fifty years after death. [14]

The right of performance for dramatic works, the right of reproduction for works of art—paintings, statues, drawings, and models—the right of execution for musical works, all of which partake of the nature of copyright, are likewise subjected to a limitation of varying degrees in their duration.

Copyright has been even more restricted in space, for until recent times, no nation had consented to recognize it for authors of works published abroad, and everywhere literary counterfeiting was practiced without scruple. The counterfeiting of French books, which in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had its main centers in Holland and Switzerland, later moved to Belgium, where it has expanded considerably over the past twenty years. France, in turn, counterfeited English, German, Italian works, etc. The United States seized upon English works, and England took its revenge by appropriating American works; in short, plundering was universal. It was only in 1837 that Prussia was the first to attempt to put an end to this international communism by inserting in its law on literary property a clause regarding reciprocity. By this clause, Prussia pledged to uphold the copy right for authors from nations that would, in return, guarantee the same right for Prussian authors. In 1838, England followed Prussia’s example, offering foreign authors the protection of their copyright, provided that their respective governments granted the same reciprocity to English authors. [15] Literary conventions were then successively concluded between various states: between Austria, Sardinia, and the canton of Ticino in 1840; between Prussia and England on May 13, 1846; between France, Sardinia, Hanover, England, and Portugal in 1846, 1850, 1861, etc. Finally, France recently set a laudable example for other nations by prohibiting the counterfeiting of foreign literary and artistic works on its territory without requiring any reciprocity. [16]

Such is the current state of the laws governing copyright among the principal civilized nations. The defining characteristic of this situation is its extreme inequality. In terms of time, English, German, and Spanish writers and artists, for example, enjoy a longer copyright or reproduction than their French, Belgian, or Sardinian counterparts. In terms of space, the inequality is no less striking. Writers and artists belonging to nations that have refrained from signing literary and artistic conventions can only rely on their national market—and, since the decree of March 28, 1852, on the French market as well. Elsewhere, the market is more or less extensive, depending on the number and importance of literary and artistic conventions.

III. Effects of the Legal Limits on copyright.

One can generally assert that

"any legal limitation on copyright, whether in time or space, results in lowering and restricting, both in quality and quantity, the production of literary and artistic works; that it discourages the production of superior works in favor of inferior ones."

Let us examine what the “natural limits” of copyright are, and this proposition will demonstrate itself.

Not all literary and artistic works benefit equally from copyright. Some are more frequently reproduced across time and space, others less so. Each work finds a market that is more or less durable and expansive, depending on its merit and on the nature and intensity of the need it fulfills.

This market is generally quite limited in time. Everyone knows how small the proportion of books that are reprinted, plays that are performed, and artworks that are reproduced after their authors' deaths. Within the entire body of literary and artistic production, this proportion likely does not exceed 5 percent. Yet, this intellectual capital that each generation bequeaths to the next is composed almost entirely of elite works. Works that are inferior in thought and style may enjoy fleeting success through fashion or publicity upon their release, but time never fails to render its judgment. Time is ruthless toward mediocrity and improvisation; it spares only genius and hard work.

Thus, when copyright is limited in time, no harm is done to mediocrity and improvisation, for their works naturally die a swift and inevitable death. The property of mediocre authors and improvisers is in [477] no way affected by a law that limits copyright over time. But is the same true for elite authors? Oh no! The law strikes their property hard and cuts it down mercilessly. Suppose, for instance, that you have devoted the greater part of your life to the construction of a literary or artistic monument, of which you may rightfully say, as your contemporaries attest:

Exegi monumentum aere perennius.

"I have erected a monument more lasting than bronze."

What does the law do to reward your diligent effort? It shortens your copyright term to its measure of twenty or thirty years and consequently deprives you of all the benefits you might have derived beyond that period. It is a true penalty imposed on you for having too much genius and for having worked too hard; it is a fine, for it is evident that you could have transferred the exploitation of your copyright under better conditions if its duration had remained unlimited. And this penalty is all the heavier the more durable your work is—that is to say, the more genius you have displayed and the more effort you have put in. What could be more shocking and at the same time more harmful? No doubt, a man of genius will not become mediocre simply because his copyright has been limited. But will he not, to some extent, be encouraged to put less effort into his works, to multiply them more at the expense of their lasting value? Will we not see genius too often descending, for lack of the auxiliary of labor, into mediocrity, instead of seeing mediocrity rising, through labor, to the level of genius?

The market for each literary or artistic work also has its natural limits in space. In general, mediocre works do not extend beyond a rather short radius. Only works remarkable for their thought or style reach far beyond. If the sphere within which copyright is recognized and protected is artificially restricted, will we not see, as in the previous case, genius and effort being punished, while mediocrity and improvisation are encouraged? Will we not also see light, superficial works multiplying at the expense of serious, profound works, and imagination taking precedence over science? Indeed, while light works cater to the masses, serious works are addressed only to a select few intellectual minds. Consequently, the market of each nation is naturally broader for the former than for the latter. However, one circumstance somewhat restores the balance: serious works find an audience abroad, while light works, which appeal to the specific tastes of a particular people, rarely cross national borders. But if copyright is restricted in scope, will this balance not be broken once again? When a serious work achieves success abroad, will counterfeiting not hasten to seize it? The publisher will therefore be able to count only on the national market, and since this market is naturally limited for such works, he will only acquire the copyright at a very low price—if he even purchases it at all. Unless the author enjoys some fortune, will he not be forced to withdraw from the literary arena or to devote himself to light literature?

Let us consider, moreover, the literary and artistic production of our time, and we will easily see how the limitation of copyright contributes to lowering the quality of works.

It also reduces their quantity by artificially diminishing the remuneration fund that sustains literary and artistic production. True, writers and artists are compensated for the partial confiscation of their copyright through subsidies, pensions, and other rewards; but it is doubtful that these compensations, however burdensome they may be for the community, provide an actual equivalent to literary and artistic producers. The natural fund for the remuneration of literary and artistic industry is thus diminished by the legal limitation of copyright. What follows from this? It is that, on the one hand, many individuals with literary and artistic abilities are forced to adopt other professions for which they are less suited, suffering a loss comparable to that inflicted on vineyard owners by protectionist policies when they are forced to uproot their vines to plant cereals or potatoes instead. On the other hand, society suffers an equally significant loss, as it is left with only a small number of writers and artists, who are interested in reproducing their works as quickly as possible, instead of having a large number of them interested in producing as many works of an elite quality as possible.

One may therefore affirm that the egalitarian limitation of copyright diminishes literary and artistic production in terms of both quality and quantity combined, and, as a final consequence, makes this production more expensive.

Given this, the interest of society clearly demands that copyright be recognized and protected within its “natural limits.” Such is the economic solution to the question. But can we hope that this economic solution will eventually replace the current halfway measure, which is part property-based and part communist? Does the communist solution not have a greater chance of prevailing in the future? This is the final point that must be examined.

IV. Conclusion.

It has been rightly observed, and this observation is of paramount importance, that as societies become more enlightened and more civilized, they grant an increasingly broad scope to property rights. In the early ages of humanity, property appears as essentially restricted and precarious: the absorption of individual property into the common domain—or, which amounts to the same thing, communism—is the dominant fact; as for infringements on property, they are only considered harmful and condemnable within a limited sphere. Beyond this sphere, they are most often [478] regarded as beneficial, rewarded, and honored. The notion of property still seems confused, poorly defined, and poorly delineated. No one thinks, for example, that the law should have the sole purpose of recognizing property, describing it, and guaranteeing it within the limits assigned to it by nature. It is generally believed that property is instituted and created by law and that it is therefore within the power of legislators to set arbitrary limits on it. Hence, everywhere, monopolies and privileges are found to shrink the property rights of some in order to expand those of others. It is only gradually, as experience reveals the evils that result from infringements on property—whether these infringements have been committed in violation of the law or even under its sanction—that the notion of property becomes clearer, more precise, and better understood. It is then that slavery begins to disappear and that personal and real property are freed from the privileges that burden them or the constraints that shackle them. It is then that the free disposal of property, whether by gift, loan, or exchange, is established as a principle, and that legal right of property becomes increasingly indistinguishable from the natural right of property.

Admittedly, this progress is not regular, and it is sometimes abruptly interrupted: disturbances arise that suddenly drive society back toward the communism of primitive barbarism; but since any violation of property inevitably causes harm, a reaction immediately follows, and the principle that has been threatened or compromised soon reasserts itself—often even expanding in scope. Thus, for example, the great upheaval of 1848 ultimately contributed to the extension of the principle of property. If we consider only literary and artistic property, it is mainly since 1848 that copyright has gained ground in international legislation, and public opinion is now increasingly inclined to extend it, whether in terms of geographic scope or duration. It is therefore permissible to hope, notwithstanding the objections of M. Louis Blanc and his school, that literary and artistic property will eventually be fully recognized and guaranteed within its natural limits.

G. de Molinari.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Traité des droits d’auteurs, by M. A.-C. Renouard. Paris, J. Renouard et comp., 2 vols. in-8.

Organon de la propriété intellectuelle, by Jobard, director of the Belgian Museum of Industry (see this name). Paris, Mathias; Brussels, Decq, 1851, 1 vol. large in-18 of 350 pages. M. Jobard has been, for more than twenty years, a devoted advocate of literary and artistic property; he has published a multitude of brochures, pamphlets, and newspaper articles in its defense. Unfortunately, M. Jobard made the mistake of attacking industrial freedom while defending intellectual property, and this deviation has greatly harmed his campaign.

De la propriété littéraire et artistique, au point de vue international, aperçu sur les législations étrangères et sur les traités relatifs à la répression de la contrefaçon, suivi d’un appendice, by Alfred Villefort, Doctor of Law, attached to the Department of Foreign Affairs. Paris, 1851, brochure in-8.

Législation de la propriété littéraire collationnée sur les textes officiels, avec notes interprétatives, by Jules Delalain, printer for the University. Paris, 1852, brochure in-8.

Le Travail intellectuel, journal des intérêts scientifiques, littéraires et artistiques (monthly), published in Paris in 1847 by M. Hippolyte Castille, with the collaboration of M. G. de Molinari and the endorsement of MM. Frédéric Bastiat, Dunoyer, Horace Say, Michel Chevalier, Joseph Garnier, etc. This journal was founded specifically to promote the cause of literary and artistic property rights. Its publication was interrupted in 1848. Seven issues were published.

De la propriété littéraire internationale, de la contrefaçon et de la liberté de la presse, by Charles Muquardt. Brussels, Muquardt, 1851. A response, full of new and insightful perspectives, to the defenders of Belgian counterfeiting.

La réimpression. Étude sur cette question considérée principalement au point de vue des intérêts belges et français, avec cette épigraphe : La propriété littéraire n’est pas une propriété. Brussels, 1851, in-18.

De la réimpression en Belgique, by A. Hauman. Brussels, 1852, brochure in-8. These two brochures were published in defense of Belgian counterfeiting.

Endnotes to Propriété littéraire

[1] (Ed. Note??) Molinari was a co-founder and contributor to the Journal Ref?? which dealt with intellectual property matters.

[2] De la propriété littéraire et de la contrefaçon belge. (Journal des Économistes, Vol. XXXI, page 255.)

[3] (Ed. Note??) The word "troupeau" (herd) is one Molinari used a couple of times to described his communist and socialist opponents. See his reflections on the violence used by socialists to close down the political club "The Liberty of Working" in February/March 1848 Ref??

[4] Organisation du travail, 5th edition, page 223.

[5] Discours sur la propriété littéraire, by Hippolyte Castille. (ˆ, issue of October 15, 1847.)

[6] See, on this subject, an interesting memoir by M. Charles Hen: De la réimpression, page 17.

[7] Law of July 19, 1793, and decree of February 5, 1810. The right to literary property, says the author of a scholarly review of this legislation, M. Alfred Villefort, is reduced in France to the following: authors of works of any kind enjoy, for their entire lifetime, the exclusive right to sell or authorize the sale of their works and to transfer ownership, in whole or in part. After them, their children enjoy this right for twenty years, and the widow for her lifetime if her marriage contracts grant her the right. However, if the work is a play, the widow, like the children, has the exclusive right to authorize its performance only for twenty years. Finally, if the author leaves heirs who are not children but ascendants or collateral relatives, their rights are reduced to ten years. As for the assignee of the author’s rights or those of his heirs, they enjoy them for the entire period granted to the author, the widow, or the heirs, unless the assignment contract specifies a shorter term. The owners of posthumous works have the same rights as authors. (De la propriété littéraire et artistique, by Alfred Villefort, page 6.)

[8] Act of 1842.

[9] Law of June 11, 1837.

[10] Law of October 19, 1846.

[11] Regulations of January 8–20, 1830.

[12] Law of February 26, 1826.

[13] Law of July 8, 1851.

[14] Law of June 10, 1847.

[15] De la propriété littéraire et artistique, by Alfred Villefort, page 53.

[16] By a presidential decree of March 28, 1852.

Servage (Serfdom)↩

Source

"Servage", DEP, T. 2, pp. 610-13

Text

[610]

Serfdom was most often a modification of slavery (see this term), a modification brought about by necessity itself. Thus, when the large agricultural estates (latifundia), cultivated by legions of slaves, had exhausted the soil of Italy; when, on the other hand, the weakening of the Roman Empire, largely caused by slavery, had made it more difficult to maintain internal and external security, the mode of cultivation had to change. To avoid ruin, landowners were forced to divide their estates and transform their slaves into serfs or coloni in order to cultivate the parcels of land. This led to a notable improvement in the condition of this lower class of society. The slave was entirely the property of his owner: the entire product of his labor, after deducting the cost of his necessary upkeep and the small stipend occasionally given to stimulate his productivity, belonged to the master. The serf’s condition was undeniably better: he was given a plot of land to cultivate under harsh conditions, yet these still left him with a measure of freedom and property. At times, he was subject to a tax in kind, at other times to a labor tax (corvée) or a monetary payment. This obligation was imposed upon him arbitrarily; he had no say in negotiating its terms, nor could he escape from it, for he was not free to change his place of residence; he was [611] bound to the land (attaché à la glèbe). Furthermore, he was forced to submit to the arbitrary will of the lord in many circumstances: for example, he could not marry without his lord’s permission, and this permission was often conditioned upon the exercise of a certain right that does not speak highly of the morality of the “good old days”. On the other hand, once the serf had paid his dues, whether in kind, labor, or money, and fulfilled his other obligations, he was free to dispose of the surplus of his production as he wished.

Without a doubt, there were many instances in which the lord had no scruples about seizing the property legitimately acquired by serfs on his estate; however, over time, landlords realized that they had a vested interest in respecting, to a certain degree, the property and liberty of their serfs. Experience showed, for example, that if a serf lived under the constant risk of being torn from his land and sold as a slave, his productivity would plummet; he would be discouraged from plowing and sowing a field whose harvest might be reaped by someone else. Consequently, the custom gradually developed of only selling serfs along with the land, and eventually, the law codified this practice, which was founded both on the best interests of the lord and of the serf. Experience also demonstrated that imposing too heavy a tax on the serf, relative to the nature of the soil and external conditions, or seizing his remaining property after he had paid his dues, weakened his incentives to work, ultimately harming both parties. Therefore, not out of humanity or philanthropy, but out of self-interest, lords granted serfs progressively broader and more secure guarantees over their person and property (see NOBLESSE). The result was that serfs were able to accumulate some savings, which they gradually used over the centuries to buy back the dues imposed upon them. By the 18th century, the number of serfs in the industrious and enlightened nations of Western Europe had become almost negligible. In France, there were barely any left, except in Franche-Comté, and we are familiar with Voltaire’s eloquent petitions to the king on their behalf. [1] Various royal edicts had been issued since the Middle Ages to improve the condition of serfs and facilitate their emancipation. One notable example is the famous edict of Louis X, known as “le Hutin”, dated 1315, in which the king declares that “every subject of his kingdom must be born free; that his kingdom is the kingdom of the Franks, and that he wishes reality to match the name.” However, one must not overestimate the influence of these edicts. While they may have facilitated the abolition of serfdom, they were not the driving force behind it. In the edict of Louis "the Hutin", for instance, the king merely authorized serfs and coloni of the royal domain to purchase their freedom. For the monarch, this was simply another way to raise money.

“It was not out of selfless motives,” M. Guizot rightly observes, “that Louis the Hutin proclaimed the principle of serf emancipation. He did not intend to grant liberty to coloni; he meant to sell it to them at reasonable and convenient prices. However, it is nonetheless true that, in principle, the king felt compelled to sell freedom, and, in practice, that the serfs were capable of buying it. This, without a doubt, was an immense difference and an immense progress between the 11th and 14th centuries.” [2]

And what was the source of this progress? It was the savings that enslaved populations had managed to accumulate over time, which they were now investing in their freedom, seeing it as the best possible use of their wealth. Had these savings not existed, what use would Louis the Hutin’s edict have been? Thus, the abolition of serfdom was a purely economic phenomenon; it occurred naturally, gradually, through the force of circumstances. The laws, royal edicts, and decrees did nothing more than acknowledge or, at most, encourage this process.

We stated at the beginning that serfdom was most often a modification of slavery. It also happened, especially in the early Middle Ages, that free men voluntarily accepted the bonds of serfdom in order to secure protection amid universal anarchy.

“At the beginning of the first dynasty,” says Montesquieu, “we see an infinite number of free men, both among the Franks and among the Romans; but the number of serfs increased so much that, by the beginning of the third dynasty, all farmers and almost all city dwellers had become serfs.” [3]

M. Guizot, in turn, cites a passage from Salvian, where the cause of this voluntary transformation of free men into serfs or coloni is clearly indicated:

“Unable to preserve their property and the dignity of their birth,” writes Salvian, “these free men submit to the humble condition of coloni: reduced to this extremity, they are stripped by tax collectors not only of their possessions but also of their status; not only of what they own, but of themselves—they lose themselves along with their property, they have no possessions left, and they renounce the right to their freedom.” [4]

These free men, who consented to descend to the status of serfs to ensure their protection, naturally tried to surrender as little of their freedom as possible. As a result, serfdom was not a uniform condition; [612] there were serfs of many different categories, forming a chain of gradations between the status of a slave and that of a free man.

In modern times, serfdom has almost entirely disappeared on a large scale, except in the Russian Empire; yet even there, it is in the process of transformation and decline. Serfdom, as it manifests in Russia, presents some noteworthy characteristics. The Russian serfs are subject, some to corvée labor, others to a monetary tax known as obroc. Corvée labor was limited to a maximum of three days per week by an ukase of Emperor Paul in 1797. However, the law allows or tolerates other arrangements, provided there are no complaints from the peasants. The obroc varies in amount depending on several factors: the fertility of the land, the ease of selling agricultural products, the average market prices, and even more importantly, the moral and industrial capacities of the peasants.

“One noteworthy fact,” says the author of a learned treatise on Russia’s national wealth, M. Alexandre Boutowski, “is that corvée labor is generally the least productive.” This is explained by the fact that the peasants have little interest in efficiently using the three days they owe to their landlords, and by the habits of laziness and negligence they acquire, which negatively affect their own farms. Exceptions are rare and are almost always due to the presence of the landlord on his estate and his active and informed involvement in its management. Under these conditions, some landlords have managed to overcome the inertia of their corvée serfs, to engage them in the success of their work, and thereby to increase their own revenue while significantly improving the condition of their peasants. The landlords who, on the contrary, leave the management of their estates to unscrupulous stewards, often serfs themselves, see their incomes and land value decline due to the bad moral habits and especially the widespread drunkenness that take hold of their peasants. The serfs paying obroc enjoy far greater freedom than those subject to corvée; and although the obroc is, in many cases, heavier to bear than corvée labor, peasants under this system are generally more prosperous. It is from among this class that the most enterprising and hardworking industrialists emerge, who, while still legally bound to their lord regarding the land for which they pay obroc, engage in commerce and industry. Thus, in Russia, entire manufacturing districts have emerged in rural areas, where various industries are highly successful, such as cutlery in Pawlovo and Vorsma, silk milling in Bogorodsk and Vokhna, and cotton weaving and printed textile manufacturing in Ivanovo. The laws do not prevent obroc serfs from leaving their villages to practice various trades in the cities: our capitals and towns are largely built by mason and carpenter serfs working under obroc. This class of obroc serfs also supplies a large portion of our factory workers, artisans’ apprentices, and domestic servants. Moreover, obroc serfs can register as bourgeois and engage in wholesale and retail trade. Among them, there are even examples of great fortunes accumulated in industry or commerce. [5]

In exchange for corvée or obroc, the peasants receive from their seigneur a portion of land, more or less considerable, which they cultivate for their own benefit. This land is not granted individually to each peasant, but rather to the commune to which the peasant belongs, and which is held collectively responsible for the dues owed by each of its members. The commune then distributes the land among the families or households (tïaglo) that make up its membership. “The size of the plots,” says M. de Tégoborski in his Études sur les forces productives de la Russie, “is proportionate to the number of family members and the available labor force.” However, this possession is highly precarious: as a family grows larger or smaller, its land allotment is increased or reduced accordingly. Moreover, at set intervals, the commune reclaims all the land and redistributes it anew.

