The Oceana and Other Works of James Harrington (1771)

James Harrington (1611–1677)  



The Oceana and Other Works of James Harrington, with an Account of His Life by John Toland (London: Becket and Cadell, 1771).

See the facs. PDF version of this work and a facs. PDF of the first edition of Oceana (1656): The Common-Wealth of Oceana (London: Printed by J. Streater, for Livewell Chap∣man, and are to be sold at his Shop at the Crown in Popes-Head-Alley, 1656).



Table of Contents (brief)

    2. A SYSTEM of POLITICS Delineated in short and easy APHORISMS.
    4. Seven Models of a Commonwealth
    5. THE WAYS and MEANS Wherby an Equal and Lasting COMMONWEALTH May be suddenly introduc’d, and perfectly founded, with the free Consent and actual Confirmation of the whole People of England.
    6. THE HUMBLE PETITION OF DIVERS WELL AFFECTED PERSONS, Deliver’d the 6th Day of July, 1659, With the PARLAMENT’s Answer therto.
    1. PIAN PIANO: OR, INTERCOURSE BETWEEN H. Ferne, D. D. and J. Harrington, Esq; UPON OCCASION OF The Doctor’s Censure of the Commonwealth of OCEANA.
    2. Pour enclouer le Canon.
    3. A DISCOURSE UPON THIS SAYING: The Spirit of the Nation is not yet to be trusted with Liberty; lest it introduce Monarchy, or invade the Liberty of Conscience.
    4. A DISCOURSE SHEWING, That the Spirit of Parliaments, with a Council in the Intervals, is not to be trusted for a Settlement; lest it introduce Monarchy, and Persecution for Conscience.
      An Appeal thereupon unto the Reader, whether the Spirit of the People, or the Spirit of Men like Mr. Rogers, be the fitter to be trusted with the Government.
    6. A sufficient Answer to Mr. STUBB.
    7. A PROPOSITION In order to the proposing of A Commonwealth or Democracy.
    8. THE ROTA: OR, A Model of a free State, or equal Commonwealth.

Table of Contents (full)



respublica, res est populi cum bene ac iuste geritur, sive ab uno rege, sive a paucis optimatibus, sive ab universo populo. cum vero iniustus est rex, quem tyrannum voco, aut iniusti optimates, quorum consensus factio est, aut iniustus ipse populus, cui nomen usitatum nullum reperio nisi ut ipsum tyrannum appellem, non iam vitiosa sed omnino nulla respublica est, quoniam non res est populi cum tyrannus eam factiove capessat; nec ipse populus iam populus est si sit iniustus, quoniam non est multitudo iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociata.

fragmentum ciceronis, ex lib. iii. de republica, apud augustin. de civ. dei, l. ii. c. xxi.




1. TOLAND’s Dedication to the Lord-Mayor, Aldermen, Sheriffs, and Common-Council of the City of London. — — Page i

2. His Preface. — — — vii

3. The Life of James Harrington. — — xi

I. The Grounds and Reasons of Monarchy considered, and exemplified in the Scotish Line, out of their own best Authors and Records. (Written by John Hall of Gray’s Inn, Esq;) — — 1

II. The Commonwealth of Oceana. (First printed in London in the Year 1656 in fol.) 31

III. The Prerogative of popular Government. (First printed at London in 1658 in 4to.) — — — 213

IV. The Art of Lawgiving. (First printed at London 1659, in 8vo.) — 359

V. A Word concerning a House of Peers. (First printed at London 1659, in 8vo.) 439

VI. Valerius and Publicola, or the true Form of a Popular Commonwealth extracted è puris Naturalibus. (First printed in 1659, in 4to.) — 445

VII. A System of Politics delineated in short and easy Aphorisms. (First published from the Author’s own Manuscript by Mr. Toland, with his Oceana and other Works, at London in 1700, in fol.) — — 465

VIII. Political Aphorisms. (First printed at London 1659, in 4to.) — 483

IX. Seven Models of a Commonwealth, or brief Directions shewing how a fit and perfect Model of popular Government may be made, found, or understood. (First printed at London 1659, in 4to.) — — 491

X. The Ways and Means whereby an equal and lasting Commonwealth may be suddenly introduced, and perfectly founded, with the free Consent and actual Confirmation of the whole People of England. (First printed at London 1660, in 4to.) — 506

XI. The humble Petition of divers well-affected Persons delivered the 6th of July 1659, with the Parliament’s Answer thereto. — — 508

APPENDIX, containing all the political Tracts of James Harrington Esq; omitted in Mr. Toland’s Edition of his Works.

XII. Pian Piano, or, Intercourse between H. Ferne, D. D. and J. Harrington, Esq; upon occasion of the Doctor’s Censure of the Commonwealth of Oceana. (First printed at London 1656, in 12mo.) — — 517

XIII. The Stumbling-Block of Disobedience and Rebellion, cunningly imputed by P. H. unto Calvin, removed; in a Letter to the said P. H. from J. H. (First printed at London 1659, in 4to.) — — — 534

XIV. A Letter unto Mr. Stubs, in Answer to his Oceana weighed, &c. (First printed at London 1659, in 4to.) — — 542

XV. Politicaster, or a comical Discourse, in answer to Mr. Wren’s Book, intitled, Monarchy afferted against Mr. Harrington’s Oceana. (First printed at London 1659, in 12mo.) — — 546

XVI. Pour enclouer le Canon. (First printed at London 1659, in 4to.) — 562

XVII. A Discourse upon this Saying, The Spirit of the Nation is not yet to be trusted with Liberty, lest it introduce Monarchy, or invade the Liberty of Conscience. (First printed at London 1659, in 4to.) — 567

XVIII. A Discourse shewing that the Spirit of Parlaments, with a Council in the Intervals, is not to be trusted for a Settlement, lest it introduce Monarchy and Persecution for Conscience. (First printed at London 1659, in 4to.) — 575

XIX. A Parallel of the Spirit of the People, with the Spirit of Mr. Rogers; and an Appeal thereupon unto the Reader, whether the Spirit of the People, or the Spirit of Men like Mr. Rogers, be the fitter to be trusted with the Government. (First printed at London 1659, in 4to.) — — — 580

XX. A sufficient Answer to Mr. Stubs. (First printed at London 1659, in 4to.) 584

XXI. A Proposition in order to the proposing of a Commonwealth or Democracy. (First printed at London 1659, in fol.) — — 586

XXII. The Rota, or a Model of a free State or equal Commonwealth, once proposed and debated in brief, and to be again more at large proposed to, and debated by a free and open Society of ingenious Gentlemen. (First printed at London 1660, in 4to.) 587



Advertisement to the Reader.

THE Reputation of Mr. Harrington’s Writings is so well established, that nothing more is necessary than to acquaint the Reader, that no Expence nor Care have been spared to make the former and present Edition as complete as possible. They contain the whole of Mr. Toland’s Edition, which was become extremely scarce, and sold at a very high Price. To these are added the several political Pieces of our Author, which Mr. Toland thought proper to omit in his Edition: a Liberty which few Readers will excuse. Most of these Pieces were republished by Mr. Harrington at London, in one Volume in Quarto, in 1660, under the general Title of Political Discourses, tending to the Introduction of a free and equal Commonwealth in England.

I take this opportunity of acknowledging my Obligation to the Rev. Mr. Thomas Birch, F. R. S. for obliging the Publick with the Political Discourses above-mentioned.




IT is not better known to you, most worthy magistrats, that government is the preserving cause of all societys, than that every society is in a languishing or flourishing condition, answerable to the particular constitution of its government: and if the goodness of the laws in any place be thus distinguishable by the happiness of the people, so the wisdom of the people is best discern’d by the laws they have made, or by which they have chosen to be govern’d. The truth of these observations is no where more conspicuous than in the present state of that most antient and famous society you have the honor to rule, and which reciprocally injoys the chearful influence of your administration. ’Tis solely to its government that London ows being universally acknowleg’d the largest, fairest, richest, and most populous city in the world; all which glorious attributes could have no foundation in history or nature, if it were not likewise the most free. ’Tis confest indeed that it derives infinite advantages above other places from its incomparable situation, as being an inland city, seated in the middle of a vale no less delicious than healthy, and on the banks of a noble river, in respect of which (if we regard how many score miles it is navigable, the clearness and depth of its channel, or its smooth and even course) the Seine is but a brook, and the celebrated Tyber it self a rivulet: yet all this could never raise it to any considerable pitch without the inestimable blessings of Liberty, which has chosen her peculiar residence, and more eminently fixt her throne in this place. Liberty is the true spring of its prodigious trade and commerce with all the known parts of the universe, and is the original planter of its many fruitful colonys in America, with its numberless factorys in Europe, Asia, and Africa: hence it is that every sea is cover’d with our ships, that the very air is scarce exemted from our inventions, and that all the productions of art or nature are imported to this common storehouse of mankind; or rather as if the whole variety of things wherwith the earth is stockt had bin principally design’d for our profit or delight, and no more of ’em allow’d to the rest of men, than what they must necessarily use as our purveyors or laborers. As Liberty has elevated the native citizens of London to so high a degree of riches and politeness, that for their stately houses, fine equipages, and sumtuous tables, they excede the port of som foren princes; so is it naturally becom every man’s country, and the happy refuge of those in all nations, who prefer the secure injoyment of life and property to the glittering pomp and slavery, as well as to the arbitrary lust and rapine of their several tyrants. To the same cause is owing the splendor and magnificence of the public structures, as palaces, temples, halls, colleges, hospitals, schools, courts of judicature, and a great many others of all kinds, which, tho singly excel’d where the wealth or state of any town cannot reach further than one building, yet, taking them all together, they are to be equal’d no where besides. The delicat country seats, and the large villages crouded on all hands around it, are manifest indications how happily the citizens live, and makes a stranger apt to believe himself in the city before he approaches it by som miles. Nor is it to the felicity of the present times that London is only indebted: for in all ages, and under all changes, it ever shew’d a most passionat love of Liberty, which it has not more bravely preserv’d than wisely manag’d, infusing the same genius into all quarters of the land, which are influenc’d from hence as the several parts of the animal body are duly supply’d with blood and nourishment from the heart. Whenever therfore the execrable design was hatcht to inslave the inhabitants of this country, the first attemts were still made on the government of the city, as there also the strongest and most successful efforts were first us’d to restore freedom: for we may remember (to name one instance for all) when the late king was fled, and every thing in confusion, that then the chief nobility and gentry resorted to Guildhall for protection, and to concert proper methods for settling the nation hereafter on a basis of liberty never to be shaken. But what greater demonstration can the world require concerning the excellency of our national government, or the particular power and freedom of this city, than the Bank of England, which, like the temple of Saturn among the Romans, is esteem’d so sacred a repository, that even soreners think their treasure more safely lodg’d there than with themselves at home; and this not only don by the subjects of absolute princes, where there can be no room for any public credit, but likewise by the inhabitants of those commonwealths where alone such banks were hitherto reputed secure. I am the more willing to make this remark, because the constitution of our bank is both preferable to that of all others, and comes the nearest of any government to Harrington’s model. In this respect a particular commendation is due to the city which produc’d such persons to whose wisdom we owe so beneficial an establishment: and therfore from my own small observation on men or things I fear not to prophesy, that, before the term of years be expir’d to which the bank is now limited, the desires of all people will gladly concur to have it render’d perpetual. Neither is it one of the last things on which you ought to value your selves, most worthy citizens, that there is scarce a way of honoring the deity known any where, but is either already allow’d, or may be safely exercis’d among you; toleration being only deny’d to immoral practices, and the opinions of men being left as free to them as their possessions, excepting only Popery, and such other rites and notions as directly tend to disturb or dissolve society. Besides the political advantages of union, wealth, and numbers of people, which are the certain consequents of this impartial liberty, ’tis also highly congruous to the nature of true religion; and if any thing on earth can be imagin’d to ingage the interest of heaven, it must be specially that which procures it the sincere and voluntary respect of mankind. I might here display the renown of the city for military glory, and recite those former valiant atchievments which our historians carefully record; but I should never finish if I inlarg’d on those things which I only hint, or if I would mention the extraordinary privileges which London now injoys, and may likely possess hereafter, for which she well deserves the name of a New Rome in the West, and, like the old one, to becom the soverain mistress of the universe.

The government of the city is so wisely and completely contriv’d, that Harrington made very few alterations in it, tho in all the other parts of our national constitution he scarce left any thing as he found it. And without question it is a most excellent model. The lord mayor, as to the solemnity of his election, the magnificence of his state, or the extent of his authority, tho inferior to a Roman consul (to whom in many respects he may be fitly compar’d) yet he far outshines the figure made by an Athenian archon, or the grandeur of any magistrat presiding over the best citys now in the world. During a vacancy of the throne he is the chief person in the nation, and is at all times vested with a very extraordinary trust, which is the reason that this dignity is not often confer’d on undeserving persons; of which we need not go further for an instance than the Right Honorable Sir Richard Levet, who now so worthily fills that eminent post, into which he was not more freely chosen by the suffrages of his fellow-citizens, than he continues to discharge the functions of it with approv’d moderation and justice. But of the great caution generally us’d in the choice of magistrats, we may give a true judgment by the present worshipful sherifs, Sir Charles Duncomb and Sir Jeffery Jefferies, who are not the creatures of petty factions and cabals, nor (as in the late reigns) illegally obtruded on the city to serve a turn for the court, but unanimously elected for those good qualitys which alone should be the proper recommendations to magistracy; that as having the greatest stakes to lose they will be the more concern’d for securing the property of others, so their willingness to serve their country is known not to be inferior to their zeal for king William; and while they are, for the credit of the city generously equalling the expences of the Roman prætors, such at the same time is their tender care of the distrest, as if to be overseers of the poor were their sole and immediat charge. As the common council is the popular representative, so the court of aldermen is the aristocratical senat of the city. To enter on the particular merits of those names who compose this illustrious assembly, as it must be own’d by all to be a labor no less arduous than extremely nice and invidious, yet to pass it quite over in such a manner as not to give at least a specimen of so much worth, would argue a pusillanimity inconsistent with Liberty, and a disrespect to those I wou’d be always understood to honor. In regard therfore that the eldest alderman is the same at London with what the prince of the senat was at Rome, I shall only presume to mention the honorable Sir Robert Clayton as well in that capacity, as by reason he universally passes for the perfect pattern of a good citizen. That this character is not exaggerated will be evident to all those who consider him, either as raising a plentiful fortune by his industry and merit, or as disposing his estate with no less liberality and judgment than he got it with honesty and care: for as to his public and privat donations, and the provision he has made for his relations or friends, I will not say that he is unequal’d by any, but that he deserves to be imitated by all. Yet these are small commendations if compar’d to his steddy conduct when he supply’d the highest stations of this great city. The danger of defending the liberty of the subject in those calamitous times is not better remember’d than the courage with which he acted, particularly in bringing in the bill for excluding a Popish successor from the crown, his brave appearance on the behalf of your charter, and the general applause with which he discharg’d his trust in all other respects; nor ought the gratitude of the people be forgot, who on this occasion first stil‘d him the father of the city, as Cicero for the like reason was the first of all Romans call’d the father of his country. That he still assists in the government of London as eldest alderman, and in that of the whole nation as a member of the high court of parlament, is not so great an honor as that he deserves it; while the posterity of those familys he supports, and the memory of his other laudable actions, will be the living and eternal monuments of his virtue, when time has consum’d the most durable brass or marble.

To whom therfore shou’d I inscribe a book containing the rules of good polity, but to a society so admirably constituted, and producing such great and excellent men? that elsewhere there may be found who understand government better, distribute justice wiser, or love liberty more, I could never persuade myself to imagin: nor can the person wish for a nobler address, or the subject be made happy in a more suitable patronage than THE SENAT AND PEOPLE OF LONDON; to whose uninterrupted increase of wealth and dignity, none can be a heartier welwisher, than the greatest admirer of their constitution, and their most humble servant,





HOW allowable it is for any man to write the history of another, without intitling himself to his opinions, or becoming answerable for his actions, I have expresly treated in the Life of John Milton, and in the just defence of the same under the title of AMYNTOR. The reasons there alleg’d are excuse and authority enough for the task I have since impos’d on my self, which is, to transmit to posterity the worthy memory of James Harrington, a bright ornament to useful learning, a hearty lover of his native country, and a generous benefactor to the whole world; a person who obscur’d the false lustre of our modern politicians, and that equal’d (if not exceded) all the antient legislators.

BUT there are some people more formidable for their noise than number, and for their number more considerable than their power, who will not fail with open mouths to proclaim, that this is a seditious attemt against the very being of monarchy, and that there’s a pernicious design on foot of speedily introducing a republican form of government into the Britannic islands; in order to which the person (continue they) whom we have for som time distinguisht as a zealous promoter of this cause, has now publisht the Life and Works of Harrington, who was the greatest commonwealthsman in the world. This is the substance of what these roaring and hoarse trumpeters of detraction will sound; for what’s likely to be said by men, who talk all by rote, is as easy to guess as to answer, tho ’tis commonly so silly as to deserve no animadversion. Those who in the late reigns were invidiously nicknam’d Commonwealthsmen, are by this time sufficiently clear’d of that imputation by their actions, a much better apology than any words: for they valiantly rescu’d our antient government from the devouring jaws of arbitrary power, and did not only unanimously concur to fix the imperial crown of England on the most deserving head in the universe, but also settl’d the monarchy for the future, not as if they intended to bring it soon to a period, but under such wife regulations as are most likely to continue it for ever, consisting of such excellent laws as indeed set bounds to the will of the king, but that render him thereby the more safe, equally binding up his and the subjects hands from unjustly seizing one another’s prescrib’d rights or privileges.

’T IS confest, that in every society there will be always found som persons prepar’d to enterprize any thing (tho never so flagitious) grown desperat by their villanies, their profuseness, their ambition, or the more raging madness of superstition; and this evil is not within the compass of art or nature to remedy. But that a whole people, or any considerable number of them, shou’d rebel against a king that well and wisely administers his government, as it cannot be instanc’d out of any history, so it is a thing in it self impossible. An infallible expedient therfore to exclude a commonwealth, is for the king to be the man of his people, and, according to his present Majesty’s glorious example, to find out the secret of so happily uniting two seemingly incompatible things, principality and liberty.

’TIS strange that men shou’d be cheated by mere names! yet how frequently are they seen to admire one denomination, what going under another they wou d undoubtedly detest; which observation made Tacitus lay down for a maxim, That the secret of setting up a new state consists in retaining the image of the old. Now if a commonwealth be a government of laws enacted for the common good of all the people, not without their own consent or approbation; and that they are not wholly excluded, as in absolute monarchy, which is a government of men who forcibly rule over others for their own private interest: then it is undeniably manifest that the English government is already a commonwealth, the most free and best constituted in all the world. This was frankly acknowleg’d by King James the First, who stiled himself the great servant of the commonwealth. It is the language of our best lawyers, and allow’d by our author, who only makes it a less perfect and more inequal form than that of his Oceana, wherin, he thinks, better provision is made against external violence or internal diseases. Nor dos it at all import by what names either persons, or places, or things, are call’d, since the commonwealthsman finds he injoys liberty under the security of equal laws, and that the rest of the subjects are fully satisfy’d they live under a government which is a monarchy in effect as well as in name. There’s not a man alive that excedes my affection to a mixt form of government, by the antients counted the most perfect; yet I am not so blinded with admiring the good constitution of our own, but that every day I can discern in it many things deficient, som things redundant, and others that require emendation or change. And of this the supreme legislative powers are so sensible, that we see nothing more frequent with them than the enacting, abrogating, explaining, and altering of laws, with regard to the very form of the administration. Nevertheless I hope the king and both houses of parlament will not be counted republicans; or, if they be, I am the readiest in the world to run the same good or bad fortune with them in this as well as in all other respects.

BUT, what Harrington was oblig’d to say on the like occasion I must now produce for my self. It was in the time of Alexander, the greatest prince and commander of his age, that Aristotle (with scarce inferior applause, and equal fame) wrote that excellent piece of prudence in his closet which is call’d his Politics, going upon far other principles than Alexander’s government, which it has long outliv’d. The like did Livy without disturbance in the time of Augustus, Sir Thomas More in that of Henry the Eighth, and Machiavel when Italy was under princes that afforded him not the ear. If these and many other celebrated men wrote not only with honor and safety, but even of commonwealths under despotic or tyrannical princes, who can be so notoriously stupid as to wonder that in a free government, and under a king that is both the restorer and supporter of the liberty of Europe, I shou’d do justice to an author who far outdos all that went before him, in his exquisit knowlege of the politics?

THIS liberty of writing freely, fully, and impartially, is a part of those rights which in the last reigns were so barbarously invaded by such as had no inclination to hear of their own enormous violations of the laws of God and man; nor is it undeserving observation, that such as raise the loudest clamors against it now, are the known enemys of King William’s title and person, being sure that the abdicated King James can never be reinthron’d so long as the press is open for brave and free spirits to display the mischiefs of tyranny in their true colors, and to shew the infinit advantages of liberty. But not to dismiss even such unreasonable people without perfect satisfaction, let ’em know that I don’t recommend a commonwealth, but write the history of a commonwealthsman, fairly divulging the principles and pretences of that party, and leaving every body to approve or dislike what he pleases, without imposing on his judgment by the deluding arts of sophistry, eloquence, or any other specious but unfair methods of persuasion. Men, to the best of their ability, ought to be ignorant of nothing; and while they talk so much for and against a commonwealth, ’tis fit they shou’d at least understand the subject of their discourse, which is not every body’s case. Now as Harrington’s Oceana is, in my opinion, the most perfect form of popular government that ever was; so this, with his other writings, contain the history, reasons, nature and effects of all sorts of government, with so much learning and perspicuity, that nothing can be more preferably read on such occasions.

LET not those therfore, who make no opposition to the reprinting or reading of Plato’s Heathen commonwealth, ridiculously declaim against the better and Christian model of Harrington; but peruse both of ’em with as little prejudice, passion, or concern, as they would a book of travels into the Indys for their improvement and diversion. Yet so contrary are the tempers of many to this equitable disposition, that Dionysius the Sicilian tyrant, and such beasts of prey, are the worthy examples they wou’d recommend to the imitation of our governors, tho, if they cou’d be able to persuade ’em, they wou’d still miss of their foolish aim: for it is ever with all books, as formerly with those of Cremutius Cordus, who was condemn’d by that monster Tiberius for speaking honorably of the immortal tyrannicides Brutus and Cassius. Tacitus records the last words of this historian, and subjoins this judicious remark: The senat, says he, order’d his books to be burnt by the ediles; but som copys were conceal’d, and afterwards publish’d; whence we may take occasion to laugh at the sottishness of those who imagin that their present power can also abolish the memory of succeding time: for, on the contrary, authors acquire additional reputation by their punishment; nor have foren kings, and such others as have us’d the like severity, got any thing by it, except to themselves disgrace, and glory to the writers. But the works of Harrington were neither supprest at their first publication under the usurper, nor ever since call’d in by lawful authority, but as inestimable treasures preserv’d by all that had the happiness to possess ’em intire; so that what was a precious rarity before, is now becom a public good, with extraordinary advantages of correctness, paper, and print. What I have perform’d in the history of his life, I leave the readers to judg for themselves; but in that and all my other studys, I constantly aim’d as much at least at the benefit of mankind, and especially of my fellow citizens, as at my own particular entertainment or reputation.

THE politics, no less than arms, are the proper study of a gentleman, tho he shou’d confine himself to nothing, but carefully adorn his mind and body with all useful and becoming accomplishments; and not imitat the servile drudgery of those mean spirits, who, for the sake of som one science, neglect the knowlege of all other matters, and in the end are many times neither masters of what they profess, nor vers’d enough in any thing else to speak of it agreably or pertinently: which renders ’em untractable in conversation, as in dispute they are opinionative and passionate, envious of their fame who eclipse their littleness, and the sworn enemys of what they do not understand.

BUT Heaven be duly prais’d, learning begins to flourish again in its proper soil among our gentlemen, in imitation of the Roman patricians, who did not love to walk in leading-strings, and to be guided blindfold, nor lazily to abandon the care of their proper business to the management of men having a distinct profession and interest: for the greatest part of their best authors were persons of consular dignity, the ablest statesmen, and the most gallant commanders. Wherfore the amplest satisfaction I can injoy of this sort will be, to find those delighted with reading this work, for whose service it was intended by the author; and which, with the study of other good books, but especially a careful perusal of the Greec and Roman historians, will make ’em in reality deserve the title and respect of gentlemen, help ’em to make an advantageous figure in their own time, and perpetuat their illustrious fame and solid worth to be admir’d by future generations.

AS for my self, tho no imployment or condition of life shall make me disrelish the lasting entertainment which books afford; yet I have resolv’d not to write the life of any modern person again, except that only of one man still alive, and whom in the ordinary course of nature I am like to survive a long while, he being already far advanc’d in his declining time, and I but this present day beginning the thirtieth year of my age.

  • Canon near Banstead, Novemb. 30. 1699.




1. JAMES HARRINGTON (who was born in January 1611) was descended of an antient and noble family in Rutlandshire, being great grandson to Sir James Harrington; of whom it is observ’d by the* historian of that county, that there were sprung in his time eight dukes, three marquisses, seventy earls, twenty-seven viscounts, and thirty-six barons; of which number sixteen were knights of the garter: to confirm which account, we shall annex a copy of the inscription on his monument and that of his three sons at Exton, with notes on the same by an uncertain hand. As for our author, he was the eldest son of Sir Sapcotes Harrington, and Jane the daughter of Sir William Samuel of Upton in Northamptonshire. His father had children besides him, William, a merchant in London; Elizabeth, marry’d to Sir Ralph Ashton in Lancashire, baronet; Ann, marry’d to Arthur Evelyn, Esq; And by a second wife he had John, kill’d at sea; Edward, a captain in the army, yet living; Frances, marry’d to John Bagshaw of Culworth in Northamptonshire, Esq; and Dorothy, marry’d to Allan Bellingham of Levens in Westmorland, Esq; This lady is still alive, and, when she understood my design, was pleas’d to put me in possession of all the remaining letters, and other manuscript papers of her brother, with the collections and observations relating to him, made by his other sister the lady Ashton, a woman of very extraordinary parts and accomplishments. These, with the account given of him by Anthony Wood, in the second volum of his Athenæ Oxonienses, and what I cou’d learn from the mouths of his surviving acquaintance, are the materials whereof I compos’d this insuing history of his life.

2. In his very childhood he gave sure hopes of his future abilitys, as well by his inclination and capacity to learn whatever was propos’d to him, as by a kind of natural gravity; whence his parents and masters were wont to say, That he rather kept them in aw, than needed their correction: yet when grown a man, none could easily surpass him for quickness of wit, and a most facetious temper. He was enter’d a gentleman commoner of Trinity College in Oxford in the year 1629, and became a pupil to that great master of reason Dr. Chillingworth, who discovering the errors, impostures, and tyranny of the Popish church (whereof he was for some time a member) attackt it with more proper and successful arms than all before, or perhaps any since have don. After considerably improving his knowlege in the university, he was more particularly fitting himself for his intended travels, by learning several foren languages, when his father dy’d, leaving him under age. Tho the court of wards was still in being, yet by the soccage tenure of his estate he was at liberty to chuse his own guardian; and accordingly pitch’d upon his grandmother the lady Samuel, a woman eminent for her wisdom and virtue. Of her and the rest of his governors he soon obtain’d a permission to satisfy his eager desire of seeing som other parts of the world, where he could make such observations on men and manners, as might best fit him in due time to serve and adorn his native country.

3. His first step was into Holland, then the principal school of martial disciplin, and (what toucht him more sensibly) a place wonderfully flourishing under the influence of their liberty, which they had so lately asserted, by breaking the yoke of a severe master, the Spanish tyrant. And here, no doubt, it was that he begun to make government the subject of his meditations: for he was often heard to say, that, before he left England, he knew no more of monarchy, anarchy, aristocracy, democracy, oligarchy, or the like, than as hard words, wherof he learnt the signification in his dictionary. For some months he listed himself in my lord Craven’s regiment and Sir Robert Stone’s; during which time being much at the Hague, he had the opportunity of further accomplishing himself in two courts, namely, those of the prince of Orange and the queen of Bohemia, the daughter of our K. James I. then a fugitive in Holland, her husband having bin abandon’d by his father in law, betray’d by the king of Spain, and stript of all his territorys by the emperor. This excellent princess entertain’d him with extraordinary favor and civility on the account of his uncle the lord Harrington, who had bin her governor; but particularly for the sake of his own merit. The prince elector also courted him into his service, ingag’d him to attend him in a journy he made to the court of Denmark, and, after his return from travelling, committed the chief management of all his affairs in England to his care. Nor were the young princesses less delighted with his company, his conversation being always extremely pleasant, as well as learned and polite; to which good qualitys those unfortunat ladies were far from being strangers, as appears by the letters of the great philosopher Cartesius, and by the other writers of those times.

4. Tho he found many charms inviting his longer stay in this place, yet none were strong enough to keep him from pursuing his main design of travelling; and therfore he went next thro Flanders into France, where having perfected himself in the language, seen what deserv’d his curiosity, and made such remarks on their government as will best appear in his works, he remov’d thence into Italy. It happen’d to be then (as it is now) the year of jubilee. He always us’d to admire the great dexterity wherwith the Popish clergy could maintain their severe government over so great a part of the world, and that men otherwise reasonable enough should be inchanted out of their senses, as well as cheated out of their mony, by these ridiculous tricks of religious pageantry. Except the small respect he shew’d to the miracles they daily told him were perform’d in their churches, he did in all other things behave himself very prudently and inoffensively. But going on a Candlemas day with several other Protestants, to see the Pope perform the ceremony of consecrating wax lights; and perceiving that none could obtain any of those torches, except such as kist the Pope’s toe (which he expos’d to ’em for that purpose) tho he had a great mind to one of the lights, yet he would not accept it on so hard a condition. The rest of his companions were not so scrupulous, and after their return complain’d of his squeamishness to the king; who telling him he might have don it only as a respect to a temporal prince, he presently reply’d, that since he had the honor to kiss his majesty’s hand, he thought it beneath him to kiss any other prince’s foot. The king was pleased with his answer, and did afterwards admit him to be one of his privy chamber extraordinary, in which quality he attended him in his first expedition against the Scots.

5. He prefer’d Venice to all other places in Italy, as he did its government to all those of the whole world, it being in his opinion immutable by any external or internal causes, and to finish only with mankind; of which assertion you may find various proofs alleg’d in his works. Here he furnish’d himself with a collection of all the valuable books in the Italian language, especially treating of politics, and contracted acquaintance with every one of whom he might receive any benefit by instruction or otherwise.

6. After having thus seen Italy, France, the Low Countrys, Denmark, and som parts of Germany, he return’d home into England, to the great joy of all his friends and acquaintance. But he was in a special manner the darling of his relations, of whom he acknowleg’d to receive reciprocal satisfaction. His brothers and sisters were now pretty well grown, which made it his next care so to provide for each of ’em as might render ’em independent of others, and easy to themselves. His brother William he bred to be a merchant, in which calling he became a considerable man; he was a good architect, and was so much notic’d for his ingenious contrivances, that he was receiv’d a fellow of the royal society. How his other brothers were dispos’d, we mention’d in the beginning of this discourse. He took all the care of a parent in the education of his sisters, and wou’d himself make large discourses to ’em concerning the reverence that was due to Almighty God; the benevolence they were oblig’d to shew all mankind; how they ought to furnish their minds with knowlege by reading of useful books, and to shew the goodness of their disposition by a constant practice of virtue: in a word, he taught ’em the true rules of humanity and decency, always inculcating to ’em, that good manners did not so much consist in a fashionable carriage (which ought not to be neglected) as in becoming words and actions, an obliging address, and a modest behavior. He treated his mother in law as if she were his own, and made no distinction between her children and the rest of his brothers and sisters; which good example had such effects on ’em all, that no family has bin more remarkable for their mutual friendship.

7. He was of a very liberal and compassionate nature, nor could he indure to see a friend want any thing he might spare; and when the relief that was necessary exceded the bounds of his estate, he persuaded his sisters not only to contribute themselves, but likewise to go about to the rest of their relations to complete what was wanting. And if at any time they alleg’d that this bounty had been thrown away on ungrateful persons, he would answer with a smile, that he saw they were mercenary, and that they plainly sold their gifts, since they expected so great a return as gratitude.

8. His natural inclinations to study kept him from seeking after any public imployments. But in the year 1646, attending out of curiosity the commissioners appointed by parlament to bring King Charles the First from Newcastle nearer to London, he was by som of ’em nam’d to wait on his majesty, as a person known to him before, and ingag’d to no party or faction. The king approv’d the proposal, yet our author would never presume to come into his presence except in public, till he was particularly commanded by the king; and that he, with Thomas Herbert (created a baronet after the restoration of the monarchy) were made grooms of the bedchamber at Holmby, together with James Maxwell and Patrick Maule (afterwards earl of Penmoore in Scotland) which two only remain’d of his old servants in that station.

9. He had the good luck to grow very acceptable to the king, who much convers’d with him about books and foren countrys. In his sister’s papers I find it exprest, that at the king’s command he translated into English Dr. Sanderson’s book concerning the obligation of oaths: but Anthony Wood says it was the king’s own doing, and that he shew’d it at different times to Harrington, Herbert, Dr. Juxon, Dr. Hammond, and Dr. Sheldon, for their approbation. However that be, ’tis certain he serv’d his master with untainted fidelity, without doing any thing inconsistent with the liberty of his country; and that he made use of his interest with his friends in parlament to have matters accommodated for the satisfaction of all partys. During the treaty in the Isle of Wight, he frequently warn’d the divines of his acquaintance to take heed how far they prest the king to insist upon any thing which, however it concern’d their dignity, was no essential point of religion; and that such matters driven too far wou’d infallibly ruin all the indeavours us’d for a peace; which prophecy was prov’d too true by the event. His majesty lov’d his company, says Anthony Wood, and, finding him to be an ingenious man, chose rather to converse with him than with others of his chamber: they had often discourses concerning government; but when they happen’d to talk of a commonwealth, the king seem’d not to indure it. Here I know not which most to commend, the king for trusting a man of republican principles, or Harrington for owning his principles while he serv’d a king.

10. After the king was remov’d out of the Isle of Wight to Hurstcastle in Hampshire, Harrington was forcibly turn’d out of service, because he vindicated som of his majesty’s arguments against the parlament commissioners at Newport, and thought his concessions not so unsatisfactory as did som others. As they were taking the king to Windsor, he beg’d admittance to the boot of the coach, that he might bid his master farewel; which being granted, and he preparing to kneel, the king took him by the hand, and pull’d him in to him. He was for three or four days permitted to stay: but because he would not take an oath against assisting or concealing the king’s escape, he was not only discharg’d from his office, but also for som time detain’d in custody, till major-general Ireton obtain’d his liberty. He afterwards found means to see the king at St. James’s, and accompany’d him on the scaffold, where, or a little before, he receiv’d a token of his majesty’s affection.

11. After the king’s death he was observ’d to keep much in his library, and more retir’d than usually, which was by his friends a long time attributed to melancholy or discontent. At length when they weary’d him with their importunitys to change this sort of life, he thought fit to shew ’em at the same time their mistake and a copy of his Oceana, which he was privatly writing all that while: telling ’em withal, that ever since he began to examin things seriously, he had principally addicted himself to the study of civil government, as being of the highest importance to the peace and felicity of mankind; and that he succeded at least to his own satisfaction, being now convinc’d that no government is of so accidental or arbitrary an institution as people are wont to imagin, there being in societys natural causes producing their necessary effects, as well as in the earth or the air. Hence he frequently argu’d, that the troubles of his time were not to be wholly attributed to wilfulness or faction, neither to the misgovernment of the prince, nor the stubborness of the people; but to change in the balance of property, which ever since Henry the Seventh’s time was daily falling into the scale of the commons from that of the king and the lords, as in his book he evidently demonstrats and explains. Not that hereby he approv’d either the breaches which the king had made on the laws, or excus’d the severity which som of the subjects exercis’d on the king; but to shew that as long as the causes of these disorder’s remain’d, so long would the like effects unavoidably follow: while on the one hand a king would be always indeavoring to govern according to the example of his predecessors when the best part of the national property was in their own hands, and consequently the greatest command of mony and men, as one of a thousand pounds a year can entertain more servants, or influence more tenants than another that has but one hundred, out of which he cannot allow one valet; and on the other hand he said, the people would be sure to struggle for preserving the property wherof they were in possession, never failing to obtain more privileges, and to inlarge the basis of their liberty, as often as they met with any success (which they generally did) in quarrels of this kind. His chief aim therfore was to find out a method of preventing such distempers, or to apply the best remedys when they happen’d to break out. But as long as the balance remain’d in this unequal state, he affirm’d that no king whatsoever could keep himself easy, let him never so much indeavor to please his people; and that though a good king might manage affairs tolerably well during his life, yet this did not prove the government to be good, since under a less prudent prince it would fall to pieces again, while the orders of a well constituted state make wicked men virtuous, and fools to act wisely.

12. That empire follows the balance of property, whether lodg’d in one, in a few, or in many hands, he was the first that ever made out; and is a noble discovery, wherof the honor solely belongs to him, as much as those of the circulation of the blood, of printing, of guns, of the compass, or of optic glasses, to the several authors. ’Tis incredible to think what gross and numberless errors were committed by all the writers before him, even by the best of them, for want of understanding this plain truth, which is the foundation of all politics. He no sooner discours’d publicly of this new doctrin, being a man of universal acquaintance, but it ingag’d all sorts of people to busy themselves about it as they were variously affected. Som, because they understood him, despis’d it, alleging it was plain to every man’s capacity, as if his highest merit did not consist in making it so. Others, and those in number the fewest, disputed with him about it, merely to be better inform’d; with which he was well pleas’d, as reckoning a pertinent objection of greater advantage to the discovery of truth (which was his aim) than a complaisant applause or approbation. But a third sort, of which there never wants in all places a numerous company, did out of pure envy strive all they could to lessen or defame him; and one of ’em (since they could not find any precedent writer out of whose works they might make him a plagiary) did endeavor, after a very singular manner, to rob him of the glory of this invention: for our author having friendly lent him a part of his papers, he publish’d a small piece to the same purpose, intitled, A letter from an officer of the army in Ireland, &c. Major Wildman was then reputed the author by som, and Henry Nevil by others; which latter, by reason of this thing, and his great intimacy with Harrington, was by his detractors reported to be the author of his works, or that at least he had a principal hand in composing of them. Notwithstanding which provocations, so true was he to the friendship he profest to Nevil and Wildman, that he avoided all harsh expressions or public censures on this occasion, contenting himself with the justice which the world was soon oblig’d to yield to him by reason of his other writings, where no such clubbing of brains could be reasonably suspected.

13. But the publication of his book met with greater difficultys from the opposition of the several partys then set against one another, and all against him; but none more than som of those who pretended to be for a commonwealth, which was the specious name under which they cover’d the rankest tyranny of Oliver Cromwel, while Harrington, like Paul at Athens, indeavor’d to make known to the people what they ignorantly ador’d. By shewing that a commonwealth was a government of laws, and not of the sword, he could not but detect the violent administration of the protector by his bashaws, intendants, or majors general, which created him no small danger: while the cavaliers on the other side tax’d him with ingratitude to the memory of the late king, and prefer’d the monarchy even of a usurper to the best order’d commonwealth. To these he answer’d, that it was enough for him to forbear publishing his sentiments during that king’s life; but the monarchy being now quite dissolv’d, and the nation in a state of anarchy, or (what was worse) groaning under a horrid usurpation, he was not only at liberty, but even oblig’d as a good citizen to offer a helping hand to his countrymen, and to shew ’em such a model of government as he thought most conducing to their tranquillity, wealth and power: that the cavaliers ought of all people to be best pleas’d with him, since if his model succeded, they were sure to enjoy equal privileges with others, and so be deliver’d from their present oppression; for in a well-constituted commonwealth there can be no distinction of partys, the passage to preferment is open to merit in all persons, and no honest man can be uneasy: but that if the prince should happen to be restor’d, his doctrin of the balance would be a light to shew him what and with whom he had to do, and so either to amend or avoid the miscarriages of his father; since all that is said of this doctrin may as well be accommodated to a monarchy regulated by laws, as to a democracy or more popular form of a commonwealth. He us’d to add on such occasions another reason of writing this model, which was, That if it should ever be the fate of this nation to be, like Italy of old, overrun by any barbarous people, or to have its government and records destroy’d by the rage of som merciless conqueror, they might not be then left to their own invention in framing a new government; for few people can be expected to succede so happily as the Venetians have don in such a case.

14. In the mean time it was known to som of the courtiers, that the book was a printing; whereupon, after hunting it from one press to another, they seiz’d their prey at last, and convey’d it to Whitehall. All the sollicitations he could make were not able to relieve his papers, till he remember’d that Oliver’s favorit daughter, the lady Claypole, acted the part of a princess very naturally, obliging all persons with her civility, and frequently interceding for the unhappy. To this lady, tho an absolute stranger to him, he thought fit to make his application; and being led into her antichamber, he sent in his name, with his humble request that she would admit him to her presence. While he attended, som of her women coming into the room were follow’d by her little daughter about three years old, who staid behind them. He entertain’d the child so divertingly, that she suffer’d him to take her up in his arms till her mother came; whereupon he stepping towards her, and setting the child down at her feet, said, Madam, ’tis well you are com at this nick of time, or I had certainly stolen this pretty little lady. Stolen her, reply’d the mother! pray, what to do with her? for she is yet too young to becom your mistress. Madam, said he, tho her charms assure her of a more considerable conquest, yet I must confess it is not love but revenge that promted me to commit this theft. Lord, answer’d the lady again, what injury have I don you that you should steal my child? none at all, reply’d he, but that you might be induc’d to prevail with your father to do me justice, by restoring my child that he has stolen. But she urging it was impossible, because her father had children enough of his own; he told her at last it was the issue of his brain which was misrepresented to the protector, and taken out of the press by his order. She immediately promis’d to procure it for him, if it contain’d nothing prejudicial to her father’s government; and he assur’d her it was only a kind of a political romance, so far from any treason against her father, that he hop’d she would acquaint him that he design’d to dedicat it to him, and promis’d that she her self should be presented with one of the first copys. The lady was so well pleas’d with his manner of address, that he had his book speedily restor’d to him; and he did accordingly inscribe it to Oliver Cromwel, who, after the perusal of it, said, the gentleman had like to trapan him out of his power, but that what he got by the sword he would not quit for a little paper shot: adding in his usual cant, that he approv’d the government of a single person as little as any of ’em, but that he was forc’d to take upon him the office of a high constable, to preserve the peace among the several partys in the nation, since he saw that being left to themselves, they would never agree to any certain form of government, and would only spend their whole power in defeating the designs, or destroying the persons of one another.

15. But nothing in the world could better discover Cromwel’s dissimulation than this speech, since Harrington had demonstrated in his book, that no commonwealth could be so easily or perfectly establish’d as one by a sole legislator, it being in his power (if he were a man of good invention himself, or had a good model propos’d to him by others) to set up a government in the whole piece at once, and in perfection; but an assembly, being of better judgment than invention, generally make patching work in forming a government, and are whole ages about that which is seldom or never brought by ’em to any perfection; but is commonly ruin’d by the way, leaving the noblest attemts under reproach, and the authors of ’em expos’d to the greatest dangers while they live, and to a certain infamy when dead. Wherfore the wisest assemblys, in mending or making a government, have pitch’d upon a sole legislator, whose model they could rightly approve, tho not so well digest; as musicians can play in consort, and judg of an air that is laid before them, tho to invent a part of music they could never agree, nor succede so happily as one person. If Cromwel therfore had meant as he spoke, no man had ever such an opportunity of reforming what was amiss in the old government, or setting up one wholly new, either according to the plan of Oceana, or any other. This would have made him indeed a hero superior in lasting fame to Solon, Lycurgus, Zaleucus, and Charondas; and render his glory far more resplendent, his security greater, and his renown more durable than all the pomp of his ill acquir’d greatness could afford: whereas on the contrary he liv’d in continual fears of those he had inslav’d, dy’d abhor’d as a monstrous betrayer of those libertys with which he was intrusted by his country, and his posterity not possessing a foot of what for their only sakes he was generally thought to usurp But this last is a mistaken notion, for som of the most notorious tyrants liv’d and dy’d without any hopes of children; which is a good reason why no mortal ought to be trusted with too much power on that score. Lycurgus and Andrew Doria, who, when it was in their power to continue princes, chose rather to be the founders of their countrys liberty, will be celebrated for their virtue thro the course of all ages, and their very names convey the highest ideas of Godlike generosity; while Julius Cæsar, Oliver Cromwel, and such others as at any time inslav’d their fellow citizens, will be for ever remember’d with detestation, and cited as the most execrable examples of the vilest treachery and ingratitude. It is only a refin’d and excellent genius, a noble soul ambitious of solid praise, a sincere lover of virtue and the good of all mankind, that is capable of executing so glorious an undertaking as making a people free. ’Tis my fix’d opinion, that if the protector’s mind had the least tincture of true greatness, he could not be proof against the incomparable rewards propos’d by Harrington in the corollary of his Oceana; as no prince truly generous, whether with or without heirs, is able to resist their charms, provided he has opportunity to advance the happiness of his people. ’Twas this disposition that brought the prince of Orange to head us when we lately contended for our libesty; to this we ow those inestimable laws we have obtain’d, since out of a grateful confidence we made him our king; and how great things, or after what manner, we may expect from him in time to com, is as hard to be truly conceiv’d as worthily express’d.

16. I shall now give som account of the book itself, intitl’d by the author, The Commonwealth of Oceana, a name by which he design’d England, as being the noblest iland of the Northern ocean. But before I procede further, I must explain som other words occurring in this book, which is written after the manner of a romance, in imitation of Plato’s Atlantic story, and is a method ordinarily follow’d by lawgivers.

Adoxus King John.
Alma The palace of St. James.
Convallium Hamton Court.
Coraunus Henry VIII.
Dicotome Richard II.
Emporium London.
Halcionia The Thames.
Halo Whitehall.
Hemisua The river Trent.
Hiera Westminster.
Leviathan Hobbes.
Marpesia Scotland.
Morpheus James I.
Mount Celia Windsor.
Neustrians Normans.
Olphaus Megaletor Oliver Cromwel.
Panopæa Ireland.
Pantheon Westminster Hall.
Panurgus Henry VII.
Parthenia Queen Elizabeth.
Scandians Danes.
Teutons Saxons.
Turbo William the Conqueror.
Verulamius Lord Chancellor Bacon.

17. The book consists of Preliminarys divided into two parts, and a third section called the Council of Legislators; then follows the Model of the Commonwealth, or the body of the book; and lastly coms the Corollary or Conclusion. The preliminary discourses contain the principles, generation, and effects of all governments, whether monarchical, aristocratical, or popular, and their several corruptions, as tyranny, oligarchy, and anarchy, with all the good or bad mixtures that naturally result from them. But the first part dos in a more particular manner treat of antient prudence, or that genius of government which most prevail’d in the world till the time of Julius Cæsar. None can consult a more certain oracle that would conceive the nature of foren or domestic empire; the balance of land or mony; arms or contracts; magistracy and judicatures; agrarian laws; elections by the ballot; rotation of officers, with a great many such heads, especially the inconveniences and preeminences of each kind of government, or the true comparison of ’em all together. These subjects have bin generally treated distinctly, and every one of them seems to require a volum; yet I am of opinion that in this short discourse there is a more full and clearer account of them, than can be easily found elsewhere: at least I must own to have receiv’d greater satisfaction here than in all my reading before, and the same thing has bin frankly own’d to me by others.

18. The second part of the Preliminarys treats of modern prudence, or that genius of government which has most obtain’d in the world since the expiration of the Roman liberty, particularly the Gothic constitution, beginning with the inundation of the barbarous northern nations over the Roman empire. In this discourse there is a very clear account of the English government under the Romans, Saxons, Danes, and Normans, till the foundations of it were cunningly undermin’d by Henry VII. terribly shaken by Henry VIII. and utterly ruin’d under Charles I. Here he must read, who in a little compass would completely understand the antient feuds and tenures, the original and degrees of our nobility, with the inferior orders of the rest of the people: under the Saxons, what was meant by ealdorman, or earls; king’s thane; middle thane or vavasors; their shiremoots, sherifs, and viscounts; their halymoots, weidenagemoots, and such others. Here likewise one may learn to understand the baronage of the Normans, as the barons by their possessions, by writ, or by letters patent; with many other particulars which give an insight into the springs and management of the barons wars, so frequent and famous in our annals. The rest of this discourse is spent in shewing the natural causes of the dissolution of the Norman monarchy under Charles the First, and the generation of the commonwealth, or rather the anarchy that succeded.

19. Next follows the Council of Legislators: for Harrington being about to give the most perfect model of government, he made himself master of all the antient and modern politicians, that he might as well imitat whatever was excellent or practicable in them, as his care was to avoid all things which were impracticable or inconvenient. These were the justest measures that could possibly be taken by any body, whether he design’d to be rightly inform’d, and sufficiently furnish’d with the best materials; or whether he would have his model meet with an easy reception: for since his own sentiments (tho’ never so true) were sure to be rejected as privat speculations or impracticable chimeras, this was the readiest way to make ’em pass currently, as both authoriz’d by the wisest men in all nations, and as what in all times and places had bin practis’d with success. To this end therefore he introduces, under feign’d names, nine legislators, who perfectly understood the several governments, they were appointed to represent. The province of the first was the commonwealth of Israel; that of the second, Athens; of the third, Sparta; of the fourth, Carthage; of the fifth, the Achæans, Ætolians, and Lycians; of the sixth, Rome; of the seventh, Venice; of the eighth, Switzerland; and of the ninth, Holland. Out of the excellencys of all these, supply’d with the fruits of his own invention, he fram’d the model of his Oceana; and indeed he shews himself in that work so throly vers’d in their several historys and constitutions, that to any man who would rightly understand them, I could not easily recommend a more proper teacher: for here they are dissected and laid open to all capacitys, their perfections applauded, their inconveniencys expos’d, and parallels frequently made between ’em no less entertaining than usual. Nor are the antient and modern Eastern or European monarchys forgot, but exhibited with all their advantages and corruptions, without the least dissimulation or partiality.

20. As for the model, I shall say nothing of it in particular, as well because I would not forestal the pleasure of the reader, as by reason an abridgment of it is once or twice made by himself, and inserted among his works. The method he observes is to lay down his orders or laws in so many positive propositions, to each of which he subjoins an explanatory discourse; and if there be occasion, adds a speech suppos’d to be deliver’d by the lord Archon, or som of the legislators. These speeches are extraordinary fine, contain a world of good learning and observation, and are perpetual commentarys on his laws. In the Corollary, which is the conclusion of the whole work, he shews how the last hand was put to his commonwealth; which we must not imagin to treat only of the form of the senat and affemblys of the people, or the manner of waging war and governing in peace. It contains besides, the disciplin of a national religion, and the security of a liberty of conscience: a form of government for Scotland, for Ireland, and the other provinces of the commonwealth; governments for London and Westminster, proportionably to which the other corporations of the nation are to be model’d; directions for the incouraging of trade; laws for regulating academys; and most excellent rules for the education of our youth, as well to the wars or the sea, to manufactures or husbandry, as to law, physic, or divinity, and chiefly to the breeding and true figure of accomplish’d gentlemen: there are admirable orders for reforming the stage; the number, choice and business of the officers of state and the revenue, with all sorts of officers; and an exact account both of their salarys, and the ordinary yearly charge of the whole commonwealth, which for two rarely consistent things, the grandeur of its state, and the frugal management of its revenues, excedes all the governments that ever were. I ought not to omit telling here, that this model gives a full answer to those who imagin that there can be no distinctions, or degrees, neither nobility nor gentry in a democracy, being led into this mistake, because they ignorantly think all commonwealths to be constituted alike; when, if they were but never so little vers’d in history, they might know that no order of men now in the world can com near the figure that was made by the noblemen and gentlemen of the Roman state: nor in this respect dos the commonwealth of Oceana com any thing behind them; for, as Harrington says very truly, an army may as well consist of soldiers without officers, or of officers without soldiers, as a commonwealth (especially such an one as is capable of greatness) consist of a people without a gentry, or of a gentry without a people. So much may suffice for understanding the scope of this book: I shall only add, that none ought to be offended with a few odd terms in it, such as the prime magnitude, the pillar of Nilus, the galaxy, and the tropic of magistrats, since the author explains what he means by ’em, and that any other may call ’em by what more significative names he pleases; for t’ e things themselves are absolutely necessary.

21. No sooner did this treatise appear in public, but it was greedily bought up, and becom the subject of all men’s discourse. The first that made exceptions to it was Dr. Henry Ferne, afterwards bishop of Chester. The lady Ashton presented him with one of the books, and desir’d his opinion of it, which he quickly sent in such a manner as shew’d he did not approve of the doctrin, tho he treated the person and his learning with due respect. To this letter a reply was made, and som querys sent along with it by Harrington, to every one of which a distinct answer was return’d by the doctor; which being again confuted by Harrington, he publish’d the whole in the year 1656, under the title of Pian Piano, or an Intercourse between H. Ferne doctor in divinity, and James Harrington, Esq; upon occasion of the doctor’s censure of the commonwealth of Oceana. ’Tis a treatise of little importance, and contains nothing but what he has much better discours’d in his answers to other antagonists, which is the reason that I give the reader no more trouble about it.

22. The next that wrote against Oceana was Matthew Wren, eldest son to the bishop of Ely. His book was intitl’d Considerations, and restrain’d only to the first part of the preliminarys. To this our author publish’d an answer in the first book of his Prerogative of Popular Government, where he inlarges, explains, and vindicats his assertions. How inequal this combat was, and after what manner he treated his adversary, I leave the reader to judg; only minding him that as Wren was one of the virtuosi who met at Dr. Wilkins’s (the seminary of the now royal society) Harrington jokingly said, That they had an excellent faculty of magnifying a louse, and diminishing a commonwealth. But the subjects he handles on this occasion are very curious, and reduc’d to the twelve following questions:

(1) Whether prudence (or the politics) be well distinguish’d into antient and modern?

(2.) Whether a commonwealth be rightly defin’d to be a government of laws and not of men; and monarchy to be a government of som men or a few men, and not of laws?

(3.) Whether the balance of dominion in land be the natural cause of empire?

(4.) Whether the balance of empire be well divided into national and provincial? and whether these two, or any nations that are of a distinct balance, coming to depend on one and the same head, such a mixture creates a new balance?

(5.) Whether there be any common right or interest of mankind distinct from the interest of the parts taken severally? and how by the orders of a commonwealth this may best be distinguish’d from privat interest?

(6.) Whether the senatusconsulta, or decrees of the Roman senat, had the power of laws?

(7.) Whether the ten commandments, propos’d by God or Moses, were voted and past into laws by the people of Israel?

(8.) Whether a commonwealth, coming up to the perfection of the kind, coms not up to the perfection of government, and has no flaw in it? that is, whether the best commonwealth be not the best government?

(9.) Whether monarchy, coming up to the perfection of the kind, coms not short of the perfection of government, and has not som flaw in it? that is, whether the best monarchy be not the worst government? Under this head are also explain’d the balance of France, the original of a landed clergy, arms, and their several kinds.

(10.) Whether any commonwealth, that was not first broken or divided by it self, was ever conquer’d by any monarch? where he shews that none ever were, and that the greatest monarchys have bin broken by very small commonwealths.

(11.) Whether there be not an agrarian, or som law or laws to supply the defects of it, in every commonwealth? Whether the agrarian, as it is stated in Oceana, be not equally satisfactory to all interests or partys?

(12.) Whether a rotation, or courses and turns, be necessary to a well-order’d commonwealth? In which is contain’d the parembole or courses of Israel before the captivity, together with an epitome of the commonwealth of Athens, as also another of the commonwealth of Venice.

23. The second book of the Prerogative of Popular Government chiefly concerns ordination in the Christian church, and the orders of the commonwealth of Israel, against the opinions of Dr. Hammond, Dr. Seaman, and the authors they follow. His dispute with these learned persons (the one of the Episcopal, and the other of the Presbyterian communion) is comprehended in five chapters.

(1.) The first, explaining the words chirotonia and chirothesia, paraphrastically relates the story of the perambulation made by the apostles Paul and Barnabas thro the citys of Lycaonia, Pisidia, &c.

(2.) The second shews that those citys, or most of ’em, were at the time of this perambulation under popular government; in which is also contain’d the whole administration of a Roman province.

(3.) The third shews the deduction of the chirotonia, or holding up of hands, from popular government, and that the original of ordination is from this custom; in which is also contain’d the institution of the sanhedrim or senat of Israel by Moses, and of that of Rome by Romulus.

(4.) The fourth shews the deduction of the chirothesia, or the laying on of hands, from monarchical or aristocratical government, and so the second way of ordination proceeds from this custom: here is also declar’d how the commonwealth of the Jews stood after the captivity.

(5.) The fifth debates whether the chirotonia us’d in the citys mention’d was (as is pretended by Dr. Hammond, Dr. Seaman, and the authors they follow) the same with the chirothesia, or a far different thing. In which are contain’d the divers kinds of church government introduc’d and exercis’d in the age of the apostles. By these heads we may perceive that a great deal of useful learning is contain’d in this book; and questionless he makes those subjects more plain and intelligible than any writer I ever yet consulted.

24. Against Oceana chiefly did Richard Baxter write his Holy Commonwealth, of which our author made so slight, that he vouchsaf’d no other answer to it but half a sheet of cant and ridicule. It dos not appear that he rail’d at all the ministers as a parcel of fools and knaves. But the rest of Baxter’s complaint seems better grounded, as that Harrington maintain’d neither he nor any ministers understood at all what polity was, but prated against they knew not what, &c. This made him publish his Holy Commonwealth in answer to Harringtons Heathenish Commonwealth; in which, adds he, I plead the cause of monarchy as better than democracy or aristocracy; an odd way of modelling a commonwealth. And yet the royalists were so far from thinking his book for their service, that in the year 1683 it was by a decree of the university of Oxford condemn’d to be publicly burnt; which sentence was accordingly executed upon it, in company with some of the books of Hobbes, Milton, and others; wheras no censure past on Harrington’s Oceana, or the rest of his works. As for divines meddling with politics, he has in the former part of the preliminarys to Oceana deliver’d his opinion, That there is somthing first in the making of a commonwealth, then in the governing of it, and last of all in the leading of its armys, which (tho there be great divines, great lawyers, great men in all professions) seems to be peculiar only to the genius of a gentleman: for it is plain in the universal series of story, that if any man founded a commonwealth, he was first a gentleman; the truth of which assertion he proves from Moses downwards.

25. Being much importun’d from all hands to publish an abridgment of his Oceana, he consented at length; and so, in the year 1659, was printed his Art of Lawgiving (or of legislation) in three books. The first, which treats of the foundation and superstructures of all kinds of government, is an abstract of his preliminarys to the Oceana: and the third book, shewing a model of popular government fitted to the present state or balance of this nation, is an exact epitome of his Oceana, with short discourses explaining the propositions. By the way, the pamphlet called the Rota is nothing else but these propositions without the discourses, and therfore, to avoid a needless repetition, not printed among his works. The second book between these two, is a full account of the commonwealth of Israel, with all the variations it underwent. Without this book it is plainly impossible to understand that admirable government concerning which no author wrote common sense before Harrington, who was persuaded to complete this treatise by such as observ’d his judicious remarks on the same subject in his other writings. To the Art of Lawgiving is annex’d a small dissertation, or a Word concerning a House of Peers, which to abridg were to transcribe.

26. In the same year, 1659, Wren coms out with another book call’d Monarchy asserted, in vindication of his Considerations. If he could not press hard on our author’s reasonings, he was resolv’d to overbear him with impertinence and calumny, treating him neither with the respect due to a gentleman, nor the fair dealing becoming an ingenuous adversary, but on the contrary with the utmost chicanery and insolence. The least thing to be admir’d is, that he would needs make the university a party against him, and bring the heavy weight of the church’s displeasure on his shoulders: for as corrupt ministers stile themselves the government, by which artifice they oblige better men to suppress their complaints, for fear of having their loyalty suspected; so every ignorant pedant that affronts a gentleman, is presently a learned university; or if he is but in deacon’s orders, he’s forthwith transform’d into the catholic church, and it becoms sacrilege to touch him. But as great bodys no less than privat persons, grow wiser by experience, and com to a clearer discernment of their true interest; so I believe that neither the church no universitys will be now so ready to espouse the quarrels of those, who, under pretence of serving them, ingage in disputes they no ways understand, wherby all the discredit redounds to their patrons, themselves being too mean to suffer any diminution of honor. Harrington was not likewise less blamable in being provok’d to such a degree by this pitiful libel, as made him forget his natural character of gravity and greatness of mind. Were not the best of men subject to their peculiar weaknesses, he had never written such a farce as his Politicaster, or Comical Discourse in answer to Mr. Wren. It relates little or nothing to the argument, which was not so much amiss, considering the ignorance of his antagonist: but it is of so very small merit, that I would not insert it among his other works, as a piece not capable to instruct or please any man now alive. I have not omitted his Answer to Dr. Stubbe concerning a select senat, as being so little worth; but as being only a repetition of what he has much better and more amply treated in some of his other pieces. Now we must note, that upon the first appearance of his Oceana this Stubbe was so great an admirer of him, that, in his preface to the Good Old Cause, he says he would inlarge in his praise, did he not think himself too inconsiderable to add any thing to those applauses which the understanding part of the world must bestow upon him, and which, tho eloquence should turn panegyrist, he not only merits but transcends.

27. Other treatises of his, which are omitted for the same reason, are, 1. A Discourse upon this Saying, The Spirit of the Nation is not yet to be trusted with Liberty, lest it introduce Monarchy, or invade the Liberty of Conscience; which proposition he disapprov’d. 2. A Discourse shewing that the Spirit of Parlaments, with a Council in the Intervals, is not to be trusted for a Settlement, lest it introduce Monarchy, and Persecution for Conscience. 3. A Parallel of the Spirit of the People with the Spirit of Mr. Rogers, with an Appeal to the Reader, whether the Spirit of the People, or the Spirit of Men like Mr. Rogers, be the fitter to be trusted with the Government. This Rogers was an Anabaptist, a seditious enthusiast, or fifthmonarchy man. 4. Pour enclour le canon, or the nailing of the Enemys Artillery. 5. The Stumbling-block of Disobedience and Rebellion, cunningly imputed by Peter Heylin to Calvin, remov’d in a Letter to the said P. H. who wrote a long answer to it in the third part of his letter combat. ’Tis obvious by the bare perusal of the titles, that these are but pamphlets solely calculated for that time; and it certainly argues a mighty want of judgment in those editors who make no distinction between the elaborat works which an author intended for universal benefit, and his more slight or temporary compositions, which were written to serve a present turn, and becom afterwards not only useless, but many times not intelligible. Of this nature are the pieces I now mention’d: all their good things are much better treated in his other books, and the personal reflections are (as I said before) neither instructive nor diverting. On this occasion I must signify, that tho the history I wrote of Milton’s life be prefix’d to his works, yet I had no hand in the edition of those volumes; or otherwise his logic, his grammar, and the like, had not increas’d the bulk or price of his other useful pieces. Our author translated into English verse som of Virgil’s Eclogs, and about six books of his Æneids; which, with his Epigrams, and other poetical conceits, are neither worthy of him nor the light.

28. Som other small books he wrote which are more deserving, and therfore transmitted to posterity with his greater works; namely, 1. Valerius and Publicola, or, The true Form of a Popular Commonwealth, a dialog. 2. Political Aphorisms, in number 120. 3. Seven Models of a Commonwealth, antient and modern; or, Brief Directions shewing how a fit and perfect Model of Popular Government may be made, found, or understood. These are all the commonwealths in the world for their kinds, tho not for their number. 4. The Ways and Means whereby an equal and lasting Commonwealth may be suddenly introduc’d, and perfectly founded, with the free Consent and actual Confirmation of the whole People of England. 5. There is added, The Petition of divers well-affected Persons, drawn up by Harrington, and containing the abstract of his Oceana; but presented to the house of commons by Henry Nevil the 6th of July 1659, to which a satisfactory answer was return’d, but nothing don. 6. Besides all these, finding his doctrin of elections by balloting not so well understood as could be desir’d, he publish’d on one side of a large sheet of paper, his Use and Manner of the Ballot, with a copper cut in the middle representing such an election in the great assembly of the commonwealth: but ’tis now inserted in its proper place in the body of Oceana. Most of these contain abridgments of his model, adapted to the various circumstances and occurrences of those times; but containing likewise som materials peculiar to themselves, and for that reason thought fit to be printed a second time. He did not write The Grounds and Reasons of Monarchy exemplify’d in the Scotish Line (which book is prefix’d to his works) but one John Hall, born in the city of Durbam, educated at Cambridg, and a student of Gray’s Inn. Being commanded by the counsil of state (of whom he had a yearly pension) to attend Oliver into Scotland, it occasion’d him to publish that piece. He wrote several other things in prose and verse, and dy’d before he was fully thirty, lamented as a prodigy of his age.

29. Harrington having thus exhausted all that could be written on this subject, he likewise indeavor’d to promote his cause by public discourses at a nightly meeting of several curious gentlemen in the New Palace Yard at Westminster. This club was call’d the Rota, of which I shall give a short account from Anthony Wood, who mortally hated all republicans, and was as much prejudic’d in favor of the royalists, tho, to his honor be it spoken, he never deny’d justice to either side. “Their discourses about government, says he, and of ordering a commonwealth, were the most ingenious and smart-that ever were heard; for the arguments in the parlament-house were but flat to those. This gang had a balloting box, and balloted how things should be carry’d by way of essay; which not being us’d or known in England before on this account, the room was every evening very full. Besides our author and H. Nevil, who were the prime men of this club, were Cyriac Skinner, Major Wildman, Major Venner, Charles Wolsley, afterwards knighted, Roger Coke, the author of the Detection of the four last Reigns, William Poultney, afterwards made a knight, John Aubry, Maximilian Petty, and Dr. Petty, who was afterwards Sir William, Sir John Hoskyns, and a great many others, som wherof are still living.—The doctrin was very taking, and the more because, as to human foresight, there was no possibility of the king’s return. The greatest of the parlamentmen hated this rotation and balloting, as being against their power. Eight or ten were for it, of which number H. Nevil was one, who propos’d it to the house, and made it out to the members, that, except they imbrac’d that sort of government, they must be ruin’d. The model of it was, that the third part of the senat or house should rote out by ballot every year (not capable of being elected again for three years to com) so that every ninth year the senat would be wholly alter’d. No magistrat was to continue above three years, and all to be chosen by the ballot, than which nothing could be invented more fair and impartial, as ’twas then thought, tho oppos’d by many for several reasons. This club of commonwealthsmen lasted till about the 21st of Febr. 1659, at which time the secluded members being restor’d by General George Monk, all their models vanish’d.”

30. When the whole matter is duly consider’d, it’s impossible a commonwealth should have succeded in England at that time, since Cromwel, who alone had the power, yet wanted the will to set it up. They were comparatively but very few that entertain’d such a design from the beginning of the troubles; and, as it usually happens, a great part of these did afterwards desert their principles, being seduc’d by the honors and preferments wherby they were retain’d in the service of the reigning powers. The body of the people were either exasperated on a religious account, only to obtain that liberty which they afterwards mutually deny’d each other, or by the change of the balance they grew weary of monarchy, and did not know it. The republicans indeed made an advantage of their discontents to destroy the establish’d government, without acquainting ’em with their real designs; and when this was effectually don, the people (who had no settl’d form in their view, and thought all things safe by the victory they had gain’d over the king and the church) fell in with what was first offer’d by those in whom they confided, and would as well have accepted a better government if they had been manag’d by men of honest and public designs. But the multitude can feel, tho they cannot see. Instead of injoying their desir’d liberty, they soon found themselves under a most heavy yoke, which they naturally labor’d to shake off; and yet in all the changes then made, two things were remarkable, that every one of ’em would be stil’d a commonwealth, and yet none of ’em would mend or take warning by the errors of those that preceded, but still continu’d to abuse the nation, and unnaturally to ingross the government into a few hands. The people being all this while told they were under a commonwealth, and not being able to see thro the deceit, begun to think themselves mistaken in the choice they had made, since their sufferings under these pretended commonwealths were infinitly greater than what induc’d ’em to dissolve the former monarchy. In this condition the several partys might (as Harrington us’d to say) be fitly compar’d to a company of puppydogs in a bag, where finding themselves uneasy for want of room, every one of ’em bites the tail or foot of the next, supposing that to be the cause of his misery. By this means whatever was said against a commonwealth obtain’d ready belief, as, that it is the most seditious sort of government, and that instead of one tyrant there are a great many, who inrich themselves by laying intolerable taxes on others. All this and much more the people in England then experienc’d, and therfore detesting their new commonwealth, they reftor’d the old monarchy. But to do all governments the justice due from an impartial historian, they never had a commonwealth, but were interchangeably under anarchy, tyranny, and oligarchy, to which commonwealths have ever bin the greatest enemys, and have frequently lent their voluntary assistance to deliver other nations from the like oppressions. Thus the people of England came to hate the name of a commonwealth, without loving their liberty the less.

31. But to return whence we digress’d: Our author, not concern’d in the excessive fears and hopes of those that favor’d or oppos’d the restoration of Charles the Second, continu’d to live in a peaceable manner at his own house, demeaning himself as became a person blindly ingag’d to no party or factions. But tho his life was retir’d, it was not solitary, being frequented with people of all sorts, som with a malicious design to fish somthing to his prejudice, and others to gain advantage to themselves by his learned conversation, or to put him upon somthing towards the better settlement of the kingdom. Among these there was an eminent royalist, who prevail’d with him to draw up som instructions for the king’s service, wherby he might be inabl’d to govern with satisfaction to the people and safety to himself: which being perform’d and sign’d with his own hand, his friend, after shewing it to several of the courtiers, found they did not approve a scheme that was not likely to further their selfish designs. At last he put his paper into the hands of a great minister about the king; and how well our author was rewarded for his good intentions, we are now going to relate. About this time he was busy in reducing his politics into short and easy aphorisms, yet methodically digested in their natural order, and suted to the most vulgar capacitys. Of this he made no secret, and freely communicated his papers to all that visited him. While he was putting the last hand to this system, and as an innocent man apprehensive of no danger, he was by an order from the king, on the 28th of December 1661, seiz’d by Sir William Poultney and others, and committed to the tower of London for treasonable designs and practices. He had the written sheets of his aphorisms then lying loose on the table before him, and understanding they intended to carry ’em to the council, he beg’d the favor that he might stitch ’em together; which was granted, and so remov’d with som other papers to Whitehall. I have that manuscript now in my hands, and another copy of the same which was given me by one of his acquaintance, from both which I have printed it among the rest of his works. It is a complete System of Politics, and discovers the true springs of the rise, temper, and dissolution of all sorts of governments, in a very brief and perspicuous manner.

32. He had no time given him to take leave of any body, but was straight convey’d to the Tower, where none were allow’d to com to his sight or speech. His sisters were inconsolable, and the more so, the less they knew what was laid to their brother’s charge. One of them, who on another occasion had experienc’d the king’s favour, threw her self now at his feet, and petition’d him to have compassion on her brother, who thro a great mistake was fallen under his majesty’s displeasure: for as she was sure that none of his subjects exceded his loyalty, so his majesty might see he was not the man they design’d, since the warrant was for Sir James Harrington, wheras her brother was never honor’d with such a title by his majesty’s ancestors, and he would not have accepted it from Oliver. To this the king made answer, that tho they might be mistaken in his title, he doubted he might be found more guilty of the crimes alleg’d against him, than he wish’d any brother of hers to be. Then she press’d he might be examin’d before his majesty, or be brought to a speedy trial. Shortly after my Lord Lauderdale, Sir George Carteret, and Sir Edward Walker, were sent to the Tower to question him about a plot which, they said, he had contriv’d against his majesty’s person and government. At this he was extraordinarily reviv’d, not being able to divine before the cause of his confinement, and knowing himself wholly innocent of this charge. He found means to transmit a copy of his examination to his sisters, giving ’em leave to publish it, which was never hitherto don, and is as follows:

33. THE Examination of James Harrington, taken in the Tower of London by the Earl of Lauderdale, Sir George Carteret, and Sir Edward Walker.

LORD Lauderdale.

Sir, I have heretofore accounted it an honor to be your kinsman, but am now sorry to see you upon this occasion; very sorry, I assure you.


My lord, seeing this is an occasion, I am glad to see you upon this occasion. Which said, the commissioners sat down; and Mr. Harrington standing before my lord, he began in this manner.


Sir, the king thinks it strange that you, who have so eminently appear’d in principles contrary to his majesty’s government, and the laws of this nation, should ever since he came over live so quiet and unmolested, and yet should be so ungrateful. Were you disturb’d? were you so much as affronted, that you should enter into such desperat practices?


My lord, when I know why this is said, I shall know what to say.


Well then, without any longer preamble, will you answer me ingenuously, and as you are a gentleman, to what I have to propose?


My lord, I value the asseveration (as I am a gentleman) as high as any man, but think it an asseveration too low upon this occasion; wherfore, with your leave, I shall make use of som greater asseveration.


For that do as you see good: do you know Mr. Wildman?


My lord, I have som acquaintance with him.


When did you see him?


My lord, he and I have not bin in one house together these two years.


Will you say so?


Yes, my lord.


Where did you see him last?


About a year ago I met him in a street that gos to Drury-lane.


Did you go into no house?


No, my lord.

Sir G. Carteret.

That’s strange!


Com, this will do you no good: had not you, in March last, meetings with him in Bowstreet in Coventgarden? where there were about twenty more of you; where you made a speech about half an hour long, that they should lay by distinguishing names, and betake themselves together into one work, which was to dissolve this parlament, and bring in a new one, or the old one again. Was not this meeting adjourn’d from thence to the Mill Bank? were not you there also?


My lord, you may think, if these things be true, I have no refuge but to the mercy of God and of the king.




Well then, my lord, solemnly and deliberately, with my eyes to heaven, I renounce the mercy of God and the king, if any of this be true, or if ever I I thought or heard of this till now that you tell it me.

Sir G. C.

This is strange!


Do you know Barebones?


Yes, my lord.


When did you see him?


I think that I have call’d at his house or shop thrice in my life.


Had you never any meetings with him since the king came over?


No, my lord.

Sir G. C.

This is strange!


Do you know Mr. Nevil?


Very well, my lord.


When did you see him?


My lord, I seldom us’d to visit him; but when he was in town, he us’d to see me at my house every evening, as duly almost as the day went over his head.


Were you not with him at som public meeting?


My lord, the publickest meeting I have bin with him at, was at dinner at his own lodging, where I met Sir Bernard Gascoin, and I think Col. Leg.

Sir Edw. Walker.

They were good safe company.


What time was it?


In venison time I am sure, for we had a good venison pasty.


Do you know one Portman?


No, my lord, I never heard of his name before.

Sir G. C.

This is strange!


Com, deal ingenuously, you had better confess the things.


My lord, you do not look upon me (for I saw he did not firmly) I pray look upon me. Do you not know an innocent face from a guilty one? com, you do, my lord, every one dos: my lord, you are great men, you com from the king, you are the messengers of death.


Is that a small matter? (at which my lord gave a shrug.)


If I be a malefactor, I am no old malefactor: why am not I pale? why do not I tremble? why dos not my tongue falter? why have you not taken me tripping? My lord, these are unavoidable symtoms of guilt. Do you find any such thing in me?


No (which he spoke with a kind of amazement) and then added, I have said all that I think I have to say.


My lord, but I have not.


Com then.


This plainly is a practice, a wicked practice, a practice for innocent blood; and as weak a one as it is wicked. Ah, my lord, if you had taken half the pains to examin the guilty that you have don to examin the innocent, you had found it; it could not have escap’d you. Now, my lord, consider if this be a practice, what kind of persons you are that are thus far made instrumental in the hands of wicked men. Nay, whither will wickedness go? Is not the king’s authority (which should be sacred) made instrumental? My lord, for your own sake, the king’s fake, for the Lord’s sake, let such villanys be found out and punish’d. At this my lord Lauderdale, as was thought somwhat out of countenance, rose up; and fumbling with his hand upon the table, said:


Why if it be as you say, they deserve punishment enough, but otherwise look it will com severely upon you.


My lord, I accepted of that condition before.


Com, Mr. Vice-Chamberlain, it is late.


My lord, now if I might I could answer the preamble.


Com, say; and so he sat down again.


My lord, in the preamble you charge me with being eminent in principles contrary to the king’s government, and the laws of this nation. Som, my lord, have aggravated this, saying, that I being a privat man have bin so mad as to meddle with politics: what had a privat man to do with government? My lord, there is not any public person, not any magistrat, that has written in the politics worth a button. All they that have bin excellent in this way, have bin privat men, as privat men, my lord, as my self. There is Plato, there is Aristotle, there is Livy, there is Machiavel. My lord, I can sum up Aristotle’s politics in a very few words; he says there is the barbarous monarchy (such a one where the people have no votes in making the laws) he says there is the heroic monarchy (such a one where the people have their votes in making the laws) and then he says there is democracy; and affirms that a man cannot be said to have liberty, but in a democracy only.

My lord Lauderdale, who thus far had bin very attentive, at this shew’d som impatience.


