My lords, the magistrats and the people of the tribe of Nubia.

“WE have this day solemniz’d the happy nuptials of the two greatest princes that are upon the earth or in nature, arms and councils: in the mutual embraces wherof consists your whole commonwealth; whose councils upon their perpetual wheelings, marches, and countermarches, create her armys; and whose armys with the golden vollys of the ballot at once create and salute her councils. There be those (such is the world at present) that think it ridiculous to see a nation exercising its civil functions in military disciplin; while they, committing their buff to their servants, com themselves to hold trenchards. For what avails it such as are unarm’d, or (which is all one) whose education acquaints them not with the proper use of their swords, to be call’d citizens? What were two or three thousand of you, tho never so well affected to your [93] country, but naked, to one troop of mercenary soldiers? If they should com upon the field and say, Gentlemen, It is thought fit that such and such men should be chosen by you; where were your liberty; Or, Gentlemen, parlaments are exceeding good, but you are to have a little patience, these times are not so fit for them; where were your commonwealth? What causes the monarchy of the Turcs but servants in arms? What was it that begot the glorious commonwealth of Rome, but the sword in the hands of her citizens? Wherfore my glad eys salute the serenity and brightness of this day with a showr that shall not cloud it. Behold the army of Israel becom a commonwealth, and the commonwealth of Israel remaining an army, with her rulers of tens and of fiftys, her rulers of hundreds and thousands, drawing near (as this day throout our happy fields) to the lot by her tribes, increas’d above threefold, and led up by her phylarchs or princes, to sit upon [43] fifty thrones, judging the fifty tribes of Oceana! Or, Is it Athens, breaking from her iron sepulcher, where she has bin so long trampled by hosts of janizarys? For certainly that is the voice of Theseus, having gather’d his scatter’d Athenians into one city. [44] This freeborn nation lives not upon the dole or bounty of one man, but distributing her annual magistracys and honours with her own hand, is herself king PEOPLE—at which the orator was a while interrupted with shouts, but at length proceded)—Is it grave Lacedemon in her arm’d tribe divided by her obæ and her mora, which appears to chide me that I teach the people to talk, or conceive such language as is drest like a woman, to be a fit usher of the joys of liberty into the hearts of men? Is it Rome in her victorious arms (for so she held her concio or congregation) that congratulats with us, for finding out that which she could not hit on, and binding up her comitia curiata, centuriata, and tributa, in one inviolable league of union? Or is it the great council of incomparable Venice, bowling forth by the self-same ballot her immortal commonwealth? For, neither by reason nor by experience is it impossible that a commonwealth should be immortal; seeing the people being the materials, never dy; and the form, which is motion, must, without opposition, be endless. The bowl which is thrown from your hand, if there be no rub, no impediment, shall never cease: for which cause the glorious luminarys that are the bowls of God, were once thrown for ever; and next these, those of Venice. But certainly, my lords, whatever these great examples may have shewn us, we are the first that have shewn to the world a commonwealth establish’d in her rise upon fifty such towers, and so garnizon’d as are the tribes of Oceana, containing a hundred thousand elders upon the annual list, and yet but an outguard; besides her marching armys to be equal in the disciplin, and in the number of her youth.

“And forasmuch as soverain power is a necessary but a formidable creature, not unlike the pouder which (as you are soldiers) is at once your safety and your danger, being subject to take fire against you as well as for you; how well and securely is she by your galaxys so collected as to be in full force and vigor, and yet so distributed that it is impossible you should be blown up by your own [94] magazine? Let them who will have it, that power if it be confin’d cannot be soverain, tell us, whether our rivers do not enjoy a more secure and fruitful reign within their proper banks, than if it were lawful for them, in ravaging our harvests, to spill themselves? whether souls, not confin’d to their peculiar bodys, do govern them any more than those of witches in their trances? whether power, not confin’d to the bounds of reason and virtue, has any other bounds than those of vice and passion? or if vice and passion be boundless, and reason and virtue have certain limits, on which of these thrones holy men should anoint their soverain? but to blow away this dust, the soverain power of a commonwealth is no more bounded, that is to say straitned, than that of a monarch; but is balanc’d. The eagle mounts not to her proper pitch, if she be bounded; nor is free, if she be not balanc’d. And lest a monarch should think he can reach further with his scepter, the Roman eagle upon such a balance spread her wings from the ocean to Euphrates. Receive the soverain power; you have received it, hold it fast, imbrace it for ever in your shining arms. The virtue of the loadstone is not impair’d or limited, but receives strength and nourishment by being bound in iron. And so giving your lordships much joy, I take my leave of this tribe.”

The orator descending, had the period of his speech made with a vast applause and exultation of the whole tribe, attending him for that night to his quarter, as the phylarch with some commanded troops did the next day to the frontiers of the tribe, where leave was taken on both sides with more tears than grief.

Definition of the tribe.So, a tribe is the third division of land occasion’d by the third collection of the people, whose functions proper to that place are contain’d in the five foregoing orders.

The institution of the commonwealth was such as needed those props and scaffolds which may have troubled the reader; but I shall here take them away, and com to the constitution which stands by it self, and yields a clearer prospect.

Constitution of the commonwealth.The motions, by what has bin already shown, are spherical; and spherical motions have their proper center: for which cause (e’er I procede further) it will be necessary, for the better understanding of the whole, that I discover the center wherupon the motions of this commonwealth are form’d.

The center, or basis of every government, is no other than the fundamental laws of the same.

Fundamental laws are such as state what it is that a man may call his own, that is to say, property; and what the means be wherby a man may enjoy his own, that is to say, protection. The first is also call’d dominion, and the second empire or soverain power, wherof this (as has been shewn) is the natural product of the former: for such as is the balance of dominion in a nation, such is the nature of its empire.

Wherfore the fundamental laws of Oceana, or the center of this commonwealth, are the agrarian and the ballot: the agrarian by the balance of dominion preserving equality in the root; and the ballot by an equal rotation conveying it into the branch, or exercise of soverain power: as, to begin with the former, appears by

The thirteenth ORDER, constituting the agrarian laws of Oceana, Marpesia, and Panopea, wherby it is ordain’d, first, for all such lands as are lying and being [95] within the proper territorys of Oceana, that every man who is at present possest, or shall hereafter be possest of an estate in land exceeding the revenue of two thousand pounds a year, and having more than one son, shall leave his lands either equally divided among them, in case the lands amount to above 2000 l. a year to each; or so near equally in case they com under, that the greater part or portion of the same remaining to the eldest, excede not the value of two thousand pounds revenue. And no man, not in present possession of lands above the value of two thousand pounds by the year, shall receive, enjoy (except by lawful inheritance) acquire, or purchase to himself lands within the said territorys, amounting, with those already in his possession, above the said revenue. And if a man has a daughter, or daughters, except she be an heiress, or they be heiresses, he shall not leave or give to any one of them in marriage, or otherwise, for her portion, above the value of one thousand five hundred pounds in lands, goods, and monys. Nor shall any friend, kinsman, or kinswoman, add to her or their portion or portions that are so provided for, to make any one of them greater. Nor shall any man demand, or have more in marriage with any woman. Nevertheless an heiress shall enjoy her lawful inheritance, and a widow, whatsoever the bounty or affection of her husband shall bequeath to her, to be divided in the first generation, wherein it is divisible according as has bin shewn.

Secondly, For lands lying and being within the territorys of Marpesia, the agrarian shall hold in all parts as it is established in Oceana, except only in the standard or proportion of estates in land, which shall be set for Marpesia at five hundred pounds. And,

Thirdly, For Panopea, the agrarian shall hold in all parts, as in Oceana. And whosoever possessing above the proportion allow’d by these laws, shall be lawfully convicted of the same, shall forfeit the overplus to the use of the state.

Agrarian laws of all others have ever bin the greatest bugbears, and so in the institution were these, at which time it was ridiculous to see how strange a fear appear’d in every body of that which, being good for all, could hurt no body. But instead of the proof of this order, I shall out of those many debates that happen’d e’er it could be past, insert two speeches that were made at the council of legislators, the first by the right honourable Philautus de Garbo, a young man, being heir apparent to a very noble family, and one of the counsillors, who exprest himself as follows.

May it please your highness, my lord Archon of Oceana.

“IF I did not, to my capacity, know from how profound a counsillor I dissent, it would certainly be no hard task to make it as light as the day: first, That an agrarian is altogether unnecessary. Secondly, That it is dangerous to a commonwealth. Thirdly, That it is insufficient to keep out monarchy. Fourthly, That it ruins familys. Fifthly, That it destroys industry. And last of all, That tho it were indeed of any good use, it will be a matter of such difficulty to introduce in this nation, and so to settle that it may be lasting, as is altogether invincible.

“First, That an agrarian is unnecessary to a commonwealth, what clearer testimony can there be, than that the commonwealths which are our cotemporarys (Venice, to which your highness gives the upperhand of all antiquity, being [96] one) have no such thing? and there can be no reason why they have it not, seeing it is in the soverain power at any time to establish such an order, but that they need it not; wherfore no wonder if Aristotle, who pretends to be a good commonwealthsman has long since derided Phaleas, to whom it was attributed by the Greecs, for his invention.

“Secondly, That an agrarian is dangerous to a commonwealth is affirm’d upon no slight authority, seeing Machiavel is positive, that it was the dissension which happen’d about the agrarian that caus’d the destruction of Rome; nor do I think that it did much better in Lacedemon, as I shall shew anon.

“Thirdly, That it is insufficient to keep out monarchy cannot without impiety be deny’d, the holy Scriptures bearing witness, that the commonwealth of Israel, notwithstanding her agrarian, submitted her neck to the arbritrary yoke of her princes.

“Fourthly, therfore to com to my next assertion, That it is destructive to familys; this also is so apparent, that it needs pity rather than proof. Why, alas, do you bind a nobility (which no generation shall deny to have bin the first that freely sacrific’d their blood to the antient libertys of this people) on an unholy altar? why are the people taught, that their liberty, which, except our noble ancestors had bin born, must have long since bin bury’d, cannot now be born except we be bury’d? a commonwealth should have the innocence of the dove. Let us leave this purchase of her birth to the serpent, which eats itself out of the womb of its mother.

“Fifthly, but it may be said, perhaps, That we are fallen from our first love, becom proud and idle. It is certain, my lords, that the hand of God is not upon us for nothing. But take heed how you admit of such assaults and sallys upon mens estates, as may slacken the nerve of labor, and give others also reason to believe that their sweat is vain; or else, whatsoever be pretended, your agrarian (which is my fifth assertion) must indeed destroy industry. For, that so it did in Lacedemon is most apparent, as also that it could do no otherwise, where every man having his 40 quarters of barly, with wine proportionable, supply’d him out of his own lot by his laborer or helot; and being confin’d in that to the scantling above which he might not live, there was not any such thing as a trade, or other art, except that of war, in exercise. Wherfore a Spartan, if he were not in arms, must sit and play with his fingers, whence insu’d perpetual war, and, the estate of the city being as little capable of increase as that of the citizens, her inevitable ruin. Now what better ends you can propose to your selves in the like ways, I do not so well see as I perceive that there may be worse: for Lacedemon yet was free from civil war: but if you employ your citizens no better than she did, I cannot promise you that you shall fare so well, because they are still desirous of war that hope it may be profitable to them; and the strongest security you can give of peace, is to make it gainful. Otherwise men will rather chuse that wherby they may break your laws, than that wherby your laws may break them. Which I speak not so much in relation to the nobility or such as would be holding, as to the people or them that would be getting; the passion in these being so much the stronger, as a man’s felicity is weaker in the fruition of things, than in their prosecution and increase.

“Truly, my lords, it is my fear, that by taking of more hands, and the best from industry, you will farther indamage it, than can be repair’d by laying on a [97] few, and the worst; while the nobility must be forc’d to send their sons to the plow, and, as if this were not enough, to marry their daughters also to farmers.

“Sixthly, but I do not see (to come to the last point) how it is possible that this thing should be brought about, to your good I mean, tho it may to the destruction of many. For that the agrarian of Israel, or that of Lacedemon might stand, is no such miracle; the lands, without any consideration of the former proprietor, being survey’d and cast into equal lots, which could neither be bought, nor sold, nor multiply’d: so that they knew wherabout to have a man. But in this nation no such division can be introduc’d, the lands being already in the hands of proprietors, and such whose estates ly very rarely together, but mix’d one with another; being also of tenures in nature so different, that as there is no experience that an agrarian was ever introduc’d in such a case, so there is no appearance how, or reason why it should: but that which is against reason and experience is impossible.”

The case of my lord Philautus was the most concern’d in the whole nation; for he had four younger brothers, his father being yet living to whom he was heir of ten thousand pounds a year. Wherfore being a man both of good parts and esteem, his words wrought both upon mens reason and passions, and had born a stroke at the head of the business, if my lord Archon had not interpos’d the buckler in this oration.

My lords, the legislators of Oceana,

“MY lord Philautus has made a thing which is easy to seem hard; if the thanks were due to his eloquence, it would be worthy of less praise, than that he ows it to his merit, and the love he has most deservedly purchas’d of all men: nor is it rationally to be fear’d, that he who is so much beforehand in his privat, should be in arrear in his public capacity. Wherfore my lord’s tenderness throout his speech arising from no other principle than his solicitude lest the agrarian should be hurtful to his country; it is no less than my duty to give the best satisfaction I am able to so good a patriot, taking every one of his doubts in the order propos’d. And,

“First, Wheras my lord, upon observation of the modern commonwealths, is of opinion, that an agrarian is not necessary: it must be confest, that at the first sight of them there is som appearance favoring his assertion, but upon accidents of no precedent to us. For the commonwealths of Switzerland and Holland, I mean of those leagues, being situated in countrys not alluring the inhabitants to wantonness, but obliging them to universal industry, have an implicit agrarian in the nature of them: and being not obnoxious to a growing nobility (which, as long as their former monarchys had spread the wing over them, conld either not at all be hatch’d, or was soon broken) are of no example to us, whose experience in this point has bin to the contrary. But what if even in these governments there be indeed an explicit agrarian? for when the law commands an equal or near equal distribution of a man’s estate in land among his children, as it is don in those countrys, a nobility cannot grow; and so there needs no agrarian, or rather there is one. And for the growth of the nobility in Venice (if so it be, for Machiavel observes in that republic, as a cause of it, a great mediocrity [98] of estates) it is not a point that she is to fear, but might study, seeing she consists of nothing else but nobility; by which, whatever their estates fuck from the people, especially, if it coms equally, is digested into the better blood of that commonwealth, which is all, or the greatest benefit they can have by accumulation. For how inequal soever you will have them to be in their incoms, they have officers of the pomp, to bring them equal in expences, or at least in the ostentation or shew of them. And so unless the advantage of an estate consists more in the measure than in the use of it, the authority of Venice dos but inforce our agrarian; nor shall a man evade or elude the prudence of it, by the authority of any other commonwealth. For if a commonwealth has bin introduc’d at once, as those of Israel and Lacedemon, you are certain to find her underlaid with this as the main foundation; nor, if she is oblig’d more to fortune than prudence, has she rais’d her head without musing upon this matter, as appears by that of Athens, which thro her defect in this point, says Aristotle, introduc’d her ostracism, as most of the democracys of Grece.Polit. 1. 3. c. 9. But, not to restrain a fundamental of such latitude to any one kind of government, do we not yet see, that if there be a sole landlord of a vast territory, he is the Turc? that if a few landlords overbalance a populous country, they have store of servants? that if a people be in an equal balance, they can have no lords? that no government can otherwise be erected, than upon som one of these foundations? that no one of these foundations (each being else apt to change into som other) can give any security to the government, unless it be fix’d: that thro the want of this fixation, potent monarchy and commonwealths have faln upon the heads of the people, and accompany’d their own sad ruins with vast effusions of innocent blood? let the fame, as was the merit of the antient nobility of this nation, be equal to, or above what has bin already said, or can be spoken; yet have we seen not only their glory, but that of a throne, the most indulgent to, and least invasive for so many ages upon the liberty of a people that the world has known, thro the mere want of fixing her foot by a proportionable agrarian upon her proper foundation, to have faln with such horror, as has bin a spectacle of astonishment to the whole earth. And were it well argu’d from one calamity, that we ought not to prevent another? nor is Aristotle so good a commonwealthsman for deriding the invention of Phaleas, as in recollecting himself, where he says, That democracys, when a less part of their citizens overtop the rest in wealth, degenerat into oligarchys and principalitys; and, which coms nearer to the present purpose, that the greater part of the nobility of Tarentum coming accidentally to be ruin’d, the government of the few came by consequence to be chang’d into that of the many.Polit. l. 5. c. 3.

“These things consider’d, I cannot see how an agrarian, as to the fixation or security of a government, can be less than necessary. And if a cure be necessary, it excuses not the patient, his disease being otherwise desperat, that it is dangerous; which was the case of Rome, not so stated by Machiavel, where he says, That the strife about the agrarian caus’d the destruction of that commonwealth. As if when a senator was not rich (as Crassus held) except he could pay an army, that commonwealth could expect nothing but ruin whether in strife about the agrarian, or without it. [45] Of late, says Livy, riches have introduc’d avarice; [99] and voluptuous pleasures abounding, have thro lust and luxury begot a desire of blasting and destroying all good orders. If the greatest security of a commonwealth consists in being provided with the proper antidote against this poison, her greatest danger must be from the absence of an agrarian, which is the whole truth of the Roman example. For the laconic, I shall reserve the farther explication of it, as my lord also did, to another place: and first see whether an agrarian proportion’d to a popular government be sufficient to keep out monarchy. My lord is for the negative, and fortify’d by the people of Israel electing a king. To which I say, That the action of the people therin exprest is a full answer to the objection of that example: for the monarchy neither grew upon them, nor could, by reason of the agrarian, possibly have invaded them, if they had not pull’d it upon themselves by the election of a king. Which being an accident, the like wherof is not to be found in any other people so planted, nor in this, till, as it is manifest, they were given up by God to infatuation (for says he to Samuel, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them) has somthing in it which is apparent, by what went before, to have bin besides the course of nature, and by what follow’d. For the king having no other foundation than the calamitys of the people, so often beaten by their enemys, that despairing of themselves, they were contented with any change; if he had peace as in the days of Solomon, left but a slippery throne to his successor, as appear’d by Rehoboam. And the agrarian, notwithstanding the monarchy thus introduc’d, so faithfully preserv’d the root of that commonwealth, that it shot forth oftner, and by intervals continu’d longer than any other government, as may be computed from the institution of the same by Joshua, 1465 years before Christ, to the total dissolution of it, which happen’d in the reign of the emperor Adrian, 135 years after the incarnation. A people planted upon an equal agrarian, and holding to it, if they part with their liberty, must do it upon good-will, and make but a bad title of their bounty. As to instance yet further in that which is propos’d by the present order to this nation, the standard wherof is at 2000 l. a year: the whole territory of Oceana being divided by this proportion, amounts to 5000 lots. So the lands of Oceana being thus distributed, and bound to this distribution, can never fall to fewer than five thousand proprietors. But five thousand proprietors so seiz’d will not agree to break the agrarian, for that were to agree to rob one another; nor to bring in a king, because they must maintain him, and can have no benefit by him; nor to exclude the people, because they can have as little by that, and must spoil their militia. So the commonwealth continuing upon the balance propos’d, tho it should come into five thousand hands, can never alter; and that it should ever come into five thousand hands, is as improbable as any thing in the world that is not altogether impossible.

“My lord’s other considerations are more privat: as that this order destroys familys; which is as if one should lay the ruin of some antient castle to the herbs which usually grow out of them; the destruction of those familys being that indeed which naturally produc’d this order. For we do not now argue for that which we would have, but for that which we are already possest of; as would appear, if a note were but taken of all such as have at this day above two thousand pounds a year in Oceana. If my lord should grant (and I will put it with the most) that they who are proprietors in land, exceeding this proportion, exceed [100] not three hundred; with what brow can the interest of so few be balanc’d with that of the whole nation? or rather, what interest have they to put in such a balance? they would live as they had bin accustom’d to do; who hinders them? they would enjoy their estates; who touches them? they would dispose of what they have according to the interest of their familys: it is that which we desire. A man has one son; let him be call’d: would he enjoy his father’s estate? it is his, his son’s, and his son’s son’s after him. A man has five sons; let them be call’d: would they enjoy their father’s estate? it is divided among them: for we have four votes for one in the same family, and therefore this must be the interest of the family, or the family knows not its own interest. If a man shall dispute otherwise, he must draw his arguments from custom, and from greatness, which was the interest of the monarchy, not of the family: and we are now a commonwealth. If the monarchy could not bear with such divisions because they tended to a commonwealth; neither can a commonwealth connive at such accumulations, because they tend to a monarchy. If the monarchy might make bold with so many for the good of one, we may make bold with one for the good of so many; nay, for the good of all. My lords, it coms into my mind, that which upon occasion of the variety of partys enumerated in our late civil wars, was said by a friend of mine coming home from his travels, about the latter end of these troubles: That he admir’d how it came to pass, that younger brothers, especially being so many more in number than their elder, did not unite as one man against a tyranny, the like wherof has not bin exercis’d in any other nation. And truly, when I consider that our countrymen are none of the worst natur’d, I must confess I marvel much how it coms to pass, that we should use our children as we do our puppys; take one, lay it in the lap, feed it with every good bit, and drown five: nay yet worse; forasmuch as the puppys are once drown’d, wheras the children are left perpetually drowning. Really, my lords, it is a flinty custom! and all this for his cruel ambition, that would raise himself a pillar, a golden pillar for his monument, tho he has children, his own reviving flesh, and a kind of immortality. And this is that interest of a family, for which we are to think ill of a government that will not indure it. But quiet ourselves: the land thro which the river Nilus wanders in one stream, is barren; but where it parts into seven, it multiplys its fertil shores by distributing, yet keeping and improving such a propriety and nutrition, as is a prudent agrarian to a well-order’d commonwealth.

“Nor (to com to the fifth assertion) is a political body render’d any fitter for industry, by having one gouty and another wither’d leg, than a natural. It tends not to the improvement of merchandize that there be som who have no need of their trading, and others that are not able to follow it. If confinement discourages industry, an estate in mony is not confin’d; and lest industry should want wherupon to work, land is not ingrost or intail’d upon any man, but remains at its devotion. I wonder whence the computation can arise, that this should discourage industry. Two thousand pounds a year a man may enjoy in Oceana, as much in Panopea, five hundred in Marpesia: there be other plantations, and the commonwealth will have more. Who knows how far the arms of our agrarian may extend themselves? and whether he that might have left a pillar, may not leave a temple of many pillars to his more pious memory? where there is som measure in riches, a man may be rich; but if you will have them to [101] be infinit, there will be no end of starving himself, and wanting what he has: and what pains dos such a one take to be poor! furthermore, if a man shall think that there may be an industry less greasy, or more noble, and so cast his thoughts upon the commonwealth, he will have leisure for her, and she riches and honors for him; his sweat shall smell like Alexander’s. My lord Philautus is a young man, who enjoying his ten thousand pounds a year, may keep a noble house in the old way, and have homely guests; and having but two, by the means propos’d, may take the upper hand of his great ancestors; with reverence to whom, I may say, there has not bin one of them would have disputed his place with a Roman consul. My lord, do not break my heart; the nobility shall go to no other plows than those which we call our consuls. But, says he, it having bin so with Lacedemon, that neither the city nor the citizens were capable of increase, a blow was given by that agrarian, which ruin’d both. And what are we concern’d with that agrarian, or that blow, while our citizens and our city (and that by our agrarian) are both capable of increase? the Spartan, if he made a conquest, had no citizens to hold it: the Oceaner will have enow: the Spartan could have no trade, the Oceaner may have all. The agrarian in Laconia, that it might bind on knapsacs, forbidding all other arts but that of war, could not make an army of above 30000 citizens. The agrarian in Oceana without interruption of traffic, provides us in the fifth part of the youth an annual source or fresh spring of 100000, besides our provincial auxiliarys, out of which to draw marching armys; and as many elders, not feeble, but men most of them in the flower of their age, and in arms for the defence of our territorys. The agrarian in Laconia banish’d mony, this multiplys it: that allow’d a matter of twenty or thirty acres to a man; this two or three thousand: there is no comparison between them. And yet I differ so much from my lord, or his opinion that the agrarian was the ruin of Lacedemon, that I hold it no less than demonstrable to have bin her main support. For if, banishing all other diversions, it could not make an army of above 30000; then letting in all other diversions, it must have broken that army. Wherfore Lysander bringing in the golden spoils of Athens, irrecoverably ruin’d that commonwealth; and is a warning to us, that in giving incouragement to industry, we also remember, that covetousness is the root of all evil. And our agrarian can never be the cause of those seditions threaten’d by my lord, but is the proper cure of them, as [46] Lucan notes well in the state of Rome before the civil wars, which happen’d thro the want of such an antidote.

“Why then are we mistaken, as if we intended not equal advantages in our commonwealth to either sex, because we would not have womens fortunes consist in that metal, which exposes them to cutpurses? if a man cuts my purse, I may have him by the heels or by the neck for it; wheras a man may cut a woman’s purse, and have her for his pains in fetters. How brutish, and much more than brutish, is that commonwealth, which prefers the earth before the fruits of the womb? if the people be her treasure, the staff by which she is sustain’d and comforted, with what justice can she suffer them, by whom she is most inrich’d, to be for that cause the most impoverish’d? and yet we see the [102] gifts of God, and the bountys of heaven in fruitful familys, thro this wretched custom of marrying for mony, becom their insupportable grief and poverty. Nor falls this so heavy upon the lower sort, being better able to shift for themselves, as upon the nobility or gentry. For what avails it in this case, from whence their veins have deriv’d their blood; while they shall see the tallow of a chandler sooner converted into that beauty which is requir’d in a bride? I appeal, whether my lord Philautus or my self be the advocat of nobility; against which in the case propos’d by me, there would be nothing to hold the balance. And why is a woman, if she may have but fifteen hundred pounds, undon? if she be unmarry’d, what nobleman allows his daughter in that case a greater revenu, than so much mony may command? and if she marry, no nobleman can give his daughter a greater portion than she has. Who is hurt in this case? nay, who is not benefited? if the agrarian gives us the sweat of our brows without diminution; if it prepares our table, if it makes our cup to overflow; and above all this, in providing for our children, anoints our heads with that oil which takes away the greatest of worldly cares; what man, that is not besotted with a covetousness as vain as endless, can imagin such a constitution to be his poverty? seeing where no woman can be considerable for her portion, no portion will be considerable with a woman; and so his children will not only find better preferments without his brokage, but more freedom of their own affections. We are wonderful severe in laws, that they shall not marry without our consent; as if it were care and tenderness over them: but is it not lest we should not have the other thousand pounds with this son, or the other hundred pounds a year more in jointure for that daughter? these, when we are crost in them, are the sins for which we water our couch with tears, but not of penitence; seeing wheras it is a mischief beyond any that we can do to our enemys, we persist to make nothing of breaking the affection of our children. But there is in this agrarian a homage to pure and spotless love, the consequence wherof I will not give for all your romances. An alderman makes not his daughter a countess till he has given her 20000 l. nor a romance a considerable mistriss till she be a princess; these are characters of bastard love. But if our agrarian excludes ambition and covetousness, we shall at length have the care of our own breed, in which we have bin curious as to our dogs and horses. The marriage-bed will be truly legitimat, and the race of the commonwealth not spurious.

“But (impar magnanimis ausis, imparque dolori) I am hurl’d from all my hopes by my lord’s last assertion of impossibility, that the root from whence we imagin these fruits, should be planted or thrive in this soil. And why? because of the mixture of estates, and variety of tenures. Nevertheless, there is yet extant in the exchequer an old survey of the whole nation; wherfore such a thing is not impossible. Now if a new survey were taken at the present rates, and the law made, that no man should hold hereafter above so much land as is valu’d therein at 2000 l. a year, it would amount to a good and sufficient agrarian. It is true, that there would remain som difficulty in the different kind of rents, and that it is a matter requiring not only more leisure than we have, but an authority which may be better able to bow men to a more general consent, than is to be wrought out of them by such as are in our capacity. Wherfore, as to the manner, it is necessary that we refer it to the parlament; but as to the matter, they cannot otherwise fix their government upon the right balance.

[103]

“I shall conclude with a few words to som parts of the order, which my lord has omitted. As first to the consequences of the agrarian to be settled in Marpesia, which irreparably breaks the aristocracy of that nation; being of such a nature, as standing, it is not possible that you should govern. For while the people of that country are little better than the cattel of the nobility, you must not wonder if, according as these can make their markets with foren princes, you find those to be driven upon your grounds. And if you be so tender, now you have it in your power, as not to hold a hand upon them that may prevent the slaughter which must otherwise insue in like cases, the blood will lie at your door. But in holding such a hand upon them, you may settle the agrarian; and in settling the agrarian, you give that people not only liberty, but lands; which makes your protection necessary to their security; and their contribution due to your protection, as to their own safety.

“For the agrarian of Panopea, it allowing such proportions of so good land, men that conceive themselves straiten’d by this in Oceana, will begin there to let themselves forth, where every citizen will in time have his villa. And there is no question, but the improvement of that country by this means must be far greater than it has bin in the best of former times.

“I have no more to say, but that in those antient and heroic ages (when men thought that to be necessary which was virtuous) the nobility of Athens having the people so much ingag’d in their debt, that there remain’d no other question among these, than which of those should be king, no sooner heard Solon speak than they quitted their debts, and restor’d the commonwealth; which ever after held a solemn and annual feast call’d the Sisacthia, or Recision, in memory of that action. Nor is this example the phœnix; for at the institution by Lycurgus, the nobility having estates (as ours here) in the lands of Laconia, upon no other valuable consideration than the commonwealth propos’d by him, threw them up to be parcel’d by his agrarian. But now when no man is desir’d to throw up a farthing of his mony, or a shovel full of his earth, and that all we can do is but to make a virtue of necessity; we are disputing whether we should have peace or war: for peace you cannot have without som government, nor any government without the proper balance. Wherfore if you will not fix this which you have, the rest is blood, for without blood you can bring in no other.”

By these speeches made at the institution of the agrarian, you may perceive what were the grounds of it. The next is

14 Order.The fourteenth ORDER, constituting the ballot of Venice, as it is fitted by several alterations, and appointed to every assembly, to be the constant and only way of giving suffrage in this commonwealth, according to the following scheme.

[104] [105]

I shall indeavour by the preceding figure to demonstrat the manner of the VENETIAN BALLOT (a thing as difficult in discourse or writing, as facil in practice) according to the use of it in Oceana. The whole figure represents the senat, containing, as to the house or form of sitting, a square and a half; the tribunal at the upper end being ascended by four steps. On the uppermost of these sit the magistrats that constitute the signory of the commonwealth, that is to say, A the strategus; B the orator; C the three commissioners of the great seal; D the three commissioners of the treasury, whereof one, E, exercises for the present the office of a censor at the middle urn F.

To the two upper steps of the tribunal answer GG. GG. the two long benches next the wall on each side of the house; the outwardmost of which are equal in height to the uppermost step, and the innermost equal in height to the next. Of these four benches consists the first seat; as the second seat consists in like manner of those four benches HH. HH. which being next the floor, are equal in height to the two nethermost steps of the throne. So the whole house is distributed into two seats, each consisting of four benches.

This distribution causes not only the greater conveniency, as will be shewn, to the senators in the exercise of their function at the ballot, but a greater grace to the aspect of the senat. In the middle of the outward benches stand I. I. the chairs of the censors, those being their ordinary places, tho upon occasion of the ballot they descend, and sit where they are shewn by K. K. at each of the outward urns L. L. Those M. M. that sit with their tables, and the bowls N. N. before them, upon the half space or second step of the tribunal from the floor, are the clercs or secretarys of the house. Upon the short seats O. O. on the floor (which should have bin represented by woolsacks) sit P the two tribuns of the horse; Q the two tribuns of the foot; and RR. RR. the judges: all which magistrats are assistants, but have no suffrage. This posture of the senat consider’d, the ballot is perform’d as follows.

First, whereas the gold balls are of several sutes, and accordingly mark’d with several letters of the alphabet, a secretary presents a litle urn (wherin there is one ball of every sute or mark) to the strategus and the orator; and look what letter the strategus draws, the same and no other is to be us’d for that time in the middle urn F; the like for the letter drawn by the orator is to be observ’d for the side urns L. L. that is to say, if the strategus drew a ball with an A, all the gold balls in the middle urn for that day are mark’d with the letter A; and if the orator drew a B, all the gold balls in the side urn for that day are mark’d with the letter B: which don immediatly before the ballot, and so the letter unknown to the ballotants, they can use no fraud or jugling; otherwise a man might carry a gold ball in his hand, and seem to have drawn it out of an urn. He that draws a gold ball at any urn, delivers it to the censor or assessor of that urn, who views the character, and allows accordingly of his lot.

The strategus and the orator having drawn for the letters, the urns are prepar’d accordingly by one of the commissioners and the two censors. The preparation of the urns is after this manner. If the senat be to elect, for example, the list call’d the tropic of magistrats, which is this;

1. The lord STRATEGUS;
2. The lord ORATOR; [106]
3. The third COMMISSIONER of the great seal;
4. The third COMMISSIONER of the treasury;
5. The first CENSOR;
6. The second CENSOR;

This list or schedule consists of six magistracys, and to every magistracy there are to be four competitors, that is, in all four and twenty competitors propos’d to the house. They that are to propose the competitors are call’d electors, and no elector can propose above one competitor: wherfore for the proposing of four and twenty competitors you must have four and twenty electors; and wheras the ballot consists of a lot and of a suffrage, the lot is for no other use than for the designation of electors; and he that draws a gold ball at the middle urn is an elector. Now, as to have four and twenty competitors propos’d, you must have four and twenty electors made; so to have four and twenty electors made by lot, you must have four and twenty gold balls in the middle urn; and these (because otherwise it would be no lot) mix’d with a competent number of blanks, or silver balls. Wherfore to the four and twenty gold balls cast six and twenty silver ones, and those (reckoning the blanks with the prizes) make fifty balls in the middle urn. This don (because no man can com to the middle urn that has not first drawn a gold ball at one of the side urns) and to be sure that the prizes or gold balls in this urn be all drawn, there must com to it fifty persons: therfore there must be in each of the side urns five and twenty gold balls, which in both com to fifty; and to the end that every senator may have his lot, the gold balls in the side urns are to be made up with blanks equal to the number of the ballotants at either urn: for example, the house consisting of 300 senators, there must be in each of the side urns 125 blanks and 25 prizes, which com in both the side urns to 300 balls. This is the whole mystery of preparing the urns, which the censors having skill to do accordingly, the rest of the ballot, whether the partys balloting understand it or no, must of necessary consequence com right; and they can neither be out, nor fall into any confusion in the exercise of this art.

But the ballot, as I said, is of two parts, lot and suffrage, or the proposition and result. The lot determins who shall propose the competitors; and the result of the senat, which of the competitors shall be the magistrats. The whole, to begin with the lot, procedes in this manner.