This system ensures that each family’s allotment is proportional to the dues it must pay, and in this regard, it is as fair as possible. However, it greatly hinders agricultural progress, as M. de Tégoborski rightly points out. The uncertainty of long-term land ownership discourages improvements since peasants have no incentive to invest in their land, knowing they might lose it in the next redistribution. Thus, as wealth grows, the redemption of corvée and obroc obligations, or their conversion into a fixed, buyable rent, is likely to become increasingly common. [6] When that happens, the communal land-sharing system, which is a direct consequence of serfdom, will completely lose its purpose.

Here is how, in 1838, the serfs of Russia were distributed among the landowners of this vast empire. The data pertains only to the male population.

No, of landowners		Absolute no. of peasants (male)	Average no. of peasants per landowner
58,457	With less than 21 peasants	430,037	7.7
30,417	Between 21 and 100 peasants	1,500,337	49.3
16,7402	Between 101 and 500 peasants	3,634,199	217.1
2,273	Between 501 and 1,000 peasants	1,562,831	687.6
1,453	More than 1,000 peasants	3,556,959	2,448
109,340		10,704,378	98

In 1848, the number of peasants who were serfs belonging to private individuals was estimated at 11,938,182; at the same time, the number of peasants of the crown domains when paid enough tax to vote was 9,209,200 (male population); in addition, there were 2,091,640 peasants belonging to categories that were more or less free. [7]

In summary, when considering serfdom from an economic point of view, one finds, on the one hand, that the serf must provide more and better labor than the slave because he enjoys a greater share of property and freedom; and, on the other hand, that it is an essentially transitory state. Indeed, as soon as the serf strongly feels the need to be free, he does not fail to apply the savings that the natural progress of security and wealth has allowed him to accumulate toward the purchase of his freedom. It is to savings, more than to any other cause, that the successive abolition of serfdom in Western Europe is due, and it appears likely that this remnant of a barbaric era will disappear, under the influence of the same cause, from the rest of the civilized world.

Endnotes to Servage

[1] To the King in His Council, on behalf of the King's subjects who seek liberty in France, against the Benedictine monks who have become canons of Saint-Claude in Franche-Comté. — Petition from the serfs of Saint-Claude to the Chancellor. — Request to the King for the serfs of Saint-Claude. — Excerpt from a memorandum for the complete abolition of servitude in France, etc. In Mélanges de politique et de législation.

[2] Course in Modern History. History of Civilization in France, vol. IV, p. 281.

[3] The Spirit of the Laws, Book XXX, Chapter XI.

[4] De gubernatione Dei, by Salvian. Book V.

[5] Essay on National Wealth and the Principles of Political Economy, by Alexandre Boutowski (in the Russian language). See the review of this work in the Journal des Économistes, vol. XXVI, p. 247.

[6] "If the Russian artisan," says M. de Haxthausen, "is frugal and manages to save some money, he takes advantage of the goodwill or a moment of difficulty of his lord to buy his freedom. The price of redemption varies from 200 to 2,000 assignat rubles (the assignat ruble is worth 1 franc 15 centimes)." Studies on the Internal Situation, National Life, and Rural Institutions of Russia, by Baron Aug. de Haxthausen. Vol. II, p. 449.

[7] Studies on the Productive Forces of Russia, by L. de Tegoborski. Vol. I, p. 320.

Slavery↩

Source

"Esclavage" (Slavery), DEP, Vol. 1, pp. 712-31.

Text

[712]

I. Origin.

Slavery was established in the world when the technology of production had developed sufficiently to provide men with more than what was strictly necessary for their subsistence. When there was no surplus or when the surplus was very small, slavery could not be established, as no one had any interest in possessing slaves; it only became possible when certain men found it advantageous to appropriate the labor of their fellow men by giving them in exchange a minimal subsistence. But as soon as it became profitable, it necessarily had to establish itself. Undoubtedly, the men who first conceived the idea of seizing their fellow men and enslaving them in order to claim a portion of the product of their labor committed an act of plunder, of theft; they inflicted a manifest and unjustifiable violation of another’s property. Unfortunately, history attests that respect for property and the observance of justice were introduced only with extreme slowness in human societies; history shows that there is no act of spoliation or injustice that has not been committed whenever men have believed they could profit from committing it.

Slavery, this unjust violation of man’s right of ownership over himself, thus became established in the world as soon as it became profitable. But since it did not become profitable everywhere and at all times in the same way, it was neither uniform nor universal. From the earliest antiquity, it appears in the southern regions of the globe, where it served as the foundation of societies. Conversely, as one moves northward, it loses its importance, and when it does appear, it is in a mitigated, softened form. What accounts for this difference? It arises from the fact that the labor of a slave could, from the outset, yield much more in the South than in the North. This inequality is explained, first, by the fact that the lands of northern regions are generally less fertile; second, by the fact that the minimum necessary for a slave is higher in the North than in the South—he requires more food and clothing, better shelter due to the natural circumstances of the climate, which in turn reduces the owner's profits. Finally, the races of the North, generally more vigorous, are more difficult to subjugate and endure servitude more impatiently. Slaves yield less profit in the North, and they are harder to keep in servitude.

Thus, it is understandable why slavery was an exceptional phenomenon in Germania and other northern regions at a time when it had become a general phenomenon in the Mediterranean basin and other southern regions.

II. Slavery in Antiquity.

Let us now examine how slavery became established in ancient societies, how it was sustained, what place it occupied, and under the influence of which causes it was gradually transformed until it largely disappeared from the civilized world.

Slavery was not established in the same manner in all the states of antiquity. Most often, it originated from the violent superposition of one race over another. Such was the case in the principal states of Greece: the Helots in Laconia, the Penestae in Thessaly, to name only these, were indigenous people whom conquest had reduced to servitude. It was different in Italy, or at least in Latium. Initially, the Romans had no slaves. According to the testimony of Varro, five or six hundred years after the founding of Rome, agriculture was still largely carried out by landowners and free laborers. But from that time onward, war and commerce brought a flood of slaves into Italy. Roman armies took entire populations into captivity and never exchanged prisoners. Charles Comte very judiciously explains the reason for this: [1]

"Among the Romans," he says, *"from the beginning to the end of the Republic, the aristocracy continually sought to replace free men who practiced a trade with a people it could own; it made it a maxim never to exchange prisoners. Faced with the choice of leaving Roman soldiers in slavery when they could not afford to ransom themselves or selling the foreign soldiers they had [713] captured as slaves, they always took the most profitable course. The restitution of an army taken from them would have benefited only the poor classes from which the soldiers came, while the restitution they would have had to make of a foreign army would have deprived them of a multitude of slaves.

Among the many causes that led the Roman aristocracy to wage war, there is one that has not been noted: the people bore the costs, while the elites [2] reaped the benefits. The elites, who, by capturing the inhabitants of an industrious city and transforming them into slaves, lost a certain number of soldiers, saw in this operation nothing but a profitable venture. It was an exchange in which everything was a gain for the aristocracy; in its eyes, a good slave was worth more than two Roman proletarians. Even the gravest dangers were not enough to make it lose sight of what it considered to be in its interest. When Hannibal captured a large number of Roman soldiers, he proposed to exchange them for those captured from him. The patricians refused to consent to the exchange; instead, they purchased eight thousand slaves and incorporated them into their army without granting them freedom. In this way, they retained the Carthaginian soldiers they had made into slaves while reserving the right to reclaim the possession of those with whom they had replaced the soldiers who had fallen into enemy hands.

This policy of abandoning Roman soldiers, whether to avoid paying their ransom or to retain the prisoners they had made into slaves, in no way compromised the freedom of the members of the aristocracy. If one of them fell into enemy hands and was not wealthy enough to ransom himself, his clients were required to contribute to securing his release from servitude. The plebeians, who had no one to ransom them when they were unfortunate enough to be taken prisoner, were, in fact, obliged to ransom the members of the aristocracy."

As Rome's conquests expanded, the number of free men in Italy decreased, while the number of slaves increased. Slavery in Rome was also replenished in various ways. All foundlings were reduced to slavery. Children became slaves if they were sold by their fathers; debtors, if they could not fulfill their obligations to their creditors. A father could sell his children even if they were married; he could also sell his grandchildren. The sale of a citizen by another, as Charles Comte further notes, was initially declared illegal; but as it happened that some individuals allowed themselves to be sold in order to later claim their freedom after having profited from the price for which they had been sold, and as these fraudulent sales harmed the commerce of the republic, they were eventually declared valid. Men convicted of crimes were sometimes reduced to servitude and became public property; finally, any child born of a female slave was also a slave. [3] Commerce also played a significant role in sustaining slavery. The regions that primarily supplied slaves to Greece and Rome, until the conquest of Gaul by Julius Caesar, were Thrace, Scythia, Dacia, Getia, Phrygia, Pontus—in short, the southern part of Western Europe and part of Asia Minor. The main slave markets were, for the North, the emporium of Tanais, located at the mouth of that river; for Asia Minor, Ephesus and Side; for Greece, Samos, Athens, and Delos. [4] People were procured cheaply in the North and resold at high prices in the South, where their labor generated a greater surplus.

The condition of slaves in antiquity has been described many times. It is well known that these pariahs of the pagan world were treated like true beasts of burden and that their lives were entirely at the discretion of their masters. It was only under the emperors that the law began to intervene to protect them; but this protection was always very limited in scope—it could best be compared to modern regulations prohibiting cruelty to animals. A master who made a contract with his slave was not bound to honor it, for Roman law considered the slave as even more insignificant than nothing: non tam vilis quam nullus. [5] On the other hand, as this type of livestock could become quite dangerous, slave revolts were punished with the most cruel torture. However, these revolts were nonetheless frequent, and the servile wars seriously threatened the security of the republic more than once.

Slaves were employed in the most diverse functions. Most of them performed the lower tasks of society, but some, more intelligent than others, held relatively elevated occupations. There were slave musicians, grammarians, even philosophers, who were sold at high prices and were generally better treated than ordinary slaves. Slave labor was exploited in two ways: either the owner used it for his own benefit, or he rented it out.

"In Athens," says Boeckh, "there was not even the poorest citizen who did not have a slave to maintain his household. In middle-class households, several were employed in all sorts of occupations: grinding grain, baking bread, cooking, making clothes; running errands and accompanying the master or mistress, who rarely went out alone. If one wanted to show off and attract attention, one would take three slaves along. Even some philosophers had as many as ten. Slaves were also rented out as mercenaries; they tended cattle and fields, worked in mines, foundries, mechanical trades, and all kinds of day labor. Entire groups were employed [714] in numerous workshops for which Athens was renowned; many were used on merchant and warships. Not to mention examples of individuals who employed only a few, Timarchus had 11 or 12 in his workshops; Demosthenes’ father had 52 or 53, not counting the female slaves in his household; Lysias and Polemarchus had 120. Plato explicitly notes that in a free man's household, one frequently found 50 slaves, and even more among the wealthy; Philemonides owned 300; Hipponicus 600; Nicias 1,000, in the mines alone." [6]

"By the nature of the matter," adds the same author, "their productivity had to be very high and, as with livestock, yield both capital and interest, which were very high in ancient times, since their value diminished with age and death could cause their total loss. Add to this the danger of losing them through escape, especially in times of war, and the necessity of pursuing them and offering rewards for their capture. The idea of establishing an insurance system against these risks occurred to a noble Macedonian, Antigenes of Rhodes, who, for a premium of 8 drachmas per head, undertook to reimburse the declared value of any escaped slave; something he could do all the more easily because he compelled provincial governors to return or pay for those who had fled into their territories. It is impossible to calculate what profit an individual slave could yield. The 32 or 33 blacksmiths or armorers owned by Demosthenes generated an annual return of 30 minae, and the chair-makers 12, after covering all expenses; since the first group was worth 190 minae and the second 40, they yielded 30 and 15 15/19 percent profit, respectively, which presents a rather striking contrast. Furthermore, the master provided the materials, and part of the total profit could be attributed to the gain he derived from them." [7]

The price of slaves naturally varied depending on the number available in the market and the demand for them; it also fluctuated based on the quantity and quality of labor they could provide.

"The price of slaves," says the learned author of The Political Economy of the Athenians, "depended on competition and numbers, but it also varied with age, health, strength, beauty, intelligence, skills, and moral qualities. A slave," Xenophon says, "can be worth 2 minae, while another is worth barely 1 1/2, and some are worth 5 or 10. Nicias, son of Niceratus, paid as much as a talent for the overseer of his mining operations. Roman soldiers sold in Achaea by Hannibal were ransomed at a price set by the Achaeans themselves, amounting to 5 minae. Typically, 20 to 30 minae were paid for female musicians and young girls destined for their masters' pleasures; thus, Neaera was purchased for 30 minae." [8]

The competition from these living machines, which were maintained with only a minimal subsistence, could not fail to be disastrous for free farmers and artisans. The labor of the free man was, however, considered far superior to that of the slave. [9] But war decimated the workers in the lower class, and on the other hand, the patricians, who owned slaves, had the advantage over them of owning capital. They could organize their agricultural or industrial enterprises on a vast scale and thus offset, through the superiority of their capital, the superiority of the labor of their competitors. The outcome of this struggle was the gradual expulsion of free men from most branches of production and the replacement of small enterprises with large ones. Most historians of the time mention this revolution, which gradually took place within Roman society, and they rightly consider it disastrous.

"Military service, by tearing free men away from agriculture," says Appian in particular, "led the rich to employ slaves in cultivating the land and tending livestock; these slaves were, for them, an extremely profitable property due to their rapid multiplication, facilitated by their exemption from military service. What was the result? The powerful men became excessively wealthy, and the fields were filled with slaves; the Italian race, worn out and impoverished, perished under the weight of poverty, taxes, and war. If sometimes a free man escaped these misfortunes, he fell into idleness because he owned nothing of his own in a territory entirely taken over by the rich, and there was no work for him on another man’s land, surrounded as he was by such a great number of slaves." [10]

But while the unequal competition from the great slave workshops decimated the free population, various causes acted to transform slavery.

If the competition of slave labor was ruinous to free workers, the very necessities of this struggle, in turn, helped improve the condition of the slaves. Experience taught Roman landowners that a slave who was allowed to accumulate a small peculium (personal savings) and who entertained the hope of buying his freedom with it worked with much more zeal and dedication than one who had no other incentive than the whip. The well-understood interest of the owners—an interest constantly stimulated by their competition with free artisans—thus led them to grant their slaves the necessary opportunities to accumulate a peculium, through which they could buy their freedom. This arrangement offered a double advantage: first, the slave worked more diligently and efficiently; second, by purchasing his freedom, he reimbursed most of the costs he had incurred, and he usually did so at a time when he had already lost part of his strength and capacity for labor. Moreover, buy-in his freedom did not grant the slave complete freedom—he remained [[715] to some extent under the authority of his former master; for example, he was often required to provide him with a payment in exchange for his patronage. Manumissions thus multiplied due to the advantages they presented to slave owners. At times, they were further encouraged by laws regarding food distributions; since these distributions were granted only to free men and freedmen, masters at certain periods, notably under Caesar, found it profitable to emancipate their slaves in order to share with them the provisions being distributed. In the countryside, particular circumstances played a role in prompting the transformation of slavery. According to the testimony of Pliny and Columella, the great agricultural estates operated by slave labor (latifundia) eventually exhausted the soil of Italy. This mode of exploitation became, therefore, increasingly unprofitable, and there came a time when landowners found it advantageous to divide their land into smaller plots and lease it out in this divided form to their former slaves, now transformed into serfs, tenant farmers, or sharecroppers. The barbarian invasions, by reducing the security of landowners, by making slave revolts and escapes easier, and by limiting the markets available for the products of large-scale agriculture, also contributed significantly to this transformation. As can be seen, the causes that led to the abolition of slavery in Europe were primarily economic. Christianity undoubtedly played a role as well by introducing a more refined morality into the world and spreading more profound seeds of justice and fraternity in people's hearts; but to attribute the entire merit of slavery's abolition to Christianity would be to settle for a very superficial examination. Even if Christianity had not intervened, slavery would have gradually disappeared under the influence of economic factors. Furthermore, Christianity’s influence in this matter was slow and indirect. It was only in the twelfth century that a pope, Alexander III, issued a bull calling for the general emancipation of slaves; and yet, as Adam Smith judiciously notes (Book III, Chapter II), this bull seems to have been more of a pious exhortation than a law intended to strictly bind the faithful, for slavery continued to exist in Europe itself for several centuries thereafter. It was not until the seventeenth century in England and the eighteenth century in France that the last traces of primitive slavery disappeared. The law, which almost always merely formalizes existing general facts, at those times prohibited the possession of slaves, at least within the metropoles.

Historians and economists differ greatly in their assessments of the number of slaves in antiquity. According to Boeckh, the population of Attica consisted of 135,000 free men and 365,000 slaves; Wallace estimates the number of slaves at 580,000; Sainte-Croix even raises this figure to 639,500; conversely, Hume reduces it to 40,000. M. Letronne, whose estimates are adopted by M. Dureau de la Malle, gives the figure of 110,000 for the slave population and 130,000 for the free population. M. Dureau de la Malle, in turn, estimates the population of slaves, freedmen, and metoeci (foreigners) in Italy, in the year 529 from the founding of Rome, at 2,312,677 individuals, with the free population at 2,665,805. The ratio would be 26 to 23. Other authors provide much higher estimates for the slave population, but those of M. Dureau de la Malle appear to be closer to the truth.

III. Slavery in Modern Times

§1. The Slavery of African people [11] — Its Establishment — Means Used to Abolish It

After gradually transforming in Europe, slavery reappeared in America with its original barbaric character. The vast and fertile territories of the New World had just been discovered, but there was a shortage of labor to exploit them. Initially, the indigenous peoples were subjected to forced labor in the mines, an industry that seemed the most lucrative of all. However, the indigenous people lacked the necessary endurance to withstand the relentless toil and the cruel treatment imposed upon them by the greed and intolerance of the conquerors. Their numbers rapidly declined. It became necessary to find replacements or risk losing the greater part of the benefits of discovering the New World. Now, European laborers could only adapt easily in temperate regions—those that contained the least natural wealth. Moreover, the importation of European workers was made difficult by their condition as free men. Generally lacking resources, they agreed to indentured service to pay for their passage; but since these contracts were limited to three, five, or seven years, this restriction naturally limited the profits that could be made from their transport (see COLONIES and EMIGRATION). Therefore, the search began for workers who could better adjust to the tropical regions of the New World and whose transport could yield better profits. These workers were found on the African coast. There, robust men, accustomed to tropical climates, were readily available, and their transport could provide maximum profits since those who transported them acquired perpetual ownership of them. Bought at a very low price on the African coast, where the still-barbaric state of production rendered labor nearly worthless, they were resold at high prices in America, where the richness of natural resources, combined with European intelligence and capital, allowed for great profit. Some authors attribute the initial idea of the slave trade to the virtuous Las Casas, bishop of Chiapa, who allegedly saw in the importation of African people a way to relieve the indigenous Indians and convert idolatrous peoples to Christianity. Las Casas does indeed seem to have recommended the importation of African people, but the initiative for this trade did not come from him. The Portuguese had already been engaged in the trade long before. Regardless, the trade in African people soon reached a [716] considerable scale. The companies that were initially granted exclusive trading rights in the colonies also sought—and obtained—exclusive privileges over the slave trade. Not only was this monopoly granted to them, but subsidies were also added, calculated per head of imported slaves. In France, the Senegal and Guinea companies obtained a subsidy of thirteen livres per head, with the condition that the first company import two thousand slaves annually and the second one thousand into the American colonies. At the Treaty of Utrecht, England secured the right to import slaves into the Spanish colonies, a privilege considered one of the most significant advantages it gained from the treaty.