I say, Aristotle says so; I have not said so much. And under what prince was it? Was it not under Alexander, the greatest prince then in the world? I beseech you, my lord, did Alexander hang up Aristotle, did he molest him? Livy for a commonwealth is one of the fullest authors; did not he write under Augustus Cæsar? did Cæsar hang up Livy, did he molest him? Machiavel, what a commonwealthsman was he? but he wrote under the Medici when they were princes in Florence; did they hang up Machiavel, or did they molest him? I have don no otherwise than as the greatest politicians, the king will do no otherwise than as the greatest princes. But, my lord, these authors had not that to say for themselves that I have; I did not write under a prince, I wrote under a usurper, Oliver. He having started up into the throne, his officers (as pretending to be for a commonwealth) kept a murmuring, at which he told them that he knew not what they meant, nor themselves; but let any of them shew him what they meant by a commonwealth (or that there was any such thing) they should see that he sought not himself: the Lord knew he sought not himself, but to make good the cause. Upon this som sober men came to me and told me, if any man in England could shew what a commonwealth was, it was my self. Upon this persuasion I wrote; and after I had written, Oliver never answer’d his officers as he had don before, therfore I wrote not against the king’s government. And for the law, if the law could have punish’d me, Oliver had don it; therfore my writing was not obnoxious to the law. After Oliver the parlament said they were a commonwealth; I said they were not, and prov’d it: insomuch that the parlament accounted me a cavalier, and one that had no other design in my writing, than to bring in the king; and now the king first of any man makes me a roundhead.


These things are out of doors; if you be no plotter, the king dos not reflect upon your writings.

And so rising up, they went out; my lord being at the head of the stairs, I said to him, My lord, there is one thing more; you tax me with ingratitude to the king, who had suffer’d me to live undisturb’d: truly, my lord, had I bin taken right by the king, it had (by this example already given) bin no more than my due. But I know well enough I have bin mistaken by the king; the king therfore taking me for no friend, and yet using me not as an enemy, is such a thing as I have mention’d to all I have convers’d with, as a high character of ingenuity and honor in the king’s nature.


I am glad you have had a sense of it; and so went down.


My lord, it is my duty to wait on you no farther.

34. Notwithstanding the apparent innocence of our author, he was still detain’d a close prisoner; and chancellor Hide, at a conference of the lords and commons, charg’d him with being concern’d in the plot, wherof one and thirty persons were the chief managers, after this manner: That they met in Bowstreet, Coventgarden, in St. Martin’s-le-grand, at the Mill-Bank, and in other places; and that they were of seven different partys or interests, as three for the commonwealth, three for the long parlament, three for the city, three for the purchasers, three for the disbanded army, three for the independents, and three for the fifthmonarchy men. That their first consideration was how to agree on the choice of parlamentmen against the insuing fession: and that a special care ought to be had about members for the city of London, as a precedent for the rest of the kingdom to follow; wherupon they nominated the four members after chosen, and now sitting in parlament: but three of these, being then present, stood up, and clear’d themselves of this aspersion. Their next care was to frame a petition to the parlament for a preaching ministry, and liberty of conscience. Then they were to divide and subdivide themselves into several councils and committees, for the better carrying on their business by themselves or their agents and accomplices all over the kingdom. In these meetings Harrington was said to be often in the chair; that they had taken an oath of secresy, and concerted measures for levying men and mony.

35. The chancellor added, that tho he had certain information of the times and places of their meetings, and particularly those of Harrington and Wildman, they were nevertheless so fixt in their nefarious design, that none of those they had taken would confess any thing, not so much as that they had seen or spoken to one another at those times or places: which obstinacy he thought must needs procede from a faithfulness to their oath. But a committee of lords and commons, after several sittings, could make nothing of this imaginary plot, and did not ever name our author in all their reports.

36. His sisters in the mean time being impatient to see him, and to know his condition, after several fruitless petitions, obtain’d an order of council at last to be admitted into the Tower, where they found him barbarously treated by the lieutenant, whom they sosten’d into more humanity with a present of fifty pounds under the notion of fees. By them he deliver’d a petition to the king, importing, that in the late times he was no public person, nor acted to any man’s detriment in his life, body, or estate, but on the contrary had don his endeavors to help all persons in distress; that he had oppos’d the usurper in such a manner as was judg’d even by the royalists themselves to be very much to his disadvantage; and that it was not probable that he, who had liv’d so peaceably before, would attempt any novelty after his majesty’s restoration: wherefore he beg’d the favor of a public trial, or a more easy confinement. But tho he had bin now a prisoner during the space of five months, neither he nor any on his behalf could receive an answer to their petitions; which made him somwhat impatient, not so much to injoy his liberty, as to vindicat himself from the base aspersions of his enemys. He therfore continually urged his fister Ashton to procure him a trial, which she not being able to effect, he petition’d the parlament, shewing that he had lain a close prisoner in the Tower for five months upon a bare suspicion of som disaffection to the government, which in all his examinations did not in the least appear; and that he hop d e’er that time so to have clear’d his innocence by a public trial, as to deserve his liberty. But because he understood these matters were in som measure represented to their house, he would not presume, without first making his application to them, to sue for his freedom by other legal means. “May it therefore please this honorable house, says he, to take tender consideration of the sufferings of an Englishman hitherto innocent; and that the long continuance of him in prison without trial may be hereafter the case of others, and a precedent for the like case: and that this honorable house would please to move his majesty that your petitioner may be proceded against by a legal way of trial, or that he may have his freedom; that so he may no longer languish in prison to the ruin of his health and estate.” These are not the words of a man conscious of guilt, or afraid of power.

37. His sister could get no member to deliver this petition, or to give her any incouragement; som alleging that she was more likely to destroy than serve her brother, and others, that by unseasonable pressing she might precipitat his danger; wheras if he would be patient under his sufferings, he might be safe in his restraint. Then he advis’d her to move for his habeas corpus; which at first was flatly deny’d, but afterwards when it was granted and duly serv’d, his warder came one day to his sisters at Westminster, and acquainted them, that between one and two a clock that morning their brother was put on board a ship to be transported he knew not whither, without any time given him either to see his friends, or to make provision of mony, linen, or other necessarys. Nor could his relations for a whole fortnight, either at the Tower or in the secretarys office, learn what was becom of him, till they receiv’d a note from himself on board one of the king’s ships then lying under Hurst castle, informing them that he believ’d he was bound for Plymouth. About a month after he sent ’em word by another letter that he was landed on a kind of rock opposite to Plymouth, call’d St. Nicholas’s Island, whence he afterwards had frequent opportunitys of writing to ’em many pious and moral admonitions, as well as letters of business and entertainment.

38. But his close restraint to this small spot of earth, where there was no fresh water, and scarce any room to move his body, quickly chang’d the state of his health; this occasion’d him to petition he might be remov’d to Plymouth, which was granted, his brother William, and his uncle Anthony Samuel, obliging themselves in a bond of 5000 l. for his safe imprisonment. Here he had not only the liberty of walking on the hoe, but was also us’d with extraordinary respect by the deputy-governor of the fort, Sir John Skelton, who frequently invited him to his table, and much lov’d his conversation. Among the other acquaintance he made at Plymouth, one was Dr. Dunstan, who advis’d him to take a preparation of guaiacum in coffee, as a certain cure for the scurvy, with which he was then troubled. He drank of this liquor in great quantitys, every morning and evening. But after using it for som time, his sisters, to their no small amazement, receiv’d no more answers to their letters. At length advice was brought ’em from his landlady, that his fancy was much disorder’d, and desiring som body might com to look after him. Immediately one of them address’d her self to the earl of Bath, then chief governor of Plymouth, and inform’d him of his prisoner’s sad condition. This noble lord, who laid many obligations on him before, and gave frequent orders for his good usage, went hereupon to intercede for him with the king, representing the danger of his life if he were not remov’d from that unwholsom place to London, where he might have the advice of able physicians: and the king was accordingly pleas’d to grant a warrant for his release, since nothing appear’d against him supported by good proof or probable presumtions.

39. The next day the lady Ashton, with another of his sisters, took their journey towards Plymouth, where they found their poor brother so transform’d in body and mind, that they scarce could persuade themselves it was the same person. He was reduc’d to a skeleton, not able to walk alone, slept very little, his imagination disturb’d, often fainted when he took his drink, and yet so fond of it that he would by no means be advis’d to forbear it. Dr. Prujean, and other eminent physicians, greatly blam’d Dr. Dunsten’s prescriptions, giving their opinion under their hands, that guaiacum and the other drying things, which he administer’d to his patient in coffee, were enough of themselves to beget melancholy or phrenzy, where there was no previous disposition to it. A rumor at Plymouth, that Harrington had taken some drink which would make any man mad in a month; the surliness of his doctor, and somthing blab’d by a maid that was put against his will to attend him, made his sister suspect he had foul play lest he should write any more Oceanas. ’Tis certain, that (tho his recovery was never perfect) he mended finely as soon as he was persuaded to abstain from this liquor. In less than a month he was able to bear the journey to London in a coach, where he was no sooner arriv’d, but Sir John Skelton, who was then in town, paid him a visit. My lady Ashton complaining to him that she had not timely notice of her brother’s distemper, he protested he would have sent her word of it, had not his doctor assur’d him that he only counterfeited; and yet at the same time he made him take strong doses of hellebor, and God knows what besides.

40. He past som time at Ashted in Surrey, to drink the Epsom waters, by which he found no benefit. At London he was put wholly under the care of Dr. Prujean, who with all his art could afford little help to the weakness of his body, and none at all to the disorder of his mind, to his dying day. He was allow’d to discourse of most other things as rationally as any man, except his own distemper, fancying strange things in the operation of his animal spirits, which he thought to transpire from him in the shape of birds, of flys, of bees, or the like. And those about him reported that he talk’d much of good and evil spirits, which made them have frightful apprehensions. But he us’d, they said, somtimes to argue so strenuously that this was no deprav’d imagination, that his doctor was often put to his shifts for an answer. He would on such occasions compare himself to Democritus, who for his admirable discoverys in anatomy was reckon’d distracted by his fellow-citizens, till Hippocrates cur’d ’em of their mistake. I confess I did not know at first what to make of these things from the informations of his acquaintance, till I met with a letter of Dr. Burthogge to his sister, wherin are contain’d certain querys propos’d to him by Harrington, with a state of his case written by the doctor, who was his intimat friend, and a very good judg, whether consider’d as a physician or a philosopher, as appears by his late treatise of the Soul of the World, &c. and as I have particular reason to affirm from his letters to my lady Ashton, which are all now before me. Among other things the doctor says, that he ever exprest the highest satisfaction in thinking of what he had at any time written, as the best service he was capable to do his country, and sincerely intended by him to the glory of God, which he thought in som measure to be the good of mankind: so far was he from being under any remorse of conscience on that score, as his ill-wishers maliciously reported. Now, tho I was somwhat stagger’d concerning the nature of his distemper by Dr. Burthogge’s letter, I grew perfectly amaz’d when I found among his papers the beginning of a little treatise written by himself, wherin (without raillery) he proves ’em to be all mad that thought him so with respect to what he discours’d of nature, which he maintain’d to work mechanically or mathematically, as Bellini, Borelli, Dr. Pitcairne, and other eminent men, have since evidently shewn. It appears there that his pretended visions of angels and devils were nothing else but good or bad animal spirits, and that his flys and bees were only similitudes wherby he us’d to express the various figures and forms of those particles. I own that he might probably enough be much decay’d in his understanding, by reason of his great and long weakness of body; but I shall never be convinc’d that he was delirious in that only instance which they allege: and to satisfy the learned in this point (which, in my opinion, is a memorable story that concerns ’em all) I shall subjoin his own discourse to this history.

41. Were he really out of order, it had bin his misfortune, not his fault, and was the case of som of the best men that ever liv’d. An action that will better persuade the world he was not truly himself, was his marrying in this condition. The lady was a very agreeable woman, whose person and conversation he always admir’d; she was the daughter of Sir Marmaduke Dorrel of Buckinghamshire, fam’d for wit more than became her pretensions to good sense, had long liv’d among his relations with the respect of a friend and a sister; but now would needs change the office of a voluntary attendant for the name of a wife. It soon appear’d that this match was not so much disinterested as she would pretend, which occasion’d som difference between ’em; but they were quickly reconcil’d, and she was always treated by him afterwards with the highest generosity, tho she did not use him so handsomly when they were both young and healthy, and might have made a more seasonable match than at this time. Towards his latter end he was subject to the gout, and enjoy’d little ease, but languishing and drooping a good while, he fell at last into a palsy, and departed this life at Westminster, the 11th of September, in the year 1677 (leaving his estate to his brother’s children) and lys bury’d there in St. Margaret’s church, on the south side of the altar, next to the grave of Sir Walter Raleigh, with this inscription over him: Hic jacet Jacobus Harrington Armiger (filius maximus natu Sapcotis Harrington de Rand, in Com. Linc. Equitis aurati, & Janæ uxoris ejus, filiæ Gulielmi Samuel de Upton in Com. Northamton, Militis) qui obiit septimo die Septembris, ætatis suæ sexagesimo sexto, anno Dom. 1677. Nec virtus, nec animi dotes (arrha licet æterni in animam amoris Dei) corruptione eximere queant corpus.

42. Thus dy’d James Harrington, whose name is sure to live so long as learning and liberty bear any reputation in England. But tho he did not think so highly of himself, yet he was strongly persuaded that his Oceana was the model of an equal commonwealth, or a government wherin no party can be at variance with or gain ground upon another, and never to be conquer’d by any foren power; whence he concluded it must needs be likewise immortal: for as the people, who are the materials, never dy; so the form, which is the motion, must (without som opposition) be endless. The immortality of a commonwealth is such a new and curious problem, that I could not assure my self of the reader’s pardon, without giving him som brief account of the arguments for it, and they run much after this manner. The perfection of government is such a libration in the frame of it, that no man or men under it can have the interest, or (having the interest) can have the power to disturb it with sedition. This will be granted at first sight, and Harrington appeals to all mankind, whether his Oceana (examin’d by this principle) be not such an equal government, completely and intirely fram’d in all its necessary orders or fundamental laws, without any contradiction to it self, to reason, or truth. If this be so (as the contrary dos not yet appear) then it has no internal cause of dissolution, and consequently such a government can never be ruin’d any way; for he farther shews (what all history cannot contradict) that a commonwealth, if not first broken or divided by factions at home, was never conquer’d by the arms of any monarch from the beginning of the world to this day: but the commonwealth of Oceana having no factions within, and so not to be conquer’d from without, is therfore an equal, perfect, and immortal government. For want of this equality in the frame, he clearly demonstrats how the commonwealths of Rome, Athens, and others, came to be destroy’d by their contending and overtopping partys; wheras that of Venice can never change or finish. He proves that this equality is yet more wanting in monarchys, for an absolute monarchy (as that of the Turk, for example) the Janizarys have frequent interest, and perpetual power to raise sedition to the ruin of the emperor, and, when they please, of the empire: this cannot be said of the armys of Oceana, and therfore an absolute monarchy is no perfect government. In what they improperly call a mix’d monarchy the nobility are somtimes putting chains on the king, at other times domineering over the people; the king is either oppressing the people without control, or contending with the nobility as their protectors; and the people are frequently in arms against both king and nobility, till at last one of the three estates becoms master of the other two, or till they so mutually weaken one another that either they fall a prey to som more potent government, or naturally grow into a commonwealth: therfore mix’d monarchy is not a perfect government; and if no such partys or contentions can possibly exist in Oceana, then on the contrary is it a most equal, perfect, and immortal commonwealth, Quod erat demonstrandum.

43. It will not be objected to the disparagement of this model, that it was no better receiv’d by Oliver Cromwel; nor is it fair to judg of things at any time by their success. If it should be said, that, after the expiration of his tyranny, the people did not think fit to establish it; I shall only answer, that all the attemts which have bin us’d for introducing arbitrary power have prov’d as unfortunat, wherby it appears at least that the character which Tacitus gave the Romans of his time, may as well agree to the people of England: and it is, that They are able to bear neither absolute liberty, nor absolute slavery.


I am dispos’d to believe that my lady Ashton’s memory fail’d her, when she said that her brother was at Rome during the jubilee; for as chronology seems to contradict it, so she might easily mistake the jubilee for the ceremony of consecrating candles, or any other solemnity; his remarks being equally applicable to all those of the Popish church. But as to the whole of this history, tho it be manag’d with due moderation, and contains nothing but bare matters of fact, or such observations as they naturally suggest; yet I was sensible before I wrote it, that I could not escape the displeasure of three sorts of persons: such as have resolv’d to be angry at whatever I do; such as neither rightly understand what is written by me nor any body else; and those who, without any particular spite against an author, yet to get a penny will pretend to answer any book that makes a considerable figure. Therfore I find my self oblig’d beforehand to disclaim all explanations made of my meaning, beyond what is warranted by the express words of my book; having constantly indeavor’d not only to write intelligibly, but so as that none can possibly misunderstand me. I renounce all the designs that may be imputed to me by such as are so far from being admitted into my secret, that they were never in my company; but I especially disown whatever is said by those who first presume to divine my thoughts, and then to vent their own rash conjectures as my undoubted opinions. I slight their artifice who, when unable to object against the point in question, labor to ingage their adversary in matters wholly besides the purpose; and when their evasions have no better fortune than their attacks, fall to railing against his person, because they cannot confute his arguments. I am as much above the malice of som, as they are below my resentments; and I wou’d at any time chuse to be rather the object of their envy than of their favor: but as I am far from thinking my self exemt from all the indiscretions of youth, or the frailtys of human nature; so I am not conscious of entertaining higher thoughts of my own performances than are becoming, or meaner of other mens than they deserve. I know that to enterprize any thing out of the common road is to undergo undoubted envy or peril; and that he, who is not beforehand resolv’d to bear opposition, will never do any great or beneficial exploit: yet ’tis no small incouragement to me, that from the beginning of the world to this time not a single instance can be produc’d of one who either was or would be eminent, but he met with enemys to his person and same. Notwithstanding this consideration be just, yet if I write any thing hereafter (either as oblig’d by duty, or to amuze idle time) I have determin’d it shall not concern personal disputes, or the narrow interests of jarring factions, but somthing of universal benefit, and which all sides may indifferently read. Without such provocations as no man ought to endure, this is my fix’d resolution; and I particularly desire that none may blame me for acting otherwise, who force me to do so themselves. I shall never be wanting to my own defence, when either the cause or the aggressor deserves it: for as to those authors who conceal their names, if they write matters of fact, ’tis a sign they cannot make them good; and all men are agreed to reject their testimony, except such as resolve to deny others common justice: but the ill opinion of these prejudic’d persons can no more injure any man, than their good opinion will do him honor. Besides other reasons of mentioning my suppos’d designs, one is to disabuse several people, who (as I am told) are made to believe, that in the history of Socrates I draw a parallel between that philosopher and Jesus Christ. This is a most scandalous and unchristian calumny, as will more fully appear to the world whenever the book it self is publish’d: for that I have bin som time about it, I freely avow; yet not in the manner those officious informers report, but as becoms a disinterested historian, and a friend to all mankind.

The Inscription on the Monument of Sir James Harrington and his three Sons, at Exton in Rutlandshire.

HERE lieth Sir James Harrington of Exton Kt. with(a) Lucy his wife, daughter to Sir William Sidney Kt. by whom he had 18 children, wherof 3 sons and 8 daughters marry’d as follows:

The eldest son, Sir(b) John, marry’d the heiress of Robert Keylwoy, surveyor of the court of wards and liverys. The 2d son, Sir(c) Henry, took to wife one of the coheirs of Francis Agar, one of his Majesty’s Privy Council in Ireland. The 3d son, James(d) Harrington Esq; had to wife one of the coheirs of Robert Sapcotes Esq; The eldest daughter, Elizabeth, was married to Sir Edward(e) Montague Kt. The 2d, Frances, to Sir William(f) Lee Kt. The 3d, Margaret, to Don(g) Bonitto de Sisnores of Spain, of the family of the Dukes of Frantasquo. The 4th, Katherine, to Sir Edward(h) Dimmock Kt. The 5th, Mary, to Sir Edward(i) Wingfield Kt. The 6th, Maball, to Sir Andrew(k) Noell Kt. The 7th, Sarah, was marry’d to the Lord Hastings, heir to the Earl of Huntingdon. The 8th, Theodosia,(l) to the Lord Dudley of Dudley castle.

The same Sir James and Lucy were marry’d fifty years: she died first, in the 72d year of her age; he shortly after yielded to nature, being 80 years old, in the year of our Lord 1591, and of Queen Elizabeth’s reign 34, their son James being made sole executor to them both; who, that he might as well perform to his parents their rites, as leave a testimony of his own piety to posterity, hath erected and dedicated this monument to their eternal memory.

The Mechanics of Nature:


An imperfect Treatise written by James Harrington during his Sickness, to prove against his Doctors that the Notions he had of his own Distemper were not, as they alleg’d, hypochondriac Whimsys or delirious Fancys.


HAVING bin about nine months, som say in a disease, I in a cure, I have bin the wonder of physicians, and they mine; not but that we might have bin reconcil’d, for books (I grant) if they keep close to nature, must be good ones, but I deny that nature is bound to books. I am no study’d naturalist, having long since given over that philosophy as inscrutable and incertain: for thus I thought with myself; “Nature, to whom it is given to work as it were under a veil or behind the curtain, is the art of God: now if there be arts of men who have wrought openly enough to the understanding (for example that of Titian) nevertheless whose excellency I shall never reach; how shall I thus, sticking in the bark at the arts of men, be able to look thence to the roots, or dive into the abyss of things in the art of God?” And nevertheless, Si placidum caput undis extulerit, should Nature afford me a sight of her, I do not think so meanly of myself but that I would know her as soon as another, tho more learned man. Laying therfore arts wholly, and books almost all aside, I shall truly deliver to the world how I felt and saw Nature; that is, how she came first into my senses, and by the senses into the understanding. Yet for the sake of my readers, and also for my own, I must invert the order of my discourse; for theirs, because, till I can speak to men that have had the same sensations with myself, I must speak to such as have a like understanding with others: for my own, because, being like in this discourse to be the monky that play’d at chess with his master, I have need of som cushion on my head, that being in all I have spoken hitherto more laid at than my reason. My discourse then is to consist of two parts: the first, in which I appeal to his understanding who will use his reason, is a platform of nature drawn out into certain aphorisms; and the second, in which I shall appeal to his senses who in a disease very common will make farther trial, is a narrative of my case.

A Platform or Scheme of Nature.

1. NATURE is the fiat, the breath, and in the whole sphere of her activity is the very word of God.

2. She is a spirit, that same spirit of God which in the beginning mov’d upon the waters, his plastic virtue, the Δύναμις eepsgr διαπλαstigmaιkappaveegrgr, Epsgrνεργεία ξωτιkappaveegrgr.

3. She is the Providence of God in his government of the things of this world, even that Providence of which it is said, that without it a sparrow cannot fall to the ground, Mat. 10. 29.

4. She is the anima mundi, or soul of the world;

Principio cœlum, ac terras, camposque liquentes,

Lucentemque globum lunæ, Titaniaque astra

Spiritus intus alit, totamque effusa per artus

Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.

Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum,

Et quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus.

Igneus est ollis vigor, & cœlestis origo

Seminibus, quantum non noxia corpora tardant,

Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra.

Hinc metuunt, cupiuntque, dolent, gaudentque, neque auras

Dispiciunt clausæ tenebris & carcere cæco.

Virgil. Æn. l. 6.

5. She is infallible: for the law of an infallible lawgiver must needs be infallible, and Nature is the law as well as the art of God.

6. Tho Nature be not fallible, yet she is limited, and can do nothing above her matter; therfore no miracles are to be expected from her.

7. As defects, redundancys, or such other rude qualitys of matter, ought not to be attributed to the artificer or his art; so neither is Nature, or the art of God, to be charg’d with monsters or imperfections, the things so reputed being the regular effects both of the matter and the art that forms it.

8. Nature is not only a spirit, but is furnish’d, or rather furnishes her self with innumerable ministerial spirits, by which she operats on her whole matter, as the universe; or on the separat parts, as man’s body.

9. These ministerial spirits are certain æthereal particles invisibly mix’d with elementary matter; they work ordinarily unseen or unfelt, and may be call’d animal spirits.

10. As in sound bodys there must needs be GOOD SPIRITS managing the œconomy of health; so in unsound bodies, as in chronical diseases, there must needs be EVIL SPIRITS managing the œconomy of distempers.

11. Animal spirits, whether in the universe, or in man’s body, are good or evil spirits, according to the matter wherin and wherof they are generated.

12. What is a good spirit to one creature, is evil to another, as the food of som beasts is poison to man; whence the gentleness of the dove, and the fierceness of the hauk.

13. Between the animal spirits of the whole or universe, and of the parts, as of man’s body, there is an intercourse or cooperation which preserves the common order of Nature unseen; and in som things often foretels or discovers it, which is what we call presages, signs, and prodigys.

14. The work of good spirits, as health for example, is felicitous, and as it were angelical; and that of evil spirits, as in diseases, is noxious, and as it were diabolical, a sort of fascination or witchcraft.

15. All fermentation is caus’d by unlocking, unbinding, or letting loose of spirits; as all attenuation is occasion’d by stirring, working, or provoking of spirits; and all transpiration by the emission or sending abroad of spirits.

16. Nothing in Nature is annihilated or lost, and therefore whatever is transpir’d, is receiv’d and put to som use by the spirits of the universe.

17. Scarce any man but at som time or other has felt such a motion as country people call the lifeblood; if in his ey, perhaps there has flown out somthing like a dusky cloud, which is a transpiration or emission of spirits, perhaps as it were a flash of fire, which also was an emission of spirits; but differenc’d according to the matter wherin and wherof they were wrought, as choler, &c.

18. Animal spirits are ordinarily emitted streaking themselves into various figures, answerable to little arms or hands, by which they work out the matter by transpiration, no otherwise than they unlock’d it, and wrought it up in the body by attenuation, that is, by manufacture: for these operations are perfectly mechanical, and downright handy work as any in our shops or workhouses.

19. If we find Nature in her operations not only using hands, but likewise somthing analogous to any art, tool, engin, or instrument which we have or use, it cannot be said that Nature had these things of men, because we know that men must have these things of Nature.

20. In attenuation and transpiration, where the matter of the disease is not only copious but inveterat, the work will not as I may say be inarticulat, as in the trembling call’d the lifeblood: but articulat, and obviously so to the sense of the patient by immediat strokes of the humor upon his organs, which somtimes may be strong enough (tho not ordinarily) to reach another’s.

21. Nature can work no otherwise than as God taught her, nor any man than as she taught him.

22. When I see a curious piece from the hands of an apprentice, I cannot imagin that his master was a bungler, or that he wrought not after the same manner as his servant learn’d of him: which I apply to God and Nature.

23. Physicians somtimes take the prudence of Nature for the phrensy of the patient.

24. If any man can shew why these things are not thus, or that they may be otherwise, then I have don, and there is said in this part already more than enough; but if they can neither shew that these things are not thus, nor know how they should be otherwise, then so far I stand my ground, and am now arm’d for my narrative cap a pè.

’TIS a thousand pitys that we have not this narrative, to which no doubt he apply’d these principles, and thence form’d the state of his distemper. But the manuscript containing no more, we may however evidently conclude, that the writer of it was not so greatly disorder’d in his thoughts, which are for the most part very just, and all as close and coherent as any man’s.



And exemplify’d in the Scotish Line, out of their own best Authors and Records.


THERE is nothing that has more confounded knowlege among men, than the reciprocal violences of the understanding and the will; or, to speak plainly, the passion of the one and blindness of the other: since som by chance or interest take up principles which they force the understanding by strain’d arguments to maintain; others by the habit of som opinion so bewitch the will into confederacy, that they can never quit it, even after confutation. To remedy this disorder, since I had resolv’d with my self to say somthing to this point (which tho’ it be but as a small wyre, yet the great weight of civil felicity lys upon it) I know no better method than to take the scales from the eys of the understanding, and shew the will how better to bring about her great design of good. And in the prosecution of this, I would not skirmish with every argument, which had bin a thing of immense slavery, and not for every ey; but I chose rather to strike at the foundations, that the understanding might lose its passion, and more freely consider upon what quicksands they lay. And in this I needed not to be positive, because I undertake a task in which most men are commonly successful, that is, to support error rather than to assert truth. Hence I consider Kingship simply, not troubling my self to maintain any other form, or to consider oaths, ends, changes of government, or the particular necessity or reasons of safety: they being distinct considerations and subjects by themselves. Now if this negative method satisfys not, I see no such great cause to be discourag’d; for, I confess, I do not perceive it so easy a thing to discover an error; and I had rather tell a man he was out of the way, than by endeavoring to bring him to the end of his journy, lead him further about. And it is my opinion, that as scepticism is not only useless, but dangerous; if in setting our thoughts in a posture of defence, it makes us absolutely wavering and incredulous: yet had I rather be sceptical in my opinion, than maintain it upon grounds taken upon trust, and not demonstrated.

The second part is merely an instance accommodated to the arguments of the first, wherin I would not be understood to be a writer of an epitome (for I have other imployments for my time and thoughts, and those nobler too) but to set down a true series by way of example; and therefore I was only to note accesses to government, and recesses from it, with the effects proceeding from the persons of governors. And here as I needed not much trouble chronology: so lest it might be a bare sceleton, I sprinkled some observations that came to hand, and seem to afford either pleasure or use. Thus much, lest I might be misunderstood, I thought necessary to premise.


I HAVE often thought it strange, that among all the governments, either past or present, the monarchical should so far in extent and number excede the popular, as that they could never yet come into comparison. I could never be persuaded but it was more happy for a people to be dispos’d of by a number of persons jointly interested and concern’d with them, than to be number’d as the herd and inheritance of one, to whose lust and madness they were absolutely subject; and that any man of the weakest reason and generosity would not rather chuse for his habitation that spot of earth where there was access to honour by virtue, and no worth could be excluded, rather than that where all advancement should procede from the will of one scarcely hearing and seeing with his own organs, and gain’d for the most part by means leud and indirect: and all this in the end to amount to nothing else but a more splendid and dangerous slavery. To clear this point, I consider’d how inscrutably providence carrys on the turns and stops of all governments, so that most people rather found than made them. The constitutions of men, som not fit to be masters of their liberty, som not capable, som not willing; the ambition of settled tyrants, who breaking their own bonds have brought in violent alterations; and lastly, civil discord have either corrupted or altered better settlements.

But these are observations rather than arguments, and relate to fact rather than reason. That which astonish’d me most was to see those of this heroic and learned age, not only not rising to thoughts of liberty, but instead thereof foolishly turning their wits and swords against themselves in the maintenance of them whose slaves they are: and indeed they can be no weak causes that produce so long and settled a distemper; tho’ some of those I mention’d, if not most of them, are the true ones.

He knows nothing that knows not how superstitiously the generality of mankind is given to retain traditions, and how pertinacious they are in the maintenance of their first prejudices, insomuch that a discovery or more refin’d reason is as insupportable to them, as the sun is to an ey newly brought out of darkness. Hence opiniativeness (which is commonly proportion’d to their ignorance) and a generous obstinacy sometimes to death and ruin. So that it is no wonder if we see many gentlemen, whose education inabled them only to use their senses and first thoughts, so dazled with the splendor of a court, prepossest with the affection of a prince, or bewitch’d with som subdolous favor, that they chuse rather any hazard than the inchantment should be dissolv’d. Others, perhaps a degree above these, yet in respect of some title stuck upon the family (which has bin as fortunat a mystery of kingcraft as any other) or in reverence to som glorious former atchievements (minding not that in all these cases the people are the only effective means, and the king only imaginary) think they should degenerat from bravery in bringing on a change. Others are witheld by sloth and timorousness, either not daring, or unwilling to be happy: som looking no further than their privat welfare, indifferent at the multiplication of public evils; others (and these the worst of all) out of a pravity of nature sacrificing to their ambition and avarice, and in order to that, following any power, concurring with any machinations, and supporting their authors: while princes themselves (train’d up in these arts, or receiving them by tradition) know how to wind all their humours to their own advantage, now foisting the divinity of their titles into pulpits, now amuzing the people with pomps and shews, now diverting their hot spirits to som unprofitable foren war (making way to their accurs’d ends of revenge or glory, with the effusion of that blood which should be as dear to them as their own) now stroking the people with som feeble but inforc’d law, for which notwithstanding they will be paid (and ’tis observ’d, the most notorious tyrants have taken this course) now giving up the eminentest of their ministers (which they part with as indifferently as their robes) to the rage and fury of the people; so that they are commanded and condemn’d by the same mouth, and the credulous and ignorant, believing their king divinely set over them, sit still, and by degrees grow into quiet and admiration, especially if lull’d asleep with som small continuance of peace (be it never so injust, unsound, or dangerous) as if the body politic could not languish of an internal disease, tho’ its complexion be fresh and chearful.

Those are the reasons which (if I conceive aright) have stupify’d the less knowing part of mankind. Now, how the more searching part have so odly miscarry’d, will fall under consideration.

First then, we need not take the pains to demonstrat how easy a thing it is for men of acuteness, not conversant in civil affairs, not only to miscarry in the apprehension, but even in their judgment of them: for they, instead of bringing the series and reason of things into rule and method, use on the contrary to measure them by their own presuppos’d speculation; and by that means becom incapable of weighing rightly the various incidences and circumstances of business. For it is to be observ’d, that the theorems of no art or profession are either more easily found, or of more difficult practice than those of policy; so that it is no wonder if men merely contemplative, fail so oft in the very laying of grounds, as we shall anon instance. Now how fruitful daintys error and absurdity are, we all know. But more especially the contentions of contemplative men are most numerous, various, and endless; for wrangling is with them an art, and they are indu’d with that ungenerous shame, never to acknowledge their mistakes. Moreover their principles are most times ill-grounded, and it is to be fear’d that in their superstructures they as often call in their imaginations as their judgment to frame arguments. Besides, these men fighting only with pen, ink and paper, seldom arrive at a means to decide the quarrel, by which he that gains the last word is suppos’d conqueror; or the other leaves almost as inglorious a conquest to the victor, as if he had bin overthrown.

That which I would infer from all this, is, that the generality of speculative men, for the most part guiding their understandings by those notions which they find in books, fall not seldom by this means into considerable errors. For all books, those I mean that are human, and fall directly under our consideration, either lay down practical things and observations of kingship, or som general and universal notions, or else controversially assert monarchy against som opposers. Now in the two latter there are generally found two grand and insupportable fallacys, the first whereof is, that they fraudulently converse in generals, and (to borrow the school-terms) speak of that in the abstract which they should do in the concrete: as for example, where they should assert the particular right of this or that prince, they cunningly or ignorantly lay out most of their discourse about monarchy in general, and often weary and amaze the dispute before they com to the true ground and stating of the quarrel, whereby the readers (diverted by such prepossession, and entangled by general notions of authority, power and government) seldom descend into the consideration of particulars, where the great scruple and difficulty for the most part lys. So that any king (be his access to the government never so fraudulent and unjustifiable) coms to be look’d on as sacred, authoritative, and by degrees begins not to blush at the attributes of sacred majesty, grace, and highness, or any other terms that the servil flattery and witty barbarity of courtiers can give to them: nay, som even of the wickedest of the Roman emperors could be content to be saluted with perennitys and divinitys; whereas if men would call their reason into counsel, they might find that these blazing stars were opac bodys, and did shine only by reflection: these men having no more luster than either the cabal of their own state and distance, or the wretched imposition upon the people, casts on them. For did man devest the authority from the person, they would then commonly find it inconsiderable, if not positively evil. And again, consider authority in itself as a thing fixt, real, immutable, and (when justly administer’d) sacred, they might find, that granting a prince to be the most regular, just person in all the world, yet many men as good join’d with him, intrusted, and concurring to the same end, might do much more good; and that to deny this, were to be as irrational as to deny that one person could do any good at all. But however, this I take to be certain and demonstrable out of their own principles, that kings being only to be consider’d in respect of the trust and power lodg’d in them, a number of men by as just means (not to say better) invested with the same trust and power, are every jot as sacred, and of as much divine right as any monarch is, the power being as essentially the same, united or divided, as if a commission be to one or three. It will follow then, that republics may be as just and authoritative as kingships; and then their radical argument of the jure divino of kingship is wholly enervated, and the other render’d equally as soverain. And I am to note (but this is only transiently) the poorness, or, to say better, the blasphemy of that argument which flourishes out kings as the types of divinity, and vainly lavishes some metaphysics, to prove that all things have a natural tendency to oneness; nay, the itch of some merry wits has carry’d them to run over most of the divine attributes (as some English lawyers have talk’d of the legal, I must say phantastical ubiquity and omniscience of our kings, tho’ we see the contrary; and som civilians have said much about the emperor before them) whereas they should consider, that the immense simplicity of God flows out in its several operations with ineffable variety, God being every where and the same, or, as the Platonists say, a center in every part of its circle, a spirit without quantity, distance, and comprehension; whereas man is a determinate narrow being, who doing one thing, ceases to do another, and thinking of one thing, is forc’d to quit his former thought. Now how fit he is to be a shadow of this archetype, let any judg, unless he could be refin’d from his corporeity, and inlarg’d into a proportionable immensity. Besides, I know not whether it be safe to think or no, That as God, who, for the most part, indues men with gifts sutable to the places to which he calls them, would in som measure pour out his spirit proportionate to these men, whereas most commonly we find them, notwithstanding their extraordinary advantages of society, education, and business, as weak men as any other: and good princes being sway’d by the advice of men, good and wise, and the bad seduc’d by men of their own inclinations, what are all monarchys but in reality optimacys? for a few only effentially govern under the name of one, who is utterly as unable as the meanest of those over whom he claims superiority.

The second fallacy is this, That men, while they labor thus to support monarchy, tell us not what kind of monarchy it is, and consequently gain nothing, tho’ we should grant them the former proposition be true. For what does it avail to tell me of the title of such a prince, if I know not by what title he holds? Grant it were visible to me that such a man was mark’d out by Providence to be my governor, yet if I cannot tell what kind of one, whether absolute, mixt, limited, merely executive, or only first in order, how shall I know to direct my obedience? If he be absolute, my very natural liberty is taken away from me; nor do I know any power that can make any man such, the Scripture setting just limitations and restrictions to all governors. If mixt and limited, I must know the due temper and bounds whereby he is to rule, or else he may usurp or be mistaken, and I opprest or injur’d. If executive, the power fundamentally resides not in him, but in the great council, or them intrusted by the people; then I adore only a shadow. Now if any prince of Europe can really clear up these mists, and shew the lines of his government drawn fairly, and his charter whole and authentic, like that of Venice and ancient Rome, for my part, I’ll be the first man shall swear him allegiance, and the last that will preserve him. But you will find that they will tell you in general about their office, and in particular of their claims of succession, inheritance, and ancestors; when but look three or four storys back, and you will meet either som savage unnatural intrusion, disguiz’d under som forc’d title or chimerical cognation, or else som violent alteration, or possibly som slender oath or articles, hardly extorted and imperfectly kept. Now if any man that will but run over these rules, and apply them to any history whatever (as we shall exemplify in that of Scotland, upon which for the present we have pitcht) and not find most titles ambiguous, the effects of former monarchys (for where, in a catalogue of forty kings, can you almost shew me three good ones, but things merely struggling to maintain their titles and domestic interest?) ruinous to the people, who for the most part consider them no otherwise than as to be rescu’d from violent confusion, not as they conduce to the positive happiness of a civil life; I say, all this will be found to be true, or my small conversation in books is extremely false. And truly I conceive reading of history to be the most rational course to set any judgment right, because it instructs by experience and effects, and grounds the judgment upon material observations, and not blindly gropes after notions and causes, which to him are tantum non inscrutabile; but of that anon. A vain mistake under this topic has bin an erroneous comparison and application of matters civil and military; for men observing that mixt councils about generals, plurality, equality of commands, frequent and sudden military alterations, have brought no small distempers and dangers to several governments and attemts; therefore they presently conclude, that in civils also it is the safest to continue a command in one hand for preventing the like disturbances. But here they are deceiv’d; civil matters consist in long debate, great consideration, patient expectation, and wary foresight, which is better to be found in a number of choice experienc’d heads, than in one single person, whose youth and vigor of spirit inables him rather to action, and fills him with that noble temerity which is commonly so happy in martial affairs; that must be guided always to improve occasions, which are seldom to be found again, and, which mistaken, are to be scarcely amended. Besides, the ferocity of daring spirits can hardly be bounded while they stand level; so that it is no wonder if they extinguish all emulations by putting the power into the hands of one, whereas in a commonwealth it is quite otherwise: and factions (unless they be cruelly exorbitant) do but poise and balance one another; and many times, like the discord of humors upon the natural body, produce real good to the government. That slender conceit, that Nature seems to dress out a principality in most of her works, as among birds, bees, &c. is so slender indeed (in regard they are no more chiefs than what they fancy them, but all their prepotency is merely predatory or oppressive; and even lions, elephants, crocodils and eagles, have small inconsiderable enemys, of which they stand in fear, and by which they are often ruin’d) that the recital confutes it; and if it were so, yet unless they cou’d prove their one man to be as much more excellent than the rest as those are, and that solely too, I see not what it would advantage them, since to comply with the design of Nature in one, they would contradict it in others, where she is equally concern’d. But these philological and rhetorical arguments have not a little hinder’d the severer disquisition of reason, and prepossess’d the more easy minds with notions so much harder to be laid aside, as they are more erroneous and pleasing.

These are the fundamental errors that have misled the judgment; now those which have misguided the conscience, have principally proceded from the misinterpretation of Scripture; and therfore seeming sacred, have bin less examin’d and doubted, as carrying the most authority. Thus in the Old Testament, there being such frequent mention of kings, which notwithstanding were given in wrath, they superstitiously maintain not only the necessity, but even the impunity of kings; whereas we know not their powers and limitations, and it is inconsequent to argue, That because Judea was so govern’d, we should follow the same pattern, when we find neither precept, consequence, nor necessity convincing us. And it is madness to think, that while the Divine Spirit so freely and vehemently exclaims against the iniquity of men, God would authorize it so far as to leave it in them only unpunishable who should exterminat and reform it. As for the antiquity from Adam, it is true, before his fall his dominion was large and wide, but it was over the beasts that after his fall learn’d to rebel against him; and œconomically, not despotically, over his wife and children. But what is this to civil government? In the New Testament (for I the brieflier pass over this head, in regard it has bin so copiously treated upon by those under whose profession it falls, and that it does not immediately conduce to my design) the principal argument has been the meekness of Christ and his compliance with civil powers, which certainly, if he had bin dispos’d to have resisted, say they, he could as easily have overthrown, as with a few cords whip the buyers and sellers out of the temple. But he, that was the wisdom of his Father, rather thought fit to build up his kingdom (which is not earthly, nor known of earthly men) in meekness and obedience to civil powers, which are perpetually chang’d and hurry’d at the will of the first mover, otherwise he would never have concern’d himself so much in giving dues to Cæsar, and to God what is God’s; intimating the distinct obedience owing by all men, as Christians, and citizens. When, granting monarchy the most and only lawful government, yet every one knows, that knows any thing of the Roman story, that Augustus had no more title to that government, than to any of those over whom he usurp’d, and that his access to the government was as fraudulent and violent as could be. Another error is the mistaking of the word* Powers, when it’s clear the Scripture speaks of it in a latitude, as extending it to all sorts of established governments. Now men have falsly pretended, that those powers were only meant of kings; and what by an indiscrete collation of the places of the Old, and violent wrestings of others of the New Testament, they perfected the other grand mistake; which since it has bin already clear’d up, and, as we said, is but collateral with us for the present, we shall no further mention it.

As for the alleg’d examples and speeches of the primitive times, I see not much in them considerable: for tho’ insurrections against princes cannot be produc’d, or rather much is said against them, yet we are to consider, that the gospel of Christ (which was at that time not much defil’d by the world) engages not to any domination, but (wholly taken up with its own extacys, spiritual delights and expectations) neglects all other affairs as strange and dangerous. And moreover (though I know what has been said to the contrary) I cannot find, after well considering those ages, any probable ground how, if they would have rebel’d, they could have made any head. They were indeed numerous, but then they had legionarys among them; and who knows not what an ineffectual thing a people is (be it never so desirous) when overaw’d by the soldiery? And they were a people (as greatness to God and man is different) not considerable for their worldly power (for how few eminent commanders were converted in the first ages?) but out of his own mere choice, so that it was not strange if they could not do much. For God, as he chose the weakest means in planting the gospel, even fishermen; so in the primitive propagation he call’d the weaker men, tho’ Christianity afterwards grew ample and august, and kings were proud to give their names to it.

As for the fathers (supposing them free of their many adulterations, interpolations, and all those errors and incertaintys which the process of time and fraud of men has foisted into them) they are to be accepted only as witnesses, not as judges: that is to say, they may prove matter of fact, but none of their words matter of right; especially if we consider their writings, either homilys, commentarys, or controversys, which are ever directed to another end than this is, and they themselves (men secluded from business) are so much more unable to judg, and resolve civil controversys, in regard the unhappiness of the latter times has produc’d many controversys not known or thought of in those days, which not falling directly under their profession, cannot receive any light or authority from them.

Having thus consider’d kingship, and how well it has appear’d thro the false lights of the understanding, we shall now consider, whether, taking it by itself, its foundations be laid upon a cylinder or upon a cube: and this, I think, we are the likeliest to do, if we consider them in their rights and uses, or, to speak plainer, in their legality and policy; so that if we find that none of the ways of retaining their crowns can be authentic except one, and that one makes against them, we shall see we have no just causes of blind adoration or implicit obligation to truckle under any of their commands. And if again we discover that sort of government itself is not so profitable to the end of civil happiness, but rather diametrically opposit to it; we may suppose that men are either strangely obstinat, or else they might eradicat an error which not only offers so many prejudices to their understanding, but that has such an evil influence upon their external welbeing.

We have then to consider, that for one man to rule over many, there must necessarily be pretended some right, tho it be but colorable; for either he must be chosen by the people as their arbitrator and supreme judg, or else he must by force of arms invade them, and bring them to obedience, which he by force preserving for his sons or successors, makes way for a third claim, which is inheritance. A fourth som have invented, tho were it real, it is but a difference of the last, and I therfore shall mention it under that head. But to the consideration.

First therefore election, supposing the people, either finding themselves unable to weild their own happiness, or for preventing of disorder, make choice of one man to be set over them, it here instantly follows, that the authority is in the people, and flowing from them; for choice argues a power, and being elected a subordination to it; in the end, I mean, tho not in every act. Now there is none chosen but for som end, or for som intentions reciprocal betwixt both partys; for otherwise such a choice were but dotage, and consequently invalid: wherefor thus it will follow, that those who pretend to king it upon this topic, must either shew a formal election (which I think many kings are not able to do) or if he can shew one, produce also the conditions and ends for which he was chosen. Now all parts being either implicit or explain’d, let him exhibit the covenant, that it may be known whether he governs according to it or not; for if he transgresses, he forfeits, and the others are absolv’d from their promis’d obedience. If the agreement be unwritten or intentional, either party is relatively ty’d; and then if he dos any thing against the welfare of the people (that soveraign law and end of all governments) the people may not only justly suppose the former capitulation broken, but even endeavor, by what possible means they can, to restore themselves to their former rights: for why should the making of a compact prejudice any when it is once broken? And here comes in another fallacy, with which the assertors of royalty have so flourish’d, that an agreement between a people and one man should descend to his posterity; wheras it is to be consider’d, that the people chusing one man is commonly in consideration of his person and personal merit; which not being the same in his son (as commonly familys in the horizon are in the meridian, the founders being braver than any that follow after them) that very intent is frustrated and ceases; and the people providing for the happiness of a few years, which are determinable with incertainty of the latter part of the life of one man, run themselves and their posterity into an eternal inconvenience (for any thing they know) of bad governors. And if the people would never so formally agree with him, that in regard of his merits or felicity of actions, his son should be receiv’d in that place, yet would they not stand to it, that very pact expiring with the life of either. For my father may leave me notionally a slave in a tenure (a thing frequent with our ancestors) or, as civilians term it, a feodary, with which I am content, in respect of the advantage it brings me, or because my own estate is too little to be independent, and therefore I think it good prudence to be shelter’d under the protection of the greater; but my natural liberty, that is to say, to make my life as justly happy and advantageous to me as I may, he can no more give away from me than my understanding or eysight: for these are privileges with which God and Nature have indu’d me, and these I cannot be deny’d but by him that will also deny me a being. But to go on, Suppose a second generation should accept the son, and a third a grandson, yet this confirms not a fourth; and the people very impoliticly strengthen and confirm the power by continuance, and in a manner with their own hands lay the foundation of absoluteness; their governors themselves growing in interests, increasing in alliances and forces: so it is very improbable but that within a little they grow too big and formidable, and leave nothing of liberty except the name, and (if they be less cunning) not that. A pertinent example of this, and so near us that I cannot pass it, we see in young Orange and the Low Countrys at this day, who continuing his progenitors for their signal services, and him for theirs, are now punish’d for their generous and indiscrete rewarding of virtue, that their liberty was lately almost blown up before they well perceiv’d it to be undermin’d, and they are now at charge to maintain their own oppression. As for that formal election and stipulation, who sees not what a vain and ridiculous cheat it is they coming with swords in their hands to demand the scepter of a weak and stupid multitude, that appears only to gaze upon the ceremonys, and whose refusal were ineffectual? but it is a gracious piece of the cabal of tyranny to deceive the people with shadows, fantasms, and names of liberty.

As for those that intrude by force, they cannot certainly have the forehead to infer any right, they being but, as the pirate said to Alexander, public and more magnificent robbers. Certainly these are the Nimrods, the great hunters, God’s fcourges, and the burdens of the earth; and whether they be founders of empires, or great captains (as Boccalin distinguishes them) they ought rather to be remember’d with horror and detestation, than have that undue reverence with which they commonly meet.

Yet these are they that lay the foundations of succession, and from these do the successors claim, and enjoy with the less reluctance, because the regret of the violences, and hate of the first, daily wears out; whether it be by the continuance of peace that charms men into a love of ease, or the continuance of slavery enfeebles their minds, that they rather chuse to look at their present enjoyment than real happiness; so that it is not strange if the person of their oppressor becomes in time adorable, and he himself thinks that confirm’d and justify’d to him in process of time, to which in the beginning he had no right. Put if we consider the business a little higher, we might find, that since neither the people (as we have prov’d before) have power to make themselves vassals, and the intruders themselves cannot pretend any just title; their domination is merely illegal, and apt to be shaken off with the first conveniency, it being every whit as equitable, that these men should be judg’d enemys of mankind, and condemn’d to die the death of parricids for usurping a power, as Nero for abusing it. But I would fain ask the regious defenders, by what law they can maintain governments to be inherent in one, and to be transmitted to his ofspring? if they say by the law of God, I would demand again how they can make this law appear to me? if they say that the scripture contains the right and sacredness of kings, I ask them again, how they know that God extends that privilege and authority to this king? if they say, that he is involv’d in the general right, they do but run into a circle; unless they can show me, that all his approaches to the government were regular, and such as God was pleas’d with, or else God had by som sign and wonder declar’d his approbation of him; for without these two, they must make God the author of evil, which is impious, and pretend his commission for an unlawful act; and by the same right, any other (as a tyrant, for example) may pretend it to an action never so unjust, it being no inusual thing to borrow the face of divinity, even upon some foul impostures, as (to forbear further instances) Numa’s conference with Ægeria, Scipio’s retirement into the capitol, and Sertorius’s white hart.

Now if they pretend the law of nature, they must demonstrat to us, both that she endow’d men with inequal freedom, and that she shap’d out such a man to rule; whereas it appears on the contrary, that all men naturally are equal: for tho nature with a noble variety has made different the features and lineaments of men, yet as to freedom, till it be lost by som external means, she has made every one alike, and given them the same desires. But suppose she had intended such a family for government, and had given them som illustrious Marks, as we read of som that had, whether by the imagination of their mothers, or by deceit; yet then would nature fall into a double irregularity, first in deserting her method of making all free, and secondly in making her general work merely subservient, and secondary to her particular; which how contrary it is to that beautiful harmony of hers, I need not much insist. Now if they say, they are fathers of the people, and for that reason they call themselves the heads, inferring the people to be no more than a trunk, it’s only metaphorical, and proves nothing: for they must remember, that since father has a relation upon which it depends, and upon whose removal it vanishes, they themselves cannot bring any such: for by physical procreation they will not offer it; and for metaphorical dependence, it will com to nothing, we seeing people languish when their princes are fullest, and, like leeches, rather willing to burst than to fall off; and on the contrary, the people upon the removal of a prince cheerful and reliev’d. Now if there were so strict a union between these two, such a contrariety and antipathy could never appear; for certainly when any two persons endeavour to gain ground one upon another, there is an enmity, whatever is pretended. Besides, if these men would be fathers, it were then their duty to do like fathers, which is to provide for, defend and cherish; wheras on the contrary, it is they themselves that eat the bread out of the mouths of their children, and thro the groans of the poor. And wheras flattery has said, that what they draw up in vapours they send down in showers, yet are we sure that such rains are for the most part unfruitful, if not ominous and infectious. If they pretend the law of nations, it were well they would declare to us first what this law is, and whether generally agreed on or no by nations. If they say, yes, they must resolve whether explicitly or implicitly: if they say the former, let them produce them; if the latter, they must demonstrat, that all nations are agreed in such and such notions, and all men of these nations, since every one must be of equal capacity: when on the contrary, tho the understandings of most men, whom we know or have convers’d with, seem to agree in som general maxims, but unpolish’d, unnumbred, and unmethodiz’d, yet we see many nations differing from us in many things, which we think clearly, fundamentally, and naturally true; neither do climats and education only so diversify the minds of men, but even their understandings, and the different ways of thinking so distinguish even those of one country, that tho we may please our selves in thinking that all mens thoughts follow the fantastical method of ours, yet we might find, if we were perfectly conversant with all men of the world, and well read in their authors (as we are not with half of them, no, nor any one man with the twentieth part) that there are scarce four or five axioms, excepting as they make a part of the law of nature, would be universally receiv’d. Now (for I have bin the longer by reason that this imaginary law has been so held up by the civilians, and made the subterfuge of so many considerable disputes) if it be so weak as that we can scarce tell whether it has a being or no, for even that which we account the most sacred piece of it, the violation of publick messengers, the Tartar and Muscovite, unless restrain’d by fear, break it every day. What then are the arguments deduc’d from it? or if there was such a law, what would it avail such a particular man? for why should other nations impose a governor where they are not concern’d? And if they pretend this law as to the preservation and impunity of their persons, the same answer will serve again, with this addition, That they make an offender incapable of punishment, which is but to give them a commission to offend. Now if they run upon that distinction of suspending only, and not punishing (as if forsooth this kind of people must be preserv’d, tho by the ruin of mankind, to immediat vengeance) then I say, that suspension is really a punishment; and if his demerits can deserve that, I see not but that upon a proportionable increase, they may deserve dethronization or death, as clearly as two and two make four, and four more make eight. If they allege positive or municipal laws, and number homages, they are not much the nearer, since that all such laws are but rivulets and branches of them we before examin’d; and since we found that those speak so little in their favor, that which these do cannot signify much, especially since princes, who are ever watchful to improve all occasions of this nature, can either by terror or artifice draw assemblys, or the major part of them, to their own lure; nay, even the worst of them have not forgot to be solicitous in this case. But it must be remark’d, that whatever positive laws are repugnant to those general ones, they are injurious, and ought to be repeal’d. And truly it is a sad observation, that as monarchs grow, either out of the weakness of government, and (as I may say) its pupilage, as Romulus and Theseus did at Rome and Athens, or else out of the disease or depravation of it, as Cæsar again invaded Rome: so have the people bin never more fond of them, than when manners were at the highest corruption, which ever gave access of strength to them; nor have they more distasted them, than when their spirits and disciplin were the most brave and healthful: so fatally disagreeing are true liberty, which is the very source of virtue and generosity, and the impotent domination of a single tyrant, who commonly reigns by no other means than the discords of braver citizens, who can neither indure equality or superiority among themselves, and rather admit a general vassalage, than just equality; or by the vices of the baser sort, which naturally reconcile them and kings, and concern them both in a bad example. But suppose succession a thing sacred and inviolable, yet once break and interrupt it, it is little worth, either the usurper being to be acknowleg’d regular, or the whole series dash’d out of order. Nay, we see aspirers themselves either so blinded with their pretences, or with animosity, and so crying up their own titles, that it is almost impossible for any privat judgment to do right in this case, themselves thwarting one another; and it cannot be in the power of nature that both should be right. But who can instance one monarch whose crown is come to him by untainted succession? and what history will not confirm the example I shall anon bring? certainly tho succession were a thing that had not so little reason and reality, yet I see not why men should with such a strange pertinacy defend it. Matters of government ought to be manag’d by prudence; but succession puts them into the hands of fortune, when a child incapable or infirm, under the regiment of a nurse, must (possibly) be supreme governor, and those whom either their abilitys or virtues fit for it, subordinat or laid aside. But what if the person whom necessity has set at the stern be incapable, lunatic, weak, or vitious, is not this a good way to prevent controversys? yet this plainly enervats all good council, when a king should have need of tutors, and that a multitude of people should be commanded by one who commands not himself; and, when we scarce obey even excellent princes, to adore shadows and weak ones.

As for Boxhornius’s distinction of succession, wherin the next heir must necessarily succede by the original right of the former, I would ask him, whether the predecessor were a possessor or usufructuary? If the first, all our former arguments fall on him; if the latter, it makes not for his successor, the people being owners: and besides, the distinction is one of his own coining, never pretended before; upon the first controversy it is invalid, altho the first founder had a right, as we have prov’d the contrary.

Having, with what brevity I could, brought to an end my first intention, I shall now fall upon the second, which is the intrinsic value and expediency of this government, and som little comparison with others; but herein we shall be short, and only so far as concerns this. And indeed it is a business so ticklish, that even Mr. Hobs in his piece de cive, tho he assur’d himself that the rest of his book (which is principally calculated for the assertion of monarchy) is demonstrated, yet he douts whether the arguments which he brings to this business be so firm or not; and Malvezzi contrarily remonstrats (in his discourses upon Tacitus) that optimacys are clearly better than monarchys, as to all advantages. And indeed if we look on the arguments for monarchy, they are either flourishes, or merely notions; such are the reference and perfection of unity, which, say they, must needs work better and more naturally as one simple cause (besides that it stills and restrains all other claims) than many coordinat: wheras they never consider that tho among many joint causes there may be some jarring, yet like cross wheels in an engine, they tend to the regulation of the whole. What violent mischiefs are brought in by the contentions of pretenders in monarchys, the ambiguitys of titles, and lawless ambition of aspirers? wheras in a settled republic all this is clear and unperplex’d; and in case any particular man aspires, they know against whom to join, and punish as a common enemy. As for that reason which alleges the advantage of secresy in business, it carries not much with it, in regard that under that even most pernicious designs may be carried on; and for wholsom councils (bating som more nice transactions) it matters not how much they be tost among those who are so much intrusted and concern’d in them, all bad designs being never in probability so feeble and ineffectual, as when there are many eyes to overlook them, and voices to decry them. As for that expedition in which they say monarchs are so happy, it may as well further a bad intention, as give effect to a just council, it depending on the judgment of a single man, to whose will and ends all must refer; wheras a select number of intrusted persons may hasten every opportunity with a just slowness as well as they, tho indeed (unless it be in som military critical minutes) I see not such an excellency in the swiftness of heady dispatch, precipitation in councils being so dangerous and ominous. As for what concerns privat suitors, they may as speedily and effectually (if not more) be answer’d in staid republics, as in the court of a king, where bribery and unworthy favorits do not what is just, but what is desir’d.

With these and many others as considerable (which partly willingly, and partly in this penury of books, forgettingly I pass) do they intend to strengthen this fantastical and airy building; but as sly controverters many times leave out the principal text or argument, because should it be produc’d, it could not be so easily answer’d: so these men tell us all the advantages of monarchy, supposing them still well settled, and under virtuous men; but you shall never hear them talk of it in its corrupt state under leud kings and unsettled laws; they never let fall a word of the dangers of Interreigns, the minoritys and vices of princes, misgovernments, evil councils, ambitions, ambiguitys of titles, and the animositys and calamities that follow them, the necessary injustices and oppressions by which monarchs (using the peoples wealth and blood against themselves) hold them fast in their seats, and by some suspension of divine justice, dy not violently.

Wheras other governments, establish’d against all these evils, being ever of vigor and just age, settled in their own right, freed from pretences, serv’d by experienc’d and engag’d councils, and (as nothing under the moon is perfect) sometimes gaining and advantag’d in their controversys, which have not seldom (as we may see in old Rome) brought forth good laws and augmentations of freedom; wheras once declining from their purity and vigor, and (which is the effect of that) ravish’d by an invader, they languish in a brutish servitude, (monarchy being truly a disease of government) and like slaves, stupid with harshness and continuance of the lash, wax old under it, till they either arrive at that period which God prescribes to all people and governments, or else better stars and posterity awaken them out of that lethargy, and restore them to their pristin liberty, and its daughter happiness.

But this is but to converse in notions, wandring, and ill abstracted from things; let us now descend to practical observation, and clearly manifest out the whole series of time and actions, what circumstances and events have either usher’d or follow’d one race of kings, that if there were all the justice in the world that the government of a nation should be intail’d upon one family, yet certainly we could not grant it to such a one whose criminal lives and formidable deaths have bin evidences of God’s wrath upon it for so many generations.

And since no country that I know yields such an illustrious example of this as Scotland dos, and it may be charity to bring into the way such as are misled, I have pitch’d upon the Scotish history, wherin as I have only consulted their own authors, as my fittest witnesses in this case; so have I (not as a just history, but as far as concerns this purpose) faithfully, and as much as the thing would permit, without glosses represented it: so that any calm understanding may conclude that the vengeance which now is level’d against that nation, is but an attendant of this new introduc’d person; and that he himself, tho’ for the present he seems a log among his frogs, and suffers them to play about him, yet God will suffer him (if the English army prevents not) to turn stork and devour them, while their crys shall not be heard, as those that (in spite of the warning of providence, and the light of their own reasons, for their own corrupt interest and greedy ambition) brought these miserys upon themselves.

An instance of the preceding REASONS out of the SCOTISH HISTORY.

AND now we com to our main business, which is the review of story, wherin we may find such a direct and uninterrupted series, such mutual endearments between prince and people, and so many of them crown’d with happy reigns and quiet deaths (two successively scarce dying naturally) that we may conclude, they have not only the most reason, but a great deal of excellent interest who espouse the person and quarrel of the hopeful descendent of such a family: nor shall we be so injurious to the glory of a nation, proud with a catalogue of names and kings, as to expunge a great part of their number; tho som, who have done it, affirm there can be no probability that they had any other being than what Hector Boyes, and the black book of Pasley (out of which Buchanan had most of his materials) are pleas’d to bestow on them, there being no mention of the name of Scot in any authentic writer, till four hundred years after Christ. No, we shall no more envy these old heroes to them, than their placing the red lion in the dexter point of their escucheon. But tho we might in justice reject them as fabulous and monkish, yet since they themselves acknowlege them, and they equally make against them, we shall run them over like genuin history. The first of this blessed race was1. Fergus; first general, and afterwards got himself made king: but no sooner cast away on the coast of Ireland, but a contention arises about the validity of their oath to him, and uncles are appointed to succede, which argues it elective: so Feritharis, brother to Fergus, is king, but his nephew forms a conspiracy2. against him, forces him to resign and fly to the iles, where he dy’d. Feritharis dying soon after, was suspected to be3. poison’d. After him coms in Main (Fergus’s 4.second son) who with his son Dornadilla, reign’d quietly fifty-seven years.5. But Reuther his son not being of age, the people make his uncle Nothat take6. the government; but he misruling, Reuther, by the help of one Doual, rais’d a party against him, and beheads him, makes himself king with the indignation of the people that he was not elected; so that by the kindred of Nothat he is fought, taken, and displac’d; but afterwards makes a party, and regains. His son Thereus7. was too young, so that his brother Rheutha succeeded, but after seventeen8. years was glad to resign. Well, Thereus reigns, but after six years declines to such leudness that they force him to fly, and govern by a Prorex. After his death9. 10. Josina his brother, and his son Finan are kings, and quietly dy so.

11.But then comes Durst, one who slays all the nobility at a banquet, and is by the people slain. After his death the validity of the oath to Fergus is call’d in12. question, and the elective power vindicated; but at length Even his brother is admitted, who tho he rul’d valiantly and well, yet he had Gillus a bastard son, vafer & regni cupidus. The next of the line are twins, Docham and Dorgal, sons of Durst: they, while they disputed about priority of age, are, by the artifice of Gillus, slain in a tumult; who makes a strong party, and seizing of a13. hold, says he was made supervisor by his father, and so becoms king, cuts off all14. the race of Durst: but is after forc’d out of the kingdom, and taken by Even the second his successor (who was chosen by the people) and by him put to death15. 16. in Ireland. After Even comes Eder: after Eder his son Even the third, who for making a law, that the nobility should have the enjoyment of all new marry’d women before they were touch’d by their husbands, was doom’d to prison during17. his life, and there strangl’d. His successor was his kinsman Metellan: after18. 19. whom was elected Caratac, whom his brother Corbret succeded. But then20. came Dardan (whom the lords made to take on him the government, by reason of the nonage of Corbret’s son) who for his leudness was taken by the people, and beheaded.

21. 22.Afterhim Corbret the second, whose son Luctat for his leudness was by23. the people put to death; then was elected Mogald, who following his vitious predecessors steps, found his death like theirs violent.

24.His son Conar, one of the conspirators against him, succeded, but misgoverning, was clapt in prison, and there dy’d.

25.Ethodius his sister’s son succeded, who was slain in the night in his chamber by his piper.

26.His son being a minor, Satrael his brother was accepted, who seeking to place the succession in his own line, grew so hateful to the people, that, not daring to come abroad, he was strangl’d in the night by his own servants, which made way for the youngest brother.

27.Donald, who outdid the others vices by contrary virtues, and had a happy reign of one and twenty years.

28.Ethodius the second, son of the first of that name, was next, a dull inactive prince, familiarium tumultu occisus.

29.His son Athirco promis’d fair, but deceiv’d their expectations with most horrid leudness, and at length vitiated the daughters of Nathalock a nobleman, and caus’d them to be whipt before his eys; but seeing himself surrounded by conspirators, eluded their fury with his own sword; his brother and children being30. forc’d to fly to the Picts. Nathalock, turning his injury into ambition, made himself king, and govern’d answerably; for he made most of the nobility to be strangl’d, under pretence of calling them to council, and was after slain by his own servants.

After his death, Athirco’s children were call’d back, and Findoc, his son,31. being of excellent hopes, accepted, who made good what his youth promis’d: he beat in sundry battles Donald the Ilander; who seeing he could not prevail by force, sent two as renegados to the king, who (being not accepted) conspire with his brother, by whose means one of them slew him with a spear when he was hunting.

His brother Donald succedes (the youngest of the three) who, about to revenge32. his brother’s death, hears the Ilander is enter’d Murray; whom he incountring with inequal forces, is taken prisoner, with thirty of the nobility, and, whether of grief, or his wounds, dy’s in prison.

The Ilander that had before usurp’d the name, now assum’d the power (the33. nobles, by reason of their kindred prisoners, being overaw’d). This man, wanting nothing of an exquisit tyrant, was, after twelve years butcherys, slain by Crathlinth, son of Findoc, who under a disguise found address and opportunity. The brave Tyrannicid was universally accepted, and gave no cause of repentance:34. his reign is famous for a war begun between the Scots and Picts about a dog (as that between the Trojans and Italians for a white hart) and the defection of Carausius from Dioclesian, which happen’d in his time.

His kinsman Fincormac succeded, worthy of memory for little but the piety35. of the Culdys (an order of religious men of that time overborn by others succeding). He being dead, three sons of his three brothers contended for the crown: Romach,36. as the eldest, strengthen’d by his alliance with the Picts, with their assistance seiz’d on it, forcing others to fly; but proving cruel, the nobility conspir’d and slew him.

Angusian, another pretender, succedes, who being assail’d by Nectham,37. king of the Picts, who came to revenge Romach, routed his army in a pitcht battel; but Nectham coming again, he was routed, and both he and Nectham slain.

Fethelmac, the third pretender, came next, who beating the Picts, and wasting38. their fields, Hergust, when he saw there could be no advantage by the sword, suborn’d two Picts to murder him, who drawing to conspiracy the piper that lay in his chamber (as the manner was then) he at the appointed time admitted them, and there slew him.

The next was Evgen, son of Fincormac, who was slain in a battel with the39. Picts, to the almost extirpation and banishment of the Scots; but at last the Picts, taking distast at the Romans, enter’d into a secret league with the Scots, and agreed that Fergus (whose uncle the last king was) being then in banishment, and of a40. military breeding and inclination, should be chosen king. With him the Danes maintain’d a long war against the Romans, and pull’d down the Picts wall: at last he and the king of Picts were in one day slain in a battel against them. This man’s access to government was strange, ignotus rex ab ignoto populo accersitus, and may be thought temerarious; he having no land for his people, and the Roman name inimical; yet founded he a monarchy, there having been kings ever since; and we are to note, this is the first man that the sounder writers will allow to be real, and not fabulous. Him succeded his son Eugenius (whose grandfather,41. Graham, had all the power) a warlike prince, whom some say slain,42. some dead of a disease. After him his brother Dongard, who, after the spending of five superstitious years, left the crown (as they call it) to his youngest brother43. Constantin; who from a good privat man turn’d a leud prince, and was slain44. by a nobleman, whose daughter he had ravish’d. He was succeded by Congal, Constantin’s son, who came a tolerable good prince to a loose people; and having spent som two and twenty years in slight excursions against the Saxons, left45. the rule to his brother Goran, who notwithstanding he made a good league against the Britans, which much conduc’d to his and the peoples settlement, yet in requital, after thirty-four years, they made away with him; which brought in46. Eugenius, the third of that name, the son of Congal, who was strongly susspected to have a hand in his death, insomuch that Goran’s widow was forc’d to fly into Ireland with her children. This man, in thirty-three years time, did nothing but reign, and make short incursions upon the borders; he left the rule to47. his brother Congal, a monastical, superstitious, and inactive prince, who reign’d48. ten years. Kinnatel his brother was design’d for successor; yet Aidan, the son of Goran, laid his claim, but was content to suspend, in respect of the age and diseases of Kinnatel, which after fourteen months took him out of the world,49. and clear’d the controversy, and Aidan, by the consent of Columba, (a priest that govern’d all in those days) came to be king; a man that, after thirty-four years turbulently spent, being beaten by the Saxons, and struck with the death of Columba, dy’d of grief.

50.After him was chosen Kenneth, who has left nothing behind him but his51. name. Then came Eugenius the Fourth, the son of Aidan (so irregular is the Scots succession, that we see it inverted by usurpation or cross elections in every two or three generations). This man left an ambiguous fame; for Hector Boetius says he was peaceable; the manuscript, implacably severe: he reign’d52. sixteen years, and left his son Ferchard successor, who, endeavoring to heighten the prerogative by the dissensions of the nobility, was, on the contrary, impeach’d by them, and call’d to an account, which he denying, was clapt in prison, where53. he himself sav’d the executioner a labor. So that his brother Donald succeded, who being taken up with the piety of those days, left nothing memorable, except that he in person interpreted Scots sermons to the Saxons. He was follow’d by his54. nephew Ferchard, son to the first of that name, a thing like a king in nothing but his exorbitancys, who in hunting was wounded by a wolf, which cast him into a fever, wherein he not observing the impos’d temperance, brought on himself the lousy disease; upon which discomforted, he was, by the persuasion of Colman (a religious man) brought out in his bed cover’d with hair-cloth, where he made a public acknowlegement to the people, and soon after dy’d. Maldwin,55. Donald’s son, follow’d, who, after twenty years ignoble reign, was strangled by56. his wife. Eugenius the Fifth succeded, son (they say) of King Dongard, tho chronology seems to refute it. This man spent five years in slight incursions, and57. was succeded by Eugenius the Sixth, son of Ferchard. This man is famous for a little learning, as the times went, and the prodigy of raining blood seven58. days, all milkmeats turning into blood. Amberkelleth, nephew to Eugenius the Fifth, who succeded this rude prince, while he was discharging the burthen of59. nature, was slain by an arrow from an unknown hand. Eugenius the Seventh follow’d, who being attemted by conspirators, had his new marry’d wife slain in bed beside him; for which he being accus’d, produc’d the murderers before his trial, and was acquitted, and so ended the rest of his seventeen years in peace, recommending to the people Mordac, son of Amberkelleth, who continuing60. a blank reign, or it may be a happy one, in regard it was peaceable, left it to Etfyn, son of Eugenius the Seventh: the first part of his reign was peaceable;61. but age obliging him to put the government into the hands of four of his servants, it happen’d to him, as it dos to other princes, whose fortunes decay commonly with their strength, that it was very unhappy and turbulent: which miserys Eugenius62. the Eighth, son of Mordac, restrain’d. But he, it seems, having a nature fitter to appease tumults than to enjoy rest, at the first enjoyment of peace broke into such leudness, that the nobility at a meeting stab’d him, and made way for Fergus, the son of Etfyn, one like his predecessor in manner, death, and63. continuance of reign, which was three years; the only dissimilitude was, that the latter’s wife brought his death; for which others being impeach’d, she stept in and confest it; and to avoid punishment, punish’d herself with a knife. Soluath,64. son of Eugenius the Eighth, follow’d him, who, tho his gout made him of less action, yet it made his prudence more visible, and himself not illaudable: his death brought in Achaius, the son of Etfyn, whose reign was innobled with an65. Irish war, and many learned men; besides the assistance lent Hungus to fight against the Northumbrians, whom he beat in a famous battel, which (if I may mention the matter) was presignify’d to Hungus in a dream, St. Andrew appearing to him, and assuring him of it; and in the time of battel a white cross (that which the heralds call a saltier, and we see commonly in the Scots banners) appear’d in the sky; and this I think to have bin the occasion of that bearing, and an order of knights of St. Andrew, sometimes in reputation in Scotland, but extinguish’d, for aught I can perceive, before the time of James the Sixth, tho the collar and pendant of it are at this day worn about the Scots arms. To this man Congal66. his cousin succeded, who left nothing behind him but five years to stretch out the account of time. Dongal, the son of Soluath, came next, who being of a nature67. fierce and insupportable, there was an endeavour to set up Alpin, son of Achaius, which design by Alpin himself was frustrated, which made the king willinger to assist Alpin in his pretension to the kingdom of Picts; in which attemt he was drown’d, and left to Alpin that which he before had so nobly refus’d,68. who making use of the former, rais’d an army, beat the Picts in many signal victorys; but at last was slain by them, leaving his name to the place of his death, and the kingdom to his son Kenneth. This man, seeing the people broken with69. the late war, and unwilling to fight, drew them on by this subtilty; he invites the nobility to dinner, and after plying them with drink till midnight, leaves them sleeping on the floor (as the manner was) and then hanging fishskins about the walls of the chamber, and making one speak thro a tube, and call them to war; they waking, and half asleep, suppos’d something of divinity to be in it, and the next morning not only consented to war, but (so strange is deluded imagination) with unspeakable courage fell upon the enemy, and put them to the rout; which being confirm’d by other great victorys, utterly ruin’d the Pictish name. This man may be added to the two Ferguses, and truly may be said to be the founder of the Scots empire, not only in making that the middle of his dominion, which was once the bounds, but in confirming his acquisitions with good laws, having the opportunity of a long peace, which was sixteen years, his whole time of government being twenty. This was he that plac’d that stone, famous for that illusory prophecy, Ni fallat fatum, &c. (which first was brought out of Spain into Ireland, and from thence into Argyle) at Scoon; where he put it in a chair, in which all his successors (till Edward the First brought it away) were crown’d, and since that all the kings of England, till the happiness of our commonwealth70. made it useless. His brother Donald was his successor, a man made up of extremitys of virtues and vices; no man had more bravery in the field, nor more vice at home, which increasing with his years, the nobility put him in prison, where, either for fear or scorn, he put an end to his days, leaving behind him71. his brother Constantin, a man wanting nothing of him but his vices, who struggling with a potent enemy (for the Picts had call’d in the Danes) and driving them much into despair (a bravery that has not seldom ruin’d many excellent captains) was taken by them, put into a little cave, and there slain. He was succeded by72. Ethus, his brother, who had all his eldest brother’s vices, and none of his second’s virtues; Nature, it seems, making two extremes and a middle in the three brethren. This man, voluptuous and cowardly, was forc’d to resign; or, as73. others say, dy’d of wounds receiv’d in a duel from his successor, who was Gregory, son of Dongal, who was not only an excellent man, but an excellent prince, that both recover’d what the others had lost, and victoriously travers’d the northern countys of England, and a great part of Ireland; of whose king, a minor, and in his power, he generously made no advantage, but settled his country, and provided faithful and able guardians for him. These things justly yield him the74. name of Great. Donald, son of Constantin the Second, by his recommendation, succeded in his power and virtues, notwithstanding some say he was remov’d75. by poison. Next was Constantin the Third, son of Ethus, an unstable person, who assisted the Danes, which none of his predecessors would do; and after they had deserted him basely, yet yielded them succors, consisting of the chief of the Scots nobility, which, with the whole Danish army, were routed by the Saxons. This struck him so, that he retir’d among the Culdys (which were as the Greec Caloyers, or Romish monks at this day) and there bury’d himself alive. After76. him was Milcom, son of Donald the Third, who, tho’ a good prince, and well skill’d in the arts of peace, was slain by a conspiracy of those to whom his virtue77. was burdensom. His successor was Indulf (by what title I find not) who fighting with the Danes, that with a navy unexpectedly came into the Frith, was slain.78. Duf, his son, succedes, famous for an accident, which, if it be true, seems nearly distant from a fable. He was suddenly afflicted by a sweating disease, by which he painfully languish’d, yet nobody could find the cause, till at last a girl, that had scattered som words, after torments, confest that her mother and som other women had made an image of wax, which, as it wasted, the king should wast, by sweating much: the place being diligently search’d, it was found accordingly; so the image being broke, he instantly recover’d. That which disturb’d his five years reign was the turbulency of the northern people, whom when he had reduc’d and taken, with intent to make exemplary punishment, Donald, the commander of the castle of Forres, where he then lay, interceded for som of them; but being repuls’d, and exasperated by his wife, after he had made all his servants drunk, slew him in his bed, and bury’d him under a little bridg (left the cutting of turfs might discover a grave) near Kilros abby: tho others say, he turn’d aside a river,79. and after he had bury’d him, suffer’d it to take its former chanel. Culen the son of Indulf, by the election of parlament, or convention of the people, succeded, good only in this one action, of inquiring and punishing his predecessor’s death; but after, by the neglect of discipline, and the exquisiteness of his vices, became a monster, and so continued three years, till being weakned and exhausted in his body, and vext with perpetual diseases, he was summon’d by the parlament, and in the way was slain by a Thane (so they then call’d lieutenants of counties) whose daughter he had ravish’d.