The first secretary with an audible voice reads first the list of the magistrats to be chosen for the day; then the oath for fair election, at which the senators hold up their hands; which don, another secretary presents a little urn to the strategus, in which are four balls, each of them having one of these four inscriptions: FIRST SEAT AT THE UPPER END. FIRST SEAT AT THE LOWER END. SECOND SEAT AT THE UPPER END. SECOND SEAT AT THE LOWER END. And look which of them the strategus draws, the secretary pronouncing the inscription with a loud voice, the seat so call’d coms accordingly to the urns: this in the figure is the SECOND SEAT AT THE UPPER END. The manner of their coming to the side urns is in double files, there being two holes in the cover of each side urn, by which means two may draw at once. The senators therfore SS. SS. are coming from the upper end of their seats HH. HH. to the side urns L. L. The senators TT. T. are drawing. The senator V has drawn a gold ball at his side urn, and is going to the middle urn F, [107] where the senator W having don the like at the other side urn, is already drawing. But the senators XX. XX. having drawn blanks at their side urns, and thrown them into the bowls Y. Y. standing at the feet of the urns, are marching by the lower end into their seats again; the senator a having don the like at the middle urn, is also throwing his blank into the bowl b, and marching to his seat again: for a man by a prize at a side urn gains no more than right to com to the middle urn, where if he draws a blank, his fortune at the side urn comes to nothing at all; wherfore he also returns to his place. But the senator c has had a prize at the middle urn, where the commissioner having viewed his ball, and found the mark to be right, he marches up the steps to the seat of the electors, which is the form d set cross the tribunal, where he places himself according as he was drawn with the other electors e e e drawn before him. These are not to look back, but sit with their faces towards the signory or state, till their number amount to that of the magistrats to be that day chosen, which for the present, as was shewn, are six; wherfore six electors being made, they are reckon’d according as they were drawn: first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, in their order; and the first six that are chosen are the FIRST ORDER OF ELECTORS.

THE first order of electors being made, are conducted by a secretary with a copy of the list to be chosen, out of the senat, and into a committee or council-chamber, being neither suffered by the way, nor in their room (till the ballot be ended) to have conference with any but themselves; wherfore the secretary, having given them their oath that they shall make election according to the law and their conscience, delivers them the list, and seats himself at the lower end of the table with his pen and paper, while another secretary keeps the door.

By such time as the first order of electors are thus seated, the second order of electors is drawn, who with a second copy of the same list are conducted into another committee-chamber, by other secretarys performing the same office with the former.

The like exactly is don by the third and by the fourth orders (or hands, as the Venetians call them) of electors, by which means you have the four and twenty electors divided according to the four copys of the same list, by six, into four hands or orders; and every one of these orders names one competitor to every magistracy in the list; that is to say, the first elector names to the first magistracy, the second elector to the second magistracy, and so forth. But tho the electors, as has bin shewn, are chosen by mere lot, yet the competitors by them nam’d are not chosen by any lot, but by the suffrage of the whole order: for example; the first elector in the first order proposes a name to be Strategus, which name is balloted by himself and the other five electors: and if the name so balloted attain not to above half the suffrages, it is laid aside, and the first elector names another to the same magistracy; and so in case this also fails, another, till one he has nam’d, whether it be himself, or som other, has attained to above half the suffrages in the affirmative; and the name so attaining to above half the suffrages in the affirmative is written to the first magistracy in the list by the secretary; which being don, the second elector of the first order names to the second magistracy till one of his nomination be chosen to the same. The like is don by the rest of the electors of the first order, till one competitor be chosen, and written to every magistracy in their list. Now the second, third, and fourth orders of electors doing exactly after the [108] same manner, it coms to pass that one competitor to every magistracy being chosen in each order, there be in all four competitors chosen to every magistracy.

If any controversy arises in an order of electors, one of the censors (these being at this game the groomporters) is advertis’d by the secretary, who brings him in, and the electors, disputing are bound to acquiesce in his sentence. For which cause it is that the censors do not ballot at the urns; the signory also abstains, lest it should deform the house: wherfore the blanks in the side urns are by so many the fewer. And so much for the lot, which is of the greater art but less consequence, because it concerns proposition only: but all, (except the tribuns and the judges, which being but assistants have no suffrage) are to ballot at the result, to which I now com.

The four orders of electors having perfected their lists, the face of the house is chang’d: for the urns are taken away, and every senator and magistrat is seated in his proper place, saving the electors, who, having given their suffrages already, may not stir out of their chambers till the house have given theirs, and the rest of the ballot be perform’d; which follows in this manner.

The four lists being presented by the secretarys of each council of electors to the signory, are first read, according to their order, to the house with an audible voice; and then the competitors are put to the ballot or suffrage of the whole senat in this manner: A. A. nam’d to be strategus in the first order; wherupon eight ballotins or pages, such as are express’d by the figures f. f. take eight of the boxes represented, tho rudely, by the figures, g. g. and go four on the one, and four on the other side of the house, that is, one to every bench, signifying A. A. nam’d to be the strategus in the first order: and every magistrat or senator (beginning by the strategus and the orator first) holds up a little pellet of linen, as the box passes, between his finger and his thumb, that men may see he has but one, and then puts it into the same. The box consisting in the inner part of two boxes, being painted on the outside white and green, to distinguish the affirmative from the negative side, is so made, that when your hand is in it, no man can see to which of the sides you put the suffrage, nor hear to which it falls, because the pellet being linen, makes no noise. The strategus and the orator having begun, all the rest do the like.

The ballotins having thus gather’d the suffrages, bring them before the signory, in whose presence the outward boxes being open’d, they take out the inner boxes, wherof the affirmative is white, and the negative green, and pour the white in the bowl N. on the right hand, which is white also, and the green into the bowl N. on the left, which is also green. These bowls or basons (better represented at the lower end of the figure by h. i.) being upon this occasion set before the tables of the secretarys at the upper end N. N. the white on the right hand, and the green on the left, the secretarys on each side number the balls: by which if they find that the affirmatives amount not to above one half, they write not the name that was balloted; but if they amount to above one half, they write it, adding the number of above half the suffrages to which it attain’d. The first name being written, or laid aside, the next that is put is B. B. nam’d to be strategus in the second order; the third C. C. nam’d to be strategus in the third order; the fourth D. D. nam’d to be strategus in the fourth order: and he of these four competitors that has most above half in the affirmative, is the magistrat; or if none of them attain to above half, the nomination for that magistracy is to be repeated by such new electors as [109] shall be chosen at the next ballot. And so, as is exemplify’d in the first magistracy, proceeds the ballot of the rest; first in the first, then in the second, and so in the third and fourth orders.

Now wheras it may happen that A. A. (for example) being nam’d strategus in the first order, may also be nam’d to the same or som one or more other magistracys in one or more of the other orders; his name is first balloted where it is first written, that is to the more worthy magistracy, wherof if he misses, he is balloted as it coms in course for the next, and so for the rest, if he misses of that, as often as he is nam’d.

And because to be nam’d twice, or oftner, whether to the same or som other magistracy, is the stronger recommendation; the note must not fail to be given upon the name, at the proposition in this manner; A. A. nam’d to be strategus in the first, and in the second order: or A. A. nam’d to be strategus in the first and the third; in the first and the fourth, &c. But if he be nam’d to the same magistracy in the first, second, third, and fourth orders, he can have no competitor; wherfore attaining to above half the suffrages, he is the magistrat. Or thus: A. A. nam’d to be strategus in the first, to be censor in the second, to be orator in the third, and to be commissioner of the seal in the fourth order, or the like in more or fewer orders: in which cases if he misses of the first magistracy, he is balloted to the second; if he misses of the second, to the third; and if he misses of the third, to the fourth.

The ballot not finish’d before sunset, tho the election of the magistrats already chosen be good, voids the election of such competitors as being chosen are not yet furnish’d with magistracys, as if they had never bin nam’d (for this is no jugling box, but an art that must see the sun) and the ballot for the remaining magistracys is to be repeated the next day by new orders of electors, and such competitors as by them shall be elected. And so in the like manner, if of all the names propos’d to the same magistracy, no one of them attains to above half the suffrages in the affirmative.

The senatorian ballot of Oceana being thus describ’d, those of the parish, of the hundred, and of the tribe, being so little different, that in this they are all contain’d, and by this may be easily understood, are yet fully describ’d, and made plain enough before in the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th orders.

This therfore is the general order, whence those branches of the ballot, som wherof you have already seen, are deriv’d; which, with those that follow were all read and debated in this place at the institution. When my lord Epimonus de Garrula, being one of the counsellors, and having no farther patience (tho the rulers were compos’d by the agent of this commonwealth, residing for that purpose at Venice) than to hear the direction for the parishes, stood up and made way for himself in this manner.

May it please your highness, my lord Archon,

“UNDER correction of Mr. Peregrin Spy, our very learn’d agent and intelligencer, I have seen the world a little, Venice, and (as gentlemen are permitted to do) the great council balloting. And truly I must needs say, that it is for a dumb shew the goodliest that I ever beheld with my eys. You should have som would take it ill, as if the noble Venetians thought themselves too [110] good to speak to strangers, but they observ’d them not so narrowly. The truth is, they have nothing to say to their acquaintance; or men that are in council sure would have tongues: for a council, and not a word spoken in it, is a contradiction. But there is such a pudder with their marching and countermarching, as, tho never a one of them draw a sword, you would think they were training; which till I found that they did it only to entertain strangers, I came from among them as wise as I went thither. But in the parlament of Oceana you had no balls nor dancing, but sober conversation; a man might know and be known, shew his parts, and improve ’em. And now if you take the advice of this same fellow, you will spoil all with his whimsys. Mr. Speaker,—Cry you mercy, my lord Archon, I mean; set the wisest man of your house in the great council of Venice, and you will not know him from a fool. Wheras nothing is more certain, than that flat and dull fellows in the judgment of all such as us’d to keep company with them before, upon election into our house, have immediatly chitted like barley in the fat, where it acquires a new spirit, and flow’d forth into language, that I am as confident as I am here, if there were not such as delight to abuse us, is far better than Tully’s; or, let any body but translate one of his orations, and speak it in the house, and see if every body do not laugh at him. This is a great matter, Mr. Speaker; they do not cant it with your book-learning, your orbs, your centers, your prime magnitudes, and your nebulones, things I profess that would make a sober man run stark mad to hear ’em; while we, who should be considering the honor of our country, and that it gos now or never upon our hand, whether it shall be ridiculous to all the world, are going to nineholes, or trow madam for our business, like your dumb Venetian, whom this same Sir Politic your resident, that never saw him do any thing but make faces, would insinuat into you, at this distance, to have the only knack of state. Wheras if you should take the pains, as I have don, to look a little nearer, you would find these same wonderful things to be nothing else but mere natural fopperys, or capricios, as they call them in Italian, even of the meanest of that nation. For, put the case you be travelling in Italy, ask your contadino, that is, the next country-fellow you meet, som question, and presently he ballots you an answer with a nod, which is affirmative; or a shake with his head, which is the negative box; or a shrug with his shoulder, which is the bossolo di non sinceri.—Good! You will admire Sands for telling you, that grotta di cane is a miracle: and I shall be laugh’d at for assuring you, that it is nothing else but such a damp (continu’d by the neighborhood of certain sulphur mines) as thro accidental heat dos somtimes happen in our coalpits. But ingratitude must not discorage an honest man from doing good. There is not, I say, such a tonguety’d generation under heaven as your Italian; that you should not wonder if he make signs. But our people must have somthing in their diurnals, we must ever and anon be telling ’em our minds; or if we be at it when we raise taxes, like those gentlemen with the finger and the thumb, they will swear that we are cutpurses.—Com, I know what I have heard ’em say, when som men had mony that wrought hard enough for it; and do you conceive they will be better pleas’d when they shall be told, that upon like occasions you are at mumchance or stoolball? I do not speak for myself; for tho I shall always acknowledge, that I got more by one year’s sitting in the house, than by my three years travels, it was not of that kind. But I hate that this same spy, for pretending to have play’d [111] at billiards with the most serene commonwealth of Venice, should make such fools of us here, when I know that he must have had his intelligence from som corncutter upon the Rialta; for a noble Venetian would be hang’d if he should keep such a fellow company. And yet if I do not think he has made you all dote, never trust me, my lord Archon is somtimes in such strange raptures. Why, good my lord, let me be heard as well as your apple squire; Venice has fresh blood in her cheeks, I must confess, yet she is but an old lady. Nor has he pick’d her cabinet; these he sends you are none of her receits, I can assure you; he bought them for a Julio at St. Marc’s of a mountebank. She has no other wash, upon my knowlege, for that same envy’d complexion of hers but her marshes, being a little better scented, saving your presence, than a chamberpot. My lords, I know what I say, but you will never have don with it, That neither the great Turc, nor any of those little Turcs her neighbors, have bin able to spoil her! Why you may as well wonder that weesels do not suck egs in swans nests. Do you think that it has lain in the devotion of her beads; which you that have puk’d so much at Popery, are now at length resolv’d shall consecrat M. Parson, and be drop’d by every one of his congregation, while those same whimsical intelligences your surveyors (you will break my heart) give the turn to your primum mobile? and so I think they will; for you will find, that mony is the primum mobile, and they will turn you thus out of som three or four hundred thousand pounds: a pretty sum for urns and balls, for boxes and pills, which these same quacksalvers are to administer to the parishes; and for what disease I marvel! Or how dos it work? Out coms a constable, an overseer, and a churchwarden! Mr. Speaker, I am amaz’d!”

Never was there goose so stuck with lard as my lord Epimonus’s speech with laughter; the Archon having much ado to recover himself, in such manner as might enable him to return these thanks.

“IN your whole lives, my lords, were you never entertain’d with so much ingenuity; my lord Epimonus having at once mended all the faults of travellers. For, first, wheras they are abominable lyars, he has not told you (except som malicious body has misinform’d him concerning poor Spy) one syllable of falshood. And, secondly, wheras they never fail to give the upper hand in all their discourses to foren nations, still justling their own into the kennel; he bears an honor to his country that will not dissolve in Cephalonia, nor be corrupted with figs and melons, which I can assure you is no ordinary obligation: and therfore hold it a matter of public concern, that we be no occasion of quenching my lord’s affections; nor is there any such great matter between us, but, in my opinion, might be easily reconcil’d: for tho that which my lord gain’d by sitting in the house, I stedfastly believe, as he can affirm, was got fairly; yet dare I not, nor do I think, that upon consideration he will promise so much for other gamesters, especially when they were at it so high, as he intimats not only to have bin in use, but to be like enough to come about again. Wherfore, say I, let them throw with boxes; for unless we will be below the politics of an ordinary, there is no such bar to cogging. It is known to his lordship, that our game is most at a throw, and that every cast of our dice is in our suffrages; nor will he deny, that partiality in a suffrage is downright cogging. Now if the [112] Venetian boxes be the most soverain of all remedys against this same cogging, is it not a strange thing that they should be thrown first into the fire by a fair gamester? Men are naturally subject to all kinds of passions: som you have that are not able to withstand the brow of an enemy; and others that make nothing of this, are less proof against that of a friend. So that if your suffrage be barefac’d, I dare say you shall not have one fair cast in twenty. But whatever a man’s fortune be at the box, he neither knows whom to thank, nor whom to challenge. Wherfore (that my lord may have a charitable opinion of the choice affection which I confess to have, above all other beautys, for that of incomparable Venice) there is in this way of suffrage no less than a demonstration that it is the most pure: and the purity of the suffrage in a popular government is the health, if not the life of it; seeing the soul is no otherwise breath’d into the soverain power, than by the suffrage of the people. Wherfore no wonder if Postellus be of opinion, that this use of the ball is the very same with that of the bean in Athens; or, that others, by the text concerning Eldad and Medad, derive it from the commonwealth of Israel. There is another thing, tho not so material to us, that my lord will excuse me if I be not willing to yield, which is, that Venice subsists only by her situation. It is true, that a man in time of war may be more secure from his enemys by being in a citadel, but not from his diseases: wherfore the first cause, if he lives long, is his good constitution, without which his citadel were to little purpose; and it is not otherwise with Venice.”

With this speech of the Archon I conclude the proof of the agrarian, and the ballot, being the fundamental laws of this commonwealth; and com now from the center to the circumferences or orbs, wherof som have bin already shewn: as how the parishes annually pour themselves into the hundreds, the hundreds into the tribes, and the tribes into the galaxys; the annual galaxy of every tribe consisting of two knights and seven deputys, wherof the knights constitute the senat; the deputys, the prerogative tribe, commonly call’d the people; and the senat and people constitute the soverain power or parlament of Oceana. Wherof to shew what the parlament is, I must first open the senat, and then the prerogative tribe.

The face of the senat.To begin with the senat, of which (as a man is differently represented by a picturedrawer, and by an anatomist) I shall first discover the face or aspect, and then the parts, with the use of them. Every Monday morning in the summer at seven, and in the winter at eight, the great bell in the clockhouse at the pantheon begins, and continues ringing for the space of one hour: in which time the magistrates of the senat, being attended according to their quality, with a respective number of the ballotins, doorkeepers, and messengers; and having the ensigns of their magistracys born before them, as the sword before the strategus, the mace before the orator, a mace with the seal before the commissioners of the chancery, the like with the purse before the commissioners of the treasury; and a silver wand, like those in use with the universitys, before each of the censors, being chancellors of the same. These with the knights, in all three hundred, assemble in the house or hall of the senat.

The house or hall of the senat, being situated in the pantheon or palace of justice, is a room consisting of a square and a half. In the middle of the lower end is the door; at the upper end hangs a rich state overshadowing the greater part of [none] [none] [113] a large throne, or half pace of two stages; the first ascended by two steps from the floor, and the second about the middle rising two steps higher. Upon this stand two chairs, in that on the right hand sits the strategus, in the other the orator, adorn’d with scarlet robes, after the fashion that was us’d by the dukes in the aristocracy. At the right end of the upper stage stand three chairs, in which the three commissioners of the seal are plac’d; and at the other end sit the three commissioners of the treasury, every one in a robe or habit like that of the earls. Of these magistrats of this upper stage consists the signory. At either end of the lower stage stands a little table, to which the secretarys of the senat are set with their tufted sleeves in the habit of civil lawyers. To the four steps, wherby the two stages of the throne are ascended, answer four long benches, which successively deriving from every one of the steps, continue their respective height, and extend themselves by the side walls towards the lower end of the house, every bench being divided by numeral characters into the thirty seven parts or places. Upon the upper benches sit the censors in the robes of barons; the first in the middle of the right hand bench, and the second directly opposit to him on the other side. Upon the rest of the benches sit the knights, who if they be call’d to the urns, distributing themselves by the figures, com in equal files, either by the first seat, which consists of the two upper benches on either side; or by the second seat, consisting of the two lower benches on either side: beginning also at the upper, or at the lower ends of the same, according to the lot wherby they are call’d; for which end the benches are open, and ascended at either end with easy stairs and large passages. The rest of the ballot is conformable to that of the tribe; the censors of the house sitting at the side urn, and the youngest magistrat of the signory at the middle: the urns being plac’d before the throne, and prepar’d according to the number of the magistrats to be at that time chosen by the rules already given to the censors of the tribes. But before the benches of the knights on either side stands one being shorter; and at the upper end of this sit the two tribuns of the horse. At the upper end of the other, the two tribuns of the foot in their arms; the rest of the benches being cover’d by the judges of the land in their robes. But these magistrats have no suffrage, nor the tribuns, though they derive their presence in the senat from the Romans; nor the judges, though they derive theirs from the antient senat of Oceana. Every Monday this assembly sits of course; at other times, if there be occasion, any magistrat of the house, by giving order for the bell, or by his lictor or ensignbearer, calls a senat. And every magistrat or knight during his session has the title, place and honor, of a duke, earl, baron, or knight, respectively. And every one that has born the same magistracy by his third session, has his respective place and title during the term of his life, which is all the honor confer’d by this commonwealth, except upon the master of the ceremonys, the master of the horse, and the king of the heralds, who are knights by their places. And thus you have the face of the senat, in which there is scarce any feature that is not Roman or Venetian; nor do the horns of the crescent extend themselves much unlike those of the sanhedrim, on either hand of the prince, and of the father of that senat. But upon beauty, in which every man has his phansy, we will not otherwise philosophize than to remember that there is something more than decency in the robe of a judg, that would not be well spar’d from the bench; and that the gravest magistrat, to whom you can commit the sword of justice, will [114] find a quickness in the spurs of honour, which if they be not laid to virtue, will lay themselves to that which may rout a commonwealth.

Constitution of the senat.To com from the face of the senat, to the constitution and use of the parts; It is contain’d in the peculiar orders. And the orders which are peculiar to the senat, are either of election or instruction.

Elections in the senat are of three sorts, annual, biennial, and extraordinary.

Annual elections are performed by the schedule call’d the tropic: and the tropic consists of two parts; the one containing the magistrats, and the other the councils to be yearly elected. The schedule or tropic of the magistrats is as follows in

15 Order. Tropic of the magistrats.The fifteenth ORDER, requiring, That upon every Monday next insuing the last of March, the knights of the annual galaxys taking their places in the senat, be call’d the third region of the same; and that the house having dismiss’d the first region, and receiv’d the third, procede to election of the magistrats contain’d in the first part of the tropic, by the insuing schedule:

THE annual magistrats (provided that no one man bears above one of those honors during the term of one session) may be elected out of any region. But the triennial magistrats may not be elected out of any other than the third region only, left the term of their session expire before that of their honor; and (it being unlawful for a man to bear magistracy any longer than he is therto qualify’d by the election of the people) cause a fraction in the rotation of this commonwealth.

Of the strategus.THE strategus is first president of the senat, and general of the army, if it be commanded to march; in which case there shall be a second strategus elected to be first president of the senat, and general of the second army: and if this also be commanded to march, a third strategus shall be chosen; and so on, as long as the commonwealth sends forth armys.

Of the orator.THE lord orator is the second and more peculiar president of the senat to whom it appertains to keep the house to orders.

Of the censors.THE censors, whereof the first by consequence of his election is chancellor of the university of Clio, and the second of that of Calliope, are presidents of the council for religion and magistrats, to whom it belongs to keep the house to the order of the ballot. They are also inquisitors into the ways and means of acquiring magistracy; and have power to punish indirect proceedings in the same, by removing a knight or magistrat out of the house, under appeal to the senat.

Of the commissioners of the seal.THE commissioners of the seal being three, wherof the third is annually chosen out of the third region, are judges in chancery.

Of the commissioners of the treasury.THE commissioners of the treasury being three, wherof the third is annually chosen out of the third region, are judges in the exchequer; and every magistrat of this schedule has right to propose to the senat.

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Of the signory.BUT the strategus with the six commissioners, are the signory of this commonwealth, having right of session and suffrage in every council of the senat, and power either jointly or severally to propose in all or any of them.

I have little in this order to observe and prove, but that the strategus is the same honor both in name and thing that was born, among others, by Philopemen and Aratus in the commonwealth of the Achæans; the like having bin in use also with the Ætolians. The orator, call’d otherwise the speaker, is with small alteration the same that had bin of former use in this nation. These two, if you will, may be compar’d to the consuls in Rome, or the suffetes in Carthage; for their magistracy is scarce different.

The censors derive their power of removing a senator from those of Rome; the government of the ballot, from those of Venice; and that of animadversion upon the ambitus, or canvass for magistracy from both.

The signory, with the whole right and use of that magistracy, to be hereafter more fully explain’d, is almost purely Venetian.

The second part of the tropic is directed by

16 Order. Constitution of the councils.The sixteenth ORDER, wherby the constitution of the councils, being four; that is to say, the council of state, the council of war, the council of religion, and the council of trade, is render’d conformable in their revolutions to that of the senat. As, first, by the annual election of five knights out of the first region of the senat into the council of state, consisting of fifteen knights, five in every region.Of the council of state. Secondly, By the annual election of three knights out of the third region of the council of state, to be propos’d by the provosts, and elected by that council, into the council of war,Of the council of war. consisting of nine knights, three in every region, not excluded by this election from remaining members also of the council of state. The four tribuns of the people have right of session and suffrage in the council of war.Of the council of religion. Thirdly, By the annual election of four knights out of the third region of the senat into the council of religion, consisting of twelve knights, four in every region. Of this council the censors are presidents Fourthly,Of the council of trade. By the annual election of four knights out of the third region of the senat into the council of trade, consisting of twelve knights, four in every region. And each region, in every one of these councils thus constituted,Of the provosts. shall weekly and interchangeably elect one provost, whose magistracy shall continue for one week; nor shall he be reelected into the same, till every knight of that region in the same council has once born the same magistracy.Of the council of the provosts. And the provosts being one in every region, three in every council, and twelve in all, beside their other capacitys, shall assemble and be a council, or rather an academy apart, to certain ends and purposes to be hereafter further explain’d with those of the rest of the councils.

This order is of no other use than the frame and turn of the councils, and yet of no small one: for in motion consists life; and the motion of a commonwealth will never be current, unless it be circular. Men that, like my lord Epimonus, not enduring the resemblance of this kind of government to orbs and spheres, fall on physicing and purging it, do no more than is necessary; for if it be not in rotation both as to persons and things, it will be very sick. The people of Rome, as to persons, if they had not bin taken up by the wheel of magistracy, had overturn’d the chariot of the senat. And those of Lacedemon, as to things, had not bin so quiet when the senat trash’d their business, by incroaching upon the result, [116] if by the institution of the ephors they had not brought it about again. So that if you allow not a commonwealth her rotation, in which consists her equality, you reduce her to a party, and then it is necessary that you be physicians indeed, or rather farriers; for you will have strong patients, and such as must be halter’d and cast, or your selves may need bonesetters. Wherfore the councils of this commonwealth, both in regard of their elections, and, as will be shewn, of their affairs, are uniform with the senat in their revolutions; not as whirlpits to swallow, but to bite, and with the scrues of their rotation to hold and turn a business (like the vice of a smith) to the hand of the workman. Without engins of which nature it is not possible for the senat, much less for the people, to be perfect artificers in a political capacity. But I shall not hold you longer from

17 Order. Constitution of the biennial election or orb of ambassadors in ordinary.The seventeenth ORDER, directing biennial elections, or the constitution of the orb of ambassadors in ordinary, consisting of four residences, the revolution wherof is perform’d in eight years, and preserv’d thro the election of one ambassador in two years by the ballot of the senat to repair to the court of France, and reside there for the term of two years; and the term of two years being expir’d, to remove from thence to the court of Spain, there to continue for the space of two years, and thence to remove to the state of Venice; and after two years residence in that city, to conclude with his residence at Constantinople for a like term of time, and so to return. A knight of the senat, or a deputy of the prerogative, may not be elected ambassador in ordinary, because a knight or deputy so chosen, must either lose his session, which would cause an unevenness in the motion of this commonwealth, or accumulat magistracy, which agrees not with the equality of the same. Nor may any man be elected into this capacity that is above five and thirty years of age, lest the commonwealth lose the charge of his education, by being depriv’d at his return of the fruit of it, or else injoy it not long thro the defects of nature.

This order is the perspective of the commonwealth, wherby she foresees; danger or the traffic, wherby she receives every two years the return of a statesinan inrich’d with eight years experience, from the prime marts of negotiation in Europe. And so much for the elections in the senat that are ordinary; such as are extraordinary follow in

18 Order. Constitution of election extraordinary, or by the scrutiny.The eighteenth ORDER, appointing all elections upon emergent occasions, except that of the dictator, to be made by the scrutiny, or that kind of election, wherby a council coms to be a fifth order of electors. For example, if there be occasion of an ambassador extraordinary, the provosts of the council of state, or any two of them, shall propose to the same, till one competitor be chosen by that council: and the council having chosen a competitor, shall bring his name into the senat, which in the usual way shall chuse four more competitors to the same magistracy; and put them, with the competitor of the council, to the ballot of the house, by which he of the five that is chosen is said to be elected by the scrutiny of the council of state. A vice-admiral, a polemarch, or field officer, shall be elected after the same manner, by the scrutiny of the council of war. A judg or serjeant at law, by the scrutiny of the commissioners of the seal. A baron, or considerable officer of the exchequer, by the scrutiny of the commissioners of the treasary. Men in magistracy, or out of it, are equally capable of election by the scrutiny; but a magistrat or officer elected by the scrutiny to a military imployment, if he be neither [117] a knight of the senat, nor a deputy of the prerogative, ought to have his office confirm’d by the prerogative, because the militia in a commonwealth, where the people are soverain, is not lawful to be touch’d injussu populi.

The Romans were so curious, that tho their consuls were elected in the [47] centuriat assemblys, they might not touch the militia, except they were confirm’d in the [48] parochial assemblys: for a magistrat not receiving his power from the people, takes it from them; and to take away their power, is to take away their liberty. As to the election by the scrutiny, it is easily perceiv’d to be Venetian, there being no such way to take in the knowledge, which in all reason must be best in every council of such men as are most fit for their turns, and yet to keep them from the biass of particular affection or interest under that pretence: for the cause why the great council in Venice scarce ever elects any other than the name that is brought in by the scrutiny, is very probable to be, that they may . . . . . This election is the last of those appertaining to the senat. The councils being chosen by the orders already shewn, it remains that we come to those wherby they are instructed: and the orders of instruction to the councils are two, the first for the matter wherupon they are to procede: and the second for the manner of their proceding. The matter of the councils is distributed to them by

19 Order. Instructions for the councils as to their matter.The nineteenth ORDER, distributing to every council such businesses as are properly to belong to their cognizance, whereof som they shall receive and determin; and others they shall receive, prepare, and introduce into the house: as, first,

For the council of state.THE council of state is to receive all addresses, intelligences, and letters of negotiation; to give audience to ambassadors sent to, and to draw up instructions for such as shall be sent by, this commonwealth; to receive propositions from, and hold intelligence with the provincial councils; to consider upon all laws to be enacted, amended, or repeal’d; and upon all levys of men or money, war or peace, leagues or associations to be made by this commonwealth, so far forth as is conducible to the orderly preparation of the same to be introduc’d by them into the senat. Provided that all such affairs, as otherwise appertaining to the council of state, are, for the good of the commonwealth, to be carry’d with greater secrecy, be manag’d by the council of war, with power to receive and send forth agents, spys, emissarys, intelligencers, frigots; and to manage affairs of that nature, if it be necessary, without communication to the senat, till such time as it may be had without detriment to the business.For the council of war. But they shall have no power to engage the commonwealth in a war without the consent of the senat and the people. It appertains also to this council to take charge of the fleet as admiral; and of all storehouses, armorys, arsenals, and magazins appertaining to this commonwealth. They shall keep a diligent record of the military expeditions from time to time reported by him that was strategus or general, or one of the polemarchs in that action; or at least so far as the experience of such commanders may tend to the improvement of the military disciplin, which they shall digest and introduce into the senat: and if the senat shall therupon frame any article, they shall see that it be observ’d in the musters or education of the youth. And wheras the council of war is the sentinel or scout of this commonwealth, if any person or persons shall go about to introduce debate into any popular assembly of the same, or otherwise to alter the present government, or strike at the root of it, [118] they shall apprehend, or cause to be apprehended, seiz’d, imprison’d; and examin, arraign, acquit, or condemn, and cause to be executed any such person or persons, by their proper power and authority, and without appeal.

For the council of religion.THE council of religion, as the arbiter of this commonwealth in cases of conscience more peculiarly appertaining to religion, christian charity, and a pious life, shall have the care of the national religion, and the protection of the liberty of conscience, with the cognizance of all causes relating to either of them. And first as to the national religion; they shall cause all places or preferments of the best revenue in either of the universitys to be conser’d upon no other than such of the most learn’d and pious men, as have dedicated themselves to the study of theology. They shall also take a special care that by such augmentations as be or shall hereafter be appointed by the senat, every benefice in this nation be improv’d at least to the value of one hundred pounds a year. And to the end that there be no interest at all, wherby the divines or teachers of the national religion may be corrupted, or corrupt religion, they shall be capable of no other kind of imployment or preferment in this commonwealth. And wheras a directory for the administration of the national religion is to be prepar’d by this council, they shall in this and other debates of this nature procede in manner following: a question arising in matter of religion shall be put and stated by the council in writing; which writing the censors shall send by their beadles (being proctors chosen to attend them) each to the university wherof he is chancellor; and the vice-chancellor of the same receiving the writing, shall call a convocation of all the divines of that univerfity, being above forty years of age. And the universitys upon a point so propos’d, shall have no manner of intelligence or correspondence one with another, till their debates be ended, and they have made return of their answers to the council of religion by two or three of their own members, that they may clear their sense, if any doubt should arise, to the council; which don, they shall return, and the council having receiv’d such information, shall procede according to their own judgments, in the preparation of the whole matter for the senat: that so the interest of the learned being remov’d, there may be a right application of reason to scripture, which is the foundation of the national religion.

SECONDLY, This council, as to the protection of the liberty of conscience, shall suffer no coercive power in the matter of religion to be exercis’d in this nation: the teachers of the natural religion being no other than such as voluntarily undertake that calling; and their auditors or hearers, no other than are also voluntary. Nor shall any gather’d congregation be molested or interrupted in their way of worship (being neither Jewish or idolatrous) but vigilantly and vigorously protected and defended in the injoyment, practice, and prosession of the same. And if there be officers or auditors appointed by any such congregation for the introduction of causes into the council of religion, all such causes so introduc’d shall be receiv’d, heard, and determin’d by the same, with recourse had, if need be, to the senat.

THIRDLY, Every petition addrest to the senat, except that of a tribe, shall be receiv’d, examin’d, and debated by this council; and such only as they, upon such examination and debate had, shall think fit, may be introduc’d into the senat.

For the council of trade.THE council of trade being the vena porta of this nation, shall hereafter receive instructions more at large. For the present, their experience attaining to a right understanding of those trades and mysterys that feed the veins of this commonwealth, and a true distinction of them from those that suck or exhaust the same, they shall acquaint the senat with the conveniences and inconveniences, to the end that incouragement may be apply’d to the one, and remedy to the other.

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For the academy of the provosts.THE academy of the provosts, being the affability of the commonwealth, shall assemble every day towards the evening in a fair room, having certain withdrawing rooms therto belonging. And all sorts of company that will repair thither for conversation or discourse, so it be upon matters of government, news, or intelligence, or to propose any thing to the councils, shall be freely and affably receiv’d in the outer chamber, and heard in the way of civil conversation, which is to be manag’d without any other aw or ceremony than is therto usually appertaining; to the end that every man may be free, and that what is propos’d by one, may be argu’d or discours’d by the rest, except the matter be of secrecy; in which case the provosts, or som of them, shall take such as desire audience into one of the withdrawing rooms. And the provosts are to give their minds, that this academy be so govern’d, adorn’d, and preserv’d, as may be most attractive to men of parts and good affections to the commonwealth, for the excellency of the conversation.

FURTHERMORE, if any man, not being able or willing to com in person, has any advice to give which he judges may be for the good of the commonwealth, he may write his mind to the academy of the provosts, in a letter sign’d or not sign’d; which letter shall be left with the doorkeeper of the academy. Nor shall any person delivering such a letter be seiz’d, molested, or detain’d, tho it should prove to be a libel. But the letters so deliver’d shall be presented to the provosts; and in case they be so many that they cannot well be perus’d by the provosts themselves, they shall distribute them as they please to be read by the gentlemen of the academy, who finding any thing in them material, will find matter of discourse: or if they happen upon a business that requires privacy, return it with a note upon it to a provost. And the provosts by the secretarys attending shall cause such notes out of discourses or letters to be taken as they please, to the end that they may propose, as occasion serves, what any two of them shall think fit out of their notes so taken to their respective councils: to the end that not only the ear of the commonwealth be open to all, but that men of such education being in her ey, she may upon emergent elections or occasions be always provided of her choice of fit persons.