In France, the honor of initiating the movement against the enslavement of African people belongs to the philosophers and economists of the eighteenth century—Turgot, Montesquieu, Raynal, Condorcet. In England, the movement against slavery arose around the same time among the dissenting Protestant sects, particularly the Quakers. In both countries, as well as in some of the newly independent states of North America, generous and passionate minds endeavored to prove—some by invoking natural law and political economy, others by appealing to religion—that African slavery was unjust, harmful, and anti-Christian. At first, they were few, subjected to the most violent attacks, and hunted like wild animals in slave-holding regions. However, over time, abolitionists succeeded in securing formal adherence to their principles from most civilized nations and gaining their—though often poorly informed—support for the abolitionist cause.

We do not intend to recount here the history of efforts made to abolish the enslavement of African people. We shall confine ourselves to examining, from an economic perspective, the methods employed in this great humanitarian endeavor and assessing whether they were the best ones that could have been chosen.

Two principal measures have been taken to date in the effort to abolish slavery:

1. The prohibition of the transport and external trade of slaves.
2. The abolition of slavery in the colonies of certain nations, particularly England and France.

Let us examine the results of these two measures.

The United States and France both claim the honor of initiating the abolition of the slave trade before England. The state of Virginia prohibited it as early as 1776, followed by eleven other states of the Union between 1776 and 1782. However, this prohibition was later revoked in South Carolina, which imported approximately 20,000 slaves from 1803 to 1808. France abolished the slave trade and slavery during its first revolution, but both were reinstated under the empire. England renounced the trade in 1807, thanks to the philanthropic efforts of Wilberforce, Clarkson, Granville Sharp, and Charles Fox. Since then, England has been the driving force behind the great crusade for African liberation. Under its active influence, the sovereigns of Europe agreed in 1814 to unite their efforts to end the slave trade, and successive treaties were concluded among civilized nations to make the suppression of this infamous commerce more effective. Naval patrols were established along the African coast to hunt down slave traders, with England, France, and the United States participating. England went further: it sought to establish an exception to maritime law specifically for the suppression of the slave trade. It demanded that slave traders be treated as pirates and subjected to the right of search, even when flying the flag of a foreign nation. The French government had agreed to this request, but opposition groups suspected this right of search to be another cunning maneuver by perfidious Albion, and the treaty was only adopted after modifications that significantly restricted its scope.

A sad thing to say, however! Despite nearly half a century of efforts aimed at suppressing the slave trade, this odious commerce has not suffered any significant reduction. Slave traders have defied prohibitions, evaded naval patrols, and the trade in African people has remained a flourishing business, even though it has everywhere—except in Africa itself—become an illicit trade. This can be judged by the following table of slave imports from Africa to America, from 1788 to 1840:

[insert table from p. 716 - use image because it is very wide??]

[717]

The following table presents the exports and imports from 1840 to 1848: [12]

[insert table]

By adding up these figures, we find that from 1807, the year of the abolition of the slave trade in England, until 1819, the year naval patrols were established, 2,290,000 people were taken from the African coast. Of this number, 680,000 were sent to Brazil, 615,000 to the Spanish colonies, and 562,000 to other countries. The loss during the voyage amounted to 433,000. From 1819 to 1847, the number of African people exported reached 2,758,506, distributed as follows: Brazil, 1,121,800; Spanish colonies, 831,027; losses, 688,299; captured, 117,380.

The totals over forty years are as follows: enslaved individuals imported to Brazil, 1,801,800; to the Spanish colonies, 1,446,027; to other countries, 562,000; losses during the voyage, 1,121,299; captured since 1819, 117,380. This results in a total of 5,048,506 victims of the slave trade since its prohibition. These figures demonstrate how little the measures taken to prevent the transportation of slaves from the African coast have achieved their intended goal.

That is not all. Not only did the prohibition of the slave trade and the measures implemented to enforce it fail to stop this odious traffic, but they also resulted in exacerbating the suffering of its victims. Before the prohibition, the African people being transported were generally well-treated during the voyage, as slave traders had an interest in ensuring their "merchandise" arrived in good condition at its destination. However, as soon as the laws suppressing the trade were enforced, all the precautions taken to provide some comfort to those being transported disappeared. The slave traders then had only one concern: evading the naval patrols. To achieve this, they minimized the space allocated to their human cargo and only loaded the bare minimum of water and food necessary for survival. As can be seen from the figures above, the result was an 11% increase in the loss of cargo. This rise in losses is explained by the horrific suffering inflicted by the conditions of the trade, driven by the greed of the slavers. Reports from the Society for the Abolition of Slavery are filled with accounts of their tortures; there is no shortage of documentation. We limit ourselves to quoting a few passages from the testimony of Dr. Cliffe, an American who participated in the operations of the slave trade and was in a position to observe all its horrors:

"The slaves," says Dr. Cliffe, "are piled together haphazardly, lying on their sides in a confused mass of arms, heads, and legs, intertwined with one another, so that it is difficult for one of them to move without the entire group shifting as well. On the same ship, sometimes two or three decks are constructed, crammed with slaves, with a height of no more than a foot and a half or even a single foot. They are given just enough space to lie down, flattened like some sticky insect; but even a child would be unable to sit up in these long, compartmentalized coffins. One could say they are stacked like bundles of merchandise or books on library shelves. They are fed by a man who lowers a calabash of water and a morsel of food to them. A small number, those who appear the most exhausted, are hoisted onto the deck for fresh air. Before the increased severity of our laws, they were fed on deck in successive groups; but today, even this slight alleviation is denied them. In the past, slave traders brought a surgeon with them; today, no respectable medical professional would accompany them. Ships sometimes lose more than half of their cargo, and there are even instances of a ship carrying 160 captives where only 16 survived the voyage. Nothing can truly convey the suffering these wretched people endure, especially due to the lack of water. Since having large quantities of water and barrels on board exposes slave traders to confiscation, they have calculated with odious precision that by rationing each individual to the amount of water contained in a teacup once every three days, they can keep them barely alive. They therefore limit their supplies of fresh water to just enough to prevent the captives from dying of thirst. Nothing can also adequately describe the appalling filth [718] on a ship carrying slaves. Crammed and essentially packed into place as they are," says Dr. Cliffe, "it becomes nearly impossible to clean the ship, which is often abandoned because there is no Hercules bold enough to clean these new Augean stables. Even ships that have been purified retain a particularly acrid and fetid odor, revealing their original purpose. I recognized that a vessel sailing along the African coast had been used for the slave trade by the unmistakable stench that emanated from it. It is certain that if a white man were plunged into the atmosphere in which these wretches live, he would be immediately asphyxiated."

Dr. Cliffe then describes the condition of a cargo of African people at the time of disembarkation:

"The kneecaps of these unfortunate people," he says, "have the appearance of a bare skull. Their arms are stripped of all muscular flesh—it is simply bone covered with skin. Their abdomens are swollen and grotesquely distended. They must be carried off the ship in someone’s arms because they are unable to walk. Having not stood upright for one or two months, their muscles have weakened to the point that they can no longer support their bodies. Their expression is vacant, bewildered, and one could say that they have descended to the last degree of degradation, beyond which there is nothing but the brute. Many are covered in bruises, large ulcers, and deeply repulsive skin diseases, while the chique burrows through their epidermis and deep into their flesh, creating its horrific refuge."

According to Dr. Cliffe, in order to deliver 65,000 African people to Brazil, it is necessary to seize 100,000 from the African coast. Of these 65,000, it is common for 3,000, 4,000, or even 5,000 to die within two months of their arrival. [13]

Other testimonies, collected in the reports of the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, confirm that Dr. Cliffe's deposition is in no way exaggerated.

How is it, then, that the measures taken to suppress the slave trade have failed to put an end to such an abominable traffic? This fact is explained by the considerable profits generated by the trade in African people—profits that the very prohibition of the trade has, paradoxically, increased enormously.

Before the trade was outlawed, the operations of slave traders yielded profits of 20 to 30 percent at most. Since the trade became a smuggling business, [14] the profits have frequently risen to 200 or even 300 percent. This increase is due, first, to the decline in competition among the capitalists and laborers who previously engaged in the trade. As the trade became condemned by public conscience and pursued by law, honest entrepreneurs and capitalists withdrew from it. Only the least scrupulous entrepreneurs and capitalists continued, and the withdrawal of their more conscientious competitors naturally increased their profits. Secondly, the ever-growing demand for tropical goods in Europe over the past sixty years—sugar, coffee, tobacco, cotton—caused a corresponding rise in the demand for labor in the colonies. Slave traders thus benefited both from the discoveries of Watt and Arkwright in England and from the liberalization of labor in France. They even profited from the laws enacted against their trade, inspired by the apostles of the abolition of slavery, just as usurers have profited from laws against usury. [15]

The slave trade has thus withstood all attempts to eradicate it. In one of its recent reports, the Society for the Abolition of Slavery was forced to acknowledge that "the extent and activity of the slave trade, though affected to some degree by the prohibition, have nonetheless continued to be governed by the demand for products of slave labor in European markets."

Moreover, England quickly realized that prohibiting the trade would be insufficient to achieve the abolition of slavery. The philanthropists who had taken up the cause of the African people then sought to persuade the government to set a great example for the world by emancipating the slaves in its colonies. The government resisted for a long time, but the abolition of slavery had become the passionate cause of the English people, and ultimately, it had to yield to public opinion.

Ten years were devoted to preparing for emancipation. On May 15, 1823, Mr. Fowell Buxton, acting on the wishes of his illustrious colleague Mr. Wilberforce, presented a proposal to Parliament regarding the abolition of slavery. Mr. Canning amended Buxton's motion, and Parliament decided that measures would be taken to improve the moral condition of African people and prepare them for freedom. In a circular dated July 9, 1823, Lord Bathurst communicated these resolutions to the colonial legislatures and instructed them to comply. However, the intentions of the British government met with strong resistance from colonial plantation owners. The preparatory measures recommended in Lord Bathurst's circular were either ignored or poorly implemented. In 1831, the government decided to move forward regardless and took a first step toward general emancipation by freeing the slaves on Crown lands. Finally, on May 18, 1833, Lord Stanley introduced a bill in the British Parliament for the abolition of slavery. Adopted by the House of Commons on June 12, 1833, and by the House of Lords on the night of June 25, the bill was sanctioned by the Crown on August 28.

Here were the provisions of the Emancipation Act:

I. A compensation of £20 million was granted to slave owners. 1859.II. Slaves aged six years and older, as of August 1, 1834, were reclassified as apprentice laborers. They were divided into three categories:

[719]

Rural apprentice laborers tied to the land; 1862.Rural apprentice laborers not tied to the land; 1863.Non-rural apprentice laborers.

A six-year apprenticeship was imposed on the first two classes and a four-year apprenticeship on the third, starting from August 1, 1834. The masters retained the right to the labor of their former slaves-turned-apprentices, provided they took responsibility for their upkeep.

The amount of labor required from an apprentice was limited to 45 hours per week.

African workers were given the option to buy their remaining years of required labor from their masters.

We will not detail the secondary provisions.

Thus, £20 million paid in cash, plus the right to the labor of the enslaved population for a period of four to six years—this was the compensation granted to colonial slaveholders.

The enslaved population in British territories subject to the Emancipation Act numbered 780,933 individuals. Calculating their value based on the average sale prices from 1823 to 1830—at a rate of 1,400 francs per head—yields a total of 1,132,043,668 francs. The financial compensation, amounting to 500 million francs (or 635 francs 61 centimes per person), represented approximately 3/7 of the total value of the population which was bought back.

Here is the breakdown of the number of emancipated slaves in the West Indies, Mauritius, and the Cape, along with the price paid per head and the total compensation amount:

[insert table]

These considerable differences in the value of slaves arose from the fact that their transport from colony to colony had been prohibited. As a result, in colonies where labor was most in demand, the price of African workers was significantly higher than in others. The legal restriction on the free movement of labor prevented prices from equalizing.

The compensation granted in the form of labor was intended to cover the remaining four-sevenths of the value. It is estimated that an enslaved generation in the British West Indies could provide an average of 7 ¼ years of labor. By granting planters the right to the labor of the generation which had been bought back for a period of four and six years, they were thus provided with more than 4/7 of its value, meaning they were generously compensated for their property.

However, this arrangement, which seemed to satisfy all parties, ultimately satisfied no one. The African people, who had expected immediate freedom, grew impatient under the apprenticeship system. Some apprentices paid truly exorbitant prices to buy their freedom—some as much as 3,000 to 4,000 francs for a single year of liberty. In Jamaica, from August 1, 1834, to August 1, 1838, the total amount of such transactions reached 300,000 dollars (1,620,000 francs). The plantation owners, in turn, found themselves subjected to the strict supervision of government agents and soon grew weary of the new system. After four years, they generally decided to relinquish the remaining two years of apprenticeship still owed by rural apprentices. Thus, August 1, 1838, became a grand day of celebration in the West Indies and other slave-holding colonies of Great Britain. Unfortunately, the celebration was short-lived—at least for the plantation owners. Once free, most of the emancipated refused to return to the plantations. Some took to cultivating uncultivated lands, while others turned to various trades. Substantial wages had to be offered to persuade those who remained to return to the fields. The daily wage fluctuated in an entirely unprecedented manner—during harvest periods, it reached an extraordinary level, rising as high as 5, 10, and even 15 francs, so great was the demand and so limited was the supply. Within a few months, a large number of plantations had to be abandoned due to a lack of labor, and sugar production declined by more than one-third. Conversely, due to this very disaster, sugar production increased significantly in the East Indies.

Here is the table of sugar imports from British territories into England before and after emancipation:

[insert table]

During the period from 1827 to 1831, the West Indies supplied 88 percent of the total colonial sugar imported into England; during the period from 1842 to 1846, they provided only [720] 57 percent. Consequently, the importation of British goods into these colonies experienced a significant decline. This can be seen in the following table of imports from the metropole into the British possessions.

[insert table]

[make this also a table**??**]

The increase in imports from North America, from 1827-31 to 1842-46, was 63 percent;

for the African possessions, 107 percent;

for the East Indies, from 1832-36 to 1842-46, 90 percent;

for Australia, 219 percent.

In contrast, in the West Indies, there was a 17 percent decrease. [16]

These figures demonstrate how disastrous emancipation was for the material prosperity of the West Indies. Guiana, Jamaica, and Trinidad were among the colonies that suffered the most. In Guiana, the value of many properties fell to almost nothing. Elsewhere, such as in Barbados and Antigua, where the population was denser than in Guiana, the damages were significantly less severe. Finally, in Mauritius, production was maintained thanks to the importation of coulis from India (See EMIGRATION).

It is important to note that the metropole bore a double burden due to emancipation: not only did it generously pay a sum of 500 million francs to compensate for the loss of slaves, but it also suffered a considerable surtax on sugar consumption from 1834 to 1847 due to the decline in colonial sugar production caused by emancipation (See the table above, A). It was only in 1847 that the price of sugar fell back to its pre-emancipation level, and this reduction occurred only after the reform of the sugar tariff in 1846. From the perspective of the economic prosperity of the colonies and the interests of the metropole, English emancipation was therefore a disastrous operation.

Other nations had preceded England on the path to abolition, while others followed. [17] France was among the first to take the initiative on this great measure at the end of the previous century; however, Bonaparte erased this achievement by reinstating slavery along with the slave trade and by attempting—unsuccessfully—to regain control over emancipated Saint-Domingue. Under the July Monarchy, the abolitionist movement regained momentum with renewed energy. For a long time, colonial landowners, wielding significant influence, managed to stave off the threat looming over them. But in 1845, the abolitionists won a decisive victory. A law was enacted allowing slaves to legally accumulate a peculium (personal savings) and purchase their freedom—even against their master’s will—using those savings. This law, though fraught with practical difficulties, marked the first step toward emancipation, though it was only in force for a short time. The Revolution of 1848 followed, leading to the immediate abolition of slavery in French possessions (Decree of the Provisional Government, April 27, confirmed by another decree of the National Assembly, September 16). The compensation to be paid to the colonists was determined by another decree on April 30, 1849. The same economic consequences observed in British territories following emancipation reappeared in French colonies. There was a shortage of labor for plantations, sugar production declined, and the importation of national goods into the colonies decreased. The deficit in colonial sugar production was largely offset by an increase in beet sugar production, but consumers still had to bear the burden of price increases caused by emancipation, just as in England. Likewise, the French government belatedly intervened to aid consumers by modifying the sugar tariff (See SUGAR). It lowered the surtax on foreign sugars, but at the same time, it sought to protect colonial sugar from beet sugar through a differential tariff. In spite of this protective measure, the prosperity of the colonies has yet to recover. A decree issued on February 18, 1852, was intended to encourage free labor immigration to compensate for the shortage of emancipated African laborers.

Thus, in both France and England, emancipation proved to be a poor economic decision. It placed a burden

1. on the taxpayers of the metropole, who had to fund the colonial compensation payments;
2. on the consumers of sugar, who were forced to pay higher prices due to emancipation;
3. and on the colonists, [721] for whom this double compensation did not adequately offset the losses they suffered due to the collapse of the plantation system.

In return, freedom was granted to one million human beings, and certainly, we would not claim that this price was too high—if only emancipation had not resulted in an equal or even greater expansion of slavery elsewhere. Indeed, as the demand for tropical goods—especially sugar—continued to rise in Europe, while production declined in emancipated colonies, sugar cultivation expanded dramatically in Brazil and Cuba, where slavery remained legal. The slave trade, which had been sluggish between 1830 and 1835, revived as soon as the economic impact of emancipation in British colonies became evident. In a short time, the exportation of slaves from the African coast doubled. Millions of these unfortunate people were forced to work in the new plantations of Brazil and Cuba, which replaced the ruined sugar industries of the British West Indies. In 1792, the enslaved population of Cuba was estimated at 84,000 individuals; by 1817, it had reached 199,000; by 1827, 286,000; and by 1843, it had surged to 430,000, due to extraordinary rate of importation from Africa. In Brazil, the increase in the enslaved population was even greater. Thus, the emancipation that England and France achieved at great cost and effort in their colonies resulted only in a simple displacement [18] of slavery, which worked to the benefit of nations least receptive to the principles of justice and humanity. A lamentable outcome for such a noble and generous undertaking!

This consequence was not lost on the abolitionists; they made every effort to combat it. As soon as they realized that slave-produced sugar from Brazil and Cuba was replacing sugar from emancipated colonies, they called for differential tariffs favoring "free-grown" sugar. Sir Robert Peel welcomed their demand, which aligned with the policy that had been followed in the fight against slavery. Before December 10, 1844, colonial sugar was taxed at 24 shillings per hundredweight, while foreign sugar—regardless of origin—was taxed at 63 shillings. Sir Robert Peel initially maintained these duties but created a new category for foreign sugar produced by free labor, taxing it at only 34 shillings. Five months later, on February 15, 1845, he went further: he reduced the tax on colonial sugar to 14 shillings 4 pence, lowered the tax on free-grown foreign sugar to 23 shillings 4 pence, while maintaining the tax on slave-produced sugar at 63 shillings. But due to limited supplies from both the colonies and free-labor countries, sugar prices remained high, leading to the abandonment of the distinction between free-grown and slave-grown sugar the following year. Under the Sugar Act, proposed by Lord John Russell’s government and passed by Parliament in August 1846, the tax on colonial sugar was kept at 14 shillings, while the tax on foreign sugar from all sources was reduced to 21 shillings. The law also stipulated that duties on foreign sugar would gradually decrease until they matched those on colonial sugar, achieving full equalization by July 5, 1854.