Then came Kenneth, brother to Duf (tho the forepart of his reign was totally80. unlike his) who being invaded by the Danes, beat them in that famous battle, which was won by the three Hays, husbandmen (from whom all the Hays now give three shields gules) who with their sythes reinforc’d the lost battle; but in his latter time he lost his reputation, by poisoning Milcolm son of Duf, to preserve the crown for a son of his name, tho of less merit (for says Buchanan, They use to chuse the fittest, not the nearest) which being don, he got ordain’d in a parlament, that the succession should be lineal, the son should inherit, and be call’d Prince of Scots; and if he were a minor, be govern’d by som wise man (here coms the pretence of succession, wheras before it was clearly elective) and at fifteen he should chuse his guardian himself. But the divine vengeance, which seldom, even in this life, passes by murder, overtook him; for he was ensnar’d by a lady, whose son he had caus’d to be executed, and slain by an arrow out of an ambush she had laid. Constantin, the son of Culen, notwithstanding all the artifice of Kenneth,81. by his reasoning against the act, perswaded most of the nobility to make him king, so that Milcolm the son of Kenneth and he made up two factions, which tore the kingdom; till at length Milcolm’s bastard brother (himself being in England assisting the Danes) fought him, routed his army, and with the loss of his own life took away his, they dying of mutual wounds. Grime, of whose82. birth they do not certainly agree, was chosen by the Constantinians, who made a good party; but at the intercession of Forard (an accounted rabbi of the times) they at last agreed, Grime being to enjoy the kingdom for his life, after which Milcolumb should succede, his father’s law standing in force. But he, after declining into leudness, cruelty and spoil (as princes drunk with greatness and prosperity use to do) the people call’d back Milcolumb, who rather receiving battel than giving it (for it was upon Ascension-day, his principal holy-day) routed his forces, wounded himself, took him, pull’d out his eyes, which altogether made an end of his life, all factions and humors being reconcil’d.

Milcolumb, who with various fortune fought many signal battles with the83. Danes, that under their king Sueno had invaded Scotland, in his latter time grew to such covetousness and oppression, that all authors agree he was murder’d, tho they disagree about the manner; som say by confederacy with his servants; som by his kinsmen and competitors; som by the friends of a maid whom he had ravish’d. Donald his grandchild succeded, a good-natur’d and inactive prince,84. who with a stratagem of sleepy drink destroy’d a Danish army that had invaded and distrest him; but at last being insnar’d by his kinsman Mackbeth (who was prick’d forward by ambition, and a former vision of three women of a sour human shape, whereof one saluted him Thane of Angus, another Earl of Murray, the third King) he was beheaded.

The severity and cruelty of Mackbeth was so known, that both the sons of85. the murder’d king were forc’d to retire, and yield to the times, while he courted the nobility with largesses. The first ten years he spent virtuously, but the remainder was so savage and tyrannical, that Macduf Thane of Fife fled into England to Milcolm, son of Donald, who by his persuasions, and the assistance of the king of England, enter’d Scotland, where he found such great accessions to his party, that Mackbeth was forc’d to fly; his death is hid in such a mist of fables, that it is not certainly known.

86.Milcolumb, the third of that name, now being quietly seated, was the first that brought in those gay inventions and distinctions of honors, as dukes, marquesses (that now are become so airy, that som carry them from places to which they have as little relation as to any iland in America, and others from cottages and dovecotes). His first trouble was Forfar, Mackbeth’s son, who claim’d the crown, but was soon after cut off. Som war he had with that William whom we call falsly the Conqueror, som with his own people, which by the intercession of the bishops were ended. At length quarrelling with our William the Second, he laid siege to Alnwick castle, which being forc’d to extremity, a knight came out with the keys on a spear, as if it were to present them to him, and to yield the castle; but he not with due heed receiving them, was run thro the ey and slain. Som from hence derive the name of Piercy (how truly I know not). His son and successor Edward following his revenge too hotly, receiv’d some wounds, of which within a few days he dy’d.

87.Donald Bane (that is in Irish, white) who had fled into the iles for fear of Mackbeth, promis’d them to the king of Norway, if he would procure him to be king, which was don with ease, as the times then stood; but this usurper being hated by the people, who generally lov’d the memory of Milcolm, they88. set Duncan, Milcolm’s bastard, against him, who forc’d him to retire to his iles. Duncan, a military man, shew’d himself unfit for civil government; so that Donald, waiting all advantages, caus’d him to be beheaded, and restor’d himself: but his reign was so turbulent, the ilanders and English invading on both sides, that they call’d in Edgar, son of Milcolm, then in England, who with small assistances possest himself, all men deserting Donald, who being taken and brought89. to the king, dy’d in prison. Edgar, secure by his good qualitys, and strengthen’d by the English alliance, spent nine years virtuously and peaceably; and gave the people leave to breathe and rest, after so much trouble and bloodshed. His brother90. Alexander, sirnam’d Acer, or the Fierce, succeded; the beginning of whose reign being disturb’d by a rebellion, he speedily met them at the Spey, which being a swift river, and the enemy on the other side, he offer’d himself to ford it on horseback: but Alexander Car taking the imployment from him, forded the river with such courage, that the enemy fled, and were quiet the rest of his reign. Som say he had the name of Acer, becaule som conspirators being by the fraud of the chamberlain admitted into his chamber, he casually waking, first slew the chamberlain, and after him six of the conspirators, not ceasing to pursue the rest, till he had slain most of them with his own hand: this, with the building of som abbys, and seventeen years reign, is all we know of him.

91.His brother David succeded, one whose profuse prodigality upon the abbys brought the revenue of the crown (so prevalent was the superstition of those days) almost to nothing. He had many battels with our Stephen about the title of Maud the empress; and having lost his excellent wife and hopeful son in the flower of their days, he left the kingdom to his grandchildren, the eldest whereof was Milcolumb a simple king, baffl’d and led up and down into France by our92. Henry the second; which brought him to such contemt, that he was vex’d by frequent insurrections, especially them of Murray, whom he almost extirpated. The latter part of his reign was spent in building monasterys; he himself ty’d by a vow of chastity, would never marry, but left for his successor his brother William,93. who expostulating for the earldom of Northumberland, gave occasion for a war, in which he was surprised and taken, but afterwards releas’d upon his doing homage for the kingdom of Scotland to king Henry, of whom he acknowledg’d to hold it, and putting in caution the castles of Roxboro (once strong, now nothing but ruins) Barwic, Edinburg, Sterling, all which notwithstanding was after releas’d by Richard Cœur de Lyon, who was then upon an expedition to the holy war; from whence returning, both he and David earl of Huntingdon, brother to the king of Scots, were taken prisoners. The rest of his reign (except the rebuilding of St. Johnston, which had bin destroy’d by waters, whereby he lost his eldest son, and som treatys with our king John) was little worth memory; only you will wonder that a Scotish king could reign forty-nine years, and yet die in peace.

Alexander his son succeded, famous for little, except som expeditions against94. our king John, som insurrections, and a reign two years longer than his father’s. His son was the third of that name, a boy of eight years old, whose minority was infested with the turbulent Cummins; who when he was of age, being call’d to account,95. not only refus’d to appear, but surpris’d him at Sterling, governing him at their pleasure. But soon after he was awak’d by a furious invasion of Acho king of Norway (under the pretence of som ilands given him by Mackbeth) whom he forc’d to accept a peace, and spent the latter part amidst the turbulencys of the priests (drunk at that time with their wealth and ease) and at last having seen the continu’d funerals of his sons David, Alexander, his wife, and his daughter, he himself with a fall from his horse broke his neck, leaving of all his race only a grandchild by his daughter, which dy’d soon after.

This man’s family being extinguish’d, they were forc’d to run to another line, which, that we may see how happy an expedient immediat succession is for the peace of the kingdom, and what miseries it prevents, I shall, as briefly and as pertinently as I can, set down.

David, brother to K. William, had three daughters, Margaret married to Allan lord of Galloway, Isabel married to Robert Bruce lord of Annandale and Cleveland, Ada married to Henry Hastings earl of Huntingdon. Now Allan begot on his wife Dornadilla, married to John Baliol afterwards king of Scotland, and two other daughters. Bruce on his wife got Robert Bruce earl of Carick, having married the heretrix therof. As for Huntingdon he desisted his claim. The question is, whether Baliol in right of the eldest daughter, or Bruce being com of the second (but a man) should have the crown, he being in the same degree, and of the more worthy sex. The controversy being tost up and down, at last was refer’d to Edward, the first of that name, king of England. He thinking to fish in these troubled waters, stirs up eight other competitors, the more to entangle the business, and with twenty-four counsellors, half English, half Scots, and abundance of lawyers fit enough to perplex the matter, so handled the business, after cunning delays, that at length he secretly tampers with Bruce (who was then conceiv’d to have the better right of the business) that if he would acknowlege the crown of him, he would adjudg it for him; but he generously answering, that he valu’d a crown at a less rate, than for it to put his country under a foren yoke: he made the same motion to Baliol, who accepted it; and so we have a king again, by what right we all see: but it is good reason to think that kings, com they by their power never so unjustly, may justly keep it.

96.Baliol having thus got a crown, as unhappily kept it; for no sooner was he crown’d, and had don homage to Edward, but the Abernethys having slain Macduf earl of Fife, he not only pardon’d them, but gave them a piece of land in controversy: whereupon Macduf’s brother complains against him to Edward, who makes him rise from his seat in parliament, and go to the bar: he hereupon enrag’d, denies Edward assistance against the French, and renounces his homage. Edward immediately coms to Berwic, takes and kills seven thousand, most of the nobility of Fife and Lowthian, and afterwards gave them a great defeat at Dunbar, whose castle instantly surrender’d. After this he march’d to Montrose, where Baliol resign’d himself and crown, all the nobility giving homage to Edward. Baliol is sent prisoner to London, and from thence, after a year’s detention, into France. While Edward was possest of all Scotland, one William Wallace arose, who being a privat man, bestir’d himself in the calamity of his country, and gave the English several notable foils. Edward coming again with an army, beat him that was already overcom with envy and emulation as well as power; upon which he laid by his command, and never acted more, but only in slight incursions. But the English being beaten at Roslin, Edward comes in again, takes Sterling, and makes them all render homage; but at length Bruce seeing all his promises nothing but smoke, enters into league with Cummin to get the kingdom: but97. being betray’d by him to Edward, he stab’d Cummin at Drumfreis, and made himself king. This man, tho he came with disadvantage, yet wanted neither patience, courage, nor conduct; so that after he had miserably lurk’d in the mountains, he came down, and gathering together som force, gave our Edward the second such a defeat near Sterling, as Scotland never gave the like to our nation: and continu’d the war with various fortune with the third, till at last age and leprosy98. brought him to his grave. His son David, a boy of eight years, inherited that which he with so much danger obtain’d, and wisdom kept. In his minority he was govern’d by Thomas Randolf earl of Murray, whose severity in punishing was no less dreaded than his valor had bin honor’d. But he soon after dying of poison; and Edward Baliol, son of John, coming with a fleet and strengthen’d99. with the assistance of the English, and som robbers, the governor the earl of Mar was routed, so that Baliol makes himself king, and David was glad to retire into France. Amidst these parties (Edward the third backing Baliol) was Scotland miserably torn, and the Bruces in a manner extinguish’d, till Robert (after king) with them of Argile and his own family and friends, began to renew the claim, and bring it into a war again; which was carry’d on by Andrew Murray the governor, and afterwards by himself: so that David, after nine years banishment, durst return, where making frequent incursions, he at length in the fourth year of his return march’d into England, and in the bishoprick of Durham was routed, and fled to an obscure bridg, shew’d to this day by the inhabitants. There he was by John Copland taken prisoner, where he continu’d nine years, and in the thirty-ninth year of his reign he dy’d.

100.Robert his sister’s son, whom he had intended to put by, succedes, and first brought the Stuarts (which at this day are a plague to the nation) into play. This man after he was king, whether it were age or sloth, did little; but his lieutenants and the English were perpetually in action. He left his kingdom to John his bastard son, by the lady More his concubin, whom he marry’d, either to legitimat the three children (as the manner was then) he had by her, or else for old acquaintance, his wife and her husband dying much about a time. This John101. would be crown’d by the name of Robert (his own, they say, being unhappy for kings) a wretched inactive prince, lame, and only govern’d by his brother Walter, who having David the prince upon complaint of som exorbitancys deliver’d to his care, caus’d him to be starv’d; upon which the king intending to send his son James into France, the boy was taken at Flamburg, and kept by our Henry the Fourth: upon the hearing of which his father swounded, and soon after dy’d. His reign was memorable for nothing but his breaking with George earl of March (to whose daughter, upon the payment of a great part of her portion which he never would repay, he had promis’d his son David for a husband) to take the daughter of Douglas who had a greater; which occasion’d the earl of March to make many inrodes with our Henry Hotspur; and a famous duel of three hundred men apiece, whereof on the one side ten remain’d, and on the other one, which was the only way to appease the deadly feuds of these two familys. The interreign was govern’d by Robert, who enjoying the power he had too much coveted, little minded the liberty of his nephew, only he sent som auxiliarys into France, who, they say, behav’d themselves worthily; and his slothful son Mordac, who making his sons so bold with indulgence, that one of them kill’d a falcon on his fist, which he deny’d to give him: he in revenge procur’d the parliament to ransom the king, who had bin eighteen years a prisoner. This James was the first102. of that name, and tho he was an excellent prince, yet had a troublesom reign; first, in regard of a great pension rais’d for his ransom; next, for domestic commotions; and lastly, for raising of mony; which, tho the revenue was exhausted, was call’d covetousness. This having offended Robert Graham, he conspir’d with the earl of Athol, slew him in his chamber, his wife receiving two wounds, endeavoring to defend him.

This James left the Second, a boy of six years, whose infancy, by the misguidance103. of the governor, made a miserable people, and betray’d the earl Douglas to death, and almost all that great family to ruin; but being supplanted by another earl Douglas, the king in his just age suffer’d minority under him, who upon displeasure rebel’d, and was kill’d by the king’s own hand. Afterwards having his middle years perpetually molested with civil broils, yet going to assist the duke of York against Henry the Sixth, he was diverted by an English gentleman that counterfeited himself a Nuncio (which I mention out of a manuscript, because I do not remember it in our storys) and broke up his army. Soon after besieging Roxburg, he was slain by the bursting of a cannon in the twenty-ninth year of his age.

James the Second left a boy of seven years, govern’d by his mother, and afterwards104. by the Boyds; thro the persuasions of astrologers and witches, to whom he was strongly addicted, he declin’d to cruelty; which so inrag’d the nobility, that, headed by his son, they conspir’d against him, routing his forces near Sterling, where he flying to a mill, and asking for a confessor, a priest came, who told him, that tho he was no good priest, yet he was a good leech, and with that stab’d him to the heart. A parlament approv’d his death, and order’d indemnitys to all that had fought against him.

105.James the Fourth, a boy of fifteen years, is made king, govern’d by the murderers of his father; a prodigal, vainglorious prince, slain at Floddon field, or, as som suppose, at Kelsy by the Humes, which (as the manuscript alleges) seems more probable, in regard that the iron belt (to which he added a ring every year) which he wore in repentance for the death of his father, was never found, and there were106 many, the day of battle, habited like him. His successor was his son James, the Fifth of that name, a boy of not above two years of age; under whose minority, what by the misgovernment of tutors, and what by the factions of the nobility, Scotland was wasted almost into famin and solitude: however in his just age he prov’d an industrious prince, yet could not so satisfy the nobility, but that he and they continued in a mutual hate, till that barbarous execution of young Hamilton so fill’d him with remorse, that he dream’d he came and cut off his two arms, and threaten’d after to cut off his head. And he displeas’d the people so much, that he could not make his army fight with the English then in Scotland; whereupon he dy’d of grief, having first heard the death of his two sons, who dy’d at the instant of his dream, and leaving a daughter of five days old, whom he never saw.

107.This was that Mary under whose minority (by the weakness of the governor, and ambition of the cardinal) the kingdom felt all those woes that are threaten’d to them whose king is a child; till at length the prevalency of the English arms (awak’d for her cause) brought the great design of sending her into France to perfection: so that at five years old she was transported, and at fifteen marry’d to the Dolphin Francis, after king; while her mother, a daughter of the Guise, in her regency, exercis’d all rage against the professors of the pure religion then in the dawn. Francis after two years left her a childless widow, so that at eighteen she return’d into Scotland to succeed her mother (then newly dead) in her exorbitancys.

I had almost forgot to tell, that this young couple in the transport of their nuptial solemnitys took the arms and title of England; which indiscrete ambition we may suppose first quicken’d the jealousy of Elizabeth against her, which after kindl’d so great a flame.

In Scotland she shew’d what a strange influence loose education has upon youth, and the weaker sex. All the French effeminacys came over with her, and the court lost that little severity which was left. David Rizio, an Italian fidler, was the only favorit, and it is too much fear’d, had those enjoyments which no woman can give but she that gives away her honor and chastity.

But a little after, Henry lord Darnly coming with Matthew earl of Lenox, his father, into Scotland, she cast an ey upon him, and marry’d him. Whether it were to strengthen her pretension to England, he being com of Henry the Seventh’s daughter, as we shall tell anon, or to color her adulterys, and hide the shame of an impregnation (tho some have whisper’d, that she never conceiv’d, and that the son was supposititious) or som phrenzy of affection drew her that way; certain it is she soon declin’d her affection to her husband, and increas’d it to David (he being her perpetual companion at board, and managing all affairs, while the king with a contemtible train was sent away) insomuch that som of the nobility that could not digest this, enter’d into a conspiracy, which the king headed, and slew him in her chamber.

This turn’d all her neglect of the king into rage, so that her chiefest business was to appease her favorit’s ghost with the slaughter of her husband; poison was first attemted, but it being (it seems) too weak, or his youth overcoming it, that expectation fail’d. But the devil and Bothwel furnish’d her with another that succeded; she so intices him, being so sick that they were forc’d to bring him in a horslitter to Edinburg, where she cherish’d him extremely, till the credulous young man began to lay aside suspicion, and to hope better: so she puts him into a ruinous house near the palace, from whence no news can be had, brings in her own bed, and lys in the house with him; and at length when the design was ripe, causes him one Sunday night, with his servant, to be strangl’d, thrown out of the window, and the house to be blown up with gunpowder, her own rich bed having bin before secretly convey’d away. This and other performances made her favor upon Bothwel so hot, that she must marry him; the only obstacle was, he had a wife already; but she was compel’d to sue for a divorce, which (so great persons being concern’d) it was a wonder it should be granting so long as ten days. Well, she marrys; but the more honest nobility amaz’d at those exorbitancys, assemble together, and with arms in their hands begin to expostulat. The newmarry’d couple are forc’d to make back southwards; where finding but slender assistance, and the queen foolishly coming from Dunbar to Leith, was glad at last to delay a parly till her dear was escap’d; and then (clad in an old tatter’d coat) to yield herself a prisoner.

Being brought to Edinburg, and us’d rather with hate of her former enormitys, than pity of her present fortune, she receiv’d a message, that she must either resign the crown to her son James (that was born in the time of her marriage with Darnly) or else they would procede to another election, and was forc’d to obey. So the child then in his cradle was acknowleg’d James the Sixth, better known108. afterwards by the title of Great Britain.

The wretched mother flying after into England, was entertain’d (tho with a guard) by queen Elizabeth; but after that being suborn’d by the Papists, and exasperated by the Guizes, she enter’d into plots and machinations, so inconsistent with the safety of England, that by an act of parlament she was condemn’d to death, which she receiv’d by a hatchet at Fotheringay castle.

The infancy of her son was attended with those domestic evils that accompany the minority of kings. In his youth he took to wife the daughter of Denmark (a woman I hear little of, saving the character Salust gives Sempronia, that she could dance better than became a virtuous woman) with whom he supposing the earl Gowry too much in league, caus’d him and his brother to be slain at their own house whither he was invited; he giving out, that they had an intent to murder him; and that by miracle and the assistance of som men (whom he had instructed for that purpose, and taught their tale) he escap’d. For this deliverance (or to say better, assassination) he blasphem’d God with a solemn thanksgiving once a year all the remainder of his life.

Well had it bin for us, if our forefathers had laid hold of that happy opportunity of Elizabeth’s death (in which the Teuthors took a period) to have perform’d that which, perhaps in due punishment, has cost us so much blood and sweat; and not have bow’d under the sway of a stranger, disdain’d by the most generous and wise at that time, and only supported by the faction of som, and the sloth of others; who brought but a slender title, and (however the flattery of the times cry’d him up for a Solomon) weak commendations for such an advancement.

His title stood thus, Margaret, eldest daughter to Henry the Seventh, was marry’d to James the Fourth, whose son James the Fifth had Mary the mother of James the Sixth. Margaret after her first husband’s death, marrys Archibald Douglas earl of Angus, who upon her begot Margaret wife of Matthew earl of Lenox, and mother of that Henry Darnly, whose tragical end we just now mention’d. Now upon this slender title, and our internal dissensions (for the Cecilians and Essexians, for several ends, made perpetual applications) got Jammy from a revenue of 30,000 l. to one of almost two millions, tho there were others that had as fair pretences (and what else can any of them make?) the statute of 25 Edw. 3. expresly excluding foreners from the crown: and so the children of Charles Brandon by Mary the second daughter, dowager of France, being next to com in. And the lady Arabella being sprung from a third husband (the lord Stuart) of the said Margaret, and by a male line, carry’d surely so formidable a pretension (it should seem) that even that iniquity which was personally inherent to her, made her days very unhappy, and for most part captive, and her death (’tis thought) somewhat too early; so cruel are the persecutions of cowardly minds, even against the weakest and most unprotected innocence.

And indeed his right to the crown was so unsatisfactory even to the most judicious of those days, that Toby Matthews having suit about som privileges which he claim’d to his bishoprick (which was then Durham) wherin the king oppos’d him; and having one day stated the case before som of his friends, who seem’d to approve of it; yes, says he, I could wish he had but half so good a title to the crown. And ’tis known that som speeches of Sir Walter Rawley, too generous and English for the times, was that which brought him to trial and condemnation for a feign’d crime; and afterwards so facilitated that barbarous design of Gundamar, to cut off his head for a crime, for which he was condemn’d fourteen years before, and which by the commissions he after receiv’d (according to the opinion of the then lord chancellor, and the greatest lawyers) was in law pardon’d.

This may appear besides our purpose; but we could not sever this consideration, unless we would draw him with a half-face, and leave as much in umbrage as we exprest. That which most solemniz’d his person was, first the consideration of his adhering to the Protestant religion; wheras we are to consider that those slight velitations he had with Bellarmin and the Romanists, tended rather to make his own authority more intrinsically intense and venerable, than to confute any thing they said: for he had before shak’d them off as to foren jurisdiction; and for matter of popery, it appear’d in his latter time that he was no such enemy to it, both by his own compliances with the Spanish embassadors, the design of the Spanish match (in which his son was personally imbarkt) and the slow assistances sent to his daughter, in whose safety and protection Protestantism was at that time so much concern’d.

For his knowlege, he had some glancings and niblings, which the severity of the excellent Buchanan forc’d into him in his younger time, and after conversation somwhat polish’d. But tho I bear not so great a contemt to his other works, as Ben Johnson did to his poetry, yet if they among many others were going to the fire, they would not be one of the first I should rescue, as possibly expecting a more severe and refin’d judgment in many others; and knowing that he had so many able wits at command, might easily give their oracles thro his mouth. But suppose the things generous and fit to live (as I am not yet convinc’d) yet what condemnation is this to a king, who should have other business than spinning and weaving fine theorys, and engaging in school chiquaneries? which was well understood by Henry the Fourth, who hearing som men celebrat him with these attributes; yes (answer’d he, very tartly) He is a fine king, and writes little books.

Tis true, he was a good drol, and possibly after Greec wine somwhat factious: but of his substantial and heroic wisdom I have not heard any great instances. He himself us’d to brag of his kingcraft, which was not to render his people happy, and to prosecute the ends of a good king, but to scrue up the prerogative, divert parlaments from the due disquisition and prosecution of their freedoms, and to break them up at pleasure; and indeed his parting with the cautionary towns of the low countrys, and that for so small a sum, shew’d him a person not so quick-sighted, or unfit to be overreach’d.

For his peaceable reign, honourable and just quarrels he wanted not; but sloth and cowardice witheld him: and indeed the ease and luxury of those times fomented and nourish’d those lurking and pestilent humours, which afterwards so dangerously broke out in his son’s reign.

We shall not trouble his ashes with the mention of his personal faults; only, if we may compare God’s judgments with apparent sins, we may find the latter end of his life neither fortunat nor comfortable to him. His wife distasted by him, and som say, languishing of a foul disease; his eldest son dying with too violent symptoms of poison, and that, as is fear’d, by a hand too much ally’d; his second (against whom he ever had a secret antipathy) scarce return’d from a mad and dangerous voyage; his daughter (all that was left of that sex) banish’d, with her numerous issue, out of her husband’s dominion, and living in miserable exile; and lastly, himself dying of a violent death by poison, in which his son was more than suspected to have a hand, as may be infer’d from Buckingham’s plea, that he did it by the command of the prince, and Charles’s dissolution of the parlament that took in hand to examin it; and lastly his indifferency at Buckingham’s death (tho he pretended all love to him alive) as glad to be rid of so dangerous and so considerable a partner of his guilt. Yet the miter’d Parasits of those times could say, that one went to heaven in Noah’s ark, the other in Elisha’s chariot, he dying of a pretended fever, she (as they said) of a dropsy.

Charles having now obtain’d his brother’s inheritance, carry’d himself in managing109. of it like one that gain’d it as he did. The first of his acts was that glorious attemt upon the ile of Rhee. The next, that noble and christian betraying of Rochel, and consequently in a manner the whole Protestant interest in France. The middle of the reign was heightening of prerogative and prelacy, and conforming our churches to the pattern of Rome; till at last just indignation brought his subjects of Scotland into England, and so forc’d him to call a parlament: which tho he shamelesly says in the first line of the book, call’d his, was out of his own inclination to parlaments, yet how well he lik’d them, may appear by his first tampering with his own army in the north, to surprize and dissolve them; then with the Scots, who at that time were court proof; then raising up the Irish rebellion, which has wasted millions of lives; and lastly, his open secession from Westminster, and hostility against the two houses, which maintain’d a first and second sharp war, that had almost ruin’d the nation, had not Providence in a manner immediatly interpos’d and rescu’d us to liberty, and made us such signal instruments of his vengeance, that all wicked kings may tremble at the example.

In a word, never was man so resolute and obstinat in a tyranny; never people more strangely besotted with it. To paint the image of David with his face, and blasphemously to parallel him with Christ, would make one at first thought think him a saint: but to compare his protestations and actions; his actions of the day, his actions of the night; his Protestant religion, and his courting of the Pope; and obedience to his wife; we may justly say, he was one of the most consummat in the arts of tyranny that ever was. And it could be no other than God’s hand that arrested him in the height of his designs and greatness, and cut off him and his family, making good his own imprecations on his own head.

110.Our scene is again in Scotland, which has accepted his son, whom for distinction sake we will be content to call Charles the Second. Certainly these people were strangely blind as to God’s judgments perpetually pour’d out upon a family; or else wonderfully addicted to their own interest, to admit the spray of such a stock; one that has so little to commend him, and so great improbability to further their designs and happiness ; a Popish education, if not religion too, however for the present he may seem to dissemble it; France, the Jesuits, and his mother, good means of such an improvement; the dangerous maxims of his father, besides the revenge he ows his death, of which he will never totally acquit the Scots; his hate to the whole nation; his sense of Montrose’s death; his backwardness to com to them till all other means fail’d (both his foren beg’d assistances, his propositions to the Pope, and commissions to Montrose) and lastly, his late running away to his old friends in the north; so that any man may see his present compliance to be but histrionical and forc’d, and that as soon as he has led them into the snare, and got power into his own hands, so as that he may appear once more barefac’d, he will be a scourge upon them for their gross hypocrisy, and leave them a sad instance to all nations, how dangerous it is to espouse such an interest, against which God with so visible and severe a hand does fight, carry’d on by and for the support of a tyrannizing nobility and clergy, and wherin the poor people are blindly led on by those afrighting (but false and ungrounded) pretensions of perfidy and perjury, and made instrumental with their own estates and blood towards inslaving and ruining themselves.



The Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland.

Quid rides? mutato nomine, de te Fabula narratur.



Pliny’s description of Oceana.OCEANA is saluted by the Panegyrist after this manner; O the most blest and fortunat of all countrys, OCEANA! how deservedly has Nature with the bountys of heaven and earth indu’d thee? thy ever-fruitful womb not clos’d with ice, nor dissolv’d by the raging star; where Ceres and Bacchus are perpetual twins. Thy woods are not the harbor of devouring beasts, nor thy continual verdure the ambush of serpents, but the food of innumerable herds and flocks presenting thee their shepherdess with distended dugs, or golden fleeces. The wings of thy night involve thee not in the horror of darkness, but have still som white feather; and thy day is (that for which we esteem life) the longest. But this extasy of Pliny (as is observ’d by Bertius) seems to allude as well to Marpesia and Panopea, now provinces of this commonwealth, as to Oceana it self.

The nature of the People.To speak of the people in each of these countrys, this of Oceana for so soft a one, is the most martial in the whole world. Let states that aim at greatness (says Verulamius) take heed how their nobility and gentlemen multiply too fast, for that makes the common subject grow to be a peasant and base swain driven out of heart, and in effect but a gentleman’s laborer; just as you may see in coppice woods, if you leave the staddels too thick, you shall never have clean underwood, but shrubs and bushes: so in countrys, if the gentlemen be too many, the commons will be base; and you will bring it to that at last, that not the hundredth poll will be fit for a helmet, specially as to the infantry, which is the nerve of an army, and so there will be great population and little strength. This of which I speak has bin no where better seen than by comparing of Oceana and France, whereof Oceana, tho far less in territory and population, has bin nevertheless an overmatch, in regard the middle people of Oceana make good soldiers, which the peasants in France do not. In which words Verulamius (as Machiavel has don before him) harps much upon a string which he has not perfectly tun’d, and that is the balance of dominion or property: as it follows more plainly in his praise of the profound and admirable device of Panurgus king of Oceana, in making farms and houses of husbandry of a standard; that is, maintain’d with such a proportion of land to them, as may breed a subject to live in convenient plenty, and no servil condition, and to keep the plow in the hand of the owners, and not mere hirelings. And thus indeed (says he) you shall attain to Virgil’s character* which he gives of antient Italy.

But the tillage bringing up a good soldiery, brings up a good commonwealth; which the author in the praise of Panurgus did not mind, nor Panurgus in deserving that praise: for where the owner of the plow coms to have the sword too, he will use it in defence of his own; whence it has happen’d that the people of Oceana in proportion to their property have bin always free. And the genius of this nation has ever had som resemblance with that of antient Italy, which was wholly addicted to commonwealths, and where Rome came to make the greatest account of her rustic tribes, and to call her consuls from the plow; for in the way of parlaments, which was the government of this realm, men of country-lives have bin still intrusted with the greatest affairs, and the people have constantly had an aversion to the ways of the court. Ambition loving to be gay, and to fawn, has bin a gallantry look’d upon as having somthing in it of the livery; and husbandry, or the country way of life, tho of a grosser spinning, as the best stuf of a commonwealth, according to Aristotle, such a one being the most obstinat assertress of her liberty, and the least subject to innovation or turbulency. Wherfore till the foundations (as will be hereafter shew’d) were remov’d, this people was observ’d to be the least subject to shakings and turbulency of any: wheras commonwealths, upon which the city life has had the stronger influence, as Athens, have seldom or never bin quiet; but at the best are found to have injur’d their own business by overdoing it. Whence the Urban tribes of Rome, consisting of the Turba forensis, and Libertins that had receiv’d their freedom by manumission, were of no reputation in comparison of the rustics. It is true, that with Venice it may seem to be otherwise, in regard the gentlemen (for so are all such call’d as have a right to that government) are wholly addicted to the city life: but then the Turba forensis, the secretarys, Cittadini, with the rest of the populace, are wholly excluded. Otherwise a commonwealth, consisting but of one city, would doubtless be stormy, in regard that ambition would be every man’s trade: but where it consists of a country, the plow in the hands of the owner finds him a better calling, and produces the most innocent and steddy genius of a commonwealth, such as is that of Oceana.

The nature of the Marpesians.Marpesia, being the northern part of the same iland, is the dry nurse of a populous and hardy nation, but where the staddels have bin formerly too thick: whence their courage answer’d not their hardiness, except in the nobility, who govern’d that country much after the manner of Poland; but that the king was not elective till the people receiv’d their liberty, the yoke of the nobility being broke by the commonwealth of Oceana, which in grateful return is thereby provided with an inexhaustible magazin of auxiliarys.

The nature of the Panopeans.Panopea, the soft mother of a slothful and pusillanimous people, is a neighbor iland, antiently subjected by the arms of Oceana; since almost depopulated for shaking the yoke, and at length replanted with a new race. But (thro what virtues of the soil, or vice of the air soever it be) they com still to degenerat. Wherfore seeing it is neither likely to yield men fit for arms, nor necessary it should; it had bin the interest of Oceana so to have dispos’d of this province, being both rich in the nature of the soil, and full of commodious ports for trade, that it might have bin order’d for the best in relation to her purse: which in my opinion (if it had bin thought upon in time) might have bin best don by planting it with Jews, allowing them their own rites and laws; for that would have brought them suddenly from all parts of the world, and in sufficient numbers. And tho the Jews be now altogether for merchandize, yet in the land of Canaan (except since their exile from whence they have not bin landlords) they were altogether for agriculture: and there is no cause why a man should doubt, but having a fruitful country, and excellent ports too, they would be good at both. Panopea well peopled, would be worth a matter of four millions dry rents; that is, besides the advantage of the agriculture and trade, which, with a nation of that industry, coms at least to as much more. Wherfore Panopea being farm’d out to the Jews and their heirs for ever, for the pay of a provincial army to protect them during the term of seven years, and for two millions annual revenue from that time forward, besides the customs which would pay the provincial army, would have bin a bargain of such advantage, both to them and this commonwealth, as is not to be found otherwise by either. To receive the Jews after any other manner into a commonwealth, were to maim it: for they of all nations never incorporat, but taking up the room of a limb, are of no use or office to the body, while they suck the nourishment which would sustain a natural and useful member.

If Panopea had bin so dispos’d of, that knapsack, with the Marpesian auxiliary, had bin an inestimable treasure; the situation of these countrys being ilands (as appears by Venice how advantageous such a one is to the like government) seems to have bin design’d by God for a commonwealth.The situation of the commonwealth of Oceana. And yet that, thro the streitness of the place and defect of proper arms, can be no more than a commonwealth for preservation: wheras this, reduc’d to the like government, is a commonwealth for increase, and upon the mightiest foundation that any has bin laid from the beginning of the world to this day.

Illam arctâ capiens Neptunus compede stringit:

Hanc autem glaucis captus complectitur ulnis.

The sea gives law to the growth of Venice, but the growth of Oceana gives law to the sea.

These countrys having bin antiently distinct and hostil kingdoms, came by Morpheus the Marpesian (who succeeded by hereditary right to the crown of Oceana) not only to be join’d under one head; but to be cast, as it were by a charm, into that profound sleep, which, broken at length by the trumpet of civil war, has produc’d those effects, that have given occasion to the insuing discourse, divided into four parts.


1. The Preliminarys, shewing the principles of government.

2. The Council of Legislators, shewing the art of making a commonwealth.

3. The Model of the Commonwealth of Oceana, shewing the effect of such an art.

4. The Corollary, shewing som consequences of such a government.

The Preliminarys, shewing the principles of government.

JANOTTI, the most excellent describer of the commonwealth of Venice, divides the whole series of government into two times or periods: the one ending with the liberty of Rome, which was the course or empire, as I may call it, of antient prudence, first discover’d to mankind by God himself in the fabric of the commonwealth of Israel, and afterwards pick’d out of his footsteps in nature, and unanimously follow’d by the Greecs and Romans: the other beginning with the arms of Cæsar, which, extinguishing liberty, were the transition of antient into modern prudence, introduc’d by those inundations of Huns, Goths, Vandals, Lombards, Saxons, which, breaking the Roman empire, deform’d the whole face of the world with those ill features of government, which at this time are becom far worse in these western parts, except Venice, which escaping the hands of the Barbarians, by virtue of its impregnable situation, has had its ey fix’d upon antient prudence, and is attain’d to a perfection even beyond the copy.

Definitions of government.Relation being had to these two times, government (to define it de jure, or according to antient prudence) is an art wherby a civil society of men is instituted and preserv’d upon the foundation of common right or interest; or (to follow Aristotle and Livy) it is the empire of laws, and not of men.

And government (to define it de facto, or according to modern prudence) is an art wherby som man, or som few men, subject a city or a nation, and rule it according to his or their privat interest: which, because the laws in such cases are made according to the interest of a man, or of som few familys, may be said to be the empire of men, and not of laws.

The former kind is that which Machiavel (whose books are neglected) is the only politician that has gon about to retrieve; and that Leviathan (who would have his book impos’d upon the universitys) gos about to destroy.Pag. 180. For, It is (says he) another error of Aristotles politics, that in a well-order’d commonwealth not men should govern, but the laws.Pag. 377. What man that has his natural senses, tho he can neither write nor read, dos not find himself govern’d by them he fears, and believes can kill or hurt him when he obeys not? Or, who believes that the law can hurt him, which is but words and paper, without the hands and swords of men? I confess, that * the magistrat upon his bench is that to the law, which a gunner upon his platform is to his cannon. Nevertheless, I should not dare to argue with a man of any ingenuity after this manner. A whole army, tho they can neither write nor read, are not afraid of a platform, which they know is but earth or stone; nor of a cannon, which without a hand to give fire to it, is but cold iron; therfore a whole army is afraid of one man. But of this kind is the ratiocination of Leviathan (as I shall shew in divers places that com in my way) throout his whole politics, or worse; as where he says of Aristotle and of Cicero, of the Greecs, and of the Romans, who liv’d under popular states, that they deriv’d those rights not from the principles of nature, but transcrib’d them into their books, out of the practice of their own commonwealths, as grammarians describe the rules of language out of poets.Pag. 111. Which is as if a man should tell famous Hervy, that he transcrib’d his circulation of the blood not out of the principles of nature, but out of the anatomy of this or that body.

To go on therfore with his preliminary discourse, I shall divide it (according to the two definitions of government relating to Janotti’s two times) in two parts. The first treating of the principles of government in general, and according to the antients: the second treating of the late governments of Oceana in particular, and in that of modern prudence.

Division of government.Government, according to the antients, and their learn’d disciple Machiavel, the only politician of later ages, is of three kinds; the government of one man, or of the better sort, or of the whole people: which by their more learn’d names are call’d monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. These they hold, thro their proneness to degenerat, to be all evil. For wheras they that govern should govern according to reason, if they govern according to passion, they do that which they should not do. Wherfore as reason and passion are two things, so government by reason is one thing, and the corruption of government by passion is another thing, but not always another government: as a body that is alive is one thing, and a body that is dead is another thing, but not always another creature, tho the corruption of one coms at length to be the generation of another. The corruption then of monarchy is call’d tyranny; that of aristocracy, oligarchy; and that of democracy, anarchy. But legislators having found these three governments at the best to be naught, have invented another consisting of a mixture of them all, which only is good. This is the doctrin of the antients.

But Leviathan is positive, that they are all deceiv’d, and that there is no other government in nature than one of the three; as also that the flesh of them cannot stink, the names of their corruptions being but the names of mens phansies, which will be understood when we are shown which of them was Senatus Populusque Romanus.

To go my own way, and yet to follow the antients, the principles of government are twofold; internal, or the goods of the mind; and external, or the goods of fortune.Goods of the mind and of fortune. The goods of the mind are natural or acquir’d virtues, as wisdom, prudence, and courage, &c. The goods of fortune are riches. There be goods also of the body, as health, beauty, strength; but these are not to be brought into account upon this score, because if a man or an army acquires victory or empire, it is more from their disciplin, arms, and courage, than from their natural health, beauty, or strength, in regard that a people conquer’d may have more of natural strength, beauty and health, and yet find little remedy. The principles of government then are in the goods of the mind, or in the goods of fortune.Empire and authority. To the goods of the mind answers authority; to the goods of fortune, power or empire. Wherfore Leviathan, tho he be right where he says that riches are power, is mistaken where he says that prudence, or the reputation of prudence, is power: for the learning or prudence of a man is no more power than the learning or prudence of a book or author, which is properly authority. A learned writer may have authority tho he has no power; and a foolish magistrat may have power, tho he has otherwise no esteem or authority. The difference of these two is observ’d by Livy in Evander, of whom he says,* that he govern’d rather by the authority of others, than by his own power.

Empire.To begin with riches, in regard that men are hung upon these, not of choice as upon the other, but of necessity and by the teeth: for as much as he who wants bread, is his servant that will feed him; if a man thus feeds a whole people, they are under his empire.

Division of empire.Empire is of two kinds, domestic and national, or foren and provincial.

Domestic empire.Domestic empire is founded upon dominion.

Dominion.Dominion is property real or personal, that is to say, in lands, or in mony and goods.

Balance in lands.Lands, or the parts and parcels of a territory, are held by the proprietor or proprietors, lord or lords of it, in som proportion; and such (except it be in a city that has little or no land, and whose revenue is in trade) as is the proportion or balance of dominion or property in land, such is the nature of the empire.

Absolute monarchy.If one man be sole landlord of a territory, or overbalance the people, for example three parts in four, he is Grand Signior: for so the Turk is call’d from his property; and his empire is absolute monarchy.

Mix’d monarchy.If the few or a nobility, or a nobility with the clergy be landlords, or overbalance the people to the like proportion, it makes the Gothic balance (to be shewn at large in the second part of this discourse) and the empire is mix’d monarchy, as that of Spain, Poland, and late of Oceana.

Popular government.And if the whole people be landlords, or hold the lands so divided among them, that no one man, or number of men, within the compass of the few or aristocracy, overbalance them, the empire (without the interposition of force) is a commonwealth.

Tyranny.If force be interpos’d in any of these three cases, it must either frame the government to the foundation, or the foundation to the government;Oligarchy. or holding the government not according to the balance, it is not natural, but violent:Anarchy. and therfore if it be at the devotion of a prince, it is tyranny; if at the devotion of the few, oligarchy; or if in the power of the people, anarchy. Each of which confusions, the balance standing otherwise, is but of short continuance, because against the nature of the balance, which, not destroy’d, destroys that which opposes it.

But there be certain other confusions, which, being rooted in the balance, are of longer continuance, and of worse consequence; as, first, where a nobility holds half the property, or about that proportion, and the people the other half; in which case, without altering the balance, there is no remedy but the one must eat out the other: as the people did the nobility in Athens, and the nobility the people in Rome. Secondly, when a prince holds about half the dominion, and the people the other half (which was the case of the Roman emperors, planted partly upon their military colonies, and partly upon the senat and the people) the government becoms a very shambles both of the princes and the people. Somwhat of this nature are certain governments at this day, which are said to subsist by confusion. In this case, to fix the balance, is to entail misery: but in the three former, not to fix it, is to lose the government. Wherfore it being unlawful in Turky, that any should possess land but the Grand Signior, the balance is fix’d by the law, and that empire firm. Nor, tho the kings often fell, was the throne of Oceana known to shake, until the statute of alienations broke the pillars, by giving way to the nobility to sell their estates.* While Lacedemon held to the division of land made by Lycurgus, it was immoveable; but, breaking that, could stand no longer. This kind of law fixing the balance in lands is call’d Agrarian, and was first introduc’d by God himself, who divided the land of Canaan to his people by lots, and is of such virtue, that wherever it has held, that government has not alter’d, except by consent; as in that unparallel’d example of the people of Israel, when being in liberty they would needs chuse a king. But without an Agrarian, government, whether monarchical, aristocratical, or popular, has no long lease.

As for dominion personal or in mony, it may now and then stir up a Melius or a Manlius, which, if the commonwealth be not provided with som kind of dictatorian power, may be dangerous, tho it has bin seldom or never successful: because to property producing empire, it is requir’d that it should have som certain root or foot-hold, which, except in land, it cannot have, being otherwise as it were upon the wing.

Balance in mony.Nevertheless, in such cities as subsist mostly by trade, and have little or no land, as Holland and Genoa, the balance of treasure may be equal to that of land in the cases mention’d.

But Leviathan, tho he seems to scew at antiquity, following his furious master Carneades, has caught hold of the public sword, to which he reduces all manner and matter of government; as, where he affirms this opinion [that any monarch receives his power by covenant, that is to say, upon conditions] to procede from the not understanding this easy truth, That covenants being but words and breath, have no power to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what they have from the public sword.Pag. 89. But as he said of the law, that without this sword it is but paper; so he might have thought of this sword, that without a hand it is but cold iron. The hand which holds this sword is the militia of a nation; and the militia of a nation is either an army in the field, or ready for the field upon occasion. But an army is a beast that has a great belly, and must be fed; wherfore this will com to what pastures you have, and what pastures you have will com to the balance of property, without which the public sword is but a name or mere spitfrog.Arms and contracts. Wherfore to set that which Leviathan says of arms and of contracts a little streighter; he that can graze this beast with the great belly, as the Turk does his Timariots, may well deride him that imagines he receiv’d his power by covenant, or is oblig’d to any such toy: it being in this case only that covenants are but words and breath. But if the property of the nobility, stock’d with their tenants and retainers, be the pasture of that beast, the ox knows his master’s crib; and it is impossible for a king in such a constitution to reign otherwise than by covenant; or if he breaks it, it is words that com to blows.

Pag. 90.But, says he, when an assembly of men is made soverain, then no man imagins any such covenant to have past in the institution. But what was that by Publicola of appeal to the people, or that wherby the people had their tribuns? Fy, says he, no body is so dull as to say, that the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans, to hold the soverainty on such or such conditions; which not perform’d, the Romans might depose the Roman people. In which there be several remarkable things; for he holds the commonwealth of Rome to have consisted of one assembly, wheras it consisted of the senat and the people; That they were not upon covenant, wheras every law enacted by them was a covenant between them; That the one assembly was made soverain, wheras the people, who only were soverain, were such from the beginning, as appears by the antient stile of their covenants or laws,* The senat has resolv’d, the people have decreed; That a council being made soverain, cannot be made such upon conditions, wheras the Decemvirs being a council that was made soverain, was made such upon conditions; That all conditions or covenants making a soverain, the soverain being made, are void; whence it must follow, that, the Decemviri being made, were ever after the lawful government of Rome, and that it was unlawful for the commonwealth of Rome to depose the Decemvirs; as also that Cicero, if he wrote otherwise out of his commonwealth, did not write out of nature.Pag. 89. But to com to others that see more of this balance.

B. 5, 3. 3. 9.You have Aristotle full of it in divers places, especially where he says, that immoderate wealth, as where one man or the few have greater possessions than the equality or the frame of the commonwealth will bear, is an occasion of sedition, which ends for the greater part in monarchy; and that for this cause the ostracism has bin receiv’d in divors places, as in Argos and Athens. But that it were better to prevent the growth in the beginning, than, when it has got head, to seek the remedy of such an evil.

D. B. 1, c. 55.Machiavel has miss’d it very narrowly and more dangerously; for not fully perceiving that if a commonwealth be gall’d by the gentry, it is by their overbalance, he speaks of the gentry as hostil to popular governments, and of popular governments as hostil to the gentry; and makes us believe that the people in such are so inrag’d against them, that where they meet a gentleman they kill him: which can never be prov’d by any one example, unless in civil war; seeing that even in Switzerland the gentry are not only safe, but in honor. But the balance, as I have laid it down, tho unseen by Machiavel, is that which interprets him, and that which he confirms by his judgment in many others as well as in this place, where he concludes, That he who will go about to make a commonwealth where there be many gentlemen, unless he first destroys them, undertakes an impossibility. And that he who goes about to introduce monarchy where the condition of the people is equal, shall never bring it to pass, unless he cull out such of them as are the most turbulent and ambitious, and make them gentlemen or noblemen, not in name but in effect; that is, by inriching them with lands, castles, and treasures, that may gain them power among the rest, and bring in the rest to dependence upon themselves, to the end that they maintaining their ambition by the prince, the prince may maintain his power by them.

Wherfore as in this place I agree with Machiavel, that a nobility or gentry, overbalancing a popular government, is the utter bane and destruction of it; so I shall shew in another, that a nobility or gentry, in a popular government, not overbalancing it, is the very life and soul of it.

The right of the militia stated.By what has bin said, it should seem that we may lay aside further disputes of the public sword, or of the right of the militia; which, be the government what it will, or let it change how it can, is inseparable from the overbalance in dominion: nor, if otherwise stated by the law or custom (as in the commonwealth of Rome*, where the people having the sword, the nobility came to have the overbalance) avails it to any other end than destruction. For as a building swaying from the foundation must fall, so it fares with the law swaying from reason, and the militia from the balance of dominion. And thus much for the balance of national or domestic empire, which is in dominion.

The balance of foren empire.The balance of foren or provincial empire is of a contrary nature. A man may as well say, that it is unlawful for him who has made a fair and honest purchase to have tenants, as for a government that has made a just progress, and inlargement of it self, to have provinces. But how a province may be justly acquir’d, appertains to another place. In this I am to shew no more than how or upon what kind of balance it is to be held; in order wherto I shall first shew upon what kind of balance it is not to be held. It has bin said, that national or independent empire, of what kind soever, is to be exercis’d by them that have the proper balance of dominion in the nation; wherfore provincial or dependent empire is not to be exercis’d by them that have the balance of dominion in the province, because that would bring the government from provincial and dependent, to national and independent. Absolute monarchy, as that of the Turks, neither plants its people at home nor abroad, otherwise than as tenants for life or at will; wherfore its national and provincial government is all one. But in governments that admit the citizen or subject to dominion in lands, the richest are they that share most of the power at home; wheras the richest among the provincials, tho native subjects, or citizens that have bin transplanted, are least admitted to the government abroad; for men, like flowers or roots being transplanted, take after the soil wherin they grow. Wherfore the commonwealth of Rome, by planting colonys of its citizens within the bounds of Italy, took the best way of propagating itself, and naturalizing the country; wheras if it had planted such colonys without the bounds of Italy, it would have alienated the citizens, and given a root to liberty abroad, that might have sprung up foren, or savage, and hostil to her: wherfore it never made any such dispersion of itself and its strength, till it was under the yoke of the emperors, who disburdening themselves of the people, as having less apprehension of what they could do abroad than at home, took a contrary course.

The Mamalucs (which till any man shew me the contrary, I shall presume to have bin a commonwealth consisting of an army, wherof the common soldier was the people, the commission officer the senat, and the general the prince) were foreners, and by nation Circassians, that govern’d Egypt; wherfore these never durst plant themselves upon dominion, which growing naturally up into the national interest, must have dissolv’d the foren yoke in that province.

The like in some sort may be said of Venice, the government wherof is usually mistaken: for Venice, tho it dos not take in the people, never excluded them. This commonwealth, the orders wherof are the most democratical or popular of all others, in regard of the exquisit rotation of the senat, at the first institution took in the whole people; they that now live under the government without participation of it, are such as have since either voluntarily chosen so to do, or were subdu’d by arms. Wherfore the subject of Venice is govern’d by provinces; and the balance of dominion not standing, as has bin said, with provincial government: as the Mamalucs durst not cast their government upon this balance in their provinces, lest the national interest should have rooted out the foren, so neither dare the Venetians take in their subjects upon this balance, lest the foren interest should root out the national (which is that of the 3000 now governing) and by diffusing the commonwealth throout her territorys, lose the advantage of her situation, by which in great part it subsists. And such also is the government of the Spaniard in the Indies, to which he deputes natives of his own country, not admitting the Creolios to the government of those provinces, tho descended from Spaniards.

But if a prince or a commonwealth may hold a territory that is foren in this, it may be ask’d, why he may not hold one that is native in the like manner? To which I answer, because he can hold a foren by a native territory, but not a native by a foren: and as hitherto I have shewn what is not the provincial balance, so by this answer it may appear what it is, namely, the overbalance of a native territory to a foren; for as one country balances itself by the distribution of property according to the proportion of the same, so one country overbalances another by advantage of divers kinds. For example, the commonwealth of Rome overbalanc’d her provinces by the vigor of a more excellent government oppos’d to a crazier, or by a more exquisit militia oppos’d to one inferior in courage or disciplin. The like was that of the Mamalucs, being a hardy people, to the Ægyptians that were a sost one. And the balance of situation is in this kind of wonderful effect; seeing the king of Denmark, being none of the most potent princes, is able at the Sound to take toll of the greatest: and as this king by the advantage of the land can make the sea tributary; so Venice, by the advantage of the sea, in whose arms she is impregnable, can make the land to feed her Gulf. For the colonys in the Indies, they are yet babes that cannot live without sucking the breasts of their mother citys, but such as I mistake if when they com of age they do not wean themselves: which causes me to wonder at princes that delight to be exhausted in that way. And so much for the principles of power, whether national or provincial, domestic or foren; being such as are external, and founded in the goods of fortune.

Authority.I com to the principles of authority, which are internal, and founded upon the goods of the mind. These the legislator that can unite in his government with those of fortune, coms nearest to the work of God, whose government consists of heaven and earth: which was said by Plato, tho in different words, as, when princes should be philosophers, or philosophers princes, the world would be happy.Eccles. 10. 15. And says Solomon, There is an evil which I have seen under the sun, which procedes from the ruler (enimvero neque nobilem, neque ingenuum,Tacit. nec libertinum quidem armis præponere, regia utilitas est) Folly is set in great dignity,Grot. and the rich (either in virtue and wisdom, in the goods of the mind, or those of fortune upon that balance which gives them a sense of the national interest) sit in low places. I have seen servants upon horses, and princes walking as servants upon the earth. Sad complaints, that the principles of power and of authority, the goods of the mind and of fortune, do not meet and twine in the wreath or crown of empire! wherfore, if we have any thing of piety or of prudence, let us raise our selves out of the mire of privat interest to the contemplation of virtue, and put a hand to the removal of this evil from under the sun; this evil against which no government that is not secur’d, can be good; this evil from which no government that is secure must be perfect. Solomon tells us, that the cause of it is from the ruler, from those principles of power, which, balanc’d upon earthly trash, exclude the heavenly treasures of virtue, and that influence of it upon government, which is authority. We have wander’d the earth to find out the balance of power: but to find out that of authority, we must ascend, as I said, nearer heaven, or to the image of God, which is the soul of man.

The soul of man (whose life or motion is perpetual contemplation or thought) is the mistress of two potent rivals, the one reason, the other passion, that are in continual suit; and, according as she gives up her will to these or either of them, is the felicity or misery which man partakes in this mortal life.

For as whatever was passion in the contemplation of a man, being brought forth by his will into action, is vice and the bondage of sin; so whatever was reason in the contemplation of a man, being brought forth by his will into action, is virtue and the freedom of soul.

Again, as those actions of a man that were sin acquire to himself repentance or shame, and affect others with scorn or pity; so those actions of a man that are virtue acquire to himself honor, and upon others authority.

Now government is no other than the soul of a nation or city: wherfore that which was reason in the debate of a commonwealth being brought forth by the result, must be virtue; and forasmuch as the soul of a city or nation is the soverain power, her virtue must be law. But the government whose law is virtue, and whose virtue is law, is the same whose empire is authority, and whose authority is empire.

Again, if the liberty of a man consists in the empire of his reason, the absence wherof would betray him to the bondage of his passions; then the liberty of a commonwealth consists in the empire of her laws, the absence wherof would betray her to the lust of tyrants. And these I conceive to be the principles upon which Aristotle and Livy (injuriously accus’d by Leviathan for not writing out of nature) have grounded their assertion, That a commonwealth is an empire of laws, and not of men.Pag. 110. But they must not carry it so. For, says he, the liberty, wherof there is so frequent and honourable mention in the historys and philosophy of the antient Greecs and Romans, and the writings and discourses of those that from them have receiv’d all their learning in the politics, is not the liberty of particular men, but the liberty of the commonwealth. He might as well have said, that the estates of particular men in a commonwealth are not the riches of particular men, but the riches of the commonwealth; for equality of estates causes equality of power, and equality of power is the liberty not only of the commonwealth, but of every man. But sure a man would never be thus irreverent with the greatest authors, and positive against all antiquity, without som certain demonstration of truth: and, what is it? why, there is written on the turrets of the city of Lucca in great characters at this day the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence infer, that a particular man has more liberty or immunity from the service of the commonwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether a commonwealth be monarchical or popular, the freedom is the same. The mountain has brought forth, and we have a little equivocation! for to say, that a Luccbese has no more liberty or immunity from the laws of Lucca, than a Turk has from those of Constantinople; and to say that a Lucchese has no more liberty or immunity by the laws of Lucca, than a Turk has by those of Constantinople, are pretty different speeches. The first may be said of all governments alike; the second scarce of any two; much less of these, seeing it is known, that wheras the greatest Basha is a tenant, as well of his head as of his estate, at the will of his lord, the meanest Lucchese that has land, is a freeholder of both, and not to be control’d but by the law, and that fram’d by every privat man to no other end (or they may thank themselves) than to protect the liberty of every privat man, which by that means coms to be the liberty of the commonwealth.

But seeing they that make the laws in commonwealths are but men, the main question seems to be, how a commonwealth coms to be an empire of laws, and not of men? or how the debate or result of a commonwealth is so sure to be according to reason; seeing they who debate, and they who resolve, be but men? and as often as reason is against a man, so often will a man be against reason.Hobs.

This is thought to be a shrewd saying, but will do no harm; for be it so that reason is nothing but interest, there be divers interests, and so divers reasons.

As first, There is privat reason, which is the interest of a privat man.

Secondly, There is reason of state, which is the interest (or error, as was said by Solomon) of the ruler or rulers, that is to say, of the prince, of the nobility, or of the people.

Thirdly, There is that reason, which is the interest of mankind, or of the whole.Hooker. B. 1. Now if we see even in those natural agents that want sense, that as in themselves they have a law which directs them in the means whereby they tend to their own perfection, so likewise that another law there is, which touches them as they are sociable parts united into one body, a law which binds them each to serve to others good, and all to prefer the good of the whole, before whatsoever their own particular; as when stones, or heavy things forsake their ordinary wont or center, and fly upwards, as if they heard themselves commanded to let go the good they privately wish, and to relieve the present distress of nature in common. There is a common right, law of nature, or interest of the whole; which is more excellent, and so acknowledg’d to be by the agents themselves, than the right or interest of the parts only.Grot. Wherfore tho it may be truly said that the creatures are naturally carry’d forth to their proper utility or profit, that ought not to be taken in too general a sense; seeing divers of them abstain from their own profit, either in regard of those of the same kind, or at least of their young.

Mankind then must either be less just than the creature, or acknowlege also his common interest to be common right. And if reason be nothing else but interest, and the interest of mankind be the right interest, then the reason of mankind must be right reason. Now compute well; for if the interest of popular government com the nearest to the interest of mankind, then the reason of popular government must com the nearest to right reason.

But it may be said, that the difficulty remains yet; for be the interest of popular government right reason, a man does not look upon reason as it is right or wrong in itself, but as it makes for him or against him. Wherfore unless you can shew such orders of a government, as, like those of God in nature, shall be able to constrain this or that creature to shake off that inclination which is more peculiar to it, and take up that which regards the common good or interest; all this is to no more end, than to persuade every man in a popular government not to carve himself of that which he desires most, but to be mannerly at the public table, and give the best from himself to decency and the common interest. But that such orders may be establish’d, as may, nay must give the upper hand in all cases to common right or interest, notwithstanding the nearness of that which sticks to every man in privat, and this in a way of equal certainty and facility, is known even to girls, being no other than those that are of common practice with them in divers cases. For example, two of them have a cake yet undivided, which was given between them: that each of them therfore might have that which is due, divide, says one to the other, and I will chuse; or let me divide, and you shall chuse. If this be but once agreed upon, it is enough: for the divident, dividing unequally, loses, in regard that the other takes the better half; wherfore she divides equally, and so both have right. O the depth of the wisdom of God! and yet by the mouths of babes and sucklings has he set forth his strength; that which great philosophers are disputing upon in vain, is brought to light by two harmless girls, even the whole mystery of a commonwealth, which lys only in dividing and chusing. Nor has God (if his works in nature be understood) left so much to mankind to dispute upon, as who shall divide, and who chuse, but distributed them for ever into two orders, wherof the one has the natural right of dividing, and the other of chusing. For example:

The orders of popular government in nature.A Commonwealth is but a civil society of men: let us take any number of men (as twenty) and immediatly make a commonwealth. Twenty men (if they be not all idiots, perhaps if they be) can never com so together, but there will be such a difference in them, that about a third will be wiser, or at least less foolish than all the rest; these upon acquaintance, tho it be but small, will be discover’d, and (as stags that have the largest heads) lead the herd: for while the six discoursing and arguing one with another, shew the eminence of their parts, the fourteen discover things that they never thought on; or are clear’d in divers truths which had formerly perplex’d them. Wherfore in matter of common concernment, difficulty, or danger, they hang upon their lips as children upon their fathers; and the influence thus acquir’d by the fix, the eminence of whose parts are found to be a stay and comfort to the fourteen, is* the authority of the fathers. Wherfore this can be no other than a natural aristocracy diffus’d by God throout the whole body of mankind to this end and purpose; and therfore such as the people have not only a natural, but a positive obligation to make use of as their guides; as where the people of Israel are commanded to take wise men, and understanding, and known among their tribes, to be made rulers over them.Deut. 1. 13. The six then approv’d of, as in the present case, are the senat, not by hereditary right, or in regard of the greatness of their estates only (which would tend to such power as might force or draw the people) but by election for their excellent parts, which tends to the advancement of the influence of their virtue or authority that leads the people. Wherfore the office of the senat is not to be commanders, but counsellors of the people; and that which is proper to counsellors is first to debate, and afterward to give advice in the business whereupon they have debated; whence the decrees of the senat are never laws, nor so call’d: and these being maturely fram’d, it is their duty to propose in the case to the people. Wherfore the senat is no more than the debate of the commonwealth. But to debate, is to discern or put a difference between things that, being alike, are not the same; or it is separating and weighing this reason against that, and that reason against this, which is dividing.

The people.The Senat then having divided, who shall chuse? ask the girls: for if she that divided must have chosen also, it had bin little worse for the other in case she had not divided at all, but kept the whole cake to her self, in regard that being to chuse too, she divided accordingly. Wherfore if the Senat have any farther power than to divide, the commonwealth can never be equal. But in a commonwealth consisting of a single council, there is no other to chuse than that which divided; whence it is, that such a council fails not to scramble, that is, to be factious, there being no other dividing of the cake in that case but among themselves.

Nor is there any remedy but to have another council to chuse. The wisdom of the few may be the light of mankind; but the interest of the few is not the profit of mankind, nor of a commonwealth. Wherfore seeing we have granted interest to be reason, they must not chuse, left it put out their light. But as the council dividing consists of the wisdom of the commonwealth, so the assembly or council chusing should consist of the interest of the commonwealth: as the wisdom of the commonwealth is in the aristocracy, so the interest of the commonwealth is in the whole body of the people. And wheras this, in case the commonwealth consist of a whole nation, is too unweildy a body to be assembled, this council is to consist of such a representative as may be equal, and so constituted, as can never contract any other interest than that of the whole people; the manner wherof, being such as is best shewn by exemplification, I remit to the model. But in the present case, the six dividing, and the fourteen chusing, must of necessity take in the whole interest of the twenty.

Dividing and chusing in the language of a commonwealth is debating and resolving; and whatsoever upon debate of the senat is propos’d to the people, and resolv’d by them, is enacted* by the authority of the fathers, and by the power of the people, which concurring, make a law.

The magistracy.But the law being made, says Leviathan, is but words and paper without the bands and swords of men; wherfore as these two orders of a commonwealth, namely the senat and the people, are legislative, so of necessity there must be a third to be executive of the laws made, and this is the magistracy; in which order, with the rest being wrought up by art, the commonwealth consists of the senat proposing, the people resolving, and the magistracy executing: wherby partaking of the aristocracy as in the senat, of the democracy as in the people, and of monarchy as in the magistracy, it is complete. Now there being no other commonwealth but this in art or nature, it is no wonder if Machiavel has shew’d us that the ancients held this only to be good; but it seems strange to me, that they should hold that there could be any other: for if there be such a thing as pure monarchy, yet that there should be such a one as pure aristocracy, or pure democracy, is not in my understanding. But the magistracy both in number and function is different in different commonwealths. Nevertheless there is one condition of it that must be the same in every one, or it dissolves the commonwealth where it is wanting. And this is no less than that as the hand of the magistrat is the executive power of the law, so the head of the magistrat is answerable to the people, that his execution be according to the law; by which Leviathan may see that the hand or sword that executes the law is in it, and not above it.

The orders of a commonwealth in experience, as thatNow whether I have rightly transcrib’d these principles of a commonwealth out of nature, I shall appeal to God, and to the world. To God in the fabric of the commonwealth of Israel: and to the world in the universal series of antient prudence. But in regard the same commonwealths will be open’d at large in the council of legislators, I shall touch them for the present but slightly, beginning with that of Israel.

Of Israel.The commonwealth of Israel consisted of the senat, the people, and the magistracy.

The people by their first division, which was genealogical, were contain’d under their thirteen tribes, houses, or familys; wherof the firstborn in each was prince of his tribe, and had the leading of it: the tribe of Levi only being set apart to serve at the altar, had no other prince but the high priest.Numb. 1. In their second division they were divided locally by their agrarian, or the distribution of the land of Canaan to them by lot, the tithe of all remaining to Levi; whence according to their local division, the tribes are reckon’d but twelve.Josh. ch. 13, to ch. 42.

The people.The assemblys of the people thus divided were methodically gather’d by trumpets to the congregation; which was, it should seem, of two sorts.Numb. 10. 7. For if it were call’d with one trumpet only, the princes of the tribes and the elders only assembl’d;Numb. 10. 4. but if it were call’d with two, the whole people gather’d themselves to the congregation, for so it is render’d by the English;Numb. 10. 3. but in the Greec it is call’d Ecclesia, or the church of God, and by the Talmudist, the great Synagog.Judg. 20. 2. The word Ecclesia was also anciently and properly us’d for the civil congregations or assemblys of the people in Athens, Lacedemon, and Ephesus, where it is so call’d in Scripture, tho it be otherwise render’d by the translators, not much as I conceive to their commendation, seeing by that means they have lost us a good lesson, the apostles borrowing that name for their spiritual congregations, to the end that we might see they intended the government of the church to be democratical or popular, as is also plain in the rest of their constitutions.Acts 19. 23.

The church or congregation of the people of Israel assembl’d in a military manner, and had the result of the commonwealth, or the power of confirming all their laws, tho propos’d even by God himself; as where they make him king; and where they reject or depose him as civil magistrat, and elect Saul.Judg. 20. 2 It is manifest, that he gives no such example to a legislator in a popular government as to deny or evade the power of the people,Exod. 19. which were a contradiction: but tho he deservedly blames the ingratitude of the people in that action, he commands Samuel,1 Sam. 8. 7. being next under himself supreme magistrat, to hearken to their voice (for where the suffrage of the people goes for nothing, it is no commonwealth) and comforts him saying, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me that I should not reign over them. But to reject him that he should not reign over them, was as civil magistrat to depose him. The power therfore which the people had to depose even God himself as he was civil magistrat, leaves little doubt but that they had power to have rejected any of those laws confirmed by them throout the Scripture,Deut. 29. which (to omit the several parcels) are generally contain’d under two heads, those that were made by covenant with the people in the land of Moab, and those which were made by covenant with the people in Horeb; which two, I think, amount to the whole body of the Israelitish laws.Josh. 7. 16. But if all and every one of the laws of Israel being propos’d by God, were no otherwise enacted than by covenant with the people,Judg 20. 8, 9, 10. then that only which was resolv’d by the people of Israel was their law;1 Sam. 7. 6, 7, 8. and so the result of that commonwealth was in the people. Nor had the people the result only in matter of law,1 Chron. 13. 2. but the power in som cases of judicature; as also the right of levying war;2 Chron. 30. 4. cognizance in matter of religion; and the election of their magistrats, as the judg or dictator, the king, the prince:Judg. 11. 11. which functions were exercised by the Synagoga magna or congregation of Israel, not always in one manner;1 Sam. 10. 17. for sometimes they were perform’d by the suffrage of the people, viva voce; sometimes by the lot only;1 Mac. I. [Editor: illegible character] and at others by the ballot, or by a mixture of the lot with the suffrage, as in the case of Eldad and Medad,Exod. 9. 3, 4, 5. which I shall open with the senate.

Josh. 7.The senat of Israel call’d in the Old Testament the seventy elders, and in the New the sanhedrim (which word is usually translated the council) was appointed by God,1 Sam. 10. [Editor: illegible character] and consisted of seventy elders besides Moses, which were at first elected by the people; but in what manner is rather intimated than shewn. Nevertheless, because I cannot otherwise understand the passage concerning Eldad and Medad,Numb. 11. of whom it is said that they were of them that were written, but went not up to the tabernacle, then with the Talmudists,Deut. [Editor: illegible character] I conceive that Eldad and Medad had the suffrage of the tribes,Numb. 11. and so were written as competitors for magistracy; but coming afterwards to the lot, fail’d of it, and therfore went not up to the tabernacle, or place of confirmation by God, or to the sessionhouse of the senat with the seventy upon whom the lot fell to be senators: for the sessionhouse of the sanhedrim was first in the court of the tabernacle, and afterwards in that of the temple, where it came to be call’d the stone chamber or pavement.John. If this were the ballot of Israel, that of Venice is the same transpos’d: for in Venice the competitor is chosen as it were by the lot, in regard that the electors are so made, and the magistrat is chosen by the suffrage of the great council or assembly of the people. But the sanhedrim of Israel being thus constituted, Moses for his time, and after him his successor, sat in the midst of it as prince or archon, and at his left hand the orator or father of the senat; the rest or the bench coming round with either horn like a crescent, had a scribe attending upon the tip of it.

This senat, in regard the legislator of Israel was infallible, and the laws given by God such as were not fit to be altered by men, is much different in the exercise of their power from all other senats, except that of the Areopagits in Athens, which also was little more than a supreme judicatory; for it will hardly, as I conceive, be found that the sanhedrim propos’d to the people till the return of the children of Israel out of captivity under Esdras, at which time there was a new law made, namely, for a kind of excommunication, or rather banishment, which had never bin before in Israel. Nevertheless it is not to be thought that the sanhedrim had not always that right, which from the time of Esdras is more frequently exercis’d, of proposing to the people, but that they forbore it in regard of the fulness and infallibility of the law already made, wherby it was needless.The magistracy. Wherfore the function of this council, which is very rare in a senat, was executive, and consisted in the administration of the law made; and wheras the council it self is often und rstood in Scripture by the priest and the Levit, there is no more in that save only that the priests and the Levits, who otherwise had no power at all, being in the younger years of this commonwealth, those that were best study’d in the laws were the most frequently elected into the sanhedrim.Deut. 17. 9. 10, 11. For the courts consisting of three and twenty elders sitting in the gates of every city, and the triumvirats of judges constituted almost in every village, which were parts of the executive magistracy subordinat to the sanhedrim, I shall take them at better leisure, and in the larger discourse; but these being that part of this commonwealth which was instituted by Moses upon the advice of Jethro the priest of Midian (as I conceive a Heathen) are to me a sufficient warrant even from God himself who confirm’d them, to make farther use of human prudence, wherever I find it bearing a testimony to it self, whether in Heathen commonwealths or others: and the rather, because so it is, that we who have the holy Scriptures, and in them the original of a commonwealth, made by the same hand that made the world, are either altogether blind or negligent of it; while the Heathens have all written theirs, as if they had had no other copy: as, to be more brief in the present account of that which you shall have more at large hereafter:Exod. 18.

Of Athens.Athens consisted of the senat of the Bean proposing, of the church or assembly of the people resolving, and too often debating, which was the ruin of it; as also of the senat of the Areopagits, the nine archons, with divers other magistrats executing.

Of Lacedemon.Lacedemon consisted of the senat proposing; of the church or congregation of the people resolving only and never debating, which was the long life of it; and of the two kings, the court of the Ephors, with divers other magistats executing.

Of Carthage.Carthage consisted of the senat proposing and somtimes resolving too; of the people resolving and somtimes debating too, for which fault she was reprehended by Aristotle; and she had her suffetes, and her hundred men, with other magistrats executing.

Of Rome.Rome consisted of the senat proposing, the concio or people resolving, and too often debating, which caused her storms; as also of the consuls, censors, ædils, tribuns, pretors, questors, and other magistrats executing.

Of Venice.Venice consists of the senat or pregati proposing, and somtimes resolving too; of the great council or assembly of the people, in whom the result is constitutively; as also of the doge, the signory, the censors, the dieci, the quazancies, and other magistrats executing.

Of Switzerland and Holland.The proceding of the commonwealths of Switzerland and Holland is of a like nature, tho after a more obscure manner; for the soveraintys, whether cantons, provinces, or citys, which are the people, send their deputies commission’d and instructed by themselves (wherin they reserve the result in their own power) to the provincial or general convention, or senat, where the deputies debate, but have no other power of result than what was confer’d upon them by the people, or is farther confer’d by the same upon farther occasion. And for the executive part they have magistrats or judges in every canton, province or city, besides those which are more public, and relate to the league, as for adjusting controversies between one canton, province or city, and another; or the like between such persons as are not of the same canton, province or city.

But that we may observe a little farther how the Heathen politicians have written, not only out of nature, but as it were out of Scripture: as in the commonwealth of Israel God is said to have bin king; so the commonwealth where the law is king, is said by Aristotle to be the kingdom of God. And where by the lusts or passions of men a power is set above that of the law deriving from reason, which is the dictat of God, God in that sense is rejected or depos’d that he should not reign over them, as he was in Israel.Page 170 And yet Leviathan will have it, that by reading of these Greec and Latin (he might as well in this sense have said Hebrew) authors, young men, and all others that are unprovided of the antidot of solid reason, receiving a strong and delightful impression of the great exploits of war, atchiev’d by the conductors of their armys, receive withal a pleasing idea of all they have don besides; and imagin their great prosperity not to have proceded from the emulation of particular men, but from the virtue of their popular form of government, not considering the frequent seditions and civil wars produc’d by the imperfection of their polity. Where, first, the blame he lays to the Heathen authors, is in his sense laid to the Scripture; and wheras he holds them to be young men, or men of no antidot that are of like opinions, it should seem that Machiavel, the sole retriever of this antient prudence, is to his solid reason, a beardless boy that has newly read Livy. And how solid his reason is, may appear, where he grants the great prosperity of antient commonwealths, which is to give up the controversy. For such an effect must have som adequat cause; which to evade he insinuats that it was nothing else but the emulation of particular men: as if so great an emulation could have bin generated without as great virtue; so great virtue without the best education; and best education without the best law; or the best laws any otherwise than by the excellency of their polity.

But if som of these commonwealths, as being less perfect in their polity than others, have bin more seditious, it is not more an argument of the infirmity of this or that commonwealth in particular, than of the excellency of that kind of polity in general; which if they, that have not altogether reach’d, have nevertheless had greater prosperity, what would befal them that should reach?

In answer to which question let me invite Leviathan, who of all other governments gives the advantage to monarchy for perfection, to a better disquisition of it by these three assertions.

The first, That the perfection of government lys upon such a libration in the frame of it, that no man or men in or under it can have the interest; or having the interest, can have the power to disturb it with sedition.

The second, That monarchy, reaching the perfection of the kind, reaches not to the perfection of government; but must have som dangerous flaw in it.

The third, That popular government, reaching the perfection of the kind, reaches the perfection of government, and has no flaw in it.

The first assertion requires no proof.

For the proof of the second; monarchy, as has bin shewn, is of two kinds, the one by arms, the other by a nobility, and there is no other kind in art or nature: for if there have been antiently som governments call’d kingdoms, as one of the Goths in Spain, and another of the Vandals in Africa, where the king rul’d without a nobility, and by a council of the people only; it is expresly said by the authors that mention them, that the kings were but the captains, and that the people not only gave them laws, but depos d them as often as they pleas’d. Nor is it possible in reason that it should be otherwise in like cases; wherfore these were either no monarchys, or had greater flaws in them than any other.

But for a monarchy by arms, as that of the Turc (which of all models that ever were, coms up to the perfection of the kind) it is not in the wit or power of man to cure it of this dangerous flaw, That the Janizarys have frequent interest and perpetual power to raise sedition, and to tear the magistrat, even the prince himself, in pieces. Therfore the monarchy of Turky is no perfect government.

And for a monarchy by nobility, as of late in Oceana (which of all other models before the declination of it came up to the perfection in that kind) it was not in the power or wit of man to cure it of that dangerous flaw, That the nobility had frequent interest and perpetual power by their retainers and tenants to raise sedition; and (wheras the Janizarys occasion this kind of calamity no sooner than they make an end of it) to levy a lasting war, to the vast effusion of blood, and that even upon occasions wherin the people, but for their dependence upon their lords, had no concernment, as in the feud of the Red and White. The like has bin frequent in Spain, France, Germany, and other monarchys of this kind; wherfore monarchy by a nobility is no perfect government.