For the attendance of the councils.EVERY council being adorn’d with a state for the signory, shall be attended by two secretarys, two doorkeepers, and two messengers in ordinary, and have power to command more upon emergencys, as occasion requires. And the academy shall be attended with two secretarys, two messengers, and two doorkeepers; this with the other councils being provided with their farther conveniences at the charge of the state.

For the dictator.BUT wheras it is incident to commonwealths, upon emergencys requiring extraordinary speed or secrecy, either thro their natural delays or unnatural hast, to incur equal danger, while holding to the slow pace of their orders, they com not in time to defend themselves from som sudden blow; or breaking them for the greater speed, they but hast to their own destruction: if the senat shall at any time make election of nine knights extraordinary, to be added to the council of war, as a juncta for the term of three months, the council of war, with the juncta so added, is for the term of the same dictater of Oceana, having power to levy men and mony, to make war and peace, as also to enact laws, which shall be good for the space of one year (if they be not sooner repcol’d by the senat and the people) and for no longer time, except they be confirm’d by the senat and the people. And the whole administration of the commonwealth for the term of the said three months shall be in the dictator; provided, that the dictator shall have no power to do any thing that tends not to his proper end and institution, but all to the preservation of the commonwealth as it is establish’d, and for the sudden restitution of the some to the natural channel and common course of government. And all acts, orders, decrees, or laws of the council of war with the juncta, being thus created, shall be sign’d,

DICTATOR OCEANÆ.

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This order of instructions to the councils being (as in a matter of that nature is requisit) very large, I have us’d my best skill to abbreviat it in such manner as might shew no more of it than is necessary to the understanding of the whole; tho as to the parts, or further dutys of the councils, I have omitted many things of singular use in a commonwealth. But it was discours’d at the council by the Archon in this manner:

My lords, the legislators,

“YOUR councils, except the dictator only, are proper and native springs and sources, you see, which (hanging a few sticks and straws, that, as less considerable, would otherwise be more troublesom, upon the banks of their peculiar channels) derive the full stream of business into the senat, so pure, and so far from the possibility of being troubl’d or stain’d (as will undeniably appear by the course contain’d in the insuing order) with any kind of privat interest or partiality, that it shall never be possible for any assembly hearkning to the advice or information of this or that worthy member (either instructed upon his pillow, or while he was making himself ready, or by the petition or ticket which he receiv’d at the door) to have half the security in his faith, or advantage by his wisdom; such a senat or council being, thro the incertainty of the winds, like a wave of the sea. Nor shall it otherwise mend the matter by flowing up into dry ditches, or referring businesses to be better examin’d by committees, than to go farther about with it to less purpose; if it dos not ebb back again with the more mud in it. For in a case refer’d to an occasional committee, of which any member that is desirous may get himself nam’d, and to which nobody will com, but either for the sake of his friend, or his own interest; it fares little better as to the Information of the senat, than if it had bin refer’d to the partys. Wherfore the Athenians being distributed into four tribes, out of which by equal numbers they annually chose four hundred men, call’d, the senat of the Bean (because the ballot at their election was perform’d by the use of beans) divided them by fiftys into eight parts. And every fifty in their turn, for one eighth part of the year, was a council apart call’d the Prytans. The Prytans in their distinct council receiving all comers, and giving ear to every man that had any thing to propose concerning the commonwealth, had power to debate and prepare all the businesses that were to be introduc’d into the senat. The Achæans had ten selected magistrats call’d the demiurgs, constituting a council apart call’d the synarchy, which with the strategus prepar’d all the business that was introduc’d into their senat. But both the senat of the Athenians, and that of the Achæans, would have wonder’d if a man had told them, that they were to receive all comers and discourses, to the end that they might refer them afterwards, to the Prytans or the synarchy; much less to an occasional committee, expos’d to the catch that catch may of the partys interested. And yet Venice, in this, as in most of her orders, excels them all by the constitution of her councils, that of the college, and the other of the dieci, or council of ten. The course of the college is exactly describ’d in the insuing order: and for that of the dieci, it so little differs from what it has bestow’d upon our dictator, that I need not make any particular description of it. But to dictatorian power in general, and the use of it, because it must needs be of difficult digestion to such as, puking still at antient prudence, [121] shew themselves to be in the nursery of motherwit; it is no less than necessary to say somthing. And, first, in a commonwealth that is not wrought up, or perfected, this power will be of very frequent, if not continual use; wherfore it is said more than once, upon defects of the government, in the book of Judges, that in those days there was no king in Israel. Nor has the translator, tho for no king he should have said no judg, abus’d you so much; seeing that the dictator (and such was the judg of Israel) or the dictatorian power being in a single person, so little differs from monarchy, which follow’d in that, that from the same cause there has bin no other effect in any commonwealth; as in Rome was manifest by Sylla and Cesar, who to make themselves absolute or soverain, had no more to do than to prolong their magistracy; for [49] the dictatorian power was reputed divine, and therfore irresistible. Nevertheless, so it is, that without this power, which is so dangerous, and subject to introduce monarchy, a commonwealth cannot be safe from falling into the like dissolution; unless you have an expedient in this case of your own, and bound up by your providence from recoiling. Expedients in som cases you must not only have, but be beholden for them to such whom you must trust at a pinch, when you have not leisure to stand with them for security; which will be a thousand times more dangerous. And there can never be a commonwealth otherwise than by the order in debate wrought up to that perfection; but this necessity must somtimes happen in regard of her natural slowness and openness, and the suddenness of assaults that may be made upon her, as also the secresy which in som cases may be of absolute necessity to her affairs. Whence Machiavel concludes it positively, that a commonwealth unprovided of such a refuge, must fall to ruin: for her course is either broken by the blow in one of those cases, or by herself, while it startles her out of her orders. And indeed a commonwealth is like a greyhound, which having once coasted, will never after run fair, but grow slothful; and when it coms to make a common practice of taking nearer ways than its orders, it is dissolv’d: for the being of a commonwealth consists in its orders. Wherfore at this lift you will be expos’d to danger, if you have not provided before-hand for the safety of your resort in the like cases: nor is it sufficient that your resort be safe, unless it be as secret and quick; for if it be slow or open, your former inconveniences are not remedy’d. Now for our imitation in this part, there is nothing in experience like that of the council of ten in Venice; the benefit wherof would be too long to be shewn in the whole piece, and therfore I shall take but a pattern out of Janotti. In the war, says he, which the Venetians had with Florence in Casentin, the Florentins finding a necessity in their affairs far from any other inclination in themselves to ask their peace, sent ambassadors about it to Venice, where they were no sooner heard, than the bargain was struck up by the council of ten: and every body admiring (seeing this commonwealth stood upon the higher ground) what should be the reason of such hast; the council upon the return of the ambassadors imparted letters to the senat, wherby it appear’d, that the Turc had newly lanch’d a formidable fleet against their state; which had it bin understood by the Florentins, it was well enough known they would have made no peace. Wherfore the service of the ten was highly applauded by the senat, and celebrated by the Venetians. Wherby may appear, not only in part what use there is of dictatorian [122] power in that government, but that it is assum’d at the discretion of that council; wheras in this of Oceana it is not otherwise intrusted than when the senat, in the election of nine knights extraordinary, gives at once the commission, and takes security in a balance, added to the council of war, tho securer before by the tribuns of the people than that of Venice, which yet never incur’d jealousy: for if the younger nobility have bin often girding at it, that happen’d not so much thro the apprehension of danger in it to the commonwealth, as thro the aw of it upon themselves. Wherfore the graver have doubtlesly shewn their prudence in the law; wherby the magistracy of these counsillors being to last till their successors be created, the council is establish’d.

The instructions of the councils for their matter being shewn, it remains that I shew the instructions for the manner of their proceding, as they follow in

20 Order. Instructions for the councils as to their manner of proceding.The twentieth ORDER, containing the method of debates to be observ’d by the magistrats and the councils successively in order to a decree of the senat.

THE magistrats of the signory, as counsillors of this commonwealth, shall take into their consideration all matters of state, or of government; and, having right to propose in any council, may any one or more of them propose what business he or they please in that council to which it most properly belongs. And, that the councils may be held to their duty, the said magistrats are superintendants and inspectors of the same, with right to propose to the senat.

THE censors have equal power with these magistrats, but in relation to the council of religion only.

ANY two of the three provosts in every council may propose to, and are the more peculiar proposers of, the same council; to the end that there be not only an inspection and superintendency of business in general, but that every work be also committed to a peculiar hand.

ANY one or more of the magistrats, or any two of the provosts respectively having propos’d, the council shall debate the business so propos’d, to which they of the third region that are willing shall speak first in their order; they of the second, next; and they of the first, last: and the opinions of those that propos’d or spoke, as they shall be thought the most considerable by the council, shall be taken by the secretary of the same in writing, and each of them sign’d with the name of the author.

THE opinions being thus prepar’d, any magistrat of the signory, the censors, or any two of the provosts of that council, upon this occasion may assemble the senat.

THE senat being assembled, the opinions (for example, if they be four) shall be read in their order, that is, according to the order or dignity of the magistrats or counsillors by which they were sign’d. And being read, if any of the council introducing them will speak, they, as best acquainted with the business, shall have precedence; and after them the senators shall speak according to their regions, beginning by the third first, and so continuing till every man that will has spoken: and when the opinions have bin sufficiently debated, they shall be put all together to the ballot after this manner.

FOUR secretarys carrying each of them one of the opinions in one hand, with a white box in the other, and each following the other, according to the order of the opinions, shall present his box, naming the author of his opinion to every senator; and one secretary or ballotin with a green box shall follow the four white ones; and one secretary or ballotin with a red box shall follow the green one: and every senator shall put one ball [123] into som one of these six boxes. The suffrage being gather’d and open’d before the signory, if the red box or nonsincere had above half the suffrages, the opinions shall be all cast out, for the major part of the house is not clear in the business. If no one of the four opinions had above half the suffrages in the affirmative, that which had fewest shall be cast out, and the other three shall be balloted again. If no one of the three had above half, that which had fewest shall be cast out, and the other two shall ballot again. If neither of the two had above half, that which had fewest shall be cast out, and the remaining opinion shall be balloted again. And if the remaining opinion has not above half, it shall also be cast out. But the first of the opinions that arrives at most above half in the affirmative, is the decree of the senat. The opinions being all of them cast out by the nonsincere, may be review’d, if occasion permits, by the council, and brought in again. If they be cast out by the negative, the case being of advice only, the house approves not, and there is an end of it: the case being necessary, and admitting delay, the council is to think again upon the business, and to bring in new opinions; but the case being necessary, and not admitting delay, the senat immediately electing the juncta, shall create the dictator. [50] And let the dictator, as the Roman saying is, take care that the commonwealth receives no harm.

THIS in case the debate concludes not in a decree. But if a decree be past, it is either in matter of state or government according to law enacted already, and then it is good without going any further: or it is in matter of law to be enacted, repeal’d or amended; and then the decree of the senat, especially if it be for a war, or for a levy of men or mony, is invalid, without the result of the commonwealth, which is in the prerogative tribe, or representative of the people.

THE senat having prepar’d a decree to be propos’d to the people, shall appoint their proposers; and no other may propose for the senat to the people but the magistrats of the house: that is to say, the three commissioners of the seal, or any two of them; the three of the treasury, or any two of them; or the two censors.

THE senat having appointed their proposers, shall require of the tribuns a muster of the people at a set time and place: and the tribuns or any two of them having muster’d the people accordingly, the proposers shall propose the sense or decree of the senat by clauses to the people. And that which is propos’d by the authority of the senat, and resolv’d by the command of the people, is the law of Oceana.

To this order, implicitly containing the sum very near of the whole civil part of the commonwealth, my lord Archon spoke thus in council.

My dear lords;

“THERE is a saying, that a man must cut his coat according to his cloth. When I consider what God has allow’d or furnish’d to our present work, I am amaz’d. You would have a popular government, he has weigh’d it to you in the present balance, as I may say, to a dram; you have no more to do, but to fix it. For the superstructures of such a government, they require a good aristocracy: and you have, or have had a nobility or gentry the best study’d, and the best writers, at least next that of Italy, in the whole world; nor have they bin inferior, when so exercis’d, in the leading of armys. But the people are the [124] main body of a commonwealth; shew me from the treasurys of the snow (as it is in Job) to the burning zone, a people whose shoulder so universally and so exactly fit the corslet. Nevertheless it were convenient to be well provided with auxiliaries. There is Marpesia thro her fruitfulness inexhaustible of men, and men thro her barrenness not only inur’d to hardship, but in your arms. It may be said, that Venice, excepting only that she takes not in the people, is the most incomparable situation of a commonwealth. You are Venice taking in your people and your auxiliarys too. My lords, the children of Israel were makers of brick, before they were builders of a commonwealth: but our brick is made, our morter temper’d, the cedars of Lebanon are hew’d and squar’d to our hands. Has this bin the work of man? or is it in man to withstand this work? shall he that contends with the Almighty, instruct him? he that reproves God, let him answer it. For our parts, every thing is so laid, that when we come to have use of it, it is the next at hand; and unless we can conceive that God and nature do any thing in vain, there is no more for us to do but to dispatch. The piece, which we have reach’d to us in the foregoing orders, is the aristocracy. Athens, as has bin shewn, was plainly lost thro the want of a good aristocracy. But the sufficiency of an aristocracy gos demonstrably upon the hand of the nobility or gentry: for that the politics can be master’d without study, or that the people can have leisure to study, is a vain imagination; and what kind of aristocracy divines and lawyers would make, let their incurable running upon their own narrow biass, and their perpetual invectives against Machiavel (tho in som places justly reprovable, yet the only politician, and incomparable patron of the people) serve for instruction. I will stand no more to the judgment of lawyers and divines in this work, than to that of so many other tradesmen; but if this model chances to wander abroad, I recommend it to the Roman speculativi (the most complete gentlemen of this age) for their censure: or with my lord Epimonus his leave, send three or four hundred copys to your agent at Venice to be presented to the magistrats there; and when they have consider’d them, to be propos’d to the debate of the senat, the most competent judges under heaven, who, tho they have great affairs, will not refuse to return you the oracle of their ballot. The counsillors of princes I will not trust; they are but journymen. The wisdom of these later times in princes affairs (says Verulamius) is rather fine deliverys and shiftings of dangers when they be near, than solid and grounded courses to keep them off. Their counsillors do not derive their procedings from any sound root of government that may contain the demonstration, and assure the success of them, but are expedient-mongers, givers of themselves to help a lame dog over a stile; else how coms it to pass, that the fame of cardinal Richlieu has bin like thunder, wherof we hear the noise, but can make no demonstration of the reason? but to return, if neither the people, nor divines, and lawyers, can be the aristocracy of a nation, there remains only the nobility; in which stile, to avoid farther repetition, I shall understand the gentry also, as the French do by the word noblesse.

“Now to treat of the nobility in such sort as may be less obnoxious to mistake, it will be convenient, and answerable to the present occasion, that I divide my discourse into four parts.

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“The first treating of nobility, and the kinds of it.

“The second, of their capacity of the senat.

“The third, of the divers kinds of senats.

“The fourth, of the senat, according to the foregoing orders.

“Nobility may be defin’d divers ways; for it is either antient riches, or antient virtue, or a title confer’d by a prince or a commonwealth.

“Nobility of the first kind may be subdivided into two others, such as hold an overbalance in dominion or property to the whole people, or such as hold not an overbalance. In the former case, a nobility (such was the Gothic, of which sufficient has bin spoken) is incompatible with popular government; for to popular government it is essential that power should be in the people, but the overbalance of a nobility in dominion draws the power to themselves. Wherfore in this sense it is that Machiavel is to be understood, where he says, [51] that these are pernicious in a commonwealth; and of France, Spain, and Italy, that they are nations [52] which for this cause are the corruption of the world: for otherwise nobility may according to his definition (which is, that they are such as live upon their own revenues in plenty, without ingagement either to the tilling of their lands, or other work for their livelihood) hold an underbalance to the people; in which cafe they are not only safe, but necessary to the natural mixture of a well-order’d commonwealth. For how else can you have a commonwealth that is not altogether mechanic? or what comparison is there of such commonwelaths as are, or com nearest to mechanic, for example, Athens, Switzerland, Holland, to Lacedemon, Rome, and Venice, plum’d with their aristocracys? your mechanics, till they have first feather’d their nests, like the fowls of the air, whose whole imployment is to seek their food, are so busy’d in their private concernments, that they have neither leisure to study the public, nor are safely to be trusted with it, [53] because a man is not faithfully imbark’d in this kind of ship, if he has no share in the freight. But if his share be such as gives him leisure by his privat advantage to reflect upon that of the public, what other name is there for this sort of men, being a leur aise, but (as Machiavel you see calls them) Nobility? especially when their familys com to be such as are noted for their services don to the commonwealth, and so take into their antient riches antient virtue, which is the second definition of nobility, but such a one as is scarce possible in nature without the former. For as the baggage, says Verulamius, is to an army, so are riches to virtue; they cannot be spar’d nor left behind, tho they be impediments, such as not only hinder the march, but sometimes thro the care of them lose or disturb the victory. Of this latter sort is the nobility of Oceana; the best of all others, because they, having no stamp whence to derive their price, can have it no otherwise than by their intrinsic value. The third definition of nobility, is a title, honor, or distinction from the people, confer’d or allow’d by the prince or the commonwealth. And this may be two ways, either without any stamp or privilege, as in Oceana; or with such privileges as are inconsiderable, as in Athens after the battel of Plateæ, whence the [126] nobility had no right, as such, but to religious offices, or inspection of the public games, to which they were also to be elected by the people: or with privileges, and those considerable ones, as the nobility in Athens before the battel of Plateæ, and the Patricians in Rome, each of which had right, or claim’d it, to the senat and all the magistracys; wherin for som time they only by their stamp were current.

“But to begin higher, and to speak more at large of nobility in their several capacitys of the senat. The phylarchs or princes of the tribes of Israel were the most ren wn’d, or, as the Latin, the most noble of the congregation, wherof by hereditary right they had the leading and judging.Numb. 1. 16. The patriarchs, or princes of familys, according as they declar’d their pedigrees, had the like right as to their familys; but neither in these nor the former, was there any hereditary right to the sanhedrim:Ver. 18. tho there be little question but the wise men, and understanding, and known among their tribes, which the people took or elected into those or other magistracys, and whom Moses made rulers over them, must have bin of these; seeing they could not chuse but be the most known among the tribes, and were likeliest by the advantages of education to be the most wise and understandingDeut. 1. 13.

“Solon having found the Athenians neither locally nor genealogically, but by their different ways of life, divided into four tribes, that is, into the soldiery, the tradesmen, the husbandmen, and the goatherds, instituted a new distribution of them, according to the cense or valuation of their estates, into four classes: the first, second, and third, consisting of such as were proprietors in land, distinguish’d by the rate of their freeholds, with that stamp upon them, which making them capable of adding honor to their riches, that is to say, of the senat, and all the magistracys, excluded the fourth, being the body of the people, and far greater in number than the former three, from all other right, as to those capacitys, except the election of these, who by this means became a hereditary aristocracy or senatorian order of nobility. This was that course which came afterwards to be the destruction of Rome, and had now ruin’d Athens. The nobility, according to the inevitable nature of such a one, having laid the plot how to devest the people of the result, and so to draw the whole power of the commonwealth to themselves; which in all likelihood they had don, if the people, coming by mere chance to be victorious in the battel of Plateæ, and famous for defending Greece against the Persians, had not return’d with such courage as irresistibly broke the classes, to which of old they had born a white tooth, brought the nobility to equal terms, and the senat with the magistracys to be common to both; the magistracys by suffrage, and the senat (which was the mischief of it, as I shall shew anon in that constitution) by lot only.

“The Lacedemonians were in the manner, and for the same cause with the Venetians at this day, no other than a nobility, even according to the definition given of nobility by Machiavel; for they neither exercis’d any trade, nor labor’d their lands or lots, which was don by their helots: wherfore som nobility may be far from pernicious in a commonwealth by Machiavel’s own testimony, who is an admirer of this, tho the servants therof were more in number than the citizens. To these servants I hold the answer of Lycurgus, when he bad him who ask’d why he did not admit the people to the government of his commonwealth, to go home and admit his servants to the government of his family, to [127] relate: for neither were the Lacedemonians servants, nor farther capable of the government, unless, wheras the congregation had the result, he should have given them the debate also; every one of these that attain’d to sixty years of age, and the major vote of the congregation, being equally capable of the senat.

“The nobility of Rome, and their capacity of the senat, I have already describ’d by that of Athens before the battel of Plateæ; saving only that the Athenian was never eligible into the senat without the suffrage of the people, till the introduction of the lot, but the Roman nobility ever: for the patricians were elected into the senat by the kings, by the consuls, or the censors; or if a plebeian happen’d to be conscrib’d, he and his posterity became patricians. Nor, tho the people had many disputes with the nobility, did this ever com in controversy, which, if there had bin nothing else, might in my judgment have bin enough to overturn that commonwealth.

“The Venetian nobility, but that they are richer, and not military, resemble at all other points the Lacedemonian, as I have already shewn. These Machiavel excepts from his rule, by saying, that their estates are rather personal than real, or of any great revenue in land; which coms to our account, and shews, that a nobility or party of the nobility, not overbalancing in dominion, is not dangerous, but of necessary use in every commonwealth, provided it be rightly order’d; for if it be so order’d as was that of Rome, tho they do not overbalance at the beginning, as they did not there, it will not be long e’er they do, as is clear both in reason and experience towards the latter end. That the nobility only be capable of the senat, is there only not dangerous, where there be no other citizens, as in this government and that of Lacedemon.

“The nobility of Holland and Switzerland, tho but few, have privileges not only distinct from the people, but so great, that in som soveraintys they have a negative voice; an example which I am far from commending, being such as (if those governments were not cantoniz’d, divided, and subdivided into many petty soveraintys that balance one another, and in which the nobility, except they had a prince at the head of them, can never join to make work) would be the most dangerous that ever was but the Gothic, of which it savors. For in antient commonwealths you shall never find a nobility to have had a negative but by the poll, which, the people being far more in number, came to nothing; wheras these have it, be they never so few, by their stamp or order.

“Ours of Oceana have nothing else but their education and their leisure for the public, furnish’d by their ease and competent riches: and their intrinsic value, which, according as it coms to hold weight in the judgment or suffrage of the people, is their only way to honor and preferment. Wherfore I would have your lordships to look upon your children as such, who if they com to shake off som part of their baggage, shall make the more quick and glorious march: for it was nothing else but the baggage sordidly plunder’d by the nobility of Rome, that lost the victory of the whole world in the midst of her triumph.

“Having follow’d the nobility thus close, they bring us, according to their natural course and divers kinds, to the divers constitutions of the senat.

“That of Israel (as was shew’d by my right noble lord Phosphorus de Augf, in the opening of the commonwealth) consisted of seventy elders, elected at first by the people. But wheras they were for life, they ever after (tho without [128] any divine precept for it) substituted their successors by ordination, which ceremony was most usually perform’d by imposition of hands; and by this means a commonwealth of as popular institution as can be found, became, as it is accounted by Josephus, aristocratical. From this ordination derives that which was introduc’d by the apostles into the Christian church; for which cause I think it is, that the Presbyterians would have the government of the church to be aristocratical: tho the apostles, to the end, as I conceive, that they might give no occasion to such a mistake, but shew that they intended the government of the church to be popular, ordain’d elders, as has bin shewn, by the holding up of hands (or free suffrage of the people) in every congregation or ecclesia: for that is the word in the original, being borrow’d from the civil congregations of the people in Athens and Lacedemon, which were so call’d; and the word for holding up of hands in the text, is also the very same, which signify’d the suffrage of the people in Athens, χειϱοτονήσαντες; for the suffrage of the Athenians was given per chirotonian, says Emmius.

“The council of the bean (as was shewn by my lord Navarchus de Paralo in his full discourse) being the proposing senat of Athens (for that of the areopagits was a judicatory) consisted of four, som say five hundred senators, elected annually, all at once, and by a mere lot without suffrage. Wherfore tho the senat, to correct the temerity of the lot, had power to cast out such as they should judg unworthy of that honor; this related to manners only, and was not sufficient to repair the commonwealth, which by such means became impotent: and forasmuch as her senat consisted not of the natural aristocracy, which in a commonwealth is the only spur and rein of the people, it was cast headlong by the rashness of her demagogs or grandees into ruin; while her senat, like the Roman tribuns ( [54] who almost always, instead of governing, were rather govern’d by the multitude) propos’d not to the result only, but to the debate also of the people, who were therefore call’d to the pulpits, where som vomited, and others drank poison.

“The senat of Lacedemon, most truly discover’d by my lord Laco de Scytale, consisted but of 30 for life, wherof the two kings having but single votes, were hereditary, the rest elected by the free suffrage of the people, but out of such as were sixty years of age. These had the whole debate of the commonwealth in themselves, and propos’d to the result only of the people. And now the riddle which I have heretofore found troublesom to unfold, is out; that is to say, why Athens and Lacedemon, consisting each of the senat and the people, the one should be held a democracy, and the other an aristocracy, or laudable oligarchy, as it is term’d by Isocrates; for that word is not, wherever you meet it, to be branded, seeing it is us’d also by Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, somtimes in a good sense. The main difference was, that the people in this had the result only, and in that the debate and result too. But for my part, where the people have the election of the senat, not bound to a distinct order, and the result, which is the soverain power, I hold them to have that share in the government (the senat being not for life) wherof, with the safety of the commonwealth, they are capable in nature; and such a government, for that cause, to be democracy: tho I do not deny, but in Lacedemon, the paucity of the senators [129] consider’d, it might be call’d oligarchy, in comparison of Athens; or, if we look on their continuance for life, tho they had bin more, aristocracy.

“The senat of Rome (whose fame has bin heard to thunder in the eloquence of my lord Dolabella d’Enyo) consisting of 300, was, in regard of the number, less oligarchical than that of Lacedemon; but more in regard of the patrician, who, having a hereditary capacity of the same, were not elected to that honor by the people; but, being conscrib’d by the censors, injoy’d it for life. Wherfore these, if they had their wills, would have resolv’d as well as debated; which set the people at such variance with them, as dissolv’d the commonwealth; wheras if the people had injoy’d the result, that about the agrarian, as well as all other strife, must of necessity have ceas’d.

“The senats of Switzerland and Holland (as I have learnt of my lords Alpester and Glaucus) being bound up (like the sheaf of arrows which the latter gives) by leagues, ly like those in their quivers: but arrows, when they com to be drawn, fly som this way, and som that; and I am contented that these concern’d us not.

“That of Venice (by the faithful testimony of my most excellent lord Linceus de Stella) has oblig’d a world, sufficiently punish’d by its own blindness and ingratitude, to repent and be wiser: for wheras a commonwealth in which there is no senat, or where the senat is corrupt, cannot stand; the great council of Venice, like the statue of Nilus, leans upon an urn or waterpot, which pours forth the senat in so pure and perpetual a stream, as being inabled to stagnat, is for ever incapable of corruption. The fuller description of this senat is contain’d in that of Oceana; and that of Oceana in the foregoing orders. To every one of which, because somthing has bin already said, I shall not speak in particular. But in general, your senat, and the other assembly, or the prerogative, as I shall shew in due place, are perpetual, not as lakes or puddles, but as the rivers of Eden; and are beds made, as you have seen, to receive the whole people, by a due and faithful vicissitude, into their current. They are not, as in the late way, alternat. Alternat life in government is the alternat [55] death of it.

“This was the Gothic work, wherby the former government (which was not only a ship, but a gust too) could never open her fails, but in danger to overset herself; neither could make any voyage, nor ly safe in her own harbor. The wars of later ages, says Verulamius, seem to be made in the dark, in respect of the glory and honor which reflected on men from the wars in antient times. Their shipping of this sort was for voyages, ours dare not lanch; nor lys it safe at home. Your Gothic politicians seem to me rather to have invented som new ammunition or gunpowder, in their king and parlament, than government. For what is becom of the princes (a kind of people) in Germany? blown up. Where are the estates, or the power of the people in France? blown up. Where is that of the people in Arragon, and the rest of the Spanish kingdoms? blown up. On the other side, where is the king of Spain’s power in Holland? blown up. Where is that of the Austrian princes in Switzerland? blown up. This perpetual peevishness and jealousy, under the alternat empire of the prince, and of the people, is obnoxious to every spark. Nor shall any man shew a reason [130] that will be holding in prudence, why the people of Oceana have blown up their king, but that their kings did not first blow up them. The rest is discourse for ladys. Wherfore your parlaments are not henceforth to com out of the bag of Æolus, but by your galaxys, to be the perpetual food of the fire of Vesta.

“Your galaxys, which divide the house into so many regions, are three; one of which constituting the third region is annually chosen, but for the term of three years; which causes the house (having at once blossoms, fruit half ripe, and others dropping off in full maturity) to resemble an orange tree, such as is at the same time an education or spring, and a harvest too: for the people have made a very ill choice in the man, who is not easily capable of the perfect knowlege in one year of the senatorian orders; which knowledge, allowing him for the first to have bin a novice, brings him the second year to practice, and time enough. For at this rate you must always have two hundred knowing men in the government. And thus the vicissitude of your senators is not perceivable in the steadiness and perpetuity of your senat; which, like that of Venice, being always changing, is for ever the same. And tho other politicians have not so well imitated their pattern, there is nothing more obvious in nature, seeing a man who wears the same flesh but a short time, is nevertheless the same man, and of the same genius; and whence is this but from the constancy of nature, in holding a man to her orders? Wherfore keep also to your orders. But this is a mean request, your orders will be worth little, if they do not hold you to them: wherfore imbark. They are like a ship, if you be once aboard, you do not carry them, but they you; and see how Venice stands to her tackling: you will no more forsake them, than you will leap into the sea.

“But they are very many, and difficult. O, my lords, what seaman casts away his card, because it has four and twenty points of the compass? and yet those are very near as many, and as difficult as the orders in the whole circumference of your commonwealth. Consider, how have we bin tost with every wind of doctrin, lost by the glib tongues of your demagogs and grandees in our own havens? A company of fidlers that have disturb’d your rest for your groat; two to one, three thousand pounds a year to another, has bin nothing. And for what? Is there one of them that yet knows what a commonwealth is? And are you yet afraid of such a government in which these shall not dare to scrape, for fear of the statute? Themistocles could not fiddle, but could make of a small city a great commonwealth: these have fiddel’d, and for your mony, till they have brought a great commonwealth to a small city.

“It grieves me, while I consider how, and from what causes imaginary difficultys will be aggravated, that the foregoing orders are not capable of any greater clearness in discourse or writing: but if a man should make a book, describing every trick and passage, it would fare no otherwise with a game at cards; and this is no more, if a man plays upon the square. There is a great difference, says Verulamius, between a cunning man and a wise man (between a demagog and a legistator) not only in point of honesty, but in point of ability: as there be that can pack the cards, and yet cannot play well; so there be som that are good in canvasses and factions, that are otherwise weak men. Allow me but these orders, and let them com with their cards in their sleeves, or pack if they can. Again, says he, it is one thing to understand persons, and another to understand matters; for many are perfect in men’s humors, that are not greatly capable of the real part of [131] business: which is the constitution of one that has study’d men more than books. But there is nothing more hurtful in a state, than that cunning men should pass for wise. His words are an oracle. As Dionysius, when he could no longer exercise his tyranny among men, turn’d schoolmaster, that he might exercise it among boys. Allow me but these orders, and your grandees so well skill’d in the baits and palats of men, shall turn ratcatchers.

“And wheras councils (as is discretely observ’d by the same author in his time) are at this day, in most places, but familiar meetings (somwhat like the academy of our provosts) where matters are rather talk’d on than debated, and run too swift to order an act of council; give me my orders, and see if I have not puzzel’d your demagogs.

“It is not so much my desire to return upon hants, as theirs that will not be satisfy’d; wherfore if, notwithstanding what was said of dividing and chusing in our preliminary discourses, men will yet be returning to the question, Why the senat must be a council apart (tho even in Athens, where it was of no other constitution than the popular assembly, the distinction of it from the other was never held less than necessary) this may be added to the former reasons, that if the aristocracy be not for the debate, it is for nothing; but if it be for debate, it must have convenience for it: and what convenience is there for debate in a croud, where there is nothing but jostling, treading upon one another, and stirring of blood, than which in this case there is nothing more dangerous? Truly, it was not ill said of my lord Epimonus, That Venice plays her game, as it were, at billiards or nineholes; and so may your lordships, unless your ribs be so strong, that you think better of footbal: for such sport is debate in a popular assembly, as, notwithstanding the distinction of the senat, was the destruction of Athens.”

This speech concluded the debate which happen’d at the institution of the senat. The next assembly is that of the people or prerogative tribe.

The face of the prerogative tribe.The face, or mien of the prerogative tribe for the arms, the horses, and the disciplin, but more especially for the select men, is that of a very noble regiment, or rather of two; the one of horse, divided into three troops, (besides that of the provinces, which will be shewn hereafter) with their captains, cornets, and two tribuns of the horse at the head of them; the other of foot in three companys (besides that of the provinces) with their captains, ensigns, and two tribuns of the foot at the head of them. The first troop is call’d the phœnix; the second the pelican; and the third the swallow. The first company the cypress; the second the myrtle; and the third the spray. Of these again (not without a near resemblance of the Roman division of a tribe) the phœnix and the cypress constitute the first class; the pelican and the myrtle the second; and the swallow with the spray the third, renew’d every spring by

21 Order. The change or election of the triennial officers of the prerogative.The one and twentieth ORDER, directing, that upon every Monday next insuing the last of March, the deputys of the annual galaxy arriving at the pavilion in the halo, and electing one captain and one cornet of the swallow (triennial officers) by and out of the cavalry at the horse urn, according to the rules contain’d in the ballot of the hundred; and one captain with one ensign of the spray (triennial officers) by and out of [132] the infantry at the foot urn, after the same way of ballotting; constitute and becom the third classes of the prerogative tribe.

Seven deputys are annually return’d by every tribe, wherof three are horse, and four are foot; and there be fifty tribes: so the swallow must consist of 150 horse, the spray of 200 foot. And the rest of the classes being two, each of them in number equal; the whole prerogative (besides the provinces, that is, the knights and deputys of Marpesia and Panopea) must consist of 1050 deputys. And these troops and companys may as well be call’d centurys as those of the Romans; for the Romans related not, in so naming theirs, to the number. And wheras they were distributed according to the valuation of their estates, so are these; which by virtue of the last order, are now accommodated with their triennial officers. But there be others appertaining to this tribe, whose election, being of far greater importance, is annual, as follows in

22 Order. The charge or election of the annual magistrats of the prerogative.The twenty-second ORDER; wherby the first class having elected their triennial officers, and made oath to the old tribuns, that they will neither introduce, cause, nor to their power suffer debate to be introduc’d into any popular assembly of this government, but to their utmost be aiding and assisting to seize and deliver any person or persons in that way offending, and striking at the root of this commonwealth, to the council of war; are to procede with the other two classes of the prerogative tribe to election of the new tribuns, being four annual magistrats, wherof two are to be elected out of the cavalry at the horse urn, and two out of the infantry at the foot urn, according to the common ballot of the tribes. And they may be promiscuously chosen out of any classis, provided that the same person shall not be capable of bearing the tribunitian honor twice in the term of one galaxy. The tribuns thus chosen shall receive the tribe (in reference to the power of mustering and disciplining the same) as commanders in chief; and for the rest as magistrats, whose proper function is prescrib’d by the next order. The tribuns may give leave to any number of the prerogative, not exceeding one hundred at a time, to be absent, so they be not magistrats, nor officers, and return within three months. If a magistrat or officer has a necessary occasion, he may also be absent for the space of one month; provided, that there be not above three cornets or ensigns, two captains, or one tribun so absent at one time.