We have just mentioned that this law, which was a new victory for the principle of free trade, was fiercely attacked by abolitionists, and rightly so, for it directly contradicted the philanthropic measures that had been taken up to that point to secure the emancipation of the African race. What, indeed, had been England’s goal in spending vast sums since 1819 on the suppression of the slave trade? It had sought to prevent the increase of the African enslaved population in America. What had been its goal in spending 500 million francs to emancipate the slaves in its colonies? It had aimed to reduce the number of enslaved African people. And yet, by abolishing the prohibitive tariff that had prevented slave-grown sugar from entering the British market, what was it doing? It was expanding the market for products made by slave labor, encouraging the establishment of new plantations in Brazil and Cuba, and granting a subsidy to the slave trade and to slavery itself. In the name of free trade, it was undoing what it had previously done in the name of abolishing slavery.

Thus, the parliamentary debate on this issue was one of the most heated. The abolitionists easily demonstrated that lowering the tariff would act as a direct subsidy for sugar production in slaveholding countries; but their opponents, particularly Mr. Macaulay, argued even more convincingly how absurd and harmful it was to maintain such a prohibition.

"You wish," they said, "to prevent the consumption of slave-grown sugar in England; why then do you allow it to be refined here? Is it not just as culpable to refine sugar produced by slave labor for the consumption of Belgians, French, and Germans as it is to consume it oneself? Why do you not also call for the prohibition of cotton produced by slave labor in the United States, in order to favor the production of free-labor cotton? One cannot enter halfway into this path without being illogical and absurd; one cannot enter fully into it without causing the ruin of the country's most flourishing industries. And what has been the result so far of the near-prohibition of slave-grown sugar in England? It has maintained sugar prices at an exorbitant level and therefore restricted consumption, to the great detriment of both consumers and the treasury. As for slave-grown sugar, it easily enters the continent, [722] replacing the free-labor sugar that is exported to us to take advantage of the differential tariff, and which is then sold to us at a monopoly price."

The abolitionists replied, in truth, that the high price England was willing to pay temporarily for free-labor sugar could not fail to stimulate its production and, consequently, lower its price; that in the end, the country would be rewarded for the sacrifices it had generously made for the abolition of slavery. But there remained the issue of effectively preventing fraud, as well as the question of whether the government had the right to indefinitely tax sugar consumers in order to prevent the expansion of slavery. Parliament, siding with the advocates of free trade, refused to continue favoring free-labor sugar over slave-grown sugar, and tariff equality was established.

The result of this measure was, as expected, a progressive increase in foreign sugar imports. In 1844, under the prohibitive tariff of 63 shillings, foreign sugar consumption in the British Isles was only 99 hundredweight; it rose to 77,307 hundredweight in 1845, to 602,739 in 1846, to 974,019 in 1847, and reached 1,220,964 in 1848. The largest share of these imports came from Brazil and Cuba. Alarmed by this outcome, Parliament slightly raised the tariff again in 1848 (XI and XII, Victoria, Chapter 97), and imports fell to 496,510 hundredweight in 1849.

What, however, did the measure taken in 1846 prove? Did it demonstrate that the British government was abandoning the cause of abolition? No, it simply showed that people in England were beginning to realize that the policy followed until then had been flawed, and they refused to pursue it further. Today, public opinion has taken another step forward: some of its most influential voices, notably The Times and The Economist, are urging the government to go even further and to abolish the naval patrols established to prevent the slave trade. Is it not absurd, indeed, to continue obstructing the trade in slaves while, at the same time, encouraging their importation and proliferation in America by lowering the tariff on slave-grown sugar?

§2. The Current Condition of African Enslaved People — The State of the Slavery Question

Despite the generous, yet economically misguided, efforts made by England, France, and several other nations to achieve the abolition of slavery, the number of slaves belonging to the African race has continued to increase. According to one of the latest reports from the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, the current estimates are as follows:

	Slaves
United States (1850 census)	3,178,000
Brazil	3,250,000
Spanish colonies	900,000
Dutch colonies	85,000
South American republics	140,000
African coastal settlements	30,000
Total:	7,883,000

At the beginning of the century, the Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico had barely 100,000 slaves; Brazil had only an insignificant number, and the United States possessed just 892,000. Including those enslaved in the English and French colonies, they accounted for at most a third of the number of African people now reduced to servitude on the American continent. This enormous expansion of slavery over the past half-century, despite all efforts made toward the emancipation of the African race, has been caused by the increasing consumption of tropical goods in the civilized world. As the Society for the Abolition of Slavery observed with despair, it is the demand for the products of slave labor in European markets that has been the constant regulator of slavery, and this demand has continued to grow under the influence of the discovery of steam power and the spinning machine, the rise of industrial freedom, and more recently, the progress of free trade.

Has slavery at least become more humane as it has expanded? Are enslaved African people better treated today than the enslaved of antiquity, or than African people themselves were a century or two ago? In this regard, one must not be under any illusions. Consulting all the documents published on the question of slavery—investigations, travelers' accounts, and laws concerning the regulation of slaves—one is convinced that African people are treated today as they were three centuries ago, just as slaves were in Greece and Rome. There is even worse. Just as the measures taken against the slave trade have aggravated beyond expression the plight of African people transported to America, the emancipation of slaves in certain colonies and the abolitionist movements in the United States have made the conditions of those still subjected to slavery even harsher. To the old rigors of the plantation discipline have been added new ones, intended to prevent escapes made easier by abolitionist propaganda, which has become more dangerous.

A few years ago, the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society addressed a series of questions to the American Society regarding the state of slavery in the United States. The American Society promptly gathered all the necessary documents to respond and compiled them into a volume containing details so cruelly degrading to human nature that they seem borrowed from the legends of primitive barbarism rather than from the history of a Christian and civilized people in the nineteenth century. Yet the authors of this investigation neither invented nor exaggerated anything; they merely reported facts contained in official documents or collected from newspapers in slave-holding states. From the volume they published, we extract some characteristic information about the economic organization of [723] slavery and the condition of slaves in the United States. [19]

Slavery currently exists in the United States in fourteen states: Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas. The slave states are divided into two categories: producing states and consuming states. In the former, slaves are raised; in the latter, they are put to work cultivating the land. The number of slaves transported annually from the breeding states to the consuming states is estimated at about 80,000.

The breeding states are Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri. The land in these states is not suited for large-scale sugar and cotton plantations, and the crops that are cultivated—tobacco, hemp, and cereals—require comparatively fewer workers. As a result, slaves there are primarily bred for exportation. The raising of this particular kind of livestock has become an important branch of production. Slave breeders have organized it on an immense scale. Not only do they seek to develop it in proportion to the increasing demand from the Southern states, but they also pay particular attention to improving their products. Having observed that mulattoes sell for higher prices than African people, they have encouraged racial mixing, even offering incentives for it. "The best blood of Virginia flows in the veins of slaves," says one of the witnesses cited in the investigation, R. M. Paxton, "and one frequently encounters slaves who are entirely white. It takes an expert to distinguish them from those of pure white descent." This is evidenced by an advertisement, copied verbatim from a Southern newspaper, where such notices are frequently found:

"A reward of 100 dollars will be given to anyone who returns my enslaved man, Edmond Kennedy. He has straight hair and skin so white that one would believe he does not have a drop of African blood in his veins. He has already been captured but managed to secure his release by passing as a white man."

"Richmond, Virginia – Anderson Bowles."

The breeding of slaves generally yields high profits. According to the testimony of those involved in the trade, no property is more lucrative than that of young enslaved women when they are healthy and fertile. In the eyes of the breeders, fertility is naturally regarded as the most valuable of virtues, while sterility, on the other hand, is sometimes considered a crime. Childless enslaved women are whipped; mothers whose children die are also whipped. [20] The average value of an adult slave is about 600 dollars. However, the price of slaves is subject to considerable fluctuations: these living tools of production [21] are sold at higher or lower prices depending on the state of the cotton and sugar markets. When these commodities are in high demand, the price of slaves rises; when they are less sought after, slaves are sold cheaply. Like all other producers, slave breeders strive to expand their markets and protect themselves from foreign competition. It was the slave breeders of Virginia and North Carolina who were the most ardent supporters of the annexation of Texas and who, on every occasion, have been the most vigorous opponents of the importation of African people.

The trade in slaves is no less profitable than their breeding. Two classes of individuals are involved in this traffic: capitalists who own large establishments in Washington, Alexandria, Baltimore, Norfolk, Richmond, etc., and agents or brokers who purchase slaves from plantations. The wholesale trade in slaves is regarded as just as honorable as any other business: some of the most notable men in the United States, including magistrates and members of the clergy, invest their capital in it without any scruples. The late President Jackson, for instance, used to buy shipments of slaves in the North to resell them in the South. The secondary agents and brokers, however, have a rather bad reputation. These brokers periodically visit plantations to make their purchases. In doing so, they pay no attention to the family ties or emotional bonds that may exist among slaves. Children are commonly separated from their mothers because they have almost no market value in the South; they are only transported there once they have reached a greater part of their growth and physical strength. After being purchased from the plantations, slaves are sent in detachments toward their destination; state prisons serve as warehouses, and until recently, a part of the national prison in Washington was designated for this use. The main traders also own private warehouses, which are solidly built prisons, half fortresses and half stables. From these warehouses, slaves are transported southward.

There are three principal modes [724]] of transport:

1. by coastal ships along the shore to New Orleans or to intermediate ports;
2. by steamboats along the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to New Orleans;
3. by land.

The last mode of transport is the most arduous. Slaves, chained in pairs, are arranged in long lines and escorted by guards armed to the teeth, carrying long sticks in their hands. Upon arrival, the slaves are taken to the market and put up for sale. They are sold individually or in lots, and auctions are the usual method of sale. There is no need to add that the internal slave trade is entirely unrestricted.

It is primarily in South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama that slaves imported from Virginia and the other breeding states are consumed. They are mainly employed in the cultivation of cotton and sugar. The plantations typically cover several thousand acres of land and are worked by several hundred slaves. Most of the owners of these vast estates are content to collect the revenues and entrust all management to their overseers and foremen. It is easy to see that this system is not favorable to the slaves: the foremen, drawn from the lower ranks of the white population, are not known for their humanity; besides, it is not in their interest to be humane. Their reputation depends on the productivity of the plantation, and their salary is determined by that reputation. In order to obtain good yields, they must extract the maximum amount of labor from the smallest number of enslaved workers.

According to the documents before us, [22] the working hours in the Southern states are considerably longer than in most other slave-holding countries. In summer, the average is 15 hours per day and 14 in winter, and as a result, slaves quickly succumb under the strain. The average lifespan of a slave imported to the South does not exceed four or five years; it is estimated that the annual loss on a slave plantation is 2.5 percent. This excessive labor, imposed on women as well as men, hinders reproduction. Slavery would soon disappear from the breeding states due to the natural extinction of the enslaved population if it were not constantly replenished by imports from those states. Poor nutrition, inadequate clothing, the unhealthy conditions of the miserable huts where slaves live in crowded squalor, and the cruel treatment they endure further contribute to increasing loss on plantations. Few plantation owners are willing to pay the cost of a doctor for their slaves. One of them, Colonel Robert Watkins of Alabama, the owner of about 300 slaves, after employing a doctor for some time, dismissed him on the grounds that it would cost him less to lose a few more slaves than to keep a physician on staff.

Nevertheless, the question of whether it is preferable to overwork slaves or to conserve their strength has been debated many times; but it seems that the more humane solution has never been considered the most economical. The advocates of extreme labor argue that it is difficult to find additional workers during harvest season and that elderly slaves become a burden on the plantations. They also claim that slaves would be more inclined to rebel if they were given lighter workloads.

The system we have just described is maintained, as one might suppose, only through terror. Slaves are subjected to a draconian discipline and are mercilessly whipped for the slightest infraction. They are forbidden to wander out of sight of the plantation, and they are also strictly prohibited from gathering outside of working hours under the harshest penalties. Each plantation has its own particular code of punishment and its own methods of torture: in some places, rebellious slaves are forced to wear collars like farm dogs; in others, they are branded on the cheek with a hot iron; elsewhere, their kneecaps are crushed with a tourniquet. One of the most common punishments inflicted on escaped slaves is the extraction of their front teeth. However, escapes are frequent, especially since the establishment of railroads. Plantation owners hunt down runaways with dogs trained specifically to track African fugitives; the training of these animals has become a lucrative trade. The hunters have no qualms about shooting at the runaways, although they take care not to break any limbs, so as not to diminish their market value too much. [23]

The legislatures of individual states have, in truth, enacted various laws to protect slaves from the cruelty of their masters; but these laws are generally regarded as ineffective. Moreover, they are full of loopholes and exceptions. For instance, a few years ago, the legislature of North Carolina decreed that the premeditated murder of a slave would be punished in the same way as the murder of a free man; but the final article of the decree significantly softened this severity.

[725]

"However," we read in the text, "this act shall not be applicable to the murder of a slave placed outside the protection of the law by virtue of any act of the assembly of this state, nor to a slave killed while resisting the orders of his overseer or master, nor to a slave who dies while undergoing moderate correction."

The legislation of the Southern states establishes a great disparity in penalties between the crimes of slaves and those of free men. In his Sketch of the Laws of Slavery, Judge Stroud states that under the laws of Virginia, there are seventy-one crimes for which slaves are punished with the death penalty, while white people committing the same crimes are only subject to imprisonment. In South Carolina, slaves are executed for nine crimes that do not carry the death penalty for white people; in Kentucky for seven; in Georgia for six. It cannot even be said that social customs are better than the law itself. When a slave wounds or kills a white person, lynch law is commonly applied in the most brutal manner. The slave is tied to the base of a tree, surrounded by bundles of wood, and burned alive without any form of trial.

It is almost unnecessary to add that slaves receive no education. In several states, the education of slaves is explicitly prohibited by law, and any attempt in this regard is severely punished. A South Carolina law, passed in 1800, authorizes the infliction of twenty lashes on any slave found at a gathering intended for "mental instruction," even if held in the presence of a white person. Another law imposes a fine of 100 dollars on any individual who teaches a slave to write. A Virginia statute from 1829 declares that any assembly of slaves, or any day or night school where they are taught to read and write, is an illegal gathering, and any law enforcement officer has the right to administer twenty lashes to enslaved individuals found in such an assembly. In North Carolina, the crime of teaching a slave to read or write, or of selling them a book (including the Bible), is punishable by thirty-five lashes if the offender is a free African person and by a fine of 200 dollars if the offender is white. The preamble of this law justifies these penalties in the following manner: "Teaching slaves to read and write tends to stir discontent in their minds and incite disorder and rebellion." In Georgia, if a white person teaches a free or enslaved African person to read and write, they become subject to a fine of 100 dollars and imprisonment for a period determined at the discretion of the court. If the offender is a person of color, whether enslaved or free, they may be whipped and imprisoned at the court's discretion. A father may be whipped for teaching his own child to read. This barbaric law dates to 1829. In Louisiana, the penalty for teaching a slave to read or write is one year of imprisonment. In some of the smaller states, such as Kentucky, the education of slaves is not legally prohibited, but social opposition presents an insurmountable barrier.

Religious instruction fares little better. With few exceptions, the governments of individual states actively obstruct it. In Georgia, any law enforcement officer has the right to dissolve a religious assembly composed of slaves and to administer twenty-five lashes to those present. In South Carolina, no slave may attend a religious gathering before sunrise or after sunset unless the majority of the assembly is white. It is easy to imagine how slaves might be able to determine in advance whether white people will be in the majority at a gathering. In Virginia, all religious gatherings of slaves are strictly prohibited. In Mississippi, the law allows a master to permit his slave to attend a sermon given by a white minister. [24] As a result of these laws in the South, barely one-tenth of the enslaved population has received even the most basic notions of Christianity. The overwhelming majority remain in a state of primitive idolatry. Slave owners, for their part, have generally found willing accomplices among religious ministers. The pulpit has often been used to defend slavery as a divinely sanctioned institution. Southern theologians have produced scholarly dissertations proving that slavery was an institution among the Jews, that the patriarchs owned slaves, and that neither Christ nor his apostles ever spoke out against this form of property. Parish assemblies, synods, and other ecclesiastical bodies have frequently passed resolutions in favor of slavery, claiming in their preambles that they do so to reassure the consciences of church members who have begun to be troubled by the abolitionist preaching coming from the North. One such resolution, issued by the Presbyterian Union of Charleston, reads as follows:

"Resolved, that in the opinion of this church, the ownership of slaves, far from being a sin in the eyes of God, is nowhere condemned in His holy word; that it is in harmony with the examples and precepts of the patriarchs, prophets, and apostles; that it is compatible with the most fraternal sentiments for the well-being of the servants whom God has placed under our charge; and consequently, that those who claim otherwise and who uphold as a fundamental principle in morality and religion that slavery is unjust are proceeding on false principles."

That the interests of the South have silenced the voice of humanity in the matter of slavery; that servitude has appeared in the nineteenth century, and in a Christian country, as hideous as it did in pagan Rome—this, alas, is all too easy to understand. Whenever men believe it to be in their interest to stifle the voice of humanity within themselves, one rarely sees them refrain from doing so. [726]But it is more difficult to comprehend why the Northern states, which were able to abolish slavery because it was not highly profitable, have accepted for so long their complicity in such a system. This fact is due to a variety of circumstances: first, to the supremacy that the political organisation of the Union has granted to the Southern states, which they have sought to maintain at all costs; and second, to the numerous economic interests that tie the North to the South.

"For a long time," we read in the investigation previously cited, "the products of slave labor constituted only a small portion of the national wealth, and slavery remained relatively insignificant. But gradually, the cultivation of cotton and sugar, particularly the former, became the predominant economic interests of the land. The wealth of the South grew at an extraordinary rate, and the men of the North, with the keen love of profit that characterizes them, sought to claim their share of this windfall. Their factories and various commercial ventures flourished through their dealings with the South. Their ambitious sons, from their shrewd lawyers to their even shrewder merchants, went to seek their fortune in the South. Their delicate daughters began to discover that the Northern climate was too harsh for their fragile health, and that they absolutely needed to spend the cold season under a milder sky. The South became the center of attraction for the entire Union. Its estates were the most splendid, its crops the most lucrative, its customs the most hospitable. Southern planters were renowned for their courteous hospitality, their chivalry, as it is called in the North. They became accustomed to hosting, during the winter season, thousands of families fleeing the rigors of the New England climate, and these guests could not help but feel deep gratitude toward their hosts. But it was slavery that allowed the planters to exercise this princely hospitality; it was slavery that provided the South with its resources, its luxury, its refined courtesy, and its chivalrous generosity. It was only natural to extend admiration from the effects to the cause, and so slavery eventually came to be regarded by Southerners and their Northern admirers as 'an indispensable institution.'" [25]

However, this moral numbness of Northern citizens regarding slavery was not destined to last forever. As in England, the abolitionist movement was primarily initiated by dissenting Protestant sects, particularly the Quakers. In 1832, the first abolitionist society was founded in Boston, Massachusetts; at its inception, it had only twelve members. The following year, the American Anti-Slavery Society was established in Philadelphia. But from the outset, the abolitionists found themselves confronted by the formidable coalition of interests vested in slavery. In 1834, their first meeting in New York was broken up by an enraged mob. The most detestable excesses were committed in this anti-abolitionist riot. The crowd ransacked churches, stormed and looted the homes of abolitionists and free African men. Marked for public vengeance, the leaders of the abolitionist movement were forced to flee New York. However, far from being discouraged by the fury of their opponents, the American Anti-Slavery Society intensified its efforts. Before long, it had branches in every free state, organized periodic meetings, funded newspapers, and distributed pamphlets by the thousands. In May 1835, it had 225 branches. By May 1836, it had 527; in May 1837, 1,006; in May 1838, 1,346; in May 1839, 1,650. Each of these abolitionist associations had an average of 80 members, amounting to a total of 132,000 adherents. Since then, the abolitionist movement has continued to grow, and its supporters now number in the hundreds of thousands, if not millions.