For the proof of the third assertion; Leviathan yields it to me, that there is no other commonwealth but monarchical or popular: wherfore if no monarchy be a perfect government, then either there is no perfect government, or it must be popular; for which kind of constitution I have something more to say, than Leviathan has said or ever will be able to say for monarchy. As,

First, That it is the government that was never conquer’d by any monarch, from the beginning of the world to this day: for if the commonwealths of Greece came under the yoke of the kings of Macedon, they were first broken by themselves.

Secondly, That it is the government that has frequently led mighty monarchs in triumph.

Thirdly, That it is the government, which, if it has bin seditious, it has not bin so from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular constitution; which, wherever the like has happen’d, must have bin inequal.

Fourthly, That it is the government, which, if it has bin any thing near equal, was never seditious; or let him shew me what sedition has happen’d in Lacedemon or Venice.

Fifthly, That it is the government, which, attaining to perfect equality, has such a libration in the frame of it, that no man living can shew which way any man or men, in or under it, can contract any such interest or power as should be able to disturb the commonwealth with sedition; wherfore an equal commonwealth is that only which is without flaw, and contains in it the full perfection of government. But to return.

By what has been shewn in reason and experience it may appear, that tho commonwealths in general be governments of the senat proposing, the people resolving, and the magistracy executing; yet som are not so good at these orders as others, thro some impediment or defect in the frame, balance, or capacity of them, according to which they are of divers kinds.

Division of commonwealths.The first division of them is into such as are single, as Israel, Athens, Lacedemon, &c. and such as are by leagues, as those of the Acheans, Etolians, Lycians, Switz, and Hollanders.

The second (being Machiavel’s) is into such as are for preservation, as Lacedemon and Venice, and such as are for increase, as Athens and Rome; in which I can see no more than that the former takes in no more citizens than are necessary for defence, and the latter so many as are capable of increase.

The third division (unseen hitherto) is into equal and inequal, and this is the main point, especially as to domestic peace and tranquillity; for to make a commonwealth inequal, is to divide it into partys, which sets them at perpetual variance, the one party endeavouring to preserve their eminence and inequality, and the other to attain to equality: whence the people of Rome deriv’d their perpetual strife with the nobility and senat. But in an equal commonwealth there can be no more strife than there can be overbalance in equal weights; wherfore the commonwealth of Venice, being that which of all others is the most equal in the constitution, is that wherein there never happen’d any strife between the senat and the people.

An equal commonwealth is such a one as is equal both in the balance or foundation, and in the superstructure; that is to say, in her Agrarian law, and in her rotation.

Equal Agrarian.An equal Agrarian is a perpetual law establishing and preserving the balance of dominion by such a distribution, that no one man or number of men, within the compass of the few of aristocracy, can com to overpower the whole people by their possessions in lands.

As the Agrarian answers to the foundation, so dos rotation to the superstructures.

Rotation.Equal rotation is equal vicissitude in government, or succession to magistracy confer’d for such convenient terms, enjoying equal vacations, as take in the whole body by parts, succeding others, thro the free election or suffrage of the people.

Prolongation of magistracy.The contrary wherunto is prolongation of magistracy, which, trashing the wheel of rotation, destroys the life or natural motion of a commonwealth.

Ballot.The election or suffrage of the people is most free, where it is made or given in such a manner, that it can neither oblige* nor disoblige another; nor thro fear of an enemy, or bashfulness towards a friend, impair a man’s liberty.

Wherfore, says Cicero, the tablet or ballot of the people of Rome (who gave their votes by throwing tablets or little pieces of wood secretly into urns mark’d for the negative or affirmative) was a welcom constitution to the people, as that which, not impairing the assurance of their brows, increas’d the freedom of their judgment. I have not stood upon a more particular description of this ballot, because that of Venice exemplify’d in the model is of all others the most perfect.

Definition of an equal commonwealth.An equal commonwealth (by that which has bin said) is a government establish’d upon an equal Agrarian, arising into the superstructures or three orders, the senat debating and proposing, the people resolving, and the magistracy executing by an equal rotation thro the suffrage of the people given by the ballot. For tho rotation may be without the ballot, and the ballot without rotation, yet the ballot not only as to the insuing model includes both, but is by far the most equal way; for which cause under the name of the ballot I shall hereafter understand both that and rotation too.

Now having reason’d the principles of an equal commonwealth, I should com to give an instance of such a one in experience, if I could find it; but if this work be of any value, it lys in that it is the first example of a commonwealth that is perfectly equal. For Venice, tho it coms the nearest, yet is a commonwealth for preservation; and such a one, considering the paucity of citizens taken in, and the number not taken in, is externally unequal: and tho every commonwealth that holds provinces must in that regard be such, yet not to that degree. Nevertheless Venice internally, and for her capacity, is by far the most equal, tho it has not in my judgment arriv’d at the full perfection of equality; both because her laws supplying the defect of an Agrarian, are not so clear nor effectual at the foundation, nor her superstructures by the virtue of her ballot or rotation exactly librated; in regard that thro the paucity of her citizens, her greater magistracys are continually wheel’d thro a few hands, as is confest by Janotti, where he says, that if a gentleman coms once to be Savio di terra ferma, it seldom happens that he fails from thenceforward to be adorn’d with som one of the greater magistracys, as Savi di mare, Savi di terra ferma, Savi Grandi, counsellors, those of the decemvirat or dictatorian council, the aurogatori or censors, which require no vacation or interval. Wherfore if this in Venice, or that in Lacedemon, where the kings were hereditary, and the senators (tho elected by the people) for life, cause no inequality (which is hard to be conceiv’d) in a commonwealth for preservation, or such a one as consists of a few citizens; yet is it manifest, that it would cause a very great one in a commonwealth for increase, or consisting of the many, which, by ingrossing the magistracys in a few hands, would be obstructed in their rotation.

But there be who say (and think it a strong objection) that let a commonwealth be as equal as you can imagin, two or three men when all is don will govern it; and there is that in it, which, notwithstanding the pretended sufficiency of a popular state, amounts to a plain confession of the imbecility of that policy, and of the prerogative of monarchy: for as much as popular governments in difficult cases have had recourse to dictatorian power, as in Rome.

To which I answer, That as truth is a spark to which objections are like bellows, so in this respect our commonwealth shines; for the eminence acquir’d by suffrage of the people in a commonwealth, especially if it be popular and equal, can be ascended by no other steps than the universal acknowledgement of virtue: and where men excel in virtue, the commonwealth is stupid and unjust, if accordingly they do not excel in authority. Wherfore this is both the advantage of virtue, which has her due incouragement, and of the commonwealth, which has her due services. These are the philosophers which Plato would have to be princes, the princes which Solomon would have to be mounted, and their steeds are those of authority, not empire: or, if they be buckl’d to the chariot of empire, as that of the dictatorian power, like the chariot of the sun, it is glorious for terms and vacations, or intervals. And as a commonwealth is a government of laws and not of men, so is this the principality of virtue, and not of man; if that fail or set in one, it rises in another* who is created his immediat successor. And this takes away that vanity from under the sun, which is an error proceding more or less from all other rulers under heaven but an equal commonwealth.

These things consider’d, it will be convenient in this place to speak a word to such as go about to insinuat to the nobility or gentry a fear of the people, or to the people a fear of the nobility or gentry, as if their interests were destructive to each other; when indeed an army may as well consist of soldiers without officers, or of officers without soldiers, as a commonwealth (especially such a one as is capable of greatness) of a people without a gentry, or of a gentry without a people. Wherfore this (tho not always so intended as may appear by Machiavel, who else would be guilty) is a pernicious error. There is somthing first in the making of a commonwealth, then in the governing of it, and last of all in the leading of its armys; which (tho there be great divines, great lawyers, great men in all professions) seems to be peculiar only to the genius of a gentleman. For so it is in the universal series of story, that if any man has founded a commonwealth, he was first a gentleman. Moses had his education by the daughter of Pharaoh; Theseus and Solon, of noble birth, were held by the Athenians worthy to be kings; Lycurgus was of the royal blood; Romulus and Numa princes; Brutus and Publico a Patricians; the Gracchi, that lost their lives for the people of Rome and the restitution of that commonwealth, were the sons of a father adorn’d with two triumphs, and of Cornelia the daughter of Scipio, who being demanded in marriage by King Ptolemy, disdain’d to becom the queen of Egypt. And the most renown’d OLPHAUS MEGALETOR, sole legislator (as you will see anon) of the commonwealth of Oceana, was deriv’d from a noble family: nor will it be any occasion of scruple in this case, that Leviathan affirms the politics to be no antienter than his book de Cive. Such also as have got any fame in the civil government of a commonwealth, or by the leading of its armys, have bin gentlemen; for so in all other respects were those plebeian magistrates elected by the people of Rome, being of known descents, and of equal virtues, except only that they were excluded from the name by the usurpation of the Patricians. Holland, thro this defect at home, has borrow’d princes for generals, and gentlemen of divers nations for commanders: and the Switzers, if they have any defect in this kind, rather lend their people to the colors of other princes, than make that noble use of them at home, which should assert the liberty of mankind. For where there is not a nobility to hearten the people, they are slothful, regardless of the world, and of the public interest of liberty, as even those of Rome had bin without their gentry: wherfore let the people embrace the gentry in peace, as the light of their eys; and in war, as the trophy of their arms; and if Cornelia disdain’d to be queen of Egypt, if a Roman consul look’d down from his tribunal upon the greatest king; let the nobility love and cherish the people that afford them a throne so much higher in a commonwealth in the acknowledgement of their virtue, than the crowns of monarchs.

An inequal: commonwealth.But if the equality of a commonwealth consist in the equality first of the Agrarian, and next of the rotation, then the inequality of a commonwealth must consist in the absence or inequality of the Agrarian, or of the rotation, or of both.

Israel and Lacedemon, which commonwealths (as the people of this, in Josephus, claims kindred of that) have great resemblance, were each of them equal in their Agrarian, and inequal in their rotation; especially Israel, where the sanhedrim or senat, first elected by the people, as appears by the words of Moses,Deut. 1. took upon them ever after, without any precept of God, to substitute their successors by ordination; which having bin there of civil use, as excommunication, community of goods, and other customs of the Esseans, who were many of them converted, came afterward to be introduced into the Christian church. And the election of the judg, suffes or dictator, was irregular, both for the occasion, the term, and the vacation of that magistracy; as you find in the book of Judges, where it is often repeated, That in those days there was no king in Israel, that is, no judg: and in the first of Samuel, where Ely judg’d Israel forty years, and Samuel, all his life. In Lacedemon the election of the senat being by suffrage of the people, tho for life, was not altogether so inequal yet the hereditary right of kings, were it not for the Agrarian, had ruin’d her.

Athens and Rome were inequal as to their Agrarian, that of Athens being infirm, and this of Rome none at all; for if it were more antiently carry’d, it was never observ’d. Whence by the time of Tiberius Gracchus the nobility had almost eaten the people quite out of their lands, which they held in the occupation of tenants and servants: whereupon the remedy being too late, and too vehemently apply’d, that commonwealth was ruin’d.

These also were inequal in their rotation, but in a contrary manner. Athens, in regard that the senat (chosen at once by lot, not by suffrage, and chang’d every year, not in part, but in the whole) consisted not of the natural aristocracy; nor sitting long enough to understand, or to be perfect in their office, had no sufficient authority to restrain the people from that perpetual turbulence in the end, which was their ruin, notwithstanding the efforts of Nicias, who did all a man could do to help it. But as Athens by the headiness of the people, so Rome fell by the ambition of the nobility, thro the want of an equal rotation; which if the people had got into the senat, and timely into the magistracys (whereof the former was always usurp’d by the Patricians, and the latter for the most part) they had both carry’d and held their Agrarian, and that had render’d that commonwealth immovable.

But let a commonwealth be equal or inequal, it must consist, as has bin shewn by reason and all experience, of the three general orders; that is to say, of the senat debating and proposing, of the people resolving, and of the magistracy executing. Wherefore I can never wonder enough at Leviathan, who, without any reason or example, will have it that a commonwealth consists of a single person, or of a single assembly; nor can I sufficiently pity those thousand gentlemen, whose minds, which otherwise would have waver’d, he has fram’d (as is affirm’d by himself) into a conscientious obedience (for so he is pleas’d to call it) of such a government.

But to finish this part of the discourse, which I intend for as complete an epitome of antient prudence, and in that of the whole art of politics, as I am able to frame in so short a time;

The two first orders, that is to say, the senat and the people, are legislative, wherunto answers that part of this science which by politicians is intitl’d* of laws; and the third order is executive, to which answers that part of the same science which is stil’d of the frame and course of courts or judicatorys. A word to each of these will be necessary.

Of laws.And first for laws, they are either ecclesiastical or civil, such as concern religion or government.

Laws ecclesiastical, or such as concern religion, according to the universal course of antient prudence, are in the power of the magistrat; but according to the common practice of modern prudence, since the papacy, torn out of his hands.

But, as a government pretending to liberty, and yet suppressing liberty of conscience (which, because religion not according to a man’s conscience can to him be none at all, is the main) must be a contradiction; so a man that, pleading for the liberty of private conscience, refuses liberty to the national conscience, must be absurd.

A commonwealth is nothing else but the national conscience. And if the conviction of a man’s privat conscience produces his privat religion, the conviction of the national conscience must produce a national religion. Whether this be well reason’d, as also whether these two may stand together, will best be shewn by the examples of the antient commonwealths taken in their order.

In that of Israel the government of the national religion appertain’d not to the Priests and Levites, otherwise than as they happen’d to be of the sanhedrim or senat, to which they had no right at all but by election.Deut. 17. It is in this capacity therefore that the people are commanded under pain of death to hearken to them, and to do according to the sentence of the law which they should teach; but in Israel the law ecclesiastical and civil was the same, therefore the sanhedrim having the power of one, had the power of both. But as the national religion appertain’d to the jurisdiction of the sanhedrim, so the liberty of conscience appertain’d, from the same date, and by the same right, to the prophets and their disciples; as where it is said, I will raise up a prophet—and whoever will not hearken to my words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him.Deut. 18. 10. The words relate to prophetic right, which was above all the orders of this commonwealth; whence Elijah not only refus’d to obey the king, but destroy’d his messengers with fire.2 Kings 1. And wheras it was not lawful by the national religion to sacrifice in any other place than the temple, a prophet was his own temple, and might sacrifice where he would, as Elijah did in Mount Carmel.1 Kings 18, 19. By this right John the Baptist and our Saviour, to whom it more particularly related, had their disciples, and taught the people; whence is deriv’d our present right of GATHER’D CONGREGATIONS: wherfore the Christian religion grew up according to the orders of the commonwealth of Israel, and not against them. Nor was liberty of conscience infring’d by this government, till the civil liberty of the same was lost, as under Herod, Pilat, and Tiberius, a threepil’d tyranny.

To procede, Athens preserv’d her religion, by the testimony of Paul, with great superstition: if Alcibiades, that atheistical fellow, had not shew’d them a pair of heels, they had shaven off his head for shaving their Mercurys, and making their gods look ridiculously upon them without beards. Nevertheless, if Paul reason’d with them, they lov’d news, for which he was the more weleom; and if he converted Dionysius the Areopagit, that is, one of the senators, there follow’d neither any hurt to him, nor lots of honor to Dionysius. And for Rome, if Cicero, in his most excellent book de natura deorum, overthrew the national religion of that commonwealth, he was never the farther from being consul. But there is a meanness and poorness in modern prudence, not only to the damage of civil government, but of religion it self: for to make a man in matter of religion, which admits not of sensible demonstration (jurare in verba magistri) engage to believe no otherwise than is believ’d by my Lord Bishop, or Goodman Presbyter, is a pedantism, that has made the sword to be a rod in the hands of schoolmasters; by which means, whereas the Christian religion is the farthest of any from countenancing war, there never was a war of religion but since Christianity: for which we are beholden to the Pope; for the Pope not giving liberty of conscience to princes and commonwealths, they cannot give that to their subjects which they have not themselves: whence both princes and subjects, either thro his instigation, or their own disputes, have introduc’d that execrable custom, never known in the world before, of fighting for religion, and denying the magistrat to have any jurisdiction concerning it; wheras the magistrat’s losing the power of religion loses the liberty of conscience, which in that case has nothing to protect it. But if the people be otherwise taught, it concerns them to look about them, and to distinguish between the shrieking of the lapwing, and the voice of the turtle.

To com to civil laws, if they stand one way and the balance another, it is the case of a government which of necessity must be new model’d; wherefore your lawyers advising you upon the like occasions to fit your government to their laws, are no more to be regarded, than your taylor if he should desire you to fit your body to his doublet. There is also danger in the plausible pretence of reforming the law, except the government be first good, in which case it is a good tree, and (trouble not yourselves overmuch) brings not forth evil fruit; otherwise, if the tree be evil, you can never reform the fruit: or if a root that is naught bring forth fruit of this kind that seems to be good, take the more heed, for it is the ranker poison. It was no wise probable, if Augustus had not made excellent laws, that the bowels of Rome could have com to be so miserably eaten out by the tyranny of Tiberius and his successors. The best rule as to your laws in general is, that they be few. Rome by the testimony of Cicero was best govern’d under those of the twelve tables; and by that of Tacitus, Plurimæ leges, corruptissima respublica. You will be told, That where the laws be few, they leave much to arbitrary power; but where they be many, they leave more: the laws in this case, according to Justinian and the best lawyers, being as litigious as the suitors. Solon made few; Lycurgus fewer laws: and commonwealths have the fewest at this day of all other governments.

Of courts.Now to conclude this part with a word de judiciis, or of the constitution or course of courts; it is a discourse not otherwise capable of being well manag’d but by particular examples, both the constitution and course of courts being divers in different governments, but best beyond compare in Venice, where they regard not so much the arbitrary power of their courts, as the constitution of them; wherby that arbitrary power being altogether unable to retard or do hurt to business, produces and must produce the quickest dispatch, and the most righteous dictats of justice that are perhaps in human nature. The manner I shall not stand in this place to describe, because it is exemplify’d at large in the judicature of the people of Oceana. And thus much of antient prudence, and the first branch of this preliminary discourse.

The Second Part of the Preliminarys.

IN the second part I shall endeavor to shew the rise, progress, and declination of modern prudence.

The date of this kind of policy is to be computed, as was shewn, from those inundations of Goths, Vandals, Huns, and Lombards, that overwhelm’d the Roman empire. But as there is no appearance in the bulk or constitution of modern prudence, that it should ever have bin able to com up and grapple with the antient, so somthing of necessity must have interpos’d, wherby this came to be enervated, and that to receive strength and incouragement. And this was the execrable reign of the Roman emperors taking rise from (that fælix scelus) the arms of Cæsar, in which storm the ship of the Roman commonwealth was forc’d to disburden itself of that precious fraight, which never since could emerge or raise its head but in the gulf of Venice.

The transition of antient into modern prudence.It is said in Scripture, Thy evil is of thyself, O Israel! To which answers that of the moralists,* None is hurt but by himself, as also the whole matter of the politics; at present this example of the Romans, who, thro a negligence committed in their Agrarian laws, let in the sink of luxury, and forfeited the inestimable treasure of liberty for themselves and their posterity.

The Agrarian laws of the Romans.Their Agrarian laws were such, wherby their lands ought to have bin divided among the people, either without mention of a colony, in which case they were not oblig’d to change their abode; or with mention and upon condition of a colony, in which case they were to change their abode; and leaving the city, to plant themselves upon the lands so assign’d.Sigonius de Ant. Ro. The lands assign’d, or that ought to have bin assign’d in either of these ways, were of three kinds: such as were taken from the enemy and distributed to the people; or such as were taken from the enemy, and under color of being reserv’d to the public use, were thro stealth possest by the nobility; or such as were bought with the public money to be distributed. Of the laws offer’d in these cases, those which divided the lands taken from the enemy, or purchas’d with the public money, never occasion’d any dispute; but such as drove at dispossessing the nobility of their usurpations, and dividing the common purchase of the sword among the people, were never touch’d but they caus’d earthquakes, nor could they ever be obtain’d by the people; or being obtain’d, be observ’d by the nobility, who not only preserv’d their prey, but growing vastly rich upon it, bought the people by degrees quite out of those shares that had been confer’d upon them. This the Gracchi coming too late to perceive, found the balance of the commonwealth to be lost; but putting the people (when they had least force) by forcible means upon the recovery of it, did ill, seeing it neither could nor did tend to any more than to shew them by worse effects, that what the wisdom of their leaders had discover’d was true. For (quite contrary to what has happen’d in Oceana, where, the balance falling to the people, they have overthrown the nobility) that nobility of Rome, under the conduct of Sylla, overthrew the people and the commonwealth: seeing Sylla first introduc’d that new balance, which was the foundation of the succeding monarchy, in the plantation of military colonys, instituted by his distribution of the conquer’d lands, not now of enemys, but of citizens, to forty-seven legions of his soldiers; so that how he came to be PERPETUAL DICTATOR, or other magistrats to succede him in like power, is no miracle.Military colony.

The balance of the Roman empire.These military colonys (in which manner succeding emperors continu’d, as Augustus by the distribution of the Veterans, wherby he had overcom Brutus and Cassius, to plant their soldiery) consisted of such as I conceive were they that are call’d milites beneficiarii; in regard that the tenure of their lands was by way of benefices, that is, for life, and upon condition of duty or service in the war upon their own charge. These benefices Alexander Severus granted to the heirs of the incumbents, but upon the same conditions. And such was the dominion by which the Roman emperors gave their balance. But to the beneficiarys, as was no less than necessary for the safety of the prince, a matter of eight thousand by the example of Augustus were added, which departed not from his sides, but were his perpetual guard, call’d Pretorian bands; tho these, according to the incurable flaw already observ’d in this kind of government, became the most frequent butchers of their lords that are to be found in story. Thus far the Roman monarchy is much the same with that at this day in Turky, consisting of a camp, and a horse-quarter; a camp in regard of the Spahys and Janizarys, the perpetual guard of the prince, except they also chance to be liquorish after his blood; and a horse-quarter in regard of the distribution of his whole land to tenants for life, upon condition of continual service, or as often as they shall be commanded at their own charge by timars, being a word which they say signifys benefices, that it shall save me a labor of opening the government.

But the fame of Mahomet and his prudence, is especially founded in this, that wheras the Roman monarchy, except that of Israel, was the most imperfect, the Turkish is the most perfect that ever was. Which happen’d in that the Roman (as the Israelitish of the sanhedrim and the congregation) had a mixture of the senat and the people; and the Turkish is pure. And that this was pure, and the other mix’d, happen’d not thro the wisdom of the legislators, but the different genius of the nations; the people of the eastern parts, except the Israelits, which is to be attributed to their agrarian, having bin such as scarce ever knew any other condition than that of slavery; and these of the western having ever had such a relish of liberty, as thro what despair soever could never be brought to stand still while the yoke was putting on their necks, but by being fed with som hopes of reserving to themselves som part of their freedom.

Wherfore Julius Cæsar (saith* Suetonius) contented himself in naming half the magistrats, to leave the rest to the suffrage of the people.Dion. And Mæcenas, tho he would not have Augustus to give the people their liberty, would not have him take it quite away. Whence this empire being neither hawk nor buzzard, made a flight accordingly; and the prince being perpetually tost (having the avarice of the soldiery on this hand to satisfy upon the people, and the senat and the people on the other to be defended from the soldiery) seldom dy’d any other death than by one horn of this dilemma, as is noted more at large by Machiavel.P. cap. 19. But the Pretorian bands, those bestial executioners of their captain’s tyranny upon others, and of their own upon him, having continued from the time of Augustus, were by Constantin the Great (incens’d against them for taking part with his adversary Maxentius) remov’d from their strong garison which they held in Rome, and distributed into divers provinces. The benefices of the soldiers that were hitherto held for life and upon duty, were by this prince made hereditary: so that the whole foundation wherupon this empire was first built being now remov’d, shews plainly, that the emperors must long before this have found out som other way of support; and this was by stipendiating the Goths, a people that, deriving their roots from the northern parts of Germany, or out of Sweden, had (thro their victorys obtain’d against Domitian) long since spred their branches to so near a neighbourhood with the Roman territorys, that they began to overshadow them. For the emperors making use of them in their armys (as the French do at this day of the Switz) gave them that under the notion of a stipend, which they receiv’d as tribute, coming (if there were any default in the payment) so often to distrein for it, that in the time of Honorius they sack’d Rome, and possest themselves of Italy. And such was the transition of antient into modern prudence; or that breach which being follow’d in every part of the Roman empire with inundations of Vandals, Huns, Lombards, Franks, Saxons, overwhelm’d antient languages, learning, prudence, manners, citys, changing the names of rivers, countrys, seas, mountains, and men; Camillus, Cæsar, and Pompey, being com to Edmund, Richard, and Geoffrey.Machiavel.

The Gothic balance.To open the groundwork or balance of these new politicians: Feudum, says Calvin the lawyer, is a Gothic word of divers significations; for it is taken either for war, or for a possession of conquer’d lands, distributed by the victor to such of his captains and soldiers as had merited in his wars, upon condition to acknowledge him to be their perpetual lord, and themselves to be his subjects.

Institution of feudatory principalitys.Of these there were three kinds or orders: the first of nobility, distinguish’d by the titles of dukes, marquisses, earls; and these being gratified with the citys, castles, and villages of the conquer’d Italians, their feuds participated of royal dignity, and were call’d regalia, by which they had right to coin mony, create magistrats, take toll, customs, confiscations, and the like.

Feuds of the second order were such as, with the consent of the king, were bestow’d by these feudatory princes upon men of inferior quality, call’d their barons, on condition that next to the king they should defend the dignitys and fortunes of their lords in arms.

The lowest order of feuds were such as being confer’d by those of the second order upon privat men, whether noble or not noble, oblig’d them in the like duty to their superiors; these were call’d vavasors. And this is the Gothic balance, by which all the kingdoms this day in Christendom were at first erected; for which cause, if I had time, I should open in this place the empire of Germany, and the kingdoms of France, Spain, and Poland: but so much as has bin said being sufficient for the discovery of the principles of modern prudence in general, I shall divide the remainder of my discourse, which is more particular, into three parts.

The first shewing the constitution of the late monarchy of Oceana.

The second, the dissolution of the same. And

The third, the generation of the present commonwealth.

The constitution of the late monarchy of Oceana is to be consider’d in relation to the different nations by whom it has bin successively subdu’d and govern’d. The first of these were the Romans, the second the Teutons, the third the Scandians, and the fourth the Neustrians.

The government of the Romans, who held it as a province, I shall omit, because I am to speak of their provincial government in another place; only it is to be remember’d here, that if we have given over running up and down naked, and with dappl’d hides, learn’d to write and read, and to be instructed with good arts, for all these we are beholden to the Romans, either immediatly, or mediatly by the Teutons: for that the Teutons had the arts from no other hand, is plain enough by their language, which has yet no word to signify either writing or reading, but what is deriv’d from the Latin. Furthermore, by the help of these arts so learn’d, we have bin capable of that religion which we have long since receiv’d; wherfore it seems to me, that we ought not to detract from the memory of the Romans, by whose means we are, as it were, of beasts becom men, and by whose means we might yet of obsoure and ignorant men (if we thought not too well of our selves) becom a wife and a great people.

For the proof of the ensuing discourse out of records and antiquities see Selden’s titles of honor from pag. 593, to pag. 837.The Romans having govern’d Oceana provincially, the Teutons were the first that introduc’d the form of the late monarchy. To these succeeded the Scandians, of whom (because their reign was short, as also because they made little alteration in the government as to the form) I shall take no notice. But the Teutons going to work upon the Gothic balance, divided the whole nation into three sorts of feuds, that of ealdorman, that of kings thane, and that of middle thane.

The Teuton monarchy.When the kingdom was first divided into precincts will be as hard to shew, as when it began first to be govern’d; it being impossible that there should be any government without som division. The division that was in use with the Teutons, was by countys, and every county had either its ealdorman, or high reeve. The title of ealdorman came in time to eorl, or erl, and that of high reeve to high sheriff.

Earls.Earl of the shire or county denoted the king’s thane, or tenant by grand serjeantry or knights service, in chief or in capite; his possessions were somtimes the whole territory from whence he had his denomination, that is, the whole county, somtimes more than one county, and somtimes less, the remaining part being in the crown. He had also somtimes a third, or som other customary part of the profits of certain citys, boroughs, or other places within his earldom. For an example of the possessions of earls in antient times, Ethelred had to him and his heirs the whole kingdom of Mercia, containing three or four countys; and there were others that had little less.

King’s thane.King’s thane was also an honorary title, to which he was qualify’d that had five hides of land held immediatly of the king by service of personal attendance; insomuch that if a churl or countryman had thriven to this proportion, having a church, a kitchen, a belhouse (that is, a hall with a bell in it to call his family to dinner) a boroughgate with a seat (that is, a porch) of his own, and any distinct office in the king’s court, then was he the king’s thane. But the proportion of a hide land, otherwise call’d caruca, or a plow land, is difficult to be understood, because it was not certain; nevertheless it is generally conceiv’d to be so much as may be manag’d with one plow, and would yield the maintenance of the same, with the appurtenances in all kinds.

Middle thane.The middle thane was feudal, but not honorary; he was also call’d a vavasor, and his lands a vavasory, which held of som mesn lord, and not immediatly of the king.

Possessions and their tenures, being of this nature, shew the balance of the Teuton monarchy; wherin the riches of earls were so vast, that to arise from the balance of their dominion to their power, they were not only call’d reguli or little kings, but were such indeed; their jurisdiction being of two sorts, either that which was exercis’d by them in the court of their countrys, or in the high court of the kingdom.

Shiremoot.In the territory denominating an earl, if it were all his own, the courts held, and the profits of that jurisdiction were to his own use and benefit. But if he had but som part of his county, then his jurisdiction and courts (saving perhaps in those possessions that were his own) were held by him to the king’s use and benefit; that is, he commonly supply’d the office which the sheriffs regularly executed in countys that had no earls, and whence they came to be call’d viscounts.Viscounts. The court of the county that had an earl was held by the earl and the bishop of the diocess, after the manner of the sheriffs turns to this day; by which means both the ecclesiastical and temporal laws were given in charge together to the country. The causes of vavasors or vavasorys appertain’d to the cognizance of this court, where wills were prov’d, judgment and execution given, cases criminal and civil determin’d.

Halymoot.The king’s thanes had the like jurisdiction in their thane lands, as lords in their manors, where they also kept courts.

Besides these in particular, both the earls and king’s thanes, together with the bishops, abbots, and vavasors, or middle thanes, had in the high court or parlament in the kingdom, a more public jurisdiction, consisting first of deliberative power for advising upon, and assenting to new laws: secondly, of giving counsil in matters of state: and thirdly, of judicature upon suits and complaints.Weidenagemoots. I shall not omit to inlighten the obscurity of these times (in which there is little to be found of a methodical constitution of this high court) by the addition of an argument, which I conceive to bear a strong testimony to it self, tho taken out of a late writing that conceals the author. “It is well known, says he, that in every quarter of the realm a great many boroughs do yet send burgesses to the parlament, which nevertheless be so antiently and so long since decay’d and gon to nought, that they cannot be shew’d to have bin of any reputation since the conquest, much less to have obtain’d any such privilege by the grant of any succeding king: wherfore these must have had this right by more antient usage, and before the conquest, they being inable now to shew whence they deriv’d it.”

This argument (tho there be more) I shall pitch upon as sufficient to prove; first, that the lower sort of the people had right to session in parlament during the time of the Teutons. Secondly, that they were qualify’d to the same by election in their boroughs, and, if knights of the shire (as no doubt they are) be as antient in the countrys. Thirdly, if it be a good argument to say, that the commons during the reign of the Teutons were elected into parlament, because they are so now, and no man can shew when this custom began; I see not which way it should be an ill one to say, that the commons during the reign of the Teutons constituted also a distinct house, because they do so now; unless any man can shew that they did ever sit in the same house with the lords. Wherfore to conclud this part, I conceive for these, and other reasons to be mention’d hereafter, that the parlament of the Teutons consisted of the king, the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons of the nation, notwithstanding the stile of divers acts of parlament, which runs as that of magna charta in the king’s name only, seeing the same was nevertheless enacted by the king, peers, and commons of the land, as is testify’d in those words by a subsequent act.25 Edw. 3. c. 1.

Monarchy of the Neustrians.The monarchy of the Teutons had stood in this posture about two hundred and twenty years; when Turbo duke of Neustria making his claim to the crown of one of their kings that dy’d childless, follow’d it with successful arms; and being possest of the kingdom, us’d it as conquer’d, distributing the earldoms, thane lands, bishoprics and prelacys of the whole realm among his Neustrians. From this time the earl came to be call’d comes, consul, and dux (tho consul and dux grew afterward out of use) the king’s thanes came to be call’d barons, and their lands baronys; the middle thane holding still of a mean lord, retain’d the name of vavasor.

Their earls.The earl or comes continu’d to have the third part of the pleas of the county paid to him by the sheriff or vice-comes, now a distinct officer in every county depending upon the king; saving that such earls as had their countys to their own use, were now counts palatin, and had under the king regal jurisdiction; insomuch that they constituted their own sheriffs, granted pardons, and issu’d writs in their own names; nor did the king’s writ of ordinary justice run in their dominions till a late statute, wherby much of this privilege was taken away.27 H. 8.

Their barons.For barons they came from henceforth to be in different times of three kinds; barons by their estates and tenures, barons by writ, and barons created by letters patent. From Turbo the first to Adoxus the seventh king from the conquest, barons had their denomination from their possessions and tenures. And these were either spiritual or temporal; for not only the thane lands, but the possessions of bishops, as also of som twenty-six abbats, and two priors, were now erected into baronys, whence the lords spiritual that had suffrage in the Teuton parlament as spiritual lords, came to have it in the Neustrian parlament as barons, and were made subject (which they had not formerly bin) to knights service in chief.Barons by their possessions. Barony coming henceforth to signify all honorary possessions as well of earls as barons, and baronage to denote all kinds of lords as well spiritual as temporal having right to sit in parlament, the baronys in this sense were somtimes more, and somtimes fewer, but commonly about 200 or 250, containing in them a matter of sixty thousand feuda militum, or knights fees, wherof some twenty-eight thousand were in the clergy. It is ill luck that no man can tell what the land of a knight’s fee (reckon’d in som writs at 40 l. a year, and in others at 10) was certainly worth; for by such a help we might have exactly demonstrated the balance of this government.Coke 11 inst. pag. 596. But, says Coke, it contain’d twelve plow lands, and that was thought to be the most certain account. But this again is extremely uncertain; for one plow out of som land that was fruitful, might work more than ten out of som other that was barren.Balance of the Neustrian monarchy. Nevertheless, seeing it appears by Bracton, that of earldoms and baronys it was wont to be said, that the whole kingdom was compos’d; as also, that these consisting of 60,000 knights fees, furnish’d 60,000 men for the king’s service, being the whole militia of this monarchy, it cannot be imagin’d that the vavasorys or freeholds in the people amounted to any considerable proportion. Wherfore the balance and foundation of this government was in the 60,000 knights fees, and these being possest by the 250 lords, it was a government of the few, or of the nobility; wherin the people might also assemble, but could have no more than a mere name. And the clergy holding a third of the whole nation, as is plain by the parlament roll; it is an absurdity (seeing the clergy of France came first thro their riches to be a state of that kingdom) to acknowlege the people to have bin a state of this realm, and not to allow it to the clergy,4 Rich. 2. who were so much more weighty in the balance, which is that of all other whence a state or order in a government is denominated.Numb. 13. Wherfore this monarchy consisted of the king, and of the three (ordines regni, or) estates, the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons: it consisted of these I say as to the balance, tho during the reign of som of these kings, not as to the administration.

Administration of the Neustrian monarchy during the reign of the first kings.For the ambition of Turbo, and som of those that more immediately succeded him, to be absolute princes, strove against the nature of their foundation, and, inasmuch as he had divided almost the whole realm among his Neustrians, with som incouragement for a while. But the Neustrians while they were but foren plants, having no security against the natives, but in growing up by their princes sides, were no sooner well rooted in their vast dominions, than they came up according to the infallible consequence of the balance domestic, and, contracting the national interest of the baronage, grew as fierce in the vindication of the antient rights and liberties of the same, as if they had bin always natives: whence, the kings being as obstinat on the one side for their absolute power, as these on the other for their immunitys, grew certain wars which took their denomination from the barons.

This fire about the middle of the reign of Adoxus began to break out.Barons by writ. And wheras the predecessors of this king had divers times bin forc’d to summon councils resembling those of the Teutons, to which the lords only that were barons by dominion and tenure had hitherto repair’d, Adoxus seeing the effects of such dominion, began first not to call such as were barons by writ (for that was according to the practice of antient times) but to call such by writs as were otherwise no barons; by which means striving to avoid the consequence of the balance, in coming unwillingly to set the government streight, he was the first that set it awry. For the barons in his reign, and his successors, having vindicated their antient authority, restor’d the parlament with all the rights and privileges of the same, saving that from thenceforth the kings had found out a way wherby to help themselves against the mighty, by creatures of their own, and such as had no other support but by their favor. By which means this government, being indeed the masterpiece of modern prudence, has bin cry’d up to the skys, as the only invention wherby at once to maintain the soverainty of a prince, and the liberty of the people. Wheras indeed it has bin no other than a wrestling match, wherin the nobility, as they have bin stronger, have thrown the king; or the king, if he has bin stronger, has thrown the nobility; or the king, where he has had a nobility, and could bring them to his party, has thrown the people, as in France and Spain; or the people where they have had no nobility, or could get them to be of their party, have thrown the king, as in Holland, and of later times in Oceana.49 H. 3. But they came not to this strength but by such approaches and degrees, as remain to be further open’d. For wheras the barons by writ (as the sixty-four abbats, and thirty-six priors that were so call’d) were but pro tempore, Dicotome being the twelfth king from the conquest, began to make barons by letters patent, with the addition of honorary pensions for the maintenance of their dignitys to them and their heirs; so that they were hands in the king’s purse, and had no shoulders for his throne.Barons by letters patent. Of these when the house of peers came once to be full, as will be seen hereafter, there was nothing more empty. But for the present, the throne having other supports, they did not hurt that so much as they did the king: for the old barons taking Dicotome’s prodigality to such creatures so ill, that they depos’d him, got the trick of it, and never gave over setting up and pulling down their kings according to their various interests, and that faction of the white and red, into which they have bin thenceforth divided, till Panurgus the eighteenth king from the conquest, was more by their favor than his right advanc’d to the crown.Dissolution of the late monarchy of Oceana. This king thro his natural subtilty reflecting at once upon the greatness of their power, and the inconstancy of their favor, began to find another flaw in this kind of government, which is also noted by Machiavel, namely that a throne supported by a nobility, is not so hard to be ascended, as kept warm. Wherfore his secret jealousy, lest the dissension of the nobility, as it brought him in, might throw him out, made him travel in ways undiscover’d by them, to ends as little foreseen by himself: while to establish his own safety, he by mixing water with their wine, first began to open those sluces that have since overwhelm’d not the king only, but the throne. For wheras a nobility strikes not at the throne without which they cannot subsist, but at som king that they do not like; popular power strikes thro the king at the throne, as that which is incompatible with it. Now that Panurgus in abating the power of the nobility, was the cause whence it came to fall into the hands of the people, appears by those several statutes that were made in his reign, as that for population, those against retainers, and that for alienations.

By the statute of population, all houses of husbandry that were us’d with twenty acres of ground and upwards, were to be maintain’d, and kept up for ever with a competent proportion of land laid to them, and in no wise, as appears by a subsequent statute, to be sever’d. By which means the houses being kept up, did of necessity inforce dwellers; and the proportion of land to be till’d being kept up, did of necessity inforce the dweller not to be a begger or cottager, but a man of som substance, that might keep hinds and servants, and set the plow a going. This did mightily concern (says the historian of that prince) the might and manhood of the kingdom, and in effect amortize a great part of the lands to the hold and possession of the yeomanry or middle people, who living not in a servil or indigent fashion, were much unlink’d from dependence upon their lords, and living in a free and plentiful manner, became a more excellent infantry; but such a one upon which the lords had so little power, that from henceforth they may be computed to have bin disarm’d.

And as they lost their infantry after this manner, so their cavalry and commanders were cut off by the statute of retainers: for wheras it was the custom of the nobility to have younger brothers of good houses, metal’d fellows, and such as were knowing in the feats of arms about them; they who were longer follow’d with so dangerous a train, escap’d not such punishments, as made them take up.

Henceforth the country-lives, and great tables of the nobility, which no longer nourish’d veins that would bleed for them, were fruitless and loathsom till they chang’d the air, and of princes became courtiers; where their revenues, never to have bin exhausted by beef and mutton, were found narrow, whence follow’d racking of rents, and at length sale of lands: the riddance thro the statute of alienations being render’d far more quick and facil than formerly it had bin thro the new invention of intails.

To this it happen’d, that Coraunus the successor of that king dissolving the abbys, brought with the declining state of the nobility so vast a prey to the industry of the people, that the balance of the commonwealth was too apparently in the popular party, to be unseen by the wise council of queen Parthenia, who converting her reign thro the perpetual lovetricks that past between her and her people into a kind of romance, wholly neglected the nobility. And by these degrees came the house of commons to raise that head, which since has bin so high and formidable to their princes, that they have look’d pale upon those assemblys. Nor was there any thing now wanting to the destruction of the throne, but that the people, not apt to see their own strength, should be put to feel it; when a prince, as stiff in disputes as the nerve of monarchy was grown slack, receiv’d that unhappy incouragement from his clergy which became his utter ruin, while trusting more to their logic than the rough philosophy of his parlament, it came to an irreparable breach; for the house of peers, which alone had stood in this gap, now sinking down between the king and the commons, shew’d that Crassus was dead, and the isthmus broken. But a monarchy devested of its nobility, has no refuge under heaven but an army. Wherfore the dissolution of this government caus’d the war, not the war the dissolution of this government.

Of the king’s success with his arms it is not necessary to give any further account, than that they prov’d as ineffectual as his nobility; but without a nobility or an army (as has bin shew’d) there can be no monarchy. Wherfore what is there in nature that can arise out of these ashes, but a popular government, or a new monarchy to be erected by the victorious army?

To erect a monarchy, be it never so new, unless like Leviathan you can hang it, as the country-fellow speaks, by geometry, (for what else is it to say, that every other man must give up his will to the will of this one man without any other foundation?) it must stand upon old principles, that is, upon a nobility or an army planted on a due balance of dominion. Aut viam inveniam aut faciam, was an adage of Cæsar; and there is no standing for a monarchy unless it finds this balance, or makes it. If it finds it, the work’s don to its hand: for, where there is inequality of estates, there must be inequality of power; and where there is inequality of power, there can be no commonwealth. To make it, the sword must extirpat out of dominion all other roots of power, and plant an army upon that ground. An army may be planted nationally or provincially. To plant it nationally, it must be in one of the four ways mention’d, that is, either monarchically in part, as the Roman beneficiarii; or monarchically, in the whole, as the Turkish timariots; aristocatrically, that is, by earls and barons, as the Neustrians were planted by Turbo; or democratically, that is, by equal lots, as the Israelitish army in the land of Canaan by Joshua. In every one of these ways there must not only be confiscations, but confiscations to such a proportion as may answer to the work intended.

Confiscation of a people that never fought against you, but whose arms you have born, and in which you have bin victorious, and this upon premeditation, and in cold blood, I should have thought to be against any example in human nature, but for those alleg’d by Machiavel of Agathocles, and Oliveretto di Fermo: the former wherof being captain general of the Syracusans, upon a day assembl’d the senat and the people, as if he had somthing to communicat with them, when at a sign given he cut the senators in pieces to a man, and all the richest of the people, by which means he came to be king. The proceedings of Oliveretto in making himself prince of Fermo, were somwhat different in circumstances, but of the same nature. Nevertheless Catilin, who had a spirit equal to any of these in his intended mischief, could never bring the like to pass in Rome. The head of a small commonwealth, such a one as was that of Syracusa or Fermo, is easily brought to the block; but that a populous nation, such as Rome, had not such a one, was the grief of Nero. If Sylvia or Cæsar attain’d to be princes, it was by civil war, and such civil war as yielded rich spoils, there being a vast nobility to be confiscated; which also was the case in Oceana, when it yielded earth by earldoms and baronys to the Neustrian, for the plantation of his new potentates. Where a conqueror finds the riches of a land in the hands of the few, the forfeitures are easy, and amount to vast advantage; but where the people have equal shares, the confiscation of many coms to little, and is not only dangerous, but fruitless.

The Romans in one of their defeats of the Volsci found among the captives certain Tusculans, who, upon examination, confest that the arms they bore were by command of their state; wherupon information being given to the senat by the general Camillus, he was forthwith commanded to march against Tusculum; which doing accordingly, he found the Tusculan fields full of husbandmen, that stir’d not otherwise from the plow, than to furnish his army with all kind of accommodations and victuals: drawing near to the city, he saw the gates wide open, the magistrats coming out in their gowns to salute and bid him welcom: entring, the shops were all at work, and open; the streets sounded with the noise of schoolboys at their books; there was no face of war. Whereupon Camillus causing the senat to assemble, told them, That tho the art was understood, yet had they at length found out the true arms wherby the Romans were most undoubtedly to be conquer’d, for which cause he would not anticipat the senat, to which he desir’d them forthwith to send, which they did accordingly; and their dictator with the rest of their embassadors being found by the Roman senators as they went into the house standing sadly at the door, were sent for in as friends, and not as enemys: where the dictator having said, If we have offended, the fault was not so great as is our penitence and your virtue; the senat gave them peace forthwith, and soon after made the Tusculans citizens of Rome.

But putting the case, of which the world is not able to shew an example, that the forfeiture of a populous nation, not conquer’d, but friends, and in cool blood, might be taken; your army must be planted in one of the ways mention’d. To plant it in the way of absolute monarchy, that is, upon feuds for life, such as the Timars, a country as large and fruitful as that of Greece, would afford you but sixteen thousand Timariots, for that is the most the Turc (being the best husband that ever was of this kind) makes of it at this day: and if Oceana, which is less in fruitfulness by one half, and in extent by three parts, should have no greater a force, whoever breaks her in one battel, may be sure she shall never rise; for such (as was noted by Machiavel) is the nature of the Turkish monarchy, if you break it in two battels, you have destroy’d its whole militia; and the rest being all slaves, you hold it without any further resistance. Wherfore the erection of an absolute monarchy in Oceana, or in any other country that is no larger, without making it a certain prey to the first invader, is altogether impossible.

To plant by halves, as the Roman emperors did their beneficiarys, or military colonys, it must be either for life; and this an army of Oceaners in their own country (especially having estates of inheritance) will never bear; because such an army so planted is as well confiscated as the people; nor had the Mamalucs bin contented with such usage in Egypt, but that they were foreners, and daring not to mix with the natives, it was of absolute necessity to their being.

Or planting them upon inheritance, whether aristocratically as the Neustrians, or democratically as the Israelits, they grow up by certain consequence into the national interest: and this, if they be planted popularly, coms to a commonwealth; if by way of nobility, to a mix’d monarchy, which of all other will be found to be the only kind of monarchy, wherof this nation, or any other that is of no greater extent, has bin or can be capable: for if the Israelits (tho their democratical balance, being fix’d by their agrarian, stood firm) be yet found to have elected kings, it was because, their territory lying open, they were perpetually invaded, and being perpetually invaded, turn’d themselves to any thing which thro the want of experience they thought might be a remedy; whence their mistake in election of their kings (under whom they gain’d nothing, but on the contrary lost all they had acquir’d by their commonwealth, both estates and libertys) is not only apparent, but without parallel. And if there have bin (as was shewn) a kingdom of the Goths in Spain, and of the Vandals in Asia, consisting of a single person and a parlament (taking a parlament to be a council of the people only, without a nobility) it is expresly said of those councils, that they depos’d their kings as often as they pleas’d: nor can there be any other consequence of such a government, seeing where there is a council of the people, they do never receive laws, but give them; and a council giving laws to a single person, he has no means in the world wherby to be any more than a subordinat magistrat, but force: in which case he is not a single person and a parlament, but a single person and an army, which army again must be planted as has bin shewn, or can be of no long continuance.

It is true, that the provincial balance being in nature quite contrary to the national, you are no way to plant a provincial army upon dominion. But then you must have a native territory in strength, situation, or government, able to overbalance the foren, or you can never hold it. That an army should in any other case be long supported by a mere tax, is a mere phansy as void of all reason and experience, as if a man should think to maintain such a one by robbing of orchards: for a mere tax is but pulling of plumtrees, the roots wherof are in others mens grounds, who suffering perpetual violence, com to hate the author of it: and it is a maxim, that no prince that is hated by his people can be safe. Arms planted upon dominion extirpat enemys, and make friends: but maintain’d by a mere tax, have enemys that have roots, and friends that have none.

To conclude, Oceana, or any other nation of no greater extent, must have a competent nobility, or is altogether incapable of monarchy: for where there is equality of estates, there must be equality of power: and where there is equality of power, there can be no monarchy.

The generation of the commonwealth.To com then to the generation of the commonwealth; it has bin shewn how thro the ways and means us’d by Panurgus to abase the nobility, and so to mend that flaw which we have asserted to be incurable in this kind of constitution, he suffer’d the balance to fall into the power of the people, and so broke the government: but the balance being in the people, the commonwealth (tho they do not see it) is already in the nature of* them. There wants nothing else but time (which is slow and dangerous) or art (which would be more quick and secure) for the bringing those native arms (wherwithal they are found already) to resist they know not how every thing that opposes them, to such maturity as may fix them upon their own strength and bottom.

What prudence is.But wheras this art is prudence; and that part of prudence which regards the present work, is nothing else but the skill of raising such superstructures of government, as are natural to the known foundations: they never mind the foundation, but thro certain animosities (wherwith by striving one against another they are infected) or thro freaks, by which, not regarding the course of things, nor how they conduce to their purpose, they are given to building in the air, com to be divided and subdivided into endless partys and factions, both civil and ecclesiastical: which briefly to open, I shall first speak of the people in general, and then of their divisions.

A People (says Machiavel) that is corrupt, is not capable of a commonwealth. But in shewing what a corrupt people is, he has either involv’d himself, or me; nor can I otherwise com out of the labyrinth, than by saying, the balance altering a people, as to the foregoing government, must of necessity be corrupt: but corruption in this sense signifys no more than that the corruption of one government (as in natural bodys) is the generation of another. Wherfore if the balance alters from monarchy, the corruption of the people in this case is that which makes them capable of a commonwealth. But wheras I am not ignorant, that the corruption which he means is in manners, this also is from the balance. For the balance leading from monarchical into popular, abates the luxury of the nobility, and, inriching the people, brings the government from a more privat to a more public interest; which coming nearer, as has bin shewn, to justice and right reason, the people upon a like alteration is so far from such a corruption of manners, as should render them incapable of a commonwealth, that of necessity they must therby contract such a reformation of manners as will bear no other kind of government. On the other side, where the balance changes from popular to oligarchical or monarchical, the public interest, with the reason and justice included in the same, becoms more privat; luxury is introduc’d in the room of temperance, and servitude in that of freedom; which causes such a corruption of manners both in the nobility and people, as, by the example of Rome in the time of the Triumvirs, is more at large discover’d by the author to have bin altogether incapable of a commonwealth.

But the balance of Oceana changing quite contrary to that of Rome, the manners of the people were not therby corrupted, but on the contrary adapted to a commonwealth. For differences of opinion in a people not rightly inform’d of their balance, or a division into partys (while there is not any common ligament of power sufficient to reconcile or hold them) is no sufficient proof of corruption. Nevertheless, seeing this must needs be matter of scandal and danger, it will not be amiss, in shewing what were the partys, to shew what were their errors.

The partys into which this nation was divided, were temporal, or spiritual: and the temporal partys were especially two, the one royalists, the other republicans: each of which asserted their different causes, either out of prudence or ignorance, out of interest or conscience.

For prudence, either that of the antients is inferior to the modern (which we have hitherto bin setting face to face, that any one may judg) or that of the royalist must be inferior to that of the commonwealthsman.The royalist. And for interest, taking the commonwealthsman to have really intended the public (for otherwise he is a hypocrit and the worst of men) that of the royalist must of necessity have bin more privat. Wherfore the whole dispute will com upon matter of conscience: and this, whether it be urg’d by the right of kings, the obligation of former laws, or of the oath of allegiance, is absolv’d by the balance.

For if the right of kings were as immediatly deriv’d from the breath of God as the life of man, yet this excludes not death and dissolution. But, that the dissolution of the late monarchy was as natural as the death of a man, has bin already shewn. Wherfore it remains with the royalists to discover by what reason or experience it is possible for a monarchy to stand upon a popular balance; or, the balance being popular, as well the oath of allegiance, as all other monarchical laws, imply an impossibility, and are therfore void.

The commonwealthsman.To the commonwealthsman I have no more to say, but that if he excludes any party, he is not truly such; nor shall ever found a commonwealth upon the natural principle of the same, which is justice. And the royalist for having not oppos’d a commonwealth in Oceana (where the laws were so ambiguous that they might be eternally disputed, and never reconcil’d) can neither be justly for that cause excluded from his full and equal share in the government; nor prudently, for this reason, that a commonwealth consisting of a party will be in perpetual labor of her own destruction: whence it was that the Romans having conquer’d the Albans, incorporated them with equal right into the commonwealth. And if the royalists be flesh of your flesh, and nearer of blood than were the Albans to the Romans, you being also both Christians, the argument’s the stronger. Nevertheless there is no reason that a commonwealth should any more favor a party remaining in fix’d opposition against it, than Brutus did his own sons. But if it fixes them upon that opposition, it is its own fault, not theirs; and this is done by excluding them. Men that have equal possessions, and the same security for their estates and their libertys that you have, have the same cause with you to defend both: but if you will be trampling, they fight for liberty, tho for monarchy; and you for tyranny, tho under the name of a commonwealth: the nature of orders in a government rightly instituted being void of all jealousy, because, let the partys which it imbraces be what they will, its orders are such as they neither would resist if they could, nor could if they would, as has bin partly already shewn, and will appear more at large by the following model

Religious partys.The partys that are spiritual are of more kinds than I need mention; some for a national religion, and others for liberty of conscience, with such animosity on both sides, as if these two could not consist together, and of which I have already sufficiently spoken, to shew, that indeed the one cannot well subsist without the other. But they of all the rest are the most dangerous, who, holding that the saints must govern, go about to reduce the commonwealth to a party, as well for the reasons already shewn, as that their pretences are against Scripture, where the saints are commanded to submit to the higher powers, and to be subject to the ordinance of man. And that men, pretending under the notion of saints or religion to civil power, have hitherto never fail’d to dishonor that profession, the world is full of examples, whereof I shall confine myself at present only to a couple, the one of old, the other of new Rome.

In old Rome the patricians or nobility pretending to be the godly party, were question’d by the people for ingrossing all the magistracys of that commonwealth, and had nothing to say why they did so, but* that magistracy requir’d a kind of holiness which was not in the people: at which the people were fill’d with such indignation as had com to cutting of throats, if the nobility had not immediatly laid by the insolency of that plea; which nevertheless when they had don, the people for a long time after continu’d to elect no other but patrician magistrats.

The example of new Rome in the rise and practise of the hierarchy (too well known to require any further illustration) is far more immodest.

This has bin the course of nature: and when it has pleas’d or shall please God to introduce any thing that is above the course of nature, he will, as he has always don, confirm it by miracle; for so in his prophecy of the reign of Christ upon earth, he expressly promises: seeing that the souls of them that were beheaded for Jesus, shall be seen to live and reign with him; which will be an object of sense, the rather, because the rest of the dead are not to live again till the thousand years be finish’d. And it is not lawful for men to persuade us that a thing already is, tho there be no such object of our sense, which God has told us shall not be till it be an object of our sense.

The saintship of a people as to government, consists in the election of magistrats fearing God, and hating covetousness, and not in their confining themselves, or being confin’d to men of this or that party or profession. It consists in making the most prudent and religious choice they can; yet not in trusting to men, but, next God, to their own orders. Give us good men, and they will make us good laws, is the maxim of a demagog, and is (thro the alteration which is commonly perceivable in men, when they have power to work their own wills) exceeding fallible. But give us good orders, and they will make us good men, is the maxim of a legislator, and the most infallible in the politics.

But these divisions (however there be some good men that look sadly on them) are trivial things; first as to the civil concern, because the government, wherof this nation is capable, being once seen, takes in all interests. And, secondly, as to the spiritual; because as the pretence of religion has always bin turbulent in broken governments, so where the government has bin sound and steddy, religion has never shew’d it self with any other face than that of the natural sweetness and tranquillity: nor is there any reason why it should; wherfore the errors of the people are occasion’d by their governors.The errors of the people are from their governors. If they be doubtful of the way, or wander from it, it is because their guides misled them; and the guides of the people are never so well qualify’d for leading by any virtue of their own, as by that of the government.

The government of Oceana (as it stood at the time wherof we discourse, consisting of one single council of the people, exclusively of the king and the lords) was call’d a parlament: nevertheless the parlaments of the Teutons and of the Neustrians consisted, as has bin shewn, of the king, lords and commons; wherfore this under an old name was a new thing: a parlament consisting of a single assembly elected by the people, and invested with the whole power of the government, without any covenants, conditions, or orders whatsoever. So new a thing, that neither antient nor modern prudence can shew any avow’d example of the like. And there is scarce any thing that seems to me so strange as that (wheras there was nothing more familiar with these counsillors, than to bring the Scripture to the house) there should not be a man of them that so much as offer’d to bring the house to the Scripture, wherin, as has bin shewn, is contain’d that original, wherof all the rest of the commonwealths seem to be copys. Certainly if Leviathan (who is surer of nothing than that a popular commonwealth consists but of one council) transcrib’d his doctrin out of this assembly, for him to except against Aristotle and Cicero for writing out of their own commonwealths, was not so fair play; or if the parlament transcrib’d out of him, it had been an honor better due to Moses. But where one of them should have an example but from the other, I cannot imagin, there being nothing of this kind that I can find in story, but the oligarchy of Athens, the thirty tyrants of the same, and the Roman decemvirs.

Lib. 8.For the oligarchy, Thucydides tells us, that it was a senat or council of four hundred, pretending to a balancing council of the people consisting of five thousand, but not producing them; wherin you have the definition of an oligarchy, which is a single council both debating and resolving, dividing and chusing; and what that must com to, was shewn by the example of the girls, and is apparent by the experience of all times: wherfore the thirty set up by the Lacedemonians (when they had conquer’d Athens) are call’d tyrants by all authors, Leviathan only excepted, who will have them against all the world to have bin an aristocracy; but for what reason I cannot imagin, these also, as void of any balance, having been void of that which is essential to every commonwealth, whether aristocratical or popular; except he be pleas’d with them, because that, according to the testimony of Xenophon, they kill’d more men in eight months, than the Lacedemonians had don in ten years; oppressing the people (to use Sir Walter Raleigh’s words) with all base and intolerable slavery.

The usurp’d government of the decemvirs in Rome was of the same kind. Wherfore in the fear of God let Christian legislators (setting the pattern given in the mount on the one side, and these execrable examples on the other) know the right hand from the left; and so much the rather, because those things which do not conduce to the good of the govern’d, are fallacious, if they appear to be good for the governors. God, in chastising a people, is accustom’d to burn his rod. The empire of these oligarchys was not so violent as short, nor did they fall upon the people, but in their own immediat ruin. A council without a balance is not a commonwealth, but an oligarchy; and every oligarchy, except it be put to the defence of its wickedness or power against som outward danger, is factious. Wherfore the errors of the people being from their governors (which maxim in the politics bearing a sufficient testimony to it self, is also prov’d by Machiavel) if the people of Oceana have bin factious, the cause is apparent: but what remedy?

The generaqll.In answer to this question, I com now to the army; of which the most victorious captain, and incomparable patriot, Olphaus Megaletor, was now general: who being a much greater master of that art wherof I have made a rough draught in these preliminarys, had such sad reflections upon the ways and procedings of the parlament, as cast him upon books, and all other means of diversion, among which he happen’d on this place of Machiavel: “Thrice happy is that people which chances to have a man able to give them such a government at once, as without alteration may secure them of their libertys; seeing it was certain that Lacedemon, in observing the laws of Lycurgus, continu’d about eight hundred years without any dangerous tumult or corruption.” My Lord General (as it is said of Themistocles, that he could not sleep for the glory obtain’d by Miltiades at the battel of Maratho) took so new and deep an impression at these words of the much greater glory of Lycurgus, that, being on this side assaulted with the emulation of his illustrious object, and on the other with the misery of the nation, which seem’d (as it were ruin’d by his victory) to cast itself at his feet, he was almost wholly depriv’d of his natural rest, till the debate he had within himself came to a firm resolution, that the greatest advantages of a commonwealth are, first, that the legislator should be one man: and, secondly, that the government should be made all together, or at once.Des. B. 1. c. 9. For the first, It is certain, says Machiavel, that a commonwealth is seldom or never well turn’d or constituted, except it has bin the work of one man; for which cause a wise legislator, and one whose mind is firmly set, not upon privat but the public interest, not upon his posterity but upon his country, may justly endeavour to get the soverain power into his own hands; nor shall any man that is master of reason blame such extraordinary means as in that case will be necessary, the end proving no other than the constitution of a well-order’d commonwealth.That a legislator is to be one. The reason of this is demonstrable: for the ordinary means not failing, the commonwealth has no need of a legislator; but the ordinary means failing, there is no recourse to be had but to such as are extraordinary. And, wheras a book or a building has not bin known to attain to its perfection, if it has not had a sole author or architect; a commonwealth, as to the fabric of it, is of the like nature.That a commonwealth is to be made at once. And thus it may be made at once; in which there be great advantages: for a commonwealth made at once, takes security at the same time it lends mony; and trusts not itself to the faith of men, but lanches immediatly forth into the empire of laws: and being set streight, brings the manners of its citizens to its rule; whence follow’d that uprightness which was in Lacedemon. But manners that are rooted in men, bow the tenderness of a commonwealth coming up by twigs to their bent; whence follow’d the obliquity that was in Rome, and those perpetual repairs by the consuls axes, and tribuns hammers, which could never finish that commonwealth but in destruction.

My Lord General being clear in these points, and of the necessity of som other course than would be thought upon by the parlament, appointed a meeting of the army, where he spoke his sense agreable to these preliminarys with such success to the soldiery, that the parlament was soon after depos’d; and he himself (in the great hall of the pantheon or palace of justice, situated in Emporium the capital city) was created by the universal suffrage of the army, Lord Archon, or sole legislator of Oceana: upon which theatre you have, to conclude this piece, a person introduc’d, whose fame shall never draw its curtain.

The Lord Archon being created, fifty select persons to assist him (by laboring in the mines of antient prudence, and bringing its hidden treasures to new light) were added, with the stile also of legislators, and sat as a council, wherof he was the sole director and president.

The Council of Legislators.

OF this piece, being the greater half of the whole work, I shall be able at this time to give no farther account, than very briefly to shew at what it aims.

My Lord Archon, in opening the council of legislators, made it appear how unsafe a thing it is to follow phansy in the fabric of a commonwealth; and how necessary that the archives of antient prudence should be ransack’d before any counsillor should presume to offer any other matter in order to the work in hand, or towards the consideration to be had by the council upon a model of government. Wherfore he caus’d an urn to be brought, and every one of the counsillors to draw a lot. By the lots as they were drawn,

The commonwealth of } ISRAEL fell to } Phosphorus de Auge.
The commonwealth of } ATHENS fell to } Navarchus de Paralo.
The commonwealth of } LACEDEMON fell to } Laco de Scytale.
The commonwealth of } CARTHAGE fell to } Mago de Syrtibus.
The commonwealth of } the ACHEANS ÆTOLIANS, and LYCIANS fell to } Aratus de Isthmo.
The commonwealth of } the SWITZ fell to } Alpester de Fulmine.
The commonwealth of } HOLLAND, and the UNITED PROVINCES fell to } Glaucus de Ulna.
The commonwealth of } ROME fell to } Dolabella de Enyo.
The commonwealth of } VENICE fell to } Lynceus de Stella.

These contain’d in them all those excellencys wherof a commonwealth is capable; so that to have added more, had bin to no purpose. Upon time given to the counsillors, by their own studys and those of their friends, to prepare themselves, they were open’d in the order, and by the persons mention’d at the council of legislators, and afterwards by order of the same were repeated at the council of the prytans to the people: for in drawing of the lots, there were about a dozen of them inscrib’d with the letter P. wherby the counsillors that drew them became prytans.

The prytans were a committee or council sitting in the great hall of Pantheon, to whom it was lawful for any man to offer any thing in order to the fabrick of the commonwealth: for which cause, that they might not be opprest by the throng, there was a rail about the table wher they sat, and on each side of the same a pulpit; that on the right hand for any man that would propose any thing, and that on the left for any other that would oppose him. And all partys (being indemnify’d by proclamation of the Archon) were invited to dispute their own interests, or propose whatever they thought fit (in order to the future government) to the council of the prytans, (who having a guard of about two or three hundred men, lest the heat of dispute might break the peace) had the right of moderators, and were to report from time to time such propositions or occurrences as they thought fit, to the council of legislators sitting more privatly in the palace call’d Alma.

This was that which made the people (who were neither safely to be admitted, nor conveniently to be excluded in the framing of the commonwealth) verily believe when it came forth, that it was no other than that wherof they themselves had bin the makers.

Moreover, this council sat divers months after the publishing, and during the promulgation of the model to the people; by which means there is scarce any thing was said or written for or against the said model, but you shall have it with the next impression of this work, by way of oration addrest to, and moderated by the prytans.

By this means the council of legislators had their necessary solitude and due aim in their greater work, as being acquainted from time to time with the pulse of the people, and yet without any manner of interruption or disturbance.

Wherfore every commonwealth in its place having bin open’d by due method, that is, first, by the people; secondly, by the senat; and, thirdly, by the magistracy; the council upon mature debate took such results or orders out of each, and out of every part of each of them, as upon opening the same they thought fit; which being put from time to time in writing by the clerk or secretary, there remain’d no more in the conclusion, than putting the orders so taken together, to view and examin them with a diligent ey, that it might be clearly discover’d whether they did interfere, or could any wise com to interfere or jostle one with the other. For as such orders jostling, or coming to jostle one another, are the certain dissolution of the commonwealth; so taken upon the proof of like experience, and neither jostling, nor shewing which way they can possibly come to jostle one another, they make a perfect, and (for aught that in human prudence can be foreseen) an immortal commonwealth.

And such was the art wherby my Lord Archon (taking council of the commonwealth of Israel, as of Moses; and of the rest of the commonwealths, as of Jethro) fram’d the model of the commonwealth of Oceana.


WHEREAS my Lord Archon being from Moses and Lycurgus the first legislator that hitherto is found in history to have introduc’d or erected an intire commonwealth at once, happen’d, like them also, to be more intent upon putting the same into execution or action, than into writing; by which means the model came to be promulgated or publish’d with more brevity and less illustration than is necessary for their understanding who have not bin acquainted with the whole procedings of the council of legislators, and of the prytans, where it was asserted and clear’d from all objections and doubts: to the end that I may supply what was wanting in the promulgated epitome to a more full and perfect narrative of the whole, I shall rather take the commonwealth practically; and as it has now given an account of it self in som years revolutions (as Dicearchus is said to have don that of Lacedemon, first transcrib’d by his hand som three or four hundred years after the institution) yet not omitting to add for proof to every order such debates and speeches of the legislators in their council, or at least such parts of them as may best discover the reason of the government; nor such ways and means as were us’d in the institution or rise of the building, not to be so well conceiv’d, without som knowlege given of the engins wherwithal the mighty weight was mov’d. But thro the intire omission of the council of legislators or workmen that squar’d every stone to this structure in the quarrys of antient prudence, the proof of the first part of this discourse will be lame, except I insert, as well for illustration as to avoid frequent repetition, three remarkable testimonys in this place.Suidas.

Exod. 18. 24.The first is taken out of the commonwealth of Israel: So Moses hearken’d to the voice of (Jethro) his father-in-law, and did all that he had said.Numb. 1. 16. And Moses chose able men out of all Israel, and made them heads over the people; tribuns, as it is in the vulgar Latin; or phylarchs, that is, princes of the tribes, sitting upon twelve* thrones, and judging the twelve tribes of Israel: and next to these he chose rulers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fiftys, and rulers of tens, which were the steps and rise of this commonwealth from its foundation or root to its proper elevation or accomplishment in the sanhedrim, and the congregation, already open’d in the preliminarys.Matth.

The second is taken out of Lacedemon, as Lycurgus (for the greater impression of his institutions upon the minds of his citizens) pretended to have receiv’d the model of that commonwealth from the oracle of Apollo at Delphos, the words wherof are thus recorded by Plutarch in the life of that famous legislator: ‘When thou shalt have divided the people into tribes (which were fix) and obas (which were five in every tribe) thou shalt constitut the senat,Crag. de Rep. consisting, with the two kings, of thirty counsellors, who, according as occasion requires, shall cause the congregation to be assembled between the bridg and the river Gnacion,Lac. lib. 1. c. 6. where the senat shall propose to the people, and dismiss them without suffering them to debate.’ The obæ were linages into which every tribe was divided, and in each tribe there was another division containing all those of the same that were of military age; which being call’d the mora, was subdivided into troops and companys that were kept in perpetual disciplin under the command of a magistrat call’d the polemarch.

The third is taken out of the commonwealth of Rome, or those parts of it which are compris’d in the first and second books of Livy, where the people, according to the institution by Romulus, are first divided into thirty curias or parishes, wherof he elected (by three out of each curia) the senat, which from his reign to that of Servius Tullus proposed to the parishes or parochial congregations; and these being call’d the comitia curiata, had the election of the* kings, the confirmation of their laws, and the last appeal in matters of judicature, as appears in the case of Horatius that kill’d his sister; till in the reign of Servius (for the other kings kept not to the institution of Romulus) the people being grown somwhat, the power of the curiata was for the greater part translated to the centuriata comitia instituted by this king, which distributed the people according to the cense or valuation of their estates into six classes, every one containing about forty centurys, divided into youth and elders; the youth for field-service, the elders for the defence of their territory, all arm’d and under continual disciplin, in which they assembl’d both upon military and civil occasions.Halicar. But when the senat propos’d to the people, the horse only, wherof there were twelve centurys consisting of the richest sort over and above those of the foot enumerated, were call’d with the first classis of the foot to the suffrage; or if these accorded not, then the second classis was call’d to them, but seldom or never any of the rest. Wherfore the people after the expulsion of the kings, growing impatient of this inequality, rested not till they had reduc’d the suffrage as it had bin in the comitia curiata to the whole people again: but in another way, that is to say, by the comitia tributa, which thereupon were instituted being a council where the people in exigencys made laws without the senat; which laws were call’d phlebiscita. This council is that in regard wherof Cicero and other great wits so frequently inveigh against the people, and somtimes even Livy, as at the first institution of it. To say the truth, it was a kind of anarchy, wherof the people could not be excusable, if there had not, thro the courses taken by the senat, bin otherwise a necessity that they must have seen the commonwealth run into oligarchy.

Sigonius.The manner how the comitia curiata, centuriata or tributa, were call’d, during the time of the commonwealth, to the suffrage, was by lot: the curia, century, or tribe, whereon the first lot fell, being stil’d principium, or the prerogative; and the other curiæ, centurys or tribes, whereon the second, third, and fourth lots, & c. fell, the jure vocatæ: From henceforth not the first classis, as in the times of Servius, but the prerogative, whether curia, century, or tribe, came first to the suffrage, whose vote was call’d omen prærogativum, and seldom fail’d to be leading to the rest of the tribes. The jure vocatæ in the order of their lots came next: the manner of giving suffrage was, by casting wooden tablets, mark’d for the affirmative or the negative, into certain urns standing upon a scaffold, as they march’d over it in files; which for the resemblance it bore, was call’d the bridg. The candidat or competitor, who had most suffrages in a curia, century, or tribe, was said to have that curia, century, or tribe; and he who had most of the curiæ, centurys, or tribes, carry’d the magistracy.

These three places being premis’d, as such upon which there will be frequent reflection, I com to the narrative, divided into two parts, the first containing the institution, the second the constitution of the commonwealth; in each wherof I shall distinguish the orders, as those which contain the whole model, from the rest of the discourse, which tends only to the explanation or proof of them.

Institution of the commonwealth.In the institution or building of a commonwealth, the first work (as that of builders) can be no other than fitting and distributing the materials.

Divisions of the people.The materials of a commonwealth are the people; and the people of Oceana were distributed by casting them into certain divisions, regarding their quality, their age, their wealth, and the places of their residence or habitation, which was don by the insuing orders.

1 Order. Into freemen and servants.The first ORDER distributes the people into freemen or citizens, and servants, while such; for if they attain to liberty, that is, to live of themselves, they are freemen or citizens.

This order needs no proof, in regard of the nature of servitude, which is inconsistent with freedom, or participation of government in a commonwealth.

2 Order. Into youth and elders.The second ORDER distributes citizens into youth and elders (such as are from 18 years of age to 30, being accounted youth; and such as are of 30 and upwards, elders) and establishes that the youth shall be the marching armys, and the elders the standing garisons of this nation.

A commonwealth whose arms are in the hands of her servants, had need be situated (as is elegantly said of Venice by* Contarini) out of the reach of their clutches; witness the danger run by that of Carthage in the rebellion of Spendius and Matho. But tho a city (if one swallow makes a summer) may thus chance to be safe, yet shall it never be great; for it Carthage or Venice acquir’d any fame in their arms, it is known to have happen’d thro the mere virtue of their captains, and not of their orders: wherefore Israel, Lacedemon, and Rome intail’d their arms upon the prime of their citizens, divided (at least in Lacedemon and Rome) into youth and elders; the youth for the field, and the elders for defence of the territory.

3 Order. Into horse and foot.The third ORDER distributes the citizens into horse and foot by the cense or valuation of their estates; they who have above one hundred pounds a year in lands, goods, or monys, being oblig’d to be of the horse; and they who have under that sum, to be of the foot. But if a man has prodigally wasted and spent his patrimony, he is neither capable of magistracy, office, or suffrage in the commonwealth.

Citizens are not only to defend the commonwealth, but according to their abilitys, as the Romans under Servius Tullus (regard had to their estates) were som inrol’d in the horse centurys, and others of the foot, with arms injoin’d accordingly; nor could it be otherwise in the rest of the commonwealths, tho out of historical remains, that are so much darker, it be not so clearly probable. And the necessary prerogative to be given by a commonwealth to estates, is in som measure in the nature of industry, and the use of it to the public.§ The Roman people, says Julius Exuperantius, were divided into classes, and tax’d according to the value of their estates. All that were worth the sums appointed were imploy’d in the wars; for they most eagerly contend for the victory, who fight for liberty in defence of their country and possessions. But the poorer sort were pol’d only for their heads (which was all they had) and kept in garison at home in time of war: for these might betray the armys for bread, by reason of their poverty; which is the reason that Marius, to whom the care of the government ought not to have bin committed, was the first that led ’em into the field; and his success was accordingly. There is a mean in things; as exorbitant riches overthrow the balance of a commonwealth, so extreme poverty cannot hold it, nor is by any means to be trusted with it. The clause in the order concerning the prodigal is Athenian, and a very laudable one; for he that could not live upon his patrimony, if he coms to touch the public mony, makes a commonwealth bankrupt.

4 Order. Into parishes, hundreds, and tribes.The fourth ORDER distributes the people according to the places of their habitation, into parishes, hundreds, and tribes.

For except the people be methodically distributed, they cannot be methodically collected; but the being of a commonwealth consists in the methodical collection of the people: wherfore you have the Israelitish divisions into rulers of thousands, of hundreds, of fiftys, and of tens; and of the whole commonwealth into tribes: the Laconic into obas, moras, and tribes; the Roman into tribes, centurys, and classes; and somthing there must of necessity be in every government of the like nature; as that in the late monarchy, by countys. But this being the only institution in Oceana (except that of the agrarian) which requir’d any charge or included any difficulty, engages me to a more particular description of the manner how it was perform’d, as follows.