To this the Archon spoke at the institution after this manner.

My lords;

“IT is affirm’d by Cicero in his oration for Flaccus, that the commonwealths of Greece were all shaken or ruin’d by the intemperance of their comitia, or assemblys of the people. The truth is, if good heed in this point be not taken, a commonwealth will have bad legs. But all the world knows he should have excepted Lacedemon, where the people, as has bin shewn by the oracle, had no power at all of debate, nor (till after Lysander, whose avarice open’d a gulf, that was not long e’er it swallow’d up his country) came it ever to be exercis’d by them. Whence that commonwealth stood longest and firmest of any other, but this, in our days, of Venice: which having underlaid her self with the like institution, ows a great, if not the greatest part of her steddiness to the same [133] principle; the great council, which is with her the people, by the authority of my lord Epimonus, never speaking a word. Nor shall any commonwealth, where the people in their political capacity is talkative, ever see half the days of one of these: but being carry’d away by vain-glorious men (that, as Overbury says, piss more than they drink) swim down the stream; as did Athens, the most prating of these dames, when that same ranting fellow Alcibiades fell a demagoging for the Sicilian war. But wheras debate by the authority and experience of Lacedemon and Venice, is not to be committed to the people in a well order’d government, it may be said, That the order specify’d is but a slight bar in a matter of like danger; for so much as an oath, if there be no recourse upon the breach of it, is a weak ty for such hands as have the sword in them: wherfore what should hinder the people of Oceana, if they happen not to regard an oath, from assuming debate, and making themselves as much an anarchy as those of Athens? To which I answer, Take the common sort in a privat capacity, and, except they be injur’d, you shall find them to have a bashfulness in the presence of the better sort, or wiser men; acknowleging their abilitys by attention, and accounting it no mean honor to receive respect from them: but if they be injur’d by them, they hate them, and the more for being wife or great, because that makes it the greater injury. Nor refrain they in this case from any kind of intemperance of speech, if of action. It is no otherwise with a people in their political capacity; you shall never find that they have assum’d debate for it self, but for somthing else. Wherfore in Lacedemon where there was, and in Venice where there is nothing else for which they should assume it, they have never shewn so much as an inclination to it. Nor was there any appearance of such a desire in the people of Rome (who from the time of Romulus had bin very well contented with the power of result either in the [56] parochial assemblys, as it was settled upon them by him; or in the meetings of the [57] hundreds, as it was alter’d in their regard for the worse by Servius Tullius) till news was brought som fifteen years after the exile of Tarquin their late king (during which time the senat had govern’d pretty well) that he was dead at the court of Aristodemus the tyrant of Cumæ. [58] Wherupon the patricians, or nobility, began to let out the hitherto-dissembl’d venom, which is inherent in the root of oligarchy, and fell immediatly upon injuring the people beyond all moderation. For wheras the people had serv’d both gallantly and contentedly in arms upon their own charges, and, tho joint purchasers by their swords of the conquer’d lands, had not participated in the same to above two acres a man (the rest being secretly usurp’d by the patricians) they thro the meanness of their support, and the greatness of their expence, being generally indebted, no sooner return’d home with victory to lay down their arms, than they were snatch’d up by their creditors, the nobility, to cram goals. Wherupon, but with the greatest modesty that was ever known in the like case, they first fell upon debate, affirming, [59] that they were opprest and captivated at home, while abroad they fought for liberty and empire; and that the freedom of the common people [134] was safer in time of war than peace, among their enemys than their fellow-citizens. It is true, that when they could not get the senat, thro fear, as was pretended by the patricians, to assemble and take their grievances into consideration, they grew so much the warmer, that it was glad to meet; where Appius Claudius, a fierce spirit, was of opinion, that recourse should be had to consular power, wherby som of the brands of sedition being taken off, the flame might be extinguish’d. Servilius being of another temper, thought it better and safer to try if the people might be bow’d than broken. But this debate was interrupted by tumultuous news of the near approach of the Volsci, a case in which the senat had no recourse but to the people, who contrary to their former custom upon the like occasions would not stir a foot, but fell a laughing, and saying, [60] Let them fight that have something to fight for. The senat that had purses, and could not sing so well before the thief, being in a great perplexity, found no possible way out of it, but to beseech Servilius, one of a genius well known to be popular, That he would accept of the consulship, and make som such use of it as might be helpful to the patrician interest. Servilius accepting of the offer, and making use of his interest with the people, persuaded them to hope well of the good intention of the fathers, whom it would little beseem to be forc’d to those things which would lose their grace, and that in view of the enemy, if they came not freely; and withal publish’d an edict, that no man should withhold a citizen of Rome by imprisonment from giving his name (for that was the way, as I shall have opportunity hereafter to shew more at large, wherby they drew out their armys) nor to seize or sell any man’s goods or children that was in the camp. Wherupon the people with a mighty concourse immediatly took arms, march’d forth, and (which to them was as easy as to be put into the humor, and that, as appears in this place, was not hard) totally defeated the Volsci first, then the Sabins (for the neighbor nations, hoping to have had a good bargain of the discord in Rome, were up in arms on all sides) and after the Sabins, the Aurunci. Whence returning victorious in three battels, they expected no less than that the senat would have made good their words: when Appius Claudius, the other consul, of his innate pride, and that he might frustrat the faith of his collegue, caus’d the soldiers (who being set at liberty, had behav’d themselves with such valor) to be restor’d at their return to their creditors and their goals. Great resort upon this was made by the people to Servilius, shewing him their wounds, calling him to witness how they had behav’d themselves, and minding him of his promise. Poor Servilius was sorry, but so overaw’d with the headiness of his collegue, and the obstinacy of the whole faction of the nobility, that not daring to do any thing either way, he lost both partys: the fathers conceiving that he was ambitious, and the people that he was false; while the consul Claudius continuing to countenance such as daily seiz’d and imprison’d som of the indebted people, had still new and dangerous controversys with them, insomuch that the commonwealth was torn with horrid division, and the people (because they found it not so safe, or so effectual in public) minded nothing but laying their heads together in privat conventicles. For this Aulus Virginius, and Titus Vetusius, the [135] new consuls, were reprov’d by the senat as slothful, and upbraided with the virtue of Appius Claudius. Wherupon the consuls having desir’d the senat, that they might know their pleasure, shew’d afterwards their readiness to obey it, by summoning the people according to command, and requiring names wherby to draw forth an army for diversion, but no man would answer. Report hereof being made to the senat, the younger sort of the fathers grew so hot with the consuls, that they desir’d them to abdicat the magistracy, which they had not the courage to defend.

“The consuls, tho they conceiv’d themselves to be roughly handled, made this soft answer: fathers conscript, that you may please to take notice it was foretold som horrid sedition is at hand, we shall only desire, that they whose valor in this place is so great, may stand by us to see how we behave our selves, and then be as resolute in your commands as you will: your fatherhoods may know if we be wanting in the performance.

“At this som of the hot young noblemen return’d with the consuls to the tribunal, before which the people were yet standing; and the consuls having generally requir’d names in vain, to put it to somthing, requir’d the name of one that was in their ey particularly; on whom, when he mov’d not, they commanded a lictor to lay hands: but the people thronging about the party summon’d, forbad the lictor, who durst not touch him; at which the hotspurs that came with the consuls, inrag’d by the affront, descended from the throne to the aid of the lictor; from whom in so doing they turn’d the indignation of the people upon themselves with such heat, that the consuls interposing, thought fit, by remitting the assembly, to appease the tumult; in which nevertheless there had bin nothing but noise. Nor was there less in the senat, being suddenly rally’d upon this occasion, where they that receiv’d the repulse, with others whose heads were as addle as their own, fell upon the business as if it had bin to be determin’d by clamor, till the consuls, upbraiding the senat that it differ’d not from the marketplace, reduc’d the house to orders. And the fathers having bin consulted accordingly, there were three opinions; Publius Virginius conceiv’d, that the consideration to be had upon the matter in question, or aid of the indebted and imprison’d people, was not to be further extended than to such as had ingag’d upon the promise made by Servilius: Titus Largius, that it was no time to think it enough, if mens merits were acknowleg’d, while the whole people, sunk under the weight of their debts, could not emerge without som common aid; which to restrain, by putting som into a better condition than others, would rather more inflame the discord than extinguish it. Appius Claudius (still upon the old hant) would have it, that the people were rather wanton than fierce: it was not oppression that necessitated, but their power that invited them to these freaks; the empire of the consuls since the appeal to the people (wherby a Plebeian might ask his fellows if he were a thief) being but a mere scarecrow. Go to, says he, let us create the dictator, from whom there is no appeal, and then let me see more of this work, or him that shall forbid my lictor. The advice of Appius was abhor’d by many; and to introduce a general recision of debts with Largius, was to violat all faith: that of Virginius, as the most moderat, would have past best, but that there were privat interests, that constant bane of the public, which withstood it. So they concluded with Appius, who also had bin dictator, if the consuls, and som of the graver sort [136] had not thought it altogether unseasonable, at a time when the Volsci and the Sabins were up again, to venture so far upon alienation of the people: for which cause Valerius, being descended from the Publicolas, the most popular family, as also in his own person of a mild nature, was rather trusted with so rigid a magistracy. Whence it happen’d, that the people, tho they knew well enough against whom the dictator was created, fear’d nothing from Valerius; but upon a new promise made to the same effect with that of Servilius, hop’d better another time, and throwing away all disputes, gave their names roundly, went out, and to be brief, came home again as victorious as in the former action, the dictator entring the city in triumph. Nevertheless when he came to press the senat to make good his promise, and do somthing for the ease of the people, they regarded him no more as to that point than they had don Servilius. Wherupon the dictator, in disdain to be made a stale, abdicated his magistracy, and went home. Here then was a victorious army, without a captain, and a senat pulling it by the beard in their gowns. What is it (if you have read the story, for there is not such another) that must follow? can any man imagin, that such only should be the opportunity upon which this people could run away? alas, poor men, the Æqui and the Volsci, and the Sabins were nothing, but the fathers invincible! there they sat som three hundred of them arm’d all in robes, and thundering with their tongues, without any hopes in the earth to reduce them to any tolerable conditions. Wherfore, not thinking it convenient to abide long so near them, away marches the army, and incamps in the fields. This retreat of the people is call’d the secession of Mount Aventin, where they lodg’d very sad at their condition; but not letting fall so much as a word of murmur against the fathers. The senat by this time were great lords, had the whole city to themselves; but certain neighbours were upon the way that might com to speak with them, not asking leave of the porter. Wherfore their minds became troubl’d, and an orator was posted to the people to make as good conditions with them as he could; but, whatever the terms were, to bring them home, and with all speed. And here it was covenanted between the senat and the people, that these should have magistrats of their own election, call’d the tribuns; upon which they return’d.

“To hold you no longer, the senat having don this upon necessity, made frequent attempts to retract it again; while the tribuns on the other side, to defend what they had got, instituted their tributa comitia, or council of the people; where they came in time, and, as disputes increas’d, to make laws without the authority of the senat, call’d plebiscita. Now to conclude in the point at which I drive; such were the steps wherby the people of Rome came to assume debate: nor is it in art or nature to debar a people of the like effect, where there is the like cause. For Romulus having in the election of his senat squar’d out a nobility for the support of a throne, by making that of the Patricians a distinct and hereditary order, planted the commonwealth upon two contrary interests or roots, which shooting forth in time produc’d two commonwealths, the one oligarchical in the nobility, the other a mere anarchy of the people, and ever after caus’d a perpetual feud and enmity between the senat and the people, even to death.

“There is not a more noble or useful question in the politics than that which is started by Machiavel, Whether means were to be found wherby the enmity [137] that was between the senat and the people of Rome could have bin remov’d? nor is there any other in which we, or the present occasion, are so much concern’d, particularly in relation to this author; forasmuch as his judgment in the determination of the question standing, our commonwealth falls. And he that will erect a commonwealth against the judgment of Machiavel, is oblig’d to give such reasons for his enterprize as must not go a begging. Wherfore to repeat the politician very honestly, but somwhat more briefly, he disputes thus:

“Mach. Disc. B. 1. c. 6. THERE be two sorts of commonwealths, the one for preservation, as Lacedemon and Venice; the other for increase, as Rome.

“Lacedemon being govern’d by a king and a small senat, could maintain it self a long time in that condition, because the inhabitants, being few, having put a bar upon the reception of strangers, and living in a strict observation of the laws of Lycurgus, which now had got reputation, and taken away all occasion of tumults, might well continue long in tranquillity. For the laws of Lycurgus introduc’d a greater equality in estates, and a less equality in honours, whence there was equal poverty; and the Plebeians were less ambitious, because the honors or magistracys of the city could extend but to a few, and were not communicable to the people: nor did the nobility by using them ill, ever give them a desire to participat of the same. This proceded from the kings, whose principality being plac’d in the midst of the nobility, had no greater means wherby to support it self, than to shield the people from all injury; whence the people not fearing empire, desir’d it not: and so all occasion of enmity between the senat and the people was taken away. But this union happen’d especially from two causes; the one, that the inhabitants of Lacedemon being few, could be govern’d by the few: the other, that, not receiving strangers into their commonwealth, they did not corrupt it, nor increase it to such a proportion as was not governable by the few.

“Venice has not divided with her Plebeians, but all are call’d gentlemen that be in administration of the government; for which government she is more beholden to chance than the wisdom of her lawmakers: for many retiring to those islands, where that city is now built, from the inundations of Barbarians that overwhelm’d the Roman empire, when they were increas’d to such a number, that to live together it was necessary to have laws; they ordain’d a form of government, wherby assembling often in council upon affairs, and finding their number sufficient for government, they put a bar upon all such as repairing afterwards to their city should becom inhabitants, excluding them from participation of power. Whence they that were included in the administration had right; and they that were excluded, coming afterwards, and being receiv’d upon no other conditions to be inhabitants, had no wrong; and therfore had no occasion, nor (being never trusted with arms) any means to be tumultuous. Wherfore this commonwealth might very well maintain it self in tranquillity.

“THESE things consider’d, it is plain that the Roman legislators, to have introduc’d a quiet state, must have don one of these two things; either shut out strangers, as the Lacedemonians; or, as the Venetians, not allow’d the people to bear arms. But they did neither. By which means the people having power and increase, were in perpetual tumult. Nor is this to be help’d in a commonwealth for increase, seeing if Rome had cut off the occasion of her tumults, she must have cut off the means of her increase, and by consequence of her greatness.

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“WHERFORE let a legislator consider with himself, whether he would make his commonwealth for preservation, in which case she may be free from tumults; or for increase, in which case she must be infested with them.

“IF he makes her for preservation, she may be quiet at home; but will be in danger abroad. First, Because her foundation must be narrow, and therfore weak, as that of Lacedemon, which lay but upon 30000 citizens; or that of Venice, which lys but upon 3000. Secondly, Such a commonwealth must either be in peace, or war: if she be in peace, the few are soonest effeminated and corrupted, and so obnoxious also to faction. If in war, succeding ill, she is an easy prey; or succeding well, ruin’d by increase: a weight which her foundation is not able to bear. For Lacedemon, when she had made her self mistriss, upon the matter, of all Greece, thro a slight accident, the rebellion of Thebes, occasion’d by the conspiracy of Pelopidas discovering this infirmity of her nature, the rest of her conquer’d citys immediatly fell off, and in the turn as it were of a band reduc’d her from the fullest tide to the lowest eb of her fortune. And Venice having possest her self of a great part of Italy by her purse, was no sooner in defence of it put to the trial of arms, than she lost all in one battel.

“WHENCE I conclude, that in the ordination of a commonwealth a legislator is to think upon that which is most honourable; and laying aside models for preservation, to follow the example of Rome conniving at, and temporizing with the enmity between the senat and the people, as a necessary step to the Roman greatness. For that any man should find out a balance that may take in the conveniences, and shut out the inconveniences of both, I do not think it possible. These are the words of the author, tho the method be somewhat alter’d, to the end that I may the better turn them to my purpose.

“My Lords, I do not know how you hearken to this sound; but to hear the greatest artist in the modern world, giving sentence against our commonwealth, is that with which I am nearly concern’d. Wherfore, with all honor due to the prince of politicians, let us examin his reasoning with the same liberty which he has asserted to be the right of a free people. But we shall never com up to him, except by taking the business a little lower, we descend from effects to their causes. The causes of commotion in a commonwealth are either external or internal. External are from enemys, from subjects, or from servants. To dispute then what was the cause why Rome was infested by the Italian, or by the servil wars; why the slaves took the capitol; why the Lacedemonians were near as frequently troubl’d with their helots, as Rome with all those; or why Venice, whose situation is not trusted to the faith of men, has as good or better quarter with them whom she governs, than Rome had with the Latins; were to dispute upon external causes. The question put by Machiavel is of internal causes; whether the enmity that was between the senat and the people of Rome might have bin remov’d. And to determin otherwise of this question than he dos, I must lay down other principles than he has don. To which end I affirm, that a commonwealth internally consider’d, is either equal or inequal. A commonwealth that is internally equal, has no internal cause of commotion, and therfore can have no such effect but from without. A commonwealth internally inequal has no internal cause of quiet, and therfore can have no such effect but by diversion.

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“To prove my assertions, I shall at this time make use of no other than his examples. Lacedemon was externally unquiet, because she was externally inequal, that is as to her belots; and she was internally at rest, because she was equal in her self, both in root and branch: in the root by her agrarian, and in branch by the senat, inasmuch as no man was therto qualify’d, but by election of the people.Arist. Polit. b. 2. Which institution of Lycurgus is mention’d by Aristotle, where he says, that rendering his citizens emulous (not careless) of that honor, he assign’d to the people the election of the senat. Wherfore Machiavel in this, as in other places, having his ey upon the division of Patrician and Plebeian familys as they were in Rome, has quite mistaken the orders of this commonwealth, where there was no such thing. Nor did the quiet of it derive from the power of the kings, who were so far from shielding the people from the injury of the nobility, of which there was none in his sense but the senat, that one declar’d end of the senat at the institution was to shield the people from the kings, who from that time had but single votes. Neither did it procede from the straitness of the senat, or their keeping the people excluded from the government, that they were quiet, but from the equality of their administration, seeing the senat (as is plain by the oracle, their fundamental law) had no more than the debate, and the result of the commonwealth belong’d to the people. Wherfore when Theopompus and Polydorus kings of Lacedemon, would have kept the people excluded from the government, by adding to the antient law this clause, If the determination of the people be faulty, it shall be lawful for the senat to resume the debate; the people immediately became unquiet, and resum’d that debate, which ended not till they had set up their ephors, and caus’d that magistracy to be confirm’d by their kings. [61] For when Theopompus first ordain’d that the ephori or overseers should be created at Lacedemon, to be such a restraint upon the kings there as the tribuns were upon the consuls at Rome, the queen complain’d to him, that by this means he transmitted the royal authority greatly diminisk’d to his children: I leave indeed less, answer’d he, but more lasting. And this was excellently said; for that power only is safe which is limited from doing hurt. Theopompus therfore, by confining the kingly power within the bounds of the laws, did recommend it by so much to the people’s affection, as he remov’d it from being arbitrary. By which it may appear, that a commonwealth for preservation, if she coms to be inequal, is as obnoxious to enmity between the senat and the people, as a commonwealth for increase; and that the tranquillity of Lacedemon was deriv’d from no other cause than her equality.

“For Venice, to say that she is quiet because she disarms her subjects, is to forget that Lacedemon disarm’d her helots, and yet could not in their regard be quiet; wherfore if Venice be defended from external causes of commotion, it is first thro her situation, in which respect her subjects have no hope (and this indeed may be attributed to her fortune); and, secondly, thro her exquisit justice, whence they have no will to invade her. But this can be attributed to no other [140] cause than her prudence; which will appear to be greater, as we look nearer; for the effects that procede from fortune, if there be any such thing, are like their cause, inconstant. But there never happen’d to any other commonwealth so undisturb’d and constant a tranquillity and peace in her self, as is in that of Venice; wherfore this must procede from som other cause than chance. And we see that as she is of all others the most quiet, so the most equal commonwealth. Her body consists of one order, and her senat is like a rolling stone, as was said, which never did, nor, while it continues upon that rotation, never shall gather the moss of a divided or ambitious interest; much less such a one as that which grasp’d the people of Rome in the talons of their own eagles. And if Machiavel, averse from doing this commonwealth right, had consider’d her orders, as his reader shall easily perceive he never did, he must have bin so far from attributing the prudence of them to chance, that he would have touch’d up his admirable work to that perfection, which, as to the civil part, has no pattern in the universal world but this of Venice.

“Rome, secure by her potent and victorious arms from all external causes of commotion, was either beholden for her peace at home to her enemys abroad, or could never rest her head. My LORDS, you that are parents of a commonwealth, and so freer agents than such as are merely natural, have a care. For, as no man shall shew me a commonwealth born streight, that ever became crooked; so, no man shall shew me a commonwealth born crooked, that ever became streight. Rome was crooked in her birth, or rather prodigious. Her twins the Patricians and Plebeian orders came, as was shewn by the foregoing story, into the world, one body but two heads, or rather two bellys: for, notwithstanding the fable out of Æsop, wherby Menenius Agrippa the orator that was sent from the senat to the people at mount Aventin, shew’d the fathers to be the belly, and the people to be the arms and the legs (which except that, how slothful soever it might seem, they were nourish’d, not these only, but the whole body must languish and be dissolv’d) it is plain, that the fathers were a distinct belly; such a one as took the meat indeed out of the people’s mouths, but abhorring the agrarian, return’d it not in the due and necessary nutrition of a commonwealth. Nevertheless, as the people that live about the cataracts of Nilus are said not to hear the noise, so neither the Roman writers, nor Machiavel the most conversant with them, seem among so many of the tribunitian storms, to hear their natural voice: for tho they could not miss of it so far as to attribute them to the strife of the people for participation in magistracy, or, in which Machiavel more particularly joins, to that about the agrarian; this was to take the business short, and the remedy for the disease.

“A people, when they are reduc’d to misery and despair, becom their own politicians, as certain beasts when they are sick becom their own physicians, and are carry’d by a natural instinct to the desire of such herbs as are their proper cure; but the people, for the greater part, are beneath the beasts in the use of them. Thus the people of Rome, tho in their misery they had recourse by instinct, as it were, to the two main fundamentals of a commonwealth, participation of magistracy, and the agrarian, did but tast and spit at them, not (which is necessary in physic) drink down the potion, and in that their healths. For when they had obtain’d participation of magistracy, it was but lamely, not to a full and equal rotation in all elections; nor did they greatly regard it in what they [141] had got. And when they had attain’d to the agrarian, they neglected it so far as to suffer the law to grow obsolete: but if you do not take the due dose of your medicins (as there be slight tasts which a man may have of philosophy that incline to atheism) it may chance to be poison, there being a like tast of the politics that inclines to confusion, as appears in the institution of the Roman tribuns, by which magistracy and no more, the people were so far from attaining to peace, that they in getting but so much, got but heads for an eternal feud; wheras if they had attain’d in perfection either to the agrarian, they had introduc’d the equality and calm of Lacedemon, or to rotation, and they had introduc’d that of Venice: and so there could have bin no more enmity between the senat and the people of Rome, than there was between those orders in Lacedemon, or is now in Venice. Wherfore Machiavel seems to me, in attributing the peace of Venice more to her luck than her prudence, of the whole stable to have saddled the wrong horse; for tho Rome [62] in her military part could beat it better, beyond all comparison, upon the sounding hoof, Venice for the civil part has plainly had the wings of Pegasus.

“The whole question then will come upon this point, Whether the people of Rome could have obtain’d these orders? and first, to say, that they could not have obtain’d them without altering the commonwealth, is no argument; seeing neither could they, without altering the commonwealth, have obtain’d their tribuns, which nevertheless were obtain’d. And if a man considers the posture that the people were in when they obtain’d their tribuns, they might as well, and with as great ease (forasmuch as the reason why the nobility yielded to the tribuns was no other, than that there was no remedy) have obtain’d any thing else. And for experience, it was in the like case that the Lacedemonians did set up their ephors, and the Athenians after the battel of Plateæ bow’d the senat (so hard a thing it is for a commonwealth that was born crooked to becom streight) as much the other way. Nor, if it be objected, that this must have ruin’d the nobility (and in that depriv’d the commonwealth of the greatness which she acquir’d by them) is this opinion holding; but confuted by the sequel of the story, shewing plainly, that the nobility thro the defect of such orders, that is to say, of rotation and the agrarian, came to eat up the people: and battening themselves in luxury, to be, as Salust speaks of them, [63] a most sluggish and lazy nobility, in whom, besides the name, there was no more than in a statue; and to bring so mighty a commonwealth, and of so huge a glory, to so deplorable an end. Wherfore means might have bin found to remove the enmity that was between the senat and the people of Rome.

“My lords, If I have argu’d well, I have given you the comfort and assurance, that notwithstanding the judgment of Machiavel, your commonwealth is both safe and sound: but if I have not argu’d well, then take the comfort and assurance which he gives you while he is firm, That a legislator is to lay aside all other examples, and follow that of Rome only, conniving and temporizing with the enmity between the senat and the people, as a necessary step to the Roman greatness. Whence it follows, that your commonwealth, at the worst, is that which he has given you his word is the best.

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“I have held your lordships long, but upon an account of no small importance, which I can now sum up in these few words: Where there is a liquorishness in a popular assembly to debate, it proceeds not from the constitution of the people, but of the commonwealth. Now that your commonwealth is of such a constitution as is naturally free from this kind of intemperance, is that which, to make good, I must divide the remainder of my discourse into two parts.

“The first, shewing the several constitutions of the assemblys of the people in other commonwealths.

“The second, comparing our assembly of the people with theirs; and shewing how it excludes the inconveniences, and embraces the conveniences of them all.

“In the beginning of the first part I must take notice, that among the popular errors of our days it is no small one, that men imagin the antient governments of this kind to have consisted for the most part of one city, that is, of one town; wheras by what we have learnt of my lords that open’d them, it appears that there was not any considerable one of such a constitution but Carthage, till this in our days of Venice.

“For to begin with Israel, it consisted of the twelve tribes, locally spread or quarter’d throout the whole territory; and these being call’d together by trumpets, constituted the church or assembly of the people. The vastness of this weight, as also the slowness thence inavoidable, became a great cause (as has bin shewn at large by my lord Phosphorus) of the breaking that commonwealth; notwithstanding that the temple, and those religious ceremonys for which the people were at least annually oblig’d to repair thither, were no small ligament of the tribes, otherwise but slightly tack’d together.

“Athens consisted of four tribes, taking in the whole people both of the city and of the territory; not so gather’d by Theseus into one town, as to exclude the country, but to the end that there might be som capital of the commonwealth: tho true it be, that the congregation consisting of the inhabitants within the walls, was sufficient to all intents and purposes, without those of the country. These also being exceding numerous, became burdensom to themselves, and dangerous to the commonwealth; the more for their ill education, as is observ’d by Xenophon and Polybius, who compare them to mariners that in a calm are perpetually disputing and swaggering one with another, and never lay their hands to the common tackling or safety, till they be all indanger’d by som storm. Which caus’d Thucydides, when he saw this people thro the purchase of their misery becom so much wiser, as to reduce their comitia or assemblys to five thousand, to say in his eighth book; And now, at least in my time, the Athenians seem to have order’d their state aright, consisting of a moderat temper both of the few (by which he means the senat of the bean) and of the many, or the five thousand. And he does not only give you his judgment, but the best proof of it; for this, says he, was the first thing that, after so many misfortunes past, made the city again to raise her head. The place I would desire your lordships to note, as the first example that I find, or think is to be found, of a popular assembly by way of representative.

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“Lacedemon consisted of thirty thousand citizens dispers’d throout Laconia, one of the greatest provinces in all Greece, and divided, as by som authors is probable, into six tribes. Of the whole body of these, being gather’d, consisted the great church or assembly, which had the legislative power; the little church, gather’d somtimes for matters of concern within the city, consisted of the Spartans only. These happen’d, like that of Venice, to be good constitutions of a congregation, but from an ill cause the infirmity of a commonwealth, which thro her paucity was oligarchical.

“Wherfore, go which way you will, it should seem, that without a representative of the people, your commonwealth consisting of a whole nation, can never avoid falling either into oligarchy or confusion.

“This was seen by the Romans, whose rustic tribes extending themselves from the river Arno to the Vulturnus, that is, from Fesulæ or Florence to Capua, invented a way of representative by lots: the tribe upon which the first fell, being the prerogative; and som two or three more that had the rest, the jure vocatæ. These gave the suffrage of the commonwealth in [64] two meetings; the prerogative at the first assembly, and the jure vocatæ at a second.

“Now to make the parallel, all the inconveniences that you have observ’d in these assemblys are shut out, and all the conveniences taken into your prerogative. For first, it is that for which Athens, shaking off the blame of Xenophon and Polybius, came to deserve the praise of Thucydides, a representative. And, secondly, not as I suspect in that of Athens, and is past suspicion in this of Rome, by lot, but by suffrage, as was also the late house of commons, by which means in your prerogatives all the tribes of Oceana are jure vocatæ; and if a man shall except against the paucity of the standing number, it is a wheel, which in the revolution of a few years turns every hand that is fit, or fits every hand that it turns to the public work. Moreover, I am deceiv’d if upon due consideration it dos not fetch your tribes, with greater equality and ease to themselves and to the government, from the frontiers of Marpesia, than Rome ever brought any one of hers out of her pomæria, or the nearest parts of her adjoining territorys. To this you may add, That wheras a commonwealth, which in regard of the people is not of facility in execution, were sure enough in this nation to be cast off thro impatience; your musters and galaxys are given to the people, as milk to babes, wherby when they are brought up thro four days election in a whole year (one at the parish, one at the hundred, and two at the tribe) to their strongest meat, it is of no harder digestion, than to give their negative or affirmative as they see cause. There be gallant men among us that laugh at such an appeal or umpire; but I refer it whether you be more inclining to pardon them or me, who I confess have been this day laughing at a sober man, but without meaning him any harm, and that is Petrus Cunæus, where speaking of the nature of the people, he says, that taking them apart, they are very simple, but yet in their assemblys they see and know somthing: and so runs away without troubling himself with what that somthing is. Wheras the people, taken apart, are but so many privat interests; but if you take them together, they are the public interest. The public interest of a commonwealth, as has bin shewn, is nearest that of mankind, and that of mankind is right reason; but [144] with aristocracy (whose reason or interest, when they are all together, as appear’d by the Patricians, is but that of a party) it is quite contrary: for as, taken apart, they are far wiser than the people consider’d in that manner; so being put together, they are such fools, who by deposing the people, as did those of Rome, will saw off the branch wherupon they sit, or rather destroy the root of their own greatness. Wherfore Machiavel following Aristotle, and yet going before him, may well assert, [65] That the people are wiser and more constant in their resolutions than a prince: which is the prerogative of popular government for wisdom. And hence it is that the prerogative of your commonwealth, as for wisdom so for power, is in the people: which (tho I am not ignorant that the Roman prerogative was so call’d à prærogando, because their suffrage was first ask’d) gives the denomination to your prerogative tribe.”

The elections, whether annual or triennial, being shewn by the twenty-second, that which coms in the next place to be consider’d is

23 Order. The constitution, function, and manner of proceding of the prerogative.The twenty-third ORDER, shewing the power, function, and manner of proceding of the prerogative tribe.

THE power or function of the prerogative is of two parts, the one of result, in which it is the legislative power; the other of judicature, in which regard it is the highest court, and the last appeal in this commonwealth.

FOR the former part (the people by this constitution being not oblig’d by any law that is not of their own making or confirmation, by the result of the prerogative, their equal representative) it shall not be lawful for the senat to require obedience from the people, nor for the people to give obedience to the senat in or by any law that has not bin promulgated, or printed and publish’d for the space of six weeks; and afterwards propos’d by the authority of the senat to the prerogative tribe, and resolv’d by the major vote of the same in the affirmative. Nor shall the senat have any power to levy war, men, or mony, otherwise than by the consent of the people so given, or by a law so enacted, except in cases of exigence, in which it is agreed, that the power both of the senat and the people shall be in the dictator, so qualify’d, and for such a term of time, as is according to that constitution already prescrib’d. While a law is in promulgation, the censors shall animadvert upon the senat, and the tribuns upon the people, that there be no laying of heads together, no conventicles or canvassing to carry on or oppose any thing; but that all may be don in a free and open way.

FOR the latter part of the power of the prerogative, or that wherby they are the supreme judicatory of this nation, and of the provinces of the same, the cognizances of crimes against the majesty of the people, such as high treason, as also of peculat, that is, robbery of the treasury, or defraudation of the commonwealth, appertains to this tribe. And if any person or persons, provincials or citizens, shall appeal to the people, it belongs to the prerogative to judg and determin the case; provided that if the appeal be from any court of justice in this nation or the provinces, the appellant shall first deposit a hundred pounds in the court from which he appeals, to be forfeited to the same, if he be cast in his suit by the people. But the power of the council of war being the expedition of this commonwealth, and the martial law of the strategus in the field, are those only from which there shall ly no appeal to the people.

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THE proceding of the prerogative in case of a proposition, is to be thus order’d. The magistrats, proposing by authority of the senat, shall rehearse the whole matter, and expound it to the people: which don, they shall put the whole together to the suffrage, with three boxes, the negative, the affirmative, and the nonsincere: and the suffrage being return’d to the tribuns, and number’d in the presence of the proposers, if the major vote be in the nonsincere, the proposers shall desist, and the senat shall resume the debate. If the major vote be in the negative, the proposers shall desist, and the senat too. But if the major vote be in the affirmative, then the tribe is clear, and the proposers shall begin and put the whole matter, with the negative and the affirmative (leaving out the nonsincere) by clauses; and the suffrages being taken and number’d by the tribuns in the presence of the proposers, shall be written and reported by the tribuns to the senat. And that which is propos’d by the authority of the senat, and confirm’d by the command of the people, is the law of Oceana.