At first, American abolitionists directed their efforts toward specific objectives. They demanded the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, where Washington, the capital of the Union, is located, and in the territories under the jurisdiction of Congress; the suppression of the internal slave trade; the rejection of any annexation requests from slave states; and the recognition of Haiti's independence. Additionally, they sought to repeal certain oppressive laws against free African people in the free states and to facilitate escape routes for fugitive slaves to these states or to Canada. Initially met with outrage and disdain—so extreme that it is difficult to comprehend—by the majority of Congress, their demands eventually gained a hearing, becoming the dominant issue of the day. The history of the struggles waged by American abolitionists in Congress would take us too far. Suffice it to say that after vigorously resisting the annexation of new slave states—hence the name Free-Soilers adopted by a faction of them that also became a political party [26] —they failed to prevent the annexation of Texas. However, this annexation, which followed a bloody and costly war waged with the explicit aim of strengthening the South's dominance, aroused deep suspicions in the North. The dissolution of the Union had become imminent two years ago, and had it not been for Henry Clay, who managed to broker a temporary compromise between the two factions, secession might have already taken place. But in all likelihood, this truce will not last long, and unless some unexpected resolution arises that satisfies both sides, the dissolution of the Union will inevitably result from the slavery question.

In the United States, the enslaved population numbered 697,397 in 1790; 892,406 in 1800; 1,190,930 in [727] 1810; 1,536,127 in 1820; 2,007,913 in 1830; 2,486,138 in 1840; and 3,178,055 in 1850. These figures indicate an increase of 28 percent in 1800; 33 percent in 1810; 29 percent in 1820; 31 percent in 1830; 24 percent in 1840; and 29.5 percent in 1850. The importation of people from Africa played a minimal role in this increase, as it had been generally insignificant since 1808. It did resume, however, in Texas, where the shortage of labor made it highly advantageous, and some of the African people imported into Texas were subsequently transported to Louisiana; yet its influence on the overall population growth has remained too negligible to be measured.

In the Spanish colonies and in Brazil, slaves are treated with somewhat less severity than in the United States. This is due, first, to the indifference of the masters, who are less driven by profit than Northern Americans; but more importantly, it is because the continued importation of people from Africa has made labor more abundant in the market, meaning that since masters can acquire a greater number of slaves at a lower cost, they are less inclined to extract the maximum amount of labor from each individual.

Brazil has recently adopted effective measures to prevent the importation of new slaves; however, these measures should be seen much less as a sign of abolitionist progress than as a protectionist strategy. The prohibition of the slave trade in Brazil is nothing more than a subsidy granted to the industry of slave breeders, and its sole effect in Brazil—just as in the United States—will likely be to worsen the condition of slaves.

IV. Conclusion

When one considers the current state of slavery in the world, one is struck by the ineffectiveness of efforts made to abolish it artificially. One is painfully convinced that all attempts by governments in this direction—driven by generous philanthropy—have resulted in consequences diametrically opposed to their intentions. Thus, most governments of the civilized world have united to prevent the transportation of people from Africa to America, yet they have only succeeded in increasing the profits of the slave traders and intensifying the suffering of the trade’s victims. The governments of England and France have abolished slavery in their colonies, but the result of this noble initiative has been to double the number of slaves in Brazil and the Spanish colonies. As sugar production declined in the emancipated colonies, and as the taxpayers of England and France, after bearing the costs of emancipation, were forced to make new sacrifices by overpaying for a commodity they could no longer obtain in sufficient quantity, sugarcane cultivation expanded at a staggering rate in Brazil and Cuba. Hundreds of thousands of people were seized from the African coast, and such were the profits of the trade that the costly naval patrols stationed in the tropics proved powerless to suppress it. In vain did English abolitionists attempt to create artificial barriers to the displacement of slavery by advocating for the maintenance of prohibitive duties on slave-grown sugar and the establishment of preferential duties on free-grown sugar. England had grown weary of a system that had led to so many disasters, and after imposing the heaviest sacrifices upon itself to abolish slavery, it ultimately granted it extraordinary encouragement by indiscriminately lowering import duties on foreign sugars.

What conclusion should be drawn from this deplorable failure of one of the most generous enterprises that honor modern times? That the abolition of slavery is impossible? Not at all. The only conclusion to be made is that governments do not have the power to abolish slavery—something very different from saying that slavery cannot be abolished. The same impotence has already been observed when governments have attempted to alleviate poverty: experience has shown that their well-intended intervention—prompted by a generous but misguided philanthropy—has had the sole effect of expanding and worsening this social affliction. Yet, does this mean that poverty cannot be alleviated?

If abolitionists, instead of incessantly calling for the active intervention of governments in the matter of slavery, had pursued an entirely different approach, they would have achieved far more effective results. Suppose, for example, they had said to governments: You intervene in the question of slavery by providing the slaveholders in your colonies with the military support of the metropole and the exclusive right to its market. Well then! Deprive them of these two advantages that make you their accomplices: cease to grant them the benefit of this dual intervention, and trust us to do the rest! Allow us to rally the opinion of the civilized world against the immorality of slavery! Let us organize a voluntary league to prohibit the consumption of slave-grown sugar! What would have been the outcome?

If the armed intervention of the metropoles had been denied to colonial planters, would they not have been compelled to treat their slaves better for the sake of their own security? Would they not have had an interest in securing their loyalty by granting them increasing degrees of freedom and property? If they had been deprived of the monopoly on the metropolitan market and subjected to competition from other producers—whether free or enslaved—of similar goods, would they not have been strongly stimulated to improve their industry? And how could they achieve this result without increasing the involvement of slaves in production, without granting them a more substantial share in their peculium, and consequently, in their ability to purchase their freedom?

On the other hand, by organizing throughout the civilized world a voluntary league [27] against the consumption of products derived from slave labor, would abolitionists not have encouraged the development of free labor production [728] and thereby vigorously stimulated the transformation of slavery?

Unfortunately, abolitionists, imbued—like most philanthropists—with the errors of the regulatory system, convinced that only government intervention could end slavery, took an entirely different path. They urged governments to adopt prohibitive measures against slavery, but these measures collided with an economic reality of irresistible force: the growing demand for sugar, cotton, and other tropical commodities. The only result was the displacement of slavery, making it even more entrenched. Abolitionists are now beginning to realize that they have taken the wrong path, and they are making efforts to retrace their steps. In England, the Anti-Slavery Society has nearly abandoned the idea of repressing the slave trade and has instead focused its efforts on promoting disuse—the voluntary rejection of products made with slave labor. [28] In the United States, the Free-Soilers now limit their demands to ensuring that slavery cannot be permitted in new states, while also striving to encourage the free production of cotton and sugar. A new development, which we have already mentioned in the article on Emigration, appears to have the potential to significantly aid their efforts: the nascent migration of the Chinese population to the western frontier of the American continent. If this voluntary migration continues to expand, and if Chinese workers engage in the cultivation of tropical commodities in America, as they do in southern China and in the Indian archipelagos, their active and intelligent competition will compel the planters of the Southern states to treat their slaves better, to motivate them with the prospect of peculium and eventual manumission, and ultimately to transition from slave labor to free labor. This is how slavery was abolished in Europe; this is how it may yet be abolished in America.

If there is one well-established economic truth, it is that free labor is superior to slave labor; that a man, no matter how weak or obscured his intelligence may be, produces more and better under the incentive of his own interest than under the incentive of the whip. If the disastrous results of the emancipation of Saint-Domingue, and later of the abolition of slavery in the other colonies of the West Indies, seem at first glance to contradict this truth, a more in-depth examination of the issue ultimately confirms it. It is indeed true that production declined in Saint-Domingue and that this magnificent country is reverting to barbarism, but why? Is it because the African population became free? No! It is primarily because they excluded white people from the higher functions of society—roles for which they themselves were largely unprepared. Similarly, if production declined in the English and French Antilles after emancipation, does this mean that the labor of freed people was less valuable than that of slaves? Not at all. It is simply that this labor was not available in sufficient quantity—that free labor was in short supply on the market, a circumstance that allowed workers to demand higher wages. This observation is so true that in colonies where the African population was densest, and in those where free immigrants could most easily compensate for the labor shortage, the emancipation crisis was barely felt. Once free labor increases in number and is supplied insufficient quantity in the regions naturally suited to the cultivation of sugar, cotton, coffee, and tobacco, slave labor will inevitably disappear under the pressure of competition from a superior form of labour.

One last question is frequently raised regarding slavery: Has slavery been beneficial at certain times and in certain places? Has it contributed to the development of wealth and the progress of civilization? If so, does this mean that some men could rightfully, in the name of the interest of society, reduce others to slavery? Many writers, even among the most religious, answer this question in the affirmative. For our part, we cannot too strongly denounce such a doctrine, which constitutes a deplorable negation of every notion of rights and sound economic reasoning. It is claimed, for example, that the institution of slavery benefited humanity by putting an end to the practice of sacrificing prisoners of war and to primitive cannibalism. But, as Montesquieu rightly points out, did the peoples who practiced slavery not always show themselves to be just as ruthless in war—if not more so—than those who did not enslave others? As for cannibalism, has it not, throughout history, been particularly prevalent in Africa, the very land of slavery? Finally, has slavery itself not become an inexhaustible source of wars and brigandage by transforming the hunting of men [729] into a profitable industry? Another argument used to justify slavery is that the initial lack of tools for production made it indispensable in the early ages of humanity. To support this claim, they cite a famous remark by Aristotle: "If the shuttle moved by itself, we could dispense with slaves." But is it not obvious that slavery was a consequence, not a cause, of the first advances in the technology of production? Before such advances had been made—before a day's labor could yield more than the bare minimum required for a worker’s subsistence—who would have had an interest in providing for the upkeep of slaves? Slavery did not precede the progress of the technology of production; it followed them. History attests that agricultural work was originally carried out by free hands, particularly in Rome. It also attests that slavery everywhere hindered the progress of the technology of production and that only after its disappearance did they resume their improvement. However, even assuming that slavery did facilitate the development of certain material industries, would that be a sufficient reason to legitimize it? Suppose that today machines were invented that allowed the mass production of certain goods at a lower cost, but that the majority of the population refused to use them—would it be just and in the general interest to enslave them in order to force them to do so? Finally, experience itself has invalidated Aristotle's observation, since slavery was abolished in Europe long before the shuttle began to move by itself.

The only case in which slavery could be justified would be this: if an industrious people, continually attacked by savage tribes, had reduced them to servitude in order to protect themselves from aggression. No doubt, such a case could have occurred. But is it not generally the opposite that has happened? Have not barbarians most often enslaved industrious people, rather than the industrious enslaving the barbarians?

Lastly, one might ask whether the enslavement of African people contributed to the growth of wealth in modern times. Without a doubt, it did. But suppose that unscrupulous traffickers—encouraged and subsidized by equally unscrupulous governments—had not imported slaves into America. Suppose that the remarkably fertile lands of the tropical latitudes of the New World had remained the exclusive domain of free men. What would have happened? Given that these lands were particularly suited to the production of certain valuable and increasingly demanded commodities—sugar, coffee, tobacco, cotton—would free laborers from the tropical regions of the Old World not have been irresistibly drawn there, just as those from temperate regions were drawn to the northern latitudes of the New World? Perhaps free migrations would have been slower to develop than the importation of slaves, but in terms of wealth and civilization, would they not have been more fruitful? The Northern states of the American Union, where slavery was nothing more than an insignificant accident, developed later than the slave colonies, but how much more extensive and magnificent was their growth!

If one focuses only on a short period in human history, one might conclude that slavery hastened the development of material wealth in certain societies. But if one takes a broader view, one will be convinced that slavery has ultimately slowed the progress of wealth and civilization. From the perspective of the general and enduring interests of humanity, slavery appears not only as an injustice but also as a harmful economic system, and political economy aligns with philosophy and morality in its condemnation.

G. de Molinari.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Traite et commerce des nègres. Paris, 1704, in-12.

Code noir, or collection of regulations concerning the colonies and the trade of African people. Paris, 1752, 1 vol. in-24; 1767, 1 vol. in-4 and 1 vol. in-18.

An historical account of Guinea, its situation, produce, etc.; with an inquiry into the rise and progress of the slave trade, its nature and lamentable effects. (Historical Account of Guinea; Its Situation, Its Products, etc.; Followed by Research on the Origin and Progress of the Slave Trade, Its Nature, and Its Deplorable Effects) by Anthony Benezet. London, 1772, in-8.

Réflexions sur l'esclavage des nègres, by Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet. (Published under the pseudonym Schwartz.) Paris, Troulté, 1781; other editions, 1788.

Réflexions sur la traite et l'esclavage des noirs. Translated from English by A. Diannyère. 1788.

Report of the Lords of the Committee of Council for Trade, etc. (Report of the Lords of the Committee of the Council on Trade..., Particularly Concerning the Slave Trade, Its Effects on Africa, the West Indies, and the General Commerce of the Kingdom). London, 1789, 4 large folio volumes. "This voluminous compilation, whose content should, however, be received with caution, contains an immense variety of details on the slave trade, their treatment in the colonies, etc." (M. C.)

La cause des esclaves nègres, by A.-M. Frossard. Lyon, 1789, 2 vol. in-8.

Discours sur cette question : Comment l'abolition progressive de la servitude en Europe a-t-elle influé sur le développement des lumières et des richesses des nations ? (Speech on the Question: How Has the Progressive Abolition of Servitude in Europe Influenced the Development of Knowledge and National Wealth?) Work honored by the National Institute, by J.-J. Leuliette. Paris and Versailles, Mme Locard, 1805, in-8.

A Letter on the Abolition of the Slave Trade, etc. (Letter on the Abolition of the Slave Trade) by William Wilberforce. London, 1807, 1 vol. in-8 (see Wilberforce).

Nouvelles réflexions sur la traite des nègres, by J.-C.-L. Simonde de Sismondi. Geneva and Paris, Paschoud, 1815, in-8.

De l'intérêt de la France à l'égard de la traite des nègres, by J.-G.-L. Simonde de Sismondi. The 3rd edition is expanded with Nouvelles réflexions sur la traite des nègres. Geneva and Paris, Paschoud, 1815, in-8.

The History of the Rise, Progress, and Accomplishment of the Abolition of the Slave Trade. (History of the Origin, Progress, and Completion of the Abolition of the Slave Trade) by Thomas Clarkson. London, 1808, 2 vol. in-8; new expanded edition, London, 1808, 1 vol. in-8. "It is well known that Th. Clarkson is one of the most distinguished abolitionists."

The slavery of the British West-India colonies, as it exists both in law and practice, etc. (Slavery in the British West Indies, As It Exists in Law and Practice, etc.) by James Stephen, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. London, 1824-30. 2 vol. in-8.

Discours prononcé dans la chambre des communes d'Angleterre à l'appui de la motion pour l'adoucissement et l'extinction graduelle de l'esclavage dans les colonies anglaises, by J. Buxton, preceded by an introduction on the condition of slaves in these colonies, by Ch. Coquerel, one of the secretaries of the Society. Translated from English, 1824.

De l'esclavage des noirs et de la législation coloniale, by Victor Schœlcher. Paris, Paulin, 1833, 1 vol. in-8.

An Inquiry into the State of Slavery among the Romans. (Research on the State of Slavery Among the Romans) by William Blair. Edinburgh, 1833, 1 vol. in-12. "A small, scholarly work of great merit." (M. C.)

Discours sur la constitution de l'esclavage en Occident pendant les derniers siècles de l'ère païenne, by P. de Saint-Paul, Deputy Prosecutor General in Montpellier. Montpellier, printed by J. Martel, 1837.

Esclavage et traite, by M. Agenor de Gasparin. Paris, Joubert, 1838, 1 vol. in-8. "The author later published an article in Revue des Deux-Mondes (June 1838) titled: Des tentatives d'émancipation dans les colonies."

De l'affranchissement des esclaves et de ses rapports avec la politique actuelle, etc., by the same author. Paris, Joubert, 1839, in-8.

Colonies étrangères et Haïti. Résultats de l'émancipation anglaise, by M. Victor Schœlcher. Paris, Pagnerre, 1839, 2 vol. in-8.

De l'émancipation des esclaves, lettres à M. de Lamartine, by Granier de Cassagnac. Paris, Delloye, 1840, in-8.

The African Slave Trade and Its Remedy. (The Slave Trade and the Means to Remedy It) by M. Fowell-Buxton. London, 1810.

De l'abolition de l'esclavage ancien en Occident; examen des causes principales qui ont concouru à l'extinction de l'esclavage ancien dans l'Europe occidentale, etc., by Ed. Biot. Paris, Jules Renouard et Comp., 1840, in-8.

Exécution de l'ordonnance du 5 janvier 1840 relative à l'instruction religieuse et au patronage des esclaves, exposé sommaire imprimé par ordre du ministre de la marine. 1st part, 1839; 2nd part, 1840 and 1841. Paris, 1841-42, 2 vol.

Colonies françaises. Abolition immédiate de l'esclavage, by M. Victor Schœlcher. Pagnerre, 1 vol. in-8.

Recherches statistiques sur l'esclavage colonial et sur les moyens de le supprimer, by M. Moreau de Jonnès. Paris (Guillaumin), 1842, 1 vol. in-8.

Some account of the trade in slaves from Africa, etc. (On the Slave Trade Since Its Introduction into Modern Europe Until Today, Particularly Regarding the Efforts Made by the French Government for Its Abolition) by James Bandinel. London, 1842, 4 vol. in-8. "A concise and well-written work on the subjects announced in the title." (M. C.)

Questions relatives à l'abolition de l'esclavage ; avis des conseils coloniaux, etc., published by the Minister of the Navy. Paris, Impr. royale, 1843, 1 large vol. in-4.

Commission instituted for the examination of questions relating to slavery and the political constitution of the colonies. Vol. I, Minutes; Vol. II, Report to the Minister of the Navy and Colonies. Paris, 1848, in-4.

Report on colonial questions addressed to the Duke of Broglie, President of the Colonial Commission, following a trip to Guyana during the years 1838 and 1839, by J. Lechevalier. Published by the Minister of the Navy. Paris, Impr. royale, 1843-1844, 2 vol. in-folio.

Proceedings on the abolition of slavery in the English colonies; reports collected by the Department of the Navy and Colonies. Four publications. Paris, Impr. royale, 1840 to 1843, 4 vol. in-8.

Statement of motives, reports, and debates of the Legislative Chambers, containing the laws of July 18 and 19, 1845, concerning the regulation of slaves, etc. Paris, 1845, 1 vol.

Histoire de l'esclavage pendant les deux dernières années, by Victor Schœlcher. Paris, Pagnerre, 1843-46, 2 vol. in-8.

De l'esclavage en général et de l'émancipation des noirs, by M. Castelli, former Apostolic Prefect of Martinique, 1 vol. in-8. 1978.(See Journ. des Écon., vol. IX, p. 390.)

Lettre à M. de Broglie sur les dangers de l'émancipation des noirs, by M. Petit-Baroncourt. Paris, Amyot, 1845, 1 vol. in-18. (See Journ. des Écon., vol. XI, p. 186.)

Situation des esclaves dans les colonies françaises, by M. Bouvellat de Cussac. Paris, Pagnerre, 1845, 1 vol. in-8.

Report on the use of funds allocated since 1839 for the religious and elementary education of African people and the implementation of the laws of July 18 and 19, 1845, concerning the regulation of slaves. Paris, Impr. royale, 1846, 1 vol.

Abolition de l'esclavage dans les colonies françaises, by M. G. de Molinari. Paris, Capelle, 1846.

Discussion of petitions for the complete and immediate abolition of slavery. Sessions of the Chamber of Deputies on April 24, 26, and May 7, 1847. Paris, Duverger, 1847, in-8.

Report on the implementation of the laws of July 18 and 19, 1834, regarding the regulation of slaves and the creation of agricultural establishments through free labor. Paris, 1847, 1 vol.

De l'esclavage et des colonies, by Gustave du Puynode, Doctor of Law. Paris, Joubert, 1847, in-8.

Histoire de l'esclavage dans l'antiquité, preceded by an introduction titled De l'esclavage dans les colonies, by M. H. Wallon. Paris, Dezobry, E. Magdeleine. 1847, 4 vol. in-8.

Du droit à l'oisiveté et de l'organisation du travail servile dans les républiques grecques et romaine, by M. Moreau-Christophe. Paris, Guillaumin et Comp., 1849, 1 vol. in-8.