The use and method of the surveyors.A thousand surveyors commissionated and instructed by the lord Archon and the council, being divided into two equal numbers, each under the inspection of two surveyors general, were distributed into the northern and southern parts of the territory, divided by the river Hemisua, the whole wherof contains about ten thousand parishes, som ten of those being assign’d to each surveyor: for as to this matter there needed no great exactness, it tending only (by shewing whither every one was to repair, and wherabout to begin) to the more orderly carrying on of the work; the nature of their instructions otherwise regarding rather the number of the inhabitants, than of the parishes. The surveyors therfore being every one furnish’d with a convenient proportion of urns, balls and balloting boxes (in the use wherof they had bin formerly exercis’d) and now arriving each at his respective parishes, began with the people, by teaching them their first lesson, which was the ballot; and tho they found them in the beginning somewhat forward as at toys, with which (while they were in expectation of greater matters from a council of legislators) they conceiv’d themselves to be abus’d, they came within a little while to think them pretty sport, and at length such as might very soberly be us’d in good earnest: wherupon the surveyors began the institution included in

5 Order. Institution of the parishes, of the ballot, and of the deputys.The first ORDER, requiring, That upon the first Monday next insuing the last of December, the bigger bell in every parish throout the nation be rung at eight of the clock in the morning, and continue ringing for the space of one hour; and that all the elders of the parish respectively repair to the church, before the bell has don ringing; where dividing themselves into two equal numbers, or as near equal as may be, they shall take their places according to their dignitys (if they be of divers qualitys) and according to their seniority (if they be of the same) the one half on the one side, and the other half on the other, in the body of the church: which don, they shall make oath to the overseers of the parish for the time being (instead of these the surveyors were to officiat at the institution or first assembly) by holding up their hands, to make a fair election according to the laws of the ballot, as they are hereafter explain’d, of such persons, amounting to a fifth part of their whole number, to be their deputys, and to exercise their power in manner hereafter explain’d, as they shall think in their consciences to be fittest for that trust, and will acquit themselves of it to the best advantage of the commonwealth. And oath being thus made, they shall procede to election, if the elders of the parish amount to one thousand by the ballot of the tribe (as it is in due place explain’d) and if the elders of the parish amount to fifty or upwards, but within the number of one thousand, by the ballot of the hundred (as it is in due place explain’d). But if the elders amount not to fifty, then they shall procede to the ballot of the parish, as it is in this place, and after this manner explain’d. The two overseers for the time being shall seat themselves at the upper end of the middle ally, with a table before them, their faces being towards the congregation: and the constable for the time being shall set an urn before the table, into which he shall put so many balls as there be elders present, wherof there shall be one that is gilded, the rest being white; and when the constable has shaken the urn, sufficiently to mix the balls, the overseers shall call the elders to the urn, who from each side of the church shall com up the middle ally in two files, every man passing by the urn, and drawing out one ball; which if it be silver, he shall cast into a bowl standing at the foot of the urn, and return by the outward ally on his side to his place. But he who draws the golden ball is the proposer, and shall be seated between the overseers, where he shall begin in what order he pleases, and name such as (upon his oath already taken) he conceives fittest to be chosen, one by one, to the elders; and the party nam’d shall withdraw while the congregation is ballotting his name by the double box or boxes appointed and mark’d on the outward part, to shew which side is affirmative and which negative, being carry’d by a boy or boys appointed by the overseers, to every one of the elders, who shall hold up a pellet made of linen rags between his finger and his thumb, and put it after such a manner into the box, as tho no man can see into which side he puts it, yet any man may see that he puts in but one pellet or suffrage. And the suffrage of the congregation being thus given, shall be return’d with the box or boxes to the overseers, who opening the same, shall pour the affirmative balls into a white bowl standing upon the table on the right hand, to be number’d by the first overseer; and the negative into a green bowl standing on the left hand, to be number’d by the second overseer: and the suffrages being number’d, he who has the major part in the affirmative is one of the deputys of the parish: and when so many deputys are chosen as amount to a full fifth part of the whole number of the elders, the ballot for that time shall cease. The deputys being chosen are to be listed by the overseers in order as they were chosen, except only that such as are horse must be listed in the first place with the rest, proportionable to the number of the congregation, after this manner:

Anno Dom.

The list of the first mover.
A.A. Ord. Eq. 1 Dep. } of the parish of — in the hundred of — and the tribe of — which parish at the present election contains 20 elders, wherof one is of the horse or equestrian order.
B. B. 2 Dep. } of the parish of — in the hundred of — and the tribe of — which parish at the present election contains 20 elders, wherof one is of the horse or equestrian order.
C. C. 3 Dep. } of the parish of — in the hundred of — and the tribe of — which parish at the present election contains 20 elders, wherof one is of the horse or equestrian order.
D.D. 4 Dep. } of the parish of — in the hundred of — and the tribe of — which parish at the present election contains 20 elders, wherof one is of the horse or equestrian order.
E. E. 5 Dep. } of the parish of — in the hundred of — and the tribe of — which parish at the present election contains 20 elders, wherof one is of the horse or equestrian order.

THE first and second in the list are overseers by consequence: the third is the constable, and the fourth and fifth are churchwardens; the persons so chosen are deputys of the parish for the space of one year from their election, and no longer; nor may they be elected two years together. This list being the primum mobile, or first mover of the commonwealth, is to be register’d in a book diligently kept and preserv’d by the overseers, who are responsible in their places for these and other dutys to be hereafter mentioned, to the censors of the tribe: and the congregation is to observe the present order, as they will answer the contrary to the phylarch, or prerogative troop of the tribe; which, in case of failure in the whole or any part of it, have power to fine them or any of them at discretion, but under an appeal to the parliament.

For proof of this order; first, in reason: it is with all politicians past dispute, that paternal power is in the right of nature; and this is no other than the derivation of power from fathers of familys, as the natural root of a commonwealth. And for experience, if it be otherwise in that of Holland, I know no other example of the like kind.Jos. 24. 1. In Israel, the soverain power came clearly from the natural root, the elders of the whole people; and Rome was born (comitiis curiatis) in her parochial congregations, out of which Romulus first rais’d her senat, then all the rest of the orders of that commonwealth, which rose so high: for the depth of a commonwealth is the just height of it.

*She raises up her head unto the skys,

Near as her root unto the center lys.

And if the commonwealth of Rome was born of thirty parishes, this of Oceana was born of ten thousand. But wheras mention in the birth of this is made of an equestrian order, it may startle such as know that the division of the people of Rome, at the institution of that commonwealth into orders, was the occasion of its ruin. The distinction of the patrician as a hereditary order from the very institution, ingrossing all the magistracys, was indeed the destruction of Rome; but to a knight or one of the equestrian order, says Horace,

Si quadringentis sex septem millia desunt,

Plebs eris.

By which it should seem that this order was not otherwise hereditary than a man’s estate, nor did it give any claim to magistracy; wherfore you shall never find that it disquieted the commonwealth; nor dos the name denote any more in Oceana, than the duty of such a man’s estate to the public.

But the surveyors both in this place and in others, forasmuch as they could not observe all the circumstances of this order, especially that of the time of election, did for the first as well as they could; and, the elections being made and register’d, took each of them copys of those lists which were within their allotments; which don they produc’d

6 Order. Of ordination, a national religion, and liberty of conscience.The sixth ORDER, directing, in case a parson or vicar of a parish coms to be remov’d by death or by the censors, that the congregation of the parish assemble and depute one or two elders by the ballot, who upon the charge of the parish shall repair to one of the universitys of this nation with a certificat sign’d by the overseers, and addrest to the Vice-Chancellor: which certificat giving notice of the death or removal of the parson or vicar, of the value of the parsonage or vicarage, and of the desire of the congregation to receive a probationer from that university, the Vice-Chancellor upon the receit therof shall call a convocation, and having made choice of a fit person, shall return him in due time to the parish, where the person so return’d shall return the full fruits of the benefice or vicarage, and do the duty of the parson or vicar, for the space of one year, as probationer: and that being expir’d, the congregation of the elders shall put their probationer to the ballot: and if he attains not to two parts in three of the suffrage affirmative, he shall take his leave of the parish, and they shall send in like manner as before for another probationer; but if their probationer obtains two parts in three of the suffrage affirmative, he is then pastor of that parish. And the pastor of the parish shall pray with the congregation, preach the word, and administer the sacraments to the same, according to the directory to be hereafter appointed by the parliament. Nevertheless such as are of gather’d congregations, or from time to time shall join with any of them, are in no wise oblig’d to this way of electing their teachers, or to give their votes in this case, but wholly left to the liberty of their own consciences, and to that way of worship which they shall chuse, being not Popish, Jewish, or idolatrous. And to the end they may be the better protected by the state in the exercise of the same, they are desir’d to make choice, in such manner as they best like, of certain magistrats in every one of their congregations, which we could wish might be four in each of them, to be auditors in cases of differences of distast, if any thro variety of opinions, that may be grievous or injurious to them, shall fall out. And such auditors or magistrats shall have power to examin the matter, and inform themselves, to the end that if they think it of sufficient weight, they may acquaint the phylarch with it, or introduce it into the council of religion; where all such causes as those magistrats introduce, shall from time to time be heard and determin’d according to such laws as are or shall hereafter be provided by the parlament for the just defeuce of the liberty of conscience.

This order consists of three parts, the first restoring the power of ordination to the people, which, that it originally belongs to them, is clear, tho not in English yet in Scripture, where the apostles ordain’d elders by the holding up of hands in every congregation, that is, by the suffrage of the people, which was also giver.Acts 14. 23. in som of those citys by the ballot. And tho it may be shewn that the apostles ordain’d som by the laying on of hands, it will not be shewn that they did so in every congregation.

Excommunication, as not clearly provable out of the scripture, being omitted, the second part of the order implys and establishes a national religion: for there be degrees of knowlege in divine things; true religion is not to be learnt without searching the Scripture: the Scriptures cannot be search’d by us unless we have them to search: and if we have nothing else, or (which is all one) understand nothing else but a translation, we may be (as in the place alleg’d we have bin) beguil’d or misled by the translation, while we should be searching the true sense of the Scripture, which cannot be attain’d in a natural way (and a commonwealth is not to presume upon that which is supernatural) but by the knowlege of the original and of antiquity, acquir’d by our own studys, or those of som others, for even faith coms by hearing. Wherfore a commonwealth not making provision of men from time to time, knowing in the original languages wherin the Scriptures were written, and vers’d in those antiquitys to which they so frequently relate, that the true sense of them depends in great part upon that knowlege, can never be secure that she shall not lose the Scripture, and by consequence her religion; which to preserve she must institut som method of this knowlege, and som use of such as have acquir’d it, which amounts to a national religion.

The commonwealth having thus perform’d her duty towards God, as a rational creature, by the best application of her reason to Scripture, and for the preservation of religion in the purity of the same, yet pretends not to infallibility, but coms in the third part of the order, establishing liberty of conscience according to the instructions given to her council of religion, to raise up her hands to heaven for further light; in which proceding she follows that (as was shewn in the preliminarys) of Israel, who tho her national religion was always a part of her civil law, gave to her prophets the upper hand of all her orders.

Definition of a parish.But the surveyors having now done with the parishes, took their leaves; so a parish is the first division of land occasion’d by the first collection of the people of Oceana, whose function proper to that place is compriz’d in the six preceding orders.

Institution of the hundred.The next step in the progress of the surveyors was to a meeting of the nearest of them, as their work lay, by twentys; where conferring their lists, and computing the deputys contain’d therin, as the number of them in parishes, being nearest neighbors, amounted to one hundred, or as even as might conveniently be brought with that account, they cast them and those parishes into the precinct which (be the deputys ever since more or fewer) is still call’d the hundred: and to every one of these precincts they appointed a certain place, being the most convenient town within the same, for the annual rendevouz; which don, each surveyor returning to his hundred, and summoning the deputys contain’d in his lists to the rendevouz, they appear’d and receiv’d

7 Order.The seventh ORDER, requiring, That upon the first Monday next insuing the last of January, the deputys of every parish annually assemble in arms at the rendevouz of the hundred, and there elect out of their number one justice of the peace, one juryman, one captain, one ensign of their troop or century, each of these out of the horse; and one juryman, one crowner, one high constable, out of the foot; the election to be made by the ballot in this manner. The jurymen for the time being are to be overseers of the ballot (instead of these, the surveyors are to officiat at the first assembly) and to look to the performance of the same according to what was directed in the ballot of the parishes, saving that the high constable setting forth the urn, shall have five several sutes of gold balls, and one dozen of every sute; wherof the first shall be mark’d with the letter A, the second with the letter B, the third with C, the fourth with D, and the fifth with E: and of each of these sutes he shall cast one ball into his hat, or into a little urn, and shaking the balls together, present them to the first overseer, who shall draw one, and the sute which is so drawn by the overseer, shall be of use for that day, and no other: for example, if the overseer drew an A, the high constable shall put seven gold balls mark’d with the letter A into the urn, with so many silver ones as shall bring them even with the number of the deputys, who being sworn, as before, at the ballot of the parish to make a fair election, shall be call’d to the urn; and every man coming in manner as was there shew’d, shall draw one ball, which if it be silver, he shall cast it into a bowl standing at the foot of the urn, aad return to his place; but the first that draws a gold ball (shewing it to the overseers, who, if it has not the letter of the present ballot, have power to apprehend and punish him) is the first elector, the second the second elector, and so to the seventh; which order they are to observe in their function. The electors as they are drawn shall be plac’d upon the bench by the overseers, till the whole number be complete, and then be conducted, with the list of the officers to be chosen, into a place apart, where being privat, the first elector shall name a person to the first office in the list; and if the person so nam’d, being balloted by the rest of the electors, attains not to the better half of the suffrages in the affirmative, the first elector shall continue nominating others, till one of them so nominated by him attains to the plurality of the suffrages in the affirmative, and be written first competitor to the first office. This don, the second elector shall observe in his turn the like order; and so the rest of the electors, naming competitors each to his respective office in the list, till one competitor be chosen to every office: and when one competitor is chosen to every office, the first elector shall begin again to name a second competitor to the first office, and the rest successively shall name to the rest of the offices till two competitors be chosen to every office; the like shall be repeated till three competitors be chosen to every office. And when three competitors are chosen to every office, the list shall be return’d to the overseers, or such as the overseers, in case they or either of them happen’d to be electors, have substituted in his or their place or places: and the overseers or substitutes having caus’d the list to be read to the congregation, shall put the competitors, in order as they are written, to the ballot of the congregation: and the rest of the proceedings being carry’d on in the manner directed in the fifth order, that competitor, of the three written to each office, who has most of the suffrages above half in the affirmative, is the officer. The list being after this manner completed, shall be entred into a register, to be kept at the rendevouz of the hundred, under inspection of the magistrats of the same, after the manner following:

Anno Domini.

The list of the nebulosa.
A. A. Ord. Eq. Justice of the Peace } of the hundred of — in the tribe of — which hundred consists at this election of 105 deputys.
B. B. Ord. Eq. First Juryman } of the hundred of — in the tribe of — which hundred consists at this election of 105 deputys.
C. C. Ord. Eq. Captain of the Hundred } of the hundred of — in the tribe of — which hundred consists at this election of 105 deputys.
D. D. Ord. Eq. Ensign } of the hundred of — in the tribe of — which hundred consists at this election of 105 deputys.
E. E. Second Juryman } of the hundred of — in the tribe of — which hundred consists at this election of 105 deputys.
F. F. High Constable } of the hundred of — in the tribe of — which hundred consists at this election of 105 deputys.
G. G. Crowner } of the hundred of — in the tribe of — which hundred consists at this election of 105 deputys.

THE list being enter’d, the high constable shall take three copys of the same, wherof he shall presently return one to the lord high sheriff of the tribe, a second to the lord custos rotulorum, and a third to the censors; or these, thro the want of such magistrats at the first muster, may be return’d to the orator, to be appointed for that tribe. To the observation of all and every part of this order, the officers and deputys of the hundred are all and every of them oblig’d, as they will answer it to the phylarch, who has power in case of failure in the whole or any part, to fine all or any of them so failing at discretion, or according to such laws as shall hereafter be provided in that case; but under an appeal to the parlament.

There is little in this order worthy of any further account, but that it answers to the rulers of hundreds in Israel, to the mora or military part of the tribe in Lacedemon, and to the century in Rome. The jurymen, being two in a hundred, and so forty in a tribe, give the latitude allow’d by the law for exceptions. And wheras the golden balls at this ballot begin to be mark’d with letters, wherof one is to be drawn immediatly before it begins; this is to the end that the letter being unknown, men may be frustrated of tricks or foul play, wheras otherwise a man may bring a golden ball with him, and make as if he had drawn it out of the urn. The surveyors, when they had taken copys of these lists, had accomplish’d their work in the hundreds.

Definition of the hundred.So a hundred is the second division of land occasion’d by the second collection of the people, whose civil and military functions proper to this place are compriz’d in the foregoing order.

Having stated the hundreds, they met once again by twentys, where there was nothing more easy than to cast every twenty hundreds, as they lay most conveniently together, into one tribe; so the whole territory of Oceana, consisting of about ten thousand parishes, came to be cast into one thousand hundreds, and into fifty tribes.Institution of the tribe. In every tribe at the place appointed for the annual rendevouz of the same, were then, or soon after, begun those buildings which are now call’d pavilions; each of them standing with one open side upon fair columns, like the porch of som antient temple, and looking into a field, capable of the muster of som four thousand men:Of the pavilion. before each pavilion stand three pillars sustaining urns for the ballot, that on the right-hand equal in height to the brow of a horsman, being call’d the horse urn; that on the left-hand, with bridges on either side to bring it equal in height with the brow of a footman, being call’d the foot urn; and the middle urn with a bridg on the side towards the foot urn, the other side, as left for the horse, being without one: and here ended the whole work of the surveyors, who return’d to the lord Archon with this

Account of the charge.
l. s.
The whole charge of the institution.IMPRIMIS, Urns, balls, and balloting boxes for ten thousand parishes, the same being wooden ware, 20000 00
ITEM, Provisions of the like kind for a thousand hundreds 3000 00
ITEM, Urns and balls of metal, with balloting boxes for fifty tribes, 2000 00
ITEM, For erecting of fifty pavilions, 60000 00
ITEM, Wages for four surveyors general at 1000 l. a man, 4000 00
ITEM, Wages for the rest of the surveyors, being 1000, at 250 l. a man, 2 50000 00
Sum Total, 3 39000 00

This is no great matter of charge for the building of a commonwealth, in regard that it has cost (which was pleaded by the surveyors) as much to rig a few ships. Nevertheless that proves not them to be honest, nor their account to be just; but they had their mony for once, tho their reckoning be plainly guilty of a crime, to cost him his neck that commits it another time, it being impossible for a commonwealth (without an exact provision that it be not abus’d in this kind) to subsist: for if no regard should be had of the charge (tho that may go deep) yet the debauchery and corruption, wherto, by negligence in accounts, it infallibly exposes its citizens, and therby lessens the public faith, which is the nerve and ligament of government, ought to be prevented. But the surveyors being dispatch’d, the lord Archon was very curious in giving names to his tribes, which having caus’d to be written in scrols cast into an urn, and presented to the counsillors, each of them drew one, and was accordingly sent to the tribe in his lot, as orators of the same, a magistracy no otherwise instituted, than for once and pro tempore, to the end that the council upon so great an occasion might both congratulat with the tribes, and assist at the first muster in som things of necessity to be differently carry’d from the establish’d administration, and future course of the commonwealth.

The orators being arriv’d, every one as soon as might be, at the rendevouz of his tribe, gave notice to the hundreds, and summon’d the muster, which appear’d for the most part upon good horses, and already indifferently well arm’d; as to instance in one for all, the tribe of Nubia, where Hermes de Caduceo, lord orator of the same, after a short salutation and a hearty welcom, apply’d himself to his business, which began with

8 Order.The eighth ORDER, requiring, That the lord high sheriff as commander in chief, and the lord Custos Rotulorum as mustermaster of the tribe (or the orator for the first muster) upon reception of the lists of their hundreds, return’d to them by the high constables of the same, presently cause them to be cast up, dividing the horse from the foot, and listing the horse by their names in troops, each troop containing about a hundred in number, to be inscrib’d, first, second or third troop, &c. according to the order agreed upon by the said magistrats: which don, they shall list the foot in like manner, and inscribe the companys in like order. These lists upon the eve of the muster shall be deliver’d to certain trumpeters and drummers, wherof there shall be fifteen of each sort (as well for the present as otherwise to be hereafter mentioned) stipendiated by the tribe. And the trumpeters and drummers shall be in the field before the pavilion, upon the day of the muster, so soon as it is light, where they shall stand every one with his list in his hand, at a due distance, placed according to the order of the list; the trumpeters with the lists of the horse on the right hand, and the drummers with the lists of the foot on the left hand: where having sounded a while, each of them shall begin to call, and continue calling the names of the deputys, as they com into the field, till both the horse and foot be gather’d by that means into their due order. The horse and foot being in order, the lord lieutenant of the tribe shall cast so many gold balls mark’d with the figures, 1, 2, 3, 4, &c. as there be troops of horse in the field, together with so many silver balls as there be companys, mark’d in the same manner, into a little urn, to which he shall call the captains; and the captains drawing the gold balls shall command the horse, and those that draw the silver the foot, each in the order of his lot. The like shall be don by the conductor at the same time for the ensigns at another urn; and they that draw the gold balls shall be cornets, the rest ensigns.

This order may puzzle the reader, but tends to a wonderful speed of the muster, to which it would be a great matter to lose a day in ranging and martialling, wheras by virtue of this the tribe is no sooner in the field than in battalia, nor sooner in battalia than call’d to the urns or the ballot by virtue of

9 Order.The ninth ORDER, wherby the censors (or the orator for the first muster) upon reception of the lists of the hundreds from the high constables, according as is directed by the seventh order, are to make their notes for the urns beforehand, with regard had to the lists of the magistrats, to be elected by the ensuing orders, that is to say, by the first list call’d the prime magnitude, six; and by the second call’d the galaxy, nine. Wherfore the censors are to put into the middle urn for the election of the first list twenty four gold balls, with twenty six blanks or silver balls, in all sixty; and into the side urns sixty gold balls divided into each according to the different number of the horse and foot: that is to say, if the horse and the foot be equal, equally; and if the horse and the foot be inequal, inequally, by an arithmetical proportion. The like shall be don the second day of the muster, for the second list, except that the censors shall put into the middle urn 36 gold balls with 24 blanks, in all sixty; and sixty gold balls into the side urns, divided respectively into the number of the horse and the foot: and the gold balls in the side urns at either ballot are by the addition of blanks to be brought even with the number of the ballotants at either urn respectively. The censors having prepar’d their notes, as has bin shewn, and being com at the day appointed into the field, shall present a little urn to the lord high sheriff, who is to draw twice for the letters to be us’d that day, the one at the side urns, and the other at the middle. And the censors having fitted the urns accordingly, shall place themselves in certain movable seats or pulpits (to be kept for that use in the pavilion) the first censor before the horse urn, the second before the foot urn, the lord lieutenant doing the office of censor pro tempore at the middle urn; where all and every one of them shall cause the laws of the ballot to be diligently observ’d, taking a special care that no man be suffer’d to com above once to the urn, (wherof it more particularly concerns the subcensors, that is to say, the overseers of every parish, to be careful; they being each in this regard responsible for their respective parishes) or to draw above one ball, which if it be gold, he is to present to the censor, who shall look upon the letter; and if it be not that of the day, and of the respective urn, apprehend the party, who for this or any other like disorder, is obnoxious to the phylarch.

This order being observ’d by the censors, it is not possible for the people, if they can but draw the balls, tho they understand nothing at all of the ballot, to be out. To philosophize further upon this art, tho there be nothing more rational, were not worth the while; because in writing it will be perplex’d, and the first practice of it gives the demonstration: whence it came to pass, that the orator, after some needless pains in the explanation of the two foregoing orders, betaking himself to exemplify the same, found the work don to his hand; for the tribe, as eager upon a business of this nature, had retain’d one of the surveyors, out of whom (before the orator arriv’d) they had got the whole mystery by a stoln muster, at which in order to the ballot they had made certain magistrats pro tempore. Wherfore he found not only the pavilion (for this time a tent) erected with three posts, supplying the place of pillars to the urns; but the urns being prepar’d with a just number of balls for the first ballot, to becom the field, and the occasion very gallantly, with their covers made in the manner of helmets, open at either ear to give passage to the hands of the ballotants, and flanting with noble plumes to direct the march of the people. Wherfore he proceeded to

10 Order.The tenth ORDER, requiring of the deputys of the parishes, That upon every Monday next ensuing the last of February, they make their personal appearance, horse and foot in arms accordingly, at the rendevouz of the tribe; where being in disciplin, the horse upon the right, and the foot upon the left, before the pavilion, and having made oath by holding up their hands upon the tender of it by the lord high sheriff, to make election without favour, and of such only as they shall judg fittest for the commonwealth: the conductor shall take three balls, the one inscrib’d with these words [outward files] another with these words [inward files] and the third with these [middle files] which balls he shall cast into a little urn, and present it to the lord high sheriff, who drawing one, shall give the words of command, as they are therupon inscrib’d, and the ballot shall begin accordingly. For example, if the ball be inscrib’d middle files, the ballot shall begin by the middle; that is, the two files that are middle to the horse, shall draw out first to the horse urn, and the two files that are middle to the foot, shall draw out first to the foot urn, and be follow’d by all the rest of the files as they are next to them in order. The like shall be don by the inward, or by the outward files, in case they be first call’d. And the files, as every man has drawn his ball, if it be silver, shall begin at the urn to countermarcb to their places; but he that has dxawn a gold ball at a side urn, shall procede to the middle urn, where if the ball he draws be silver, he shall also countermarch: but if it be gold, he shall take his place upon a form set cross the pavilion, with his face toward the lord high sheriff, who shall be seated in the middle of the pavilion, with certain clercs by him, one of which shall write down the names of every elector, that is, of every one that drew a gold ball at the middle urn, and in the order his ball was drawn, till the electors amount to six in number. And the first six electors, horse and foot promiscuously, are the first order of electors; the second six (still accounting them as they are drawn) the second order; the third six, the third order; and the fourth six, the fourth order of electors: every elector having place in his order, according to the order wherein he was drawn. But so soon as the first order of electors is complete, the lord high sheriff shall send them with a copy of the following list, and a clerc that understands the ballot, immediatly to a little tent standing before the pavilion in his ey, to which no other person but themselves, during the election, shall approach. The list shall be written in this manner:

Anno Domini.

The list of the prime magnitude or first day’s election of magistrats.
Institution of the prime magnitude.1. The lord high sheriff, commander in chief } of the tribe of Nubia, containing at this present muster 700 horse, and 1500 foot, in all 22000 deputys.
2. Lord lieutenant } of the tribe of Nubia, containing at this present muster 700 horse, and 1500 foot, in all 22000 deputys.
3. Lord custos rotulorum, mustermaster general } of the tribe of Nubia, containing at this present muster 700 horse, and 1500 foot, in all 22000 deputys.
4. The conductor, being quartermaster general } of the tribe of Nubia, containing at this present muster 700 horse, and 1500 foot, in all 22000 deputys.
5. The first censor } of the tribe of Nubia, containing at this present muster 700 horse, and 1500 foot, in all 22000 deputys.
6. The second censor } of the tribe of Nubia, containing at this present muster 700 horse, and 1500 foot, in all 22000 deputys.

AND the electers of the first band or order, being six, shall each of them name to his respective magistracy in the left such as are not already elected in the hundreds, till one competitor be chosen to every magistracy in the list by the ballot of the electors of the first order; which don, the list with the competitors therunto annex’d shall be return’d to the lord high sheriff by the clerc attending that order, but the electors shall keep their places: for they have already given their suffrage, and may not enter into the ballot of the tribe. If there arises any dispute in an order of electors, one of the censors or subcensors appointed by them in case they be electors, shall enter into the tent of that order; and that order shall stand to his judgment in the decision of the controversy. The like shall be don exactly by each other order of electors, being sent as they are drawn, each with another copy of the same list, into a distinct tent, till there be return’d to the lord high sheriff four competitors to every magistracy in the list; that is to say, one competitor elected to every office in every one of the four orders: which competitors the lord high sheriff shall cause to be pronounc’d or read by a cryer to the congregation; and the congregation having heard the whole lists repeated, the names shall be put by the lord high sheriff to the tribe, one by one, beginning with the first competitor in the first order, thence proceding to the first competitor in the second order, and so to the first in the third and fourth orders. And the suffrages being taken in boxes by boys (as has bin already shewn) shall be pour’d into the bowls standing before the censors, who shall be seated at each end of the table in the pavilion, the one numbring the affirmatives, and the other the negatives; and he, of the four competitors to the first magistracy, that has most above half the suffrages of the tribe in the affirmative, is the first magistrat. The like is to be don successively by the rest of the competitors in their order. But because soon after the boxes are sent out for the first name, there be others sent out for the second, and so for the third, &c. by which means divers names are successively at one and the same time in balloting; the boy that carrys a box shall sing or repeat continually the name of the competitor for whom that box is carrying, with that also of the magistracy to which he is propos’d. A magistrat of the tribe happening to be an elector, may substitute any one of his own order to execute his other function. The magistrats of the prime magnitude being thus elected, shall receive the present charge of the tribe.

If it be objected against this order, that the magistrats to be elected by it, will be men of more inferior rank than those of the hundreds, in regard that those are chosen first; it may be remember’d, that so were the burgesses in the former government, nevertheless the knights of the shire were men of greater quality: and the election at the hundred is made by a council of electors, of whom less cannot be expected than the discretion of naming persons fittest for those capacitys, with an ey upon these to be elected at the tribe. As for what may be objected in point of difficulty, it is demonstrable by the foregoing orders, that a man might bring ten thousand men (if there were occasion) with as much ease, and as suddenly to perform the ballot, as he can make five thousand men (drawing them out by double files) to march a quarter of a mile. But because at this ballot, to go up and down the field, distributing the linen pellets to every man, with which he is to ballot or give suffrage, would lose a great deal of time, therfore a man’s wife, his daughters, or others, make him his provision of pellets before the ballot; and he coms into the field with a matter of a score of them in his pocket. And now I have as good as don with the sport. The next is

11 Order. Functions of the magistrats of the prime magnitude.The eleventh ORDER, explaining the dutys and functions of the magistrats contain’d in the list of the prime magnitude: and those of the hundreds, beginning with the lord high sheriff, who, over and above his more antient offices, and those added by the former order, is the first magistrat of the phylarch, or prerogative troop. The lord lieutenant, over and above his duty mentioned, is commander in chief of the musters of the youth, and second magistrat of the phylarch. The custos rotulorum is to return the yearly muster-rolls of the tribe, as well that of the youth as of the elders, to the rolls in emporium, and is the third magistrat of the phylarch. The censors by themselves, and their subcensors, that is, the overseers of the parishes, are to see that the respective laws of the ballot be observ’d in all the popular assemblys of the tribe. They have power also to put such national ministers, as in preaching shell intermeddle with matters of government, out of their livings: except the party appeals to the phylarch, or to the council of religion, where in that case the censors shall prosecute. All and every one of these magistrats, together with the justices of peace, and the jurymen of the hundreds, amounting in the whole number to threescore and six, are the prerogative troop or phylarch of the tribe.

THE function of the phylarch or prerogative troop is fivesold.

Functions of the phylarch.First, They are the council of the tribe, and as such to govern the musters of the same according to the foregoing orders, having cognizance of what has past in the congregation or elections made in the parishes or the hundreds, with power to punish any undue practices, or variation from their respective rules and orders, under an appeal to the parlament. A marriage legitimatly is to be pronounc’d by the parochial congregation, the muster of the hundred, or the phylarch. And if a tribe have a desire (which they are to express at the muster by their captains, every troop by his own) to petition the parlament, the phylarch, as the counsil, shall frame the petition in the pavilion, and propose it by clauses to the ballot of the whole tribe; and the clauses that shall be affirm’d by the ballot of the tribe, and sign’d by the hands of the six magistrats of the prime magnitude, shall be receiv’d and esteem’d by the parlament as the petition of the tribe, and no other.

Secondly, The phylarch has power to call to their assistance what other troops of the tribe they please (be they elders or youth, whose disciplin will be hereafter directed) and with these to receive the judges itinerant in their circuits, whom the magistrats of the phylarch shall assist upon the bench, and the jurys elsewhere in their proper functions according to the more antient laws and customs of this nation.

Thirdly, The phylarch shall hold the court called the quarter sessions according to the antient custom, and therin shall also hear causes in order to the protection of liberty of conscience, by such rules as are or shall hereafter be appointed by the parlament.

Fourthly, All commissions issu’d into the tribes by the parlament, or by the chancery, are to be directed to the phylarch, or som of that troop, and executed by the same respectively.

Fifthly, In the case of levys of mony the parlament shall tax the phylarchs, the phylarchs shall tax the hundreds, the hundreds the parishes, and the parishes shall levy it upon themselves. The parishes having levy’d the tax-mony, accordingly shall return it to the officers of the hundreds, the hundreds to the phylarchs, and the phylarchs to the Exchequer. But if a man has ten children living, he shall pay no taxes; if he has five living, he shall pay but half taxes; if he has bin marry’d three years, or be above twenty five years of age, and has no child or children lawfully begotten, he shall pay double taxes. And if there happen to grow any dispute upon these or such other orders as shall or may hereto be added hereafter, the phylarchs shall judg the tribes, and the parlament shall judg the phylarchs. For the rest, if any man shall go about to introduce the right or power of debate into any popular council or congregation of this nation, the phylarch or any magistrat of the hundred, or of the tribe, shall cause him presently to be sent in custody to the council of war.

Institution of the roll call’d the pillar of Nilus.The part of the order relating to the rolls in Emporium being of singular use, is not unworthy to be somwhat better open’d. In what manner the lists of the parishes, hundreds, and tribes are made, has bin shewn in their respective orders, where after the partys are elected, they give an account of the whole number of the elders or deputys in their respective assemblys or musters; the like for this part exactly is don by the youth in their disciplin (to be hereafter shewn) wherfore the lists of the parishes, youth and elders, being sum’d up, give the whole number of the people able to bear arms; and the lists of the tribes, youth and elders, being sum’d up, give the whole number of the people bearing arms. This account, being annually recorded by the master of the rolls, is call’d the pillar of Nilus, because the people being the riches of the commonwealth, as they are found to rise or fall by the degrees of this pillar like that river, give an account of the public harvest.

Thus much for the description of the first day’s work at the muster, which happen’d, as has bin shewn, to be done as soon as said: for as in practice it is of small difficulty, so requires it not much time, seeing the great council of Venice, consisting of a like number, begins at twelve of the clock, and elects nine magistrats in one afternoon. But the tribe being dismist for this night, repair’d to their quarters, under the conduct of their new magistrats. The next morning returning to the field very early, the orator proceded to

12 Order. Institution of the galaxy.The twelfth ORDER, directing the muster of the tribe in the second day’s election, being that of the list call’d the galaxy; in which the censors shall prepare the urns according to the directions given in the ninth order for the second ballot; that is to say, with 36 gold balls in the middle urn, making four orders, and nine electors in every order, according to the number of the magistrats in the list of the galaxy, which is as follows:

1. Knight } to be chosen out of the horse.
2. Knight } to be chosen out of the horse.
3. Deputy } to be chosen out of the horse.
4. Deputy } to be chosen out of the horse.
5. Deputy } to be chosen out of the horse.
6. Deputy } to be chosen out of the foot.
7. Deputy } to be chosen out of the foot.
8. Deputy } to be chosen out of the foot.
9. Deputy } to be chosen out of the foot.

THE rest of the ballot shall procede exactly according to that of the first day. But forasmuch as the commonwealth demands as well the fruits of a man’s body as of his mind, he that has not bin marry’d shall not be capable of these magistracys till he be marry’d. If a deputy, already chosen to be an officer in the parish, in the hundred, or in the tribe, be afterwards chosen of the galaxy, it shall be lawful for him to delegat his office in the parish, in the hundred, or in the tribe, to any one of his own order, being not already chosen into office. The knights and deputys being chosen, shall be brought to the head of the tribe by the lord high sheriff, who shall administer to them this oath; Ye shall well and truly observe and keep the orders and customs of this commonwealth which the people have chosen. And if any of them shall refuse the oath, he shall be rejected, and that competitor which had the most voices next shall be call’d, in his place; who if he takes the oath shall be entered in the list; but if he also refuses the oath, he who had most voices next shall be call’d, and so till the number of nine out of those competitors which had most voices be sworn knights and deputys of the galaxy. [This clause, in regard of the late divisions, and to the end that no violence be offer’d to any man’s conscience, to be of force but for the first three years only.] The knights of the galaxy being elected and sworn, are to repair, by the Monday next insuing the last of March, to the pantheon or palace of justice, situated in the metropolis of this commonwealth (except the parlament, by reason of a contagious sickness, or som other occasion, has adjourn’d to another part of the nation) where they are to take their places in the senat, and continue in full power and commission as senators for the full term of three years next insuing the date of their election. The deputys of the galaxy are to repair by the same day (except as before excepted) to the halo situated in Emporium, where they are to be listed of the prerogative tribe, or equal representative of the people; and to continue in full power and commission as their deputys for the full term of three years next insuing their election. But forasmuch as the term of every magistracy or office in this commonwealth requires an equal vacation, a knight or deputy of the galaxy, having fulfill’d his term of three years, shall not be reelected into the same galaxy, or any other, till he has also fulfill’d his three years vacation.

Whoever shall rightly consider the foregoing orders, will be as little able to find how it is possible, that a worshipful knight should declare himself in ale and beef worthy to serve his country, as how my lord high sheriff’s honour, in case he were protected from the law, could play the knave. But tho the foregoing orders, so far as they regard the constitution of the senat and the people, requiring no more as to an ordinary election than is therin explain’d, that is but one third part of their knights and deputys, are perfect; yet must we in this place, and as to the institution, of necessity erect a scaffold. For the commonwealth to the first creation of her councils in full number, requir’d thrice as many as are eligible by the foregoing orders. Wherfore the orator, whose aid in this place was most necessary, rightly informing the people of the reason, staid them two days longer at the muster, and took this course. One list containing two knights and seven deputys, he caus’d to be chosen upon the second day; which list being call’d the first galaxy, qualify’d the partys elected of it with power for the term of one year and no longer: another list containing two knights and seven deputys more, he caus’d to be chosen the third day, which list being call’d the second galaxy, qualify’d the partys elected of it with power for the term of two years and no longer. And upon the fourth day he chose the third galaxy, according as it is directed by the order, impower’d for three years; which lists successively falling (like the sign: or constellations of one hemisphere, which setting, cause those of the other to rise) cast the great orbs of this commonwealth into an annual, triennial, and perpetual revolution.

The business of the muster being thus happily finish’d, Hermes de Caduceo, lord orator of the tribe of Nubia, being now put into her first rapture, caus’d one of the censors pulpits to be planted in front of the squadron, and ascending into the same, spake after this manner.

My lords, the magistrats and the people of the tribe of Nubia.

“WE have this day solemniz’d the happy nuptials of the two greatest princes that are upon the earth or in nature, arms and councils: in the mutual embraces wherof consists your whole commonwealth; whose councils upon their perpetual wheelings, marches, and countermarches, create her armys; and whose armys with the golden vollys of the ballot at once create and salute her councils. There be those (such is the world at present) that think it ridiculous to see a nation exercising its civil functions in military disciplin; while they, committing their buff to their servants, com themselves to hold trenchards. For what avails it such as are unarm’d, or (which is all one) whose education acquaints them not with the proper use of their swords, to be call’d citizens? What were two or three thousand of you, tho never so well affected to your country, but naked, to one troop of mercenary soldiers? If they should com upon the field and say, Gentlemen, It is thought fit that such and such men should be chosen by you; where were your liberty; Or, Gentlemen, parlaments are exceeding good, but you are to have a little patience, these times are not so fit for them; where were your commonwealth? What causes the monarchy of the Turcs but servants in arms? What was it that begot the glorious commonwealth of Rome, but the sword in the hands of her citizens? Wherfore my glad eys salute the serenity and brightness of this day with a showr that shall not cloud it. Behold the army of Israel becom a commonwealth, and the commonwealth of Israel remaining an army, with her rulers of tens and of fiftys, her rulers of hundreds and thousands, drawing near (as this day throout our happy fields) to the lot by her tribes, increas’d above threefold, and led up by her phylarchs or princes, to sit upon* fifty thrones, judging the fifty tribes of Oceana! Or, Is it Athens, breaking from her iron sepulcher, where she has bin so long trampled by hosts of janizarys? For certainly that is the voice of Theseus, having gather’d his scatter’d Athenians into one city. This freeborn nation lives not upon the dole or bounty of one man, but distributing her annual magistracys and honours with her own hand, is herself king PEOPLE—at which the orator was a while interrupted with shouts, but at length proceded)—Is it grave Lacedemon in her arm’d tribe divided by her obæ and her mora, which appears to chide me that I teach the people to talk, or conceive such language as is drest like a woman, to be a fit usher of the joys of liberty into the hearts of men? Is it Rome in her victorious arms (for so she held her concio or congregation) that congratulats with us, for finding out that which she could not hit on, and binding up her comitia curiata, centuriata, and tributa, in one inviolable league of union? Or is it the great council of incomparable Venice, bowling forth by the self-same ballot her immortal commonwealth? For, neither by reason nor by experience is it impossible that a commonwealth should be immortal; seeing the people being the materials, never dy; and the form, which is motion, must, without opposition, be endless. The bowl which is thrown from your hand, if there be no rub, no impediment, shall never cease: for which cause the glorious luminarys that are the bowls of God, were once thrown for ever; and next these, those of Venice. But certainly, my lords, whatever these great examples may have shewn us, we are the first that have shewn to the world a commonwealth establish’d in her rise upon fifty such towers, and so garnizon’d as are the tribes of Oceana, containing a hundred thousand elders upon the annual list, and yet but an outguard; besides her marching armys to be equal in the disciplin, and in the number of her youth.

“And forasmuch as soverain power is a necessary but a formidable creature, not unlike the pouder which (as you are soldiers) is at once your safety and your danger, being subject to take fire against you as well as for you; how well and securely is she by your galaxys so collected as to be in full force and vigor, and yet so distributed that it is impossible you should be blown up by your own magazine? Let them who will have it, that power if it be confin’d cannot be soverain, tell us, whether our rivers do not enjoy a more secure and fruitful reign within their proper banks, than if it were lawful for them, in ravaging our harvests, to spill themselves? whether souls, not confin’d to their peculiar bodys, do govern them any more than those of witches in their trances? whether power, not confin’d to the bounds of reason and virtue, has any other bounds than those of vice and passion? or if vice and passion be boundless, and reason and virtue have certain limits, on which of these thrones holy men should anoint their soverain? but to blow away this dust, the soverain power of a commonwealth is no more bounded, that is to say straitned, than that of a monarch; but is balanc’d. The eagle mounts not to her proper pitch, if she be bounded; nor is free, if she be not balanc’d. And lest a monarch should think he can reach further with his scepter, the Roman eagle upon such a balance spread her wings from the ocean to Euphrates. Receive the soverain power; you have received it, hold it fast, imbrace it for ever in your shining arms. The virtue of the loadstone is not impair’d or limited, but receives strength and nourishment by being bound in iron. And so giving your lordships much joy, I take my leave of this tribe.”

The orator descending, had the period of his speech made with a vast applause and exultation of the whole tribe, attending him for that night to his quarter, as the phylarch with some commanded troops did the next day to the frontiers of the tribe, where leave was taken on both sides with more tears than grief.

Definition of the tribe.So, a tribe is the third division of land occasion’d by the third collection of the people, whose functions proper to that place are contain’d in the five foregoing orders.

The institution of the commonwealth was such as needed those props and scaffolds which may have troubled the reader; but I shall here take them away, and com to the constitution which stands by it self, and yields a clearer prospect.

Constitution of the commonwealth.The motions, by what has bin already shown, are spherical; and spherical motions have their proper center: for which cause (e’er I procede further) it will be necessary, for the better understanding of the whole, that I discover the center wherupon the motions of this commonwealth are form’d.

The center, or basis of every government, is no other than the fundamental laws of the same.

Fundamental laws are such as state what it is that a man may call his own, that is to say, property; and what the means be wherby a man may enjoy his own, that is to say, protection. The first is also call’d dominion, and the second empire or soverain power, wherof this (as has been shewn) is the natural product of the former: for such as is the balance of dominion in a nation, such is the nature of its empire.

Wherfore the fundamental laws of Oceana, or the center of this commonwealth, are the agrarian and the ballot: the agrarian by the balance of dominion preserving equality in the root; and the ballot by an equal rotation conveying it into the branch, or exercise of soverain power: as, to begin with the former, appears by

The thirteenth ORDER, constituting the agrarian laws of Oceana, Marpesia, and Panopea, wherby it is ordain’d, first, for all such lands as are lying and being within the proper territorys of Oceana, that every man who is at present possest, or shall hereafter be possest of an estate in land exceeding the revenue of two thousand pounds a year, and having more than one son, shall leave his lands either equally divided among them, in case the lands amount to above 2000 l. a year to each; or so near equally in case they com under, that the greater part or portion of the same remaining to the eldest, excede not the value of two thousand pounds revenue. And no man, not in present possession of lands above the value of two thousand pounds by the year, shall receive, enjoy (except by lawful inheritance) acquire, or purchase to himself lands within the said territorys, amounting, with those already in his possession, above the said revenue. And if a man has a daughter, or daughters, except she be an heiress, or they be heiresses, he shall not leave or give to any one of them in marriage, or otherwise, for her portion, above the value of one thousand five hundred pounds in lands, goods, and monys. Nor shall any friend, kinsman, or kinswoman, add to her or their portion or portions that are so provided for, to make any one of them greater. Nor shall any man demand, or have more in marriage with any woman. Nevertheless an heiress shall enjoy her lawful inheritance, and a widow, whatsoever the bounty or affection of her husband shall bequeath to her, to be divided in the first generation, wherein it is divisible according as has bin shewn.

Secondly, For lands lying and being within the territorys of Marpesia, the agrarian shall hold in all parts as it is established in Oceana, except only in the standard or proportion of estates in land, which shall be set for Marpesia at five hundred pounds. And,

Thirdly, For Panopea, the agrarian shall hold in all parts, as in Oceana. And whosoever possessing above the proportion allow’d by these laws, shall be lawfully convicted of the same, shall forfeit the overplus to the use of the state.

Agrarian laws of all others have ever bin the greatest bugbears, and so in the institution were these, at which time it was ridiculous to see how strange a fear appear’d in every body of that which, being good for all, could hurt no body. But instead of the proof of this order, I shall out of those many debates that happen’d e’er it could be past, insert two speeches that were made at the council of legislators, the first by the right honourable Philautus de Garbo, a young man, being heir apparent to a very noble family, and one of the counsillors, who exprest himself as follows.

May it please your highness, my lord Archon of Oceana.

“IF I did not, to my capacity, know from how profound a counsillor I dissent, it would certainly be no hard task to make it as light as the day: first, That an agrarian is altogether unnecessary. Secondly, That it is dangerous to a commonwealth. Thirdly, That it is insufficient to keep out monarchy. Fourthly, That it ruins familys. Fifthly, That it destroys industry. And last of all, That tho it were indeed of any good use, it will be a matter of such difficulty to introduce in this nation, and so to settle that it may be lasting, as is altogether invincible.

First, That an agrarian is unnecessary to a commonwealth, what clearer testimony can there be, than that the commonwealths which are our cotemporarys (Venice, to which your highness gives the upperhand of all antiquity, being one) have no such thing? and there can be no reason why they have it not, seeing it is in the soverain power at any time to establish such an order, but that they need it not; wherfore no wonder if Aristotle, who pretends to be a good commonwealthsman has long since derided Phaleas, to whom it was attributed by the Greecs, for his invention.

Secondly, That an agrarian is dangerous to a commonwealth is affirm’d upon no slight authority, seeing Machiavel is positive, that it was the dissension which happen’d about the agrarian that caus’d the destruction of Rome; nor do I think that it did much better in Lacedemon, as I shall shew anon.

Thirdly, That it is insufficient to keep out monarchy cannot without impiety be deny’d, the holy Scriptures bearing witness, that the commonwealth of Israel, notwithstanding her agrarian, submitted her neck to the arbritrary yoke of her princes.

Fourthly, therfore to com to my next assertion, That it is destructive to familys; this also is so apparent, that it needs pity rather than proof. Why, alas, do you bind a nobility (which no generation shall deny to have bin the first that freely sacrific’d their blood to the antient libertys of this people) on an unholy altar? why are the people taught, that their liberty, which, except our noble ancestors had bin born, must have long since bin bury’d, cannot now be born except we be bury’d? a commonwealth should have the innocence of the dove. Let us leave this purchase of her birth to the serpent, which eats itself out of the womb of its mother.

Fifthly, but it may be said, perhaps, That we are fallen from our first love, becom proud and idle. It is certain, my lords, that the hand of God is not upon us for nothing. But take heed how you admit of such assaults and sallys upon mens estates, as may slacken the nerve of labor, and give others also reason to believe that their sweat is vain; or else, whatsoever be pretended, your agrarian (which is my fifth assertion) must indeed destroy industry. For, that so it did in Lacedemon is most apparent, as also that it could do no otherwise, where every man having his 40 quarters of barly, with wine proportionable, supply’d him out of his own lot by his laborer or helot; and being confin’d in that to the scantling above which he might not live, there was not any such thing as a trade, or other art, except that of war, in exercise. Wherfore a Spartan, if he were not in arms, must sit and play with his fingers, whence insu’d perpetual war, and, the estate of the city being as little capable of increase as that of the citizens, her inevitable ruin. Now what better ends you can propose to your selves in the like ways, I do not so well see as I perceive that there may be worse: for Lacedemon yet was free from civil war: but if you employ your citizens no better than she did, I cannot promise you that you shall fare so well, because they are still desirous of war that hope it may be profitable to them; and the strongest security you can give of peace, is to make it gainful. Otherwise men will rather chuse that wherby they may break your laws, than that wherby your laws may break them. Which I speak not so much in relation to the nobility or such as would be holding, as to the people or them that would be getting; the passion in these being so much the stronger, as a man’s felicity is weaker in the fruition of things, than in their prosecution and increase.

Truly, my lords, it is my fear, that by taking of more hands, and the best from industry, you will farther indamage it, than can be repair’d by laying on a few, and the worst; while the nobility must be forc’d to send their sons to the plow, and, as if this were not enough, to marry their daughters also to farmers.

Sixthly, but I do not see (to come to the last point) how it is possible that this thing should be brought about, to your good I mean, tho it may to the destruction of many. For that the agrarian of Israel, or that of Lacedemon might stand, is no such miracle; the lands, without any consideration of the former proprietor, being survey’d and cast into equal lots, which could neither be bought, nor sold, nor multiply’d: so that they knew wherabout to have a man. But in this nation no such division can be introduc’d, the lands being already in the hands of proprietors, and such whose estates ly very rarely together, but mix’d one with another; being also of tenures in nature so different, that as there is no experience that an agrarian was ever introduc’d in such a case, so there is no appearance how, or reason why it should: but that which is against reason and experience is impossible.”

The case of my lord Philautus was the most concern’d in the whole nation; for he had four younger brothers, his father being yet living to whom he was heir of ten thousand pounds a year. Wherfore being a man both of good parts and esteem, his words wrought both upon mens reason and passions, and had born a stroke at the head of the business, if my lord Archon had not interpos’d the buckler in this oration.

My lords, the legislators of Oceana,

“MY lord Philautus has made a thing which is easy to seem hard; if the thanks were due to his eloquence, it would be worthy of less praise, than that he ows it to his merit, and the love he has most deservedly purchas’d of all men: nor is it rationally to be fear’d, that he who is so much beforehand in his privat, should be in arrear in his public capacity. Wherfore my lord’s tenderness throout his speech arising from no other principle than his solicitude lest the agrarian should be hurtful to his country; it is no less than my duty to give the best satisfaction I am able to so good a patriot, taking every one of his doubts in the order propos’d. And,

First, Wheras my lord, upon observation of the modern commonwealths, is of opinion, that an agrarian is not necessary: it must be confest, that at the first sight of them there is som appearance favoring his assertion, but upon accidents of no precedent to us. For the commonwealths of Switzerland and Holland, I mean of those leagues, being situated in countrys not alluring the inhabitants to wantonness, but obliging them to universal industry, have an implicit agrarian in the nature of them: and being not obnoxious to a growing nobility (which, as long as their former monarchys had spread the wing over them, conld either not at all be hatch’d, or was soon broken) are of no example to us, whose experience in this point has bin to the contrary. But what if even in these governments there be indeed an explicit agrarian? for when the law commands an equal or near equal distribution of a man’s estate in land among his children, as it is don in those countrys, a nobility cannot grow; and so there needs no agrarian, or rather there is one. And for the growth of the nobility in Venice (if so it be, for Machiavel observes in that republic, as a cause of it, a great mediocrity of estates) it is not a point that she is to fear, but might study, seeing she consists of nothing else but nobility; by which, whatever their estates fuck from the people, especially, if it coms equally, is digested into the better blood of that commonwealth, which is all, or the greatest benefit they can have by accumulation. For how inequal soever you will have them to be in their incoms, they have officers of the pomp, to bring them equal in expences, or at least in the ostentation or shew of them. And so unless the advantage of an estate consists more in the measure than in the use of it, the authority of Venice dos but inforce our agrarian; nor shall a man evade or elude the prudence of it, by the authority of any other commonwealth. For if a commonwealth has bin introduc’d at once, as those of Israel and Lacedemon, you are certain to find her underlaid with this as the main foundation; nor, if she is oblig’d more to fortune than prudence, has she rais’d her head without musing upon this matter, as appears by that of Athens, which thro her defect in this point, says Aristotle, introduc’d her ostracism, as most of the democracys of Grece.Polit. 1. 3. c. 9. But, not to restrain a fundamental of such latitude to any one kind of government, do we not yet see, that if there be a sole landlord of a vast territory, he is the Turc? that if a few landlords overbalance a populous country, they have store of servants? that if a people be in an equal balance, they can have no lords? that no government can otherwise be erected, than upon som one of these foundations? that no one of these foundations (each being else apt to change into som other) can give any security to the government, unless it be fix’d: that thro the want of this fixation, potent monarchy and commonwealths have faln upon the heads of the people, and accompany’d their own sad ruins with vast effusions of innocent blood? let the fame, as was the merit of the antient nobility of this nation, be equal to, or above what has bin already said, or can be spoken; yet have we seen not only their glory, but that of a throne, the most indulgent to, and least invasive for so many ages upon the liberty of a people that the world has known, thro the mere want of fixing her foot by a proportionable agrarian upon her proper foundation, to have faln with such horror, as has bin a spectacle of astonishment to the whole earth. And were it well argu’d from one calamity, that we ought not to prevent another? nor is Aristotle so good a commonwealthsman for deriding the invention of Phaleas, as in recollecting himself, where he says, That democracys, when a less part of their citizens overtop the rest in wealth, degenerat into oligarchys and principalitys; and, which coms nearer to the present purpose, that the greater part of the nobility of Tarentum coming accidentally to be ruin’d, the government of the few came by consequence to be chang’d into that of the many.Polit. l. 5. c. 3.

These things consider’d, I cannot see how an agrarian, as to the fixation or security of a government, can be less than necessary. And if a cure be necessary, it excuses not the patient, his disease being otherwise desperat, that it is dangerous; which was the case of Rome, not so stated by Machiavel, where he says, That the strife about the agrarian caus’d the destruction of that commonwealth. As if when a senator was not rich (as Crassus held) except he could pay an army, that commonwealth could expect nothing but ruin whether in strife about the agrarian, or without it.* Of late, says Livy, riches have introduc’d avarice; and voluptuous pleasures abounding, have thro lust and luxury begot a desire of blasting and destroying all good orders. If the greatest security of a commonwealth consists in being provided with the proper antidote against this poison, her greatest danger must be from the absence of an agrarian, which is the whole truth of the Roman example. For the laconic, I shall reserve the farther explication of it, as my lord also did, to another place: and first see whether an agrarian proportion’d to a popular government be sufficient to keep out monarchy. My lord is for the negative, and fortify’d by the people of Israel electing a king. To which I say, That the action of the people therin exprest is a full answer to the objection of that example: for the monarchy neither grew upon them, nor could, by reason of the agrarian, possibly have invaded them, if they had not pull’d it upon themselves by the election of a king. Which being an accident, the like wherof is not to be found in any other people so planted, nor in this, till, as it is manifest, they were given up by God to infatuation (for says he to Samuel, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them) has somthing in it which is apparent, by what went before, to have bin besides the course of nature, and by what follow’d. For the king having no other foundation than the calamitys of the people, so often beaten by their enemys, that despairing of themselves, they were contented with any change; if he had peace as in the days of Solomon, left but a slippery throne to his successor, as appear’d by Rehoboam. And the agrarian, notwithstanding the monarchy thus introduc’d, so faithfully preserv’d the root of that commonwealth, that it shot forth oftner, and by intervals continu’d longer than any other government, as may be computed from the institution of the same by Joshua, 1465 years before Christ, to the total dissolution of it, which happen’d in the reign of the emperor Adrian, 135 years after the incarnation. A people planted upon an equal agrarian, and holding to it, if they part with their liberty, must do it upon good-will, and make but a bad title of their bounty. As to instance yet further in that which is propos’d by the present order to this nation, the standard wherof is at 2000 l. a year: the whole territory of Oceana being divided by this proportion, amounts to 5000 lots. So the lands of Oceana being thus distributed, and bound to this distribution, can never fall to fewer than five thousand proprietors. But five thousand proprietors so seiz’d will not agree to break the agrarian, for that were to agree to rob one another; nor to bring in a king, because they must maintain him, and can have no benefit by him; nor to exclude the people, because they can have as little by that, and must spoil their militia. So the commonwealth continuing upon the balance propos’d, tho it should come into five thousand hands, can never alter; and that it should ever come into five thousand hands, is as improbable as any thing in the world that is not altogether impossible.

My lord’s other considerations are more privat: as that this order destroys familys; which is as if one should lay the ruin of some antient castle to the herbs which usually grow out of them; the destruction of those familys being that indeed which naturally produc’d this order. For we do not now argue for that which we would have, but for that which we are already possest of; as would appear, if a note were but taken of all such as have at this day above two thousand pounds a year in Oceana. If my lord should grant (and I will put it with the most) that they who are proprietors in land, exceeding this proportion, exceed not three hundred; with what brow can the interest of so few be balanc’d with that of the whole nation? or rather, what interest have they to put in such a balance? they would live as they had bin accustom’d to do; who hinders them? they would enjoy their estates; who touches them? they would dispose of what they have according to the interest of their familys: it is that which we desire. A man has one son; let him be call’d: would he enjoy his father’s estate? it is his, his son’s, and his son’s son’s after him. A man has five sons; let them be call’d: would they enjoy their father’s estate? it is divided among them: for we have four votes for one in the same family, and therefore this must be the interest of the family, or the family knows not its own interest. If a man shall dispute otherwise, he must draw his arguments from custom, and from greatness, which was the interest of the monarchy, not of the family: and we are now a commonwealth. If the monarchy could not bear with such divisions because they tended to a commonwealth; neither can a commonwealth connive at such accumulations, because they tend to a monarchy. If the monarchy might make bold with so many for the good of one, we may make bold with one for the good of so many; nay, for the good of all. My lords, it coms into my mind, that which upon occasion of the variety of partys enumerated in our late civil wars, was said by a friend of mine coming home from his travels, about the latter end of these troubles: That he admir’d how it came to pass, that younger brothers, especially being so many more in number than their elder, did not unite as one man against a tyranny, the like wherof has not bin exercis’d in any other nation. And truly, when I consider that our countrymen are none of the worst natur’d, I must confess I marvel much how it coms to pass, that we should use our children as we do our puppys; take one, lay it in the lap, feed it with every good bit, and drown five: nay yet worse; forasmuch as the puppys are once drown’d, wheras the children are left perpetually drowning. Really, my lords, it is a flinty custom! and all this for his cruel ambition, that would raise himself a pillar, a golden pillar for his monument, tho he has children, his own reviving flesh, and a kind of immortality. And this is that interest of a family, for which we are to think ill of a government that will not indure it. But quiet ourselves: the land thro which the river Nilus wanders in one stream, is barren; but where it parts into seven, it multiplys its fertil shores by distributing, yet keeping and improving such a propriety and nutrition, as is a prudent agrarian to a well-order’d commonwealth.

Nor (to com to the fifth assertion) is a political body render’d any fitter for industry, by having one gouty and another wither’d leg, than a natural. It tends not to the improvement of merchandize that there be som who have no need of their trading, and others that are not able to follow it. If confinement discourages industry, an estate in mony is not confin’d; and lest industry should want wherupon to work, land is not ingrost or intail’d upon any man, but remains at its devotion. I wonder whence the computation can arise, that this should discourage industry. Two thousand pounds a year a man may enjoy in Oceana, as much in Panopea, five hundred in Marpesia: there be other plantations, and the commonwealth will have more. Who knows how far the arms of our agrarian may extend themselves? and whether he that might have left a pillar, may not leave a temple of many pillars to his more pious memory? where there is som measure in riches, a man may be rich; but if you will have them to be infinit, there will be no end of starving himself, and wanting what he has: and what pains dos such a one take to be poor! furthermore, if a man shall think that there may be an industry less greasy, or more noble, and so cast his thoughts upon the commonwealth, he will have leisure for her, and she riches and honors for him; his sweat shall smell like Alexander’s. My lord Philautus is a young man, who enjoying his ten thousand pounds a year, may keep a noble house in the old way, and have homely guests; and having but two, by the means propos’d, may take the upper hand of his great ancestors; with reverence to whom, I may say, there has not bin one of them would have disputed his place with a Roman consul. My lord, do not break my heart; the nobility shall go to no other plows than those which we call our consuls. But, says he, it having bin so with Lacedemon, that neither the city nor the citizens were capable of increase, a blow was given by that agrarian, which ruin’d both. And what are we concern’d with that agrarian, or that blow, while our citizens and our city (and that by our agrarian) are both capable of increase? the Spartan, if he made a conquest, had no citizens to hold it: the Oceaner will have enow: the Spartan could have no trade, the Oceaner may have all. The agrarian in Laconia, that it might bind on knapsacs, forbidding all other arts but that of war, could not make an army of above 30000 citizens. The agrarian in Oceana without interruption of traffic, provides us in the fifth part of the youth an annual source or fresh spring of 100000, besides our provincial auxiliarys, out of which to draw marching armys; and as many elders, not feeble, but men most of them in the flower of their age, and in arms for the defence of our territorys. The agrarian in Laconia banish’d mony, this multiplys it: that allow’d a matter of twenty or thirty acres to a man; this two or three thousand: there is no comparison between them. And yet I differ so much from my lord, or his opinion that the agrarian was the ruin of Lacedemon, that I hold it no less than demonstrable to have bin her main support. For if, banishing all other diversions, it could not make an army of above 30000; then letting in all other diversions, it must have broken that army. Wherfore Lysander bringing in the golden spoils of Athens, irrecoverably ruin’d that commonwealth; and is a warning to us, that in giving incouragement to industry, we also remember, that covetousness is the root of all evil. And our agrarian can never be the cause of those seditions threaten’d by my lord, but is the proper cure of them, as* Lucan notes well in the state of Rome before the civil wars, which happen’d thro the want of such an antidote.

Why then are we mistaken, as if we intended not equal advantages in our commonwealth to either sex, because we would not have womens fortunes consist in that metal, which exposes them to cutpurses? if a man cuts my purse, I may have him by the heels or by the neck for it; wheras a man may cut a woman’s purse, and have her for his pains in fetters. How brutish, and much more than brutish, is that commonwealth, which prefers the earth before the fruits of the womb? if the people be her treasure, the staff by which she is sustain’d and comforted, with what justice can she suffer them, by whom she is most inrich’d, to be for that cause the most impoverish’d? and yet we see the gifts of God, and the bountys of heaven in fruitful familys, thro this wretched custom of marrying for mony, becom their insupportable grief and poverty. Nor falls this so heavy upon the lower sort, being better able to shift for themselves, as upon the nobility or gentry. For what avails it in this case, from whence their veins have deriv’d their blood; while they shall see the tallow of a chandler sooner converted into that beauty which is requir’d in a bride? I appeal, whether my lord Philautus or my self be the advocat of nobility; against which in the case propos’d by me, there would be nothing to hold the balance. And why is a woman, if she may have but fifteen hundred pounds, undon? if she be unmarry’d, what nobleman allows his daughter in that case a greater revenu, than so much mony may command? and if she marry, no nobleman can give his daughter a greater portion than she has. Who is hurt in this case? nay, who is not benefited? if the agrarian gives us the sweat of our brows without diminution; if it prepares our table, if it makes our cup to overflow; and above all this, in providing for our children, anoints our heads with that oil which takes away the greatest of worldly cares; what man, that is not besotted with a covetousness as vain as endless, can imagin such a constitution to be his poverty? seeing where no woman can be considerable for her portion, no portion will be considerable with a woman; and so his children will not only find better preferments without his brokage, but more freedom of their own affections. We are wonderful severe in laws, that they shall not marry without our consent; as if it were care and tenderness over them: but is it not lest we should not have the other thousand pounds with this son, or the other hundred pounds a year more in jointure for that daughter? these, when we are crost in them, are the sins for which we water our couch with tears, but not of penitence; seeing wheras it is a mischief beyond any that we can do to our enemys, we persist to make nothing of breaking the affection of our children. But there is in this agrarian a homage to pure and spotless love, the consequence wherof I will not give for all your romances. An alderman makes not his daughter a countess till he has given her 20000 l. nor a romance a considerable mistriss till she be a princess; these are characters of bastard love. But if our agrarian excludes ambition and covetousness, we shall at length have the care of our own breed, in which we have bin curious as to our dogs and horses. The marriage-bed will be truly legitimat, and the race of the commonwealth not spurious.

But (impar magnanimis ausis, imparque dolori) I am hurl’d from all my hopes by my lord’s last assertion of impossibility, that the root from whence we imagin these fruits, should be planted or thrive in this soil. And why? because of the mixture of estates, and variety of tenures. Nevertheless, there is yet extant in the exchequer an old survey of the whole nation; wherfore such a thing is not impossible. Now if a new survey were taken at the present rates, and the law made, that no man should hold hereafter above so much land as is valu’d therein at 2000 l. a year, it would amount to a good and sufficient agrarian. It is true, that there would remain som difficulty in the different kind of rents, and that it is a matter requiring not only more leisure than we have, but an authority which may be better able to bow men to a more general consent, than is to be wrought out of them by such as are in our capacity. Wherfore, as to the manner, it is necessary that we refer it to the parlament; but as to the matter, they cannot otherwise fix their government upon the right balance.

I shall conclude with a few words to som parts of the order, which my lord has omitted. As first to the consequences of the agrarian to be settled in Marpesia, which irreparably breaks the aristocracy of that nation; being of such a nature, as standing, it is not possible that you should govern. For while the people of that country are little better than the cattel of the nobility, you must not wonder if, according as these can make their markets with foren princes, you find those to be driven upon your grounds. And if you be so tender, now you have it in your power, as not to hold a hand upon them that may prevent the slaughter which must otherwise insue in like cases, the blood will lie at your door. But in holding such a hand upon them, you may settle the agrarian; and in settling the agrarian, you give that people not only liberty, but lands; which makes your protection necessary to their security; and their contribution due to your protection, as to their own safety.

For the agrarian of Panopea, it allowing such proportions of so good land, men that conceive themselves straiten’d by this in Oceana, will begin there to let themselves forth, where every citizen will in time have his villa. And there is no question, but the improvement of that country by this means must be far greater than it has bin in the best of former times.

I have no more to say, but that in those antient and heroic ages (when men thought that to be necessary which was virtuous) the nobility of Athens having the people so much ingag’d in their debt, that there remain’d no other question among these, than which of those should be king, no sooner heard Solon speak than they quitted their debts, and restor’d the commonwealth; which ever after held a solemn and annual feast call’d the Sisacthia, or Recision, in memory of that action. Nor is this example the phœnix; for at the institution by Lycurgus, the nobility having estates (as ours here) in the lands of Laconia, upon no other valuable consideration than the commonwealth propos’d by him, threw them up to be parcel’d by his agrarian. But now when no man is desir’d to throw up a farthing of his mony, or a shovel full of his earth, and that all we can do is but to make a virtue of necessity; we are disputing whether we should have peace or war: for peace you cannot have without som government, nor any government without the proper balance. Wherfore if you will not fix this which you have, the rest is blood, for without blood you can bring in no other.”

By these speeches made at the institution of the agrarian, you may perceive what were the grounds of it. The next is

14 Order.The fourteenth ORDER, constituting the ballot of Venice, as it is fitted by several alterations, and appointed to every assembly, to be the constant and only way of giving suffrage in this commonwealth, according to the following scheme.

I shall indeavour by the preceding figure to demonstrat the manner of the VENETIAN BALLOT (a thing as difficult in discourse or writing, as facil in practice) according to the use of it in Oceana. The whole figure represents the senat, containing, as to the house or form of sitting, a square and a half; the tribunal at the upper end being ascended by four steps. On the uppermost of these sit the magistrats that constitute the signory of the commonwealth, that is to say, A the strategus; B the orator; C the three commissioners of the great seal; D the three commissioners of the treasury, whereof one, E, exercises for the present the office of a censor at the middle urn F.

To the two upper steps of the tribunal answer GG. GG. the two long benches next the wall on each side of the house; the outwardmost of which are equal in height to the uppermost step, and the innermost equal in height to the next. Of these four benches consists the first seat; as the second seat consists in like manner of those four benches HH. HH. which being next the floor, are equal in height to the two nethermost steps of the throne. So the whole house is distributed into two seats, each consisting of four benches.

This distribution causes not only the greater conveniency, as will be shewn, to the senators in the exercise of their function at the ballot, but a greater grace to the aspect of the senat. In the middle of the outward benches stand I. I. the chairs of the censors, those being their ordinary places, tho upon occasion of the ballot they descend, and sit where they are shewn by K. K. at each of the outward urns L. L. Those M. M. that sit with their tables, and the bowls N. N. before them, upon the half space or second step of the tribunal from the floor, are the clercs or secretarys of the house. Upon the short seats O. O. on the floor (which should have bin represented by woolsacks) sit P the two tribuns of the horse; Q the two tribuns of the foot; and RR. RR. the judges: all which magistrats are assistants, but have no suffrage. This posture of the senat consider’d, the ballot is perform’d as follows.

First, whereas the gold balls are of several sutes, and accordingly mark’d with several letters of the alphabet, a secretary presents a litle urn (wherin there is one ball of every sute or mark) to the strategus and the orator; and look what letter the strategus draws, the same and no other is to be us’d for that time in the middle urn F; the like for the letter drawn by the orator is to be observ’d for the side urns L. L. that is to say, if the strategus drew a ball with an A, all the gold balls in the middle urn for that day are mark’d with the letter A; and if the orator drew a B, all the gold balls in the side urn for that day are mark’d with the letter B: which don immediatly before the ballot, and so the letter unknown to the ballotants, they can use no fraud or jugling; otherwise a man might carry a gold ball in his hand, and seem to have drawn it out of an urn. He that draws a gold ball at any urn, delivers it to the censor or assessor of that urn, who views the character, and allows accordingly of his lot.

The strategus and the orator having drawn for the letters, the urns are prepar’d accordingly by one of the commissioners and the two censors. The preparation of the urns is after this manner. If the senat be to elect, for example, the list call’d the tropic of magistrats, which is this;

  • 1.  The lord STRATEGUS;
  • 2.  The lord ORATOR;
  • 3.  The third COMMISSIONER of the great seal;
  • 4.  The third COMMISSIONER of the treasury;
  • 5.  The first CENSOR;
  • 6.  The second CENSOR;

This list or schedule consists of six magistracys, and to every magistracy there are to be four competitors, that is, in all four and twenty competitors propos’d to the house. They that are to propose the competitors are call’d electors, and no elector can propose above one competitor: wherfore for the proposing of four and twenty competitors you must have four and twenty electors; and wheras the ballot consists of a lot and of a suffrage, the lot is for no other use than for the designation of electors; and he that draws a gold ball at the middle urn is an elector. Now, as to have four and twenty competitors propos’d, you must have four and twenty electors made; so to have four and twenty electors made by lot, you must have four and twenty gold balls in the middle urn; and these (because otherwise it would be no lot) mix’d with a competent number of blanks, or silver balls. Wherfore to the four and twenty gold balls cast six and twenty silver ones, and those (reckoning the blanks with the prizes) make fifty balls in the middle urn. This don (because no man can com to the middle urn that has not first drawn a gold ball at one of the side urns) and to be sure that the prizes or gold balls in this urn be all drawn, there must com to it fifty persons: therfore there must be in each of the side urns five and twenty gold balls, which in both com to fifty; and to the end that every senator may have his lot, the gold balls in the side urns are to be made up with blanks equal to the number of the ballotants at either urn: for example, the house consisting of 300 senators, there must be in each of the side urns 125 blanks and 25 prizes, which com in both the side urns to 300 balls. This is the whole mystery of preparing the urns, which the censors having skill to do accordingly, the rest of the ballot, whether the partys balloting understand it or no, must of necessary consequence com right; and they can neither be out, nor fall into any confusion in the exercise of this art.

But the ballot, as I said, is of two parts, lot and suffrage, or the proposition and result. The lot determins who shall propose the competitors; and the result of the senat, which of the competitors shall be the magistrats. The whole, to begin with the lot, procedes in this manner.

The first secretary with an audible voice reads first the list of the magistrats to be chosen for the day; then the oath for fair election, at which the senators hold up their hands; which don, another secretary presents a little urn to the strategus, in which are four balls, each of them having one of these four inscriptions: FIRST SEAT AT THE UPPER END. FIRST SEAT AT THE LOWER END. SECOND SEAT AT THE UPPER END. SECOND SEAT AT THE LOWER END. And look which of them the strategus draws, the secretary pronouncing the inscription with a loud voice, the seat so call’d coms accordingly to the urns: this in the figure is the SECOND SEAT AT THE UPPER END. The manner of their coming to the side urns is in double files, there being two holes in the cover of each side urn, by which means two may draw at once. The senators therfore SS. SS. are coming from the upper end of their seats HH. HH. to the side urns L. L. The senators TT. T. are drawing. The senator V has drawn a gold ball at his side urn, and is going to the middle urn F, where the senator W having don the like at the other side urn, is already drawing. But the senators XX. XX. having drawn blanks at their side urns, and thrown them into the bowls Y. Y. standing at the feet of the urns, are marching by the lower end into their seats again; the senator a having don the like at the middle urn, is also throwing his blank into the bowl b, and marching to his seat again: for a man by a prize at a side urn gains no more than right to com to the middle urn, where if he draws a blank, his fortune at the side urn comes to nothing at all; wherfore he also returns to his place. But the senator c has had a prize at the middle urn, where the commissioner having viewed his ball, and found the mark to be right, he marches up the steps to the seat of the electors, which is the form d set cross the tribunal, where he places himself according as he was drawn with the other electors e e e drawn before him. These are not to look back, but sit with their faces towards the signory or state, till their number amount to that of the magistrats to be that day chosen, which for the present, as was shewn, are six; wherfore six electors being made, they are reckon’d according as they were drawn: first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, in their order; and the first six that are chosen are the FIRST ORDER OF ELECTORS.

THE first order of electors being made, are conducted by a secretary with a copy of the list to be chosen, out of the senat, and into a committee or council-chamber, being neither suffered by the way, nor in their room (till the ballot be ended) to have conference with any but themselves; wherfore the secretary, having given them their oath that they shall make election according to the law and their conscience, delivers them the list, and seats himself at the lower end of the table with his pen and paper, while another secretary keeps the door.

By such time as the first order of electors are thus seated, the second order of electors is drawn, who with a second copy of the same list are conducted into another committee-chamber, by other secretarys performing the same office with the former.

The like exactly is don by the third and by the fourth orders (or hands, as the Venetians call them) of electors, by which means you have the four and twenty electors divided according to the four copys of the same list, by six, into four hands or orders; and every one of these orders names one competitor to every magistracy in the list; that is to say, the first elector names to the first magistracy, the second elector to the second magistracy, and so forth. But tho the electors, as has bin shewn, are chosen by mere lot, yet the competitors by them nam’d are not chosen by any lot, but by the suffrage of the whole order: for example; the first elector in the first order proposes a name to be Strategus, which name is balloted by himself and the other five electors: and if the name so balloted attain not to above half the suffrages, it is laid aside, and the first elector names another to the same magistracy; and so in case this also fails, another, till one he has nam’d, whether it be himself, or som other, has attained to above half the suffrages in the affirmative; and the name so attaining to above half the suffrages in the affirmative is written to the first magistracy in the list by the secretary; which being don, the second elector of the first order names to the second magistracy till one of his nomination be chosen to the same. The like is don by the rest of the electors of the first order, till one competitor be chosen, and written to every magistracy in their list. Now the second, third, and fourth orders of electors doing exactly after the same manner, it coms to pass that one competitor to every magistracy being chosen in each order, there be in all four competitors chosen to every magistracy.

If any controversy arises in an order of electors, one of the censors (these being at this game the groomporters) is advertis’d by the secretary, who brings him in, and the electors, disputing are bound to acquiesce in his sentence. For which cause it is that the censors do not ballot at the urns; the signory also abstains, lest it should deform the house: wherfore the blanks in the side urns are by so many the fewer. And so much for the lot, which is of the greater art but less consequence, because it concerns proposition only: but all, (except the tribuns and the judges, which being but assistants have no suffrage) are to ballot at the result, to which I now com.

The four orders of electors having perfected their lists, the face of the house is chang’d: for the urns are taken away, and every senator and magistrat is seated in his proper place, saving the electors, who, having given their suffrages already, may not stir out of their chambers till the house have given theirs, and the rest of the ballot be perform’d; which follows in this manner.

The four lists being presented by the secretarys of each council of electors to the signory, are first read, according to their order, to the house with an audible voice; and then the competitors are put to the ballot or suffrage of the whole senat in this manner: A. A. nam’d to be strategus in the first order; wherupon eight ballotins or pages, such as are express’d by the figures f. f. take eight of the boxes represented, tho rudely, by the figures, g. g. and go four on the one, and four on the other side of the house, that is, one to every bench, signifying A. A. nam’d to be the strategus in the first order: and every magistrat or senator (beginning by the strategus and the orator first) holds up a little pellet of linen, as the box passes, between his finger and his thumb, that men may see he has but one, and then puts it into the same. The box consisting in the inner part of two boxes, being painted on the outside white and green, to distinguish the affirmative from the negative side, is so made, that when your hand is in it, no man can see to which of the sides you put the suffrage, nor hear to which it falls, because the pellet being linen, makes no noise. The strategus and the orator having begun, all the rest do the like.

The ballotins having thus gather’d the suffrages, bring them before the signory, in whose presence the outward boxes being open’d, they take out the inner boxes, wherof the affirmative is white, and the negative green, and pour the white in the bowl N. on the right hand, which is white also, and the green into the bowl N. on the left, which is also green. These bowls or basons (better represented at the lower end of the figure by h. i.) being upon this occasion set before the tables of the secretarys at the upper end N. N. the white on the right hand, and the green on the left, the secretarys on each side number the balls: by which if they find that the affirmatives amount not to above one half, they write not the name that was balloted; but if they amount to above one half, they write it, adding the number of above half the suffrages to which it attain’d. The first name being written, or laid aside, the next that is put is B. B. nam’d to be strategus in the second order; the third C. C. nam’d to be strategus in the third order; the fourth D. D. nam’d to be strategus in the fourth order: and he of these four competitors that has most above half in the affirmative, is the magistrat; or if none of them attain to above half, the nomination for that magistracy is to be repeated by such new electors as shall be chosen at the next ballot. And so, as is exemplify’d in the first magistracy, proceeds the ballot of the rest; first in the first, then in the second, and so in the third and fourth orders.