THE proceding of the prerogative in a case of judicature is to be thus order’d. The tribuns being auditors of all causes appertaining to the cognizance of the people, shall have notice of the suit or trial, whether of appeal or otherwise, that is to be commenc’d; and if any one of them shall accept of the same, it appertains to him to introduce it. A cause being introduc’d, and the people muster’d or assembl’d for the decision of the same, the tribuns are presidents of the court, having power to keep it to orders, and shall be seated upon a scaffold erected in the middle of the tribe. Upon the right hand shall stand a seat, or large pulpit assign’d to the plaintiff, or the accuser; and, upon the left, another for the defendant, each if they please with his council. And the tribuns (being attended upon such occasions with so many ballotins, secretarys, doorkeepers, and messengers of the senat as shall be requisit) one of them shall turn up a glass of the nature of an hourglass, but such a one as is to be of an hour and a half’s running; which being turn’d up, the party or council on the right hand may begin to speak to the people. If there be papers to be read, or witnesses to be examin’d, the officer shall lay the glass sideways till the papers be read, and the witnesses examin d, and then turn it up again; and so long as the glass is running, the party on the right hand has liberty to speak, and no longer. The party on the right hand having had his time, the like shall be don in every respect for the party on the left. And the cause being thus heard, the tribuns shall put the question to the tribe with a white, a black, and a red box (or nonsincere) whether guilty, or not guilty. And if the suffrage being taken, the major vote be in the nonsincere, the cause shall be reheard upon the next juridical day following, and put to the question in the same manner. If the major vote coms the second time in the nonsincere, the cause shall be heard again upon the third day; but at the third hearing the question shall be put without the nonsincere. Upon the first of the three days in which the major vote coms in the white box, the party accus’d is absolv’d; and upon the first of them in which it coms in the black box, the party accus’d is condemn’d. The party accus’d being condemn’d, the tribuns (if the case be criminal) shall put with the white and the black box these questions, or such of them, as, regard had to the case, they shall conceive most proper.

1. WHETHER he shall have a writ of case.
2. WHETHER he shall be fin’d so much, or so much.
3. WHETHER he shall be confiscated.
4. WHETHER he shall be render’d incapable of magistrecy.
5. WHETHER he shall be banish’d.
6. WHETHER he shall be put to death.

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THESE, or any three of these questions, whether simple or such as shall be thought fitly mix’d, being put by the tribuns, that which has most above half the votes in the black box is the sentence of the people, which the troop of the third classis is to see executed accordingly.

BUT wheras by the constitution of this commonwealth it may appear that neither the propositions of the senat, nor the judicature of the people, will be so frequent as to hold the prerogative in continual imployment; the senat, a main part of whose office it is to teach and instruct the people, shall duly (if they have no greater affairs to divert them) cause an oration to be made to the prerogative by som knight or magistrat of the senat, to be chosen out of the ablest men, and from time to time appointed by the orator of the house, in the great hall of the pantheon, while the parlament resides in the town; or in some grove or sweet place in the field, while the parlament for the heat of the year shall reside in the country; upon every Tuesday, morning or afternoon.

AND the orator appointed for the time to this office, shall first repeat the orders of the commonwealth with all possible brevity; and then making choice of one or som part of it, discourse therof to the people. An oration or discourse of this nature, being afterwards perus’d by the council of state, may as they see cause be printed and publish’d.

The Archon’s comment upon the order I find to have bin of this sense:

My lords,

“TO crave pardon for a word or two in farther explanation of what was read, I shall briefly shew how the constitution of this tribe or assembly answers to their function; and how their function, which is of two parts, the former in the result or legislative power, the latter in the supreme judicature of the commonwealth, answers to their constitution. Machiavel has a discourse, where he puts the question, Whether the guard of liberty may with more security be committed to the nobility, or to the people? Which doubt of his arises thro the want of explaining his terms; for the guard of liberty can signify nothing else but the result of the commonwealth: so that to say, that the guard of liberty may be committed to the nobility, is to say, that the result may be committed to the senat, in which case the people signify nothing. Now to shew it was a mistake to affirm it to have bin thus in Lacedemon, sufficient has bin spoken; and wheras he will have it to be so in Venice also, [66] They, says Contarini, in whom resides the supreme power of the whole commonwealth, and of the laws, and upon whose orders depends the authority as well of the senat as of all the other magistrats, is the GREAT COUNCIL. It is institutively in the great council, by the judgment of all that know that commonwealth; tho for the reasons shewn, it be somtimes exercis’d by the senat. Nor need I run over the commonwealths in this place for the proof of a thing so doubtless, and such as has bin already made so apparent, as that the result of each was in the popular part of it. The popular part of yours, or the prerogative tribe, consists of seven deputys (wherof three are of the horse) annually elected out of every tribe of Oceana; which being fifty, amounts to one hundred and fifty horse, and two hundred [147] foot. And the prerogative consisting of three of these lists, consists of four hundred and fifty horse, and six hundred foot, besides those of the provinces to be hereafter mention’d; by which means the overbalance in the suffrage remaining to the foot by one hundred and fifty votes, you have to the support of a true and natural aristocracy, the deepest root of a democracy that has bin ever planted. Wherfore there is nothing in art or nature better qualify’d for the result than this assembly. It is noted out of Cicero by Machiavei, That the people, tho they are not so prone to find out truth of themselves, as to follow custom, or run into error; yet if they be shewn truth, they not only acknowledge and imbrace it very suddenly, but are the most constant and faithful guardians and conservators of it. It is your duty and office, wherto you are also qualify’d by the orders of this commonwealth, to have the people as you have your hauks and greyhounds, in leases and slips, to range the fields, and beat the bushes for them; for they are of a nature that is never good at this sport, but when you spring or start their proper quarry. Think not that they will stand to ask you what it is, or less know it than your hauks and greyhounds do theirs; but presently make such a flight or course, that a huntsman may as well undertake to run with his dogs, or a falconer to fly with his hauk, as an aristocracy at this game to compare with the people. The people of Rome were possest of no less a prey than the empire of the world, when the nobility turn’d tails, and perch’d among daws upon the tower of monarchy. For tho they did not all of them intend the thing, they would none of them indure the remedy, which was the agrarian.

“But the prerogative tribe has not only the result, but is the supreme judicature, and the ultimat appeal in this commonwealth. For the popular government that makes account to be of any standing, must make sure in the first place of the [67] appeal to the people. As an estate in trust becoms a man’s own, if he be not answerable for it, so the power of a magistracy not accountable to the people, from whom it was receiv’d, becoming of privat use, the commonwealth loses her liberty. Wherfore the right of supreme judicature in the people (without which there can be no such thing as popular government) is confirm’d by the constant practice of all commonwealths; as that of Israel in the cases of Achan, and of the tribe of Benjamin, adjudg’d by the congregation. The dicasterian or court call’d the heliaia in Athens, which (the comitia of that commonwealth consisting of the whole people, and so being too numerous to be a judicatory) was constituted somtimes of five hundred, at others of one thousand, or, according to the greatness of the cause, of fifteen hundred, elected by the lot out of the whole body of the people, had with the nine Archons that were presidents, the cognizance of such causes as were of highest importance in that state. The five ephors in Lacedemon, which were popular magistrats, might question their kings, as appears by the cases of Pausanias, and of Agis, who being upon his trial in this court, was cry’d to by his mother to appeal to the people, as Plutarch has it in his life. The tribuns of the people of Rome (like, in the nature of their magistracy, and for som time in number, to the ephors, as being, according to Halicarnasseus and Plutarch, instituted in [148] imitation of them) had power [68] to summon any man, his magistracy at least being expir’d (for from the dictator there lay no appeal) to answer for himself to the people. As in the case of Coriolanus, who was going about to force the people, by withholding corn from them in a famin, to relinquish the magistracy of the tribuns; in that of Spurius Cassius for affecting tyranny; of Marcus Sergius for running away at Veii; of Caius Lucretius for spoiling his province; of Junius Silanus for making war, without a command from the people, against the Cimbri; with divers others. And the crimes of this nature were call’d læsæ majestatis, or high treason. Examples of such as were arrain’d or try’d for peculat, or defraudation of the commonwealth, were Marcus Curius, for intercepting the mony of the Samnits; Salinator, for the inequal division of spoils to his soldiers; Marcus Posthumius, for cheating the commonwealth by a feign’d shipwreck. Causes of these two kinds were of a more public nature; but the like power upon appeals was also exercis’d by the people in privat matters, even during the time of the kings; as in the case of Horatius. Nor is it otherwise with Venice, where the doge Loredano was sentenc’d by the great council; and Antonio Grimani, afterwards doge, question’d, for that he being admiral had suffer’d the Turc to take Lepanto in view of his fleet.

“Nevertheless, there lay no appeal from the Roman dictator to the people; which if there had, might have cost the commonwealth dear, when Spurius Melius affecting empire, circumvented and debauch’d the tribuns: wherupon Titus Quintus Cincinnatus was created dictator; who having chosen Servilius Ahala to be his lieutenant, or magister equitum, sent him to apprehend Melius, whom, while he disputed the commands of the dictator, and implor’d the aid of the people, Ahala cut off upon the place. By which example you may see in what cases the dictator may prevent the blow which is ready somtimes to fall e’er the people be aware of the danger. Wherefore there lys no appeal from the dieci, or the council of ten, in Venice, to the great council, nor from our council of war to the people. For the way of proceding of this tribe, or the ballot, it is, as was once said for all, Venetian.

“This discourse of judicatorys wherupon we are faln, brings us rather naturally than of design from the two general orders of every commonwealth, that is to say, from the debating part or the senat, and the resolving part or the people, to the third, which is the executive part or the magistracy, wherupon I shall have no need to dwell: for the executive magistrats of this commonwealth are the strategus in arms; the signory in their several courts, as the chancery, the exchequer; as also the councils in divers cases within their instructions; the censors as well in their proper magistracy, as in the council of religion; the tribuns in the government of the prerogative, and that judicatory; and the judges with their courts: of all which so much is already said or known as may suffice.

“The Tuesday lectures or orations to the people will be of great benefit to the senat, the prerogative, and the whole nation. To the senat, because they will not only teach your senators elocution, but keep the system of the government in their memorys. Elocution is of great use to your senators; for if they do [149] not understand rhetoric (giving it at this time for granted, that the art were not otherwise good) and com to treat with, or vindicat the cause of the commonwealth against som other nation that is good at it, the advantage will be subject to remain upon the merit of the art, and not upon the merit of the cause. Fucthermore, the genius or soul of this government being in the whole and in every part, they will never be of ability in determination upon any particular, unleis at the same time they have an idea of the whole. That this therfore muit be, in that regard, of equal benefit to the prerogative, is plain; tho these have a greater concernment in it. For this commonwealth is the estate of the people: and a man, you know, tho he be virtuous, yet if he dos not understand his estate, may run out or be cheated of it. Last of all, the treasures of the politics will by this means be so open’d, rifled, and dispers’d, that this nation will as soon dote, like the Indians, upon glass beads, as disturb your government with whimsys and freaks of motherwit; or suffer themselves to be stutter’d out of their libertys. There is not any reason why your grandees, your wise men of this age, that laugh out and openly at a commonwealth as the most ridiculous thing, do not appear to be, as in this regard they are, mere idiots, but that the people have not eys.

There remains no more relating to the senat and the people than

24 Order. Constitution of the provincial part of the senat and the people.The twenty-fourth ORDER, wherby it is lawful for the province of Marpesia to have 30 knights of their own election continually present in the senat of Oceana, together with 60 deputys of horse, and 120 of foot in the prerogative tribe, indu’d with equal power (respect had to their quality and number) in the debate and result of this commonwealth: provided that they observe the course or rotation of the same by the annual return of 10 knights, 20 deputys of the horse, and 40 of the foot. The like in all respects is lawful for Panopea; and the horse of both the provinces amounting to one troop, and the foot to one company, one captain and one cornet of the horse shall be annually chosen by Marpesia, and one captain and one ensign of the foot shall be annually chosen by Panopea.

The orb of the prerogative being thus complete, is not unnaturally compar’d to that of the moon, either in consideration of the light borrow’d from the senat, as from the sun; or of the ebs and stoods of the people, which are mark’d by the negative or affirmative of this tribe.Constitution of the parlament. And the constitution of the senat and the people being shewn, you have that of the parlament of Oceana, consisting of the senat proposing, and of the people resolving; which amounts to an act of parlament. So the parlament is the heart, which, consisting of two ventricles, the one greater and replenish’d with a grosser matter, the other less and full of a purer, sucks in, and spouts forth the vital blood of Oceana by a perpetual circulation. Wherfore the life of this government is no more unnatural or obnoxious upon this score to dissolution, than that of a man; nor to giddiness than the world: seeing the earth, whether it be it self or the heavens that are in rotation, is so far from being giddy, that it could not subsist without motion. But why should not this government be much rather capable of duration and steddiness by motion? than which God has ordain’d no other to the universal commonwealth of mankind: seeing one generation coms, and another gos, but the earth remains firm for ever; [150] that is, in her proper situation or place, whether she be mov’d or not mov’d upon her proper center. The senat, the people, and the magistracy, or the parlament so constituted, as you have seen, is the guardian of this commonwealth, and the husband of such a wife as is elegantly describ’d by Solomon.Prov. 31. She is like the merchant’s ships; she brings her food from far. She considers a field; and buys it: with the fruit of her hands she plants a vineyard. She perceives that her merchandize is good. She stretches forth her hands to the poor. She is not afraid of the snow for her houshold; for all her houshold are cloth’d with scarlet. She makes her self coverings of tapestry; her clothing is silk and purple. Her husband is known (by his robes) in the gates, when he sits among the senators of the land. The gates, or inferior courts, were branches as it were of the sanhedrim or senat of Israel. Nor is our commonwealth a worse houswife, or she has less regard to her magistrats; as may appear by

25 Order.The twenty-fifth ORDER: That, wheras the public revenue is thro the late civil wars dilapidated, the excise, being improv’d or improvable to the revenue of one million, be apply’d for the space of eleven years to com, to the reparation of the same, and for the present maintenance of the magistrats, knights, deputys, and other officers, who, according to their several dignitys and functions, shall annually receive towards the support of the same, as follows:

The lord strategus marching, is, upon another account, to have field pay as general.

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OUT of the personal estates of every man, who at his death bequeaths not above forty shillings to the muster of that hundred wherin it lys, shall be levy’d one per cent. till the solid revenue of the muster of the hundred amounts to 50 l. per annum for the prizes of the youth.

THE twelve ballotins are to be divided into three regions, according to the course of the senat; the four of the first region to be elected at the tropic out of such children as the knights of the same shall offer, not being under eleven years of age, nor above thirteen. And their election shall be made by the lot at an urn set by the serjeant of the house for that purpose in the hall of the pantheon. The livery of the commonwealth for the fashion or the color may be chang’d at the election of the strategus according to his phansy. But every knight during his session shall be bound to give to his footman, or some one of his footmen, the livery of the commonwealth.

The prerogative tribe shall receive as follows:

THE dignity of the commonwealth, and aids of the several magistracys and offices therto belonging, being provided for as aforesaid, the overplus of the excise, with the product of the sum rising, shall be carefully manag’d by the senat and the people thro the diligence of the officers of the exchequer, till it amount to eight millions, or to the purchase of about four hundred thousand pounds solid revenue. At which time, the term of eleven years being expir’d, the excise, except it be otherwise order’d by the senat and the people, shall be totally remitted and abolish’d for ever.

At this institution the takes, as will better appear in the corollary, were abated about one half, which made the order when it came to be tasted, to be of good relish with the people in the very beginning; tho the advantages then were no ways comparable to the consequences to be hereafter shewn. Nevertheless, my lord Epimonus, who with much ado had bin held till now, found it midsummer moon, and broke out of bedlam in this manner:

My lord Archon,

“I Have a singing in my head like that of a cartwheel, my brains are upon a rotation; and som are so merry, that a man cannot speak his griefs, but if your highshod prerogative, and those same slouching fellows your tribuns, do not take my lord strategus’s, and my lord orator’s heads, and jole them together under the canopy, then let me be ridiculous to all posterity. For here is a commonwealth, to which if a man should take that of the prentices in their ancient administration of justice at Shrovetide, it were an aristocracy. You have set the very rabble with troncheons in their hands, and the gentry of this nation, like cocks with scarlet gills, and the golden combs of their salarys to boot, lest they should not be thrown at.

“Not a night can I sleep for som horrid apparition or other; one while these myrmidons are measuring silks by their quarterstaves; another stuffing their greasy pouches with my lord high treasurer’s jacobusses. For they are above a thousand in arms to three hundred, which, their gowns being pull’d over their ears, are but in their doublets and hose. But what do I speak of a thousand? there be two thousand in every tribe, that is, a hundred thousand in the whole nation, not only in the posture of an army, but in a civil capacity sufficient to give us what laws they please. Now every body knows, that the lower sort of people regard nothing but mony; and you say it is the duty of a legislator to presume all men to be wicked: wherfore they must fall upon the richer, as they are an army; or, lest their minds should misgive them in such a villany, you have given them incouragement that they have a nearer way, seeing it may be don every whit as well as by the overbalancing power which they have in elections. There is a fair which is annually kept in the center of these territorys at Kiberton, a town famous for ale, and frequented by good fellows; where there is a solemnity of the pipers and fidlers of this nation (I know not whether Lacedemon, where the senat kept account of the stops of the flutes and of the fiddle-strings of that commonwealth, had any such custom) call’d the bulrunning; and he that catches and holds the bull, is the annual and supreme magistrat of that comitia or congregation, call’d king piper; without whose licence it is not lawful for any of those citizens to injoy the liberty of his calling; nor is he otherwise legitimatly qualify’d (or civitate donatus) to lead apes or bears in any perambulation of the same. Mine host of the bear, in Kiberton, the father of ale, and patron of good footbal and cudgelplayers, has any time since I can remember, bin grand chancellor of this order. Now, say I, seeing great things arise from small beginnings, what should hinder the people, prone to their own advantage, and loving mony, from having intelligence convey’d to them by this same king piper and his chancellor, with their loyal subjects the minstrils and bearwards, masters of ceremonys, to which there is great recourse in their respective perambulations, and which they will commission and instruct, with directions to all the tribes, willing and commanding them, that as they with their own good, they chuse no other into the next primum mobile, but of the ablest cudgel and footbal-players? which don as soon as said, your primum mobile consisting of no other stuff, must of necessity be drawn forth into your nebulones, and your galimosrys; and so the silken purses of your senat and prerogative being made of sows ears, [153] most of them blacksmiths, they will strike while the iron is hot, and beat your estates into hobnails; mine host of the bear being strategus, and king piper lord orator. Well, my lords, it might have bin otherwise exprest, but this is well enough a conscience. In your way, the wit of man shall not prevent this or the like inconvenience; but if this (for I have confer’d with artists) be a mathematical demonstration, I could kneel to you, that e’er it be too late we might return to som kind of sobriety.

“If we empty our purses with these pomps, salarys, coaches, lacquys, and pages, what can the people say less, than that we have drest a senat and a prerogative for nothing, but to go to the park with the ladys?”

My lord Archon, whose meekness resembl’d that of Moses, vouchsaf’d this answer:

My lords,

“FOR all this, I can see my lord Epimonus every night in the park, and with ladys; nor do I blame this in a young man, or the respect which is and ought to be given to a sex that is one half of the commonwealth of mankind, and without which the other would be none: but our magistrats, I doubt, may be somwhat of the oldest to perform this part with much acceptation; and, as the Italian proverb says, [69] Servire & non gradire è cosa da far morire. Wherfore we will lay no certain obligation upon them in this point, but leave them, if it please you, to their own fate or discretion. But this (for I know my lord Epimonus loves me, tho I can never get his esteem) I will say, if he had a mistress should use him so, he would find it a sad life; or I appeal to your lordships, how I can resent it from such a friend, that he puts king piper’s politics in the balance with mine. King piper, I deny not, may teach his bears to dance, but they have the worst ear of all creatures. Now how he should make them keep time in fifty several tribes, and that two years together, for else it will be to no purpose, may be a small matter with my lord to promise; but it seems to me of impossible performance. First, thro the nature of the bean; and, secondly, thro that of the ballot; or how what he has hitherto thought so hard, is now com to be easy: but he may think, that for expedition they will eat up these balls like apples. However, there is so much more in their way by the constitution of this, than is to be found in that of any other commonwealth, that I am reconcil’d; it now appearing plainly, that the points of my lord’s arrows are directed at no other white, than to shew the excellency of our government above others; which, as he procedes further, is yet plainer; while he makes it appear, that there can be no other elected by the people but smiths,

“Brontesque Steropesque & nudus membra Pyracmon:

“Othoniel, Aod, Gideon, Jephtha, Samson, as in Israel: Miltiades, Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, as in Athens: Papyrius, Cincinnatus, Camillus, Fabius Scipio, as in Rome: smiths of the fortune [154] of the commonwealth; not such as forg’d hob-nails, but thunderbolts. Popular elections are of that kind, that all the rest of the world is not able, either in number or glory, to equal those of these three commonwealths. These indeed were the ablest cudgel and footbal-players; bright arms were their cudgels, and the world was the ball that lay at their feet. Wherfore we are not so to understand the maxim of legislators, which holds all men to be wicked, as if it related to mankind or a commonwealth, the interests wherof are the only strait lines they have wherby to reform the crooked; but as it relates to every man or party, under what color soever he or they pretend to be trusted apart, with or by the whole. Hence then it is deriv’d, which is made good in all experience, that the aristocracy is ravenous, and not the people. Your highwaymen are not such as have trades, or have bin brought up to industry; but such commonly whose education has pretended to that of gentlemen. My lord is so honest, he does not know the maxims that are of absolute necessity to the arts of wickedness; for it is most certain, if there be not more purses than thieves, that the thieves themselves must be forc’d to turn honest, because they cannot thrive by their trade: but now if the people should turn thieves, who sees not that there would be more thieves than purses? wherfore that a whole people should turn robbers or levellers, is as impossible in the end as in the means. But that I do not think your artist which you mention’d, whether astronomer or arithmetician, can tell me how many barlycorns would reach to the sun; I could be content he were call’d to the account, with which I shall conclude this point: when by the way I have chid my lords the legislators, who, as if they doubted my tackling could not hold, would leave me to flag in a perpetual calm, but for my lord Epimonus, who breaths now and then into my sails, and stirs the waters. A ship makes not her way so briskly, as when she is handsomly brush’d by the waves, and tumbles over those that seem to tumble against her; in which case I have perceiv’d in the dark, that light has bin struck even out of the sea, as in this place, where my lord Epimonus seigning to give us a demonstration of one thing, has given it of another, and of a better. For the people of this nation, if they amount in each tribe to two thousand elders, and two thousand youths, upon the annual roll, holding a fifth to the whole tribe; then the whole of a tribe, not accounting women and children, must amount to twenty thousand; and so the whole of all the tribes being fifty, to one million. Now you have ten thousand parishes, and reckoning these one with another, each at one thousand pounds a year dry rent, the rent or revenue of the nation, as it is or might be let to farm, amounts to ten millions; and ten millions in revenue divided equally to one million of men, coms but to ten pounds a year to each wherwith to maintain himself, his wife and children. But he that has a cow upon the common, and earns his shilling by the day at his labor, has twice as much already as this would com to for his share; because if the land were thus divided, there would be no body to set him on work. So my lord Epimonus’s footman, who costs him thrice as much as one of these could thus get, would certainly lose by his bargain. What should we speak of those innumerable trades wherupon men live, not only better than others upon good shares of lands, but becom also purchasers of greater estates? is not this the demonstration which my lord meant, that the revenue of industry in a nation, at least in this, is three or fourfold greater than that of the mere rent? if the people then obstruct industry, [155] they obstruct their own livelihood; but if they make a war, they obstruct industry. Take the bread out of the peoples mouths, as did the Roman Patricians, and you are sure enough of a war, in which case they may be levellers; but our agrarian causes their industry to flow with milk and hony. It will be own’d, that this is true, if the people were given [70] to understand their own happiness; but where is it they do that? let me reply with the like question, where do they not? they do not know their happiness it should seem in France, Spain and Italy: but teach them what it is, and try whose sense is the truer. As to the late wars in Germany, it has bin affirm’d to me there, that the princes could never make the people to take arms while they had bread, and have therfore suffer’d countrys now and then to be wasted, that they might get soldiers. This you will find to be the certain pulse and temper of the people; and if they have bin already prov’d to be the most wife and constant order of a government, why should we think (when no man can produce one example of the common soldiery in an army mutinying because they had not captains pay) that the prerogative should jole the heads of the senat together, because these have the better salarys; when it must be as evident to the people in a nation as to the soldiery in an army, that it is no more possible their emoluments of this kind should be afforded by any commonwealth in the world to be made equal with those of the senat, than that the common soldiers should be equal with the captains? it is enough for the common soldier, that his virtue may bring him to be a captain, and more to the prerogative, that each of them is nearer to be a senator.

“If my lord thinks our salarys too great, and that the commonwealth is not houswife enough; whether is it better houswifery that she should keep her family from the snow, or suffer them to burn her house that they may warm themselves? for one of these must be. Do you think that she came off at a cheaper rate, when men had their rewards by a thousand, two thousand pounds a year in land of inheritance? if you say, that they will be more godly than they have bin, it may be ill taken; and if you cannot promise that, it is time we find out som way of stinting at least, if not curing them of that same sacra fames. On the other side, if a poor man (as such a one may save a city) gives his sweat to the public, with what conscience can you suffer his family in the mean time to starve? but he that lays his hand to this plow, shall not lose by taking it off from his own: and a commonwealth that will mend this, shall be penny wise. The sanhedrim of Israel being the supreme, and a constant court of judicature, could not chuse but be exceding gainful. The senat of the bean in Athens, because it was but annual, was moderatly salariated; but that of the areopagits being for life, bountifully: and what advantages the senators of Lacedemen had, where there was little mony or use of it, were in honors for life. The Patricians having no profit, took all. Venice being a situation, where a man goes but to the door for his imployment, the honor is great, and the reward very little: but in Holland a counsillor of state has fifteen hundred Flemish pounds a year, besides other accommodations. The states general have more. And that commonwealth looks nearer her penny than ours needs to do.

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“For the revenue of this nation, besides that of her industry, it amounts, as has bin shewn, to ten millions; and the salarys in the whole com not to three hundred thousand pounds a year. The beauty they will add to the commonwealth will be exceding great, and the people will delight in this beauty of their commonwealth; the incouragement they will give to the study of the public being very profitable, the accommodation they will afford to your magistrats very honorable and easy. And the sum, when it or twice as much was spent in hunting and housekeeping, was never any grievance to the people. I am asham’d to stand huckling upon this point; it is sordid. Your magistrats are rather to be provided with further accommodations. For what if there should be sickness? whither will you have them to remove? and this city in the soundest times, for the heat of the year, is no wholsom abode: have a care of their healths to whom you commit your own. I would have the senat and the people, except they see cause to the contrary, every first of June to remove into the country air for the space of three months. You are better fitted with summerhouses for them, than if you had built them to that purpose. There is som twelve miles distant the convallium upon the river Halcionia, for the tribuns and the prerogative, a palace capable of a thousand men: and twenty miles distant you have mount Celia, reverend as well for the antiquity as state of a castle completely capable of the senat: the proposers having lodgings in the convallium, and the tribuns in Celia, it holds the correspondency between the senat and the people exactly. And it is a small matter for the proposers, being attended with the coaches and officers of state, besides other conveniences of their own, to go a matter of five or ten miles (those seats are not much further distant) to meet the people upon any heath or field that shall be appointed: where, having dispatch’d their business, they may hunt their own venizon (for I would have the great wall’d park upon the Halcionia to belong to the signory, and those about the convallium to the tribuns) and so go to supper. Pray, my lords, see that they do not pull down these houses to sell the lead of them; for when you have consider’d on’t, they cannot be spar’d. The founders of the school in Hiera provided that the boys should have a summer seat. You should have as much care of these magistrats. But there is such a selling, such a Jewish humor in our republicans, that I cannot tell what to say to it; only this, any man that knows what belongs to a commonwealth, or how diligent every nation in that case has bin to preserve her ornaments, and shall see the wast lately made (the woods adjoining to this city, which serv’d for the delight and health of it, being cut down to be sold for three pence) will tell you, that they who did such things would never have made a commonwealth. The like may be said of the ruin or damage don upon our cathedrals, ornaments in which this nation excels all others. Nor shall this ever be excus’d upon the score of religion; for tho it be true that God dwells not in houses made with hands, yet you cannot hold your assemblys but in such houses, and these are of the best that have bin made with hands. Nor is it well argu’d that they are pompous, and therfore profane, or less proper for divine service; seeing the christians in the primitive church, chose to meet with one accord in the temple; so far were they from any inclination to pull it down.”

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The orders of this commonwealth, so far, or near so far as they concern the elders, together with the several speeches at the institution, which may serve for the better understanding of them as so many commentaries, being shewn; I should now com from the elders to the youth, or from the civil constitution of this government to the military, but that I judg this the fittest place wherinto, by the way, to insert the government of the city, tho for the present but perfunctorily.

The government of Emporium.THE metropolis or capital city of Oceana is commonly call’d Emporium, tho it consists of two citys distinct, as well in name as in government, wherof the other is call’d Hiera: for which cause I shall treat of each apart, beginning with Emporium.

The city tribes and wards.Emporium with the libertys is under a twofold division, the one regarding the national, and the other the urban or city government. It is divided, in regard of the national government, into three tribes, and in respect of the urban into twenty-six, which for distinction sake are call’d wards, being contain’d under three tribes but inequally: wherfore the first tribe containing ten wards is call’d scazon, the second containing eight metoche, and the third containing as many telicouta: the bearing of which names in mind concerns the better understanding of the government.

Wardmote.EVERY ward has her wardmote, court, or inquest, consisting of all that are of the clothing or liverys of companys residing within the same.

The liverys.SUCH are of the livery or clothing as have attain’d to the dignity to wear gowns and particolor’d hoods or tippets, according to the rules and ancient customs of their respective companys.

The companys.A COMPANY is a brotherhood of tradesmen professing the same art, govern’d according to their charter by a master and wardens. Of these there be about sixty, wherof twelve are of greater dignity than the rest, that is to say, the mercers, grocers, drapers, fishmongers, goldsmiths, skinners, merchant-taylors, haberdashers, salters, ironmongers, vintners, clothworkers; which, with most of the rest, have common halls, divers of them being of antient and magnificent structure, wherin they have frequent meetings at the summons of their master or wardens for the managing and regulation of their respective trades and mysterys.Common halls. These companys, as I shall shew, are the roots of the whole government of the city. For the liverys that reside in the same ward, meeting at the wardmote inquest (to which it belongs to take cognizance of all sorts of nusances, and violations of the customs and orders of the city, and to present them to the court of aldermen) have also power to make election of two sorts of magistrats or officers; the first of elders or aldermen of the ward, the second of deputys of the same, otherwise call’d common-council men.

Election of aldermen, and of the common-council men.THE wards in these elections, because they do not elect all at once, but som one year, and som another, observe the distinction of the three tribes; for example, the scazon consisting of ten wards, makes election the first year of ten aldermen, one in each ward, and of one hundred and fifty deputys, fifteen in each ward: all which are triennial magistrats or officers, that is to say, are to bear their dignity for the space of three years.

THE second year the metoche, consisting of eight wards, elects eight aldermen, one in each ward, and a hundred and twenty deputys, fifteen in each ward; being also triennial magistrats.

THE third year telicouta, consisting of a like number of wards, elects an equal number of like magistrats for a like term. So that the whole number of the aldermen, according to that of the wards, amounts to twenty-six; and the whole number of the deputys, to three hundred and ninety.

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The court of aldermen.THE aldermen thus elected have divers capacities: for, first, they are justices of the peace for the term, and in consequence of their election. Secondly, they are presidents of the wardmote, and governors each of that ward wherby he was elected. And last of all, these magistrats being assembled together, constitute the senat of the city, otherwise call’d the court of aldermen: but no man is capable of this election that is not worth ten thousand pounds. This court upon every new election, makes choice of nine censors out of their own number.

The common council.THE deputys in like manner being assembled together, constitute the prerogative tribe of the city, otherwise call’d the common council: by which means the senat and the people of the city were comprehended, as it were, by the motion of the national government, into the same wheel of annual, triennial, and perpetual revolution.

The common hall.BUT the liverys, over and above the right of these elections by their divisions mention’d, being assembled all together at the guild of the city, constitute another assembly call’d the common hall.

The election of the lord mayor and sheriffs.THE common hall has the right of two other elections; the one of the lord mayor, and the other of the two sheriffs, being annual magistrats. The lord mayor can be elected out of no other than one of the twelve companys of the first ranks; and the common hall agrees by the plurality of suffrages upon two names: which being presented to the lord mayor for the time being, and the court of aldermen, they elect one by their scrutiny; for so they call it, tho it differs from that of the commonwealth. The orator or assistant to the lord mayor in holding of his courts, is som able lawyer elected by the court of aldermen, and call’d the recorder of Emporium.

THE lord mayor being thus elected, has two capacitys; one regarding the nation, and the other the city. In that which regards the city, he is president of the court of aldermen, having power to assemble the same, or any other council of the city, as the common council or common hall, at his will and pleasure: and in that which regards the nation, he is commander in chief of the three tribes wherinto the city is divided; one of which he is to bring up in person at the national muster to the ballot, as his vicecomites, or high sheriffs, are to do by the other two, each at their distinct pavilion, where the nine aldermen, elected censors, are to officiat by three in each tribe, according to the rules and orders already given to the censors of the rustic tribes. And the tribes of the city have no other than one common phylarch, which is the court of aldermen and the common council; for which cause they elect not at their muster the first list call’d the prime magnitude.

Some conveniences in this alteration.THE conveniences of this alteration of the city government, besides the bent of it to a conformity with that of the nation, were many, wherof I shall mention but a few: as first, wheras men under the former administration, when the burden of som of these magistracys lay for life, were oftentimes chosen not for their fitness, but rather unfitness, or at least unwillingness to undergo such a weight, wherby they were put at great rates to fine for their ease; a man might now take his share in magistracy with that equity which is due to the public, and without any inconvenience to his privat affairs. Secondly, wheras the city (inasmuch as the acts of the aristocracy, or court of aldermen, in their former way of proceding, were rather impositions than propositions) was frequently disquieted with the inevitable consequence of disorder in the power of debate exercis’d by the popular part, or common council; the right of debate being henceforth establish’d in the court of aldermen, and that of result in the common council, kill’d the branches of division in the root. Which for the present may suffice to have bin said of the city of Emporium.

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The government of Hiera.THAT of Hiera consists as to the national government of two tribes, the first call’d agoræa, the second propola: but as to the peculiar policy of twelve manipuls, or wards divided into three cohorts, each cohort containing four wards; wherof the wards of the first cohort elect for the first year four burgesses, one in each ward; the wards of the second cohort for the second year four burgesses, one in each ward; and the wards of the third cohort for the third year four burgesses, one in each ward; all triennial magistrats:The court. by which the twelve burgesses, making one court for the government of this city, according to their instructions by act of parlament, fall likewise into an annual, triennial, and perpetual revolution.

The high steward.THIS court being thus constituted, makes election of divers magistrats; as first, of a high steward, who is commonly som person of quality, and this magistracy is elected in the senat by the scrutiny of this court; with him they chuse som able lawyer to be his deputy, and to hold the court; and last of all they elect out of their own number six censors.

THE high steward is commander in chief of the two tribes, wherof he in person brings up the one at the national muster to the ballot, and his deputy the other at a distinct pavilion; the six censors chosen by the court, officiating by three in each tribe at the urns; and these tribes have no other phylarch but this court.

AS for the manner of elections and suffrage, both in Emporium and Hiera, it may be said once for all, that they are perform’d by ballot, and according to the respective rules already given.

THERE be other citys and corporations throout the territory, whose policy being much of this kind, would be tedious and not worth the labor to insert, nor dare I stay. Juvenum manus emicat ardens.

I return, according to the method of the commonwealth, to the remaining parts of her orbs, which are military and provincial; the military, except the strategus, and the polemarchs or field officers, consisting of the youth only, and the provincial consisting of a mixture both of elders and of the youth.