Annual Report of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, etc. (Rapport annuel de la Société pour l'Abolition de l'Esclavage, etc.). London, printed at the expense of the Society. "The 12th report appeared in 1851, and the first in 1840. These reports contain valuable information on the state of African slavery, the slave trade, and the progress of the abolitionist cause. The drafting of these reports is attributed to Mr. John Scoble, Secretary of the Society."

Anti-Slavery Reporter (weekly newspaper published by the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society).

Also consult:

A. Smith, Wealth of Nations, vol. I, p. 89, 112, 480; vol. II, p. 207, 338 (Guillaumin edition). 1992.Boeckh, Economie politique des Athéniens. 1993.Dureau de la Malle, vol. I, p. 230, Économie politique des Romains. 1994.Charles Comte, Traité de législation (vol. IV). 1995.J.-B. Say and several other economists have also addressed the issue of slavery. 1996.The most recent data on this subject can be found in:

Journ. des Écon., vol. IX, p. 486; XVIII, 197; but especially vol. XX, p. 209; XXI, 152, 396; XXV, 184, 384, 385; XXVI, 58.

Also see the bibliography of the article COLONIES.

Endnotes to Esclavage

[1] Traité de législation, by Charles Comte, vol. III, book V, chap. II, p. 469.

[2] Molinari contrasts here "le peuple" (the common people) and "les grands" (the big and powerful powerful people).

[3] Traité de législation, by C. Comte, vol. IV, book V, chap. VII.

[4] Économie politique des Romains, by Dureau de la Malle, vol. I, p. 266. See also a paper by the scholar Heyne: Opusc. acad., vol. IV, p. 120.

[5] translate??

[6] Économie politique des Athéniens, by Boeckh, vol. I, p. 61.

[7] Ibid., p. 122. The Athenian drachma was worth 0.92 francs. The mina was worth 91.66 francs. The talent was worth 5,500 francs.

[8] Ibid., pp. 114 and 118.

[9] The labor of an slave was valued at only half that of a free person. Économie politique des Romains, by Dureau de la Malle, vol. I, p. 151.

[10] Appian, Bellum Civile, vol. I, p. 7.

[11] (Ed. Note) Molinari uses the term "les nègres" which we have translated as "black people" or "African people??" ??

[12] These tables are taken from British parliamentary documents. They appear in the 10th report of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society.

[13] Testimony of Dr. Cliffe, cited in Journal des Économistes, vol. XXI, p. 154.

[14] (Ed. Note.??) "un commerce de contrebande ."

[15] (Ed. Note.??) Molinari wrote the entry on "Usury" for the DEP.

[16] These two tables are borrowed from a paper by J.-T. Danson on the progress of British colonies from 1827 to 1846. See the analysis of this work in Journal des Économistes, vol. XXV, p. 381.

[17] Here are, in chronological order, the dates of the abolition of slavery since the end of the last century. Slavery was successively abolished: In the United States, in the following states: Vermont (1777), Pennsylvania (1780), Massachusetts (1780), Connecticut (1784), Rhode Island (1784), New Hampshire (1784), New York (1799), and New Jersey (1804). Most South American republics followed these examples: Buenos Aires (1816), Colombia and Chile (1821), Bolivia (1826), Peru, Guatemala, and Montevideo (1828), Mexico (1829), and Uruguay (1843). Slavery was also abolished in the East Indies in 1843, in the Malay Peninsula and Sindh. In 1844, this measure was extended to the Hong Kong establishment. In 1846, Sweden allocated a sum of 30,000 gourdes (250,000 francs) for the redemption of slaves on the small island of Saint-Barthélemy. In 1847, the Pasha of Egypt and the Bey of Tunis decreed the abolition of slavery. Finally, in 1848, France and Denmark emancipated the enslaved populations of their colonies.

[18] (Ed Note??) The idea of "la déplacement" was important in Bastiat's theory Ref??

[19] Slavery and the Internal Slave Trade in the United States of North America, being Replies to Questions Transmitted by the Committee of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, etc. 1 vol. in-8.

[20] The following took place on a plantation containing about one hundred slaves. One day the owner ordered the women into the barn: he then went in among them, whip in hand, and told them he meant to flog them all to death. They began immediately to cry out, "What have I done, massa? What have I done?" He replied, "Damn you! I will let you know what you have done; you don't breed. I have not had a young one from one of you for several months."

A slave on another plantation gave birth to a child, which lived only two or three weeks. After its death, the planter called the woman to him and asked her how she let the child die. He accused her of carelessness and declared that he intended to flog her for it. She explained, with all the feeling of a mother, the circumstances of its death, but her story meant nothing to the savage brutality of her master: she was severely whipped. A healthy four-month-old child was then considered worth one hundred dollars in North Carolina. (Narrative of M. Caulkins, who spent eleven months in North Carolina— American Slavery, p. 35.)

[21] (ED Note.) Molinari says "ces outils vivants de la production".

[22] Slavery and the Internal Slave Trade in the United States of North America.

[23] We have before us several accounts of these kinds of hunts, taken from Southern newspapers, which report the details as our newspapers recount those of hunting harmful animals. We reproduce two as samples:

"A fugitive slave was discovered on Thursday near Washington Falls, in a wooded area where he had dug himself a kind of burrow, the entrance of which was concealed with foliage. When the fugitive realized his hiding place was discovered, he tried to flee; but Mr. Adams and his excellent dogs immediately set out after him, and within minutes, they had succeeded in capturing him. It was a slave who had been on the run for more than a year." (Macon Telegraph.)

"Two days ago, a gentleman from this parish, while hunting slaves, discovered their camp in the swamps of Cat Island. He managed to capture two of them, but the third escaped by swimming. He shot at him and wounded him in the shoulder. Nevertheless, the fugitive continued to swim, until the dogs caught up with him and managed to overpower him." (Chronicle of St. Francisville.)

[24] Jay’s Inquiry, pp. 136-37.

[25] Slavery and the Internal Slave Trade, p. 233.

[26] The program of the Free-Soiler party can be found in the 11th annual report of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, 1850.

[27] (Ed Note??) Molinari would argue along similar lines some 40 years later concerning a "League of Neutral States" to make the outbreak of war less likely in Europe.

[28] In its 10th annual report (1849), the Society's governing committee drew the following conclusions:

1. That the funds recently allocated to suppressing the slave trade should instead be used to develop free production in British India.

2. That the government should press the rulers of Spain and Brazil to enforce the treaties in which they committed to preventing the importation of enslaved Africans.

3. That differential duties should be established in favor of sugar produced by free labor.

4. That abolitionist supporters should henceforth refrain from consuming products of slave labor.

At the same time, a petition was addressed to the Queen by abolitionist women, urging her to set an example of "disuse" of slave labor products. The petitioners reminded the Queen that when the slave trade was still practiced in England, 300,000 individuals had voluntarily pledged to abstain from sugar. The deprivation would be even less now, as it would only require giving preference to "free-grown sugar."

This abolitionist women's petition bore 39,688 signatures. It appears in the second report of the Society for the Abolition of Slavery, p. 24. (Ed. Note??) Another name for "disuse" is "boycott".

Théâtres (Theatres)↩

Source

“Théâtres,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 731-33.

Text

[731]

We are only concerned here with theaters in terms of the specific regulations to which they are subjected. These regulations are among the most complex. In France, they can be summarized as follows: 1. The number of theatrical enterprises is limited; a privilege is required to establish a theater; 2. subsidies are granted to certain theatrical enterprises, either at the expense of taxpayers or at the expense of other enterprises of the same nature; 3. a special tax is levied on theaters; 4. plays are subject to censorship.

This ultra-regulatory regime has existed in France since the very inception of theaters, but it was under Louis XIV that it became formalized and took on its most tyrannical forms. When Louis XIV merged the two troupes that had emerged from the Hôtel de Bourgogne under the title of the Comédie-Française, he granted this privileged enterprise a sort of right of life and death over its rival companies. These competitors were required to submit their plays to its censorship, and the Comédie-Française, perceiving how pernicious competition was, did not fail to use and abuse the autocratic power with which it had been endowed. It went so far as to prohibit speech altogether for its competitors, leaving them only pantomime. However, the theaters it oppressed devised a thousand increasingly ingenious tricks [732] to circumvent its prohibitions. Sometimes, dialogue that the actors could not speak was written on movable screens; other times, the audience itself was entrusted with reciting the prose and singing the verses while the actors gestured. The public flocked to them in large numbers, and the privileged company reaped no benefit from its petty harassment.

The Opéra, whose privilege was granted to the musician Lulli, was hardly less favored than the Comédie-Française. It was granted not only the exclusive right to perform operas and ballets but also the far more excessive privilege of taxing other theaters for its own benefit. Moreover, it was given the authority to seize actors from these theaters at will. Even parental authority had to yield before a contract made with the Opéra by a minor.

This oppressive regime lasted until the French Revolution. A law passed on January 13–19, 1791, established freedom of theaters; but this freedom, after prompting the formation of numerous theatrical enterprises despite the revolutionary crisis, was once again suppressed under the Empire. On June 8, 1806, a decree was issued reinstating the regime of privilege in place of theatrical freedom and restoring censorship. Another decree reduced the number of theaters in Paris to eight and organized provincial troupes almost in the manner of gendarmerie detachments.

"All unauthorized theaters," we read, "shall be closed before August 15. Consequently, no play may be performed in any other theaters in our good city of Paris than those designated, under any pretext, nor may the public be admitted, even free of charge, nor any posters displayed, etc."

The decree further stated that no new theater could be built, nor could any troupe be relocated within Paris without the special authorization of His Imperial Majesty. Each theater was assigned a specific genre within which it was strictly confined. The Théâtre-Français, for example, had the exclusive privilege of performing noble verse plays or alexandrines. Serious ballets were assigned to the Opéra, light ballets to the Porte-Saint-Martin. The Opéra shared with the Opéra-Comique the privilege of introducing new musical airs; secondary theaters had to content themselves with known airs. This regime, completed in 1812 by a decree issued from Moscow that granted the Comédie-Française its own charter, has remained in place, with slight modifications, to the present day. Let us examine the effects of this system from both the producer's and the consumer's perspectives.

Undoubtedly, the limitation on the number of theatrical enterprises can, to some extent, benefit the privileged entrepreneurs; but this advantage has been rendered almost illusory by the increasing number of privileges and the burdens imposed on concessionaires. In Paris, after the number of theaters was reduced to eight in 1806, it has since risen to twenty-five in recent years. As a result, the situation of entrepreneurs has become increasingly unfavorable, yet they continue to bear significant costs to obtain or maintain their privileges. Their dependence on the administration has forced them to issue numerous complimentary tickets, meaning they must give away a portion of their product for free to those whose influence may be beneficial to them. The restriction of genres, the obligation to perform only plays of a certain category, and the requirement to stage them year-round, even in the height of summer, have further diminished their chances of profitability. All things considered, pure and simple freedom would obviously be more beneficial to them. If one seeks proof of this, one only needs to consult the archives of the commercial court. There, it will be found that no competitive industry has experienced as many bankruptcies as the privileged theater industry. From the perspective of the interests of the public as consumers, the system of privilege is even less favorable. Without even mentioning the artificial increase in ticket prices resulting from this system, the constraints placed on theatrical freedom delay the progress of dramatic art, just as the restrictions of guilds and corporations once hindered the advancement of industry.

Subsidies granted to certain theatrical enterprises take various forms. Sometimes a theater is allocated a subsidy from the public treasury; sometimes it is granted free use of a performance hall; sometimes, finally, similar enterprises are taxed for its benefit. These subsidies are usually justified by claiming that the government is obligated to encourage the fine arts and maintain good traditions. It is asserted that public taste would inevitably become corrupted if the government failed to subsidize certain theatrical establishments, which are deemed necessary for preserving this taste, supposedly so prone to decay. But if this were the case, would not the government's responsibility be extraordinarily vast? It is not only the theater that influences public taste, but the entirety of the fine arts and the so-called artistic industries, such as those that provide furniture, clothing, and so forth. Furnishings and fashion constantly change, sometimes in ways not entirely aligned with the principles of aesthetics. For example, the furniture and costumes of the Directoire and Empire periods are of less refined taste than those of the reign of Louis XIV. Should the government, as guardian of public taste, not have intervened to prevent this degeneration of fashion? Should it not have subsidized tailors and milliners, or even wig manufacturers, to perpetuate, despite shifting tastes, the sound traditions of the Grand Siècle’s styles? Would this have been any more unreasonable than subsidizing a theater to perform, too frequently and to nearly empty seats, plays from that era?

But can one assume that the government’s taste is superior to that of the rest of society? Is the administration composed of [733] beings of a higher essence, whose judgments are infallible in matters of taste, as in all else? No, not even the most fanatical supporters of the principle of authority would dare to claim such a thing. However, if this infallibility does not exist, if the administration lacks the necessary competence to guide public taste for the benefit of the community, how can the system of subsidies be justified? How can it be fair to tax the peasants of Brittany and Gascony to subsidize the theaters of Paris? What service do these worthy country folk, who in their entire lives never set foot in a theater, receive in return for this portion of their tax burden? In cities where municipalities levy theater subsidies from the proceeds of local taxes, such as the octroi, [1] is the injustice not just as glaring? Is it not a case of imposing taxes upon the necessities of all to satisfy the luxury needs of the wealthiest class? And finally, is it truly fair to tax certain theatrical enterprises, such as traveling shows, for the benefit of privileged entrepreneurs in large cities? Is this not equivalent to taxing pottery and earthenware manufacturers for the benefit of the Sèvres porcelain factory and high-end china makers? In short, is it not sheer plunder?

While theatrical enterprises are privileged and subsidized with one hand, supposedly to support their prosperity, they are burdened with heavy taxation with the other. In France, theaters are taxed at one-tenth of their gross receipts, with the revenue going to hospitals. Thus, taxpayers are taxed through subsidies, the public is taxed through privileges, and, in the end, the theaters themselves are taxed. Is this cascading system of taxation truly consistent with sound economic principles?

A final restriction on theatrical freedom comes from censorship. Since this institution primarily has a moral and political character, we will not assess it here. However, whether it concerns the theater or any other industry, is not repressive regulation preferable to preventive regulation? If the administration decided to require industrialists and merchants to submit their goods for inspection, if it kept them in its warehouses for months, and if it refused approval for certain foods and garments on the grounds that some were too spicy and others did not conform to prevailing fashion, would such preventive regulation not be considered intolerable? Would industries subject to its delays and whims not fall into an irreparable decline? And is this not precisely the situation imposed on the industry of dramatic authors? From a purely economic perspective, would a repressive regulation, which would spare them the delays and whims of censorship while still dealing justly with harmful and offensive works, not be preferable?

The ultimate effect of the complex regulations imposed on the theatrical industry, the burdens it must bear, and the favors it receives, is to hinder its natural development. The cost of attending performances has generally risen instead of decreasing, and although the theater has at its service more open and active minds than almost any other industry, there is no sector where progressive transformation has been slower. This is because privilege, in all things, breeds high costs and stagnation, while competition fosters affordability and progress.

Bibliography.

On the Legislation of Theaters, by MM. Vivien and Ed. Blanc. 1 vol. in-8.

Administrative Studies, by M. Vivien. 2 vol. large in-18.

Inquiry on Theaters, conducted in 1849 by the Council of State. 1 vol. in-4. At that time, the question of theater freedom was being debated, and a draft law was submitted to the Council of State. The commission, formed within the council to examine this draft law, sought to gather the opinions of those involved. It devoted six sessions to hearing thirty-one individuals, among whom were eleven playwrights or composers, three critics, eight dramatic artists, seven theater directors, and two former censors. Among those heard, we may cite MM. J. Janin, Théophile Gautier, Rolle, Alexandre Dumas, Victor Hugo, Nestor Roqueplan, Hostein, Provost, Régnier, and Bocage. Two main questions were put to them: that of theater freedom and that of censorship. The restrictive and interventionist opinions prevailed. M. Hostein, director of the Théâtre-Historique and La Gaîté, was almost the only one to defend, with solid arguments, the cause of theater freedom.

Journal des Économistes. Three articles by M. G. de Molinari on the theater industry, vol. XXIV, p. 12 and p. 342; vol. XXVI, p. 130; and two articles on The History and Statistics of Parisian Theaters, by M. Natalis Rondot, vol. XXXI, p. 271 and 386. These last two articles summarize and complete the information on theaters contained in the extensive statistical study of industry in Paris, compiled under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce.

Endnotes to Theatres

[1] (ED Note??). Ref??

Voyages (Voyages, Travel)↩

Source

"Voyages", DEP, T. 2, pp. 858-60.

Text

[858]

Voyages can be divided into two broad categories: travel for business and travel for leisure. The former, which far exceed the latter in both number and importance, play a significant role in production. Exploratory or discovery voyages, for instance, open new markets for industry and sometimes provide new settlements for an overpopulated region. The voyages of Christopher Columbus and other bold navigators who revealed the existence of a new world to the peoples of Europe can undoubtedly be counted among the enterprises that have most contributed to the increase of general wealth and civilization.

These voyages, which serve either to expand the scope of international relations or to make available to civilized peoples additional lands and other unclaimed natural resources, have particularly attracted the attention of governments. They have been encouraged and subsidized. Undoubtedly, there are worse uses of public funds; however, government intervention does not seem any more indispensable in this area than in many others. In reality, one of two situations must exist: either the population possesses the entrepreneurial spirit and the capital necessary to open foreign markets and undertake distant expeditions, or it does not. In the first case, the government will have no need to intervene to encourage enterprises toward which the population is naturally inclined, guided by its own aptitudes and interests. In the second case, government intervention will be more harmful than beneficial; for if a people lacks both the skills and the capital required to establish distant settlements, it would be doing them a disservice to push them into such endeavors. If we are speaking simply of voyages aimed at advancing science, natural history, geology, botany, etc., state intervention presents fewer drawbacks—especially in countries where the government has assumed a monopoly over education and, consequently, has hindered the formation of private societies that would have been dedicated to supporting such explorations. However, it must be added that the sciences owe far less to voyages undertaken under government auspices than to those carried out at the expense and risk of private individuals.

The needs of production also give rise to a multitude of voyages. The sale of many goods is conducted through professional traveling salesmen; the same applies to the procurement of raw materials for industry or wholesale goods for retail resale. Then there are the journeys of workers who seek to apply their industrial or artistic skills in the most favorable markets, those of apprentices, students, and artists who go to complete their education in centers of industry, science, or the fine arts, etc. Compared to these business travels, those undertaken for leisure and pleasure barely deserve mention. Until very recently, such trips were an exclusive luxury of the wealthy classes; however, thanks to the progress of transportation, they are beginning to be accessible to all. Already, pleasure trains on railways are carrying masses of individuals to distant places—people who, not long ago, never ventured beyond the small circles where [859] their occupations kept them confined. Nothing is better suited than the ease and affordability of travel to eradicate the old prejudices that still separate nations. Indeed, these outdated prejudices persist mainly among those portions of the population that travel the least—that is, those who have the least frequent contact with the foreigners they disdain. Let travel increase, let nations become more closely connected through both business and leisure, and those national hatreds—whose origins date back to times when people knew each other only through war, that is, through the harm they inflicted upon one another—will soon give way to a benevolent sympathy. Why should nations continue to hate one another? If they differ in language, customs, habits, and institutions, do they belong any less to the same species? And has Providence not arranged things in such a way that they cannot develop their abilities or satisfy their needs without peacefully interacting with one another, without exchanging their ideas and their products? Has it not made each nation’s prosperity dependent on the well-being of all?

But while we should welcome the progress that enables nations to visit each other more easily, that is no reason to approve the extravagant spending of certain governments and municipal administrations aimed at attracting foreign travelers. No speculation is more misguided than this; yet none is more encouraged by popular prejudices. Let us leave it to J.-B. Say to refute this notion:

"When a foreign traveler arrives in France and spends ten thousand francs, one should not believe that France gains ten thousand francs. It provides the foreigner with goods in exchange for the sum it receives. This is a trade that may be advantageous for France; it is a form of commerce in which returns are obtained perhaps more quickly than in other ways; but it is nothing more than commerce, even when the payment is made in gold.