Now wheras it may happen that A. A. (for example) being nam’d strategus in the first order, may also be nam’d to the same or som one or more other magistracys in one or more of the other orders; his name is first balloted where it is first written, that is to the more worthy magistracy, wherof if he misses, he is balloted as it coms in course for the next, and so for the rest, if he misses of that, as often as he is nam’d.

And because to be nam’d twice, or oftner, whether to the same or som other magistracy, is the stronger recommendation; the note must not fail to be given upon the name, at the proposition in this manner; A. A. nam’d to be strategus in the first, and in the second order: or A. A. nam’d to be strategus in the first and the third; in the first and the fourth, &c. But if he be nam’d to the same magistracy in the first, second, third, and fourth orders, he can have no competitor; wherfore attaining to above half the suffrages, he is the magistrat. Or thus: A. A. nam’d to be strategus in the first, to be censor in the second, to be orator in the third, and to be commissioner of the seal in the fourth order, or the like in more or fewer orders: in which cases if he misses of the first magistracy, he is balloted to the second; if he misses of the second, to the third; and if he misses of the third, to the fourth.

The ballot not finish’d before sunset, tho the election of the magistrats already chosen be good, voids the election of such competitors as being chosen are not yet furnish’d with magistracys, as if they had never bin nam’d (for this is no jugling box, but an art that must see the sun) and the ballot for the remaining magistracys is to be repeated the next day by new orders of electors, and such competitors as by them shall be elected. And so in the like manner, if of all the names propos’d to the same magistracy, no one of them attains to above half the suffrages in the affirmative.

The senatorian ballot of Oceana being thus describ’d, those of the parish, of the hundred, and of the tribe, being so little different, that in this they are all contain’d, and by this may be easily understood, are yet fully describ’d, and made plain enough before in the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th orders.

This therfore is the general order, whence those branches of the ballot, som wherof you have already seen, are deriv’d; which, with those that follow were all read and debated in this place at the institution. When my lord Epimonus de Garrula, being one of the counsellors, and having no farther patience (tho the rulers were compos’d by the agent of this commonwealth, residing for that purpose at Venice) than to hear the direction for the parishes, stood up and made way for himself in this manner.

May it please your highness, my lord Archon,

“UNDER correction of Mr. Peregrin Spy, our very learn’d agent and intelligencer, I have seen the world a little, Venice, and (as gentlemen are permitted to do) the great council balloting. And truly I must needs say, that it is for a dumb shew the goodliest that I ever beheld with my eys. You should have som would take it ill, as if the noble Venetians thought themselves too good to speak to strangers, but they observ’d them not so narrowly. The truth is, they have nothing to say to their acquaintance; or men that are in council sure would have tongues: for a council, and not a word spoken in it, is a contradiction. But there is such a pudder with their marching and countermarching, as, tho never a one of them draw a sword, you would think they were training; which till I found that they did it only to entertain strangers, I came from among them as wise as I went thither. But in the parlament of Oceana you had no balls nor dancing, but sober conversation; a man might know and be known, shew his parts, and improve ’em. And now if you take the advice of this same fellow, you will spoil all with his whimsys. Mr. Speaker,—Cry you mercy, my lord Archon, I mean; set the wisest man of your house in the great council of Venice, and you will not know him from a fool. Wheras nothing is more certain, than that flat and dull fellows in the judgment of all such as us’d to keep company with them before, upon election into our house, have immediatly chitted like barley in the fat, where it acquires a new spirit, and flow’d forth into language, that I am as confident as I am here, if there were not such as delight to abuse us, is far better than Tully’s; or, let any body but translate one of his orations, and speak it in the house, and see if every body do not laugh at him. This is a great matter, Mr. Speaker; they do not cant it with your book-learning, your orbs, your centers, your prime magnitudes, and your nebulones, things I profess that would make a sober man run stark mad to hear ’em; while we, who should be considering the honor of our country, and that it gos now or never upon our hand, whether it shall be ridiculous to all the world, are going to nineholes, or trow madam for our business, like your dumb Venetian, whom this same Sir Politic your resident, that never saw him do any thing but make faces, would insinuat into you, at this distance, to have the only knack of state. Wheras if you should take the pains, as I have don, to look a little nearer, you would find these same wonderful things to be nothing else but mere natural fopperys, or capricios, as they call them in Italian, even of the meanest of that nation. For, put the case you be travelling in Italy, ask your contadino, that is, the next country-fellow you meet, som question, and presently he ballots you an answer with a nod, which is affirmative; or a shake with his head, which is the negative box; or a shrug with his shoulder, which is the bossolo di non sinceri.—Good! You will admire Sands for telling you, that grotta di cane is a miracle: and I shall be laugh’d at for assuring you, that it is nothing else but such a damp (continu’d by the neighborhood of certain sulphur mines) as thro accidental heat dos somtimes happen in our coalpits. But ingratitude must not discorage an honest man from doing good. There is not, I say, such a tonguety’d generation under heaven as your Italian; that you should not wonder if he make signs. But our people must have somthing in their diurnals, we must ever and anon be telling ’em our minds; or if we be at it when we raise taxes, like those gentlemen with the finger and the thumb, they will swear that we are cutpurses.—Com, I know what I have heard ’em say, when som men had mony that wrought hard enough for it; and do you conceive they will be better pleas’d when they shall be told, that upon like occasions you are at mumchance or stoolball? I do not speak for myself; for tho I shall always acknowledge, that I got more by one year’s sitting in the house, than by my three years travels, it was not of that kind. But I hate that this same spy, for pretending to have play’d at billiards with the most serene commonwealth of Venice, should make such fools of us here, when I know that he must have had his intelligence from som corncutter upon the Rialta; for a noble Venetian would be hang’d if he should keep such a fellow company. And yet if I do not think he has made you all dote, never trust me, my lord Archon is somtimes in such strange raptures. Why, good my lord, let me be heard as well as your apple squire; Venice has fresh blood in her cheeks, I must confess, yet she is but an old lady. Nor has he pick’d her cabinet; these he sends you are none of her receits, I can assure you; he bought them for a Julio at St. Marc’s of a mountebank. She has no other wash, upon my knowlege, for that same envy’d complexion of hers but her marshes, being a little better scented, saving your presence, than a chamberpot. My lords, I know what I say, but you will never have don with it, That neither the great Turc, nor any of those little Turcs her neighbors, have bin able to spoil her! Why you may as well wonder that weesels do not suck egs in swans nests. Do you think that it has lain in the devotion of her beads; which you that have puk’d so much at Popery, are now at length resolv’d shall consecrat M. Parson, and be drop’d by every one of his congregation, while those same whimsical intelligences your surveyors (you will break my heart) give the turn to your primum mobile? and so I think they will; for you will find, that mony is the primum mobile, and they will turn you thus out of som three or four hundred thousand pounds: a pretty sum for urns and balls, for boxes and pills, which these same quacksalvers are to administer to the parishes; and for what disease I marvel! Or how dos it work? Out coms a constable, an overseer, and a churchwarden! Mr. Speaker, I am amaz’d!”

Never was there goose so stuck with lard as my lord Epimonus’s speech with laughter; the Archon having much ado to recover himself, in such manner as might enable him to return these thanks.

“IN your whole lives, my lords, were you never entertain’d with so much ingenuity; my lord Epimonus having at once mended all the faults of travellers. For, first, wheras they are abominable lyars, he has not told you (except som malicious body has misinform’d him concerning poor Spy) one syllable of falshood. And, secondly, wheras they never fail to give the upper hand in all their discourses to foren nations, still justling their own into the kennel; he bears an honor to his country that will not dissolve in Cephalonia, nor be corrupted with figs and melons, which I can assure you is no ordinary obligation: and therfore hold it a matter of public concern, that we be no occasion of quenching my lord’s affections; nor is there any such great matter between us, but, in my opinion, might be easily reconcil’d: for tho that which my lord gain’d by sitting in the house, I stedfastly believe, as he can affirm, was got fairly; yet dare I not, nor do I think, that upon consideration he will promise so much for other gamesters, especially when they were at it so high, as he intimats not only to have bin in use, but to be like enough to come about again. Wherfore, say I, let them throw with boxes; for unless we will be below the politics of an ordinary, there is no such bar to cogging. It is known to his lordship, that our game is most at a throw, and that every cast of our dice is in our suffrages; nor will he deny, that partiality in a suffrage is downright cogging. Now if the Venetian boxes be the most soverain of all remedys against this same cogging, is it not a strange thing that they should be thrown first into the fire by a fair gamester? Men are naturally subject to all kinds of passions: som you have that are not able to withstand the brow of an enemy; and others that make nothing of this, are less proof against that of a friend. So that if your suffrage be barefac’d, I dare say you shall not have one fair cast in twenty. But whatever a man’s fortune be at the box, he neither knows whom to thank, nor whom to challenge. Wherfore (that my lord may have a charitable opinion of the choice affection which I confess to have, above all other beautys, for that of incomparable Venice) there is in this way of suffrage no less than a demonstration that it is the most pure: and the purity of the suffrage in a popular government is the health, if not the life of it; seeing the soul is no otherwise breath’d into the soverain power, than by the suffrage of the people. Wherfore no wonder if Postellus be of opinion, that this use of the ball is the very same with that of the bean in Athens; or, that others, by the text concerning Eldad and Medad, derive it from the commonwealth of Israel. There is another thing, tho not so material to us, that my lord will excuse me if I be not willing to yield, which is, that Venice subsists only by her situation. It is true, that a man in time of war may be more secure from his enemys by being in a citadel, but not from his diseases: wherfore the first cause, if he lives long, is his good constitution, without which his citadel were to little purpose; and it is not otherwise with Venice.

With this speech of the Archon I conclude the proof of the agrarian, and the ballot, being the fundamental laws of this commonwealth; and com now from the center to the circumferences or orbs, wherof som have bin already shewn: as how the parishes annually pour themselves into the hundreds, the hundreds into the tribes, and the tribes into the galaxys; the annual galaxy of every tribe consisting of two knights and seven deputys, wherof the knights constitute the senat; the deputys, the prerogative tribe, commonly call’d the people; and the senat and people constitute the soverain power or parlament of Oceana. Wherof to shew what the parlament is, I must first open the senat, and then the prerogative tribe.

The face of the senat.To begin with the senat, of which (as a man is differently represented by a picturedrawer, and by an anatomist) I shall first discover the face or aspect, and then the parts, with the use of them. Every Monday morning in the summer at seven, and in the winter at eight, the great bell in the clockhouse at the pantheon begins, and continues ringing for the space of one hour: in which time the magistrates of the senat, being attended according to their quality, with a respective number of the ballotins, doorkeepers, and messengers; and having the ensigns of their magistracys born before them, as the sword before the strategus, the mace before the orator, a mace with the seal before the commissioners of the chancery, the like with the purse before the commissioners of the treasury; and a silver wand, like those in use with the universitys, before each of the censors, being chancellors of the same. These with the knights, in all three hundred, assemble in the house or hall of the senat.

The house or hall of the senat, being situated in the pantheon or palace of justice, is a room consisting of a square and a half. In the middle of the lower end is the door; at the upper end hangs a rich state overshadowing the greater part of a large throne, or half pace of two stages; the first ascended by two steps from the floor, and the second about the middle rising two steps higher. Upon this stand two chairs, in that on the right hand sits the strategus, in the other the orator, adorn’d with scarlet robes, after the fashion that was us’d by the dukes in the aristocracy. At the right end of the upper stage stand three chairs, in which the three commissioners of the seal are plac’d; and at the other end sit the three commissioners of the treasury, every one in a robe or habit like that of the earls. Of these magistrats of this upper stage consists the signory. At either end of the lower stage stands a little table, to which the secretarys of the senat are set with their tufted sleeves in the habit of civil lawyers. To the four steps, wherby the two stages of the throne are ascended, answer four long benches, which successively deriving from every one of the steps, continue their respective height, and extend themselves by the side walls towards the lower end of the house, every bench being divided by numeral characters into the thirty seven parts or places. Upon the upper benches sit the censors in the robes of barons; the first in the middle of the right hand bench, and the second directly opposit to him on the other side. Upon the rest of the benches sit the knights, who if they be call’d to the urns, distributing themselves by the figures, com in equal files, either by the first seat, which consists of the two upper benches on either side; or by the second seat, consisting of the two lower benches on either side: beginning also at the upper, or at the lower ends of the same, according to the lot wherby they are call’d; for which end the benches are open, and ascended at either end with easy stairs and large passages. The rest of the ballot is conformable to that of the tribe; the censors of the house sitting at the side urn, and the youngest magistrat of the signory at the middle: the urns being plac’d before the throne, and prepar’d according to the number of the magistrats to be at that time chosen by the rules already given to the censors of the tribes. But before the benches of the knights on either side stands one being shorter; and at the upper end of this sit the two tribuns of the horse. At the upper end of the other, the two tribuns of the foot in their arms; the rest of the benches being cover’d by the judges of the land in their robes. But these magistrats have no suffrage, nor the tribuns, though they derive their presence in the senat from the Romans; nor the judges, though they derive theirs from the antient senat of Oceana. Every Monday this assembly sits of course; at other times, if there be occasion, any magistrat of the house, by giving order for the bell, or by his lictor or ensignbearer, calls a senat. And every magistrat or knight during his session has the title, place and honor, of a duke, earl, baron, or knight, respectively. And every one that has born the same magistracy by his third session, has his respective place and title during the term of his life, which is all the honor confer’d by this commonwealth, except upon the master of the ceremonys, the master of the horse, and the king of the heralds, who are knights by their places. And thus you have the face of the senat, in which there is scarce any feature that is not Roman or Venetian; nor do the horns of the crescent extend themselves much unlike those of the sanhedrim, on either hand of the prince, and of the father of that senat. But upon beauty, in which every man has his phansy, we will not otherwise philosophize than to remember that there is something more than decency in the robe of a judg, that would not be well spar’d from the bench; and that the gravest magistrat, to whom you can commit the sword of justice, will find a quickness in the spurs of honour, which if they be not laid to virtue, will lay themselves to that which may rout a commonwealth.

Constitution of the senat.To com from the face of the senat, to the constitution and use of the parts; It is contain’d in the peculiar orders. And the orders which are peculiar to the senat, are either of election or instruction.

Elections in the senat are of three sorts, annual, biennial, and extraordinary.

Annual elections are performed by the schedule call’d the tropic: and the tropic consists of two parts; the one containing the magistrats, and the other the councils to be yearly elected. The schedule or tropic of the magistrats is as follows in

15 Order. Tropic of the magistrats.The fifteenth ORDER, requiring, That upon every Monday next insuing the last of March, the knights of the annual galaxys taking their places in the senat, be call’d the third region of the same; and that the house having dismiss’d the first region, and receiv’d the third, procede to election of the magistrats contain’d in the first part of the tropic, by the insuing schedule:

The lord strategus, } annual magistrats.
The lord orator, } annual magistrats.
The first censor, } annual magistrats.
The second censor, } annual magistrats.
The third commissioner of the seal, } triennial magistrats.
The third commissioner of the treasury, } triennial magistrats.

THE annual magistrats (provided that no one man bears above one of those honors during the term of one session) may be elected out of any region. But the triennial magistrats may not be elected out of any other than the third region only, left the term of their session expire before that of their honor; and (it being unlawful for a man to bear magistracy any longer than he is therto qualify’d by the election of the people) cause a fraction in the rotation of this commonwealth.

Of the strategus.THE strategus is first president of the senat, and general of the army, if it be commanded to march; in which case there shall be a second strategus elected to be first president of the senat, and general of the second army: and if this also be commanded to march, a third strategus shall be chosen; and so on, as long as the commonwealth sends forth armys.

Of the orator.THE lord orator is the second and more peculiar president of the senat to whom it appertains to keep the house to orders.

Of the censors.THE censors, whereof the first by consequence of his election is chancellor of the university of Clio, and the second of that of Calliope, are presidents of the council for religion and magistrats, to whom it belongs to keep the house to the order of the ballot. They are also inquisitors into the ways and means of acquiring magistracy; and have power to punish indirect proceedings in the same, by removing a knight or magistrat out of the house, under appeal to the senat.

Of the commissioners of the seal.THE commissioners of the seal being three, wherof the third is annually chosen out of the third region, are judges in chancery.

Of the commissioners of the treasury.THE commissioners of the treasury being three, wherof the third is annually chosen out of the third region, are judges in the exchequer; and every magistrat of this schedule has right to propose to the senat.

Of the signory.BUT the strategus with the six commissioners, are the signory of this commonwealth, having right of session and suffrage in every council of the senat, and power either jointly or severally to propose in all or any of them.

I have little in this order to observe and prove, but that the strategus is the same honor both in name and thing that was born, among others, by Philopemen and Aratus in the commonwealth of the Achæans; the like having bin in use also with the Ætolians. The orator, call’d otherwise the speaker, is with small alteration the same that had bin of former use in this nation. These two, if you will, may be compar’d to the consuls in Rome, or the suffetes in Carthage; for their magistracy is scarce different.

The censors derive their power of removing a senator from those of Rome; the government of the ballot, from those of Venice; and that of animadversion upon the ambitus, or canvass for magistracy from both.

The signory, with the whole right and use of that magistracy, to be hereafter more fully explain’d, is almost purely Venetian.

The second part of the tropic is directed by

16 Order. Constitution of the councils.The sixteenth ORDER, wherby the constitution of the councils, being four; that is to say, the council of state, the council of war, the council of religion, and the council of trade, is render’d conformable in their revolutions to that of the senat. As, first, by the annual election of five knights out of the first region of the senat into the council of state, consisting of fifteen knights, five in every region.Of the council of state. Secondly, By the annual election of three knights out of the third region of the council of state, to be propos’d by the provosts, and elected by that council, into the council of war,Of the council of war. consisting of nine knights, three in every region, not excluded by this election from remaining members also of the council of state. The four tribuns of the people have right of session and suffrage in the council of war.Of the council of religion. Thirdly, By the annual election of four knights out of the third region of the senat into the council of religion, consisting of twelve knights, four in every region. Of this council the censors are presidents Fourthly,Of the council of trade. By the annual election of four knights out of the third region of the senat into the council of trade, consisting of twelve knights, four in every region. And each region, in every one of these councils thus constituted,Of the provosts. shall weekly and interchangeably elect one provost, whose magistracy shall continue for one week; nor shall he be reelected into the same, till every knight of that region in the same council has once born the same magistracy.Of the council of the provosts. And the provosts being one in every region, three in every council, and twelve in all, beside their other capacitys, shall assemble and be a council, or rather an academy apart, to certain ends and purposes to be hereafter further explain’d with those of the rest of the councils.

This order is of no other use than the frame and turn of the councils, and yet of no small one: for in motion consists life; and the motion of a commonwealth will never be current, unless it be circular. Men that, like my lord Epimonus, not enduring the resemblance of this kind of government to orbs and spheres, fall on physicing and purging it, do no more than is necessary; for if it be not in rotation both as to persons and things, it will be very sick. The people of Rome, as to persons, if they had not bin taken up by the wheel of magistracy, had overturn’d the chariot of the senat. And those of Lacedemon, as to things, had not bin so quiet when the senat trash’d their business, by incroaching upon the result, if by the institution of the ephors they had not brought it about again. So that if you allow not a commonwealth her rotation, in which consists her equality, you reduce her to a party, and then it is necessary that you be physicians indeed, or rather farriers; for you will have strong patients, and such as must be halter’d and cast, or your selves may need bonesetters. Wherfore the councils of this commonwealth, both in regard of their elections, and, as will be shewn, of their affairs, are uniform with the senat in their revolutions; not as whirlpits to swallow, but to bite, and with the scrues of their rotation to hold and turn a business (like the vice of a smith) to the hand of the workman. Without engins of which nature it is not possible for the senat, much less for the people, to be perfect artificers in a political capacity. But I shall not hold you longer from

17 Order. Constitution of the biennial election or orb of ambassadors in ordinary.The seventeenth ORDER, directing biennial elections, or the constitution of the orb of ambassadors in ordinary, consisting of four residences, the revolution wherof is perform’d in eight years, and preserv’d thro the election of one ambassador in two years by the ballot of the senat to repair to the court of France, and reside there for the term of two years; and the term of two years being expir’d, to remove from thence to the court of Spain, there to continue for the space of two years, and thence to remove to the state of Venice; and after two years residence in that city, to conclude with his residence at Constantinople for a like term of time, and so to return. A knight of the senat, or a deputy of the prerogative, may not be elected ambassador in ordinary, because a knight or deputy so chosen, must either lose his session, which would cause an unevenness in the motion of this commonwealth, or accumulat magistracy, which agrees not with the equality of the same. Nor may any man be elected into this capacity that is above five and thirty years of age, lest the commonwealth lose the charge of his education, by being depriv’d at his return of the fruit of it, or else injoy it not long thro the defects of nature.

This order is the perspective of the commonwealth, wherby she foresees; danger or the traffic, wherby she receives every two years the return of a statesinan inrich’d with eight years experience, from the prime marts of negotiation in Europe. And so much for the elections in the senat that are ordinary; such as are extraordinary follow in

18 Order. Constitution of election extraordinary, or by the scrutiny.The eighteenth ORDER, appointing all elections upon emergent occasions, except that of the dictator, to be made by the scrutiny, or that kind of election, wherby a council coms to be a fifth order of electors. For example, if there be occasion of an ambassador extraordinary, the provosts of the council of state, or any two of them, shall propose to the same, till one competitor be chosen by that council: and the council having chosen a competitor, shall bring his name into the senat, which in the usual way shall chuse four more competitors to the same magistracy; and put them, with the competitor of the council, to the ballot of the house, by which he of the five that is chosen is said to be elected by the scrutiny of the council of state. A vice-admiral, a polemarch, or field officer, shall be elected after the same manner, by the scrutiny of the council of war. A judg or serjeant at law, by the scrutiny of the commissioners of the seal. A baron, or considerable officer of the exchequer, by the scrutiny of the commissioners of the treasary. Men in magistracy, or out of it, are equally capable of election by the scrutiny; but a magistrat or officer elected by the scrutiny to a military imployment, if he be neither a knight of the senat, nor a deputy of the prerogative, ought to have his office confirm’d by the prerogative, because the militia in a commonwealth, where the people are soverain, is not lawful to be touch’d injussu populi.

The Romans were so curious, that tho their consuls were elected in the* centuriat assemblys, they might not touch the militia, except they were confirm’d in the parochial assemblys: for a magistrat not receiving his power from the people, takes it from them; and to take away their power, is to take away their liberty. As to the election by the scrutiny, it is easily perceiv’d to be Venetian, there being no such way to take in the knowledge, which in all reason must be best in every council of such men as are most fit for their turns, and yet to keep them from the biass of particular affection or interest under that pretence: for the cause why the great council in Venice scarce ever elects any other than the name that is brought in by the scrutiny, is very probable to be, that they may . . . . . This election is the last of those appertaining to the senat. The councils being chosen by the orders already shewn, it remains that we come to those wherby they are instructed: and the orders of instruction to the councils are two, the first for the matter wherupon they are to procede: and the second for the manner of their proceding. The matter of the councils is distributed to them by

19 Order. Instructions for the councils as to their matter.The nineteenth ORDER, distributing to every council such businesses as are properly to belong to their cognizance, whereof som they shall receive and determin; and others they shall receive, prepare, and introduce into the house: as, first,

For the council of state.THE council of state is to receive all addresses, intelligences, and letters of negotiation; to give audience to ambassadors sent to, and to draw up instructions for such as shall be sent by, this commonwealth; to receive propositions from, and hold intelligence with the provincial councils; to consider upon all laws to be enacted, amended, or repeal’d; and upon all levys of men or money, war or peace, leagues or associations to be made by this commonwealth, so far forth as is conducible to the orderly preparation of the same to be introduc’d by them into the senat. Provided that all such affairs, as otherwise appertaining to the council of state, are, for the good of the commonwealth, to be carry’d with greater secrecy, be manag’d by the council of war, with power to receive and send forth agents, spys, emissarys, intelligencers, frigots; and to manage affairs of that nature, if it be necessary, without communication to the senat, till such time as it may be had without detriment to the business.For the council of war. But they shall have no power to engage the commonwealth in a war without the consent of the senat and the people. It appertains also to this council to take charge of the fleet as admiral; and of all storehouses, armorys, arsenals, and magazins appertaining to this commonwealth. They shall keep a diligent record of the military expeditions from time to time reported by him that was strategus or general, or one of the polemarchs in that action; or at least so far as the experience of such commanders may tend to the improvement of the military disciplin, which they shall digest and introduce into the senat: and if the senat shall therupon frame any article, they shall see that it be observ’d in the musters or education of the youth. And wheras the council of war is the sentinel or scout of this commonwealth, if any person or persons shall go about to introduce debate into any popular assembly of the same, or otherwise to alter the present government, or strike at the root of it, they shall apprehend, or cause to be apprehended, seiz’d, imprison’d; and examin, arraign, acquit, or condemn, and cause to be executed any such person or persons, by their proper power and authority, and without appeal.

For the council of religion.THE council of religion, as the arbiter of this commonwealth in cases of conscience more peculiarly appertaining to religion, christian charity, and a pious life, shall have the care of the national religion, and the protection of the liberty of conscience, with the cognizance of all causes relating to either of them. And first as to the national religion; they shall cause all places or preferments of the best revenue in either of the universitys to be conser’d upon no other than such of the most learn’d and pious men, as have dedicated themselves to the study of theology. They shall also take a special care that by such augmentations as be or shall hereafter be appointed by the senat, every benefice in this nation be improv’d at least to the value of one hundred pounds a year. And to the end that there be no interest at all, wherby the divines or teachers of the national religion may be corrupted, or corrupt religion, they shall be capable of no other kind of imployment or preferment in this commonwealth. And wheras a directory for the administration of the national religion is to be prepar’d by this council, they shall in this and other debates of this nature procede in manner following: a question arising in matter of religion shall be put and stated by the council in writing; which writing the censors shall send by their beadles (being proctors chosen to attend them) each to the university wherof he is chancellor; and the vice-chancellor of the same receiving the writing, shall call a convocation of all the divines of that univerfity, being above forty years of age. And the universitys upon a point so propos’d, shall have no manner of intelligence or correspondence one with another, till their debates be ended, and they have made return of their answers to the council of religion by two or three of their own members, that they may clear their sense, if any doubt should arise, to the council; which don, they shall return, and the council having receiv’d such information, shall procede according to their own judgments, in the preparation of the whole matter for the senat: that so the interest of the learned being remov’d, there may be a right application of reason to scripture, which is the foundation of the national religion.

SECONDLY, This council, as to the protection of the liberty of conscience, shall suffer no coercive power in the matter of religion to be exercis’d in this nation: the teachers of the natural religion being no other than such as voluntarily undertake that calling; and their auditors or hearers, no other than are also voluntary. Nor shall any gather’d congregation be molested or interrupted in their way of worship (being neither Jewish or idolatrous) but vigilantly and vigorously protected and defended in the injoyment, practice, and prosession of the same. And if there be officers or auditors appointed by any such congregation for the introduction of causes into the council of religion, all such causes so introduc’d shall be receiv’d, heard, and determin’d by the same, with recourse had, if need be, to the senat.

THIRDLY, Every petition addrest to the senat, except that of a tribe, shall be receiv’d, examin’d, and debated by this council; and such only as they, upon such examination and debate had, shall think fit, may be introduc’d into the senat.

For the council of trade.THE council of trade being the vena porta of this nation, shall hereafter receive instructions more at large. For the present, their experience attaining to a right understanding of those trades and mysterys that feed the veins of this commonwealth, and a true distinction of them from those that suck or exhaust the same, they shall acquaint the senat with the conveniences and inconveniences, to the end that incouragement may be apply’d to the one, and remedy to the other.

For the academy of the provosts.THE academy of the provosts, being the affability of the commonwealth, shall assemble every day towards the evening in a fair room, having certain withdrawing rooms therto belonging. And all sorts of company that will repair thither for conversation or discourse, so it be upon matters of government, news, or intelligence, or to propose any thing to the councils, shall be freely and affably receiv’d in the outer chamber, and heard in the way of civil conversation, which is to be manag’d without any other aw or ceremony than is therto usually appertaining; to the end that every man may be free, and that what is propos’d by one, may be argu’d or discours’d by the rest, except the matter be of secrecy; in which case the provosts, or som of them, shall take such as desire audience into one of the withdrawing rooms. And the provosts are to give their minds, that this academy be so govern’d, adorn’d, and preserv’d, as may be most attractive to men of parts and good affections to the commonwealth, for the excellency of the conversation.

FURTHERMORE, if any man, not being able or willing to com in person, has any advice to give which he judges may be for the good of the commonwealth, he may write his mind to the academy of the provosts, in a letter sign’d or not sign’d; which letter shall be left with the doorkeeper of the academy. Nor shall any person delivering such a letter be seiz’d, molested, or detain’d, tho it should prove to be a libel. But the letters so deliver’d shall be presented to the provosts; and in case they be so many that they cannot well be perus’d by the provosts themselves, they shall distribute them as they please to be read by the gentlemen of the academy, who finding any thing in them material, will find matter of discourse: or if they happen upon a business that requires privacy, return it with a note upon it to a provost. And the provosts by the secretarys attending shall cause such notes out of discourses or letters to be taken as they please, to the end that they may propose, as occasion serves, what any two of them shall think fit out of their notes so taken to their respective councils: to the end that not only the ear of the commonwealth be open to all, but that men of such education being in her ey, she may upon emergent elections or occasions be always provided of her choice of fit persons.

For the attendance of the councils.EVERY council being adorn’d with a state for the signory, shall be attended by two secretarys, two doorkeepers, and two messengers in ordinary, and have power to command more upon emergencys, as occasion requires. And the academy shall be attended with two secretarys, two messengers, and two doorkeepers; this with the other councils being provided with their farther conveniences at the charge of the state.

For the dictator.BUT wheras it is incident to commonwealths, upon emergencys requiring extraordinary speed or secrecy, either thro their natural delays or unnatural hast, to incur equal danger, while holding to the slow pace of their orders, they com not in time to defend themselves from som sudden blow; or breaking them for the greater speed, they but hast to their own destruction: if the senat shall at any time make election of nine knights extraordinary, to be added to the council of war, as a juncta for the term of three months, the council of war, with the juncta so added, is for the term of the same dictater of Oceana, having power to levy men and mony, to make war and peace, as also to enact laws, which shall be good for the space of one year (if they be not sooner repcol’d by the senat and the people) and for no longer time, except they be confirm’d by the senat and the people. And the whole administration of the commonwealth for the term of the said three months shall be in the dictator; provided, that the dictator shall have no power to do any thing that tends not to his proper end and institution, but all to the preservation of the commonwealth as it is establish’d, and for the sudden restitution of the some to the natural channel and common course of government. And all acts, orders, decrees, or laws of the council of war with the juncta, being thus created, shall be sign’d,


This order of instructions to the councils being (as in a matter of that nature is requisit) very large, I have us’d my best skill to abbreviat it in such manner as might shew no more of it than is necessary to the understanding of the whole; tho as to the parts, or further dutys of the councils, I have omitted many things of singular use in a commonwealth. But it was discours’d at the council by the Archon in this manner:

My lords, the legislators,

“YOUR councils, except the dictator only, are proper and native springs and sources, you see, which (hanging a few sticks and straws, that, as less considerable, would otherwise be more troublesom, upon the banks of their peculiar channels) derive the full stream of business into the senat, so pure, and so far from the possibility of being troubl’d or stain’d (as will undeniably appear by the course contain’d in the insuing order) with any kind of privat interest or partiality, that it shall never be possible for any assembly hearkning to the advice or information of this or that worthy member (either instructed upon his pillow, or while he was making himself ready, or by the petition or ticket which he receiv’d at the door) to have half the security in his faith, or advantage by his wisdom; such a senat or council being, thro the incertainty of the winds, like a wave of the sea. Nor shall it otherwise mend the matter by flowing up into dry ditches, or referring businesses to be better examin’d by committees, than to go farther about with it to less purpose; if it dos not ebb back again with the more mud in it. For in a case refer’d to an occasional committee, of which any member that is desirous may get himself nam’d, and to which nobody will com, but either for the sake of his friend, or his own interest; it fares little better as to the Information of the senat, than if it had bin refer’d to the partys. Wherfore the Athenians being distributed into four tribes, out of which by equal numbers they annually chose four hundred men, call’d, the senat of the Bean (because the ballot at their election was perform’d by the use of beans) divided them by fiftys into eight parts. And every fifty in their turn, for one eighth part of the year, was a council apart call’d the Prytans. The Prytans in their distinct council receiving all comers, and giving ear to every man that had any thing to propose concerning the commonwealth, had power to debate and prepare all the businesses that were to be introduc’d into the senat. The Achæans had ten selected magistrats call’d the demiurgs, constituting a council apart call’d the synarchy, which with the strategus prepar’d all the business that was introduc’d into their senat. But both the senat of the Athenians, and that of the Achæans, would have wonder’d if a man had told them, that they were to receive all comers and discourses, to the end that they might refer them afterwards, to the Prytans or the synarchy; much less to an occasional committee, expos’d to the catch that catch may of the partys interested. And yet Venice, in this, as in most of her orders, excels them all by the constitution of her councils, that of the college, and the other of the dieci, or council of ten. The course of the college is exactly describ’d in the insuing order: and for that of the dieci, it so little differs from what it has bestow’d upon our dictator, that I need not make any particular description of it. But to dictatorian power in general, and the use of it, because it must needs be of difficult digestion to such as, puking still at antient prudence, shew themselves to be in the nursery of motherwit; it is no less than necessary to say somthing. And, first, in a commonwealth that is not wrought up, or perfected, this power will be of very frequent, if not continual use; wherfore it is said more than once, upon defects of the government, in the book of Judges, that in those days there was no king in Israel. Nor has the translator, tho for no king he should have said no judg, abus’d you so much; seeing that the dictator (and such was the judg of Israel) or the dictatorian power being in a single person, so little differs from monarchy, which follow’d in that, that from the same cause there has bin no other effect in any commonwealth; as in Rome was manifest by Sylla and Cesar, who to make themselves absolute or soverain, had no more to do than to prolong their magistracy; for* the dictatorian power was reputed divine, and therfore irresistible. Nevertheless, so it is, that without this power, which is so dangerous, and subject to introduce monarchy, a commonwealth cannot be safe from falling into the like dissolution; unless you have an expedient in this case of your own, and bound up by your providence from recoiling. Expedients in som cases you must not only have, but be beholden for them to such whom you must trust at a pinch, when you have not leisure to stand with them for security; which will be a thousand times more dangerous. And there can never be a commonwealth otherwise than by the order in debate wrought up to that perfection; but this necessity must somtimes happen in regard of her natural slowness and openness, and the suddenness of assaults that may be made upon her, as also the secresy which in som cases may be of absolute necessity to her affairs. Whence Machiavel concludes it positively, that a commonwealth unprovided of such a refuge, must fall to ruin: for her course is either broken by the blow in one of those cases, or by herself, while it startles her out of her orders. And indeed a commonwealth is like a greyhound, which having once coasted, will never after run fair, but grow slothful; and when it coms to make a common practice of taking nearer ways than its orders, it is dissolv’d: for the being of a commonwealth consists in its orders. Wherfore at this lift you will be expos’d to danger, if you have not provided before-hand for the safety of your resort in the like cases: nor is it sufficient that your resort be safe, unless it be as secret and quick; for if it be slow or open, your former inconveniences are not remedy’d. Now for our imitation in this part, there is nothing in experience like that of the council of ten in Venice; the benefit wherof would be too long to be shewn in the whole piece, and therfore I shall take but a pattern out of Janotti. In the war, says he, which the Venetians had with Florence in Casentin, the Florentins finding a necessity in their affairs far from any other inclination in themselves to ask their peace, sent ambassadors about it to Venice, where they were no sooner heard, than the bargain was struck up by the council of ten: and every body admiring (seeing this commonwealth stood upon the higher ground) what should be the reason of such hast; the council upon the return of the ambassadors imparted letters to the senat, wherby it appear’d, that the Turc had newly lanch’d a formidable fleet against their state; which had it bin understood by the Florentins, it was well enough known they would have made no peace. Wherfore the service of the ten was highly applauded by the senat, and celebrated by the Venetians. Wherby may appear, not only in part what use there is of dictatorian power in that government, but that it is assum’d at the discretion of that council; wheras in this of Oceana it is not otherwise intrusted than when the senat, in the election of nine knights extraordinary, gives at once the commission, and takes security in a balance, added to the council of war, tho securer before by the tribuns of the people than that of Venice, which yet never incur’d jealousy: for if the younger nobility have bin often girding at it, that happen’d not so much thro the apprehension of danger in it to the commonwealth, as thro the aw of it upon themselves. Wherfore the graver have doubtlesly shewn their prudence in the law; wherby the magistracy of these counsillors being to last till their successors be created, the council is establish’d.

The instructions of the councils for their matter being shewn, it remains that I shew the instructions for the manner of their proceding, as they follow in

20 Order. Instructions for the councils as to their manner of proceding.The twentieth ORDER, containing the method of debates to be observ’d by the magistrats and the councils successively in order to a decree of the senat.

THE magistrats of the signory, as counsillors of this commonwealth, shall take into their consideration all matters of state, or of government; and, having right to propose in any council, may any one or more of them propose what business he or they please in that council to which it most properly belongs. And, that the councils may be held to their duty, the said magistrats are superintendants and inspectors of the same, with right to propose to the senat.

THE censors have equal power with these magistrats, but in relation to the council of religion only.

ANY two of the three provosts in every council may propose to, and are the more peculiar proposers of, the same council; to the end that there be not only an inspection and superintendency of business in general, but that every work be also committed to a peculiar hand.

ANY one or more of the magistrats, or any two of the provosts respectively having propos’d, the council shall debate the business so propos’d, to which they of the third region that are willing shall speak first in their order; they of the second, next; and they of the first, last: and the opinions of those that propos’d or spoke, as they shall be thought the most considerable by the council, shall be taken by the secretary of the same in writing, and each of them sign’d with the name of the author.

THE opinions being thus prepar’d, any magistrat of the signory, the censors, or any two of the provosts of that council, upon this occasion may assemble the senat.

THE senat being assembled, the opinions (for example, if they be four) shall be read in their order, that is, according to the order or dignity of the magistrats or counsillors by which they were sign’d. And being read, if any of the council introducing them will speak, they, as best acquainted with the business, shall have precedence; and after them the senators shall speak according to their regions, beginning by the third first, and so continuing till every man that will has spoken: and when the opinions have bin sufficiently debated, they shall be put all together to the ballot after this manner.

FOUR secretarys carrying each of them one of the opinions in one hand, with a white box in the other, and each following the other, according to the order of the opinions, shall present his box, naming the author of his opinion to every senator; and one secretary or ballotin with a green box shall follow the four white ones; and one secretary or ballotin with a red box shall follow the green one: and every senator shall put one ball into som one of these six boxes. The suffrage being gather’d and open’d before the signory, if the red box or nonsincere had above half the suffrages, the opinions shall be all cast out, for the major part of the house is not clear in the business. If no one of the four opinions had above half the suffrages in the affirmative, that which had fewest shall be cast out, and the other three shall be balloted again. If no one of the three had above half, that which had fewest shall be cast out, and the other two shall ballot again. If neither of the two had above half, that which had fewest shall be cast out, and the remaining opinion shall be balloted again. And if the remaining opinion has not above half, it shall also be cast out. But the first of the opinions that arrives at most above half in the affirmative, is the decree of the senat. The opinions being all of them cast out by the nonsincere, may be review’d, if occasion permits, by the council, and brought in again. If they be cast out by the negative, the case being of advice only, the house approves not, and there is an end of it: the case being necessary, and admitting delay, the council is to think again upon the business, and to bring in new opinions; but the case being necessary, and not admitting delay, the senat immediately electing the juncta, shall create the dictator.* And let the dictator, as the Roman saying is, take care that the commonwealth receives no harm.

THIS in case the debate concludes not in a decree. But if a decree be past, it is either in matter of state or government according to law enacted already, and then it is good without going any further: or it is in matter of law to be enacted, repeal’d or amended; and then the decree of the senat, especially if it be for a war, or for a levy of men or mony, is invalid, without the result of the commonwealth, which is in the prerogative tribe, or representative of the people.

THE senat having prepar’d a decree to be propos’d to the people, shall appoint their proposers; and no other may propose for the senat to the people but the magistrats of the house: that is to say, the three commissioners of the seal, or any two of them; the three of the treasury, or any two of them; or the two censors.

THE senat having appointed their proposers, shall require of the tribuns a muster of the people at a set time and place: and the tribuns or any two of them having muster’d the people accordingly, the proposers shall propose the sense or decree of the senat by clauses to the people. And that which is propos’d by the authority of the senat, and resolv’d by the command of the people, is the law of Oceana.

To this order, implicitly containing the sum very near of the whole civil part of the commonwealth, my lord Archon spoke thus in council.

My dear lords;

“THERE is a saying, that a man must cut his coat according to his cloth. When I consider what God has allow’d or furnish’d to our present work, I am amaz’d. You would have a popular government, he has weigh’d it to you in the present balance, as I may say, to a dram; you have no more to do, but to fix it. For the superstructures of such a government, they require a good aristocracy: and you have, or have had a nobility or gentry the best study’d, and the best writers, at least next that of Italy, in the whole world; nor have they bin inferior, when so exercis’d, in the leading of armys. But the people are the main body of a commonwealth; shew me from the treasurys of the snow (as it is in Job) to the burning zone, a people whose shoulder so universally and so exactly fit the corslet. Nevertheless it were convenient to be well provided with auxiliaries. There is Marpesia thro her fruitfulness inexhaustible of men, and men thro her barrenness not only inur’d to hardship, but in your arms. It may be said, that Venice, excepting only that she takes not in the people, is the most incomparable situation of a commonwealth. You are Venice taking in your people and your auxiliarys too. My lords, the children of Israel were makers of brick, before they were builders of a commonwealth: but our brick is made, our morter temper’d, the cedars of Lebanon are hew’d and squar’d to our hands. Has this bin the work of man? or is it in man to withstand this work? shall he that contends with the Almighty, instruct him? he that reproves God, let him answer it. For our parts, every thing is so laid, that when we come to have use of it, it is the next at hand; and unless we can conceive that God and nature do any thing in vain, there is no more for us to do but to dispatch. The piece, which we have reach’d to us in the foregoing orders, is the aristocracy. Athens, as has bin shewn, was plainly lost thro the want of a good aristocracy. But the sufficiency of an aristocracy gos demonstrably upon the hand of the nobility or gentry: for that the politics can be master’d without study, or that the people can have leisure to study, is a vain imagination; and what kind of aristocracy divines and lawyers would make, let their incurable running upon their own narrow biass, and their perpetual invectives against Machiavel (tho in som places justly reprovable, yet the only politician, and incomparable patron of the people) serve for instruction. I will stand no more to the judgment of lawyers and divines in this work, than to that of so many other tradesmen; but if this model chances to wander abroad, I recommend it to the Roman speculativi (the most complete gentlemen of this age) for their censure: or with my lord Epimonus his leave, send three or four hundred copys to your agent at Venice to be presented to the magistrats there; and when they have consider’d them, to be propos’d to the debate of the senat, the most competent judges under heaven, who, tho they have great affairs, will not refuse to return you the oracle of their ballot. The counsillors of princes I will not trust; they are but journymen. The wisdom of these later times in princes affairs (says Verulamius) is rather fine deliverys and shiftings of dangers when they be near, than solid and grounded courses to keep them off. Their counsillors do not derive their procedings from any sound root of government that may contain the demonstration, and assure the success of them, but are expedient-mongers, givers of themselves to help a lame dog over a stile; else how coms it to pass, that the fame of cardinal Richlieu has bin like thunder, wherof we hear the noise, but can make no demonstration of the reason? but to return, if neither the people, nor divines, and lawyers, can be the aristocracy of a nation, there remains only the nobility; in which stile, to avoid farther repetition, I shall understand the gentry also, as the French do by the word noblesse.

Now to treat of the nobility in such sort as may be less obnoxious to mistake, it will be convenient, and answerable to the present occasion, that I divide my discourse into four parts.

The first treating of nobility, and the kinds of it.

The second, of their capacity of the senat.

The third, of the divers kinds of senats.

The fourth, of the senat, according to the foregoing orders.

Nobility may be defin’d divers ways; for it is either antient riches, or antient virtue, or a title confer’d by a prince or a commonwealth.

Nobility of the first kind may be subdivided into two others, such as hold an overbalance in dominion or property to the whole people, or such as hold not an overbalance. In the former case, a nobility (such was the Gothic, of which sufficient has bin spoken) is incompatible with popular government; for to popular government it is essential that power should be in the people, but the overbalance of a nobility in dominion draws the power to themselves. Wherfore in this sense it is that Machiavel is to be understood, where he says, that these are pernicious in a commonwealth; and of France, Spain, and Italy, that they are nations which for this cause are the corruption of the world: for otherwise nobility may according to his definition (which is, that they are such as live upon their own revenues in plenty, without ingagement either to the tilling of their lands, or other work for their livelihood) hold an underbalance to the people; in which cafe they are not only safe, but necessary to the natural mixture of a well-order’d commonwealth. For how else can you have a commonwealth that is not altogether mechanic? or what comparison is there of such commonwelaths as are, or com nearest to mechanic, for example, Athens, Switzerland, Holland, to Lacedemon, Rome, and Venice, plum’d with their aristocracys? your mechanics, till they have first feather’d their nests, like the fowls of the air, whose whole imployment is to seek their food, are so busy’d in their private concernments, that they have neither leisure to study the public, nor are safely to be trusted with it,* because a man is not faithfully imbark’d in this kind of ship, if he has no share in the freight. But if his share be such as gives him leisure by his privat advantage to reflect upon that of the public, what other name is there for this sort of men, being a leur aise, but (as Machiavel you see calls them) Nobility? especially when their familys com to be such as are noted for their services don to the commonwealth, and so take into their antient riches antient virtue, which is the second definition of nobility, but such a one as is scarce possible in nature without the former. For as the baggage, says Verulamius, is to an army, so are riches to virtue; they cannot be spar’d nor left behind, tho they be impediments, such as not only hinder the march, but sometimes thro the care of them lose or disturb the victory. Of this latter sort is the nobility of Oceana; the best of all others, because they, having no stamp whence to derive their price, can have it no otherwise than by their intrinsic value. The third definition of nobility, is a title, honor, or distinction from the people, confer’d or allow’d by the prince or the commonwealth. And this may be two ways, either without any stamp or privilege, as in Oceana; or with such privileges as are inconsiderable, as in Athens after the battel of Plateæ, whence the nobility had no right, as such, but to religious offices, or inspection of the public games, to which they were also to be elected by the people: or with privileges, and those considerable ones, as the nobility in Athens before the battel of Plateæ, and the Patricians in Rome, each of which had right, or claim’d it, to the senat and all the magistracys; wherin for som time they only by their stamp were current.

But to begin higher, and to speak more at large of nobility in their several capacitys of the senat. The phylarchs or princes of the tribes of Israel were the most ren wn’d, or, as the Latin, the most noble of the congregation, wherof by hereditary right they had the leading and judging.Numb. 1. 16. The patriarchs, or princes of familys, according as they declar’d their pedigrees, had the like right as to their familys; but neither in these nor the former, was there any hereditary right to the sanhedrim:Ver. 18. tho there be little question but the wise men, and understanding, and known among their tribes, which the people took or elected into those or other magistracys, and whom Moses made rulers over them, must have bin of these; seeing they could not chuse but be the most known among the tribes, and were likeliest by the advantages of education to be the most wise and understandingDeut. 1. 13.

Solon having found the Athenians neither locally nor genealogically, but by their different ways of life, divided into four tribes, that is, into the soldiery, the tradesmen, the husbandmen, and the goatherds, instituted a new distribution of them, according to the cense or valuation of their estates, into four classes: the first, second, and third, consisting of such as were proprietors in land, distinguish’d by the rate of their freeholds, with that stamp upon them, which making them capable of adding honor to their riches, that is to say, of the senat, and all the magistracys, excluded the fourth, being the body of the people, and far greater in number than the former three, from all other right, as to those capacitys, except the election of these, who by this means became a hereditary aristocracy or senatorian order of nobility. This was that course which came afterwards to be the destruction of Rome, and had now ruin’d Athens. The nobility, according to the inevitable nature of such a one, having laid the plot how to devest the people of the result, and so to draw the whole power of the commonwealth to themselves; which in all likelihood they had don, if the people, coming by mere chance to be victorious in the battel of Plateæ, and famous for defending Greece against the Persians, had not return’d with such courage as irresistibly broke the classes, to which of old they had born a white tooth, brought the nobility to equal terms, and the senat with the magistracys to be common to both; the magistracys by suffrage, and the senat (which was the mischief of it, as I shall shew anon in that constitution) by lot only.

The Lacedemonians were in the manner, and for the same cause with the Venetians at this day, no other than a nobility, even according to the definition given of nobility by Machiavel; for they neither exercis’d any trade, nor labor’d their lands or lots, which was don by their helots: wherfore som nobility may be far from pernicious in a commonwealth by Machiavel’s own testimony, who is an admirer of this, tho the servants therof were more in number than the citizens. To these servants I hold the answer of Lycurgus, when he bad him who ask’d why he did not admit the people to the government of his commonwealth, to go home and admit his servants to the government of his family, to relate: for neither were the Lacedemonians servants, nor farther capable of the government, unless, wheras the congregation had the result, he should have given them the debate also; every one of these that attain’d to sixty years of age, and the major vote of the congregation, being equally capable of the senat.

The nobility of Rome, and their capacity of the senat, I have already describ’d by that of Athens before the battel of Plateæ; saving only that the Athenian was never eligible into the senat without the suffrage of the people, till the introduction of the lot, but the Roman nobility ever: for the patricians were elected into the senat by the kings, by the consuls, or the censors; or if a plebeian happen’d to be conscrib’d, he and his posterity became patricians. Nor, tho the people had many disputes with the nobility, did this ever com in controversy, which, if there had bin nothing else, might in my judgment have bin enough to overturn that commonwealth.

The Venetian nobility, but that they are richer, and not military, resemble at all other points the Lacedemonian, as I have already shewn. These Machiavel excepts from his rule, by saying, that their estates are rather personal than real, or of any great revenue in land; which coms to our account, and shews, that a nobility or party of the nobility, not overbalancing in dominion, is not dangerous, but of necessary use in every commonwealth, provided it be rightly order’d; for if it be so order’d as was that of Rome, tho they do not overbalance at the beginning, as they did not there, it will not be long e’er they do, as is clear both in reason and experience towards the latter end. That the nobility only be capable of the senat, is there only not dangerous, where there be no other citizens, as in this government and that of Lacedemon.

The nobility of Holland and Switzerland, tho but few, have privileges not only distinct from the people, but so great, that in som soveraintys they have a negative voice; an example which I am far from commending, being such as (if those governments were not cantoniz’d, divided, and subdivided into many petty soveraintys that balance one another, and in which the nobility, except they had a prince at the head of them, can never join to make work) would be the most dangerous that ever was but the Gothic, of which it savors. For in antient commonwealths you shall never find a nobility to have had a negative but by the poll, which, the people being far more in number, came to nothing; wheras these have it, be they never so few, by their stamp or order.

Ours of Oceana have nothing else but their education and their leisure for the public, furnish’d by their ease and competent riches: and their intrinsic value, which, according as it coms to hold weight in the judgment or suffrage of the people, is their only way to honor and preferment. Wherfore I would have your lordships to look upon your children as such, who if they com to shake off som part of their baggage, shall make the more quick and glorious march: for it was nothing else but the baggage sordidly plunder’d by the nobility of Rome, that lost the victory of the whole world in the midst of her triumph.

Having follow’d the nobility thus close, they bring us, according to their natural course and divers kinds, to the divers constitutions of the senat.

That of Israel (as was shew’d by my right noble lord Phosphorus de Augf, in the opening of the commonwealth) consisted of seventy elders, elected at first by the people. But wheras they were for life, they ever after (tho without any divine precept for it) substituted their successors by ordination, which ceremony was most usually perform’d by imposition of hands; and by this means a commonwealth of as popular institution as can be found, became, as it is accounted by Josephus, aristocratical. From this ordination derives that which was introduc’d by the apostles into the Christian church; for which cause I think it is, that the Presbyterians would have the government of the church to be aristocratical: tho the apostles, to the end, as I conceive, that they might give no occasion to such a mistake, but shew that they intended the government of the church to be popular, ordain’d elders, as has bin shewn, by the holding up of hands (or free suffrage of the people) in every congregation or ecclesia: for that is the word in the original, being borrow’d from the civil congregations of the people in Athens and Lacedemon, which were so call’d; and the word for holding up of hands in the text, is also the very same, which signify’d the suffrage of the people in Athens, χειrhosymbolοτονήσαντες; for the suffrage of the Athenians was given per chirotonian, says Emmius.

The council of the bean (as was shewn by my lord Navarchus de Paralo in his full discourse) being the proposing senat of Athens (for that of the areopagits was a judicatory) consisted of four, som say five hundred senators, elected annually, all at once, and by a mere lot without suffrage. Wherfore tho the senat, to correct the temerity of the lot, had power to cast out such as they should judg unworthy of that honor; this related to manners only, and was not sufficient to repair the commonwealth, which by such means became impotent: and forasmuch as her senat consisted not of the natural aristocracy, which in a commonwealth is the only spur and rein of the people, it was cast headlong by the rashness of her demagogs or grandees into ruin; while her senat, like the Roman tribuns (*who almost always, instead of governing, were rather govern’d by the multitude) propos’d not to the result only, but to the debate also of the people, who were therefore call’d to the pulpits, where som vomited, and others drank poison.

The senat of Lacedemon, most truly discover’d by my lord Laco de Scytale, consisted but of 30 for life, wherof the two kings having but single votes, were hereditary, the rest elected by the free suffrage of the people, but out of such as were sixty years of age. These had the whole debate of the commonwealth in themselves, and propos’d to the result only of the people. And now the riddle which I have heretofore found troublesom to unfold, is out; that is to say, why Athens and Lacedemon, consisting each of the senat and the people, the one should be held a democracy, and the other an aristocracy, or laudable oligarchy, as it is term’d by Isocrates; for that word is not, wherever you meet it, to be branded, seeing it is us’d also by Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, somtimes in a good sense. The main difference was, that the people in this had the result only, and in that the debate and result too. But for my part, where the people have the election of the senat, not bound to a distinct order, and the result, which is the soverain power, I hold them to have that share in the government (the senat being not for life) wherof, with the safety of the commonwealth, they are capable in nature; and such a government, for that cause, to be democracy: tho I do not deny, but in Lacedemon, the paucity of the senators consider’d, it might be call’d oligarchy, in comparison of Athens; or, if we look on their continuance for life, tho they had bin more, aristocracy.

The senat of Rome (whose fame has bin heard to thunder in the eloquence of my lord Dolabella d’Enyo) consisting of 300, was, in regard of the number, less oligarchical than that of Lacedemon; but more in regard of the patrician, who, having a hereditary capacity of the same, were not elected to that honor by the people; but, being conscrib’d by the censors, injoy’d it for life. Wherfore these, if they had their wills, would have resolv’d as well as debated; which set the people at such variance with them, as dissolv’d the commonwealth; wheras if the people had injoy’d the result, that about the agrarian, as well as all other strife, must of necessity have ceas’d.

The senats of Switzerland and Holland (as I have learnt of my lords Alpester and Glaucus) being bound up (like the sheaf of arrows which the latter gives) by leagues, ly like those in their quivers: but arrows, when they com to be drawn, fly som this way, and som that; and I am contented that these concern’d us not.

That of Venice (by the faithful testimony of my most excellent lord Linceus de Stella) has oblig’d a world, sufficiently punish’d by its own blindness and ingratitude, to repent and be wiser: for wheras a commonwealth in which there is no senat, or where the senat is corrupt, cannot stand; the great council of Venice, like the statue of Nilus, leans upon an urn or waterpot, which pours forth the senat in so pure and perpetual a stream, as being inabled to stagnat, is for ever incapable of corruption. The fuller description of this senat is contain’d in that of Oceana; and that of Oceana in the foregoing orders. To every one of which, because somthing has bin already said, I shall not speak in particular. But in general, your senat, and the other assembly, or the prerogative, as I shall shew in due place, are perpetual, not as lakes or puddles, but as the rivers of Eden; and are beds made, as you have seen, to receive the whole people, by a due and faithful vicissitude, into their current. They are not, as in the late way, alternat. Alternat life in government is the alternat* death of it.

This was the Gothic work, wherby the former government (which was not only a ship, but a gust too) could never open her fails, but in danger to overset herself; neither could make any voyage, nor ly safe in her own harbor. The wars of later ages, says Verulamius, seem to be made in the dark, in respect of the glory and honor which reflected on men from the wars in antient times. Their shipping of this sort was for voyages, ours dare not lanch; nor lys it safe at home. Your Gothic politicians seem to me rather to have invented som new ammunition or gunpowder, in their king and parlament, than government. For what is becom of the princes (a kind of people) in Germany? blown up. Where are the estates, or the power of the people in France? blown up. Where is that of the people in Arragon, and the rest of the Spanish kingdoms? blown up. On the other side, where is the king of Spain’s power in Holland? blown up. Where is that of the Austrian princes in Switzerland? blown up. This perpetual peevishness and jealousy, under the alternat empire of the prince, and of the people, is obnoxious to every spark. Nor shall any man shew a reason that will be holding in prudence, why the people of Oceana have blown up their king, but that their kings did not first blow up them. The rest is discourse for ladys. Wherfore your parlaments are not henceforth to com out of the bag of Æolus, but by your galaxys, to be the perpetual food of the fire of Vesta.

Your galaxys, which divide the house into so many regions, are three; one of which constituting the third region is annually chosen, but for the term of three years; which causes the house (having at once blossoms, fruit half ripe, and others dropping off in full maturity) to resemble an orange tree, such as is at the same time an education or spring, and a harvest too: for the people have made a very ill choice in the man, who is not easily capable of the perfect knowlege in one year of the senatorian orders; which knowledge, allowing him for the first to have bin a novice, brings him the second year to practice, and time enough. For at this rate you must always have two hundred knowing men in the government. And thus the vicissitude of your senators is not perceivable in the steadiness and perpetuity of your senat; which, like that of Venice, being always changing, is for ever the same. And tho other politicians have not so well imitated their pattern, there is nothing more obvious in nature, seeing a man who wears the same flesh but a short time, is nevertheless the same man, and of the same genius; and whence is this but from the constancy of nature, in holding a man to her orders? Wherfore keep also to your orders. But this is a mean request, your orders will be worth little, if they do not hold you to them: wherfore imbark. They are like a ship, if you be once aboard, you do not carry them, but they you; and see how Venice stands to her tackling: you will no more forsake them, than you will leap into the sea.

But they are very many, and difficult. O, my lords, what seaman casts away his card, because it has four and twenty points of the compass? and yet those are very near as many, and as difficult as the orders in the whole circumference of your commonwealth. Consider, how have we bin tost with every wind of doctrin, lost by the glib tongues of your demagogs and grandees in our own havens? A company of fidlers that have disturb’d your rest for your groat; two to one, three thousand pounds a year to another, has bin nothing. And for what? Is there one of them that yet knows what a commonwealth is? And are you yet afraid of such a government in which these shall not dare to scrape, for fear of the statute? Themistocles could not fiddle, but could make of a small city a great commonwealth: these have fiddel’d, and for your mony, till they have brought a great commonwealth to a small city.

It grieves me, while I consider how, and from what causes imaginary difficultys will be aggravated, that the foregoing orders are not capable of any greater clearness in discourse or writing: but if a man should make a book, describing every trick and passage, it would fare no otherwise with a game at cards; and this is no more, if a man plays upon the square. There is a great difference, says Verulamius, between a cunning man and a wise man (between a demagog and a legistator) not only in point of honesty, but in point of ability: as there be that can pack the cards, and yet cannot play well; so there be som that are good in canvasses and factions, that are otherwise weak men. Allow me but these orders, and let them com with their cards in their sleeves, or pack if they can. Again, says he, it is one thing to understand persons, and another to understand matters; for many are perfect in men’s humors, that are not greatly capable of the real part of business: which is the constitution of one that has study’d men more than books. But there is nothing more hurtful in a state, than that cunning men should pass for wise. His words are an oracle. As Dionysius, when he could no longer exercise his tyranny among men, turn’d schoolmaster, that he might exercise it among boys. Allow me but these orders, and your grandees so well skill’d in the baits and palats of men, shall turn ratcatchers.

And wheras councils (as is discretely observ’d by the same author in his time) are at this day, in most places, but familiar meetings (somwhat like the academy of our provosts) where matters are rather talk’d on than debated, and run too swift to order an act of council; give me my orders, and see if I have not puzzel’d your demagogs.

It is not so much my desire to return upon hants, as theirs that will not be satisfy’d; wherfore if, notwithstanding what was said of dividing and chusing in our preliminary discourses, men will yet be returning to the question, Why the senat must be a council apart (tho even in Athens, where it was of no other constitution than the popular assembly, the distinction of it from the other was never held less than necessary) this may be added to the former reasons, that if the aristocracy be not for the debate, it is for nothing; but if it be for debate, it must have convenience for it: and what convenience is there for debate in a croud, where there is nothing but jostling, treading upon one another, and stirring of blood, than which in this case there is nothing more dangerous? Truly, it was not ill said of my lord Epimonus, That Venice plays her game, as it were, at billiards or nineholes; and so may your lordships, unless your ribs be so strong, that you think better of footbal: for such sport is debate in a popular assembly, as, notwithstanding the distinction of the senat, was the destruction of Athens.

This speech concluded the debate which happen’d at the institution of the senat. The next assembly is that of the people or prerogative tribe.

The face of the prerogative tribe.The face, or mien of the prerogative tribe for the arms, the horses, and the disciplin, but more especially for the select men, is that of a very noble regiment, or rather of two; the one of horse, divided into three troops, (besides that of the provinces, which will be shewn hereafter) with their captains, cornets, and two tribuns of the horse at the head of them; the other of foot in three companys (besides that of the provinces) with their captains, ensigns, and two tribuns of the foot at the head of them. The first troop is call’d the phœnix; the second the pelican; and the third the swallow. The first company the cypress; the second the myrtle; and the third the spray. Of these again (not without a near resemblance of the Roman division of a tribe) the phœnix and the cypress constitute the first class; the pelican and the myrtle the second; and the swallow with the spray the third, renew’d every spring by

21 Order. The change or election of the triennial officers of the prerogative.The one and twentieth ORDER, directing, that upon every Monday next insuing the last of March, the deputys of the annual galaxy arriving at the pavilion in the halo, and electing one captain and one cornet of the swallow (triennial officers) by and out of the cavalry at the horse urn, according to the rules contain’d in the ballot of the hundred; and one captain with one ensign of the spray (triennial officers) by and out of the infantry at the foot urn, after the same way of ballotting; constitute and becom the third classes of the prerogative tribe.

Seven deputys are annually return’d by every tribe, wherof three are horse, and four are foot; and there be fifty tribes: so the swallow must consist of 150 horse, the spray of 200 foot. And the rest of the classes being two, each of them in number equal; the whole prerogative (besides the provinces, that is, the knights and deputys of Marpesia and Panopea) must consist of 1050 deputys. And these troops and companys may as well be call’d centurys as those of the Romans; for the Romans related not, in so naming theirs, to the number. And wheras they were distributed according to the valuation of their estates, so are these; which by virtue of the last order, are now accommodated with their triennial officers. But there be others appertaining to this tribe, whose election, being of far greater importance, is annual, as follows in

22 Order. The charge or election of the annual magistrats of the prerogative.The twenty-second ORDER; wherby the first class having elected their triennial officers, and made oath to the old tribuns, that they will neither introduce, cause, nor to their power suffer debate to be introduc’d into any popular assembly of this government, but to their utmost be aiding and assisting to seize and deliver any person or persons in that way offending, and striking at the root of this commonwealth, to the council of war; are to procede with the other two classes of the prerogative tribe to election of the new tribuns, being four annual magistrats, wherof two are to be elected out of the cavalry at the horse urn, and two out of the infantry at the foot urn, according to the common ballot of the tribes. And they may be promiscuously chosen out of any classis, provided that the same person shall not be capable of bearing the tribunitian honor twice in the term of one galaxy. The tribuns thus chosen shall receive the tribe (in reference to the power of mustering and disciplining the same) as commanders in chief; and for the rest as magistrats, whose proper function is prescrib’d by the next order. The tribuns may give leave to any number of the prerogative, not exceeding one hundred at a time, to be absent, so they be not magistrats, nor officers, and return within three months. If a magistrat or officer has a necessary occasion, he may also be absent for the space of one month; provided, that there be not above three cornets or ensigns, two captains, or one tribun so absent at one time.

To this the Archon spoke at the institution after this manner.

My lords;

“IT is affirm’d by Cicero in his oration for Flaccus, that the commonwealths of Greece were all shaken or ruin’d by the intemperance of their comitia, or assemblys of the people. The truth is, if good heed in this point be not taken, a commonwealth will have bad legs. But all the world knows he should have excepted Lacedemon, where the people, as has bin shewn by the oracle, had no power at all of debate, nor (till after Lysander, whose avarice open’d a gulf, that was not long e’er it swallow’d up his country) came it ever to be exercis’d by them. Whence that commonwealth stood longest and firmest of any other, but this, in our days, of Venice: which having underlaid her self with the like institution, ows a great, if not the greatest part of her steddiness to the same principle; the great council, which is with her the people, by the authority of my lord Epimonus, never speaking a word. Nor shall any commonwealth, where the people in their political capacity is talkative, ever see half the days of one of these: but being carry’d away by vain-glorious men (that, as Overbury says, piss more than they drink) swim down the stream; as did Athens, the most prating of these dames, when that same ranting fellow Alcibiades fell a demagoging for the Sicilian war. But wheras debate by the authority and experience of Lacedemon and Venice, is not to be committed to the people in a well order’d government, it may be said, That the order specify’d is but a slight bar in a matter of like danger; for so much as an oath, if there be no recourse upon the breach of it, is a weak ty for such hands as have the sword in them: wherfore what should hinder the people of Oceana, if they happen not to regard an oath, from assuming debate, and making themselves as much an anarchy as those of Athens? To which I answer, Take the common sort in a privat capacity, and, except they be injur’d, you shall find them to have a bashfulness in the presence of the better sort, or wiser men; acknowleging their abilitys by attention, and accounting it no mean honor to receive respect from them: but if they be injur’d by them, they hate them, and the more for being wife or great, because that makes it the greater injury. Nor refrain they in this case from any kind of intemperance of speech, if of action. It is no otherwise with a people in their political capacity; you shall never find that they have assum’d debate for it self, but for somthing else. Wherfore in Lacedemon where there was, and in Venice where there is nothing else for which they should assume it, they have never shewn so much as an inclination to it. Nor was there any appearance of such a desire in the people of Rome (who from the time of Romulus had bin very well contented with the power of result either in the* parochial assemblys, as it was settled upon them by him; or in the meetings of the hundreds, as it was alter’d in their regard for the worse by Servius Tullius) till news was brought som fifteen years after the exile of Tarquin their late king (during which time the senat had govern’d pretty well) that he was dead at the court of Aristodemus the tyrant of Cumæ. Wherupon the patricians, or nobility, began to let out the hitherto-dissembl’d venom, which is inherent in the root of oligarchy, and fell immediatly upon injuring the people beyond all moderation. For wheras the people had serv’d both gallantly and contentedly in arms upon their own charges, and, tho joint purchasers by their swords of the conquer’d lands, had not participated in the same to above two acres a man (the rest being secretly usurp’d by the patricians) they thro the meanness of their support, and the greatness of their expence, being generally indebted, no sooner return’d home with victory to lay down their arms, than they were snatch’d up by their creditors, the nobility, to cram goals. Wherupon, but with the greatest modesty that was ever known in the like case, they first fell upon debate, affirming,§ that they were opprest and captivated at home, while abroad they fought for liberty and empire; and that the freedom of the common people was safer in time of war than peace, among their enemys than their fellow-citizens. It is true, that when they could not get the senat, thro fear, as was pretended by the patricians, to assemble and take their grievances into consideration, they grew so much the warmer, that it was glad to meet; where Appius Claudius, a fierce spirit, was of opinion, that recourse should be had to consular power, wherby som of the brands of sedition being taken off, the flame might be extinguish’d. Servilius being of another temper, thought it better and safer to try if the people might be bow’d than broken. But this debate was interrupted by tumultuous news of the near approach of the Volsci, a case in which the senat had no recourse but to the people, who contrary to their former custom upon the like occasions would not stir a foot, but fell a laughing, and saying,* Let them fight that have something to fight for. The senat that had purses, and could not sing so well before the thief, being in a great perplexity, found no possible way out of it, but to beseech Servilius, one of a genius well known to be popular, That he would accept of the consulship, and make som such use of it as might be helpful to the patrician interest. Servilius accepting of the offer, and making use of his interest with the people, persuaded them to hope well of the good intention of the fathers, whom it would little beseem to be forc’d to those things which would lose their grace, and that in view of the enemy, if they came not freely; and withal publish’d an edict, that no man should withhold a citizen of Rome by imprisonment from giving his name (for that was the way, as I shall have opportunity hereafter to shew more at large, wherby they drew out their armys) nor to seize or sell any man’s goods or children that was in the camp. Wherupon the people with a mighty concourse immediatly took arms, march’d forth, and (which to them was as easy as to be put into the humor, and that, as appears in this place, was not hard) totally defeated the Volsci first, then the Sabins (for the neighbor nations, hoping to have had a good bargain of the discord in Rome, were up in arms on all sides) and after the Sabins, the Aurunci. Whence returning victorious in three battels, they expected no less than that the senat would have made good their words: when Appius Claudius, the other consul, of his innate pride, and that he might frustrat the faith of his collegue, caus’d the soldiers (who being set at liberty, had behav’d themselves with such valor) to be restor’d at their return to their creditors and their goals. Great resort upon this was made by the people to Servilius, shewing him their wounds, calling him to witness how they had behav’d themselves, and minding him of his promise. Poor Servilius was sorry, but so overaw’d with the headiness of his collegue, and the obstinacy of the whole faction of the nobility, that not daring to do any thing either way, he lost both partys: the fathers conceiving that he was ambitious, and the people that he was false; while the consul Claudius continuing to countenance such as daily seiz’d and imprison’d som of the indebted people, had still new and dangerous controversys with them, insomuch that the commonwealth was torn with horrid division, and the people (because they found it not so safe, or so effectual in public) minded nothing but laying their heads together in privat conventicles. For this Aulus Virginius, and Titus Vetusius, the new consuls, were reprov’d by the senat as slothful, and upbraided with the virtue of Appius Claudius. Wherupon the consuls having desir’d the senat, that they might know their pleasure, shew’d afterwards their readiness to obey it, by summoning the people according to command, and requiring names wherby to draw forth an army for diversion, but no man would answer. Report hereof being made to the senat, the younger sort of the fathers grew so hot with the consuls, that they desir’d them to abdicat the magistracy, which they had not the courage to defend.

The consuls, tho they conceiv’d themselves to be roughly handled, made this soft answer: fathers conscript, that you may please to take notice it was foretold som horrid sedition is at hand, we shall only desire, that they whose valor in this place is so great, may stand by us to see how we behave our selves, and then be as resolute in your commands as you will: your fatherhoods may know if we be wanting in the performance.

At this som of the hot young noblemen return’d with the consuls to the tribunal, before which the people were yet standing; and the consuls having generally requir’d names in vain, to put it to somthing, requir’d the name of one that was in their ey particularly; on whom, when he mov’d not, they commanded a lictor to lay hands: but the people thronging about the party summon’d, forbad the lictor, who durst not touch him; at which the hotspurs that came with the consuls, inrag’d by the affront, descended from the throne to the aid of the lictor; from whom in so doing they turn’d the indignation of the people upon themselves with such heat, that the consuls interposing, thought fit, by remitting the assembly, to appease the tumult; in which nevertheless there had bin nothing but noise. Nor was there less in the senat, being suddenly rally’d upon this occasion, where they that receiv’d the repulse, with others whose heads were as addle as their own, fell upon the business as if it had bin to be determin’d by clamor, till the consuls, upbraiding the senat that it differ’d not from the marketplace, reduc’d the house to orders. And the fathers having bin consulted accordingly, there were three opinions; Publius Virginius conceiv’d, that the consideration to be had upon the matter in question, or aid of the indebted and imprison’d people, was not to be further extended than to such as had ingag’d upon the promise made by Servilius: Titus Largius, that it was no time to think it enough, if mens merits were acknowleg’d, while the whole people, sunk under the weight of their debts, could not emerge without som common aid; which to restrain, by putting som into a better condition than others, would rather more inflame the discord than extinguish it. Appius Claudius (still upon the old hant) would have it, that the people were rather wanton than fierce: it was not oppression that necessitated, but their power that invited them to these freaks; the empire of the consuls since the appeal to the people (wherby a Plebeian might ask his fellows if he were a thief) being but a mere scarecrow. Go to, says he, let us create the dictator, from whom there is no appeal, and then let me see more of this work, or him that shall forbid my lictor. The advice of Appius was abhor’d by many; and to introduce a general recision of debts with Largius, was to violat all faith: that of Virginius, as the most moderat, would have past best, but that there were privat interests, that constant bane of the public, which withstood it. So they concluded with Appius, who also had bin dictator, if the consuls, and som of the graver sort had not thought it altogether unseasonable, at a time when the Volsci and the Sabins were up again, to venture so far upon alienation of the people: for which cause Valerius, being descended from the Publicolas, the most popular family, as also in his own person of a mild nature, was rather trusted with so rigid a magistracy. Whence it happen’d, that the people, tho they knew well enough against whom the dictator was created, fear’d nothing from Valerius; but upon a new promise made to the same effect with that of Servilius, hop’d better another time, and throwing away all disputes, gave their names roundly, went out, and to be brief, came home again as victorious as in the former action, the dictator entring the city in triumph. Nevertheless when he came to press the senat to make good his promise, and do somthing for the ease of the people, they regarded him no more as to that point than they had don Servilius. Wherupon the dictator, in disdain to be made a stale, abdicated his magistracy, and went home. Here then was a victorious army, without a captain, and a senat pulling it by the beard in their gowns. What is it (if you have read the story, for there is not such another) that must follow? can any man imagin, that such only should be the opportunity upon which this people could run away? alas, poor men, the Æqui and the Volsci, and the Sabins were nothing, but the fathers invincible! there they sat som three hundred of them arm’d all in robes, and thundering with their tongues, without any hopes in the earth to reduce them to any tolerable conditions. Wherfore, not thinking it convenient to abide long so near them, away marches the army, and incamps in the fields. This retreat of the people is call’d the secession of Mount Aventin, where they lodg’d very sad at their condition; but not letting fall so much as a word of murmur against the fathers. The senat by this time were great lords, had the whole city to themselves; but certain neighbours were upon the way that might com to speak with them, not asking leave of the porter. Wherfore their minds became troubl’d, and an orator was posted to the people to make as good conditions with them as he could; but, whatever the terms were, to bring them home, and with all speed. And here it was covenanted between the senat and the people, that these should have magistrats of their own election, call’d the tribuns; upon which they return’d.

To hold you no longer, the senat having don this upon necessity, made frequent attempts to retract it again; while the tribuns on the other side, to defend what they had got, instituted their tributa comitia, or council of the people; where they came in time, and, as disputes increas’d, to make laws without the authority of the senat, call’d plebiscita. Now to conclude in the point at which I drive; such were the steps wherby the people of Rome came to assume debate: nor is it in art or nature to debar a people of the like effect, where there is the like cause. For Romulus having in the election of his senat squar’d out a nobility for the support of a throne, by making that of the Patricians a distinct and hereditary order, planted the commonwealth upon two contrary interests or roots, which shooting forth in time produc’d two commonwealths, the one oligarchical in the nobility, the other a mere anarchy of the people, and ever after caus’d a perpetual feud and enmity between the senat and the people, even to death.

There is not a more noble or useful question in the politics than that which is started by Machiavel, Whether means were to be found wherby the enmity that was between the senat and the people of Rome could have bin remov’d? nor is there any other in which we, or the present occasion, are so much concern’d, particularly in relation to this author; forasmuch as his judgment in the determination of the question standing, our commonwealth falls. And he that will erect a commonwealth against the judgment of Machiavel, is oblig’d to give such reasons for his enterprize as must not go a begging. Wherfore to repeat the politician very honestly, but somwhat more briefly, he disputes thus:

Mach. Disc. B. 1. c. 6. THERE be two sorts of commonwealths, the one for preservation, as Lacedemon and Venice; the other for increase, as Rome.

Lacedemon being govern’d by a king and a small senat, could maintain it self a long time in that condition, because the inhabitants, being few, having put a bar upon the reception of strangers, and living in a strict observation of the laws of Lycurgus, which now had got reputation, and taken away all occasion of tumults, might well continue long in tranquillity. For the laws of Lycurgus introduc’d a greater equality in estates, and a less equality in honours, whence there was equal poverty; and the Plebeians were less ambitious, because the honors or magistracys of the city could extend but to a few, and were not communicable to the people: nor did the nobility by using them ill, ever give them a desire to participat of the same. This proceded from the kings, whose principality being plac’d in the midst of the nobility, had no greater means wherby to support it self, than to shield the people from all injury; whence the people not fearing empire, desir’d it not: and so all occasion of enmity between the senat and the people was taken away. But this union happen’d especially from two causes; the one, that the inhabitants of Lacedemon being few, could be govern’d by the few: the other, that, not receiving strangers into their commonwealth, they did not corrupt it, nor increase it to such a proportion as was not governable by the few.