To begin with the youth, or the military orbs, they are circles to which the commonwealth must have a care to keep close. A man is a spirit rais’d by the magic of nature; if she dos not stand safe, and so that she may set him to som good and useful work, he spits fire, and blows up castles: for where there is life, there must be motion or work; and the work of idleness is mischief, but the work of industry is health. To set men to this, the commonwealth must begin betimes with them, or it will be too late: and the means wherby she sets them to it, is EDUCATION, the plastic art of government. But it is as frequent as sad in experience (whether thro negligence, or, which in the consequence is all one or worse, overfondness in the domestic performance of this duty) that innumerable children com to ow their utter perdition to their own parents; in each of which the commonwealth loses a citizen. Wherfore the laws of a government, how wholsom soever in themselves, are such as, if men by a congruity in their education be not bred to find a relish in them, they will be sure to loath and detest. The education therefore of a man’s own children is not wholly to be committed or trusted to himself. You find in [71] Livy the children of Brutus having bin bred under [160] monarchy, and us’d to a court life, making faces at the commonwealth of Rome: A king (say they) is a man with whom you may prevail when you have need there should be law, or when you have need there should be no law; he has favors in the right, and he frowns not in the wrong place; he knows his friends from his enemys. But laws are deaf inexorable things, such as make no difference between a gentleman and an ordinary fellow; a man can never be merry for them, for to trust altogether to his own innocence is a sad life. Unhappy wantons! Scipio on the other side, when he was but a boy (about two or three and twenty) being inform’d that certain Patricians of Roman gentlemen, thro a qualm upon the defeat which Hannibal had given them at Cannæ, were laying their heads together and contriving their flight with the transportation of their goods out of Rome, drew his sword, and setting himself at the door of the chamber where they were at council, protested, That who did not immediatly swear not to desert the commonwealth, he would make his soul to desert his body. Let men argue as they please for monarchy, or against a commonwealth, the world shall never see any man so sottish or wicked as in cool blood to prefer the education of the sons of Brutus before that of Scipio; and of this mould, except a Melius or a Manlius, was the whole youth of that commonwealth, tho not ordinarily so well cast. Now the health of a government, and the education of the youth being of the same pulse, no wonder if it has bin the constant practice of well-order’d commonwealths to commit the care and feeling of it to public magistrats. A duty that was perform’d in such a manner by the areopagits, as is elegantly prais’d by Isocrates. The Athenians, says he, write not their laws upon dead walls, nor content themselves with having ordain’d punishments for crimes, but provide in such a way by the education of their youth, that there be no crimes for punishment. He speaks of those laws which regarded manners, not of those orders which concerned the administration of the commonwealth, lest you should think he contradicts Xenophon and Polybius. The children of Lacedemon, at the seventh year of their age, were delivered to the pædonomi, or schoolmasters, not mercenary, but magistrats of the commonwealth, to which they were accountable for their charge: and by these at the age of fourteen they were presented to other magistrats call’d the beidiæi, having the inspection of the games and exercises, among which that of the platanista was famous, a kind of fight in squadrons, but somwhat too fierce. When they came to be of military age, they were listed of the mora, and so continu’d in readiness for public service under the discipline of the polemarchs. But the Roman education and disciplin by the centurys and classes is that to which the commonwealth of Oceana has had a more particular regard in her three essays, being certain degrees by which the youth commence as it were in arms for magistracy, as appears by

26 Order.The twenty-sixth ORDER, instituting, That if a parent has but one son, the education of that one son shall be wholly at the disposition of that parent. But wheras there be free schools erected and endow’d, or to be erected and endow’d in every tribe of this nation, to a sufficient proportion for the education of the children of the same (which schools, to the end there be no detriment or hindrance to the scholars upon case of removing from one to another, are every of them to be govern’d by the strict inspection of the censors of the tribes, both upon the schoolmasters manner of life and teaching, and the proficiency of the children, after the rules and method of that in Hiera) if a parent has more sons than one, the censors of the tribes shall animadvert upon and punish him that sends [161] not his sons within the ninth year of their age to som one of the schools of a tribe, there to be kept and taught, if he be able, at his own charges; and if he be not able, gratis, till they arrive at the age of fifteen years. And a parent may expect of his sons at the fifteenth year of their age according to his choice or ability, whether it be to service in the way of apprentices to som trade or otherwise, or to further study, as by sending them to the inns of court, of chancery, or to one of the universitys of this nation. But he that takes not upon him one of the professions proper to som of those places, shall not continue longer in any of them than till he has attain’d to the age of eighteen years; and every man having not at the age of eighteen years taken upon him, or addicted himself to the profession of the law, theology, or physic, and being no servant, shall be capable of the essays of the youth, and no other person whatsoever: except a man, having taken upon him such a profession, happens to lay it by, e’er he arrives at three or four and twenty years of age, and be admitted to this capacity by the respective phylarch, being satisfy’d that he kept not out so long with any design to evade the service of the commonwealth; but, that being no sooner at his own disposal, it was no sooner in his choice to com in. And if any youth or other person of this nation have a desire to travel into foren countrys upon occasion of business, delight, or further improvement of his education; the same shall be lawful for him upon a pass obtain’d from the censors in parliament, putting a convenient limit to the time, and recommending him to the embassadors by whom he shall be assisted, and to whom he shall yield honor and obedience in their respective residences. Every youth at his return from his travel is to present the censors with a paper of his own writing, containing the interest of state or form of government of the countrys, or som one of the countrys where he has bin; and if it be good, the censors shall cause it to be printed and publish’d, prefixing a line in commendation of the author.

EVERY Wednesday next insuing the last of December, the whole youth of every parish, that is to say every man (not excepted by the foregoing part of the order) being from eighteen years of age to thirty, shall repair at the sound of the bell to their respective church, and being there assembled in presence of the overseers, who are to govern the ballot, and the constable who is to officiat at the urn, shall, after the manner of the elders, elect every fifth man of their whole number (provided that they chuse not above one of two brothers at one election, nor above half if they be four or upward) to be a stratiot or deputy of the youth; and the list of the stratiots so elected being taken by the overseers, shall be enter’d in the parish book, and diligently preserv’d as a record, call’d the first essay. They whose estates by the law are able, or whose friends are willing to mount them, shall be of the horse, the rest are of the foot. And he who has bin one year of this list, is not capable of being reelected till after another year’s interval.

EVERY Wednesday next insuing the last of January, the stratiots being muster’d at the rendevouz of their respective hundred, shall in the presence of the jurymen, who are overseers of that ballot, and of the high constable who is to officiat at the urn, elect out of the horse of their troop or company one captain, and one ensign or cornet, to the command of the same. And the jurymen having enter’d the list of the hundred into a record to be diligently kept at the rendevouz of the same; the first public game of this commonwealth shall begin and be perform’d in this manner. Wheras there is to be at every rendevouz of a hundred one cannon, culverin, or saker; the prize arms being forg’d by sworn armorers of this commonwealth, and for their proof, besides their beauty, view’d and try’d at the tower of Emporium, shall be expos’d by the justice of peace appertaining to that hundred (the said justice with the jurymen being judges of the game) and the judges shall deliver to the horseman that gains the prize at the career, one sute of arms being of the value of [162] twenty pouns; to the pikeman that gains the prize at throwing the bullet, one sute of arms of the value of ten pounds; to the musketeer that gains the prize at the mark with his musket, one sute of arms of the value of ten pounds; and to the cannoneer that gains the prize at the mark with the cannon, culverin, or saker, a chain of silver being the value of ten pounds; provided, that no one man at the same muster plays above one of the prizes. Whosoever gains a prize is bound to wear it (if it be his lot) upon service; and no man shall sell or give away any armor thus won, except he has lawfully attain’d to two or more of them at the games.

THE games being ended, and the muster dismist, the captain of the troop or company shall repair with a copy of the list to the lord lieutenant of the tribe, and the high constable with a duplicat of the same to the custos rotulorum, or mustermaster general, to be also communicated to the censors; in each of which the jurymen giving a note upon every name of an only son, shall certify that the list is without subterfuge or evasion; or, if it be not, an account of those upon whom the evasion or subterfuge lys, to the end that the phylarch or the censors may animadvert accordingly.

AND every Wednesday next insuing the last of February, the lord lieutenant, custos rotulorum, the censors, and the conductor, shall receive the whole muster of the youth of that tribe at the rendevouz of the same, distributing the horse and foot with their officers, according to the directions given in the like case for the distribution of the elders; and the whole squadron being put by that means in battalia, the second game of this commonwealth shall begin by the exercise of the youth in all the parts of their military disciplin according to the orders of parlament, or direction of the council of war in that case. And the hundred pounds allow’d by the parlament for the ornament of the muster in every tribe, shall be expended by the phylarch upon such artificial castles, citadels, or the like devices, as may make the best and most profitable sport for the youth and their spectators. Which being ended, the censors having prepar’d the urns by putting into the horse-urn 220 gold balls, wherof ten are to be mark’d with the letter M, and other ten with the letter P; into the foot-urn 700 gold balls, whereof 50 are to be mark’d with the letter M, and 50 with the letter P: and after they have made the gold balls in each urn, by the addition of silver balls to the same, in number equal with the horse and foot of the stratiots, the lord lieutenant shall call the stratiots to the urns, where they that draw the silver balls shall return to their places, and they that draw the gold balls shall fall off to the pavilion, where, for the space of one hour, they may chop and change their balls according as one can agree with another, whose lot he likes better But the hour being out, the conductor separating them whose gold balls have no letter, from those whose balls are mark’d, shall cause the cryer to call the alphabet, as first A; wherupon all they whose gold balls are not mark’d, and whose sirnames begin with the letter A, shall repair to a clerc appertaining to the custos rotulorum, who shall first take the names of that letter; then those of B, and so on, till all the names be alphabetically inrol’d. And the youth of this list being six hundred foot in a tribe, that is, 30000 foot in all the tribes; and two hundred horse in a tribe, that is, 10000 horse in all the tribes, are the second essay of the stratiots, and the standing army of this commonwealth to be always ready upon command to march. They whose balls are mark’d with M, amounting, by 20 horse and 50 foot in a tribe, to 2500 foot, and 500 horse in all the tribes; and they whose balls are mark’d with P, in every point correspondent, are parts of the third essay: they in M being straight to march for Marpesia, and they of P for Panopea, to the ends, and according to the further directions following in the order for the provincial orbs.

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IF the polemarchs or field officers be elected by the scrutiny of the council of war, and the strategus commanded by the parlament or the dictator to march, the lord lieutenants (who have power to muster and disciplin the youth so often as they receive orders for the same from the council of war) are to deliver the second essay, or so many of them as shall be commanded, to the conductors, who shall present them to the lord strategus at the time and place appointed by his excellency to be the general rendevouz of Oceana, where the council of war shall have the accommodation of horses and arms for his men in readiness: and the lord strategus having arm’d, mounted and distributed them, whether according to the recommendation of their prize arms, or otherwise, shall lead them away to his shipping, being also ready and provided with victuals, ammunition, artillery, and all other necessarys; commanding them, and disposing of the whole conduct of the war by his sole power and authority. And this is the third essay of the stratiots, which being ship’d, or march’d out of their tribes, the lord lieutenants shall reelect the second essay out of the remaining part of the first; and the senat another strategus.

IF any veteran or veterans of this nation, the term of whose youth or militia is expir’d, having a desire to be entertain’d in the further service of the commonwealth, shall present him or themselves at the rendevouz of Oceana to the strategus, it is in his power to take on such and so many of them as shall be agreed by the polemarchs, and to send back an equal number of the stratiots.

AND for the better managing of the proper forces of this nation, the lord strategus, by appointment of the council of war, and out of such levys as they shall have made in either or both of the provinces to that end, shall receive auxiliaries by sea or elsewhere at som certain place, not exceeding his proper arms in number.

AND whosoever shall refuse any one of his three essays, except upon cause shewn he be dispens’d withal by the phylarch; or, if the phylarch be not assembled, by the censors of his tribe, shall be deem’d a helot or public servant, shall pay a fifth part of his yearly revenue, besides all other taxes, to the commonwealth for his protection, and be incapable of bearing any magistracy except such as is proper to the law. Nevertheless if a man has but two sons, the lord lieutenant shall not suffer above one of them to come to the urn at one election of the second essay: and tho he has above two sons, there shall not com above half the brothers at one election; and if a man has but one son, he shall not com to the urn at all without the consent of his parents, or his guardians; nor shall it be any reproach to him, or impediment to his bearing of magistracy.

This order, with relation to foren expeditions, will be prov’d and explain’d together with

27 Order.The twenty-seventh ORDER, providing, in case of invasion apprehended, that the lords high sherifs of the tribes upon commands receiv’d from the parlament, or the dictator, distribute the bands of the elders into divisions after the nature of the essays of the youth; and that the second division or essay of the elders, being made and consisting of 30000 foot, and 10000 horse, be ready to march with the second essay of the youth, and be brought also by the conductors to the strategus.

THE second essay of the elders and youth being march’d out of their tribes, the lords high sherifs and lieutenants shall have the remaining part of the annual hands both of elders and youth in readiness, which, if the beacons be fir’d, shall march to the rendevouz to be in that case appointed by the parlament, or the dictator. And the beacons being fir’d, the curiata comitia, or parochial congregations, shall elect a fourth both of elders [164] and youth to be immediatly upon the guard of the tribes, and dividing themselves as aforesaid, to march also in their divisions according to orders: which method in case of extremity shall procede to the election of a third, or the levy of a second, or of the last man in the nation, by the power of the lords high sherifs; to the end that the commonwealth in her utmost pressure may shew her trust that God in his justice will remember mercy, by humbling her self, and yet preserving her courage, disciplin and constancy, even to the last drop of her blood, and the utmost farthing.

THE services perform’d by the youth, or by the elders, in case of invasion, and according to this order shall be at their proper cost and charges that are any ways able to endure it; but if there be such as are known in their parishes to be so indigent that they cannot march out of their tribes, nor undergo the burden in this case incumbent, then the congregations of their parishes shall furnish them with sufficient sums of mony to be repaid upon the certificat of the same by the parlament when the action shall be over. And of that which is respectively injoin’d by this order, any tribe, parish, magistrat, or person that shall fail, is to answer for it at the council of war, as a deserter of his country.

The Archon, being the greatest captain of his own, if not of any age, added much to the glory of this commonwealth, by interweaving the militia with more art and luster than any legislator from or before the time of Servius Tullius, who constituted the Roman militia. But as the bones or skeleton of a man, tho the greatest part of his beauty be contain’d in their proportion or symmetry, yet shewn without flesh, are a spectacle that is rather horrid than entertaining; so without discourses are the orders of a commonwealth; which, if she gos forth in that manner, may complain of her friends that they stand mute, and staring upon her. Wherfore this order was thus flesh’d by the lord Archon.

My lords;

“DIOGENES seeing a young fellow drunk, told him that his father was drunk when he begot him. For this, in natural generation I must confess I see no reason; but in the political it is right. The vices of the people are from their governors; those of their governors from their laws or orders; and those of their laws or orders from their legislators. [72] Whatever was in the womb imperfect, as to her proper work, coms very rarely, or never at all to perfection afterwards: and the formation of a citizen in the womb of the commonwealth is his education.

“Education by the first of the foregoing orders is of six kinds: at the school, in the mechanics, at the universitys, at the ins of court or chancery, in travels, and in military disciplin: som of which I shall but touch, and som I shall handle more at large.

Schools.“That which is propos’d for the erecting and indowing of schools throout the tribes, capable of all the children of the same, and able to give to the poor the education of theirs gratis, is only matter of direction in case of very great charity, as easing the needy of the charge of their children from the ninth to the fifteenth year of their age, during which time their work cannot be profitable; and restoring them when they may be of use, furnished with tools wherof there are [165] advantages to be made in every work, seeing he that can read and use his pen has som convenience by it in the meanest vocation. And it cannot be conceiv’d, but that which coms, tho in small parcels, to the advantage of every man in his vocation, must amount to the advantage of every vocation, and so to that of the whole commonwealth. Wherfore this is commended to the charity of every wisehearted and welminded man, to be don in time, and as God shall stir him up or inable him; there being such provision already in the case, as may give us leave to procede without obstruction.

Mechanics in general.“Parents, under animadversion of the censors, are to dispose of their children at the fifteenth year of their age to somthing; but what, is left, according to their abilitys or inclination, at their own choice. This, with the multitude, must be to the mechanics, that is to say, to agriculture or husbandry; to manufactures, or to merchandize.

Husbandry.“Agriculture is the bread of the nation; we are hung upon it by the teeth; it is a mighty nursery of strength, the best army, and the most assur’d knapsac; it is manag’d with the least turbulent or ambitious, and the most innocent hands of all other arts. Wherfore I am of Aristotle’s opinion, that a commonwealth of husbandmen, and such is ours, must be the best of all others. Certainly, my lords, you have no measure of what ought to be, but what can be don for the incouragement of this profession. I could wish I were husband good enough to direct somthing to this end; but racking of rents is a vile thing in the richer sort, an uncharitable one to the poorer, a perfect mark of slavery, and nips your commonwealth in the fairest blossom. On the other side, if there should be too much ease given in this kind, it would occasion sloth, and so destroy industry, the principal nerve of a commonwealth. But if ought might be don to hold the balance even between these two, it would be a work in this nation equal to that for which Fabius was sirnam’d Maximus by the Romans.

Manufactures and merchandize.“In manufactures and merchandize the Hollander has gotten the start of us; but at the long run it will be found, that a people working upon a foren commodity dos but farm the manufacture, and that it is really intail’d upon them only, where the growth of it is native: as also that it is one thing to have the carriage of other mens goods, and another for a man to bring his own to the best market. Wherfore (nature having provided incouragement for these arts in this nation above all others, where, the people growing, they of necessity must also increase) it cannot but establish them upon a far more sure and effectual foundation than that of the Hollanders. But these educations are in order to the first things, or necessitys of nature; as husbandry to the food, manufacture to the clothing, and merchandize to the purse of the commonwealth.

“There be other things in nature, which being second as to their order, for their dignity and value are first, and such to which the other are but accommodations; or this sort are especially these, religion, justice, courage, and wisdom.

Universitys.“The education that answers to religion in our government is that of the universitys. Moses the divine legislator was not only skilful in all the learning of the Egyptians, but took also into the fabric of his commonwealth the learning of the Midianites in the advice of Jethro; and his foundation of a university laid in the tabernacle, and finish’d in the temple, became that pinacle from whence (according to many Jewish and Christian authors) all the learning in the world [166] has taken wing; as the philosophy of the Stoics from the Pharisees; that of the Epicureans from the Sadduces; and from the learning of the Jews so often quoted by our Savior, and fulfilled in him, the Christian religion.Acts 17. 18. Athens was the most famous university in her days; and her senators, that is to say, the Areopagits, were all philosophers. Lacedemon, to speak truth, tho she could write and read, was not very bookish. But he that disputes hence against universitys, disputes by the same argument against agriculture, manufacture, and merchandize; every one of these having bin equally forbid by Lycurgus, not for itself (for if he had not bin learn’d in all the learning of Crete, and well travell’d in the knowledge of other governments, he had never made his commonwealth) but for the diversion which they must have given his citizens from their arms, who, being but few, if they had minded any thing else, must have deserted the commonwealth. For Rome, she had ingenium par ingenio, was as learned as great, and held her college of augurs in much reverence. Venice has taken her religion upon trust. Holland cannot attend it to be very studious. Nor dos Switzerland mind it much; yet are they all addicted to their universitys. We cut down trees to build houses; but I would have som body shew me, by what reason or experience the cutting down of a university should tend to the setting up of a commonwealth. Of this I am sure, that the perfection of a commonwealth is not to be attain’d without the knowlege of antient prudence; nor the knowlege of antient prudence without learning; nor learning without schools of good literature: and these are such as we call universitys. Now tho mere university learning of itself be that which (to speak the words of Verulamius) crafty men contemn, and simple men only admire, yet is it such as wife men have use of; for studys do not teach their own use, but that is a wisdom without and above them, won by observation. Expert men may execute, and perhaps judge of particulars one by one; but the general counsils and the plots, and the marshalling of affairs, com best from those that are learned. Wherfore if you would have your children to be statesmen, let them drink by all means of these fountains, where perhaps there were never any. But what tho the water a man drinks be not nourishment; it is the vehicle without which he cannot be nourish’d. Nor is religion less concern’d in this point than government; for take away your universitys, and in a few years you lose it.

“The holy Scriptures are written in Hebrew and Greec: they that have neither of these languages may think light of both; but find me a man that has one in perfection, the study of whose whole life it has not bin. Again, this is apparent to us in daily conversation, that if four or five persons that have liv’d together be talking, another speaking the same language may com in, and yet understand very little of their discourse, in that it relates to circumstances, persons, things, times and places, which he knows not. It is no otherwise with a man, having no insight of the times in which they were written, and the circumstances to which they relate, in the reading of antient books, whether they be divine or human. For example, when we fall upon the discourse about baptism and regeneration that was between our Savior and Nicodemus, where Christ reproaches him with his ignorance in this matter: Art thou a doctor in Israel, and understandest not these things? What shall we think of it? or wherfore should a doctor in Israel have understood these things more than another, but that both baptism and regeneration, as was shew’d at large by my lord Phosphorus, were [167] doctrins held in Israel? I instance in one place of a hundred, which he, that has not master’d the circumstances to which they relate, cannot understand. Wherfore to the understanding of the Scripture, it is necessary to have antient languages, and the knowlege of antient times, or the aid of them who have such knowlege: and to have such as may be always able and ready to give such aid (unless you would borrow it of another nation, which would not only be base, but deceitful) it is necessary to a commonwealth that she have schools of good literature, or universitys of her own. We are commanded, as has been said more than once, to search the Scriptures; and which of ’em search the Scriptures, they that take this pains in antient languages and learning, or they that will not, but trust to translations only, and to words as they sound to present circumstances? than which nothing is more fallible, or certain to lose the true sense of Scriptures, pretended to be above human understanding, for no other cause than that they are below it. But in searching the Scriptures by the proper use of our universitys, we have bin heretofore blest with greater victorys and trophys against the purple hosts and golden standards of the Romish hierarchy, than any nation; and therfore why we should relinquish this upon the presumption of som, that because there is a greater light which they have, I do not know. There is a greater light than the sun, but it does not extinguish the sun, nor does any light of God’s giving extinguish that of nature, but increase and sanctify it. Wherfore, neither the honor born by the Israelitish, Roman, or any other commonwealth that I have shewn, to their ecclesiastics, consisted in being govern’d by them, but in consulting them in matters of religion; upon whose responses or oracles they did afterwards as they thought fit. Nor would I be here mistaken, as if, by affirming the universitys to be, in order both to religion and government, of absolute necessity, I declar’d them or the ministry in any wife fit to be trusted, so far as to exercise any power not deriv’d from the civil magistrat in the administration of either. If the Jewish religion were directed and established by Moses, it was directed and establish’d by the civil magistrat; or if Moses exercis’d this administration as a prophet, the same prophet did invest with the same administration the sanhedrim, and not the priests; and so dos our commonwealth the senat, and not the clergy. They who had the supreme administration or government of the national religion in Athens, were the first Archon, the rex sacrificus, or high priest, and a polemarch; which magistrats were ordain’d or elected [73] by the holding up of hands in the church, congregation or comitia of the people. The religion of Lacedemon was govern’d by the kings, who were also high priests, and officiated at the sacrifice; these had power to substitute their pythii, embassadors, or nuncios, by which, not without concurrence of the senat, they held intelligence with the oracle of Apollo at Delphos. And the ecclesiastical part of the commonwealth of Rome was govern’d by the pontifex maximus, the rex sacrificulus, and the Flamins, all ordain’d or elected by the people, the pontifex by the [74] tribes, the king by the [75] centurys, and the Flamins by the [76] parishes. I do not mind you of these things as if, for the matter, there were any parallel to be drawn out of their superstitions to our religion; but to shew that for the manner, antient prudence is as well a rule in divine as human things; nay, and such a one as the apostles themselves, [168] ordaining elders by the holding up of hands in every congregation, have exactly follow’d: for som of the congregations where they thus ordain’d elders were those of Antioch, Iconium, Lystra, Derbe, the countrys of Lycaonia, Pisidia, Pampbilia, Perga, with Attalia Now that these citys and countrys, when the Romans propagated their empire into Asia, were found most of them commonwealths, and that many of the rest were indu’d with like power, so that the people living under the protection of the Roman emperors, continu’d to elect their own magistrats, is so known a thing, that I wonder whence it is that men, quite contrary to the universal proof of these examples, will have ecclesiastical government to be necessarily distinct from civil power, when the right of the elders ordain’d by the holding up of hands in every congregation to teach the people, was plainly deriv’d from the same civil power by which they ordain’d the rest of their magistrats. And it is not otherwise in our commonwealth, where the parochial congregation elects or ordains its pastor. To object the commonwealth of Venice in this place, were to shew us that it has bin no otherwise but where the civil power has lost the liberty of her conscience by imbracing popery; as also that to take away the liberty of conscience in this administration from the civil power, were a proceding which has no other precedent than such as is popish. Wherfore your religion is settled after the following manner: the universitys are the seminarys of that part which is national, by which means others with all safety may be permitted to follow the liberty of their own consciences, in regard that, however they behave themselves, the ignorance of the unlearned in this case cannot lose your religion nor disturb your government, which otherwise it would most certainly do; and the universitys with their emoluments, as also the benefices of the whole nation, are to be improv’d by such augmentations as may make a very decent and comfortable subsistence for the ministry, which is neither to be allow’d synods nor assemblys, except upon the occasion shewn in the universitys, when they are consulted by the council of state, and suffer’d to meddle with affairs of religion, nor to be capable of any other public preferment whatsoever; by which means the interest of the learned can never com to corrupt your religion, nor disturb your government, which otherwise it would most certainly do. Venice, tho she dos not see, or cannot help the corruption of her religion, is yet so circumspect to avoid disturbance of her government in this kind, that her council procedes not to election of magistrats, till it be proclaim’d, fora papalini, by which words such as have consanguinity with red hats, or relation to the court of Rome, are warm’d to withdraw. If a minister in Holland meddles with matter of state, the magistrat sends him a pair of shoes; wherupon, if he dos not go, he is driven away from his charge. I wonder why ministers, of all men, should be perpetually tampering with government; first because they, as well as others, have it in express charge to submit themselves to the ordinances of men; and secondly, because these ordinances of men must go upon such political principles, as they of all others, by any thing that can be found in their writings or actions, least understand: whence you have the suffrage of all nations to this sense, that an ounce of wisdom is worth a pound of clergy. Your greatest clercs are not your wisest men: and when som foul absurdity in state is committed, it is common with the French, and even the Italians, to call it pas de clerc, or, governo de prete. They may bear with men that will be preaching without study, while they will be governing [169] without prudence. My lords, if you know not how to rule your clergy, you will most certainly, like a man that cannot rule his wife, have neither quiet at home, nor honor abroad. Their honest vocation is to teach your children at the schools and the universitys, and the people in the parishes; and yours is concern’d to see that they do not play the shrews: of which parts dos consist the education of your commonwealth, so far as it regards religion.

The ins of court and chancery.“To Justice, or that part of it which is commonly executive, answers the education of the ins of court and chancery. Upon which to philosophize requires a public kind of learning that I have not. But they who take upon them any profession proper to the educations mention’d, that is, theology, physic, or law, are not at leisure for the essays. Wherfore the essays being degrees wherby the youth commence for all magistracys, offices, and honors in the parish, hundred, tribe, senat or prerogative; divines, physicians, and lawyers, not taking these degrees, exclude themselves from all such magistracys, offices, and honors. And wheras lawyers are likest to exact further reason for this, they (growing up from the most gainful art at the bar to those magistracys upon the bench, which are continually appropriated to themselves, and not only indow’d with the greatest revenues, but also held for life) have the least reason of all the rest to pretend to any other; especially in an equal commonwealth, where accumulation of magistracy, or to take a person ingag’d by his profit to the laws, as they stand, into the power, which is legislative, and which should keep them to what they were, or ought to be, were a solœcism in prudence. It is true, that the legislative power may have need of advice and assistance from the executive magistracy, or such as are learned in the law; for which cause the judges are, as they have heretofore bin, assistants in the senat. Nor, however it came about, can I see any reason why a judg, being but an assistant or lawyer, should be member of a legislative council.

“I deny not, that the Roman patricians were all patrons, and that the whole people were clients, som to one family, and som to another, by which means they had their causes pleaded and defended in som appearance gratis; for the patron took no mony, tho if he had a daughter to marry, his clients were to pay her portion: nor was this so great a grievance. But if the client accus’d his patron, gave testimony or suffrage against him, it was a crime of such a nature, that any man might lawfully kill him as a traitor; and this, as being the nerve of the optimacy, was a great cause of ruin to that commonwealth: for when the people would carry any thing that pleas’d not the senat, the senators were ill provided if they could not intercede, that is, oppose it by their clients; with whom, to vote otherwise than they pleas’d, was the highest crime. The observation of this bond till the time of the Gracchi, that is to say, till it was too late, or to no purpose to break it, was the cause, why in all the former heats and disputes that had happen’d between the senat and the people, it never came to blows, which indeed was good: but withal, the people could have no remedy, which was certainly evil. Wherfore I am of opinion, that a senator ought not to be a patron or advocat, nor a patron or advocat to be a senator: for if his practice be gratis, it debauches the people; and if it be mercenary, it debauches himself: take it which way you will, when he should be making of laws, he will be knitting of nets.

[170]

“Lycurgus, as I said, by being a traveller became a legislator, but in times when prudence was another thing. Nevertheless we may not shut out this part of education in a commonwealth, which will be herself a traveller; for those of this make have seen the world, especially because this is certain (tho it be not regarded in our times, when things being left to take their chance, it fares with us accordingly) that no man can be a politician, except he be first a historian or a traveller; for except he can see what must be, or what may be, he is no politician. Now if he has no knowledge in story, he cannot tell what has bin; and if he has not bin a traveller, he cannot tell what is: but he that neither knows what has bin, nor what is, can never tell what must be, or what may be. Furthermore, the embassys in ordinary by our constitution are the prizes of young men, more especially such as have bin travellers. Wherfore they of these inclinations having leave of the censors, ow them an account of their time, and cannot chuse but lay it out with som ambition of praise or reward, where both are open: whence you will have eys abroad, and better choice of public ministers; your gallants shewing themselves not more to the ladys at their balls, than to your commonwealth at her academy, when they return from their travels.

“But this commonwealth being constituted more especially of two elements, arms and councils, drives by a natural instinct at courage and wisdom; which he who has attain’d, is arriv’d at the perfection of human nature. It is true, that these virtues must have some natural root in him that is capable of them; but this amounts not to so great a matter as some will have it. For if poverty makes an industrious, a moderate estate a temperat, and a lavish fortune a wanton man, and this be the common course of things; wisdom then is rather of necessity than inclination. And that an army which was meditating upon flight, has bin brought by despair to win the field, is so far from being strange, that like causes will evermore produce like effects. Wherfore this commonwealth drives her citizens like wedges; there is no way with them but thorow, nor end but that glory wherof man is capable by art or nature. That the genius of the Roman familys commonly preserv’d it self throout the line (as to instance in som, the Manlii were still severe, the Publicolæ lovers, and the Appii haters of the people) is attributed by Machiavel to their education: nor, if interest might add to the reason why the genius of a Patrician was one thing, and that of a Plebeian another, is the like so apparent between different nations, who, according to their different educations, have yet as different manners. It was antiently noted, and long confirm’d by the actions of the French, that in their first assaults their courage was more than that of men; and for the rest less than that of women: which nevertheless, thro the amendment of their disciplin, we see now to be otherwise. I will not say, but that som man or nation upon an equal improvement of this kind may be lighter than som other; but certainly, education is the scale without which no man or nation can truly know his or her own weight or value. By our historys we can tell when one Marpesian would have beaten ten Oceaners, and when one Oceaner would have beaten ten Marpesians. Marc Anthony was a Roman, but how did that appear in the imbraces of Cleopatra? you must have som other education for your youth; or they, like that passage, will shew better in romance than true story.

“The custom of the commonwealth of Rome in distributing her magistracys without respect of age, happen’d to do well in Corvinus and Scipio; for which [171] cause Machiavel (with whom that which was done by Rome, and that which is well don, is for the most part all one) commends this course. Yet how much it did worse at other times, is obvious in Pompy and Cæsar; examples by which Boccalini illustrats the prudence of Venice in her contrary practice, affirming it to have bin no small step to the ruin of the Roman liberty, that these (having tasted in their youth of the supreme honors) had no greater in their age to hope for, but by perpetuating of the same in themselves; which came to blood, and ended in tyranny. The opinion of Verulamius is safe: the errors, says he, of young men are the ruin of business; wheras the errors of old men amount but to this, that more might have bin don, or sooner. But tho their wisdom be little, their courage is great: wherfore (to com to the main education of this commonwealth) the militia of Oceana is the province of youth.

“The distribution of this province by the essays is so fully describ’d in the order, that I need repeat nothing: the order itself being but a repetition or copy of that original, which in antient prudence is of all others the fairest: as that from whence the commonwealth of Rome more particularly deriv’d the empire of the world. And there is much more reason in this age, when governments are universally broken, or swerv’d from their foundations, and the people groan under tyranny, that the same causes (which could not be withstood when the world was full of popular governments) should have the like effects.

“The causes in the commonwealth of Rome, wherof the empire of the world was not any miraculous, but a natural (nay I may safely say a necessary) consequence, are contain’d in that part of her disciplin which was domestic, and in that which she exercis’d in her provinces or conquest. Of the latter I shall have better occasion to speak when we com to our provincial orbs; the former divided the whole people by tribes, amounting, as Livy and Cicero shew, at their full growth to thirty-five, and every tribe by the cense or valuation of estates into five classes: for the sixth being proletary, that is the nursery, or such as thro their poverty contributed nothing to the commonwealth but children, was not reckon’d nor us’d in arms. And this is the first point of the militia, in which modern prudence is quite contrary to the antient; for wheras we, excusing the rich, and arming the poor, becom the vassals of our servants, they, by excusing the poor, and arming such as were rich enough to be freemen, became lords of the earth. The nobility and gentry of this nation, who understand so little what it is to be the lords of the earth, that they have not bin able to keep their own lands, will think it a strange education for their children to be common soldiers, and oblig’d to all the dutys of arms: nevertheless it is not for 4 s. a week, but to be capable of being the best man in the field or in the city; the latter part of which consideration makes the common soldier herin a better man than the general of any monarchical army. And wheras it may be thought, that this would drink deep of noble blood, I dare boldly say, take the Roman nobility in the heat of their fiercest wars, and you shall not find such a shambles of them as has bin made of ours by mere luxury and slothfulness; which, killing the body, kill the soul also; Animasque in vulnere ponunt. Wheras common right is that which he who stands in the vindication of, has us’d that sword of justice for which he receives the purple of magistracy. The glory of a man on earth can go no higher, and if he falls he rises again, and coms sooner to that reward which is so much higher as heaven is above the earth. To return to the [172] Roman example: every classis was divided, as has bin more than once shewn into centurys, and every century was equally divided into youth and elders; the youth for foren service, and the elders for the guard of the territory. In the first classis were about eighteen centurys of horse, being those which by the institution of Servius were first call’d to the suffrage in the [77] centurial assemblys. But the delectus, or levy of an army, which is the present business, proceded, according to Polybius, in this manner.