"This matter has not been viewed in this light until now. Always proceeding from the principle that the only real value is that which appears in the form of metal, people saw in the arrival of a traveler a value of ten thousand francs brought in gold or silver, and they called this a gain of ten thousand francs—as if the tailor who dressed the foreigner, the jeweler who adorned him, or the restaurateur who fed him did not provide goods in exchange for his money and instead made a profit equal to the full amount of their charges!

"The benefit that a foreigner brings is the same as that derived from any exchange, namely, the ability to produce the goods received in return through more advantageous means than if they were produced directly. This is not a negligible advantage, but it must be valued correctly to avoid the reckless expenditures with which people have imagined it should be purchased. One of the most celebrated authors on commercial matters has said that 'spectacles [1] cannot be too grand, too magnificent, or too numerous, as they constitute a trade in which France always receives without giving'—which is nearly the opposite of the truth. In reality, France gives, that is to say, loses, the entire cost of spectacles, which provide nothing in return for the resources they consume other than the pleasure they afford. These may be very pleasant amusements, but they are certainly absurd as economic calculations. What would we think of a merchant who opened a dance hall in his shop, hired acrobats, and distributed refreshments to boost his business?

"Furthermore," adds the illustrious economist with equal reason, "is it even certain that a festival or a spectacle, no matter how magnificent, attracts many foreigners from abroad? Are travelers not more likely to be drawn by commerce, by rich collections of antiquities, by numerous masterpieces of art that exist nowhere else, by a climate or waters particularly favorable to health, or even by the desire to visit sites made famous by great historical events and to learn a widely spoken language? I am quite inclined to believe that the promise of a few trivial pleasures has never attracted a significant number of visitors from far away. A spectacle or a festival may encourage people to travel a short distance, but it rarely prompts a long journey. It is unlikely that the desire to see the Paris Opera is the reason why so many Germans, Russians, Englishmen, and Italians visit this great capital in times of peace—a city that, fortunately, has much more substantial claims on general curiosity. The Spanish regard their bullfights as exceptionally fascinating, yet I do not believe that many French people have traveled to Madrid just for that amusement. Such entertainments may be enjoyed by foreigners who are drawn to the country for other reasons, but they are not the determining factor in their travels." [2]

Thus, one must be content with the natural attractions that can be offered to foreign travelers and not grant them a premium in the form of festivals and spectacles whose costs fall upon taxpayers. Governments, moreover, have at their disposal a much simpler and less expensive way to attract foreign travelers: to abolish or simplify the burdensome and costly formalities of passports and customs inspections, imposing only those restrictions on free movement that are strictly necessary for safeguarding public finances and security.

Some travelers or tourists publish accounts of their journeys, particularly when they visit little-known regions. Travel writing constitutes an interesting and useful branch of literary production. Unfortunately, [860] such works are often written carelessly and without sincerity; at times, the tourist recounting his "travel impressions" has not even bothered to leave his study. But when the traveler is an attentive, judicious, and honest observer, his book becomes a valuable source of information for the economist. The Travels of Arthur Young may, in this regard, be cited as exemplary models.

Endnotes to Voyages

[1] That is "entertainment or performances".

[2] Traité d'Économie politique, by J.-B. Say. Book 1, Chapter XX. On Travel and Expatriation in Relation to National Wealth. Guillaumin, 1841, pp. 236–38.

Usure (Usury)↩

Source

“Usure,” DEP, T. 2, pp. 790-95.

Text

[790]

I. Definition.

Usury is a more or less imaginary offense that consists, according to certain jurists and theologians, in charging an interest rate higher than that specified by law; according to other jurists and theologians, now joined by some socialists, in charging any interest rate whatsoever. An usurer, according to the former, is a capitalist who lends money above the legal rate; according to the latter, it is any capitalist who demands interest, whether large or small, who refuses, in other words, to lend money for free.

II. History.

The history of the offense or sin of usury is one of the most interesting topics. It has already been partially outlined under the entry INTEREST by one of our learned contributors. We will limit ourselves here to completing it, refraining as much as possible from delving into the core of the issue to avoid repetitions.

The hostility toward lending at interest dates back to the earliest antiquity. Moses forbade the Jews from charging any interest on money lent to their poor fellow citizens. King David and the prophets, among whom Ezekiel must be mentioned, repeatedly denounced usurers with anathemas. The same aversion to lending at interest can be found among most legislators and philosophers of pagan antiquity. Aristotle, for example, asserted as a principle that interest is something unnatural. Cato, Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch held the same view. When someone asked Cato what he thought of lending at interest, he replied that in his eyes, it was almost the same crime as murdering a man: Quid fœnerari? Quid hominem occidere. Christianity adopted this opinion, which was shared by the most eminent minds of antiquity.

In a passage from the Gospel according to Saint Luke, Jesus Christ expresses himself as follows:

"If you lend to those from whom you expect to receive a return, what thanks do you deserve, since even sinners lend to sinners in order to receive the same in return?... Lend, expecting nothing in return (mutuum date, nihil indè sperantes), and then your reward will be great, and you will be children of the Most High."

In all likelihood, this was merely a simple precept of charity; but from the very beginning, it was interpreted in a much stricter manner. The Church formally forbade lending at interest, even at a low rate. According to its Fathers and Doctors, notably Saint Thomas, who devoted much attention to this subject, anyone who demands anything beyond the principal sum, that is, the amount lent, is an usurer and, as such, subject to all the censures of the Church. Saint Ambrose, Tertullian, Saint Basil, Saint Jerome, and Saint John Chrysostom—all the great authorities of the early Church—expressed the same opinion as Saint Thomas in this regard. The Church councils repeatedly condemned lending at interest, branding it with the name of usury.

Throughout the Middle Ages, the canonical prohibition of lending at interest appears to have been maintained without provoking much opposition. It was only around the time of the Renaissance that a reaction began to emerge against the established doctrine. This reaction was spurred by the changes that had gradually taken place in the economic situation of Europe. The anarchy that had once reigned within each state had begun to give way to order; wars had become less frequent, and communications had become easier. As a result of these changes, all branches of production had rapidly developed, requiring increasingly large amounts of capital. Capitalists would have been quite eager to provide such funds, but they were intimidated by the threat of eternal damnation that the Church directed against usurers. The canonical prohibition of interest was then subjected to renewed examination and vigorously challenged by the growing number of interests it harmed. Two opposing camps formed within the Church and the judiciary: those who clung to tradition and were steeped in the principle of authority defended the old doctrine, while the more progressive thinkers and advocates of free inquiry embraced the new one. Most of the leaders of the Reformation sided with the legitimacy of interest, and, as Léon Faucher rightly notes, this fact partly explains the industrial and commercial superiority of Protestant nations.

Thus, Calvin declared:

“1. That while usury and a kind of cruelty exist in demanding interest when lending to the poor, there is none when lending to the rich; 2. that usury is bad and condemnable among the rich only when excessive interest is drawn from the loan.”

Some Catholic theologians, among whom we may cite Major, Navarro, and Launoy, as well as jurists such as Charles Dumoulin and Grotius, boldly defended the legitimacy of lending at interest; but their opinion was condemned by most of the general assemblies of the clergy. Bossuet wrote a Treatise on Usury to refute it. However, the reaction in favor of lending at interest continued unabated: in the eighteenth century, Turgot and the Économistes demonstrated with irresistible clarity the usefulness of the freedom of lending. Bentham aided them with his admirable Defense of Usury. The Catholic Church then felt the necessity of bringing its doctrine on lending at interest into greater harmony with the demands of the time. It continued to prohibit [[791] lending at interest in general, invoking the Gospel precept: Mutuum date, nihil indè sperantes—"Lend, expecting nothing in return"; but it admitted two circumstances in which the lender could receive compensation from the borrower as indemnity: these two circumstances were damnum emergens (emerging damage) and lucrum cessans (ceasing profit).

By emerging damage, the Church meant the harm that the lender might suffer by parting with his capital. For example, it was said: [1]

"He who, having money to carry out necessary repairs on his house, is kind enough to lend it to someone who asks for it, cannot repair his house and is unable to rent it because it is at risk of collapse: it is just that he should receive something above the principal as compensation for the loss he incurs by failing to rent his house."

This is what the Church, following the definition of jurists, meant by emerging damage.

Ceasing profit referred to the deprivation of expected gain. If, for example, said the casuists, a merchant lends a sum of money that he would have earned a guaranteed profit from by using it in his trade, he may legitimately claim compensation, under ceasing profit, for the profit he failed to realize. However, the Church imposed rather strict conditions on compensation for ceasing profit. [2]

"It is not enough for "ceasing profit" to be possible," said orthodox theologians, "because if that were sufficient, lending at interest would no longer be usurious. Anyone could claim that they could have profited from the money they lent, and this would be a deception; thus, it is absolutely necessary that ceasing profit be imminent, probable, and, as the law says, morally certain and assured. Such is the ceasing profit of merchants who, having resolved to invest their money in commerce, deprive themselves of an imminent, probable, and morally certain gain when they lend to a friend who solicits them."

Despite these restrictions, by admitting the circumstances of emerging damage and ceasing profit, the Church was moving directly toward rehabilitating lending at interest. Thus, at the time when these two justifications were granted to lenders—namely, in France, towards the end of the seventeenth century—part of the clergy protested against such a pernicious innovation. It was the doctors of the Sorbonne who had admitted emerging damage and ceasing profit. [3] The provincial doctors, who remained more detached from the progress of the century, rejected with indignation a doctrine they did not hesitate to call unfaithful to the Church’s tradition. Ceasing profit was particularly targeted by their attacks. They claimed that in legitimizing this circumstance, the doctors of the Sorbonne had followed the methods of lax casuists: "Neither Moses," they wrote in a memorandum, "nor David, nor Ezekiel, nor the other prophets, nor even Jesus Christ in Scripture, nor the Holy Fathers, nor canon or civil law have ever spoken of ceasing profit: it must therefore be rejected." At the same time, they invoked the authority of several great doctors, such as Saint Thomas, Saint Raymond, and Saint Antoninus, who had explicitly condemned ceasing profit.

The doctors of the Sorbonne did not fail to reply; they endeavored to demonstrate that nothing in Scripture or in the Fathers of the Church opposed the adoption of ceasing profit; that it was inaccurate to claim that Saint Thomas had condemned it; and, furthermore, that this great doctor had admitted emerging damage (Reply of the twelve doctors of the Sorbonne, May 7, 1672). More in harmony with the needs of the time, the doctrine defended by the doctors of the Sorbonne prevailed in the Church. However, this doctrine only partially legitimizes interest and still leaves ample room for the sin of usury. Under the titles of emerging damage and ceasing profit, the Church admits compensation for the deprivation of capital; in contrast, it refuses to recognize as legitimate the premium intended to cover the risk of lending. This is all the more peculiar because the Church has no difficulty in acknowledging the legitimacy of the often enormous profits made by making a "bottomry loan" [4] —that is, by financing a portion of a ship's cargo in order to partake in the risks and rewards of the venture.

At the time of writing, the question remains unresolved canonically. There are still opponents of lending at interest within the Catholic Church. On August 18, 1830, the Roman court issued a ruling stating that confessors should not trouble lenders, but left the fundamental question unresolved. This ruling provoked yet another storm within the clergy. The old quarrel between the provincial doctors and the doctors of the Sorbonne resurfaced in France. Several members of the clergy, among whom we may cite Abbé Laborde, vicar of the metropolitan church of Auch, and Abbé Denavit, professor of theology in Lyon, protested against the decision of the Roman penitentiary. "I refuse absolution," wrote Abbé Denavit, "to those who take interest, and to priests who claim that civil law is a sufficient justification." The majority of the clergy, however, ultimately accepted this ruling, and today the Church generally limits itself to condemning as usurers only those lenders who demand interest above the legal rate.

Unfortunately, it must be said that the errors of legal scholars in this matter continue to support those of theologians. Not only have laws limiting interest rates been maintained in most European countries, but in France, for example, these laws were even made stricter in 1850 (see INTEREST). Condemned as a sin by spiritual authority, usury continues to be punished as a crime by temporal authority.

[792]

III. Arguments Used Against Usury—Probable Origin of the Prejudice that Condemns It

That it should be reprehensible to derive interest from money or goods that one has lent, while it is not reprehensible to collect rent from a house that one has leased, revenue from land that one has rented, or even profit from money or goods that one has employed oneself; that one should commit a crime and a sin in the first case while exercising a legitimate right in the others—this seems difficult to justify. However, this difficulty did not deter the opponents of lending at interest. They have filled volumes upon volumes in their efforts to overcome it, and thanks to widespread ignorance, they managed for centuries to prevail against common sense. We will limit ourselves here to reproducing a few of the sophisms they used most frequently.

Here is how they justified the distinction they made between interest and rent:

“When I rent a house, land, a tool, a horse, or a donkey,” they said, “I can separate the use I make of it from the object itself, and it is fair that I should make you pay for that use. For when you return my house, my land, my tool, my horse, or my donkey, you have worn them down to some extent, they have deteriorated. Is it not fair that you should compensate me, provide an indemnity for the depreciation you have caused to my property by using it? This compensation, this indemnity, is the price of rent.

“There is, on the other hand, another category of objects whose use cannot be separated from the object itself, because they cannot be used without being consumed or disappearing from the hands of the user. These are fungible goods. Such are money, wheat, wine, oil, raw materials necessary for industry, etc. When I lend you a sum of money, a sack of wheat, a barrel of wine, or a cask of oil, you cannot return these things to me after using them in the same way that you return my house, my land, my tool, my horse, or my donkey. You cannot do so because it is in the nature of these things to be consumed through use. You therefore return to me different money, different wheat, different wine, different oil. But would it be just for you to return more than you received? One can understand that when returning a house, land, a tool, a horse, or a donkey, one adds an indemnity to compensate for deterioration or wear. But if you entirely replace the fungible capital I lent you, can I demand anything more? Do I not receive, if not the exact thing I lent, at least an equivalent? Should not the lending of fungible goods be free of charge by the very nature of things?”

If they needed to justify the distinction they made between profit derived from the use of fungible capital and interest derived from lending that same capital, the opponents of usury claimed that in the first case, one takes risks, while in the second, one does not.

“When one employs one’s capital oneself,” they said, “one runs the risk of making bad investments and losing one’s capital in whole or in part, whereas when one lends it, whether the borrower does good or bad business, one always receives the same interest.”

Nothing could be weaker, or more childish even, than these arguments against usury. Was it not obvious, in fact, that the rent of houses, land, etc., included more than just the necessary indemnity to maintain them in good condition? That the profit derived from the use of fungible capital far exceeded the indemnity necessary to cover the risks of its use? Finally, that when lending capital, one was not “always sure of receiving the same interest”; that one was not even always sure of receiving any interest at all, or even of recovering the capital itself? It could easily have been demonstrated to the opponents of usury that, to remain logical, they should have condemned as usury everything in the rent of a house, land, a tool, a horse, or a donkey that exceeded the indemnity necessary to compensate for the depreciation of the leased object; everything in the profit from capital employed by its owner that exceeded the premium for risk. They would have been led to the absurd conclusion that, for example, a farmer who returned land after improving it should not only owe no rent to the owner but could, in good justice, demand compensation from him.

A third argument, even more puerile than the previous ones, was based on the supposed sterility of money and other precious metals used as currency. “It is against nature,” said Aristotle—or at least, his interpreters made him say—“for money to produce money.” Saint Basil, who fully adopted the opinion attributed to the Greek philosopher, reminded the faithful that copper, gold, and metals produce nothing; that they bear no fruit by their very nature. Another Church Father, Saint Gregory of Nyssa, pointed out that the Creator had said only to living creatures, Be fruitful and multiply; He had said nothing similar to inanimate objects like money. Bentham refutes this argument, attributed to Aristotle and repeated by most of the Church Fathers, doctors, and many jurists, in an original manner. [5] [6]

[793]

"It happened," he says, "that this great philosopher, with all his talent and insight, and despite the number of silver coins that had passed through his hands—perhaps a greater number than had ever passed before or since through the hands of any philosopher—and despite the particular pains he had taken to clarify the question of generation, was never able to discover in any coin an organ that would allow it to generate another. Emboldened by a negative proof of such strength, he ventured to present to the world the result of his observations in the form of this universal proposition: that, by its nature, all money is sterile. You, my friend, on whom sound reason has far more influence than ancient philosophy, will undoubtedly have already noticed that what should have been concluded from this specious observation, if anything were to be concluded at all, was that one would try in vain to extract 5 percent interest from one's money, not that one would be doing wrong if one succeeded in doing so. But the sages of that time judged otherwise.

“A consideration that never presented itself to the mind of this great philosopher, and which, had it occurred to him, would not have been entirely unworthy of his attention, is that although a daric (a Greek coin) was as incapable of generating another daric as it was of engendering a ram or a ewe, a man, nevertheless, with a borrowed daric, could buy a ram and two ewes, which, when left together, would likely, by the end of the year, produce two or three lambs. So that this man, upon selling his ram and two ewes at the expiration of the term in order to repay the daric, and giving one of his lambs in addition for the use of this sum, would still find himself with two lambs—or at least one—richer than if he had never made this transaction.”

The error of Aristotle and his disciples, as we can see, stemmed from their misunderstanding of the economic significance of the words sterility and productivity. Money is sterile in the sense that two coins placed side by side will never generate a third; but are not houses, ships, machines, and tools of all kinds affected by the same type of sterility? Is it not just as "against nature" to derive rent from them?

It is, therefore, through an abundance of sophisms that the opinion opposing interest-bearing loans has been sustained. This makes it all the more interesting to investigate what circumstances gave rise to this belief and allowed it to persist until today, despite the truly puerile weakness of the arguments used to support it. These circumstances can be summed up in one word: monopoly.

The competition that now levels the prices of all things rarely had a sufficiently broad sphere of action in the past. Natural and artificial monopolies, which are now the exception, were then the rule. The imperfection of communication routes, the lack of security, and many other obstacles narrowly restricted the extent of markets. As a result, for farmers, industrialists, merchants, capitalists, and even workers who controlled these markets, there were numerous small monopolies. The most effective way to eliminate these monopolies would undoubtedly have been to make transportation faster, cheaper, and more secure, as well as to remove obstacles to the freedom of professions; in other words, to expand the sphere of competition. But even if one had been convinced of the effectiveness of this approach—and no such idea existed at the time—it would not always have been easy to implement. Governments generally tried to compensate for it through regulation. When a monopoly became too oppressive, they limited or attempted to limit the power of its holders by imposing a maximum price. This is the origin of the price controls established, particularly in cities, for most consumer goods, as well as the laws that set a maximum price for labor. The regulation of bread and meat prices, still found in some places, remains an outdated relic of this former system. It is likely that the limitation of interest rates originated in the same way.

In ancient societies, the lending of capital generally constituted a genuine monopoly, and this monopoly, born from the institutions and circumstances of the time, in turn led to oppressive abuses. In the military republic of Rome, for example, capital was scarce and concentrated in the hands of a few. Lenders could therefore dictate their terms to borrowers, and when these terms were not met punctually, the debtor fell under the most cruel of penalties: slavery. Moreover, in Rome, as in most other ancient societies, war constantly forced a large portion of the population to resort to borrowing. The system of standing armies had not yet been adopted. When war broke out, all able-bodied citizens could be required to participate. A small landowner, for instance, who cultivated his field himself with one or two slaves, was obliged to leave for the army. During his absence, his property was left untended. Upon his return, he would find his small capital diminished, his reserves depleted. He had no choice but to borrow the sum necessary to survive [794] until the next harvest, and he would go knocking at the door of the wealthy patrician, who was in a very different position. The patrician had numerous slaves, disciplined like an army and supervised by overseers whose diligence was stimulated by the prospect of manumission. When he went to war, his land continued to be cultivated, and his workshops did not fall idle. Moreover, war was far more profitable for the patricians, who held the highest ranks in the army, than for the plebeians. The commanders made sure to claim the largest share of the spoils of the vanquished; often, they left nothing for the common soldiers, their companions in peril and glory.