Venice has not divided with her Plebeians, but all are call’d gentlemen that be in administration of the government; for which government she is more beholden to chance than the wisdom of her lawmakers: for many retiring to those islands, where that city is now built, from the inundations of Barbarians that overwhelm’d the Roman empire, when they were increas’d to such a number, that to live together it was necessary to have laws; they ordain’d a form of government, wherby assembling often in council upon affairs, and finding their number sufficient for government, they put a bar upon all such as repairing afterwards to their city should becom inhabitants, excluding them from participation of power. Whence they that were included in the administration had right; and they that were excluded, coming afterwards, and being receiv’d upon no other conditions to be inhabitants, had no wrong; and therfore had no occasion, nor (being never trusted with arms) any means to be tumultuous. Wherfore this commonwealth might very well maintain it self in tranquillity.

THESE things consider’d, it is plain that the Roman legislators, to have introduc’d a quiet state, must have don one of these two things; either shut out strangers, as the Lacedemonians; or, as the Venetians, not allow’d the people to bear arms. But they did neither. By which means the people having power and increase, were in perpetual tumult. Nor is this to be help’d in a commonwealth for increase, seeing if Rome had cut off the occasion of her tumults, she must have cut off the means of her increase, and by consequence of her greatness.

WHERFORE let a legislator consider with himself, whether he would make his commonwealth for preservation, in which case she may be free from tumults; or for increase, in which case she must be infested with them.

IF he makes her for preservation, she may be quiet at home; but will be in danger abroad. First, Because her foundation must be narrow, and therfore weak, as that of Lacedemon, which lay but upon 30000 citizens; or that of Venice, which lys but upon 3000. Secondly, Such a commonwealth must either be in peace, or war: if she be in peace, the few are soonest effeminated and corrupted, and so obnoxious also to faction. If in war, succeding ill, she is an easy prey; or succeding well, ruin’d by increase: a weight which her foundation is not able to bear. For Lacedemon, when she had made her self mistriss, upon the matter, of all Greece, thro a slight accident, the rebellion of Thebes, occasion’d by the conspiracy of Pelopidas discovering this infirmity of her nature, the rest of her conquer’d citys immediatly fell off, and in the turn as it were of a band reduc’d her from the fullest tide to the lowest eb of her fortune. And Venice having possest her self of a great part of Italy by her purse, was no sooner in defence of it put to the trial of arms, than she lost all in one battel.

WHENCE I conclude, that in the ordination of a commonwealth a legislator is to think upon that which is most honourable; and laying aside models for preservation, to follow the example of Rome conniving at, and temporizing with the enmity between the senat and the people, as a necessary step to the Roman greatness. For that any man should find out a balance that may take in the conveniences, and shut out the inconveniences of both, I do not think it possible. These are the words of the author, tho the method be somewhat alter’d, to the end that I may the better turn them to my purpose.

My Lords, I do not know how you hearken to this sound; but to hear the greatest artist in the modern world, giving sentence against our commonwealth, is that with which I am nearly concern’d. Wherfore, with all honor due to the prince of politicians, let us examin his reasoning with the same liberty which he has asserted to be the right of a free people. But we shall never com up to him, except by taking the business a little lower, we descend from effects to their causes. The causes of commotion in a commonwealth are either external or internal. External are from enemys, from subjects, or from servants. To dispute then what was the cause why Rome was infested by the Italian, or by the servil wars; why the slaves took the capitol; why the Lacedemonians were near as frequently troubl’d with their helots, as Rome with all those; or why Venice, whose situation is not trusted to the faith of men, has as good or better quarter with them whom she governs, than Rome had with the Latins; were to dispute upon external causes. The question put by Machiavel is of internal causes; whether the enmity that was between the senat and the people of Rome might have bin remov’d. And to determin otherwise of this question than he dos, I must lay down other principles than he has don. To which end I affirm, that a commonwealth internally consider’d, is either equal or inequal. A commonwealth that is internally equal, has no internal cause of commotion, and therfore can have no such effect but from without. A commonwealth internally inequal has no internal cause of quiet, and therfore can have no such effect but by diversion.

To prove my assertions, I shall at this time make use of no other than his examples. Lacedemon was externally unquiet, because she was externally inequal, that is as to her belots; and she was internally at rest, because she was equal in her self, both in root and branch: in the root by her agrarian, and in branch by the senat, inasmuch as no man was therto qualify’d, but by election of the people.Arist. Polit. b. 2. Which institution of Lycurgus is mention’d by Aristotle, where he says, that rendering his citizens emulous (not careless) of that honor, he assign’d to the people the election of the senat. Wherfore Machiavel in this, as in other places, having his ey upon the division of Patrician and Plebeian familys as they were in Rome, has quite mistaken the orders of this commonwealth, where there was no such thing. Nor did the quiet of it derive from the power of the kings, who were so far from shielding the people from the injury of the nobility, of which there was none in his sense but the senat, that one declar’d end of the senat at the institution was to shield the people from the kings, who from that time had but single votes. Neither did it procede from the straitness of the senat, or their keeping the people excluded from the government, that they were quiet, but from the equality of their administration, seeing the senat (as is plain by the oracle, their fundamental law) had no more than the debate, and the result of the commonwealth belong’d to the people. Wherfore when Theopompus and Polydorus kings of Lacedemon, would have kept the people excluded from the government, by adding to the antient law this clause, If the determination of the people be faulty, it shall be lawful for the senat to resume the debate; the people immediately became unquiet, and resum’d that debate, which ended not till they had set up their ephors, and caus’d that magistracy to be confirm’d by their kings.* For when Theopompus first ordain’d that the ephori or overseers should be created at Lacedemon, to be such a restraint upon the kings there as the tribuns were upon the consuls at Rome, the queen complain’d to him, that by this means he transmitted the royal authority greatly diminisk’d to his children: I leave indeed less, answer’d he, but more lasting. And this was excellently said; for that power only is safe which is limited from doing hurt. Theopompus therfore, by confining the kingly power within the bounds of the laws, did recommend it by so much to the people’s affection, as he remov’d it from being arbitrary. By which it may appear, that a commonwealth for preservation, if she coms to be inequal, is as obnoxious to enmity between the senat and the people, as a commonwealth for increase; and that the tranquillity of Lacedemon was deriv’d from no other cause than her equality.

For Venice, to say that she is quiet because she disarms her subjects, is to forget that Lacedemon disarm’d her helots, and yet could not in their regard be quiet; wherfore if Venice be defended from external causes of commotion, it is first thro her situation, in which respect her subjects have no hope (and this indeed may be attributed to her fortune); and, secondly, thro her exquisit justice, whence they have no will to invade her. But this can be attributed to no other cause than her prudence; which will appear to be greater, as we look nearer; for the effects that procede from fortune, if there be any such thing, are like their cause, inconstant. But there never happen’d to any other commonwealth so undisturb’d and constant a tranquillity and peace in her self, as is in that of Venice; wherfore this must procede from som other cause than chance. And we see that as she is of all others the most quiet, so the most equal commonwealth. Her body consists of one order, and her senat is like a rolling stone, as was said, which never did, nor, while it continues upon that rotation, never shall gather the moss of a divided or ambitious interest; much less such a one as that which grasp’d the people of Rome in the talons of their own eagles. And if Machiavel, averse from doing this commonwealth right, had consider’d her orders, as his reader shall easily perceive he never did, he must have bin so far from attributing the prudence of them to chance, that he would have touch’d up his admirable work to that perfection, which, as to the civil part, has no pattern in the universal world but this of Venice.

Rome, secure by her potent and victorious arms from all external causes of commotion, was either beholden for her peace at home to her enemys abroad, or could never rest her head. My LORDS, you that are parents of a commonwealth, and so freer agents than such as are merely natural, have a care. For, as no man shall shew me a commonwealth born streight, that ever became crooked; so, no man shall shew me a commonwealth born crooked, that ever became streight. Rome was crooked in her birth, or rather prodigious. Her twins the Patricians and Plebeian orders came, as was shewn by the foregoing story, into the world, one body but two heads, or rather two bellys: for, notwithstanding the fable out of Æsop, wherby Menenius Agrippa the orator that was sent from the senat to the people at mount Aventin, shew’d the fathers to be the belly, and the people to be the arms and the legs (which except that, how slothful soever it might seem, they were nourish’d, not these only, but the whole body must languish and be dissolv’d) it is plain, that the fathers were a distinct belly; such a one as took the meat indeed out of the people’s mouths, but abhorring the agrarian, return’d it not in the due and necessary nutrition of a commonwealth. Nevertheless, as the people that live about the cataracts of Nilus are said not to hear the noise, so neither the Roman writers, nor Machiavel the most conversant with them, seem among so many of the tribunitian storms, to hear their natural voice: for tho they could not miss of it so far as to attribute them to the strife of the people for participation in magistracy, or, in which Machiavel more particularly joins, to that about the agrarian; this was to take the business short, and the remedy for the disease.

A people, when they are reduc’d to misery and despair, becom their own politicians, as certain beasts when they are sick becom their own physicians, and are carry’d by a natural instinct to the desire of such herbs as are their proper cure; but the people, for the greater part, are beneath the beasts in the use of them. Thus the people of Rome, tho in their misery they had recourse by instinct, as it were, to the two main fundamentals of a commonwealth, participation of magistracy, and the agrarian, did but tast and spit at them, not (which is necessary in physic) drink down the potion, and in that their healths. For when they had obtain’d participation of magistracy, it was but lamely, not to a full and equal rotation in all elections; nor did they greatly regard it in what they had got. And when they had attain’d to the agrarian, they neglected it so far as to suffer the law to grow obsolete: but if you do not take the due dose of your medicins (as there be slight tasts which a man may have of philosophy that incline to atheism) it may chance to be poison, there being a like tast of the politics that inclines to confusion, as appears in the institution of the Roman tribuns, by which magistracy and no more, the people were so far from attaining to peace, that they in getting but so much, got but heads for an eternal feud; wheras if they had attain’d in perfection either to the agrarian, they had introduc’d the equality and calm of Lacedemon, or to rotation, and they had introduc’d that of Venice: and so there could have bin no more enmity between the senat and the people of Rome, than there was between those orders in Lacedemon, or is now in Venice. Wherfore Machiavel seems to me, in attributing the peace of Venice more to her luck than her prudence, of the whole stable to have saddled the wrong horse; for tho Rome* in her military part could beat it better, beyond all comparison, upon the sounding hoof, Venice for the civil part has plainly had the wings of Pegasus.

The whole question then will come upon this point, Whether the people of Rome could have obtain’d these orders? and first, to say, that they could not have obtain’d them without altering the commonwealth, is no argument; seeing neither could they, without altering the commonwealth, have obtain’d their tribuns, which nevertheless were obtain’d. And if a man considers the posture that the people were in when they obtain’d their tribuns, they might as well, and with as great ease (forasmuch as the reason why the nobility yielded to the tribuns was no other, than that there was no remedy) have obtain’d any thing else. And for experience, it was in the like case that the Lacedemonians did set up their ephors, and the Athenians after the battel of Plateæ bow’d the senat (so hard a thing it is for a commonwealth that was born crooked to becom streight) as much the other way. Nor, if it be objected, that this must have ruin’d the nobility (and in that depriv’d the commonwealth of the greatness which she acquir’d by them) is this opinion holding; but confuted by the sequel of the story, shewing plainly, that the nobility thro the defect of such orders, that is to say, of rotation and the agrarian, came to eat up the people: and battening themselves in luxury, to be, as Salust speaks of them, a most sluggish and lazy nobility, in whom, besides the name, there was no more than in a statue; and to bring so mighty a commonwealth, and of so huge a glory, to so deplorable an end. Wherfore means might have bin found to remove the enmity that was between the senat and the people of Rome.

My lords, If I have argu’d well, I have given you the comfort and assurance, that notwithstanding the judgment of Machiavel, your commonwealth is both safe and sound: but if I have not argu’d well, then take the comfort and assurance which he gives you while he is firm, That a legislator is to lay aside all other examples, and follow that of Rome only, conniving and temporizing with the enmity between the senat and the people, as a necessary step to the Roman greatness. Whence it follows, that your commonwealth, at the worst, is that which he has given you his word is the best.

I have held your lordships long, but upon an account of no small importance, which I can now sum up in these few words: Where there is a liquorishness in a popular assembly to debate, it proceeds not from the constitution of the people, but of the commonwealth. Now that your commonwealth is of such a constitution as is naturally free from this kind of intemperance, is that which, to make good, I must divide the remainder of my discourse into two parts.

The first, shewing the several constitutions of the assemblys of the people in other commonwealths.

The second, comparing our assembly of the people with theirs; and shewing how it excludes the inconveniences, and embraces the conveniences of them all.

In the beginning of the first part I must take notice, that among the popular errors of our days it is no small one, that men imagin the antient governments of this kind to have consisted for the most part of one city, that is, of one town; wheras by what we have learnt of my lords that open’d them, it appears that there was not any considerable one of such a constitution but Carthage, till this in our days of Venice.

For to begin with Israel, it consisted of the twelve tribes, locally spread or quarter’d throout the whole territory; and these being call’d together by trumpets, constituted the church or assembly of the people. The vastness of this weight, as also the slowness thence inavoidable, became a great cause (as has bin shewn at large by my lord Phosphorus) of the breaking that commonwealth; notwithstanding that the temple, and those religious ceremonys for which the people were at least annually oblig’d to repair thither, were no small ligament of the tribes, otherwise but slightly tack’d together.

Athens consisted of four tribes, taking in the whole people both of the city and of the territory; not so gather’d by Theseus into one town, as to exclude the country, but to the end that there might be som capital of the commonwealth: tho true it be, that the congregation consisting of the inhabitants within the walls, was sufficient to all intents and purposes, without those of the country. These also being exceding numerous, became burdensom to themselves, and dangerous to the commonwealth; the more for their ill education, as is observ’d by Xenophon and Polybius, who compare them to mariners that in a calm are perpetually disputing and swaggering one with another, and never lay their hands to the common tackling or safety, till they be all indanger’d by som storm. Which caus’d Thucydides, when he saw this people thro the purchase of their misery becom so much wiser, as to reduce their comitia or assemblys to five thousand, to say in his eighth book; And now, at least in my time, the Athenians seem to have order’d their state aright, consisting of a moderat temper both of the few (by which he means the senat of the bean) and of the many, or the five thousand. And he does not only give you his judgment, but the best proof of it; for this, says he, was the first thing that, after so many misfortunes past, made the city again to raise her head. The place I would desire your lordships to note, as the first example that I find, or think is to be found, of a popular assembly by way of representative.

Lacedemon consisted of thirty thousand citizens dispers’d throout Laconia, one of the greatest provinces in all Greece, and divided, as by som authors is probable, into six tribes. Of the whole body of these, being gather’d, consisted the great church or assembly, which had the legislative power; the little church, gather’d somtimes for matters of concern within the city, consisted of the Spartans only. These happen’d, like that of Venice, to be good constitutions of a congregation, but from an ill cause the infirmity of a commonwealth, which thro her paucity was oligarchical.

Wherfore, go which way you will, it should seem, that without a representative of the people, your commonwealth consisting of a whole nation, can never avoid falling either into oligarchy or confusion.

This was seen by the Romans, whose rustic tribes extending themselves from the river Arno to the Vulturnus, that is, from Fesulæ or Florence to Capua, invented a way of representative by lots: the tribe upon which the first fell, being the prerogative; and som two or three more that had the rest, the jure vocatæ. These gave the suffrage of the commonwealth in* two meetings; the prerogative at the first assembly, and the jure vocatæ at a second.

Now to make the parallel, all the inconveniences that you have observ’d in these assemblys are shut out, and all the conveniences taken into your prerogative. For first, it is that for which Athens, shaking off the blame of Xenophon and Polybius, came to deserve the praise of Thucydides, a representative. And, secondly, not as I suspect in that of Athens, and is past suspicion in this of Rome, by lot, but by suffrage, as was also the late house of commons, by which means in your prerogatives all the tribes of Oceana are jure vocatæ; and if a man shall except against the paucity of the standing number, it is a wheel, which in the revolution of a few years turns every hand that is fit, or fits every hand that it turns to the public work. Moreover, I am deceiv’d if upon due consideration it dos not fetch your tribes, with greater equality and ease to themselves and to the government, from the frontiers of Marpesia, than Rome ever brought any one of hers out of her pomæria, or the nearest parts of her adjoining territorys. To this you may add, That wheras a commonwealth, which in regard of the people is not of facility in execution, were sure enough in this nation to be cast off thro impatience; your musters and galaxys are given to the people, as milk to babes, wherby when they are brought up thro four days election in a whole year (one at the parish, one at the hundred, and two at the tribe) to their strongest meat, it is of no harder digestion, than to give their negative or affirmative as they see cause. There be gallant men among us that laugh at such an appeal or umpire; but I refer it whether you be more inclining to pardon them or me, who I confess have been this day laughing at a sober man, but without meaning him any harm, and that is Petrus Cunæus, where speaking of the nature of the people, he says, that taking them apart, they are very simple, but yet in their assemblys they see and know somthing: and so runs away without troubling himself with what that somthing is. Wheras the people, taken apart, are but so many privat interests; but if you take them together, they are the public interest. The public interest of a commonwealth, as has bin shewn, is nearest that of mankind, and that of mankind is right reason; but with aristocracy (whose reason or interest, when they are all together, as appear’d by the Patricians, is but that of a party) it is quite contrary: for as, taken apart, they are far wiser than the people consider’d in that manner; so being put together, they are such fools, who by deposing the people, as did those of Rome, will saw off the branch wherupon they sit, or rather destroy the root of their own greatness. Wherfore Machiavel following Aristotle, and yet going before him, may well assert,* That the people are wiser and more constant in their resolutions than a prince: which is the prerogative of popular government for wisdom. And hence it is that the prerogative of your commonwealth, as for wisdom so for power, is in the people: which (tho I am not ignorant that the Roman prerogative was so call’d à prærogando, because their suffrage was first ask’d) gives the denomination to your prerogative tribe.”

The elections, whether annual or triennial, being shewn by the twenty-second, that which coms in the next place to be consider’d is

23 Order. The constitution, function, and manner of proceding of the prerogative.The twenty-third ORDER, shewing the power, function, and manner of proceding of the prerogative tribe.

THE power or function of the prerogative is of two parts, the one of result, in which it is the legislative power; the other of judicature, in which regard it is the highest court, and the last appeal in this commonwealth.

FOR the former part (the people by this constitution being not oblig’d by any law that is not of their own making or confirmation, by the result of the prerogative, their equal representative) it shall not be lawful for the senat to require obedience from the people, nor for the people to give obedience to the senat in or by any law that has not bin promulgated, or printed and publish’d for the space of six weeks; and afterwards propos’d by the authority of the senat to the prerogative tribe, and resolv’d by the major vote of the same in the affirmative. Nor shall the senat have any power to levy war, men, or mony, otherwise than by the consent of the people so given, or by a law so enacted, except in cases of exigence, in which it is agreed, that the power both of the senat and the people shall be in the dictator, so qualify’d, and for such a term of time, as is according to that constitution already prescrib’d. While a law is in promulgation, the censors shall animadvert upon the senat, and the tribuns upon the people, that there be no laying of heads together, no conventicles or canvassing to carry on or oppose any thing; but that all may be don in a free and open way.

FOR the latter part of the power of the prerogative, or that wherby they are the supreme judicatory of this nation, and of the provinces of the same, the cognizances of crimes against the majesty of the people, such as high treason, as also of peculat, that is, robbery of the treasury, or defraudation of the commonwealth, appertains to this tribe. And if any person or persons, provincials or citizens, shall appeal to the people, it belongs to the prerogative to judg and determin the case; provided that if the appeal be from any court of justice in this nation or the provinces, the appellant shall first deposit a hundred pounds in the court from which he appeals, to be forfeited to the same, if he be cast in his suit by the people. But the power of the council of war being the expedition of this commonwealth, and the martial law of the strategus in the field, are those only from which there shall ly no appeal to the people.

THE proceding of the prerogative in case of a proposition, is to be thus order’d. The magistrats, proposing by authority of the senat, shall rehearse the whole matter, and expound it to the people: which don, they shall put the whole together to the suffrage, with three boxes, the negative, the affirmative, and the nonsincere: and the suffrage being return’d to the tribuns, and number’d in the presence of the proposers, if the major vote be in the nonsincere, the proposers shall desist, and the senat shall resume the debate. If the major vote be in the negative, the proposers shall desist, and the senat too. But if the major vote be in the affirmative, then the tribe is clear, and the proposers shall begin and put the whole matter, with the negative and the affirmative (leaving out the nonsincere) by clauses; and the suffrages being taken and number’d by the tribuns in the presence of the proposers, shall be written and reported by the tribuns to the senat. And that which is propos’d by the authority of the senat, and confirm’d by the command of the people, is the law of Oceana.

THE proceding of the prerogative in a case of judicature is to be thus order’d. The tribuns being auditors of all causes appertaining to the cognizance of the people, shall have notice of the suit or trial, whether of appeal or otherwise, that is to be commenc’d; and if any one of them shall accept of the same, it appertains to him to introduce it. A cause being introduc’d, and the people muster’d or assembl’d for the decision of the same, the tribuns are presidents of the court, having power to keep it to orders, and shall be seated upon a scaffold erected in the middle of the tribe. Upon the right hand shall stand a seat, or large pulpit assign’d to the plaintiff, or the accuser; and, upon the left, another for the defendant, each if they please with his council. And the tribuns (being attended upon such occasions with so many ballotins, secretarys, doorkeepers, and messengers of the senat as shall be requisit) one of them shall turn up a glass of the nature of an hourglass, but such a one as is to be of an hour and a half’s running; which being turn’d up, the party or council on the right hand may begin to speak to the people. If there be papers to be read, or witnesses to be examin’d, the officer shall lay the glass sideways till the papers be read, and the witnesses examin d, and then turn it up again; and so long as the glass is running, the party on the right hand has liberty to speak, and no longer. The party on the right hand having had his time, the like shall be don in every respect for the party on the left. And the cause being thus heard, the tribuns shall put the question to the tribe with a white, a black, and a red box (or nonsincere) whether guilty, or not guilty. And if the suffrage being taken, the major vote be in the nonsincere, the cause shall be reheard upon the next juridical day following, and put to the question in the same manner. If the major vote coms the second time in the nonsincere, the cause shall be heard again upon the third day; but at the third hearing the question shall be put without the nonsincere. Upon the first of the three days in which the major vote coms in the white box, the party accus’d is absolv’d; and upon the first of them in which it coms in the black box, the party accus’d is condemn’d. The party accus’d being condemn’d, the tribuns (if the case be criminal) shall put with the white and the black box these questions, or such of them, as, regard had to the case, they shall conceive most proper.

  • 1.  WHETHER he shall have a writ of case.
  • 2.  WHETHER he shall be fin’d so much, or so much.
  • 3.  WHETHER he shall be confiscated.
  • 4.  WHETHER he shall be render’d incapable of magistrecy.
  • 5.  WHETHER he shall be banish’d.
  • 6.  WHETHER he shall be put to death.

THESE, or any three of these questions, whether simple or such as shall be thought fitly mix’d, being put by the tribuns, that which has most above half the votes in the black box is the sentence of the people, which the troop of the third classis is to see executed accordingly.

BUT wheras by the constitution of this commonwealth it may appear that neither the propositions of the senat, nor the judicature of the people, will be so frequent as to hold the prerogative in continual imployment; the senat, a main part of whose office it is to teach and instruct the people, shall duly (if they have no greater affairs to divert them) cause an oration to be made to the prerogative by som knight or magistrat of the senat, to be chosen out of the ablest men, and from time to time appointed by the orator of the house, in the great hall of the pantheon, while the parlament resides in the town; or in some grove or sweet place in the field, while the parlament for the heat of the year shall reside in the country; upon every Tuesday, morning or afternoon.

AND the orator appointed for the time to this office, shall first repeat the orders of the commonwealth with all possible brevity; and then making choice of one or som part of it, discourse therof to the people. An oration or discourse of this nature, being afterwards perus’d by the council of state, may as they see cause be printed and publish’d.

The Archon’s comment upon the order I find to have bin of this sense:

My lords,

“TO crave pardon for a word or two in farther explanation of what was read, I shall briefly shew how the constitution of this tribe or assembly answers to their function; and how their function, which is of two parts, the former in the result or legislative power, the latter in the supreme judicature of the commonwealth, answers to their constitution. Machiavel has a discourse, where he puts the question, Whether the guard of liberty may with more security be committed to the nobility, or to the people? Which doubt of his arises thro the want of explaining his terms; for the guard of liberty can signify nothing else but the result of the commonwealth: so that to say, that the guard of liberty may be committed to the nobility, is to say, that the result may be committed to the senat, in which case the people signify nothing. Now to shew it was a mistake to affirm it to have bin thus in Lacedemon, sufficient has bin spoken; and wheras he will have it to be so in Venice also,* They, says Contarini, in whom resides the supreme power of the whole commonwealth, and of the laws, and upon whose orders depends the authority as well of the senat as of all the other magistrats, is the GREAT COUNCIL. It is institutively in the great council, by the judgment of all that know that commonwealth; tho for the reasons shewn, it be somtimes exercis’d by the senat. Nor need I run over the commonwealths in this place for the proof of a thing so doubtless, and such as has bin already made so apparent, as that the result of each was in the popular part of it. The popular part of yours, or the prerogative tribe, consists of seven deputys (wherof three are of the horse) annually elected out of every tribe of Oceana; which being fifty, amounts to one hundred and fifty horse, and two hundred foot. And the prerogative consisting of three of these lists, consists of four hundred and fifty horse, and six hundred foot, besides those of the provinces to be hereafter mention’d; by which means the overbalance in the suffrage remaining to the foot by one hundred and fifty votes, you have to the support of a true and natural aristocracy, the deepest root of a democracy that has bin ever planted. Wherfore there is nothing in art or nature better qualify’d for the result than this assembly. It is noted out of Cicero by Machiavei, That the people, tho they are not so prone to find out truth of themselves, as to follow custom, or run into error; yet if they be shewn truth, they not only acknowledge and imbrace it very suddenly, but are the most constant and faithful guardians and conservators of it. It is your duty and office, wherto you are also qualify’d by the orders of this commonwealth, to have the people as you have your hauks and greyhounds, in leases and slips, to range the fields, and beat the bushes for them; for they are of a nature that is never good at this sport, but when you spring or start their proper quarry. Think not that they will stand to ask you what it is, or less know it than your hauks and greyhounds do theirs; but presently make such a flight or course, that a huntsman may as well undertake to run with his dogs, or a falconer to fly with his hauk, as an aristocracy at this game to compare with the people. The people of Rome were possest of no less a prey than the empire of the world, when the nobility turn’d tails, and perch’d among daws upon the tower of monarchy. For tho they did not all of them intend the thing, they would none of them indure the remedy, which was the agrarian.

But the prerogative tribe has not only the result, but is the supreme judicature, and the ultimat appeal in this commonwealth. For the popular government that makes account to be of any standing, must make sure in the first place of the appeal to the people. As an estate in trust becoms a man’s own, if he be not answerable for it, so the power of a magistracy not accountable to the people, from whom it was receiv’d, becoming of privat use, the commonwealth loses her liberty. Wherfore the right of supreme judicature in the people (without which there can be no such thing as popular government) is confirm’d by the constant practice of all commonwealths; as that of Israel in the cases of Achan, and of the tribe of Benjamin, adjudg’d by the congregation. The dicasterian or court call’d the heliaia in Athens, which (the comitia of that commonwealth consisting of the whole people, and so being too numerous to be a judicatory) was constituted somtimes of five hundred, at others of one thousand, or, according to the greatness of the cause, of fifteen hundred, elected by the lot out of the whole body of the people, had with the nine Archons that were presidents, the cognizance of such causes as were of highest importance in that state. The five ephors in Lacedemon, which were popular magistrats, might question their kings, as appears by the cases of Pausanias, and of Agis, who being upon his trial in this court, was cry’d to by his mother to appeal to the people, as Plutarch has it in his life. The tribuns of the people of Rome (like, in the nature of their magistracy, and for som time in number, to the ephors, as being, according to Halicarnasseus and Plutarch, instituted in imitation of them) had power* to summon any man, his magistracy at least being expir’d (for from the dictator there lay no appeal) to answer for himself to the people. As in the case of Coriolanus, who was going about to force the people, by withholding corn from them in a famin, to relinquish the magistracy of the tribuns; in that of Spurius Cassius for affecting tyranny; of Marcus Sergius for running away at Veii; of Caius Lucretius for spoiling his province; of Junius Silanus for making war, without a command from the people, against the Cimbri; with divers others. And the crimes of this nature were call’d læsæ majestatis, or high treason. Examples of such as were arrain’d or try’d for peculat, or defraudation of the commonwealth, were Marcus Curius, for intercepting the mony of the Samnits; Salinator, for the inequal division of spoils to his soldiers; Marcus Posthumius, for cheating the commonwealth by a feign’d shipwreck. Causes of these two kinds were of a more public nature; but the like power upon appeals was also exercis’d by the people in privat matters, even during the time of the kings; as in the case of Horatius. Nor is it otherwise with Venice, where the doge Loredano was sentenc’d by the great council; and Antonio Grimani, afterwards doge, question’d, for that he being admiral had suffer’d the Turc to take Lepanto in view of his fleet.

Nevertheless, there lay no appeal from the Roman dictator to the people; which if there had, might have cost the commonwealth dear, when Spurius Melius affecting empire, circumvented and debauch’d the tribuns: wherupon Titus Quintus Cincinnatus was created dictator; who having chosen Servilius Ahala to be his lieutenant, or magister equitum, sent him to apprehend Melius, whom, while he disputed the commands of the dictator, and implor’d the aid of the people, Ahala cut off upon the place. By which example you may see in what cases the dictator may prevent the blow which is ready somtimes to fall e’er the people be aware of the danger. Wherefore there lys no appeal from the dieci, or the council of ten, in Venice, to the great council, nor from our council of war to the people. For the way of proceding of this tribe, or the ballot, it is, as was once said for all, Venetian.

This discourse of judicatorys wherupon we are faln, brings us rather naturally than of design from the two general orders of every commonwealth, that is to say, from the debating part or the senat, and the resolving part or the people, to the third, which is the executive part or the magistracy, wherupon I shall have no need to dwell: for the executive magistrats of this commonwealth are the strategus in arms; the signory in their several courts, as the chancery, the exchequer; as also the councils in divers cases within their instructions; the censors as well in their proper magistracy, as in the council of religion; the tribuns in the government of the prerogative, and that judicatory; and the judges with their courts: of all which so much is already said or known as may suffice.

The Tuesday lectures or orations to the people will be of great benefit to the senat, the prerogative, and the whole nation. To the senat, because they will not only teach your senators elocution, but keep the system of the government in their memorys. Elocution is of great use to your senators; for if they do not understand rhetoric (giving it at this time for granted, that the art were not otherwise good) and com to treat with, or vindicat the cause of the commonwealth against som other nation that is good at it, the advantage will be subject to remain upon the merit of the art, and not upon the merit of the cause. Fucthermore, the genius or soul of this government being in the whole and in every part, they will never be of ability in determination upon any particular, unleis at the same time they have an idea of the whole. That this therfore muit be, in that regard, of equal benefit to the prerogative, is plain; tho these have a greater concernment in it. For this commonwealth is the estate of the people: and a man, you know, tho he be virtuous, yet if he dos not understand his estate, may run out or be cheated of it. Last of all, the treasures of the politics will by this means be so open’d, rifled, and dispers’d, that this nation will as soon dote, like the Indians, upon glass beads, as disturb your government with whimsys and freaks of motherwit; or suffer themselves to be stutter’d out of their libertys. There is not any reason why your grandees, your wise men of this age, that laugh out and openly at a commonwealth as the most ridiculous thing, do not appear to be, as in this regard they are, mere idiots, but that the people have not eys.

There remains no more relating to the senat and the people than

24 Order. Constitution of the provincial part of the senat and the people.The twenty-fourth ORDER, wherby it is lawful for the province of Marpesia to have 30 knights of their own election continually present in the senat of Oceana, together with 60 deputys of horse, and 120 of foot in the prerogative tribe, indu’d with equal power (respect had to their quality and number) in the debate and result of this commonwealth: provided that they observe the course or rotation of the same by the annual return of 10 knights, 20 deputys of the horse, and 40 of the foot. The like in all respects is lawful for Panopea; and the horse of both the provinces amounting to one troop, and the foot to one company, one captain and one cornet of the horse shall be annually chosen by Marpesia, and one captain and one ensign of the foot shall be annually chosen by Panopea.

The orb of the prerogative being thus complete, is not unnaturally compar’d to that of the moon, either in consideration of the light borrow’d from the senat, as from the sun; or of the ebs and stoods of the people, which are mark’d by the negative or affirmative of this tribe.Constitution of the parlament. And the constitution of the senat and the people being shewn, you have that of the parlament of Oceana, consisting of the senat proposing, and of the people resolving; which amounts to an act of parlament. So the parlament is the heart, which, consisting of two ventricles, the one greater and replenish’d with a grosser matter, the other less and full of a purer, sucks in, and spouts forth the vital blood of Oceana by a perpetual circulation. Wherfore the life of this government is no more unnatural or obnoxious upon this score to dissolution, than that of a man; nor to giddiness than the world: seeing the earth, whether it be it self or the heavens that are in rotation, is so far from being giddy, that it could not subsist without motion. But why should not this government be much rather capable of duration and steddiness by motion? than which God has ordain’d no other to the universal commonwealth of mankind: seeing one generation coms, and another gos, but the earth remains firm for ever; that is, in her proper situation or place, whether she be mov’d or not mov’d upon her proper center. The senat, the people, and the magistracy, or the parlament so constituted, as you have seen, is the guardian of this commonwealth, and the husband of such a wife as is elegantly describ’d by Solomon.Prov. 31. She is like the merchant’s ships; she brings her food from far. She considers a field; and buys it: with the fruit of her hands she plants a vineyard. She perceives that her merchandize is good. She stretches forth her hands to the poor. She is not afraid of the snow for her houshold; for all her houshold are cloth’d with scarlet. She makes her self coverings of tapestry; her clothing is silk and purple. Her husband is known (by his robes) in the gates, when he sits among the senators of the land. The gates, or inferior courts, were branches as it were of the sanhedrim or senat of Israel. Nor is our commonwealth a worse houswife, or she has less regard to her magistrats; as may appear by

25 Order.The twenty-fifth ORDER: That, wheras the public revenue is thro the late civil wars dilapidated, the excise, being improv’d or improvable to the revenue of one million, be apply’d for the space of eleven years to com, to the reparation of the same, and for the present maintenance of the magistrats, knights, deputys, and other officers, who, according to their several dignitys and functions, shall annually receive towards the support of the same, as follows:

The lord strategus marching, is, upon another account, to have field pay as general.

lib. per ann.
THE lord strategus sitting 2000
THE lord orator 2000
THE three commissioners of the seal 4500
THE three commissioners of the treasury 4500
THE two censors 3000
THE 290 knights, at 500 l. a man. 145000
THE 4 embassadors in ordinary 12000
THE council of war for intelligence 3000
THE master of the ceremonys 500
THE master of the horse 500
HIS substitute 150
THE 12 ballotins for their winter liverys 240
FOR their summer liverys 120
FOR their board-wages 480
FOR the keeping of three coaches of state, 24 coach-horses, with coachmen and postilions 1500
FOR the grooms, and keeping of 16 great horses for the master of the horse, and for the ballotins whom he is to govern and instruct in the art of riding 480
THE 20 secretarys of the parlament 2000
THE 20 doorkeepers, who are to attend with poleaxes; for their coats 200
FOR their board-wages 1000
THE 20 messengers, which are trumpeters, for their coats 200
For their board wages 1000
FOR ornament of the musters of the youth 5000
Sum 189370

OUT of the personal estates of every man, who at his death bequeaths not above forty shillings to the muster of that hundred wherin it lys, shall be levy’d one per cent. till the solid revenue of the muster of the hundred amounts to 50 l. per annum for the prizes of the youth.

THE twelve ballotins are to be divided into three regions, according to the course of the senat; the four of the first region to be elected at the tropic out of such children as the knights of the same shall offer, not being under eleven years of age, nor above thirteen. And their election shall be made by the lot at an urn set by the serjeant of the house for that purpose in the hall of the pantheon. The livery of the commonwealth for the fashion or the color may be chang’d at the election of the strategus according to his phansy. But every knight during his session shall be bound to give to his footman, or some one of his footmen, the livery of the commonwealth.

The prerogative tribe shall receive as follows:

lib. by the week.
THE 2 tribuns of the horse 14
THE 2 tribuns of the foot 12
THE 3 captains of horse 15
THE 3 cornets 9
THE 3 captains of foot 12
THE 3 ensigns 7
THE 442 horse, at 2 l. a man 884
THE 592 foot, at 1 l. 10 s. a man 888
THE 6 trumpeters 7 10s.
THE 3 drummers 2 5s.
SUM by the week 1850 15s.
SUM by the year 96239
THE total of the senat, the people, and the magistracy, 287459 15s.

THE dignity of the commonwealth, and aids of the several magistracys and offices therto belonging, being provided for as aforesaid, the overplus of the excise, with the product of the sum rising, shall be carefully manag’d by the senat and the people thro the diligence of the officers of the exchequer, till it amount to eight millions, or to the purchase of about four hundred thousand pounds solid revenue. At which time, the term of eleven years being expir’d, the excise, except it be otherwise order’d by the senat and the people, shall be totally remitted and abolish’d for ever.

At this institution the takes, as will better appear in the corollary, were abated about one half, which made the order when it came to be tasted, to be of good relish with the people in the very beginning; tho the advantages then were no ways comparable to the consequences to be hereafter shewn. Nevertheless, my lord Epimonus, who with much ado had bin held till now, found it midsummer moon, and broke out of bedlam in this manner:

My lord Archon,

I Have a singing in my head like that of a cartwheel, my brains are upon a rotation; and som are so merry, that a man cannot speak his griefs, but if your highshod prerogative, and those same slouching fellows your tribuns, do not take my lord strategus’s, and my lord orator’s heads, and jole them together under the canopy, then let me be ridiculous to all posterity. For here is a commonwealth, to which if a man should take that of the prentices in their ancient administration of justice at Shrovetide, it were an aristocracy. You have set the very rabble with troncheons in their hands, and the gentry of this nation, like cocks with scarlet gills, and the golden combs of their salarys to boot, lest they should not be thrown at.

Not a night can I sleep for som horrid apparition or other; one while these myrmidons are measuring silks by their quarterstaves; another stuffing their greasy pouches with my lord high treasurer’s jacobusses. For they are above a thousand in arms to three hundred, which, their gowns being pull’d over their ears, are but in their doublets and hose. But what do I speak of a thousand? there be two thousand in every tribe, that is, a hundred thousand in the whole nation, not only in the posture of an army, but in a civil capacity sufficient to give us what laws they please. Now every body knows, that the lower sort of people regard nothing but mony; and you say it is the duty of a legislator to presume all men to be wicked: wherfore they must fall upon the richer, as they are an army; or, lest their minds should misgive them in such a villany, you have given them incouragement that they have a nearer way, seeing it may be don every whit as well as by the overbalancing power which they have in elections. There is a fair which is annually kept in the center of these territorys at Kiberton, a town famous for ale, and frequented by good fellows; where there is a solemnity of the pipers and fidlers of this nation (I know not whether Lacedemon, where the senat kept account of the stops of the flutes and of the fiddle-strings of that commonwealth, had any such custom) call’d the bulrunning; and he that catches and holds the bull, is the annual and supreme magistrat of that comitia or congregation, call’d king piper; without whose licence it is not lawful for any of those citizens to injoy the liberty of his calling; nor is he otherwise legitimatly qualify’d (or civitate donatus) to lead apes or bears in any perambulation of the same. Mine host of the bear, in Kiberton, the father of ale, and patron of good footbal and cudgelplayers, has any time since I can remember, bin grand chancellor of this order. Now, say I, seeing great things arise from small beginnings, what should hinder the people, prone to their own advantage, and loving mony, from having intelligence convey’d to them by this same king piper and his chancellor, with their loyal subjects the minstrils and bearwards, masters of ceremonys, to which there is great recourse in their respective perambulations, and which they will commission and instruct, with directions to all the tribes, willing and commanding them, that as they with their own good, they chuse no other into the next primum mobile, but of the ablest cudgel and footbal-players? which don as soon as said, your primum mobile consisting of no other stuff, must of necessity be drawn forth into your nebulones, and your galimosrys; and so the silken purses of your senat and prerogative being made of sows ears, most of them blacksmiths, they will strike while the iron is hot, and beat your estates into hobnails; mine host of the bear being strategus, and king piper lord orator. Well, my lords, it might have bin otherwise exprest, but this is well enough a conscience. In your way, the wit of man shall not prevent this or the like inconvenience; but if this (for I have confer’d with artists) be a mathematical demonstration, I could kneel to you, that e’er it be too late we might return to som kind of sobriety.

If we empty our purses with these pomps, salarys, coaches, lacquys, and pages, what can the people say less, than that we have drest a senat and a prerogative for nothing, but to go to the park with the ladys?”

My lord Archon, whose meekness resembl’d that of Moses, vouchsaf’d this answer:

My lords,

“FOR all this, I can see my lord Epimonus every night in the park, and with ladys; nor do I blame this in a young man, or the respect which is and ought to be given to a sex that is one half of the commonwealth of mankind, and without which the other would be none: but our magistrats, I doubt, may be somwhat of the oldest to perform this part with much acceptation; and, as the Italian proverb says,* Servire & non gradire è cosa da far morire. Wherfore we will lay no certain obligation upon them in this point, but leave them, if it please you, to their own fate or discretion. But this (for I know my lord Epimonus loves me, tho I can never get his esteem) I will say, if he had a mistress should use him so, he would find it a sad life; or I appeal to your lordships, how I can resent it from such a friend, that he puts king piper’s politics in the balance with mine. King piper, I deny not, may teach his bears to dance, but they have the worst ear of all creatures. Now how he should make them keep time in fifty several tribes, and that two years together, for else it will be to no purpose, may be a small matter with my lord to promise; but it seems to me of impossible performance. First, thro the nature of the bean; and, secondly, thro that of the ballot; or how what he has hitherto thought so hard, is now com to be easy: but he may think, that for expedition they will eat up these balls like apples. However, there is so much more in their way by the constitution of this, than is to be found in that of any other commonwealth, that I am reconcil’d; it now appearing plainly, that the points of my lord’s arrows are directed at no other white, than to shew the excellency of our government above others; which, as he procedes further, is yet plainer; while he makes it appear, that there can be no other elected by the people but smiths,

Brontesque Steropesque & nudus membra Pyracmon:

Othoniel, Aod, Gideon, Jephtha, Samson, as in Israel: Miltiades, Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, as in Athens: Papyrius, Cincinnatus, Camillus, Fabius Scipio, as in Rome: smiths of the fortune of the commonwealth; not such as forg’d hob-nails, but thunderbolts. Popular elections are of that kind, that all the rest of the world is not able, either in number or glory, to equal those of these three commonwealths. These indeed were the ablest cudgel and footbal-players; bright arms were their cudgels, and the world was the ball that lay at their feet. Wherfore we are not so to understand the maxim of legislators, which holds all men to be wicked, as if it related to mankind or a commonwealth, the interests wherof are the only strait lines they have wherby to reform the crooked; but as it relates to every man or party, under what color soever he or they pretend to be trusted apart, with or by the whole. Hence then it is deriv’d, which is made good in all experience, that the aristocracy is ravenous, and not the people. Your highwaymen are not such as have trades, or have bin brought up to industry; but such commonly whose education has pretended to that of gentlemen. My lord is so honest, he does not know the maxims that are of absolute necessity to the arts of wickedness; for it is most certain, if there be not more purses than thieves, that the thieves themselves must be forc’d to turn honest, because they cannot thrive by their trade: but now if the people should turn thieves, who sees not that there would be more thieves than purses? wherfore that a whole people should turn robbers or levellers, is as impossible in the end as in the means. But that I do not think your artist which you mention’d, whether astronomer or arithmetician, can tell me how many barlycorns would reach to the sun; I could be content he were call’d to the account, with which I shall conclude this point: when by the way I have chid my lords the legislators, who, as if they doubted my tackling could not hold, would leave me to flag in a perpetual calm, but for my lord Epimonus, who breaths now and then into my sails, and stirs the waters. A ship makes not her way so briskly, as when she is handsomly brush’d by the waves, and tumbles over those that seem to tumble against her; in which case I have perceiv’d in the dark, that light has bin struck even out of the sea, as in this place, where my lord Epimonus seigning to give us a demonstration of one thing, has given it of another, and of a better. For the people of this nation, if they amount in each tribe to two thousand elders, and two thousand youths, upon the annual roll, holding a fifth to the whole tribe; then the whole of a tribe, not accounting women and children, must amount to twenty thousand; and so the whole of all the tribes being fifty, to one million. Now you have ten thousand parishes, and reckoning these one with another, each at one thousand pounds a year dry rent, the rent or revenue of the nation, as it is or might be let to farm, amounts to ten millions; and ten millions in revenue divided equally to one million of men, coms but to ten pounds a year to each wherwith to maintain himself, his wife and children. But he that has a cow upon the common, and earns his shilling by the day at his labor, has twice as much already as this would com to for his share; because if the land were thus divided, there would be no body to set him on work. So my lord Epimonus’s footman, who costs him thrice as much as one of these could thus get, would certainly lose by his bargain. What should we speak of those innumerable trades wherupon men live, not only better than others upon good shares of lands, but becom also purchasers of greater estates? is not this the demonstration which my lord meant, that the revenue of industry in a nation, at least in this, is three or fourfold greater than that of the mere rent? if the people then obstruct industry, they obstruct their own livelihood; but if they make a war, they obstruct industry. Take the bread out of the peoples mouths, as did the Roman Patricians, and you are sure enough of a war, in which case they may be levellers; but our agrarian causes their industry to flow with milk and hony. It will be own’d, that this is true, if the people were given* to understand their own happiness; but where is it they do that? let me reply with the like question, where do they not? they do not know their happiness it should seem in France, Spain and Italy: but teach them what it is, and try whose sense is the truer. As to the late wars in Germany, it has bin affirm’d to me there, that the princes could never make the people to take arms while they had bread, and have therfore suffer’d countrys now and then to be wasted, that they might get soldiers. This you will find to be the certain pulse and temper of the people; and if they have bin already prov’d to be the most wife and constant order of a government, why should we think (when no man can produce one example of the common soldiery in an army mutinying because they had not captains pay) that the prerogative should jole the heads of the senat together, because these have the better salarys; when it must be as evident to the people in a nation as to the soldiery in an army, that it is no more possible their emoluments of this kind should be afforded by any commonwealth in the world to be made equal with those of the senat, than that the common soldiers should be equal with the captains? it is enough for the common soldier, that his virtue may bring him to be a captain, and more to the prerogative, that each of them is nearer to be a senator.

If my lord thinks our salarys too great, and that the commonwealth is not houswife enough; whether is it better houswifery that she should keep her family from the snow, or suffer them to burn her house that they may warm themselves? for one of these must be. Do you think that she came off at a cheaper rate, when men had their rewards by a thousand, two thousand pounds a year in land of inheritance? if you say, that they will be more godly than they have bin, it may be ill taken; and if you cannot promise that, it is time we find out som way of stinting at least, if not curing them of that same sacra fames. On the other side, if a poor man (as such a one may save a city) gives his sweat to the public, with what conscience can you suffer his family in the mean time to starve? but he that lays his hand to this plow, shall not lose by taking it off from his own: and a commonwealth that will mend this, shall be penny wise. The sanhedrim of Israel being the supreme, and a constant court of judicature, could not chuse but be exceding gainful. The senat of the bean in Athens, because it was but annual, was moderatly salariated; but that of the areopagits being for life, bountifully: and what advantages the senators of Lacedemen had, where there was little mony or use of it, were in honors for life. The Patricians having no profit, took all. Venice being a situation, where a man goes but to the door for his imployment, the honor is great, and the reward very little: but in Holland a counsillor of state has fifteen hundred Flemish pounds a year, besides other accommodations. The states general have more. And that commonwealth looks nearer her penny than ours needs to do.

For the revenue of this nation, besides that of her industry, it amounts, as has bin shewn, to ten millions; and the salarys in the whole com not to three hundred thousand pounds a year. The beauty they will add to the commonwealth will be exceding great, and the people will delight in this beauty of their commonwealth; the incouragement they will give to the study of the public being very profitable, the accommodation they will afford to your magistrats very honorable and easy. And the sum, when it or twice as much was spent in hunting and housekeeping, was never any grievance to the people. I am asham’d to stand huckling upon this point; it is sordid. Your magistrats are rather to be provided with further accommodations. For what if there should be sickness? whither will you have them to remove? and this city in the soundest times, for the heat of the year, is no wholsom abode: have a care of their healths to whom you commit your own. I would have the senat and the people, except they see cause to the contrary, every first of June to remove into the country air for the space of three months. You are better fitted with summerhouses for them, than if you had built them to that purpose. There is som twelve miles distant the convallium upon the river Halcionia, for the tribuns and the prerogative, a palace capable of a thousand men: and twenty miles distant you have mount Celia, reverend as well for the antiquity as state of a castle completely capable of the senat: the proposers having lodgings in the convallium, and the tribuns in Celia, it holds the correspondency between the senat and the people exactly. And it is a small matter for the proposers, being attended with the coaches and officers of state, besides other conveniences of their own, to go a matter of five or ten miles (those seats are not much further distant) to meet the people upon any heath or field that shall be appointed: where, having dispatch’d their business, they may hunt their own venizon (for I would have the great wall’d park upon the Halcionia to belong to the signory, and those about the convallium to the tribuns) and so go to supper. Pray, my lords, see that they do not pull down these houses to sell the lead of them; for when you have consider’d on’t, they cannot be spar’d. The founders of the school in Hiera provided that the boys should have a summer seat. You should have as much care of these magistrats. But there is such a selling, such a Jewish humor in our republicans, that I cannot tell what to say to it; only this, any man that knows what belongs to a commonwealth, or how diligent every nation in that case has bin to preserve her ornaments, and shall see the wast lately made (the woods adjoining to this city, which serv’d for the delight and health of it, being cut down to be sold for three pence) will tell you, that they who did such things would never have made a commonwealth. The like may be said of the ruin or damage don upon our cathedrals, ornaments in which this nation excels all others. Nor shall this ever be excus’d upon the score of religion; for tho it be true that God dwells not in houses made with hands, yet you cannot hold your assemblys but in such houses, and these are of the best that have bin made with hands. Nor is it well argu’d that they are pompous, and therfore profane, or less proper for divine service; seeing the christians in the primitive church, chose to meet with one accord in the temple; so far were they from any inclination to pull it down.”

The orders of this commonwealth, so far, or near so far as they concern the elders, together with the several speeches at the institution, which may serve for the better understanding of them as so many commentaries, being shewn; I should now com from the elders to the youth, or from the civil constitution of this government to the military, but that I judg this the fittest place wherinto, by the way, to insert the government of the city, tho for the present but perfunctorily.

The government of Emporium.THE metropolis or capital city of Oceana is commonly call’d Emporium, tho it consists of two citys distinct, as well in name as in government, wherof the other is call’d Hiera: for which cause I shall treat of each apart, beginning with Emporium.

The city tribes and wards.Emporium with the libertys is under a twofold division, the one regarding the national, and the other the urban or city government. It is divided, in regard of the national government, into three tribes, and in respect of the urban into twenty-six, which for distinction sake are call’d wards, being contain’d under three tribes but inequally: wherfore the first tribe containing ten wards is call’d scazon, the second containing eight metoche, and the third containing as many telicouta: the bearing of which names in mind concerns the better understanding of the government.

Wardmote.EVERY ward has her wardmote, court, or inquest, consisting of all that are of the clothing or liverys of companys residing within the same.

The liverys.SUCH are of the livery or clothing as have attain’d to the dignity to wear gowns and particolor’d hoods or tippets, according to the rules and ancient customs of their respective companys.

The companys.A COMPANY is a brotherhood of tradesmen professing the same art, govern’d according to their charter by a master and wardens. Of these there be about sixty, wherof twelve are of greater dignity than the rest, that is to say, the mercers, grocers, drapers, fishmongers, goldsmiths, skinners, merchant-taylors, haberdashers, salters, ironmongers, vintners, clothworkers; which, with most of the rest, have common halls, divers of them being of antient and magnificent structure, wherin they have frequent meetings at the summons of their master or wardens for the managing and regulation of their respective trades and mysterys.Common halls. These companys, as I shall shew, are the roots of the whole government of the city. For the liverys that reside in the same ward, meeting at the wardmote inquest (to which it belongs to take cognizance of all sorts of nusances, and violations of the customs and orders of the city, and to present them to the court of aldermen) have also power to make election of two sorts of magistrats or officers; the first of elders or aldermen of the ward, the second of deputys of the same, otherwise call’d common-council men.

Election of aldermen, and of the common-council men.THE wards in these elections, because they do not elect all at once, but som one year, and som another, observe the distinction of the three tribes; for example, the scazon consisting of ten wards, makes election the first year of ten aldermen, one in each ward, and of one hundred and fifty deputys, fifteen in each ward: all which are triennial magistrats or officers, that is to say, are to bear their dignity for the space of three years.

THE second year the metoche, consisting of eight wards, elects eight aldermen, one in each ward, and a hundred and twenty deputys, fifteen in each ward; being also triennial magistrats.

THE third year telicouta, consisting of a like number of wards, elects an equal number of like magistrats for a like term. So that the whole number of the aldermen, according to that of the wards, amounts to twenty-six; and the whole number of the deputys, to three hundred and ninety.

The court of aldermen.THE aldermen thus elected have divers capacities: for, first, they are justices of the peace for the term, and in consequence of their election. Secondly, they are presidents of the wardmote, and governors each of that ward wherby he was elected. And last of all, these magistrats being assembled together, constitute the senat of the city, otherwise call’d the court of aldermen: but no man is capable of this election that is not worth ten thousand pounds. This court upon every new election, makes choice of nine censors out of their own number.

The common council.THE deputys in like manner being assembled together, constitute the prerogative tribe of the city, otherwise call’d the common council: by which means the senat and the people of the city were comprehended, as it were, by the motion of the national government, into the same wheel of annual, triennial, and perpetual revolution.

The common hall.BUT the liverys, over and above the right of these elections by their divisions mention’d, being assembled all together at the guild of the city, constitute another assembly call’d the common hall.

The election of the lord mayor and sheriffs.THE common hall has the right of two other elections; the one of the lord mayor, and the other of the two sheriffs, being annual magistrats. The lord mayor can be elected out of no other than one of the twelve companys of the first ranks; and the common hall agrees by the plurality of suffrages upon two names: which being presented to the lord mayor for the time being, and the court of aldermen, they elect one by their scrutiny; for so they call it, tho it differs from that of the commonwealth. The orator or assistant to the lord mayor in holding of his courts, is som able lawyer elected by the court of aldermen, and call’d the recorder of Emporium.

THE lord mayor being thus elected, has two capacitys; one regarding the nation, and the other the city. In that which regards the city, he is president of the court of aldermen, having power to assemble the same, or any other council of the city, as the common council or common hall, at his will and pleasure: and in that which regards the nation, he is commander in chief of the three tribes wherinto the city is divided; one of which he is to bring up in person at the national muster to the ballot, as his vicecomites, or high sheriffs, are to do by the other two, each at their distinct pavilion, where the nine aldermen, elected censors, are to officiat by three in each tribe, according to the rules and orders already given to the censors of the rustic tribes. And the tribes of the city have no other than one common phylarch, which is the court of aldermen and the common council; for which cause they elect not at their muster the first list call’d the prime magnitude.

Some conveniences in this alteration.THE conveniences of this alteration of the city government, besides the bent of it to a conformity with that of the nation, were many, wherof I shall mention but a few: as first, wheras men under the former administration, when the burden of som of these magistracys lay for life, were oftentimes chosen not for their fitness, but rather unfitness, or at least unwillingness to undergo such a weight, wherby they were put at great rates to fine for their ease; a man might now take his share in magistracy with that equity which is due to the public, and without any inconvenience to his privat affairs. Secondly, wheras the city (inasmuch as the acts of the aristocracy, or court of aldermen, in their former way of proceding, were rather impositions than propositions) was frequently disquieted with the inevitable consequence of disorder in the power of debate exercis’d by the popular part, or common council; the right of debate being henceforth establish’d in the court of aldermen, and that of result in the common council, kill’d the branches of division in the root. Which for the present may suffice to have bin said of the city of Emporium.

The government of Hiera.THAT of Hiera consists as to the national government of two tribes, the first call’d agoræa, the second propola: but as to the peculiar policy of twelve manipuls, or wards divided into three cohorts, each cohort containing four wards; wherof the wards of the first cohort elect for the first year four burgesses, one in each ward; the wards of the second cohort for the second year four burgesses, one in each ward; and the wards of the third cohort for the third year four burgesses, one in each ward; all triennial magistrats:The court. by which the twelve burgesses, making one court for the government of this city, according to their instructions by act of parlament, fall likewise into an annual, triennial, and perpetual revolution.

The high steward.THIS court being thus constituted, makes election of divers magistrats; as first, of a high steward, who is commonly som person of quality, and this magistracy is elected in the senat by the scrutiny of this court; with him they chuse som able lawyer to be his deputy, and to hold the court; and last of all they elect out of their own number six censors.

THE high steward is commander in chief of the two tribes, wherof he in person brings up the one at the national muster to the ballot, and his deputy the other at a distinct pavilion; the six censors chosen by the court, officiating by three in each tribe at the urns; and these tribes have no other phylarch but this court.

AS for the manner of elections and suffrage, both in Emporium and Hiera, it may be said once for all, that they are perform’d by ballot, and according to the respective rules already given.

THERE be other citys and corporations throout the territory, whose policy being much of this kind, would be tedious and not worth the labor to insert, nor dare I stay. Juvenum manus emicat ardens.

I return, according to the method of the commonwealth, to the remaining parts of her orbs, which are military and provincial; the military, except the strategus, and the polemarchs or field officers, consisting of the youth only, and the provincial consisting of a mixture both of elders and of the youth.

To begin with the youth, or the military orbs, they are circles to which the commonwealth must have a care to keep close. A man is a spirit rais’d by the magic of nature; if she dos not stand safe, and so that she may set him to som good and useful work, he spits fire, and blows up castles: for where there is life, there must be motion or work; and the work of idleness is mischief, but the work of industry is health. To set men to this, the commonwealth must begin betimes with them, or it will be too late: and the means wherby she sets them to it, is EDUCATION, the plastic art of government. But it is as frequent as sad in experience (whether thro negligence, or, which in the consequence is all one or worse, overfondness in the domestic performance of this duty) that innumerable children com to ow their utter perdition to their own parents; in each of which the commonwealth loses a citizen. Wherfore the laws of a government, how wholsom soever in themselves, are such as, if men by a congruity in their education be not bred to find a relish in them, they will be sure to loath and detest. The education therefore of a man’s own children is not wholly to be committed or trusted to himself. You find in* Livy the children of Brutus having bin bred under monarchy, and us’d to a court life, making faces at the commonwealth of Rome: A king (say they) is a man with whom you may prevail when you have need there should be law, or when you have need there should be no law; he has favors in the right, and he frowns not in the wrong place; he knows his friends from his enemys. But laws are deaf inexorable things, such as make no difference between a gentleman and an ordinary fellow; a man can never be merry for them, for to trust altogether to his own innocence is a sad life. Unhappy wantons! Scipio on the other side, when he was but a boy (about two or three and twenty) being inform’d that certain Patricians of Roman gentlemen, thro a qualm upon the defeat which Hannibal had given them at Cannæ, were laying their heads together and contriving their flight with the transportation of their goods out of Rome, drew his sword, and setting himself at the door of the chamber where they were at council, protested, That who did not immediatly swear not to desert the commonwealth, he would make his soul to desert his body. Let men argue as they please for monarchy, or against a commonwealth, the world shall never see any man so sottish or wicked as in cool blood to prefer the education of the sons of Brutus before that of Scipio; and of this mould, except a Melius or a Manlius, was the whole youth of that commonwealth, tho not ordinarily so well cast. Now the health of a government, and the education of the youth being of the same pulse, no wonder if it has bin the constant practice of well-order’d commonwealths to commit the care and feeling of it to public magistrats. A duty that was perform’d in such a manner by the areopagits, as is elegantly prais’d by Isocrates. The Athenians, says he, write not their laws upon dead walls, nor content themselves with having ordain’d punishments for crimes, but provide in such a way by the education of their youth, that there be no crimes for punishment. He speaks of those laws which regarded manners, not of those orders which concerned the administration of the commonwealth, lest you should think he contradicts Xenophon and Polybius. The children of Lacedemon, at the seventh year of their age, were delivered to the pædonomi, or schoolmasters, not mercenary, but magistrats of the commonwealth, to which they were accountable for their charge: and by these at the age of fourteen they were presented to other magistrats call’d the beidiæi, having the inspection of the games and exercises, among which that of the platanista was famous, a kind of fight in squadrons, but somwhat too fierce. When they came to be of military age, they were listed of the mora, and so continu’d in readiness for public service under the discipline of the polemarchs. But the Roman education and disciplin by the centurys and classes is that to which the commonwealth of Oceana has had a more particular regard in her three essays, being certain degrees by which the youth commence as it were in arms for magistracy, as appears by

26 Order.The twenty-sixth ORDER, instituting, That if a parent has but one son, the education of that one son shall be wholly at the disposition of that parent. But wheras there be free schools erected and endow’d, or to be erected and endow’d in every tribe of this nation, to a sufficient proportion for the education of the children of the same (which schools, to the end there be no detriment or hindrance to the scholars upon case of removing from one to another, are every of them to be govern’d by the strict inspection of the censors of the tribes, both upon the schoolmasters manner of life and teaching, and the proficiency of the children, after the rules and method of that in Hiera) if a parent has more sons than one, the censors of the tribes shall animadvert upon and punish him that sends not his sons within the ninth year of their age to som one of the schools of a tribe, there to be kept and taught, if he be able, at his own charges; and if he be not able, gratis, till they arrive at the age of fifteen years. And a parent may expect of his sons at the fifteenth year of their age according to his choice or ability, whether it be to service in the way of apprentices to som trade or otherwise, or to further study, as by sending them to the inns of court, of chancery, or to one of the universitys of this nation. But he that takes not upon him one of the professions proper to som of those places, shall not continue longer in any of them than till he has attain’d to the age of eighteen years; and every man having not at the age of eighteen years taken upon him, or addicted himself to the profession of the law, theology, or physic, and being no servant, shall be capable of the essays of the youth, and no other person whatsoever: except a man, having taken upon him such a profession, happens to lay it by, e’er he arrives at three or four and twenty years of age, and be admitted to this capacity by the respective phylarch, being satisfy’d that he kept not out so long with any design to evade the service of the commonwealth; but, that being no sooner at his own disposal, it was no sooner in his choice to com in. And if any youth or other person of this nation have a desire to travel into foren countrys upon occasion of business, delight, or further improvement of his education; the same shall be lawful for him upon a pass obtain’d from the censors in parliament, putting a convenient limit to the time, and recommending him to the embassadors by whom he shall be assisted, and to whom he shall yield honor and obedience in their respective residences. Every youth at his return from his travel is to present the censors with a paper of his own writing, containing the interest of state or form of government of the countrys, or som one of the countrys where he has bin; and if it be good, the censors shall cause it to be printed and publish’d, prefixing a line in commendation of the author.

EVERY Wednesday next insuing the last of December, the whole youth of every parish, that is to say every man (not excepted by the foregoing part of the order) being from eighteen years of age to thirty, shall repair at the sound of the bell to their respective church, and being there assembled in presence of the overseers, who are to govern the ballot, and the constable who is to officiat at the urn, shall, after the manner of the elders, elect every fifth man of their whole number (provided that they chuse not above one of two brothers at one election, nor above half if they be four or upward) to be a stratiot or deputy of the youth; and the list of the stratiots so elected being taken by the overseers, shall be enter’d in the parish book, and diligently preserv’d as a record, call’d the first essay. They whose estates by the law are able, or whose friends are willing to mount them, shall be of the horse, the rest are of the foot. And he who has bin one year of this list, is not capable of being reelected till after another year’s interval.

EVERY Wednesday next insuing the last of January, the stratiots being muster’d at the rendevouz of their respective hundred, shall in the presence of the jurymen, who are overseers of that ballot, and of the high constable who is to officiat at the urn, elect out of the horse of their troop or company one captain, and one ensign or cornet, to the command of the same. And the jurymen having enter’d the list of the hundred into a record to be diligently kept at the rendevouz of the same; the first public game of this commonwealth shall begin and be perform’d in this manner. Wheras there is to be at every rendevouz of a hundred one cannon, culverin, or saker; the prize arms being forg’d by sworn armorers of this commonwealth, and for their proof, besides their beauty, view’d and try’d at the tower of Emporium, shall be expos’d by the justice of peace appertaining to that hundred (the said justice with the jurymen being judges of the game) and the judges shall deliver to the horseman that gains the prize at the career, one sute of arms being of the value of twenty pouns; to the pikeman that gains the prize at throwing the bullet, one sute of arms of the value of ten pounds; to the musketeer that gains the prize at the mark with his musket, one sute of arms of the value of ten pounds; and to the cannoneer that gains the prize at the mark with the cannon, culverin, or saker, a chain of silver being the value of ten pounds; provided, that no one man at the same muster plays above one of the prizes. Whosoever gains a prize is bound to wear it (if it be his lot) upon service; and no man shall sell or give away any armor thus won, except he has lawfully attain’d to two or more of them at the games.

THE games being ended, and the muster dismist, the captain of the troop or company shall repair with a copy of the list to the lord lieutenant of the tribe, and the high constable with a duplicat of the same to the custos rotulorum, or mustermaster general, to be also communicated to the censors; in each of which the jurymen giving a note upon every name of an only son, shall certify that the list is without subterfuge or evasion; or, if it be not, an account of those upon whom the evasion or subterfuge lys, to the end that the phylarch or the censors may animadvert accordingly.

AND every Wednesday next insuing the last of February, the lord lieutenant, custos rotulorum, the censors, and the conductor, shall receive the whole muster of the youth of that tribe at the rendevouz of the same, distributing the horse and foot with their officers, according to the directions given in the like case for the distribution of the elders; and the whole squadron being put by that means in battalia, the second game of this commonwealth shall begin by the exercise of the youth in all the parts of their military disciplin according to the orders of parlament, or direction of the council of war in that case. And the hundred pounds allow’d by the parlament for the ornament of the muster in every tribe, shall be expended by the phylarch upon such artificial castles, citadels, or the like devices, as may make the best and most profitable sport for the youth and their spectators. Which being ended, the censors having prepar’d the urns by putting into the horse-urn 220 gold balls, wherof ten are to be mark’d with the letter M, and other ten with the letter P; into the foot-urn 700 gold balls, whereof 50 are to be mark’d with the letter M, and 50 with the letter P: and after they have made the gold balls in each urn, by the addition of silver balls to the same, in number equal with the horse and foot of the stratiots, the lord lieutenant shall call the stratiots to the urns, where they that draw the silver balls shall return to their places, and they that draw the gold balls shall fall off to the pavilion, where, for the space of one hour, they may chop and change their balls according as one can agree with another, whose lot he likes better But the hour being out, the conductor separating them whose gold balls have no letter, from those whose balls are mark’d, shall cause the cryer to call the alphabet, as first A; wherupon all they whose gold balls are not mark’d, and whose sirnames begin with the letter A, shall repair to a clerc appertaining to the custos rotulorum, who shall first take the names of that letter; then those of B, and so on, till all the names be alphabetically inrol’d. And the youth of this list being six hundred foot in a tribe, that is, 30000 foot in all the tribes; and two hundred horse in a tribe, that is, 10000 horse in all the tribes, are the second essay of the stratiots, and the standing army of this commonwealth to be always ready upon command to march. They whose balls are mark’d with M, amounting, by 20 horse and 50 foot in a tribe, to 2500 foot, and 500 horse in all the tribes; and they whose balls are mark’d with P, in every point correspondent, are parts of the third essay: they in M being straight to march for Marpesia, and they of P for Panopea, to the ends, and according to the further directions following in the order for the provincial orbs.

IF the polemarchs or field officers be elected by the scrutiny of the council of war, and the strategus commanded by the parlament or the dictator to march, the lord lieutenants (who have power to muster and disciplin the youth so often as they receive orders for the same from the council of war) are to deliver the second essay, or so many of them as shall be commanded, to the conductors, who shall present them to the lord strategus at the time and place appointed by his excellency to be the general rendevouz of Oceana, where the council of war shall have the accommodation of horses and arms for his men in readiness: and the lord strategus having arm’d, mounted and distributed them, whether according to the recommendation of their prize arms, or otherwise, shall lead them away to his shipping, being also ready and provided with victuals, ammunition, artillery, and all other necessarys; commanding them, and disposing of the whole conduct of the war by his sole power and authority. And this is the third essay of the stratiots, which being ship’d, or march’d out of their tribes, the lord lieutenants shall reelect the second essay out of the remaining part of the first; and the senat another strategus.

IF any veteran or veterans of this nation, the term of whose youth or militia is expir’d, having a desire to be entertain’d in the further service of the commonwealth, shall present him or themselves at the rendevouz of Oceana to the strategus, it is in his power to take on such and so many of them as shall be agreed by the polemarchs, and to send back an equal number of the stratiots.

AND for the better managing of the proper forces of this nation, the lord strategus, by appointment of the council of war, and out of such levys as they shall have made in either or both of the provinces to that end, shall receive auxiliaries by sea or elsewhere at som certain place, not exceeding his proper arms in number.

AND whosoever shall refuse any one of his three essays, except upon cause shewn he be dispens’d withal by the phylarch; or, if the phylarch be not assembled, by the censors of his tribe, shall be deem’d a helot or public servant, shall pay a fifth part of his yearly revenue, besides all other taxes, to the commonwealth for his protection, and be incapable of bearing any magistracy except such as is proper to the law. Nevertheless if a man has but two sons, the lord lieutenant shall not suffer above one of them to come to the urn at one election of the second essay: and tho he has above two sons, there shall not com above half the brothers at one election; and if a man has but one son, he shall not com to the urn at all without the consent of his parents, or his guardians; nor shall it be any reproach to him, or impediment to his bearing of magistracy.

This order, with relation to foren expeditions, will be prov’d and explain’d together with

27 Order.The twenty-seventh ORDER, providing, in case of invasion apprehended, that the lords high sherifs of the tribes upon commands receiv’d from the parlament, or the dictator, distribute the bands of the elders into divisions after the nature of the essays of the youth; and that the second division or essay of the elders, being made and consisting of 30000 foot, and 10000 horse, be ready to march with the second essay of the youth, and be brought also by the conductors to the strategus.

THE second essay of the elders and youth being march’d out of their tribes, the lords high sherifs and lieutenants shall have the remaining part of the annual hands both of elders and youth in readiness, which, if the beacons be fir’d, shall march to the rendevouz to be in that case appointed by the parlament, or the dictator. And the beacons being fir’d, the curiata comitia, or parochial congregations, shall elect a fourth both of elders and youth to be immediatly upon the guard of the tribes, and dividing themselves as aforesaid, to march also in their divisions according to orders: which method in case of extremity shall procede to the election of a third, or the levy of a second, or of the last man in the nation, by the power of the lords high sherifs; to the end that the commonwealth in her utmost pressure may shew her trust that God in his justice will remember mercy, by humbling her self, and yet preserving her courage, disciplin and constancy, even to the last drop of her blood, and the utmost farthing.

THE services perform’d by the youth, or by the elders, in case of invasion, and according to this order shall be at their proper cost and charges that are any ways able to endure it; but if there be such as are known in their parishes to be so indigent that they cannot march out of their tribes, nor undergo the burden in this case incumbent, then the congregations of their parishes shall furnish them with sufficient sums of mony to be repaid upon the certificat of the same by the parlament when the action shall be over. And of that which is respectively injoin’d by this order, any tribe, parish, magistrat, or person that shall fail, is to answer for it at the council of war, as a deserter of his country.

The Archon, being the greatest captain of his own, if not of any age, added much to the glory of this commonwealth, by interweaving the militia with more art and luster than any legislator from or before the time of Servius Tullius, who constituted the Roman militia. But as the bones or skeleton of a man, tho the greatest part of his beauty be contain’d in their proportion or symmetry, yet shewn without flesh, are a spectacle that is rather horrid than entertaining; so without discourses are the orders of a commonwealth; which, if she gos forth in that manner, may complain of her friends that they stand mute, and staring upon her. Wherfore this order was thus flesh’d by the lord Archon.

My lords;

DIOGENES seeing a young fellow drunk, told him that his father was drunk when he begot him. For this, in natural generation I must confess I see no reason; but in the political it is right. The vices of the people are from their governors; those of their governors from their laws or orders; and those of their laws or orders from their legislators.* Whatever was in the womb imperfect, as to her proper work, coms very rarely, or never at all to perfection afterwards: and the formation of a citizen in the womb of the commonwealth is his education.

Education by the first of the foregoing orders is of six kinds: at the school, in the mechanics, at the universitys, at the ins of court or chancery, in travels, and in military disciplin: som of which I shall but touch, and som I shall handle more at large.

Schools.That which is propos’d for the erecting and indowing of schools throout the tribes, capable of all the children of the same, and able to give to the poor the education of theirs gratis, is only matter of direction in case of very great charity, as easing the needy of the charge of their children from the ninth to the fifteenth year of their age, during which time their work cannot be profitable; and restoring them when they may be of use, furnished with tools wherof there are advantages to be made in every work, seeing he that can read and use his pen has som convenience by it in the meanest vocation. And it cannot be conceiv’d, but that which coms, tho in small parcels, to the advantage of every man in his vocation, must amount to the advantage of every vocation, and so to that of the whole commonwealth. Wherfore this is commended to the charity of every wisehearted and welminded man, to be don in time, and as God shall stir him up or inable him; there being such provision already in the case, as may give us leave to procede without obstruction.

Mechanics in general.Parents, under animadversion of the censors, are to dispose of their children at the fifteenth year of their age to somthing; but what, is left, according to their abilitys or inclination, at their own choice. This, with the multitude, must be to the mechanics, that is to say, to agriculture or husbandry; to manufactures, or to merchandize.

Husbandry.Agriculture is the bread of the nation; we are hung upon it by the teeth; it is a mighty nursery of strength, the best army, and the most assur’d knapsac; it is manag’d with the least turbulent or ambitious, and the most innocent hands of all other arts. Wherfore I am of Aristotle’s opinion, that a commonwealth of husbandmen, and such is ours, must be the best of all others. Certainly, my lords, you have no measure of what ought to be, but what can be don for the incouragement of this profession. I could wish I were husband good enough to direct somthing to this end; but racking of rents is a vile thing in the richer sort, an uncharitable one to the poorer, a perfect mark of slavery, and nips your commonwealth in the fairest blossom. On the other side, if there should be too much ease given in this kind, it would occasion sloth, and so destroy industry, the principal nerve of a commonwealth. But if ought might be don to hold the balance even between these two, it would be a work in this nation equal to that for which Fabius was sirnam’d Maximus by the Romans.

Manufactures and merchandize.In manufactures and merchandize the Hollander has gotten the start of us; but at the long run it will be found, that a people working upon a foren commodity dos but farm the manufacture, and that it is really intail’d upon them only, where the growth of it is native: as also that it is one thing to have the carriage of other mens goods, and another for a man to bring his own to the best market. Wherfore (nature having provided incouragement for these arts in this nation above all others, where, the people growing, they of necessity must also increase) it cannot but establish them upon a far more sure and effectual foundation than that of the Hollanders. But these educations are in order to the first things, or necessitys of nature; as husbandry to the food, manufacture to the clothing, and merchandize to the purse of the commonwealth.

There be other things in nature, which being second as to their order, for their dignity and value are first, and such to which the other are but accommodations; or this sort are especially these, religion, justice, courage, and wisdom.

Universitys.The education that answers to religion in our government is that of the universitys. Moses the divine legislator was not only skilful in all the learning of the Egyptians, but took also into the fabric of his commonwealth the learning of the Midianites in the advice of Jethro; and his foundation of a university laid in the tabernacle, and finish’d in the temple, became that pinacle from whence (according to many Jewish and Christian authors) all the learning in the world has taken wing; as the philosophy of the Stoics from the Pharisees; that of the Epicureans from the Sadduces; and from the learning of the Jews so often quoted by our Savior, and fulfilled in him, the Christian religion.Acts 17. 18. Athens was the most famous university in her days; and her senators, that is to say, the Areopagits, were all philosophers. Lacedemon, to speak truth, tho she could write and read, was not very bookish. But he that disputes hence against universitys, disputes by the same argument against agriculture, manufacture, and merchandize; every one of these having bin equally forbid by Lycurgus, not for itself (for if he had not bin learn’d in all the learning of Crete, and well travell’d in the knowledge of other governments, he had never made his commonwealth) but for the diversion which they must have given his citizens from their arms, who, being but few, if they had minded any thing else, must have deserted the commonwealth. For Rome, she had ingenium par ingenio, was as learned as great, and held her college of augurs in much reverence. Venice has taken her religion upon trust. Holland cannot attend it to be very studious. Nor dos Switzerland mind it much; yet are they all addicted to their universitys. We cut down trees to build houses; but I would have som body shew me, by what reason or experience the cutting down of a university should tend to the setting up of a commonwealth. Of this I am sure, that the perfection of a commonwealth is not to be attain’d without the knowlege of antient prudence; nor the knowlege of antient prudence without learning; nor learning without schools of good literature: and these are such as we call universitys. Now tho mere university learning of itself be that which (to speak the words of Verulamius) crafty men contemn, and simple men only admire, yet is it such as wife men have use of; for studys do not teach their own use, but that is a wisdom without and above them, won by observation. Expert men may execute, and perhaps judge of particulars one by one; but the general counsils and the plots, and the marshalling of affairs, com best from those that are learned. Wherfore if you would have your children to be statesmen, let them drink by all means of these fountains, where perhaps there were never any. But what tho the water a man drinks be not nourishment; it is the vehicle without which he cannot be nourish’d. Nor is religion less concern’d in this point than government; for take away your universitys, and in a few years you lose it.