“Upon a war decreed, the consuls elected four and twenty military tribuns or colonels; wherof ten, being such as had merited their tenth stipend, were younger officers. The tribuns being chosen, the consuls appointed a day to the tribes, when those in them of military age were to appear at the capitol; the day being com, and the youth assembl’d accordingly, the consuls ascended their tribunal, and the younger tribuns were straight divided into four parts after this manner: four were assign’d to the first legion (a legion at the most consisted of 6000 foot, and 300 horse) three to the second, four to the third, and three to the fourth. The younger tribuns being thus distributed, two of the elder were assign’d to the first legion, three to the second, two to the third, and three to the fourth. And the officers of each legion thus assign’d, having drawn the tribes by lot, and being seated according to their divisions at a convenient distance from each other, the tribe of the first lot was call’d: wherupon they that were of it knowing the business, and being prepar’d, presently bolted out four of their number, in the choice wherof such care was taken, that they offer’d none that was not a citizen; no citizen that was not of the youth; no youth that was not of som one of the five classes; nor any one of the five classes that was not expert at his exercises. Moreover, they used such diligence in matching them for age and stature, that the officers of the legions, except they happen’d to be acquainted with the youth so bolted, were forc’d to put themselves upon fortune, while they of the first legion chose one; they of the second, the next; they of the third another; and the fourth youth fell to the last legion: and thus was the election (the legions and the tribes varying according to their lots) carry’d on till the foot were complete. The like course with little alteration was taken by the horse officers till the horse also were complete.Judg. 20. 9. This was call’d giving of names, which the children of Israel did also by lot; and if any man refus’d to give his name, he was sold for a slave, or his estate confiscated to the commonwealth. When [78] Marcus Curius the consul was forc’d to make a sudden levy, and none of the youth would give in their names, all the tribes being put to the lot, he commanded the first name drawn out of the urn of the Pollian tribe (which happen’d to com first) to be call’d; but the youth not answering, he order’d his goods to be sold: which was conformable to the law in Israel, according to which Saul took a yoke of oxen, and hew’d them in pieces, and sent them throout the tribes, saying, Whosoever coms not forth to battel after Saul and Samuel, so shall it be done to his oxen.1 Sam. 11. 7. By which you may observe also, that they who had no cattel were not of the militia in Israel. But the age of the Roman youth by the Tullian law determin’d at 30; and by the law (tho it should seem by Machiavel [173] and others, that this was not well observ’d) a man could not stand for magistracy till he was miles emeritus, or had fulfil’d the full term of his militia, which was complete in his tenth stipend or service: nor was he afterwards oblig’d under any penalty to give his name, except the commonwealth were invaded, in which case the elders were as well oblig’d as the youth. [79] The consul might also levy milites evocatos, or soldiers, commanded men out of such as had serv’d their turn, and this at his discretion. The legions being thus complete, were divided by two to each consul; and in these no man had right to serve but a Roman citizen: now because two legions made but a small army, the Romans added to every one of their arms an equal number of foot, and a double number of horse levy’d among their Latin or Italian associats; so a consular army, with the legions and auxiliarys, amounted to about thirty thousand: and wheras they commonly levy’d two such armys together, these being join’d made about sixty thousand.

“The steps wherby our militia follows the greatest captain, are the three essays; the first, elected by a fifth man in the [80] parishes, and amounting in the whole to one hundred thousand, chuse their officers at the [81] hundreds, where they fall also to their games or exercises, invited by handsom prizes, such as for themselves and the honor of them will be coveted; such as will render the hundred a place of sports, and exercise of arms all the year long; such as in the space of ten years will equip 30000 men horse and foot, with such arms for their forge, proof, and beauty, as (notwithstanding the argyraspides, or silver shields of Alexander’s guards) were never worn by so many; such as will present marks of virtue and direction to your general or strategus in the distribution of his army, which doubles the value of them to the proprietors, who are bound to wear them, and eases the commonwealth of so much charge, so many being arm’d already.

“But here will be the objection now. How shall such a revenue be compas’d? fifty pounds a year in every hundred is a great deal, not so easily rais’d: men will not part with their mony; nor would the sum as it is propos’d by the order of Pompey, rise in many years. These are difficulties that fit our genius exactly: and yet a thousand pounds in each hundred once levy’d, establishes the revenue for ever. Now the hundreds one with another are worth ten thousand pounds a year dry rent, over and above personal estates, which bring it to twice the value: so that a twentieth part of one year’s revenue of the hundred dos it. If you cannot afford this while you pay taxes, tho from henceforth they will be but small ones, do it when you pay none. If it be then too much for one year, do it in two: if it be too much for two years, do it in four. What husbands have we hitherto bin? what is becom of greater sums? my lords, if you should thus cast your bread upon the waters, after many days you shall find it: stand not huckling when you are offer’d corn and your mony again in the mouth of the sack.

“But to proceed: the first essay being officer’d at the hundreds, and muster’d at the [82] tribes (where they are entertain’d with other sports, which will be very fine ones) procedes to the election of the second essay, or standing army of this nation, consisting of thirty thousand foot, and ten thousand horse; and these, [174] upon a war decreed, being deliver’d at the rendevous of Oceana to the strategus, are the third essay, which answers to the Roman legions. But you may observe, that wheras the consuls elected the military tribuns, and rais’d commanded men out of the veterans at their own discretion: our polemarchs or field officers are elected by the scrutiny of the council of war: and our veterans not otherwise taken on than as volunteers, and with the consent of the polemarchs; which may serve for the removal of certain scruples which might otherwise be incident in this place, tho without incouragement by the Roman way of proceding, much less by that which is propos’d. But wheras the Roman legions in all amounted not in one army to above 30000 men, or little more, you have here forty thousand; and wheras they added auxiliarys, it is in this regard that Marpesia will be a greater revenue to you, than if you had the Indys; for wheras heretofore she has yielded you nothing but her native thistles, in plowing out the rankness of her aristocracy by your agrarian, you will find her an inexhaustible magazin of men, and to her own advantage, who will make a far better account by the arms, than by the pins of Poland. Wherfore as a consular army consisted of about an equal number of auxiliarys added to their legions by their Latin or Italian associats, you may add to a parlamentary army an equal number of Marpesians or Panopeans, as that colony shall hereafter be able to supply you: by which means the commonwealth will be able to go forth to battel with fourscore thousand men. To make wars with small forces is no husbandry, but a wast, a disease, a lingring and painful consumtion of men and mony; the Romans making theirs thick, made them short, and had little regard to mony; as that which they who have men enow, can command where it is fittest that it should be levy’d. All the antient monarchys by this means got on wing, and attain’d to vast riches. Wheras your modern princes being dear purchasers of small parcels, have but emty pockets. But it may be som will accuse the order of rashness, in that it commits the sole conduct of the war to the general; and the custom of Venice by her proveditori, or checks upon her commanders in chief, may seem to be of greater prudence: but in this part of our government neither Venice nor any nation that makes use of mercenary forces is for our instruction. A mercenary army, with a standing general, is like the fatal sister that spins; but proper forces, with an annual magistrat, are like her that cuts the thred. Their interests are quite contrary, and yet you have a better proveditor than the Venetian, another strategus sitting with an army standing by him; wherupon that which is marching, if there were any probability it should, would find as little possibility that it could recoil, as a foren enemy to invade you. These things consider’d, a war will appear to be of a contrary nature to that of all other reckonings, inasmuch as of this you must never look to have a good account if you be strict in imposing checks. Let a council of huntsmen assembled beforehand, tell you which way the stag shall run, where you shall cast about at the fault, and how you shall ride to be in at the chase all the day: but these may as well do that, as a council of war direct a general. The hours that have painted wings, and of different colors, are his council: he must be like the ey that makes not the scene, but has it so soon as it changes. That in many counsillors there is strength, is spoken of civil administrations: as to those that are military, there is nothing more certain, than that in many counsillors there is weakness. Joint commissions in military affairs, are like hunting your [175] hounds in their couples. In the Attic war Cleomenes and Demaratus, kings of Lacedemon, being thus coupl’d, tug’d one against another; and while they should have join’d against the Persian, were the cause of the common calamity: wherupon that commonwealth took better counsil, and made a law, wherby from thenceforth there went at once but one of her kings to battel.

“THE Fidenati being in rebellion, and having slain the colony of the Romans, four tribuns with consular power were created by the people of Rome, wherof one being left for the guard of the city, the other three were sent against the Fidenati, who, thro the division that happen’d among them, brought nothing home but dishonor: wherupon the Romans created the dictator, and Livy gives his judgment in these words: [83] the three tribuns with consular power were a lesson how useless in war is the joint command of several generals; for each following his own counsils, while they all differ’d in their opinions, gave by this opportunity an advantage to the enemy. When the consuls, Quintius and Agrippa were sent against the Æqui, Agrippa for this reason refus’d to go with his colleague, saying, [84] That in the administration of great actions it was most safe that the chief command should be lodg’d in one person. And if the ruin of modern armys were well consider’d, most of it would be found to have faln upon this point: it being in this case far safer to trust to any one man of common prudence, than to any two or more together of the greatest parts. The consuls indeed being equal in power, while one was present with the senat, and the other in the field with the army, made a good balance; and this with us is exactly follow’d by the election of a new strategus upon the march of the old one.

“The seven and twentieth order, wherby the elders in case of invasion are oblig’d to equal duty with the youth, and each upon their own charge, is suitable to reason (for every man defends his own estate) and to our copy, as in the war with the Samnits and Tuscans. [85] The senat order’d a vacation to be proclaim’d, and a levy to be made of all sorts of persons: and not only the freemen and youths were listed, but cohorts of the old men were likewise form’d. This nation of all others is the least obnoxious to invasion. Oceana, says a French politician, is a beast that cannot be devour’d but by herself; nevertheless, that government is not perfect which is not provided at all points; and in this (ad triarios res rediit) the elders being such as in a martial state must be veterans, the commonwealth invaded gathers strength like Antæus by her fall, while the whole number of the elders consisting of five hundred thousand, and the youth of as many, being brought up according to the order, give twelve successive battels, each battel consisting of eighty thousand men, half elders and half youth. And the commonwealth whose constitution can be no stranger to any of those virtues which are to be acquir’d in human life, grows familiar with death ere she dys. If the hand of God be upon her for her transgressions, she shall mourn for her sins, and ly in the dust for her iniquitys, without losing her manhood.

Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidam ferient ruinæ.

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The remaining part, being the constitution of the provincial orb, is partly civil, or consisting of the elders; and partly military, or consisting of the youth. The civil part of the provincial orb is directed by

28 Order. Constitution of the civil part of the provincial orb.The twenty eighth ORDER, wherby the council of a province being constituted of twelve knights, divided by four into three regions (for their term and revolution conformable to the parlament) is perpetuated by the annual election at the tropic of four knights (being triennial magistrats) out of the region of the senat whose term expires; and of one knight out of the same region to be strategus or general of the province, which magistracy is annual. The strategus or magistrat thus chosen, shall be as well president of the provincial council with power to propose to the same, as general of the army. The council for the rest shall elect weekly provosts, having any two of them also right to propose after the manner of the senatorian councils of Oceana. And wheras all provincial councils are members of the council of state, they may and ought to keep diligent correspondence with the same, which is to be don after this manner: any opinion or opinions legitimately propos’d and debated at a provincial council, being therupon sign’d by the strategus, or any two of the provosts, may be transmitted to the council of state in Oceana; and the council of state proceding upon the same in their natural course (whether by their own power, if it be a matter within their instructions, or by authority of the senat therupon consulted, if it be a matter of state which is not in their instructions; or by authority of the senat and command of the people, if it be a matter of law, as for the levys of men or mony upon common use and safety) shall return such answers, advice, or orders, as in any of the ways mention’d shall be determin’d upon the case. The provincial councils of Marpesia and Panopea respectivly shall take special care that the agrarian laws, as also all other laws that be or shall from time to time be enacted by the parlament of Oceana, for either of them, be duly put in execution: they shall manage and receive the customs of either nation for the shipping of Oceana, being the common guard: they shall have a care that moderat and sufficient pay upon the respective province be duly rais’d for the support and maintenance of the officers and soldiers, or army of the same, in the most effectual, constant and convenient way: they shall receive the regalia, or public revenues of those nations, out of which every counsillor shall have for his term, and to his proper use, the sum of 500 l. per annum, and the strategus 500 l. as president, besides his pay as general, which shall be 1000 pounds: the remainder to go to the use of the knights and deputys of the respective provinces, to be paid, if it will reach, according to the rates of Oceana; if not, by an equal distribution, respectively; or the overplus, if there be any, to be return’d to the treasury of Oceana. They shall manage the lands (if there be any such held in either of the provinces by the commonwealth of Oceana, in dominion) and return the rents into the exchequer. If the commonwealth coms to be possest of richer provinces, the pay of the general or strategus, and of the councils, may be respectively increas’d. The people for the rest shall elect their own magistrats, and be govern’d by their own laws, having power also to appeal from their native or provincial magistrats, if they please, to the people of Oceana. And wheras there may be such as receiving injury, are not able to prosecute their appeals at so great a distance, eight serjeants at law being sworn by the commissioners of the seal, shall be sent by four into each province once in two years; who, dividing the same by circuits, shall hear such causes; and having gather’d and introduc’d them, shall return to the several appellants, gratis, the determinations and decrees of the people in their several cases.

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THE term of a knight in a provincial orb, as to domestic magistracys, shall be esteemed a vacation, and no bar to present election to any other honor, his provincial magistracy being expir’d.

THE quorum of a provincial council, as also of every other council or assembly in Oceana, shall in time of health consist of two parts in three of the whole number proper to that council or assembly; and in a time of sickness, of one part in three: but of the senat there can be no quorum without three of the signory; nor of a council without two of the provosts.

The civil part of the provincial orb being declar’d by the foregoing order; the military part of the same is constituted by

29 Order. Constitution of the military part of the provincial orb.The twenty ninth ORDER; wherby the stratiots of the third essay having drawn the gold balls mark’d with the letter M, and being ten horse and fifty foot in a tribe, that is to say, five hundred horse, and two thousand five hundred foot in all, the tribes shall be deliver’d by the respective conductors to the provincial strategus or general, at such a time and place, or rendevous, as he shall appoint by order and certificat of his election: and the strategus having receiv’d the horse and foot mention’d, which are the third classis of his provincial guard or army, shall forthwith lead them away to Marpesia, where the army consists of three classes, each classis containing three thousand men, wherof five hundred are horse; and receiving the new strategus with the third classis, the old strategus with the first classis shall be dismist by the provincial council. The same method with the stratiots of the letter P, is to be observ’d for the provincial orb of Panopea: and the commonwealth coming to acquire new provinces, the senat and the people may erect new orbs in like manner, consisting of greater or less numbers, according as is requir’d by the respective occasion. If a stratiot has once serv’d his term in a provincial orb, and happens afterwards to draw the letter of a province at the election of the second essay, he may refuse his lot; and if he refuses it, the censor of that urn shall cause the files ballotting at the same to make a halt; and if the stratiot produces the certificat of his strategus or general, that he has serv’d his time accordingly, the censor throwing the ball that he drew into the urn again, and taking out a blank, shall dismiss the youth, and cause the ballot to procede.

To perfect the whole structure of this commonwealth, som directions are given to the third essay, or army marching, in

30 Order.The thirtieth ORDER. When thou goest to battel against thy enemys, and seest horses and chariots, and a people more than thou;Deut. 20. 1. be not afraid of them, for the Lord thy God is he that gos with thee to fight for thee against thy enemys.1 Sam. 30 24. And when thou dividest the spoil, it shall be as a statute and an ordinance to thee, that as his part is that gos down to the battel, so shall his part be that tarrys by the stuff: that is, (as to the commonwealth of Oceana) the spoil taken of the enemy (except clothes, arms, horses, ammunition and victuals, to be divided to the soldiery by the strategus and the polemarchs upon the place according to their discretion) shall be deliver’d to four commissarys of the spoils elected and sworn by the council of war; which commissarys shall be allow’d shipping by the state, and convoys according as occasion shall require by the strategus; to the end that having a bill of lading sign’d by three or more of the polemarchs, they may ship and bring, or cause such spoils to be brought to the prize-office [178] in Oceana, where they shall be sold; and the profit arising by such spoils shall be divided into three parts, wherof one shall go to the treasury, another shall be paid to the soldiery of this nation, and a third to the auxiliarys at their return from their service, provided that the said auxiliarys be equal in number to the proper forces of this nation, otherwise their share shall be so much less as they themselves are fewer in number: the rest of the two thirds to go to the officers and soldiers of the proper forces. And the spoils so divided to the proper forces, shall be subdivided into three equal parts, wherof one shall go to the officers, and two to the common soldiers: the like for the auxiliarys. And the share allotted to the officers shall be divided into four equal parts, wherof one shall go to the strategus, another to the polemarchs, a third to the colonels, and a fourth to the captains, cornets, ensigns, and under officers, receiving their share of the spoil as common soldiers: the like for the auxiliarys. And this upon pain, in the case of failure, of what the people of Oceana (to whom the cognizance of peculat or crimes of this nature is properly appertaining) shall adjudg or decree.

Upon these three last orders the Archon seem’d to be haranguing at the head of his army in this manner:

My dear lords and excellent patriots,

“A Government of this make is a commonwealth for increase. Of those for preservation, the inconveniences and frailtys have bin shewn: their roots are narrow, such as do not run, have no fibers, their tops weak and dangerously expos’d to the weather; except you chance to find one, as Venice, planted in a flowerpot; and if she grows, she grows top-heavy, and falls too. But you cannot plant an oak in a flowerpot; she must have earth for her root, and heaven for her branches.

Imperium Oceano, famam quæ terminet astris.

“ROME was said to be broken by her own weight, but poetically: for that weight by which she was pretended to be ruin’d, was supported in her emperors by a far slighter foundation. And in the common experience of good architecture, there is nothing more known, than that buildings stand the firmer and the longer for their own weight; nor ever swerve thro any other internal cause, than that their materials are corruptible: but the people never dy; nor, as a political body, are subject to any other corruption than that which derives from their government. Unless a man will deny the chain of causes, in which he denys God, he must also acknowledge the chain of effects; wherfore there can be no effect in nature, that is not from the first cause, and those successive links of the chain, without which it could not have bin. Now except a man can shew the contrary in a commonwealth; if there be no cause of corruption in the first make of it, there can never be any such effect. Let no man’s superstition impose profaneness upon this assertion; for as man is sinful, but yet the universe is perfect, so may the citizen be sinful, and yet the commonwealth be perfect. And as man, seeing the world is perfect, can never commit any such sin as shall render it imperfect, or bring it to a natural dissolution; so the citizen, where the commonwealth is perfect, can never commit any such crime as will render it [179] imperfect, or bring it to a natural dissolution. To com to experience; Venice, notwithstanding we have found some flaws in it, is the only commonwealth in the make wherof no man can find a cause of dissolution; for which reason we behold her (tho she consists of men that are not without sin) at this day with one thousand years upon her back, yet for any internal cause, as young, as fresh, and free from decay, or any appearance of it, as she was born: but whatever in nature is not sensible of decay by the course of a thousand years, is capable of the whole age of nature; by which calculation, for any check that I am able to give my self, a commonwealth, rightly order’d, may, for any internal causes, be as immortal or longliv’d as the world. But if this be true, those commonwealths that are naturally fall’n, must have deriv’d their ruin from the rise of them. Israel and Athens dy’d not natural but violent deaths; in which manner the world itself is to dy. We are speaking of those causes of dissolution which are natural to government; and they are but two, either contradiction or inequality: if a commonwealth be a contradiction, she must needs destroy her self; and if she be inequal, it tends to strife, and strife to ruin. By the former of these fell Lacedemon, by the latter Rome. Lacedemon being made altogether for war, and yet not for increase, her natural progress became her natural dissolution, and the building of her own victorious hand too heavy for her foundation; so that she fell indeed by her own weight. But Rome perish’d thro her native inequality, which how it inveterated the bosoms of the senat and the people each against other, and even to death, has bin shewn at large.

“Look well to it, my lords, for if there be a contradiction or inequality in your commonwealth, it must fall; but if it has neither of these, it has no principle of mortality. Do not think me impudent; if this be truth, I shall commit a gross indiscretion in concealing it. Sure I am that Machiavel is for the immortality of a commonwealth upon far weaker principles.Dis. b. 3. c. 22 b 3. c. 29. If a commonwealth, says he, were so happy as to be provided often with men, that, when she is swerving from her principles, should reduce her to her institution, she would be immortal. But a commonwealth, as we have demonstrated, swerves not from her principles, but by and thro her institution; if she brought no biass into the world with her, her course for any internal cause must be streight forward, as we see is that of Venice. She cannot turn to the right hand, nor to the left, but by som rub, which is not an internal but external cause; against such she can be no way fortify’d, but thro her situation, as is Venice; or thro her militia, as was Rome: by which examples a commonwealth may be secure of those also. Think me not vain, for I cannot conceal my opinion here; a commonwealth that is rightly instituted can never swerve, nor one that is not rightly instituted be secur’d from swerving by reduction to her first principles: wherfore it is no less apparent in this place, that Machiavel understood not a commonwealth as to the whole piece, than where having told you, That a tribun, or any other citizen of Rome, might propose a law to the people, and debate it with them; he adds, this order was good, while the people were good; but when the people became evil, it became most pernicious.Dis. b. 1. c. 18. As if this order (thro which, with the like, the people most apparently became evil) could ever have bin good; or that the people, or the commonwealth could ever have becom good, by being reduc’d to such principles as were the original of their evil. The disease of Rome was, as has bin shewn, from the native inequality of her balance, and no otherwise from the empire of the world, than as, this falling [180] into one scale, that of the nobility (an evil in such a fabric inevitable) kick’d out the people. Wherfore a man that could have made her to throw away the empire of the world, might in that have reduc’d her to her principles; and yet have bin so far from rendring her immortal, that going no further, he should never have cur’d her. But your commonwealth is founded upon an equal agrarian; and if the earth be given to the sons of men, this balance is the balance of justice, such a one as in having due regard to the different industry of different men, yet faithfully judges the poor.Prov. 29. 14. And the king that faithfully judges the poor, his throne shall be establish’d for ever; much more the commonwealth, seeing that equality which is the necessary dissolution of monarchy, is the generation, the very life and soul of a commonwealth. And now, if ever, I may be excusable, seeing my assertion, that the throne of a commonwealth may be establish’d for ever, is consonant to the holy scriptures.

“The balance of a commonwealth that is equal, is of such a nature, that whatever falls into her empire, must fall equally; and if the whole earth falls into your scales, it must fall equally; and so you may be a greater people, and yet not swerve from your principles one hair. Nay, you will be so far from that, that you must bring the world in such a case to your balance, even to the balance of justice. But hearken, my lords; are we on earth? do we see the sun? or are we visiting those shady places which are feign’d by the poets?

Continuò auditæ voces, vagitus & ingens.

“These Gothic empires that are yet in the world, were at the first, tho they had legs of their own, but a heavy and unweildy burden; but their foundations being now broken, the iron of them enters even into the souls of the opprest; and hear the voice of their comforters: my father hath chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions. Hearken, I say; if thy brother crys to thee in affliction, wilt thou not hear him? this is a commonwealth of the fabric, that has an open ear and a public concern; she is not made for her self only, but given as a magistrat of God to mankind, for the vindication of common right, and the law of nature. Wherfore says Cicero of the like, that of the Romans, [86] we have rather undertaken the patronage, than the empire of the world. If you, not regarding this example, like som other nations that are upon the point to smart for it, shall, having attain’d to your own liberty, bear the sword of your common magistracy in vain, sit still, and fold your arms, or, which is worse, let out the blood of your people to tyrants, to be shed in the defence of their yokes like water, and so not only turn the grace of God into wantonness, but his justice into wormwood: I say if you do thus, you are not now making a commonwealth, but heaping coals of fire upon your own heads. A commonwealth of this make is a minister of God upon earth, to the end that the world may be govern’d with righteousness. For which cause (that I may com at length to our present business) the orders last rehears’d are buds of empire, such as with the blessing of God may spread the arms of your commonwealth, like a holy asylum to the distress’d world, and give the earth her sabbath of years, or rest from her labors, under the shadow of your wings. It is upon this point where the writings [181] of Machiavel, having for the rest excel’d all other authors, com as far to excel themselves.

Dis. b. 2. c. 4.“COMMONWEALTHS, says he, have had three ways of propagating themselves, one after the manner of monarchys, by imposing the yoke, which was the way of Athens, and towards the latter times of Lacedemon; another by equal leagues, which is the way of Switzerland; (I shall add of Holland, tho since his time) a third by inequal leagues, which, to the shame of the world, was never practis’d, nay nor so much as seen or minded, by any other commonwealth but that only of Rome. They will each of them, either for caution or imitation, be worthy to be well weigh’d, which is the proper work of this place. Athens and Lacedemon have bin the occasion of great scandal to the world, in two, or at least one of two regards: the first their emulation, which involv’d Greece in perpetual wars; the second their way of propagation, which by imposing yokes upon others, was plainly contradictory to their own principles.

“For the first: governments, be they of what kind soever, if they be planted too close, are like trees, that impatient in their growth to have it hinder’d, eat out one another. It was not unknown to these in speculation, or, if you read the story of Agesilaus, in action, that either of them with thirty thousand men might have master’d the east; and certainly, if the one had not stood in the other’s light, Alexander had com too late to that end, which was the means (and wou’d be if they were to live again) of ruin, at least to one of them: wherfore with any man that understands the nature of government this is excusable. So it was between Oceana and Marpesia; so it is between France and Spain, tho less excusable; and so it ever will be in the like cases. But to com to the second occasion of scandal by them given, which was in the way of their propagation, it is not excusable: for they brought their confederats under bondage; by which means Athens gave occasion of the Peloponnesian war, the wound of which she dy’d stinking, when Lacedemon, taking the same infection from her carcase, soon follow’d.

“Wherfore, my lords, let these be warnings to you, not to make that liberty which God has given you a snare to others in practising this kind of inlargement to your selves.

“The second way of propagation or inlargement us’d by commonwealths, is that of Switzerland and Holland, equal leagues: this, tho it be not otherwise mischievous, is useless to the world, and dangerous to themselves: useless to the world; for as the former governments were storks, these are blocks, have no sense of honor, or concern in the sufferings of others. But as the Ætolians, a state of the like fabric, were reproach’d by Philip of Macedon, to prostitute themselves, by letting out their arms to the lusts of others, while they leave their own liberty barren, and without legitimat issue; so I do not defame these people: the Switzer for valor has no superior, the Hollander for industry no equal; but themselves in the mean time shall so much the less excuse their governments, seeing that to the Switz it is well enough known that the ensigns of his commonwealth have no other motto than in te converte manus: and that of the Hollander, tho he sweats more gold than the Spaniard digs, lets him languish in debt; for she herself lives upon charity. These are dangerous to themselves, precarious governments, such as do not command, but beg their bread from province to province, in coats that being patch’d up of all colors are in effect of [182] none. That their cantons and provinces are so many arrows, is good; but they are so many bows too, which is naught.

“Like to these was the commonwealth of the antient Tuscans, hung together like bobbins, without a hand to weave with them: therfore easily overcom by the Romans, tho at that time, for number, a far less considerable people. If your liberty be not a root that grows, it will be a branch that withers; which consideration brings me to the paragon, the commonwealth of Rome.

“The ways and means wherby the Romans acquir’d the patronage, and in that the empire of the world, were different, according to the different condition of their commonwealth in her rise, and in her growth: in her rise she proceded rather by colonys; in her growth by inequal leagues. Colonys without the bounds of Italy she planted none (such dispersion of the Roman citizen as to plant him in foren parts, till the contrary interest of the emperors brought in that practise, was unlawful) nor did she ever demolish any city within that compass, or devest it of liberty; but wheras the most of them were commonwealths, stir’d up by emulation of her great felicity to war against her, if she overcame any, she confiscated som part of their lands that were the greatest incendiarys, or causes of the trouble, upon which she planted colonys of her own people, preserving the rest of their lands and libertys for the natives or inhabitants. By this way of proceding, that I may be as brief as possible, she did many and great things. For in confirming of liberty, she propagated her empire; in holding the inhabitants from rebellion, she put a curb upon the incursion of enemys; in exonerating her self of the poorer sort, she multiply’d her citizens; in rewarding her veterans, she render’d the rest less seditious; and in acquiring to her self the reverence of a common parent, she from time to time became the mother of newborn citys.

“In her farther growth the way of her propagation went more upon leagues, which for the first division were of two kinds, social and provincial.

“Again, social leagues, or leagues of society, were of two kinds.

“The first call’d latinity or Latin, the second Italian right.

“The league between the Romans and the Latins, or Latin right, approach’d nearest to jus quiritium, or the right of a native Roman. The man or the city that was honor’d with this right, was civitate donatus cum suffragio, adopted a citizen of Rome, with the right of giving suffrage with the people in som cases, as those of confirmation of law, or determination in judicature, if both the consuls were agreed, not otherwise; wherfore that coming to little, the greatest and most peculiar part of this privilege was, that who had born magistracy (at least that of ædil or quæstor) in any Latin city, was by consequence of the same, a citizen of Rome at all points.

“Italian right was also a donation of the city, but without suffrage: they who were in either of these leagues, were govern’d by their own laws and magistrats, having all the rights, as to liberty, of citizens of Rome, yielding and paying to the commonwealth as head of the league, and having in the conduct of all affairs appertaining to the common cause, such aid of men and mony as was particularly agreed to upon the merit of the cause, and specify’d in their respective leagues, whence such leagues came to be call’d equal or inequal accordingly.

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“Provincial leagues were of different extension, according to the merit and capacity of a conquer’d people; but they were all of one kind: for every province was govern’d by Roman magistrats, as a prætor or a proconsul, according to the dignity of the province, for the civil administration and conduct of the provincial army; and a quæstor for the gathering of the public revenue, from which magistrats a province might appeal to Rome.

“For the better understanding of these particulars, I shall exemplify in as many of them as is needful: and first in Macedon.

“The Macedonians were thrice conquer’d by the Romans, first under the conduct of Titus Quintus Flaminius; secondly, under that of Lucius Æmilius Paulus; and, thirdly, under that of Quintus Cæcilius Metellus, thence call’d Macedonicus.

“For the first time Philip of Macedon, who (possest of acrocorinthus) boasted no less than was true, that he had Greece in fetters, being overcom by Flaminius, had his kingdom restor’d to him, upon condition that he should immediatly set all the citys which he held in Greece and in Asia at liberty; and that he should not make war out of Macedon, but by leave of the senat of Rome; which Philip (having no other way to save any thing) agreed should be don accordingly.

“The Grecians being at this time assembl’d at the Isthmian games, where the concourse was mighty great, a crier, appointed to the office by Flaminius, was heard among them proclaiming all Greece to be free; to which the people being amaz’d at so hopeless a thing, gave little credit, till they receiv’d such testimony of the truth as put it past all doubt, wherupon they fell immediatly on running to the proconsul with flowers and garlands, and such violent expressions of their admiration and joy, as, if Flaminius, a young man, about thirty-three, had not also bin very strong, he must have dy’d of no other death than their kindness, while every one striving to touch his hand, they bore him up and down the field with an unruly throng, full of such ejaculations as these: How! Is there a people in the world, that at their own charge, at their own peril, will fight for the liberty of another? Did they live at the next door to this fire? Or what kind of men are these, whose business it is to pass the seas, that the world may be govern’d with righteousness? The citys of Greece and of Asia shake off their iron fetters at the voice of a cryer! Was it madness to imagin such a thing, and is it don? O virtue! O felicity! O fame!

“In this example your lordships have a donation of liberty, or of Italian right to a people, by restitution to what they had formerly injoy’d; and som particular men, familys or citys, according to their merit of the Romans, if not upon this, yet upon the like occasions, were gratify’d with latinity.

“But Philip’s share by this means did not please him, wherfore the league was broken by his son Perseus; and the Macedonians therupon for the second time conquer’d by Æmilius Paulus, their king taken, and they som time after the victory summon’d to the tribunal of the general; where remembring how little hope they ought to have of pardon, they expected som dreadful sentence: when Æmilius in the first place declar’d the Macedonians to be free, in the full possession of their lands, goods, and laws, with right to elect annual magistrats, yielding and paying to the people of Rome one half of the tribute which they were accustom’d to pay to their own kings. This don he went on, making so [184] skilful a division of the country in order to the methodizing of the people, and casting them into the form of popular government, that the Macedonians, being first surpriz’d with the virtue of the Romans, began now to alter the scene of their admiration, that a stranger should do such things for them in their own country, and with such facility, as they had never so much as once imagin’d to be possible. Nor was this all; for Æmilius, as if not dictating to conquer’d enemys, but to som well-deserving friends, gave them in the last place laws so suitable, and contriv’d with such care and prudence, that long use and experience (the only correctress of works of this nature) could never find a fault in them.

“In this example you have a donation of liberty, or of Italian right, to a people that had not tasted of it before, but were now taught how to use it.

“My lords, the royalists should compare what we are doing, and we what hitherto we have don for them, with this example. It is a shame that while we are boasting up our selves above all others, we should yet be so far from imitating such examples as these, that we do not so much as understand that if government be the parent of manners, where there are no heroic virtues, there is no heroic government.

“But the Macedonians rebelling, at the name of a false Philip, the third time against the Romans were by them judg’d incapable of liberty, and reduc’d by Metellus to a province.

“Now wheras it remains, that I explain the nature of a province, I shall rather chuse that of Sicily, because having bin the first which the Romans made, the descriptions of the rest relate to it.

“WE have so receiv’d the Sicilian citys into amity, says Cicero, that they injoy their antient laws; and upon no other condition than of the same obedience to the people of Rome, which they formerly yielded to their own princes or superiors. So the Sicilians, wheras they had bin parcel’d out to divers princes, and into divers states (the cause of perpetual wars, wherby, hewing one another down, they became sacrifices to the ambition of their neighbors, or of som invader) were now receiv’d at the old rate into a new protection which could hold them, and in which no enemy durst touch them; nor was it possible, as the case then stood, for the Sicilians to receive, or for the Romans to give more.

“A Roman province is defin’d by Sigonius, a region having provincial right. Provincial right in general was to be govern’d by a Roman prætor, or consul, in matters at least of state, and of the militia: and by a quæstor, whose office it was to receive the public revenue. Provincial right in particular was different, according to the different leagues or agreements between the commonwealth, and the people reduc’d into a province. Siculi hoc jure sunt, ut quod civis cum cive agat, domi certet suis legibus; quod siculus cum siculo non ejusdem civitatis, ut de eo prætor judices, ex P. Rupilii decreto, sortiatur. Quod privatus a populo petit, aut populus a privato, senatus ex aliqua civitate, qui judicet, datur, cui alternæ civitates rejectæ sunt. Quod vivis Romanus a siculo petit, siculus judex datur; quod siculus a cive Romano, civis Romanus datur. Cæterarum rerum selecti judices ex civium Romanorum conventu proponi solent. Inter aratores & decumanos lege frumentaria, quam Hicronicam appellant, judicia fiunt. Because the rest would oblige me to a discourse too large for this place, it shall suffice that I have shew’d you how it was in Sicily.