Upon returning to Rome after the campaign, the patrician found himself wealthy—wealthy from the spoils he had seized from the enemy, and also from the profits his lands or workshops had generated during his absence. The unfortunate plebeian, on the other hand, found only misery awaiting him at home. He borrowed in order to recover; he borrowed from the wealthy patrician under the condition of repaying it at a more or less imminent due date. But often, as the deadline approached, a new war would break out. Once again forced to abandon his field or his workshop, the plebeian was unable to pay his debt. Then he was ruthlessly seized at the request of his creditor, and this glorious veteran, this victor of nations, was sold at auction and shackled alongside the very enemies he had defeated. One can understand how such a cruel fate would stir emotions among the masses, among whom so many debtors faced the same looming fate. The victims of the creditors’ harshness loudly recalled the services they had rendered to the republic; they enumerated their heroic deeds, displaying the scars that covered their bodies, and at times, the indignant people would break their chains. Thus arose continuous unrest and vehement complaints, the echoes of which have carried across centuries; thus also emerged this sentiment of compassion for the debtor and revulsion for the creditor, which filled people's hearts and has not yet been entirely erased; and finally, from this came the masses’ prejudice against interest-bearing loans and their hatred of usurers. For the masses rarely trace the suffering they endure back to its true source. They usually stop at the apparent cause. War and slavery—these were, in antiquity, the primary causes of the hardships that crushed the plebeian classes. But public opinion favored war, and slavery was considered an indispensable institution. So, blame was placed on usury, and the philanthropists of the time called either for limiting interest rates or even for making loans entirely free of charge.

In the Middle Ages, the situation had hardly changed. Capital was just as scarce as in antiquity, if not more so, and markets remained just as restricted. The lending of capital continued to be, almost everywhere, the monopoly of a small number of individuals. A particular circumstance even contributed to making this monopoly more oppressive and more odious than ever. The Church had cast anathema upon usury, and the vast majority of Christian capitalists, intimidated by the threat of eternal damnation, refrained from lending. The Jews, who did not share the same apprehensions, then monopolized this trade, which the Church unwittingly and unwillingly handed over to them as a lucrative privilege. Naturally, this worsened the conditions for borrowers, and the hatred of usurers was compounded by the intense loathing felt toward the Jews.

Thus, the opposition to interest-bearing loans arose because circumstances and institutions commonly combined to grant capitalists a monopoly that allowed them to lend at excessive rates. And since the methods used to combat the effects of this monopoly were most often ineffective—sometimes even worsening the very problem they sought to eliminate—people became convinced that lending at interest was inherently tainted with an incurable vice. The harms caused by usury were blamed on lending itself rather than being traced back to their true source, which was monopoly, and lending was condemned as a result; then, in the absence of sound reasoning to justify this condemnation, recourse was made to sophistry.

IV. What Should Be Thought of Usury—The Remedy It Requires

If by usury one means any compensation granted for the lending of a fungible capital, as the casuists express it, then it is evident that usury is just as legitimate and necessary as rent, profit, or wages. If the meaning of the term is restricted further—if usury is understood only as the monopoly price of interest, the rate at which interest rises in the absence of sufficient competition, whether competition is restricted by natural obstacles or artificial barriers—then, without a doubt, usury is a problem. But as we have seen earlier, this problem originates in monopoly, not in lending itself.

In his polemic against Bastiat on the subject of free credit, M. Proudhon introduces the case of a shipwrecked man cast upon Robinson Crusoe’s island, where that infamous proprietor unscrupulously lends him tools, raw materials, and provisions at an interest rate of 99%. Carefully omitting the crucial factor of monopoly— which allows the lender to dictate terms to the borrower and extract enormous usury—M. Proudhon presents his example as an irrefutable argument against interest. But who does not see, as Bastiat rightly pointed out, that profit and wages could just as easily be condemned using the same kind of reasoning? The usury of M. Proudhon's Robinson-capitalist is, in fact, of the same nature as that of a merchant who exploits his isolation in a market to drive up the price of his goods above the normal level dictated by competition. It is also of the same nature as that of a worker who raises the price of his labor when he possesses extraordinary talent, or even simply when laborers are in short supply. These three cases present no essential difference. The monopolist merchant and [795] the monopolist worker are just as much usurers as M. Proudhon's monopolist capitalist: if the latter lends at usury, the former sells and works at usury. Would it be justified, however, to conclude from this that profit and wages are illegitimate?

It now remains to determine whether the three usurers just mentioned are, or are not, to be condemned; whether they may, or may not, legitimately exercise the power conferred upon them by market conditions. This is evidently a question whose answer may vary according to circumstances. As it falls more within the domain of morality than that of political economy, we shall not examine it here. We shall limit ourselves to stating that the best way to prevent usury—at least in the current state of civilization—is to refrain from regulating and setting a maximum on interest rates; it is to allow the self-regulating mechanism of competition to operate. Indeed, as soon as capital becomes scarce in a given locality, the interest rate rises, and this increase, if it is not hindered or masked by a legal maximum, immediately attracts capital from all other parts of the general market. Then, the gap is filled, the interest rate falls, and usury disappears.

— (For the bibliography on Usury, see the article INTEREST.)

Endnotes to Usury

[1] Conférences ecclésiastiques de Paris sur l'usure et la restitution, established and printed by order of Mgr the Cardinal de Noailles, Archbishop of Paris. 1756, vol. 1, p. 261.

[2] Conférences, vol. 1, p. 271.

[3] Assemblies of the Doctors of the Sorbonne, October 4, 1665, and February 17, 1666.

[4] "Prêtant à la grosse aventure" or in Latin "fœnus nauticum".

[5] Not to mention poets. In The Merchant of Venice by Shakespeare, the question of the legitimacy of interest gives rise to a most curious debate between the Jewish moneylender Shylock and the Christian merchant Antonio. Shylock, who pleads pro domo suâ in defense of usury, cites in support of his argument the profits that Jacob made from his sheep. His adversary ironically asks him whether gold and silver are sheep. The Jew finds nothing to reply to such a peremptory argument. This does not, however, prevent him from later lending Antonio a sum of three thousand ducats, stipulating that if the sum is not repaid by the due date, he will have the right to cut a pound of flesh from any part of his debtor’s body that he chooses. Antonio, having agreed to submit to this cannibalistic usury, finds himself unable to repay the borrowed sum on time. Shylock ruthlessly demands his due, invoking justice and good faith. The Merchant of Venice is on the verge of becoming his victim when the young and beautiful heroine Portia, disguised as a lawyer, saves him by noting that "blood was not included in the contract." Shylock may therefore take his pound of flesh as interest or usury, but not a single drop of blood—on penalty of death. The Merchant of Venice is saved. This fable, which Shakespeare’s genius has turned into a masterpiece, is it not a curious specimen of the ignorance of the time?

[6] Defence of Usury, by Jeremy Bentham. Letter X.

Travail (Labour, Work)↩

Source

“Travail” DEP, T. 2, pp. 761-64.

Text

[761]

Labor consists of the application of human faculties to production. J.-B. Say defines it as follows:

“The sustained action one engages in to carry out an operation of industry, or even just a part of these operations. — Whatever the operation to which labor is applied,” he adds, “it is productive since it contributes to the creation of a product. Thus, the labor of a scientist conducting experiments and writing books is productive; the labor of an entrepreneur, even though he does not directly take part in manual work, is productive; finally, the labor of a manual worker, from the day laborer digging the earth to the sailor maneuvering a ship, is still productive.” [1]

All operations of production require, to a greater or lesser extent, the contribution of labor. It is therefore important to thoroughly examine the nature of this indispensable agent, the conditions under which it can be employed in production, and the circumstances in which it achieves maximum efficiency.

The nature of labor is inherently diverse. Each industry demands from the worker the exercise of particular faculties. The manual laborer and the porter do not employ the same faculties in their work as the scientist or the artist. The former primarily use their physical strength, whereas the latter work primarily with their minds. This same diversity is also observed in the functions that divide each branch of production. In a cotton factory, for example, the spinner or weaver does not employ the same faculties as the mechanic, the foreman, or the director. In an army, the soldier does not deploy the same faculties as the general, and so on. In short, labor has its natural hierarchy. The functions assigned to it are structured, layered, and ranked according to the number, type, and extent of the faculties they require.

However, this natural hierarchy of labor is not fixed. Industrial progress continually works to modify it. Here is how: industrial progress commonly replaces the use of the worker’s physical strength with that of a mechanical force that is both cheaper and more powerful. In industries transformed by progress, human labor is therefore seen to change successively in nature: originally purely physical—at least in its lower functions—it becomes increasingly intellectual. If we examine, for instance, the transportation industry at its different stages of development, we will be struck by the extent and significance of the transformations undergone by the labor it requires under the influence of progress. At the outset, it is man himself who transports loads using his muscular strength. This is still the case in certain parts of India, where the arms and shoulders of coolies are the only means available for transporting both travelers and goods. But as the transportation industry advances, man tames the horse, the donkey, the camel, and the elephant, compelling them to carry burdens; he also invents the cart, the carriage, and the ship. As a result, the nature of the labor required for the transport of people and goods changes. Muscular strength alone is no longer sufficient and plays only a secondary role in the transportation industry; skill and intelligence now take precedence. It takes more skill and intelligence than physical strength to guide a horse, a donkey, a camel, or an elephant, to drive a carriage or a cart, or to navigate a ship. Finally, a last advancement emerges: steam is applied to locomotion. The locomotive, with its long trains of wagons, replaces the horse, the cart, and the stagecoach; the steamship takes the place of the sailing vessel. With this new transformation, the function of the worker in the transportation industry acquires an even more pronounced intellectual character. Railway employees must exhibit more intelligence and less physical strength than the carters, couriers, etc., whom they have replaced. In waterborne transportation, the intervention of steam eliminates the human equipment previously employed to operate a ship’s propulsion system—masts, sails, rigging, etc. To this apparatus, which still required the application of a certain amount of muscular strength, steam substitutes a machine whose operators—stokers or engineers—need hardly apply anything but their intelligence.

By examining, then, the transportation industry from its starting point to its latest development, one notices that the proportion in which it requires the contribution of human muscular strength and intellectual strength has progressively changed, and that the latter has ended up almost entirely replacing the former. The same result is obtained by studying the impact of industrial progress on other branches of production, leading to this important conclusion: modern industry requires less human muscular strength than in the early ages of the world, but, in return, it demands a much greater degree of intellectual and moral faculties.

Now, the nature of labor has a decisive influence on the conditions under which it can be employed in industry. Thus, for example, the remuneration of the simple laborer, who deploys little more than muscular strength and does not need to use anything else, is found at the lower end of the wage scale, because the necessary maintenance for the laborer is reduced to very little. When, on the other hand, a function requires the contribution of the worker’s intellectual faculties, the necessary maintenance costs of that worker, in other words, the production costs of his labor, rise much higher. He requires a more refined diet, [762] more complete maintenance; otherwise, the faculties he employs will soon deteriorate. The ancients understood this necessity well, and they followed it in how they treated their slaves: they fed, clothed, and housed better those who had intellectual occupations than those who were devoted to material labor; they also imposed lighter tasks on them, even though the laws, customs, and public opinion made no distinction between the various categories of slaves: experience had taught them that a slave could not make regular and continuous use of his intelligence unless he was better maintained and treated more leniently than if he only had to exert muscular strength.

This inequality is further increased by the varying costs of replenishing workers depending on the professions they enter. The costs of education and training, which are almost nil for workers engaged in physical labor, are, on the other hand, very high for lawyers, doctors, priests, administrators, magistrates, engineers, etc. The profession of a lawyer, for example, requires a long and costly apprenticeship. It is not enough to have a natural dose of eloquence and the other faculties necessary to succeed at the bar. These natural abilities must first be developed generally; then, one must acquire the knowledge and skills of the profession, study jurisprudence, and learn how to apply it. Undoubtedly, the curriculum for these preliminary studies has been excessively burdened: law students are forced to overload their minds with a host of unnecessary knowledge. But even if the training costs of a lawyer were reduced to the strict minimum, they would still be higher than those of a tailor or a mason, and, even more so, than those of a porter or a plow-hand.

Thus, the conditions under which labor can be applied to production differ, first, due to the diversity and inequality of the strengths or faculties required in different industrial operations and the maintenance they demand; and second, due to the diversity and inequality of the costs of replenishing workers.

If man were immortal, these costs of education and apprenticeship for workers would obviously have an insignificant influence on labor remuneration, as they would be spread over an infinitely long period. But this is not the case: the human workforce must be regularly renewed, and the renewal period varies according to industries and countries. In unhealthy industries, for example, the human workforce must be replenished much more frequently than in others. The manufacture of white lead, to cite just one example, consumes in a century two or three more generations than ordinary industries; from which it follows that the remuneration of its workers must include the costs of education and apprenticeship for these additional generations. The same observation applies to all industries in an unhealthy country. Regions where contagious diseases, plague, yellow fever, and malaria regularly take their toll are placed, under the influence of this cause, in unfavorable production conditions. Not only must the human workforce be replenished very frequently, but it is also continuously depleted, with its essential parts being worn down daily, without the possibility of immediately filling the gaps caused by the spread of contagious diseases.

The progress that improves the hygienic conditions of production, that prevents accidents to which workers are exposed, etc., consequently has great economic importance. Much value is rightly placed on processes that increase the durability of tools, machines, and buildings; that protect useful animals and plants from contagious diseases and other accidental causes of destruction. But those processes that increase the longevity of man as an agent of production, thereby allowing existing generations to save part of the costs of raising and training the generations needed to replace them, surely deserve no less the attention of the economist.

Other causes also contribute to making the conditions under which labor can be applied to production diverse and unequal. These can be found enumerated under the word WAGES. However, those we have already outlined are, we believe, sufficient to demonstrate the absurdity of the communist theory that establishes equality in the remuneration of labor. Such equality would only be possible under the following two conditions: 1. if all production operations required the application of forces of the same nature and perfectly equal; 2. if the human workforce had always and everywhere the same lifespan. In that case, one could conceive that workers might be subjected to a system of equal wages, just as one understands that machines of identical make are subject to the same maintenance costs. But if, as observation attests, the functions of production are essentially diverse and unequal—if some can be performed with the aid of a simple and crude human tool, while others require a complex and refined human tool—then is not wage equality in direct contradiction to the nature of things? To insist on giving a porter and a railway director, for example, equal remuneration, would it not be as absurd and as contrary to the natural order as wanting to allocate the same sum for the maintenance and renewal of a locomotive as for that of a draft horse?

It is true that industrial progress has a certain tendency toward equality. As we have noted, industrial progress raises the general level of the functions of production and, consequently, reduces the distance between [763] the highest and lowest. But the hierarchy of functions does not disappear for that reason. Even in the most advanced industries, there are still functions that require superior faculties. There are also always those that wear out workers and machines more quickly than others, and these inequalities—being intrinsic to the nature of things—must necessarily be reflected in wages. Nevertheless, it is reassuring to think that every industrial advance entails a progressive modification in the nature of human forces required for production and that this modification leads to a corresponding shift in the level of labor remuneration.

Now that we have examined under what conditions labor can be regularly and continuously applied to production; that we have established that these conditions are essentially diverse and are modified daily under the influence of progress, let us now investigate under what circumstances labor is most efficient or effective.

The most favorable situation in this regard is one in which the worker is always free to choose an occupation suited to his abilities and in which he has the greatest possible incentive to work well. This situation does not occur, for example, under the regime of castes or privileged professions. In such a system, the worker does not have the freedom to choose the profession that best matches his abilities, and as a result, the most important functions in society are often poorly performed, while valuable talents remain unused among the general population. The same phenomenon occurs under the regime of slavery and serfdom. However, since slave or serf owners have an interest in exploiting this human capital as profitably as possible, they sometimes make efforts to recognize the abilities of their slaves or serfs, to cultivate them, and to apply them in the most suitable roles in order to increase the revenue they derive from them. Thus, in antiquity, some masters would provide an artistic or literary education to their most intelligent slaves, so they could later profit from them as painters, grammarians, etc. Likewise, in Russia, landlords commonly allow their serfs to choose the profession for which they are most suited, with the aim of securing the highest possible obroc from them (see SERFDOM). Sometimes, they even take an active role in identifying their serfs’ natural talents, much like one would with virgin soil, and they advance them the necessary funds to develop and capitalize on these talents. M. de Haxthausen cites several interesting examples of this sound economic practice in his Studies on Russia. [2]

It therefore seems that slavery and serfdom hinder the useful distribution of labor to a lesser degree than the system of castes or privileged professions.

From the point of view of the necessary stimulus for the worker to fully develop his activity, both regimes appear equally flawed, but for different reasons. Under the regime of castes and privileged professions, the worker willingly succumbs to laziness and neglect due to the absence of competition as a stimulant; under the regime of slavery and serfdom, he works only with reluctance, lacking the stimulus of personal interest, unless the [764] master consents to leave him a large share of the fruits of his labor.

It is only when the worker is placed under the spur of competition and can retain for himself the full product of his labor that he is motivated to provide the greatest quantity and the best quality of work. Now, this situation can only occur under a regime of complete freedom of labor and trade (see these terms); it is therefore to freedom that one must turn, as M. Dunoyer has demonstrated so remarkably, to give labor its maximum efficiency or power.

The production of labor and its useful distribution, in the vast arena open to human activity, can still give rise to interesting considerations. Labor is a raw material necessary for all industries, but only in certain proportions determined by the nature of things. This raw material, therefore, cannot be produced in unlimited quantity, since the contribution of other productive agents—capital and appropriated natural resources—is essential for its utilization. Hence the necessity of limiting population, to avoid overburdening the labor market (see POPULATION). Hence also the necessity of allowing the distribution of labor to occur freely, so as to best meet the needs of production (see EMIGRATION).

We need not add that governments have no more reason to intervene in the use of this raw material than they do in that of any other commodity, and it has been demonstrated elsewhere that they pursue the most costly and disappointing of illusions when they attempt to protect national labor (see FREE TRADE).

Endnotes to Travail

[1] Traité d’Économie politique, book 1, chapter vii.

[2] We will cite two examples that bear a certain mark of originality, one concerning the troupe of actors in Nizhny Novgorod, the other a barber in the city of Penza.

"I could not suppress extreme surprise when I learned in Nizhny Novgorod," says M. Haxthausen, "that the entire theater staff—actors, singers, and actresses—were serfs belonging to a nobleman. I cannot say what a strange impression these words made on me. The prima donna, an actress adored by the public, accustomed to applause and triumphs, was the daughter of a poor peasant subject to the authority of a master; the actors who had played the roles of prince, boyar, and hero were equally poor souls, sons of serfs bound to their lord's land. What a strange contrast they must have found between their fleeting roles and their habitual condition, between the oblivion brought by artistic inspiration and the awareness of their real status! In order to have the right to be actors, to practice the freest and most independent of all the arts, they were obliged to pay their master an obroc, just as one must to practice a trade, to punctually settle a tithe levied on intelligence.

"Here is the history of the Nizhny Novgorod theater. A few years ago, a bachelor nobleman had a theater built on his estate and selected from among his serfs a number of individuals suited to become musicians or actors. Later, when their education was completed, he staged several operas and eventually moved to Nizhny Novgorod, where he also built a theater. At first, he invited only his friends and acquaintances using invitation cards, but later, when his financial difficulties—caused by excessive spending—forced him to put his affairs in order, he decided to sell tickets and simply became the entrepreneur or director of a troupe of actors. After his death, he was replaced by another director, and currently, as I was assured, it is still a nobleman who heads this enterprise."

Here is the other example:

"… Upon returning to the hotel where I was staying in Penza, I asked the innkeeper, a German, to send me a barber. A few minutes later, a well-dressed young man with a respectable demeanor entered and shaved me with the ease of a true Parisian. He was, however, a Russian peasant whom the lord of his village had trained as a Figaro, paying, in addition to food, 350 rubles for three years of apprenticeship. After this time, he was placed under the obroc system. The young man is quite pleased with his situation. He earns beyond the 175 rubles he must pay annually, enjoys himself, goes to the theater, and plays the dandy no better or worse than one of his counterparts on the Boulevard des Italiens."

Studies on the Internal Situation, National Life, and Rural Institutions of Russia, by Baron August von Haxthausen, vol. I, p. 271; and vol. II, p. 65.

In both cases, the rent or obroc paid by the serf included, in addition to the ordinary tax, an interest with amortization for the capital that the nobleman had invested in the development of the serf’s skills.