[185]

“My lords, Upon the fabric of your provincial orb I shall not hold you; because it is sufficiently describ’d in the order, and I cannot believe that you think it inferior to the way of a prætor and a quæstor. But wheras the provincial way of the Roman commonwealth was that wherby it held the empire of the world, and your orbs are intended to be capable at least of the like use; there may arise many controversys: as whether such a course be lawful; whether it be feizible; and, seeing that the Romans were ruin’d upon that point, whether it would not be to the destruction of the commonwealth.

“For the first, If the empire of a commonwealth be an occasion to ask whether it be lawful for a commonwealth to aspire to the empire of the world, it is to ask whether it be lawful for it to do its duty, or to put the world into a better condition than it was before.

“And to ask whether this be feizible, is to ask why the Oceaner, being under the like administration of government, may not do as much with two hundred men as the Roman did with one hundred; for comparing their commonwealths in their rise, the difference is yet greater: now that Rome (seris avaritia luxuriaque) thro the natural thirst of her constitution, came at length with the fulness of her provinces to burst herself, this is no otherwise to be understood, than as when a man that from his own evil constitution had contracted the dropsy, dys with drinking: it being apparent that in case her agrarian had held, she could never have bin thus ruin’d: and I have already demonstrated that your agrarian being once pois’d, can never break or swerve.

“Wherfore to draw towards some conclusion of this discourse, let me inculcat the use, by selecting a few considerations out of many. The regard had in this place to the empire of the world appertains to a well-order’d commonwealth, more especially for two reasons:

“1. The facility of this great enterprize, by a government of the model propos’d.

“2. The danger that you would run in the omission of such a government.

“The facility of this enterprize, upon the grounds already laid, must needs be great, forasmuch as the empire of the world has bin, both in reason and experience, the necessary consequence of a commonwealth of this nature only: for tho it has bin given to all kinds to drive at it, since that of Athens or Lacedemon, if the one had not hung in the other’s light might have gain’d it; yet could neither of them have held it: not Athens, thro the manner of her propagation, which, being by downright tyranny, could not preserve what she had; nor Lacedemon, because she was overthrown by the weight of a less conquest. The facility then of this great enterprize being peculiar to popular government, I shall consider it, first, In gaining; and secondly, In holding

“For the former, volenti non fit injuria; it is said of the people under Eumenes, that they would not have chang’d their subjection for liberty; wherfore the Romans gave them no disturbance. If a people be contented with their government, it is a certain sign that it is good, and much good do them with it. The sword of your magistracy is for a terror to them that do evil. Eumenes had the sear of God, or of the Romans before his eys; concerning such he has given you no commission.

“But till we can say here are the Romans, where is Eumenes? do not think that the late appearances of God to you have bin altogether for your selves; he [186] has surely seen the affliction of your brethren, and heard their cry by reason of their taskmasters. For to believe otherwise, is not only to be mindless of his ways, but altogether deaf. If you have ears to hear, this is the way in which you will certainly be call’d upon: for if, while there is no stock of liberty, no sanctuary of the afflicted, it be a common object to behold a people casting themselves out of the pan of one prince into the fire of another; what can you think, but if the world should see the Roman eagle again, she would renew her age, and her flight? nor did ever she spread her wings with better omen, than will be read in your ensigns; which if, call’d in by an oppress’d people they interpose between them and their yoke, the people themselves must either do nothing in the mean time, or have no more pains to take for their wish’d fruit than to gather it, if that be not likewise don for them. Wherfore this must needs be easy, and yet you have a greater facility than is in the arm of flesh; for if the cause of mankind be the cause of God, the Lord of Hosts will be your captain, and you shall be a praise to the whole earth.

“The facility of holding is in the way of your propagation; if you take that of Athens and Lacedemon, you shall rain snares; but either catch, or hold nothing. Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord: if setting up for liberty, you impose yokes, he will infallibly destroy you. On the other side, to go about a work of this nature by a league without a head, is to abdicat that magistracy, wherwith he has not only indu’d you, but wherof he will require an account of you; for, cursed is he that dos the work of the Lord negligently. Wherfore you are to take the course of Rome: if you have subdu’d a nation that is capable of liberty, you shall make them a present of it, as did Flaminius to Greece, and Æmilius to Macedon, reserving to your selves some part of that revenue which was legally paid to the former government, together with the right of being head of the league, which includes such levys of men and mony as shall be necessary for the carrying on of the public work. For if a people have by your means attain’d to freedom, they ow both to the cause and you, such aid as may propagat the like fruit to the rest of the world. But wheras every nation is not capable of her liberty to this degree, lest you be put to doing and undoing of things, as the Romans were in Macedon, you shall diligently observe what nation is fit for her liberty to this degree, and what not: which is to be don by two marks, the first if she be willing to help the Lord against the mighty; for if she has no care of the liberty of mankind, she deserves not her own. But because in this you may be deceiv’d by pretences, which, continuing for a while specious, may afterwards vanish; the other is more certain, and that is if she be capable of an equal agrarian; which that it was not observ’d by excellent Æmilius in his donation of liberty, and introduction of a popular state among the Macedonians, I am more than mov’d to believe for two reasons: the first, because at the same time the agrarian was odious to the Roman Patricians; the second, that the Pseudo-Philip could afterwards so easily recover Macedon, which could not have happen’d but by the nobility, and their impatience, having great estates, to be equal’d with the people; for that the people should otherwise, at the mere sound of a name, have thrown away their liberty, is incredible. Wherfore be assur’d, that the nation where you cannot establish an equal agrarian, is incapable of its liberty as to this kind of donation. For example, except the aristocracy in Marpesia be dissolv’d, neither can that people have their liberty there, nor you govern [187] at home; for they continuing still liable to be sold by their lords to foren princes, there will never (especially in a country of which there is no other profit to be made) be want of such merchants and drovers, while you must be the market where they are to receive their second payment.

“Nor can the aristocracy there be dissolv’d but by your means, in relation wherto you are provided with your provincial orb; which being proportion’d to the measure of the nation that you have vindicated or conquer’d, will easily hold it: for there is not a people in the world more difficult to be held than the Marpesians, which tho by themselves it be ascrib’d to their own nature, is truly to be attributed to that of their country. Nevertheless you having nine thousand men upon the continual guard of it, that, threaten’d by any sudden insurrection, have places of retreat; and an army of forty thousand men upon a day’s warning ready to march to their rescue; it is not to be rationally shewn which way they can possibly slip out of your hands. And if a man should think that upon a province more remote and divided by the sea, you have not the like hold, he has not so well consider’d your wings as your talons, your shipping being of such a nature, as makes the descent of your armys almost of equal facility in any country: so that what you take you hold, both because your militia, being already populous, will be of great growth in it self; and also thro your confederats, by whom in taking and holding you are still more inabled to do both.

“Nor shall you easier hold, than the people under your empire or patronage may be held. My lords, I would not go to the door to see whether it be close shut; this is no underhand dealing, nor a game at which he shall have any advantage against you who sees your cards, but on the contrary the advantage shall be your own: for with eighteen thousand men (which number I put, because it circulats your orb by the annual change of six thousand) having establish’d your matters in the order shewn, you will be able to hold the greatest province; and eighteen thousand men, allowing them greater pay than any prince ever gave, will not stand the province in one million revenue; [87] in consideration wherof, they shall have their own estates free to themselves, and be govern’d by their own laws and magistrats; which, if the revenue of the province be in dry rent (as there may be som that are four times as big as Oceana) forty millions, will bring it with that of industry to speak with the least to twice the value: so that the people there, who at this day are so opprest that they have nothing at all wheron to live, shall for one million paid to you, receive at least seventy nine to their proper use: in which place I appeal to any man, whether the empire describ’d can be other than the patronage of the world.

“Now if you add to the propagation of civil liberty (so natural to this commonwealth that it cannot be omitted) the propagation of the liberty of conscience, this empire, this patronage of the world is the kingdom of Christ: for as the kingdom of God the father was a commonwealth, so shall the kingdom of God the son; the people shall be willing in the day of his power.Psal. 110. 3.

“Having shew’d you in this and other places, som of those inestimable benefits of this kind of government, together with the natural and facil emanation of them from their fountain, I com (lest God who has appear’d to you, for he is the God of nature, in the glorious constellation of these subordinat causes, wherof we have hitherto bin taking the true elevation, should shake off the dust [188] of his feet against you) to warn you of the dangers which you, not taking the opportunity, will incur by omission.

“MACHIAVEL speaking of the defect of Venice, thro her want of proper arms, crys our, [88] This cut her wings, and spoil’d her mount to heaven. If you lay your commonwealth upon any other foundation than the people, you frustrat your self of proper arms, and so lose the empire of the world; nor is this all, but som other nation will have it.

“COLUMBUS offer’d gold to one of your kings, thro whose happy incredulity another prince has drunk the poison, even to the consumtion of his people; but I do not offer you a nerve of war that is made of pursestrings, such a one as has drawn the face of the earth into convulsions, but such as is natural to her health and beauty. Look you to it, where there is tumbling and tossing upon the bed of sickness, it must end in death or recovery. Tho the people of the world, in the dregs of the Gothic empire, be yet tumbling and tossing upon the bed of sickness, they cannot dy; nor is there any means of recovery for them but by antient prudence, whence of necessity it must com to pass, that this drug be better known. If France, Italy, and Spain, were not all sick, all corrupted together, there would be none of them so; for the sick would not be able to withstand the sound, nor the sound to preserve their health without curing of the sick. The first of these nations (which, if you stay her leisure, will in my mind be France) that recovers the health of antient prudence, shall certainly govern the world; for what did Italy when she had it? and as you were in that, so shall you in the like case be reduced to a province; I do not speak at random. Italy, in the consulship of Lucius Æmilius Papus, and Caius Atilius Regulus, arm’d upon the Gallic tumult that then happen’d of her self, and without the aid of foren auxiliarys, seventy thousand horse, and seven hundred thousand foot: but as Italy is the least of those three countrys in extent, so is France now the most populous.

I, decus, I, nostrum, melioribus utere fatis.

“MY dear lords, Oceana is as the rose of Sharon, and the lilly of the vally. As the lilly among thorns, such is my love among the daughters. She is comly as the tents of Kedar, and terrible as an army with banners. Her neck is as the tower of David, builded for an armory, whereon there hang a thousand bucklers and shields of mighty men. Let me hear thy voice in the morning, whom my soul loves. The south has drop’d, and the west is breathing upon thy garden of spices. Arise, queen of the earth, arise, holy spouse of Jesus; for lo the winter is past, the rain is over and gon; the flowers appear on the earth, the time for the singing of birds is com, and the voice of the turtle is heard in our land. Arise, I say, com forth, and do not tarry: ah! wherfore should my eys behold thee by the rivers of Babylon, hanging thy harps upon the willows, thou fairest among women?

“Excellent PATRIOTS; if the people be soverain, here is that which establishes their prerogative: if we be sincere, here is that which disburdens our souls, and makes good all our ingagements: if we be charitable, here is that [189] which imbraces all partys: if we would be settl’d, here is that which will stand, and last for ever.

“If our religion be any thing else but a vain boast, scratching and defacing human nature or reason, which, being the image of God, makes it a kind of murder; here is that empire whence justice shall run down like a river, and judgment like a mighty stream.Amos 5 24. Who is it then that calls us? or what is in our way? a lion! is it not the dragon that old serpent? for what wretched shifts are these? here is a great deal, might we not have som of this at one time, and som at another?

“My LORDS, permit me to give you the sum, or brief

CHAP. I.: Whether Prudence be well distinguish’d into Antient and Modern. ↩

THE considerer (where by antient prudence I understand the policy of a commonwealth, and by modern prudence that of king, lords, and commons, which introduc’d by the Goths and Vandals upon the ruin of the Roman empire, has since reign’d in these western countrys, till by the predominating of som one of the three parts, it be now almost universally extinguish’d) thinks it enough for the confutation of this distinction, to shew out of Thucydides that of monarchy to be a more antient policy than that of a commonwealth. Upon which occasion, I must begin here to discover that which, the further I go, will be the more manifest; namely, that there is a difference between quoting authors, and saying some part of them without book: this may be don by their words, but the former no otherwise than by keeping to their sense. Now the sense of Thucydides, as he is translated by Mr. Hobbs in the place alleg’d, is thus:Thu. R. 1. P. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. The manner, says he, of living in the most antient times of Greece was thieving; the stronger going abroad under the conduct of their most puissant men, both to inrich themselves, and fetch home maintenance for the weak: for there was neither traffic, property of lands, nor constant abode, till M nos built a navy, and expelling the malefactors out of the islands, planted colonys of his own, by which means they who inhabited the seacoasts, becoming more addicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwellings: of whom som, grown now rich, compass’d their towns about with walls For out of a desire of gain, the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty; and the mighty (thus overbalancing at home) with their wealth, brought the lesser citys (abroad) into subjection. Thus Pelops, tho he was a stranger, obtain’d such power in Peloponnesus, that the country was call’d after his name. Thus Atrius obtain’d the kingdom of Mycenæ: and thus kingdoms with honors limited came to be hereditary; and rising to power, proceeded afterwards to the war against Troy. After the war with Troy, tho with much ado, and in a long time Greece had constant rest (and land without doubt came to property) for shifting their seats no longer, at length they sent colonys abroad; the Athenians into Ionia with the islands, the Peloponnesians into Italy, Sicily, and other parts. The power of Greece thus improv’d, and the desire of mony withal, their revenues (in what? not in mony, if yet there was no usury: therefore except a man can shew that there was usury in land) being inlarg’d, in most of the citys there were erected tyrannys. Let us lay this place to the former, when out of a desire of gain the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty, it caus’d hereditary kingdoms with honors limited, as happen’d also with us since the time of the Goths and Vandals. But when the people came to property in land, and their revenues were inlarg’d, such as assum’d power over them, not according to the nature of their property or balance, were tyrants: well, and what remedy?Consid. p. 4. why, then it was, says the considerer, that the Grecians out of an extreme aversion to that which was the cause of their present sufferings slipt into popular government, not that upon [222] calm and mature debates they found it best, but that they might put themselves at the greatest distance (which spirit usually accompanys all reformations) from that with which they were grown into dislike.Book I. Wherby he agrees exactly with his author in making out the true force and nature of the balance, working even without deliberation, and whether men will or no. For the government that is natural and easy, being in no other direction than that of the respective balance, is not of choice but of necessity. The policy of king, lords and commons, was not so much from the prudence of our ancestors, as from their necessity. If three hundred men held at this day the like overbalance to the whole people, it was not in the power of prudence to institute any other than the same kind of government, thro the same necessity. Thus the meaner sort with Thucydides submitting to the mighty, it came to kingdoms with hereditary honors: but the people coming to be wealthy, call’d their kings, tho they knew not why, tyrants; nay, and using them accordingly, found out means, with as little deliberation it may be as a bull takes to toss a dog, or a hern to split a hawk (that is, rather, as at the long-run they will ever do in the like cases, by instinct, than prudence or debate) to throw down that, which by the mere information of sense they could no longer bear; and which being thrown down, they found themselves eas’d. But the question yet remains, and that is, forsooth, whether of these is to be call’d antient prudence. To this end, never man made a more unlucky choice than the considerer has don for himself of this author, who, in the very beginning of his book, speaking of the Peloponnesian war, or that between the commonwealths of Athens and Lacedemon, says, that the actions which preceded this, and those again that were more antient, tho the truth of them thro length of time cannot by any means be clearly discover’d; yet for any argument that (looking into times far past) he had yet lighted on to persuade him, he dos not think they have bin very great either for matter of war, or otherwise; that is, for matter of peace or government.Mr. Hobbs in the Magire. And lest this should not be plain enough, he calls the prudence of the three periods, observ’d by Mr. Hobbs, viz. that from the beginning of the Grecian memory to the Trojan war, that of the Trojan war it self, and that from thence to the present commonwealths and wars, wherof he treats, the imbecillity of antient times.Thu. b. 1. p. 3. Wherfore certainly this prevaricator, to give him his own fees, has less discretion than a common attorny, who will be sure to examin only those witnesses that seem to make for the cause in which he is entertain’d.Consid. p. 34. Seeing that which he affirms to be antient prudence is depos’d by his own witness to have bin the imbecillity of antient times, for which I could have so many more than I have leisure to examin, that, (to take only of the most authentic) as you have heard one Greec, I shall add no more than one Roman, and that is Florus in his prolog, where (computing the ages of the Romans, in the same manner as Thucydides did those of the Greecs) he affirms the time while he liv’d under their kings, to have bin their infancy; that from the consuls till they conquer’d Italy, their youth; that from hence to their emperors, their manly age; and the rest (with a complement or Salvo to Trajan his present lord) their dotage.

These things, tho originally all government amongst the Greecs and the Romans was regal, are no more than they who have not yet past their novitiat in story, might have known.Consid. p. 2, 3. Yet, says the considerer, it seems to be a defect of experience to think that the Greec and the Roman actions are only considerable in antiquity. But is it such a defect of experience to think them only considerable, as not to think them chiefly considerable in antiquity, or that the name of antient prudence dos not [223] belong to that prudence which was chiefest in antiquity? True, says he, it is very frequent with such as have bin conversant with Greec and Roman authors, to be led by them into a belief that the rest of the world was a rude inconsiderable people, and, which is a term they very much delight in, altogether barbarous. This should be som fine gentleman that would have universitys pull’d down; for the office of a university is no more than to preserve so much of antiquity as may keep a nation from stinking, or being barbarous; which salt grew not in monarchys, but in commonwealths: or whence has the Christian world that religion and those laws which are now common, but from the Hebrews and Romans? or from whence have we arts but from these or the Greecs? that we have a doctor of divinity, or a master of arts, we may thank popular government; or with what languages, with what things are scholars conversant that are otherwise descended? will they so plead their own cause as to tell us it is possible there should be a nation at this day in the world without universitys, or universitys without Hebrew, Greec and Latin, and not be barbarous, that is to say, rude, unlearn’d, and inconsiderable? yes, this humour even among the Greecs and Romans themselves was a servil addiction to narrow principles, and a piece of very pedantical pride. What, man! the Greecs and the Romans that of all other would not serve, servil! their principles, their learning, with whose scraps we set up for batchelors, masters, and doctors of fine things, narrow! their inimitable eloquence a piece of very pedantical pride! the world can never make sense of this any otherwise than that since heads and fellows of colleges became the only Greecs and Romans, the Greecs and Romans are become servily addicted, of narrow principles, very pedants, and prouder of those things they do not understand, than the other were of those they did: for, say they, in this question, the examples of the Babylonians, Persians and Egyptians (not to omit the antient and like modern discoverys of the queen of the Amazons, and of the king of China) cannot without gross partiality be neglected. This is pretty; they who say nothing at all to the policy of these governments, accuse me, who have fully open’d it, of negligence. The Babylonian, Persian, and, for ought appears to the contrary, the Chinese policy, is summ’d up, and far excell’d by that at this day of Turky; and in opening this latter, I have open’d them all, so far from neglect, that I every where give the Turc his due, whose policy I assert to be the best of this kind, tho not of the best kind. But they will bear me down, and but with one argument, which I beseech you mark, that it is absolutely of the best kind; for say they, it is of a more absolute form (has more of the man and less of the law in it) than is to be met with in any kingdom of Europe.

I am amaz’d! this is that kind of government which to hold barbarous, was in the Greecs and Romans pedantical pride, but would be in us, who have not the same temtation of interest, downright folly. The interest of a people is not their guide but their temtation! we that hold our land divided among us, have not the same temtation of interest that had the servil Hebrews, Greecs and Romans; but the same that had the free people of Babylon, Persia and Egypt, where not the people but the prince was sole landlord! O the arts in which these men are masters! to follow the pedantical pride of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, Romulus, were with us downright folly; but to follow humble and learned Mahomet or Ottoman, in whose only model the perfection of the Babylonian, Persian, Egyptian policy is consummated, is antient prudence! exquisit politicians! egregious divines, for the leading of a people into Egypt or Babylon! these things consider’d, whether antient prudence, [224] as I have stated it, be downright folly, or as they have stated it, be not downright knavery, I appeal to any court of claims in the world, where the judges, I mean, have not more in their caps than in their heads, and in their sleeves than the scarlet. And wheras men love compendious works, if I gain my cause, the reader, for an answer to the Oxford book, needs look no further than this chapter. For if riches and freedom be the end of government; and these men propose nothing but slavery, beggery, and Turcism, what need more words?

CHAP. II.: Whether a Commonwealth be rightly defin’d to be a Government of Laws and not of Men, and a Monarchy to be the Government of som Man, or a few Men, and not of Laws? ↩

THAT part of the preliminarys which the prevaricator, as is usual with him, recites in this place falsly and fraudulently, is thus: relation had to these two times (that of antient and that of modern prudence) the one, as is computed by Janotti, ending with the liberty of Rome, the other beginning with the arms of Cæsar (which extinguishing liberty, became the translation of antient into modern prudence, introduc’d in the ruin of the Roman empire by the Goths and Vandals) GOVERNMENT (to define it de jure, or according to antient prudence) is an art wherby a civil society of men is instituted and preserv’d, upon the foundation of common right or interest; or (to follow Aristotle and Livy) it is an empire of laws, and not of men.

AND government, to define it de facto, or according to modern prudence, is an art wherby som man, or som few men, subject a city or a nation, and rule it according to his or their privat interest; which, because laws in such cases are made according to the interest of a man, or som few familys, may be said to be an empire of men, and not of laws.

Hereby it is plain, whether in an empire of laws, and not of men, as a commonwealth; or in an empire of men, and not of laws, as monarchy: first, That law must equally procede from will, that is, either from the will of the whole people, as in a commonwealth; from the will of one man, as in an absolute, or from the will of a few men, as in a regulated monarchy.

Secondly, That will, whether of one or more, or all, is not presum’d to be, much less to act without a mover.

Thirdly, That the mover of the will is interest.

Fourthly, That interests also being of one, or more, or of all; those of one man, or of a few men, where laws are made accordingly, being more privat than coms duly up to the law, the nature wherof lys not in partiality but in justice, may be call’d the empire of men, and not of laws: and that of the whole people coming up to the public interest (which is no other than common right and justice, excluding all partiality or privat interest) may be call’d the empire of laws, and not of men. By all which put together, wheras it is demonstrable that in this division of government I do not stay at the will, which must have som motive or mover, but go to the first and remotest notion of government, in the foundation and origination of [225] it, in which lys the credit of this division, and the definition of the several members,Chap. II. that is to say, of interest, whether privat or public; the prevaricator tells me, that this division of government having (he knows not how) lost its credit,Confid. p. 6. the definitions of the several members of it need not be consider’d further, than that they com not at all up to the first and remotest notion of government in the foundation and origination of it, in which lys all the difficulty; and being here neglected, there is little hope the subsequent discourse can have in it the light of probable satisfaction, much less the force of infallible demonstration.

Very good! interest it should seem then is not the first and remotest notion of government, but that which he will outthrow; and at this cast, by saying, that the declaration of the will of the soverain power is call’d law:Consid. p. 8. which if it outlives the person whose will it was, it is only because the persons who succede in power are presum’d to have the same will, unless they manifest the contrary, and that is the abrogation of the law; so that still the government is not in the law, but in the person whose will gave a being to that law. I might as well say, the declaration to all men by these presents that a man ows mony is call’d a bond; which if it outlives the person that enter’d into that bond, it is only because the persons that succede him in his estate, are presum’d to have the same will, unless they manifest the contrary, and that is, the abrogation or cancelling of the bond; so that still the debt is not in the bond, but in his will who gave a being to that bond. If it be alleg’d against this example, that it is a privat one, the case may be put between several princes, states or governments, or between several states of the same principality or government, whether it be a regulated monarchy or a commonwealth; for in the like obligation of the states (as of the king, the lords, and commons) or partys agreeing, authoritate patrum & jussu populi, till the partys that so agreed to the obligation, shall agree to repeal or cancel it, lys all law that is not merely in the will of one man, or of one state, or party, as the oligarchy. But not to dispute these things further in this place, let the government be what it will, for the prevaricator to fetch the origination of law no further than the will (while he knows very well that I fetch’d it from interest, the antecedent of will) and yet to boast that he has outthrown me, I say he is neither an honest man, nor a good bowler. No matter, he will be a better gunner; for where I said that the magistrat upon the bench is that to the law, which a gunner upon his platform is to his cannon, he gos about to take better aim, and says, If the proportion of things be accurately consider’d, it will appear that the laden cannon answers not to the laws, but to the power of the person whose will created those laws: which if som of them that the power of the person whose will created them, intended should be of as good stuff or carriage as the rest, do nevertheless according to the nature of their matter or of their charge, com short or over, and others break or recoil; sure this report of the prevaricator is not according to the bore of my gun, but according to the bore of such a gunner. Yet again, if he be not so good a gunner, he will be a better anatomist: for wheras I affirm, that to say, Aristotle and Cicero wrote not the rights or rules of their politics from the principles of nature, but transcrib’d them into their books out of the practice of their own commonwealths, is as if a man should say of famous Harvey, that he transcrib’d his circulation of the blood, not out of the principles of nature, but out of the anatomy of this or that body: he answers, that the whole force of this objection amounts but to this, that because Harvey in his circulation has [226] follow’d the principles of nature, therfore Aristotle and Cicero have don so in their discourses of government.

Pretty! it is said in Scripture, Thy word is sweet as hony: amounts that but to this, because hony is sweet, therfore the word of God is sweet? to say that my lord protector has not conquer’d many nations, were as if one should say, Cæsar had not conquer’d many nations: amounts that but to this, because Cæsar conquer’d many nations, therfore my lord protector has conquer’d many nations? what I produce as a similitude, he calls an objection; where I say, as, he says, because: what ingenious man dos not detest such a cheat! a similitude is brought to shew how a thing is or may be, not to prove that it is so; it is us’d for illustration, not as an argument: the candle I held did not set up the post, but shew where the post was set, and yet this blind buzzard has run his head against it. Nor has he yet enough; if he be not the better naturalist, he will be the better divine, tho he should make the worse sermon. My doctrin and use upon that of Solomon, I have seen servants upon horses, and princes walking as servants upon the ground, discovers the true means wherby the principles of power and authority, the goods of the mind and of fortune, may so meet and twine in the wreath or crown of empire, that the government standing upon earth like a holy altar, and breathing perpetual incense to heaven in justice and piety, may be somthing, as it were between heaven and earth; while that only which is propos’d by the best, and resolv’d by the most, becoms law, and so the whole government an empire of laws, and not of men.Consid. p. 7. This he says is a goodby sermon; it is honest, and sense. But let any man make sense or honesty of this doctrin, which is his own; To say that laws do or can govern, is to amuse ourselves with a form of speech, as when we say time, or age, or death, dos such a thing; to which indeed the phansy of poets, and superstition of women, may adapt a person, and give a power of action; but wise men know they are only expressions of such actions or qualifications as belong to things or persons.

Speak out; is it the word of God, or the knavery and nonsense of such preachers that ought to govern? are we to hearken to that of the Talmud, there is more in the word of a scribe, than in the words of the law; or that which Christ therupon says to the Pharisees, You have made the word of God of no effect by your traditions?Mat. 15. 6. say, is the commonwealth to be govern’d in the word of a priest or a Pharisee, or by the vote of the people, and the interest of mankind?

CHAP. III.: Whether the balance of dominion in land be the natural cause of empire? ↩

THE doctrin of the balance is that, tho he strains at it, which choaks the prevaricator; for this of all others is that principle which makes the politics, not so before the invention of the same, to be undeniable throout, and (not to meddle with the mathematics, an art I understand as little as mathematicians do this) the most demonstrable of any whatsoever.

For this cause I shall rather take pleasure than pains to look back, or tread the same path with other, and perhaps plainer steps: as thus; if a man having one hundred pounds a year may keep one servant, or have one man at his command, then having one hundred times so much, he may keep one hundred servants; and [227] this multiply’d by a thousand, he may have one hundred thousand men at his command.Chap. III. Now that the single person, or nobility of any country in Europe, that had but half so many men at command, would be king or prince, is that which I think no man will doubt. But [93] no mony, no Switzers, as the French speak: if the mony be flown, so are the men also. Tho riches in general have wings, and be apt to bate; yet those in land are the most hooded, and ty’d to the perch, wheras those in mony have the least hold, and are the swiftest of flight. A bank where the mony takes not wing, but to come home seiz’d, or like a coyduck, may well be great; but the treasure of the Indys going out, and not upon returns, makes no bank. Whence a bank never paid an army; or paying an army, soon became no bank. But where a prince or a nobility has an estate in land, the revenue wherof will defray this charge, there their men are planted, have toes that are roots, and arms that bring forth what fruit you please.

Thus a single person is made, or a nobility makes a king, not with difficulty, or any greater prudence, but with ease, the rest coming home, as the ox that only knows his master’s crib, but must starve or repair to it. Nor for the same reason is government acquir’d with more ease than it is preserv’d; that is, if the foundation of property be in land: but if in mony, lightly com, lightly go. The reason why a single person, or the nobility that has one hundred thousand men, or half so many at command, will have the government, is that the estate in land, wherby they are able to maintain so many, in any European territory, must overbalance the rest that remains to the people, at least three parts in four, by which means they are no more able to dispute the government with him or them, than your servant is with you. Now for the same reason, if the people hold three parts in four of the territory, it is plain there can neither be any single person nor nobility able to dispute the government with them; in this case therfore, except force be interpos’d, they govern themselves. So by this computation of the balance of property or dominion in the land, you have according to the threefold foundation of property, the root or generation of the threefold kind of government or empire.

Oceana, p. 39.If one man be sole landlord of a territory, or overbalance the whole people, three parts in four, or thereabouts, he is Grand Signior; for so the Turc, not from his empire, but his property is call’d; and the empire in this case is absolute monarchy.

If the few, or a nobility, or a nobility with a clergy, be landlords to such a proportion as overbalances the people in the like manner, they may make whom they please king; or if they be not pleas’d with their king, down with him and set up whom they like better; a Henry the Fourth, or the Seventh, a Guise, a Montfort, a Nevil, or a Porter, should they find that best for their own ends and purposes: for as not the balance of the king, but that of the nobility in this case is the cause of the government, so not the estate or riches of the prince or captain, but his virtue or ability, or fitness for the ends of the nobility, acquires that command or office. This for aristocracy, or mix’d monarchy. But if the whole people be landlords, or hold the land so divided among them, that no one man or number of men within the compass of the few, or aristocracy overbalance them, it is a commonwealth. Such is the branch in the root, or the balance of property naturally producing empire; which not confuted, no man shall be able to batter [228] my superstructures, and which confuted, I lay down my arms. Till then, if the cause necessarily precede the effect, property must have a being before empire, or beginning with it, must be still first in order.

Property coms to have a being before empire or government two ways, either by a natural or violent revolution. Natural revolution happens from within, or by commerce, as when a government erected upon one balance, that for example of a nobility or a clergy, thro the decay of their estates coms to alter to another balance; which alteration in the root of property, leaves all to confusion, or produces a new branch or government, according to the kind or nature of the root. Violent revolution happens from without, or by arms, as when upon conquest there follows confiscation. Confiscation again is of three kinds, when the captain taking all to himself, plants his army by way of military colonys, benefices, or timars, which was the policy of Mahomet; or when the captain has som shares, or a nobility that divides with him, which was the policy introduc’d by the Goths and Vandals; or when the captain divides the inheritance by lots, or otherwise, to the whole people; which policy was instituted by God or Moses in the commonwealth of Israel. This triple distribution, whether from natural or violent revolution, returns as to the generation of empire to the same thing, that is, to the nature of the balance already stated and demonstrated. Now let us see what the prevaricator will say, which first is this:

Consid. p. 14.THE assertion, that property producing empire consists only in land, appears too positive. A pig of my own sow; this is no more than I told him, only there is more imply’d in what I told him, than he will see; which therfore I shall now further explain. The balance in mony may be as good or better than that of land in three cases. First, where there is no property of land yet introduc’d, as in Greece during the time of her antient imbecillity; whence, as is noted by Thucydides, the meaner sort thro a desire of gain underwent the servitude of the mighty. Secondly, in citys of small territory and great trade, as Holland and Genoa, the land not being able to feed the people, who must live upon traffic, is overbalanc’d by the means of that traffic, which is mony. Thirdly, in a narrow country, where the lots are at a low scantling, as among the Israelits, if care be not had of mony in the regulation of the same, it will eat out the balance of land.Deut. 15. 6. & 23. 19. For which cause, tho an Israelit might both have mony, and put it to usury (thou shalt lend [upon usury] to many nations) yet might he not lend it upon usury to a citizen or brother: whence two things are manifest: first, that usury in itself is not unlawful: and next, that usury in Israel was no otherwise forbidden, than as it might com to overthrow the balance or foundation of the government; for where a lot as to the general amounted not perhaps to four acres, a man that should have had a thousand pounds in his purse, would not have regarded such a lot in comparison of his mony; and he that should have bin half so much in debt, would have bin quite eaten out. Usury is of such a nature, as, not forbidden in the like cases, must devour the government. The Roman people, while their territory was no bigger, and their lots, which exceeded not two acres a man, were yet scantier, were flead alive with it; and if they had not help’d themselves by their tumults, and the institution of their tribuns, it had totally ruin’d both them and their government. In a commonwealth, whose territory is very small, the balance of the government being laid upon the land, as in Lacedemon, it will not be sufficient to forbid usury, but mony itself must be forbidden. Whence Lycurgus allow’d of none, or of such [229] only as being of old, or otherwise useless iron, was little better, or if you will, little worse than none. The prudence of which law appear’d in the neglect of it, as when Lysander, general for the Lacedemonians in the Peloponnesian war, having taken Athens, and brought home the spoil of it, occasion’d the ruin of that commonwealth in her victory. The land of Canaan compar’d with Spain or England, was at the most but a Yorkshire, and Laconia was less than Canaan. Now if we imagin Yorkshire divided, as was Canaan into six hundred thousand lots, or as was Laconia, into thirty thousand; a Yorkshire man having one thousand pounds in his purse, would, I believe, have a better estate in mony than in land; wherfore in this case, to make the land hold the balance, there is no way but either that of Israel by forbidding usury, or that of Lacedemon by forbidding mony. Where a small sum may com to overbalance a man’s estate in land, there I say usury or mony for the preservation of the balance in land, must of necessity be forbidden, or the government will rather rest upon the balance of mony, than upon that of land, as in Holland and Genoa. But in a territory of such extent as Spain, or England, the land being not to be overbalanc’d by mony, there needs no forbidding of mony or usury. In Lacedemon merchandize was forbidden, in Israel and Rome it was not exercis’d; wherfore to these usury must have bin the more destructive: but in a country where merchandize is exercis’d, it is so far from being destructive, that it is necessary; else that which might be of profit to the commonwealth would rust unprofitably in private purses, there being no man that will venture his mony but thro hope of som gain; which if it be so regulated that the borrower may gain more by it than the lender, as at four in the hundred, or therabouts, usury becoms a mighty profit to the public, and a charity to privat men; in which sense we may not be persuaded by them that do not observe these different causes, that it is against Scripture. Had usury to a brother bin permitted in Israel, that government had bin overthrown: but that such a territory as England or Spain cannot be overbalanc’d by mony, whether it be a scarce or plentiful commodity, whether it be accumulated by parsimony as in the purse of Henry the 7th, or presented by fortune, as in the revenue of the Indys, is sufficiently demonstrated, or shall be.