The holy Scriptures are written in Hebrew and Greec: they that have neither of these languages may think light of both; but find me a man that has one in perfection, the study of whose whole life it has not bin. Again, this is apparent to us in daily conversation, that if four or five persons that have liv’d together be talking, another speaking the same language may com in, and yet understand very little of their discourse, in that it relates to circumstances, persons, things, times and places, which he knows not. It is no otherwise with a man, having no insight of the times in which they were written, and the circumstances to which they relate, in the reading of antient books, whether they be divine or human. For example, when we fall upon the discourse about baptism and regeneration that was between our Savior and Nicodemus, where Christ reproaches him with his ignorance in this matter: Art thou a doctor in Israel, and understandest not these things? What shall we think of it? or wherfore should a doctor in Israel have understood these things more than another, but that both baptism and regeneration, as was shew’d at large by my lord Phosphorus, were doctrins held in Israel? I instance in one place of a hundred, which he, that has not master’d the circumstances to which they relate, cannot understand. Wherfore to the understanding of the Scripture, it is necessary to have antient languages, and the knowlege of antient times, or the aid of them who have such knowlege: and to have such as may be always able and ready to give such aid (unless you would borrow it of another nation, which would not only be base, but deceitful) it is necessary to a commonwealth that she have schools of good literature, or universitys of her own. We are commanded, as has been said more than once, to search the Scriptures; and which of ’em search the Scriptures, they that take this pains in antient languages and learning, or they that will not, but trust to translations only, and to words as they sound to present circumstances? than which nothing is more fallible, or certain to lose the true sense of Scriptures, pretended to be above human understanding, for no other cause than that they are below it. But in searching the Scriptures by the proper use of our universitys, we have bin heretofore blest with greater victorys and trophys against the purple hosts and golden standards of the Romish hierarchy, than any nation; and therfore why we should relinquish this upon the presumption of som, that because there is a greater light which they have, I do not know. There is a greater light than the sun, but it does not extinguish the sun, nor does any light of God’s giving extinguish that of nature, but increase and sanctify it. Wherfore, neither the honor born by the Israelitish, Roman, or any other commonwealth that I have shewn, to their ecclesiastics, consisted in being govern’d by them, but in consulting them in matters of religion; upon whose responses or oracles they did afterwards as they thought fit. Nor would I be here mistaken, as if, by affirming the universitys to be, in order both to religion and government, of absolute necessity, I declar’d them or the ministry in any wife fit to be trusted, so far as to exercise any power not deriv’d from the civil magistrat in the administration of either. If the Jewish religion were directed and established by Moses, it was directed and establish’d by the civil magistrat; or if Moses exercis’d this administration as a prophet, the same prophet did invest with the same administration the sanhedrim, and not the priests; and so dos our commonwealth the senat, and not the clergy. They who had the supreme administration or government of the national religion in Athens, were the first Archon, the rex sacrificus, or high priest, and a polemarch; which magistrats were ordain’d or elected* by the holding up of hands in the church, congregation or comitia of the people. The religion of Lacedemon was govern’d by the kings, who were also high priests, and officiated at the sacrifice; these had power to substitute their pythii, embassadors, or nuncios, by which, not without concurrence of the senat, they held intelligence with the oracle of Apollo at Delphos. And the ecclesiastical part of the commonwealth of Rome was govern’d by the pontifex maximus, the rex sacrificulus, and the Flamins, all ordain’d or elected by the people, the pontifex by the tribes, the king by the centurys, and the Flamins by the§ parishes. I do not mind you of these things as if, for the matter, there were any parallel to be drawn out of their superstitions to our religion; but to shew that for the manner, antient prudence is as well a rule in divine as human things; nay, and such a one as the apostles themselves, ordaining elders by the holding up of hands in every congregation, have exactly follow’d: for som of the congregations where they thus ordain’d elders were those of Antioch, Iconium, Lystra, Derbe, the countrys of Lycaonia, Pisidia, Pampbilia, Perga, with Attalia Now that these citys and countrys, when the Romans propagated their empire into Asia, were found most of them commonwealths, and that many of the rest were indu’d with like power, so that the people living under the protection of the Roman emperors, continu’d to elect their own magistrats, is so known a thing, that I wonder whence it is that men, quite contrary to the universal proof of these examples, will have ecclesiastical government to be necessarily distinct from civil power, when the right of the elders ordain’d by the holding up of hands in every congregation to teach the people, was plainly deriv’d from the same civil power by which they ordain’d the rest of their magistrats. And it is not otherwise in our commonwealth, where the parochial congregation elects or ordains its pastor. To object the commonwealth of Venice in this place, were to shew us that it has bin no otherwise but where the civil power has lost the liberty of her conscience by imbracing popery; as also that to take away the liberty of conscience in this administration from the civil power, were a proceding which has no other precedent than such as is popish. Wherfore your religion is settled after the following manner: the universitys are the seminarys of that part which is national, by which means others with all safety may be permitted to follow the liberty of their own consciences, in regard that, however they behave themselves, the ignorance of the unlearned in this case cannot lose your religion nor disturb your government, which otherwise it would most certainly do; and the universitys with their emoluments, as also the benefices of the whole nation, are to be improv’d by such augmentations as may make a very decent and comfortable subsistence for the ministry, which is neither to be allow’d synods nor assemblys, except upon the occasion shewn in the universitys, when they are consulted by the council of state, and suffer’d to meddle with affairs of religion, nor to be capable of any other public preferment whatsoever; by which means the interest of the learned can never com to corrupt your religion, nor disturb your government, which otherwise it would most certainly do. Venice, tho she dos not see, or cannot help the corruption of her religion, is yet so circumspect to avoid disturbance of her government in this kind, that her council procedes not to election of magistrats, till it be proclaim’d, fora papalini, by which words such as have consanguinity with red hats, or relation to the court of Rome, are warm’d to withdraw. If a minister in Holland meddles with matter of state, the magistrat sends him a pair of shoes; wherupon, if he dos not go, he is driven away from his charge. I wonder why ministers, of all men, should be perpetually tampering with government; first because they, as well as others, have it in express charge to submit themselves to the ordinances of men; and secondly, because these ordinances of men must go upon such political principles, as they of all others, by any thing that can be found in their writings or actions, least understand: whence you have the suffrage of all nations to this sense, that an ounce of wisdom is worth a pound of clergy. Your greatest clercs are not your wisest men: and when som foul absurdity in state is committed, it is common with the French, and even the Italians, to call it pas de clerc, or, governo de prete. They may bear with men that will be preaching without study, while they will be governing without prudence. My lords, if you know not how to rule your clergy, you will most certainly, like a man that cannot rule his wife, have neither quiet at home, nor honor abroad. Their honest vocation is to teach your children at the schools and the universitys, and the people in the parishes; and yours is concern’d to see that they do not play the shrews: of which parts dos consist the education of your commonwealth, so far as it regards religion.

The ins of court and chancery.To Justice, or that part of it which is commonly executive, answers the education of the ins of court and chancery. Upon which to philosophize requires a public kind of learning that I have not. But they who take upon them any profession proper to the educations mention’d, that is, theology, physic, or law, are not at leisure for the essays. Wherfore the essays being degrees wherby the youth commence for all magistracys, offices, and honors in the parish, hundred, tribe, senat or prerogative; divines, physicians, and lawyers, not taking these degrees, exclude themselves from all such magistracys, offices, and honors. And wheras lawyers are likest to exact further reason for this, they (growing up from the most gainful art at the bar to those magistracys upon the bench, which are continually appropriated to themselves, and not only indow’d with the greatest revenues, but also held for life) have the least reason of all the rest to pretend to any other; especially in an equal commonwealth, where accumulation of magistracy, or to take a person ingag’d by his profit to the laws, as they stand, into the power, which is legislative, and which should keep them to what they were, or ought to be, were a solœcism in prudence. It is true, that the legislative power may have need of advice and assistance from the executive magistracy, or such as are learned in the law; for which cause the judges are, as they have heretofore bin, assistants in the senat. Nor, however it came about, can I see any reason why a judg, being but an assistant or lawyer, should be member of a legislative council.

I deny not, that the Roman patricians were all patrons, and that the whole people were clients, som to one family, and som to another, by which means they had their causes pleaded and defended in som appearance gratis; for the patron took no mony, tho if he had a daughter to marry, his clients were to pay her portion: nor was this so great a grievance. But if the client accus’d his patron, gave testimony or suffrage against him, it was a crime of such a nature, that any man might lawfully kill him as a traitor; and this, as being the nerve of the optimacy, was a great cause of ruin to that commonwealth: for when the people would carry any thing that pleas’d not the senat, the senators were ill provided if they could not intercede, that is, oppose it by their clients; with whom, to vote otherwise than they pleas’d, was the highest crime. The observation of this bond till the time of the Gracchi, that is to say, till it was too late, or to no purpose to break it, was the cause, why in all the former heats and disputes that had happen’d between the senat and the people, it never came to blows, which indeed was good: but withal, the people could have no remedy, which was certainly evil. Wherfore I am of opinion, that a senator ought not to be a patron or advocat, nor a patron or advocat to be a senator: for if his practice be gratis, it debauches the people; and if it be mercenary, it debauches himself: take it which way you will, when he should be making of laws, he will be knitting of nets.

Lycurgus, as I said, by being a traveller became a legislator, but in times when prudence was another thing. Nevertheless we may not shut out this part of education in a commonwealth, which will be herself a traveller; for those of this make have seen the world, especially because this is certain (tho it be not regarded in our times, when things being left to take their chance, it fares with us accordingly) that no man can be a politician, except he be first a historian or a traveller; for except he can see what must be, or what may be, he is no politician. Now if he has no knowledge in story, he cannot tell what has bin; and if he has not bin a traveller, he cannot tell what is: but he that neither knows what has bin, nor what is, can never tell what must be, or what may be. Furthermore, the embassys in ordinary by our constitution are the prizes of young men, more especially such as have bin travellers. Wherfore they of these inclinations having leave of the censors, ow them an account of their time, and cannot chuse but lay it out with som ambition of praise or reward, where both are open: whence you will have eys abroad, and better choice of public ministers; your gallants shewing themselves not more to the ladys at their balls, than to your commonwealth at her academy, when they return from their travels.

But this commonwealth being constituted more especially of two elements, arms and councils, drives by a natural instinct at courage and wisdom; which he who has attain’d, is arriv’d at the perfection of human nature. It is true, that these virtues must have some natural root in him that is capable of them; but this amounts not to so great a matter as some will have it. For if poverty makes an industrious, a moderate estate a temperat, and a lavish fortune a wanton man, and this be the common course of things; wisdom then is rather of necessity than inclination. And that an army which was meditating upon flight, has bin brought by despair to win the field, is so far from being strange, that like causes will evermore produce like effects. Wherfore this commonwealth drives her citizens like wedges; there is no way with them but thorow, nor end but that glory wherof man is capable by art or nature. That the genius of the Roman familys commonly preserv’d it self throout the line (as to instance in som, the Manlii were still severe, the Publicolæ lovers, and the Appii haters of the people) is attributed by Machiavel to their education: nor, if interest might add to the reason why the genius of a Patrician was one thing, and that of a Plebeian another, is the like so apparent between different nations, who, according to their different educations, have yet as different manners. It was antiently noted, and long confirm’d by the actions of the French, that in their first assaults their courage was more than that of men; and for the rest less than that of women: which nevertheless, thro the amendment of their disciplin, we see now to be otherwise. I will not say, but that som man or nation upon an equal improvement of this kind may be lighter than som other; but certainly, education is the scale without which no man or nation can truly know his or her own weight or value. By our historys we can tell when one Marpesian would have beaten ten Oceaners, and when one Oceaner would have beaten ten Marpesians. Marc Anthony was a Roman, but how did that appear in the imbraces of Cleopatra? you must have som other education for your youth; or they, like that passage, will shew better in romance than true story.

The custom of the commonwealth of Rome in distributing her magistracys without respect of age, happen’d to do well in Corvinus and Scipio; for which cause Machiavel (with whom that which was done by Rome, and that which is well don, is for the most part all one) commends this course. Yet how much it did worse at other times, is obvious in Pompy and Cæsar; examples by which Boccalini illustrats the prudence of Venice in her contrary practice, affirming it to have bin no small step to the ruin of the Roman liberty, that these (having tasted in their youth of the supreme honors) had no greater in their age to hope for, but by perpetuating of the same in themselves; which came to blood, and ended in tyranny. The opinion of Verulamius is safe: the errors, says he, of young men are the ruin of business; wheras the errors of old men amount but to this, that more might have bin don, or sooner. But tho their wisdom be little, their courage is great: wherfore (to com to the main education of this commonwealth) the militia of Oceana is the province of youth.

The distribution of this province by the essays is so fully describ’d in the order, that I need repeat nothing: the order itself being but a repetition or copy of that original, which in antient prudence is of all others the fairest: as that from whence the commonwealth of Rome more particularly deriv’d the empire of the world. And there is much more reason in this age, when governments are universally broken, or swerv’d from their foundations, and the people groan under tyranny, that the same causes (which could not be withstood when the world was full of popular governments) should have the like effects.

The causes in the commonwealth of Rome, wherof the empire of the world was not any miraculous, but a natural (nay I may safely say a necessary) consequence, are contain’d in that part of her disciplin which was domestic, and in that which she exercis’d in her provinces or conquest. Of the latter I shall have better occasion to speak when we com to our provincial orbs; the former divided the whole people by tribes, amounting, as Livy and Cicero shew, at their full growth to thirty-five, and every tribe by the cense or valuation of estates into five classes: for the sixth being proletary, that is the nursery, or such as thro their poverty contributed nothing to the commonwealth but children, was not reckon’d nor us’d in arms. And this is the first point of the militia, in which modern prudence is quite contrary to the antient; for wheras we, excusing the rich, and arming the poor, becom the vassals of our servants, they, by excusing the poor, and arming such as were rich enough to be freemen, became lords of the earth. The nobility and gentry of this nation, who understand so little what it is to be the lords of the earth, that they have not bin able to keep their own lands, will think it a strange education for their children to be common soldiers, and oblig’d to all the dutys of arms: nevertheless it is not for 4 s. a week, but to be capable of being the best man in the field or in the city; the latter part of which consideration makes the common soldier herin a better man than the general of any monarchical army. And wheras it may be thought, that this would drink deep of noble blood, I dare boldly say, take the Roman nobility in the heat of their fiercest wars, and you shall not find such a shambles of them as has bin made of ours by mere luxury and slothfulness; which, killing the body, kill the soul also; Animasque in vulnere ponunt. Wheras common right is that which he who stands in the vindication of, has us’d that sword of justice for which he receives the purple of magistracy. The glory of a man on earth can go no higher, and if he falls he rises again, and coms sooner to that reward which is so much higher as heaven is above the earth. To return to the Roman example: every classis was divided, as has bin more than once shewn into centurys, and every century was equally divided into youth and elders; the youth for foren service, and the elders for the guard of the territory. In the first classis were about eighteen centurys of horse, being those which by the institution of Servius were first call’d to the suffrage in the* centurial assemblys. But the delectus, or levy of an army, which is the present business, proceded, according to Polybius, in this manner.

Upon a war decreed, the consuls elected four and twenty military tribuns or colonels; wherof ten, being such as had merited their tenth stipend, were younger officers. The tribuns being chosen, the consuls appointed a day to the tribes, when those in them of military age were to appear at the capitol; the day being com, and the youth assembl’d accordingly, the consuls ascended their tribunal, and the younger tribuns were straight divided into four parts after this manner: four were assign’d to the first legion (a legion at the most consisted of 6000 foot, and 300 horse) three to the second, four to the third, and three to the fourth. The younger tribuns being thus distributed, two of the elder were assign’d to the first legion, three to the second, two to the third, and three to the fourth. And the officers of each legion thus assign’d, having drawn the tribes by lot, and being seated according to their divisions at a convenient distance from each other, the tribe of the first lot was call’d: wherupon they that were of it knowing the business, and being prepar’d, presently bolted out four of their number, in the choice wherof such care was taken, that they offer’d none that was not a citizen; no citizen that was not of the youth; no youth that was not of som one of the five classes; nor any one of the five classes that was not expert at his exercises. Moreover, they used such diligence in matching them for age and stature, that the officers of the legions, except they happen’d to be acquainted with the youth so bolted, were forc’d to put themselves upon fortune, while they of the first legion chose one; they of the second, the next; they of the third another; and the fourth youth fell to the last legion: and thus was the election (the legions and the tribes varying according to their lots) carry’d on till the foot were complete. The like course with little alteration was taken by the horse officers till the horse also were complete.Judg. 20. 9. This was call’d giving of names, which the children of Israel did also by lot; and if any man refus’d to give his name, he was sold for a slave, or his estate confiscated to the commonwealth. When Marcus Curius the consul was forc’d to make a sudden levy, and none of the youth would give in their names, all the tribes being put to the lot, he commanded the first name drawn out of the urn of the Pollian tribe (which happen’d to com first) to be call’d; but the youth not answering, he order’d his goods to be sold: which was conformable to the law in Israel, according to which Saul took a yoke of oxen, and hew’d them in pieces, and sent them throout the tribes, saying, Whosoever coms not forth to battel after Saul and Samuel, so shall it be done to his oxen.1 Sam. 11. 7. By which you may observe also, that they who had no cattel were not of the militia in Israel. But the age of the Roman youth by the Tullian law determin’d at 30; and by the law (tho it should seem by Machiavel and others, that this was not well observ’d) a man could not stand for magistracy till he was miles emeritus, or had fulfil’d the full term of his militia, which was complete in his tenth stipend or service: nor was he afterwards oblig’d under any penalty to give his name, except the commonwealth were invaded, in which case the elders were as well oblig’d as the youth. The consul might also levy milites evocatos, or soldiers, commanded men out of such as had serv’d their turn, and this at his discretion. The legions being thus complete, were divided by two to each consul; and in these no man had right to serve but a Roman citizen: now because two legions made but a small army, the Romans added to every one of their arms an equal number of foot, and a double number of horse levy’d among their Latin or Italian associats; so a consular army, with the legions and auxiliarys, amounted to about thirty thousand: and wheras they commonly levy’d two such armys together, these being join’d made about sixty thousand.

The steps wherby our militia follows the greatest captain, are the three essays; the first, elected by a fifth man in the parishes, and amounting in the whole to one hundred thousand, chuse their officers at the§ hundreds, where they fall also to their games or exercises, invited by handsom prizes, such as for themselves and the honor of them will be coveted; such as will render the hundred a place of sports, and exercise of arms all the year long; such as in the space of ten years will equip 30000 men horse and foot, with such arms for their forge, proof, and beauty, as (notwithstanding the argyraspides, or silver shields of Alexander’s guards) were never worn by so many; such as will present marks of virtue and direction to your general or strategus in the distribution of his army, which doubles the value of them to the proprietors, who are bound to wear them, and eases the commonwealth of so much charge, so many being arm’d already.

But here will be the objection now. How shall such a revenue be compas’d? fifty pounds a year in every hundred is a great deal, not so easily rais’d: men will not part with their mony; nor would the sum as it is propos’d by the order of Pompey, rise in many years. These are difficulties that fit our genius exactly: and yet a thousand pounds in each hundred once levy’d, establishes the revenue for ever. Now the hundreds one with another are worth ten thousand pounds a year dry rent, over and above personal estates, which bring it to twice the value: so that a twentieth part of one year’s revenue of the hundred dos it. If you cannot afford this while you pay taxes, tho from henceforth they will be but small ones, do it when you pay none. If it be then too much for one year, do it in two: if it be too much for two years, do it in four. What husbands have we hitherto bin? what is becom of greater sums? my lords, if you should thus cast your bread upon the waters, after many days you shall find it: stand not huckling when you are offer’d corn and your mony again in the mouth of the sack.

But to proceed: the first essay being officer’d at the hundreds, and muster’d at the* tribes (where they are entertain’d with other sports, which will be very fine ones) procedes to the election of the second essay, or standing army of this nation, consisting of thirty thousand foot, and ten thousand horse; and these, upon a war decreed, being deliver’d at the rendevous of Oceana to the strategus, are the third essay, which answers to the Roman legions. But you may observe, that wheras the consuls elected the military tribuns, and rais’d commanded men out of the veterans at their own discretion: our polemarchs or field officers are elected by the scrutiny of the council of war: and our veterans not otherwise taken on than as volunteers, and with the consent of the polemarchs; which may serve for the removal of certain scruples which might otherwise be incident in this place, tho without incouragement by the Roman way of proceding, much less by that which is propos’d. But wheras the Roman legions in all amounted not in one army to above 30000 men, or little more, you have here forty thousand; and wheras they added auxiliarys, it is in this regard that Marpesia will be a greater revenue to you, than if you had the Indys; for wheras heretofore she has yielded you nothing but her native thistles, in plowing out the rankness of her aristocracy by your agrarian, you will find her an inexhaustible magazin of men, and to her own advantage, who will make a far better account by the arms, than by the pins of Poland. Wherfore as a consular army consisted of about an equal number of auxiliarys added to their legions by their Latin or Italian associats, you may add to a parlamentary army an equal number of Marpesians or Panopeans, as that colony shall hereafter be able to supply you: by which means the commonwealth will be able to go forth to battel with fourscore thousand men. To make wars with small forces is no husbandry, but a wast, a disease, a lingring and painful consumtion of men and mony; the Romans making theirs thick, made them short, and had little regard to mony; as that which they who have men enow, can command where it is fittest that it should be levy’d. All the antient monarchys by this means got on wing, and attain’d to vast riches. Wheras your modern princes being dear purchasers of small parcels, have but emty pockets. But it may be som will accuse the order of rashness, in that it commits the sole conduct of the war to the general; and the custom of Venice by her proveditori, or checks upon her commanders in chief, may seem to be of greater prudence: but in this part of our government neither Venice nor any nation that makes use of mercenary forces is for our instruction. A mercenary army, with a standing general, is like the fatal sister that spins; but proper forces, with an annual magistrat, are like her that cuts the thred. Their interests are quite contrary, and yet you have a better proveditor than the Venetian, another strategus sitting with an army standing by him; wherupon that which is marching, if there were any probability it should, would find as little possibility that it could recoil, as a foren enemy to invade you. These things consider’d, a war will appear to be of a contrary nature to that of all other reckonings, inasmuch as of this you must never look to have a good account if you be strict in imposing checks. Let a council of huntsmen assembled beforehand, tell you which way the stag shall run, where you shall cast about at the fault, and how you shall ride to be in at the chase all the day: but these may as well do that, as a council of war direct a general. The hours that have painted wings, and of different colors, are his council: he must be like the ey that makes not the scene, but has it so soon as it changes. That in many counsillors there is strength, is spoken of civil administrations: as to those that are military, there is nothing more certain, than that in many counsillors there is weakness. Joint commissions in military affairs, are like hunting your hounds in their couples. In the Attic war Cleomenes and Demaratus, kings of Lacedemon, being thus coupl’d, tug’d one against another; and while they should have join’d against the Persian, were the cause of the common calamity: wherupon that commonwealth took better counsil, and made a law, wherby from thenceforth there went at once but one of her kings to battel.

THE Fidenati being in rebellion, and having slain the colony of the Romans, four tribuns with consular power were created by the people of Rome, wherof one being left for the guard of the city, the other three were sent against the Fidenati, who, thro the division that happen’d among them, brought nothing home but dishonor: wherupon the Romans created the dictator, and Livy gives his judgment in these words:* the three tribuns with consular power were a lesson how useless in war is the joint command of several generals; for each following his own counsils, while they all differ’d in their opinions, gave by this opportunity an advantage to the enemy. When the consuls, Quintius and Agrippa were sent against the Æqui, Agrippa for this reason refus’d to go with his colleague, saying,§ That in the administration of great actions it was most safe that the chief command should be lodg’d in one person. And if the ruin of modern armys were well consider’d, most of it would be found to have faln upon this point: it being in this case far safer to trust to any one man of common prudence, than to any two or more together of the greatest parts. The consuls indeed being equal in power, while one was present with the senat, and the other in the field with the army, made a good balance; and this with us is exactly follow’d by the election of a new strategus upon the march of the old one.

The seven and twentieth order, wherby the elders in case of invasion are oblig’d to equal duty with the youth, and each upon their own charge, is suitable to reason (for every man defends his own estate) and to our copy, as in the war with the Samnits and Tuscans. The senat order’d a vacation to be proclaim’d, and a levy to be made of all sorts of persons: and not only the freemen and youths were listed, but cohorts of the old men were likewise form’d. This nation of all others is the least obnoxious to invasion. Oceana, says a French politician, is a beast that cannot be devour’d but by herself; nevertheless, that government is not perfect which is not provided at all points; and in this (ad triarios res rediit) the elders being such as in a martial state must be veterans, the commonwealth invaded gathers strength like Antæus by her fall, while the whole number of the elders consisting of five hundred thousand, and the youth of as many, being brought up according to the order, give twelve successive battels, each battel consisting of eighty thousand men, half elders and half youth. And the commonwealth whose constitution can be no stranger to any of those virtues which are to be acquir’d in human life, grows familiar with death ere she dys. If the hand of God be upon her for her transgressions, she shall mourn for her sins, and ly in the dust for her iniquitys, without losing her manhood.

Si fractus illabatur orbis,

Impavidam ferient ruinæ.

The remaining part, being the constitution of the provincial orb, is partly civil, or consisting of the elders; and partly military, or consisting of the youth. The civil part of the provincial orb is directed by

28 Order. Constitution of the civil part of the provincial orb.The twenty eighth ORDER, wherby the council of a province being constituted of twelve knights, divided by four into three regions (for their term and revolution conformable to the parlament) is perpetuated by the annual election at the tropic of four knights (being triennial magistrats) out of the region of the senat whose term expires; and of one knight out of the same region to be strategus or general of the province, which magistracy is annual. The strategus or magistrat thus chosen, shall be as well president of the provincial council with power to propose to the same, as general of the army. The council for the rest shall elect weekly provosts, having any two of them also right to propose after the manner of the senatorian councils of Oceana. And wheras all provincial councils are members of the council of state, they may and ought to keep diligent correspondence with the same, which is to be don after this manner: any opinion or opinions legitimately propos’d and debated at a provincial council, being therupon sign’d by the strategus, or any two of the provosts, may be transmitted to the council of state in Oceana; and the council of state proceding upon the same in their natural course (whether by their own power, if it be a matter within their instructions, or by authority of the senat therupon consulted, if it be a matter of state which is not in their instructions; or by authority of the senat and command of the people, if it be a matter of law, as for the levys of men or mony upon common use and safety) shall return such answers, advice, or orders, as in any of the ways mention’d shall be determin’d upon the case. The provincial councils of Marpesia and Panopea respectivly shall take special care that the agrarian laws, as also all other laws that be or shall from time to time be enacted by the parlament of Oceana, for either of them, be duly put in execution: they shall manage and receive the customs of either nation for the shipping of Oceana, being the common guard: they shall have a care that moderat and sufficient pay upon the respective province be duly rais’d for the support and maintenance of the officers and soldiers, or army of the same, in the most effectual, constant and convenient way: they shall receive the regalia, or public revenues of those nations, out of which every counsillor shall have for his term, and to his proper use, the sum of 500 l. per annum, and the strategus 500 l. as president, besides his pay as general, which shall be 1000 pounds: the remainder to go to the use of the knights and deputys of the respective provinces, to be paid, if it will reach, according to the rates of Oceana; if not, by an equal distribution, respectively; or the overplus, if there be any, to be return’d to the treasury of Oceana. They shall manage the lands (if there be any such held in either of the provinces by the commonwealth of Oceana, in dominion) and return the rents into the exchequer. If the commonwealth coms to be possest of richer provinces, the pay of the general or strategus, and of the councils, may be respectively increas’d. The people for the rest shall elect their own magistrats, and be govern’d by their own laws, having power also to appeal from their native or provincial magistrats, if they please, to the people of Oceana. And wheras there may be such as receiving injury, are not able to prosecute their appeals at so great a distance, eight serjeants at law being sworn by the commissioners of the seal, shall be sent by four into each province once in two years; who, dividing the same by circuits, shall hear such causes; and having gather’d and introduc’d them, shall return to the several appellants, gratis, the determinations and decrees of the people in their several cases.

THE term of a knight in a provincial orb, as to domestic magistracys, shall be esteemed a vacation, and no bar to present election to any other honor, his provincial magistracy being expir’d.

THE quorum of a provincial council, as also of every other council or assembly in Oceana, shall in time of health consist of two parts in three of the whole number proper to that council or assembly; and in a time of sickness, of one part in three: but of the senat there can be no quorum without three of the signory; nor of a council without two of the provosts.

The civil part of the provincial orb being declar’d by the foregoing order; the military part of the same is constituted by

29 Order. Constitution of the military part of the provincial orb.The twenty ninth ORDER; wherby the stratiots of the third essay having drawn the gold balls mark’d with the letter M, and being ten horse and fifty foot in a tribe, that is to say, five hundred horse, and two thousand five hundred foot in all, the tribes shall be deliver’d by the respective conductors to the provincial strategus or general, at such a time and place, or rendevous, as he shall appoint by order and certificat of his election: and the strategus having receiv’d the horse and foot mention’d, which are the third classis of his provincial guard or army, shall forthwith lead them away to Marpesia, where the army consists of three classes, each classis containing three thousand men, wherof five hundred are horse; and receiving the new strategus with the third classis, the old strategus with the first classis shall be dismist by the provincial council. The same method with the stratiots of the letter P, is to be observ’d for the provincial orb of Panopea: and the commonwealth coming to acquire new provinces, the senat and the people may erect new orbs in like manner, consisting of greater or less numbers, according as is requir’d by the respective occasion. If a stratiot has once serv’d his term in a provincial orb, and happens afterwards to draw the letter of a province at the election of the second essay, he may refuse his lot; and if he refuses it, the censor of that urn shall cause the files ballotting at the same to make a halt; and if the stratiot produces the certificat of his strategus or general, that he has serv’d his time accordingly, the censor throwing the ball that he drew into the urn again, and taking out a blank, shall dismiss the youth, and cause the ballot to procede.

To perfect the whole structure of this commonwealth, som directions are given to the third essay, or army marching, in

30 Order.The thirtieth ORDER. When thou goest to battel against thy enemys, and seest horses and chariots, and a people more than thou;Deut. 20. 1. be not afraid of them, for the Lord thy God is he that gos with thee to fight for thee against thy enemys.1 Sam. 30 24. And when thou dividest the spoil, it shall be as a statute and an ordinance to thee, that as his part is that gos down to the battel, so shall his part be that tarrys by the stuff: that is, (as to the commonwealth of Oceana) the spoil taken of the enemy (except clothes, arms, horses, ammunition and victuals, to be divided to the soldiery by the strategus and the polemarchs upon the place according to their discretion) shall be deliver’d to four commissarys of the spoils elected and sworn by the council of war; which commissarys shall be allow’d shipping by the state, and convoys according as occasion shall require by the strategus; to the end that having a bill of lading sign’d by three or more of the polemarchs, they may ship and bring, or cause such spoils to be brought to the prize-office in Oceana, where they shall be sold; and the profit arising by such spoils shall be divided into three parts, wherof one shall go to the treasury, another shall be paid to the soldiery of this nation, and a third to the auxiliarys at their return from their service, provided that the said auxiliarys be equal in number to the proper forces of this nation, otherwise their share shall be so much less as they themselves are fewer in number: the rest of the two thirds to go to the officers and soldiers of the proper forces. And the spoils so divided to the proper forces, shall be subdivided into three equal parts, wherof one shall go to the officers, and two to the common soldiers: the like for the auxiliarys. And the share allotted to the officers shall be divided into four equal parts, wherof one shall go to the strategus, another to the polemarchs, a third to the colonels, and a fourth to the captains, cornets, ensigns, and under officers, receiving their share of the spoil as common soldiers: the like for the auxiliarys. And this upon pain, in the case of failure, of what the people of Oceana (to whom the cognizance of peculat or crimes of this nature is properly appertaining) shall adjudg or decree.

Upon these three last orders the Archon seem’d to be haranguing at the head of his army in this manner:

My dear lords and excellent patriots,

“A Government of this make is a commonwealth for increase. Of those for preservation, the inconveniences and frailtys have bin shewn: their roots are narrow, such as do not run, have no fibers, their tops weak and dangerously expos’d to the weather; except you chance to find one, as Venice, planted in a flowerpot; and if she grows, she grows top-heavy, and falls too. But you cannot plant an oak in a flowerpot; she must have earth for her root, and heaven for her branches.

Imperium Oceano, famam quæ terminet astris.

ROME was said to be broken by her own weight, but poetically: for that weight by which she was pretended to be ruin’d, was supported in her emperors by a far slighter foundation. And in the common experience of good architecture, there is nothing more known, than that buildings stand the firmer and the longer for their own weight; nor ever swerve thro any other internal cause, than that their materials are corruptible: but the people never dy; nor, as a political body, are subject to any other corruption than that which derives from their government. Unless a man will deny the chain of causes, in which he denys God, he must also acknowledge the chain of effects; wherfore there can be no effect in nature, that is not from the first cause, and those successive links of the chain, without which it could not have bin. Now except a man can shew the contrary in a commonwealth; if there be no cause of corruption in the first make of it, there can never be any such effect. Let no man’s superstition impose profaneness upon this assertion; for as man is sinful, but yet the universe is perfect, so may the citizen be sinful, and yet the commonwealth be perfect. And as man, seeing the world is perfect, can never commit any such sin as shall render it imperfect, or bring it to a natural dissolution; so the citizen, where the commonwealth is perfect, can never commit any such crime as will render it imperfect, or bring it to a natural dissolution. To com to experience; Venice, notwithstanding we have found some flaws in it, is the only commonwealth in the make wherof no man can find a cause of dissolution; for which reason we behold her (tho she consists of men that are not without sin) at this day with one thousand years upon her back, yet for any internal cause, as young, as fresh, and free from decay, or any appearance of it, as she was born: but whatever in nature is not sensible of decay by the course of a thousand years, is capable of the whole age of nature; by which calculation, for any check that I am able to give my self, a commonwealth, rightly order’d, may, for any internal causes, be as immortal or longliv’d as the world. But if this be true, those commonwealths that are naturally fall’n, must have deriv’d their ruin from the rise of them. Israel and Athens dy’d not natural but violent deaths; in which manner the world itself is to dy. We are speaking of those causes of dissolution which are natural to government; and they are but two, either contradiction or inequality: if a commonwealth be a contradiction, she must needs destroy her self; and if she be inequal, it tends to strife, and strife to ruin. By the former of these fell Lacedemon, by the latter Rome. Lacedemon being made altogether for war, and yet not for increase, her natural progress became her natural dissolution, and the building of her own victorious hand too heavy for her foundation; so that she fell indeed by her own weight. But Rome perish’d thro her native inequality, which how it inveterated the bosoms of the senat and the people each against other, and even to death, has bin shewn at large.

Look well to it, my lords, for if there be a contradiction or inequality in your commonwealth, it must fall; but if it has neither of these, it has no principle of mortality. Do not think me impudent; if this be truth, I shall commit a gross indiscretion in concealing it. Sure I am that Machiavel is for the immortality of a commonwealth upon far weaker principles.Dis. b. 3. c. 22 b 3. c. 29. If a commonwealth, says he, were so happy as to be provided often with men, that, when she is swerving from her principles, should reduce her to her institution, she would be immortal. But a commonwealth, as we have demonstrated, swerves not from her principles, but by and thro her institution; if she brought no biass into the world with her, her course for any internal cause must be streight forward, as we see is that of Venice. She cannot turn to the right hand, nor to the left, but by som rub, which is not an internal but external cause; against such she can be no way fortify’d, but thro her situation, as is Venice; or thro her militia, as was Rome: by which examples a commonwealth may be secure of those also. Think me not vain, for I cannot conceal my opinion here; a commonwealth that is rightly instituted can never swerve, nor one that is not rightly instituted be secur’d from swerving by reduction to her first principles: wherfore it is no less apparent in this place, that Machiavel understood not a commonwealth as to the whole piece, than where having told you, That a tribun, or any other citizen of Rome, might propose a law to the people, and debate it with them; he adds, this order was good, while the people were good; but when the people became evil, it became most pernicious.Dis. b. 1. c. 18. As if this order (thro which, with the like, the people most apparently became evil) could ever have bin good; or that the people, or the commonwealth could ever have becom good, by being reduc’d to such principles as were the original of their evil. The disease of Rome was, as has bin shewn, from the native inequality of her balance, and no otherwise from the empire of the world, than as, this falling into one scale, that of the nobility (an evil in such a fabric inevitable) kick’d out the people. Wherfore a man that could have made her to throw away the empire of the world, might in that have reduc’d her to her principles; and yet have bin so far from rendring her immortal, that going no further, he should never have cur’d her. But your commonwealth is founded upon an equal agrarian; and if the earth be given to the sons of men, this balance is the balance of justice, such a one as in having due regard to the different industry of different men, yet faithfully judges the poor.Prov. 29. 14. And the king that faithfully judges the poor, his throne shall be establish’d for ever; much more the commonwealth, seeing that equality which is the necessary dissolution of monarchy, is the generation, the very life and soul of a commonwealth. And now, if ever, I may be excusable, seeing my assertion, that the throne of a commonwealth may be establish’d for ever, is consonant to the holy scriptures.

The balance of a commonwealth that is equal, is of such a nature, that whatever falls into her empire, must fall equally; and if the whole earth falls into your scales, it must fall equally; and so you may be a greater people, and yet not swerve from your principles one hair. Nay, you will be so far from that, that you must bring the world in such a case to your balance, even to the balance of justice. But hearken, my lords; are we on earth? do we see the sun? or are we visiting those shady places which are feign’d by the poets?

Continuò auditæ voces, vagitus & ingens.

“These Gothic empires that are yet in the world, were at the first, tho they had legs of their own, but a heavy and unweildy burden; but their foundations being now broken, the iron of them enters even into the souls of the opprest; and hear the voice of their comforters: my father hath chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions. Hearken, I say; if thy brother crys to thee in affliction, wilt thou not hear him? this is a commonwealth of the fabric, that has an open ear and a public concern; she is not made for her self only, but given as a magistrat of God to mankind, for the vindication of common right, and the law of nature. Wherfore says Cicero of the like, that of the Romans,* we have rather undertaken the patronage, than the empire of the world. If you, not regarding this example, like som other nations that are upon the point to smart for it, shall, having attain’d to your own liberty, bear the sword of your common magistracy in vain, sit still, and fold your arms, or, which is worse, let out the blood of your people to tyrants, to be shed in the defence of their yokes like water, and so not only turn the grace of God into wantonness, but his justice into wormwood: I say if you do thus, you are not now making a commonwealth, but heaping coals of fire upon your own heads. A commonwealth of this make is a minister of God upon earth, to the end that the world may be govern’d with righteousness. For which cause (that I may com at length to our present business) the orders last rehears’d are buds of empire, such as with the blessing of God may spread the arms of your commonwealth, like a holy asylum to the distress’d world, and give the earth her sabbath of years, or rest from her labors, under the shadow of your wings. It is upon this point where the writings of Machiavel, having for the rest excel’d all other authors, com as far to excel themselves.

Dis. b. 2. c. 4.COMMONWEALTHS, says he, have had three ways of propagating themselves, one after the manner of monarchys, by imposing the yoke, which was the way of Athens, and towards the latter times of Lacedemon; another by equal leagues, which is the way of Switzerland; (I shall add of Holland, tho since his time) a third by inequal leagues, which, to the shame of the world, was never practis’d, nay nor so much as seen or minded, by any other commonwealth but that only of Rome. They will each of them, either for caution or imitation, be worthy to be well weigh’d, which is the proper work of this place. Athens and Lacedemon have bin the occasion of great scandal to the world, in two, or at least one of two regards: the first their emulation, which involv’d Greece in perpetual wars; the second their way of propagation, which by imposing yokes upon others, was plainly contradictory to their own principles.

For the first: governments, be they of what kind soever, if they be planted too close, are like trees, that impatient in their growth to have it hinder’d, eat out one another. It was not unknown to these in speculation, or, if you read the story of Agesilaus, in action, that either of them with thirty thousand men might have master’d the east; and certainly, if the one had not stood in the other’s light, Alexander had com too late to that end, which was the means (and wou’d be if they were to live again) of ruin, at least to one of them: wherfore with any man that understands the nature of government this is excusable. So it was between Oceana and Marpesia; so it is between France and Spain, tho less excusable; and so it ever will be in the like cases. But to com to the second occasion of scandal by them given, which was in the way of their propagation, it is not excusable: for they brought their confederats under bondage; by which means Athens gave occasion of the Peloponnesian war, the wound of which she dy’d stinking, when Lacedemon, taking the same infection from her carcase, soon follow’d.

Wherfore, my lords, let these be warnings to you, not to make that liberty which God has given you a snare to others in practising this kind of inlargement to your selves.

The second way of propagation or inlargement us’d by commonwealths, is that of Switzerland and Holland, equal leagues: this, tho it be not otherwise mischievous, is useless to the world, and dangerous to themselves: useless to the world; for as the former governments were storks, these are blocks, have no sense of honor, or concern in the sufferings of others. But as the Ætolians, a state of the like fabric, were reproach’d by Philip of Macedon, to prostitute themselves, by letting out their arms to the lusts of others, while they leave their own liberty barren, and without legitimat issue; so I do not defame these people: the Switzer for valor has no superior, the Hollander for industry no equal; but themselves in the mean time shall so much the less excuse their governments, seeing that to the Switz it is well enough known that the ensigns of his commonwealth have no other motto than in te converte manus: and that of the Hollander, tho he sweats more gold than the Spaniard digs, lets him languish in debt; for she herself lives upon charity. These are dangerous to themselves, precarious governments, such as do not command, but beg their bread from province to province, in coats that being patch’d up of all colors are in effect of none. That their cantons and provinces are so many arrows, is good; but they are so many bows too, which is naught.

Like to these was the commonwealth of the antient Tuscans, hung together like bobbins, without a hand to weave with them: therfore easily overcom by the Romans, tho at that time, for number, a far less considerable people. If your liberty be not a root that grows, it will be a branch that withers; which consideration brings me to the paragon, the commonwealth of Rome.

The ways and means wherby the Romans acquir’d the patronage, and in that the empire of the world, were different, according to the different condition of their commonwealth in her rise, and in her growth: in her rise she proceded rather by colonys; in her growth by inequal leagues. Colonys without the bounds of Italy she planted none (such dispersion of the Roman citizen as to plant him in foren parts, till the contrary interest of the emperors brought in that practise, was unlawful) nor did she ever demolish any city within that compass, or devest it of liberty; but wheras the most of them were commonwealths, stir’d up by emulation of her great felicity to war against her, if she overcame any, she confiscated som part of their lands that were the greatest incendiarys, or causes of the trouble, upon which she planted colonys of her own people, preserving the rest of their lands and libertys for the natives or inhabitants. By this way of proceding, that I may be as brief as possible, she did many and great things. For in confirming of liberty, she propagated her empire; in holding the inhabitants from rebellion, she put a curb upon the incursion of enemys; in exonerating her self of the poorer sort, she multiply’d her citizens; in rewarding her veterans, she render’d the rest less seditious; and in acquiring to her self the reverence of a common parent, she from time to time became the mother of newborn citys.

In her farther growth the way of her propagation went more upon leagues, which for the first division were of two kinds, social and provincial.

Again, social leagues, or leagues of society, were of two kinds.

The first call’d latinity or Latin, the second Italian right.

The league between the Romans and the Latins, or Latin right, approach’d nearest to jus quiritium, or the right of a native Roman. The man or the city that was honor’d with this right, was civitate donatus cum suffragio, adopted a citizen of Rome, with the right of giving suffrage with the people in som cases, as those of confirmation of law, or determination in judicature, if both the consuls were agreed, not otherwise; wherfore that coming to little, the greatest and most peculiar part of this privilege was, that who had born magistracy (at least that of ædil or quæstor) in any Latin city, was by consequence of the same, a citizen of Rome at all points.

Italian right was also a donation of the city, but without suffrage: they who were in either of these leagues, were govern’d by their own laws and magistrats, having all the rights, as to liberty, of citizens of Rome, yielding and paying to the commonwealth as head of the league, and having in the conduct of all affairs appertaining to the common cause, such aid of men and mony as was particularly agreed to upon the merit of the cause, and specify’d in their respective leagues, whence such leagues came to be call’d equal or inequal accordingly.

Provincial leagues were of different extension, according to the merit and capacity of a conquer’d people; but they were all of one kind: for every province was govern’d by Roman magistrats, as a prætor or a proconsul, according to the dignity of the province, for the civil administration and conduct of the provincial army; and a quæstor for the gathering of the public revenue, from which magistrats a province might appeal to Rome.

For the better understanding of these particulars, I shall exemplify in as many of them as is needful: and first in Macedon.

The Macedonians were thrice conquer’d by the Romans, first under the conduct of Titus Quintus Flaminius; secondly, under that of Lucius Æmilius Paulus; and, thirdly, under that of Quintus Cæcilius Metellus, thence call’d Macedonicus.

For the first time Philip of Macedon, who (possest of acrocorinthus) boasted no less than was true, that he had Greece in fetters, being overcom by Flaminius, had his kingdom restor’d to him, upon condition that he should immediatly set all the citys which he held in Greece and in Asia at liberty; and that he should not make war out of Macedon, but by leave of the senat of Rome; which Philip (having no other way to save any thing) agreed should be don accordingly.

The Grecians being at this time assembl’d at the Isthmian games, where the concourse was mighty great, a crier, appointed to the office by Flaminius, was heard among them proclaiming all Greece to be free; to which the people being amaz’d at so hopeless a thing, gave little credit, till they receiv’d such testimony of the truth as put it past all doubt, wherupon they fell immediatly on running to the proconsul with flowers and garlands, and such violent expressions of their admiration and joy, as, if Flaminius, a young man, about thirty-three, had not also bin very strong, he must have dy’d of no other death than their kindness, while every one striving to touch his hand, they bore him up and down the field with an unruly throng, full of such ejaculations as these: How! Is there a people in the world, that at their own charge, at their own peril, will fight for the liberty of another? Did they live at the next door to this fire? Or what kind of men are these, whose business it is to pass the seas, that the world may be govern’d with righteousness? The citys of Greece and of Asia shake off their iron fetters at the voice of a cryer! Was it madness to imagin such a thing, and is it don? O virtue! O felicity! O fame!

In this example your lordships have a donation of liberty, or of Italian right to a people, by restitution to what they had formerly injoy’d; and som particular men, familys or citys, according to their merit of the Romans, if not upon this, yet upon the like occasions, were gratify’d with latinity.

But Philip’s share by this means did not please him, wherfore the league was broken by his son Perseus; and the Macedonians therupon for the second time conquer’d by Æmilius Paulus, their king taken, and they som time after the victory summon’d to the tribunal of the general; where remembring how little hope they ought to have of pardon, they expected som dreadful sentence: when Æmilius in the first place declar’d the Macedonians to be free, in the full possession of their lands, goods, and laws, with right to elect annual magistrats, yielding and paying to the people of Rome one half of the tribute which they were accustom’d to pay to their own kings. This don he went on, making so skilful a division of the country in order to the methodizing of the people, and casting them into the form of popular government, that the Macedonians, being first surpriz’d with the virtue of the Romans, began now to alter the scene of their admiration, that a stranger should do such things for them in their own country, and with such facility, as they had never so much as once imagin’d to be possible. Nor was this all; for Æmilius, as if not dictating to conquer’d enemys, but to som well-deserving friends, gave them in the last place laws so suitable, and contriv’d with such care and prudence, that long use and experience (the only correctress of works of this nature) could never find a fault in them.

In this example you have a donation of liberty, or of Italian right, to a people that had not tasted of it before, but were now taught how to use it.

My lords, the royalists should compare what we are doing, and we what hitherto we have don for them, with this example. It is a shame that while we are boasting up our selves above all others, we should yet be so far from imitating such examples as these, that we do not so much as understand that if government be the parent of manners, where there are no heroic virtues, there is no heroic government.

But the Macedonians rebelling, at the name of a false Philip, the third time against the Romans were by them judg’d incapable of liberty, and reduc’d by Metellus to a province.

Now wheras it remains, that I explain the nature of a province, I shall rather chuse that of Sicily, because having bin the first which the Romans made, the descriptions of the rest relate to it.

WE have so receiv’d the Sicilian citys into amity, says Cicero, that they injoy their antient laws; and upon no other condition than of the same obedience to the people of Rome, which they formerly yielded to their own princes or superiors. So the Sicilians, wheras they had bin parcel’d out to divers princes, and into divers states (the cause of perpetual wars, wherby, hewing one another down, they became sacrifices to the ambition of their neighbors, or of som invader) were now receiv’d at the old rate into a new protection which could hold them, and in which no enemy durst touch them; nor was it possible, as the case then stood, for the Sicilians to receive, or for the Romans to give more.

A Roman province is defin’d by Sigonius, a region having provincial right. Provincial right in general was to be govern’d by a Roman prætor, or consul, in matters at least of state, and of the militia: and by a quæstor, whose office it was to receive the public revenue. Provincial right in particular was different, according to the different leagues or agreements between the commonwealth, and the people reduc’d into a province. Siculi hoc jure sunt, ut quod civis cum cive agat, domi certet suis legibus; quod siculus cum siculo non ejusdem civitatis, ut de eo prætor judices, ex P. Rupilii decreto, sortiatur. Quod privatus a populo petit, aut populus a privato, senatus ex aliqua civitate, qui judicet, datur, cui alternæ civitates rejectæ sunt. Quod vivis Romanus a siculo petit, siculus judex datur; quod siculus a cive Romano, civis Romanus datur. Cæterarum rerum selecti judices ex civium Romanorum conventu proponi solent. Inter aratores & decumanos lege frumentaria, quam Hicronicam appellant, judicia fiunt. Because the rest would oblige me to a discourse too large for this place, it shall suffice that I have shew’d you how it was in Sicily.

My lords, Upon the fabric of your provincial orb I shall not hold you; because it is sufficiently describ’d in the order, and I cannot believe that you think it inferior to the way of a prætor and a quæstor. But wheras the provincial way of the Roman commonwealth was that wherby it held the empire of the world, and your orbs are intended to be capable at least of the like use; there may arise many controversys: as whether such a course be lawful; whether it be feizible; and, seeing that the Romans were ruin’d upon that point, whether it would not be to the destruction of the commonwealth.

For the first, If the empire of a commonwealth be an occasion to ask whether it be lawful for a commonwealth to aspire to the empire of the world, it is to ask whether it be lawful for it to do its duty, or to put the world into a better condition than it was before.

And to ask whether this be feizible, is to ask why the Oceaner, being under the like administration of government, may not do as much with two hundred men as the Roman did with one hundred; for comparing their commonwealths in their rise, the difference is yet greater: now that Rome (seris avaritia luxuriaque) thro the natural thirst of her constitution, came at length with the fulness of her provinces to burst herself, this is no otherwise to be understood, than as when a man that from his own evil constitution had contracted the dropsy, dys with drinking: it being apparent that in case her agrarian had held, she could never have bin thus ruin’d: and I have already demonstrated that your agrarian being once pois’d, can never break or swerve.

Wherfore to draw towards some conclusion of this discourse, let me inculcat the use, by selecting a few considerations out of many. The regard had in this place to the empire of the world appertains to a well-order’d commonwealth, more especially for two reasons:

“1. The facility of this great enterprize, by a government of the model propos’d.

“2. The danger that you would run in the omission of such a government.

The facility of this enterprize, upon the grounds already laid, must needs be great, forasmuch as the empire of the world has bin, both in reason and experience, the necessary consequence of a commonwealth of this nature only: for tho it has bin given to all kinds to drive at it, since that of Athens or Lacedemon, if the one had not hung in the other’s light might have gain’d it; yet could neither of them have held it: not Athens, thro the manner of her propagation, which, being by downright tyranny, could not preserve what she had; nor Lacedemon, because she was overthrown by the weight of a less conquest. The facility then of this great enterprize being peculiar to popular government, I shall consider it, first, In gaining; and secondly, In holding

For the former, volenti non fit injuria; it is said of the people under Eumenes, that they would not have chang’d their subjection for liberty; wherfore the Romans gave them no disturbance. If a people be contented with their government, it is a certain sign that it is good, and much good do them with it. The sword of your magistracy is for a terror to them that do evil. Eumenes had the sear of God, or of the Romans before his eys; concerning such he has given you no commission.

But till we can say here are the Romans, where is Eumenes? do not think that the late appearances of God to you have bin altogether for your selves; he has surely seen the affliction of your brethren, and heard their cry by reason of their taskmasters. For to believe otherwise, is not only to be mindless of his ways, but altogether deaf. If you have ears to hear, this is the way in which you will certainly be call’d upon: for if, while there is no stock of liberty, no sanctuary of the afflicted, it be a common object to behold a people casting themselves out of the pan of one prince into the fire of another; what can you think, but if the world should see the Roman eagle again, she would renew her age, and her flight? nor did ever she spread her wings with better omen, than will be read in your ensigns; which if, call’d in by an oppress’d people they interpose between them and their yoke, the people themselves must either do nothing in the mean time, or have no more pains to take for their wish’d fruit than to gather it, if that be not likewise don for them. Wherfore this must needs be easy, and yet you have a greater facility than is in the arm of flesh; for if the cause of mankind be the cause of God, the Lord of Hosts will be your captain, and you shall be a praise to the whole earth.

The facility of holding is in the way of your propagation; if you take that of Athens and Lacedemon, you shall rain snares; but either catch, or hold nothing. Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord: if setting up for liberty, you impose yokes, he will infallibly destroy you. On the other side, to go about a work of this nature by a league without a head, is to abdicat that magistracy, wherwith he has not only indu’d you, but wherof he will require an account of you; for, cursed is he that dos the work of the Lord negligently. Wherfore you are to take the course of Rome: if you have subdu’d a nation that is capable of liberty, you shall make them a present of it, as did Flaminius to Greece, and Æmilius to Macedon, reserving to your selves some part of that revenue which was legally paid to the former government, together with the right of being head of the league, which includes such levys of men and mony as shall be necessary for the carrying on of the public work. For if a people have by your means attain’d to freedom, they ow both to the cause and you, such aid as may propagat the like fruit to the rest of the world. But wheras every nation is not capable of her liberty to this degree, lest you be put to doing and undoing of things, as the Romans were in Macedon, you shall diligently observe what nation is fit for her liberty to this degree, and what not: which is to be don by two marks, the first if she be willing to help the Lord against the mighty; for if she has no care of the liberty of mankind, she deserves not her own. But because in this you may be deceiv’d by pretences, which, continuing for a while specious, may afterwards vanish; the other is more certain, and that is if she be capable of an equal agrarian; which that it was not observ’d by excellent Æmilius in his donation of liberty, and introduction of a popular state among the Macedonians, I am more than mov’d to believe for two reasons: the first, because at the same time the agrarian was odious to the Roman Patricians; the second, that the Pseudo-Philip could afterwards so easily recover Macedon, which could not have happen’d but by the nobility, and their impatience, having great estates, to be equal’d with the people; for that the people should otherwise, at the mere sound of a name, have thrown away their liberty, is incredible. Wherfore be assur’d, that the nation where you cannot establish an equal agrarian, is incapable of its liberty as to this kind of donation. For example, except the aristocracy in Marpesia be dissolv’d, neither can that people have their liberty there, nor you govern at home; for they continuing still liable to be sold by their lords to foren princes, there will never (especially in a country of which there is no other profit to be made) be want of such merchants and drovers, while you must be the market where they are to receive their second payment.

Nor can the aristocracy there be dissolv’d but by your means, in relation wherto you are provided with your provincial orb; which being proportion’d to the measure of the nation that you have vindicated or conquer’d, will easily hold it: for there is not a people in the world more difficult to be held than the Marpesians, which tho by themselves it be ascrib’d to their own nature, is truly to be attributed to that of their country. Nevertheless you having nine thousand men upon the continual guard of it, that, threaten’d by any sudden insurrection, have places of retreat; and an army of forty thousand men upon a day’s warning ready to march to their rescue; it is not to be rationally shewn which way they can possibly slip out of your hands. And if a man should think that upon a province more remote and divided by the sea, you have not the like hold, he has not so well consider’d your wings as your talons, your shipping being of such a nature, as makes the descent of your armys almost of equal facility in any country: so that what you take you hold, both because your militia, being already populous, will be of great growth in it self; and also thro your confederats, by whom in taking and holding you are still more inabled to do both.

Nor shall you easier hold, than the people under your empire or patronage may be held. My lords, I would not go to the door to see whether it be close shut; this is no underhand dealing, nor a game at which he shall have any advantage against you who sees your cards, but on the contrary the advantage shall be your own: for with eighteen thousand men (which number I put, because it circulats your orb by the annual change of six thousand) having establish’d your matters in the order shewn, you will be able to hold the greatest province; and eighteen thousand men, allowing them greater pay than any prince ever gave, will not stand the province in one million revenue;* in consideration wherof, they shall have their own estates free to themselves, and be govern’d by their own laws and magistrats; which, if the revenue of the province be in dry rent (as there may be som that are four times as big as Oceana) forty millions, will bring it with that of industry to speak with the least to twice the value: so that the people there, who at this day are so opprest that they have nothing at all wheron to live, shall for one million paid to you, receive at least seventy nine to their proper use: in which place I appeal to any man, whether the empire describ’d can be other than the patronage of the world.

Now if you add to the propagation of civil liberty (so natural to this commonwealth that it cannot be omitted) the propagation of the liberty of conscience, this empire, this patronage of the world is the kingdom of Christ: for as the kingdom of God the father was a commonwealth, so shall the kingdom of God the son; the people shall be willing in the day of his power.Psal. 110. 3.

Having shew’d you in this and other places, som of those inestimable benefits of this kind of government, together with the natural and facil emanation of them from their fountain, I com (lest God who has appear’d to you, for he is the God of nature, in the glorious constellation of these subordinat causes, wherof we have hitherto bin taking the true elevation, should shake off the dust of his feet against you) to warn you of the dangers which you, not taking the opportunity, will incur by omission.

MACHIAVEL speaking of the defect of Venice, thro her want of proper arms, crys our,* This cut her wings, and spoil’d her mount to heaven. If you lay your commonwealth upon any other foundation than the people, you frustrat your self of proper arms, and so lose the empire of the world; nor is this all, but som other nation will have it.

COLUMBUS offer’d gold to one of your kings, thro whose happy incredulity another prince has drunk the poison, even to the consumtion of his people; but I do not offer you a nerve of war that is made of pursestrings, such a one as has drawn the face of the earth into convulsions, but such as is natural to her health and beauty. Look you to it, where there is tumbling and tossing upon the bed of sickness, it must end in death or recovery. Tho the people of the world, in the dregs of the Gothic empire, be yet tumbling and tossing upon the bed of sickness, they cannot dy; nor is there any means of recovery for them but by antient prudence, whence of necessity it must com to pass, that this drug be better known. If France, Italy, and Spain, were not all sick, all corrupted together, there would be none of them so; for the sick would not be able to withstand the sound, nor the sound to preserve their health without curing of the sick. The first of these nations (which, if you stay her leisure, will in my mind be France) that recovers the health of antient prudence, shall certainly govern the world; for what did Italy when she had it? and as you were in that, so shall you in the like case be reduced to a province; I do not speak at random. Italy, in the consulship of Lucius Æmilius Papus, and Caius Atilius Regulus, arm’d upon the Gallic tumult that then happen’d of her self, and without the aid of foren auxiliarys, seventy thousand horse, and seven hundred thousand foot: but as Italy is the least of those three countrys in extent, so is France now the most populous.

I, decus, I, nostrum, melioribus utere fatis.

MY dear lords, Oceana is as the rose of Sharon, and the lilly of the vally. As the lilly among thorns, such is my love among the daughters. She is comly as the tents of Kedar, and terrible as an army with banners. Her neck is as the tower of David, builded for an armory, whereon there hang a thousand bucklers and shields of mighty men. Let me hear thy voice in the morning, whom my soul loves. The south has drop’d, and the west is breathing upon thy garden of spices. Arise, queen of the earth, arise, holy spouse of Jesus; for lo the winter is past, the rain is over and gon; the flowers appear on the earth, the time for the singing of birds is com, and the voice of the turtle is heard in our land. Arise, I say, com forth, and do not tarry: ah! wherfore should my eys behold thee by the rivers of Babylon, hanging thy harps upon the willows, thou fairest among women?

Excellent PATRIOTS; if the people be soverain, here is that which establishes their prerogative: if we be sincere, here is that which disburdens our souls, and makes good all our ingagements: if we be charitable, here is that which imbraces all partys: if we would be settl’d, here is that which will stand, and last for ever.

If our religion be any thing else but a vain boast, scratching and defacing human nature or reason, which, being the image of God, makes it a kind of murder; here is that empire whence justice shall run down like a river, and judgment like a mighty stream.Amos 5 24. Who is it then that calls us? or what is in our way? a lion! is it not the dragon that old serpent? for what wretched shifts are these? here is a great deal, might we not have som of this at one time, and som at another?

My LORDS, permit me to give you the sum, or brief

Epitome of the whole Commonwealth.

THE center or fundamental laws are, first, the agrarian, proportion’d at two thousand pounds a year in land, lying and being within the proper territory of Oceana, and stating property in land at such a balance, that the power can never swerve out of the hands of the many.

SECONDLY, the ballot conveying this equal sap from the root, by an equal election or rotation, into the branches of magistracy or soverain power.

THE orbs of this commonwealth being civil, military or provincial, are, as it were, cast upon this mold or center by the divisions of the people; first, into citizens and servants: secondly, into youth and elders: thirdly, into such as have one hundred pounds a year in lands, goods or monys, who are of the horse; and such as have under, who are of the foot: fourthly, they are divided by their usual residence, into parishes, hundreds, and tribes.

THE civil orbs consist of the elders, and are thus created; every Monday next insuing the last of December, the elders in every parish elect the fifth man to be a deputy; which is but half a day’s work: every Monday next insuing the last of January, the deputys meet at their respective hundred, and elect out of their number one justice of the peace, one juryman, one coroner, and one high constable of the foot; one day’s work.

EVERY Monday next insuing the last of February, the hundreds meet at their respective tribe, and there elect the lords high sherif, lieutenant, custos rotulorum, the conductor, the two censors out of the horse, the magistrats of the tribe and of the hundreds, with the jurymen constituting the phylarch, and who assist in their respective offices at the assizes, hold the quarter-sessions, &c. The day following the tribe elects the annual galaxy, consisting of two knights, and three deputys out of the horse, with four deputys out of the foot, therby indu’d with power, as magistrats of the whole nation, for the term of three years. An officer chosen at the hundred may not be elected a magistrat of the tribe; but a magistrat or officer either of the hundred or of the tribe, being elected into the galaxy, may substitute any one of his own order to his magistracy or office in the hundred, or in the tribe. This of the muster is two days work. So the body of the people is annually, at the charge of three days work and a half, in their own tribes, for the perpetuation of their power, receiving over and above the magistracys so divided among them.

EVERY Monday next insuing the last of March, the knights, being a hundred in all the tribes, take their places in the senat; the knights, having taken their places in the senat, make the third region of the same; and the house procedes to the senatorian elections. Senatorian elections are annual, biennial, or emergent.

THE annual are perform’d by the tropic.

THE tropic is a schedule consisting of two parts; the first by which the senatorian magistrats are elected; and the second, by which the senatorian councils are perpetuated.

THE first part is of this tenor:

THE lord strategus, } Annual magistrats, and therefore such as may be elected out of any region; the term of every region having at the tropic one year at the least unexpir’d.
THE lord orator, } Annual magistrats, and therefore such as may be elected out of any region; the term of every region having at the tropic one year at the least unexpir’d.
THE first censor, } Annual magistrats, and therefore such as may be elected out of any region; the term of every region having at the tropic one year at the least unexpir’d.
THE second censor, } Annual magistrats, and therefore such as may be elected out of any region; the term of every region having at the tropic one year at the least unexpir’d.
THE third commissioner of the seal, } Triennial magistrats, and therefore such as can be chosen out of the third region only, as that alone which has the term of three years unexpir’d.
THE third commissioner of the treasury, } Triennial magistrats, and therefore such as can be chosen out of the third region only, as that alone which has the term of three years unexpir’d.

THE strategus and the orator sitting, are consuls, or presidents of the senat.

THE strategus marching is general of the army, in which case a new strategus is to be elected in his room.

THE strategus sitting with six commissioners, being counsillors of the nation, are the signory of the commonwealth.

THE censors are magistrats of the ballot, presidents of the council for religion, and chancellors of the universitys.

THE second part of the tropic perpetuats the council of state, by the election of five knights out of the first region of the senat, to be the first region of that council consisting of fifteen knights, five in every region.

THE like is don by the election of four into the council of religion, and four into the council of trade, out of the same region in the senat; each of these councils consisting of twelve knights, four in every region.

BUT the council of war consisting of nine knights, three in every region, is elected by and out of the council of state, as the other councils are elected by and out of the senat. And if the senat add a juncta of nine knights more, elected out of their own number, for the term of three months, the council of war by virtue of that addition, is dictator of Oceana for the said term.

THE signory jointly or severally has right of session and suffrage in every senatorial council, and to propose either to the senat, or any of them. And every region in a council electing one weekly provost, any two of those provosts have power also to propose to their respective council, as the proper and peculiar proposers of the same: for which cause they hold an academy, where any man either by word of mouth, or writing, may propose to the proposers.

NEXT to the elections of the tropic is the biennial election of one embassador in ordinary, by the ballot of the house, to the residence of France; at which time the resident of France removes to Spain, he of Spain to Venice, he of Venice to Constantinople, and he of Constantinople returns. So the orb of the residents is wheel’d about in eight years, by the biennial election of one embassador in ordinary.

THE last kind of election is emergent. Emergent elections are made by the scrutiny. Election by scrutiny is when a competitor being made by a council, and brought into the senat, the senat chuses four more competitors to him; and putting all five to the ballot, he who has most above half the suffrages, is the magistrat. The polemarchs or field officers are chosen by the scrutiny of the council of war; an embassador extraordinary by the scrutiny of the council of state; the judges and serjeants at law by the scrutiny of the seal; and the barons and prime officers of the exchequer, by the scrutiny of the treasury.

THE opinion or opinions that are legitimatly propos’d to any council must be debated by the same, and so many as are resolv’d upon the debate are introduc’d into the senat, where they are debated and resolved, or rejected by the whole house: that which is resolv’d by the senat is a decree which is good in matters of state, but no law, except it be propos’d to and resolv’d by the prerogative.

THE deputys of the galaxy being three horse and four foot in a tribe, amount in all the tribes to one hundred and fifty horse, and two hundred foot; which, having enter’d the prerogative, and chosen their captains, cornet and ensign (triennial officers) make the third classis, consisting of one troop, and one company; and so joining with the whole prerogative, elect four annual magistrats, call’d tribuns, wherof two are of the horse, and two of the foot. These have the command of the prerogative sessions, and suffrage in the council of war, and sessions without suffrage in the senat.

THE senat having past a decree which they would propose to the people, cause it to be printed and publish’d, or promulgated for the space of six weeks; which being order’d, they chuse their proposers. The proposers must be magistrats, that is, the commissioners of the seal, those of the treasury, or the censors. These being chosen, desire the muster of the tribuns, and appoint the day. The people being assembl’d at the day appointed, and the decree propos’d, that which is propos’d by authority of the senat, and commanded by the people, is the law of Oceana, or an act of parlament.

SO the parlament of Oceana consists of the senat proposing, and the people resolving.

THE people or prerogative are also the supreme judicatory of this nation, having power of hearing and determining all causes of appeal from all magistrats, or courts provincial, or domestic; as also to question any magistrat, the term of his magistracy being expir’d, if the case be introduc’d by the tribuns, or any one of them.

THE military orbs consist of the youth, that is, such as are from eighteen to thirty years of age; and are created in the following manner:

EVERY Wednesday next ensuing the last of December, the youth of every parish assembling, elect the fifth of their number to be their deputys; the deputys of the youth are call’d stratiots, and this is the first essay.

EVERY Wednesday next insuing the last of January, the stratiots assembling at the hundred, elect their captain and their ensign, and fall to their games and sports.

EVERY Wednesday next insuing the last of February, the stratiots are receiv’d by the lord lieutenant their commander in chief, with the conductors and the censors; and, having bin disciplin’d and entertain’d with other games, are call’d to the urns, where they elect the second essay, consisting of two hundred horse and six hundred foot in a tribe; that is, of ten thousand horse, and thirty thousand foot in all the tribes, which is the standing army of this nation, to march at any warning. They also elect at the same time a part of the third essay, by the mixture of balls mark’d with the letter M. and the letter P. for Marpesia and Panopea; they of either mark being ten horse and fifty foot in a tribe, that is, five hundred horse, and two thousand five hundred foot in all the tribes, which are forthwith to march to their respective provinces.

BUT the third essay of this nation more properly so call’d, is when the strategus with the polemarchs (the senat and the people, or the dictator having decreed a war) receive in return of his warrants the second essay from the hands of the conductors at the rendevous of Oceana; which army marching with all accommodations provided by the council of war, the senat elects a new strategus, and the lords lieutenants a new second essay.

A YOUTH, except he be an only son, refusing any one of his three essays, without sufficient cause shewn to the phylarch or the censors, is incapable of magistracy, and is fin’d a fifth part of his yearly rent, or of his estate, for protection. In case of invasion the elders are oblig’d to like duty with the youth, and upon their own charge.

THE provincial orb consisting in part of the elders, and in part of the youth, is thus created:

FOUR knights out of the first region falling, are elected in the senat to be the first region of the provincial orb of Marpesia; these being triennial magistrats, take their places in the provincial council, consisting of twelve knights, four in every region, each region chusing their weekly provosts of the council thus constituted. One knight more chosen out of the same region in the senat, being an annual magistrat, is president, with power to propose; and the opinions propos’d by the president, or any two of the provosts, are debated by the council, and, if there be occasion of farther power or instruction than they yet have, transmitted to the council of state, with which the provincial is to hold intelligence.

THE president of this council is also strategus, or general of the provincial army; wherfore the conductors upon notice of his election, and appointment of his rendevous, deliver to him the stratiots of his letter, which he takes with him into his province: and the provincial army having receiv’d the new strategus with the third classis, the council dismisses the old strategus with the first classis. The like is don for Panopea, or any other province.

BUT wheras the term of every other magistracy or election in this commonwealth, whether annual or triennial, requires an equal vacation, the term of a provincial counsiller or magistrat requires no vacation at all. The quorum of a provincial, as also that of every other council and assembly, requires two thirds in a time of health, and one third in a time of sickness.

I think I have omitted nothing but the props and scaffolds, which are not of use but in building. And how much is here? shew me another commonwealth in this compass? how many things? shew me another intire government consisting but of thirty orders. If you now go to law with any body, there ly to som of our courts two hundred original writs: if you stir your hand, there go more nerves and bones to that motion: if you play, you have more cards in the pack; nay you could not sit with your ease in that chair, if it consisted not of more parts. Will you not then allow to your legislator, what you can afford your upholster; or to the throne, what is necessary to a chair?

My LORDS, if you will have fewer orders in a commonwealth, you will have more; for where she is not perfect at first, every day, every hour will produce a new order, the end wherof is to have no order at all, but to grind with the clack of som demagog. Is he providing already for his golden thum? lift up your heads; away with ambition, that fulsom complexion of a statesman, temper’d, like Sylla’s, with blood and muck. And the Lord give to his senators wisdom; and make our faces to shine, that we may be a light to them that sit in darkness and the shadow of death, to guide their feet in the way of peace.—In the name of God, what’s the matter!

Philadelphus the secretary of the council having perform’d his task in reading the several orders as you have seen, upon the receipt of a packet from his correspondent Boccalini, secretary of Parnassus, in reading one of the letters, burst forth into such a violent passion of weeping and downright howling, that the legislators being startled with the apprehension of som horrid news; one of them had no sooner snatch’d the letter out of his hand, than the rest crying, read, read, he obey’d in this manner:

THE 3d instant his Phœbean majesty having taken the nature of free states into his royal consideration, and being steadily perswaded that the laws in such governments are incomparably better and more surely directed to the good of mankind than in any other; that the courage of such a people is the aptest tinder to noble fire; that the genius of such a soil is that wherin the roots of good literature are least worm-eaten with pedantism, and where their fruits have ever com to the greatest maturity and highest relish; conceiv’d such a loathing of their ambition and tyranny, who, usurping the liberty of their native countrys, becom slaves to themselves, inasmuch as (be it never so contrary to their own nature or consciences) they have taken the earnest of sin, and are ingag’d to persecute all men that are good with the same or greater rigor than is ordain’d by laws for the wicked:Trajano Boccalini, Centuria 1. Raggual. 21. for* none ever administer’d that power by good, which he purchas’d by ill arts: Phoebus, I say, having consider’d this, assembl’d all the senators residing in the learned court at the theatre of Melpomene, where he caus’d Cæsar the dictator to com upon the stage, and his sister Actia, his nephew Augustus, Julia his daughter, with the children which she had by Marcus Agrippa, Lucius and Caius Cæsars, Agrippa Posthumus, Julia, and Agrippina, with the numerous progeny which she bore to her renown’d husband Germanicus, to enter. A miserable scene in any, but most deplorable in the eys of Cæsar, thus beholding what havock his prodigious ambition, not satisfy’d with his own bloody ghost, had made upon his more innocent remains, even to the total extinction of his family. For it is (seeing where there is any humanity, there must be som compassion) not to be spoken without tears, that of the full branches deriving from Octavia the eldest sister, and Julia the daughter of Augustus, there should not be one fruit or blossom that was not cut off or blasted by the sword, famin, or poison. Now might the great soul of Cæsar have bin full; and yet that which pour’d in as much or more, was to behold that execrable rate of the Claudii having hunted and suck’d his blood with the thirst of tigers, to be rewarded with the Roman empire, and remain in full possession of that famous patrimony: a spectacle to pollute the light of heaven! nevertheless as if Cæsar had not yet enough, his Phœbean majesty caus’d to be introauc’d on the other side of the theatre, the most illustrious and happy prince Andrea Doria, with his dear posterity, imbrac’d by the soft and constant arms of the city of Genoa, into whose bosom, ever fruitful in her gratitude, he had dropt her fair Liberty like the dew of heaven; which when the Roman tyrant beheld, and how much more fresh that laurel was worn with a firm root in the hearts of the people, than that which he had torn off, he fell into such a horrid distortion of limbs and countenance, that the senators who had thought themselves steel and flint at such an object, having hitherto stood in their reverend snowlike thawing Alps, now cover’d their faces with their large sleeves.

MY lords, said the Archon rising, witty Philadelphus has given us grave admonition in dreadful tragedy. Discite justitiam moniti, & non temnere divos. Great and glorious Cæsar, the highest character of flesh, yet could not rule but by that part of man which is the beast: but a commonwealth is a monarchy; to her God is king, in as much as reason, his dictat, is her soverain power.”

Which said, he adjourn’d the council. And the model was soon after promulgated. Quod bonum, fœlix, faustumque sit huic reipublicæ. Agite quirites, censuere patres, jubeat populus: The sea roar’d, and the floods clapt their hands.

The Proclamation of his Highness the Lord Archon of Oceana upon Promulgation of the Model.

See the course of the decemvirs in the promulgation of the first ten of their twelve tables in LIVY.WHeras his highness and the council, in the framing of the model promulgated, have not had any private interest, or ambition, but the fear of God, and the good of this people before their eys; and it remains their desire that this great work may be carry’d on accordingly: This present greeting is to inform the good people of this land, that as the council of prytans sat during the framing of the model, to receive from time to time such propositions as should be offer’d by any wisehearted or public spirited man, towards the institution of a well-order’d commonwealth, so the said council is to sit as formerly in the great hall of the pantheon during promulgation (which is to continue for the space of three months) to receive, weigh, and, as there shall be occasion, transmit to the council of legislators, all such objections as shall be made against the said model, whether in the whole, or in any part. Wherfore that nothing be don rashly, or without the consent of the people, such, of what party soever, with whom there may remain any doubts or difficultys, are desir’d with all convenient speed to address themselves to the said prytans; where, if such objections, doubts, or difficultys, receive solution to the satisfaction of the auditory, they shall have public thanks: but if the said objections, doubts, or difficultys, receive no solution to the satisfaction of the auditory then the model promulgated shall be reviewed, and the party that was the occasion of the review, shall receive public thanks, together with the best horse in his highness’s stable, and be one of the council of legislators. And so God have you in his keeping.

I should now write the same council of the prytans, but for two reasons; the one, that having had but a small time for that which is already don, I am overlabour’d; the other, that there may be new objections. Wherfore, if my reader has any such as to the model, I intreat him to address himself by way of oration, as it were, to the prytans, that when this rough draught coms to be a work, his speech being faithfully inserted in this place, may give or receive correction to amendment: for what is written will be weigh’d. But conversation, in these days, is a game, at which they are best provided that have light gold: it is like the sport of women that make flowers of straws, which must be stuck up, but may not be touch’d. Nor, which is worse, is this the fault of conversation only: but to the examiner, I say, If to invent method, and teach an art, be all one, let him shew that this method is not truly invented, or this art is faithfully taught.Arist. Rhet.

I cannot conclude a circle (and such is this commonwealth) without turning the end into the beginning. The time of promulgation being expir’d, the surveyors were sent down, who having in due season made report that their work was perfect, the orators follow’d; under the administration of which officers and magistrats the commonwealth was ratify’d and establish’d by the whole body of the people, in their* parochial, hundred, and county assemblys. And the orators being, by virtue of their scrols or lots, members of their respective tribes, were elected each the first knight of the third list, or galaxy; wherfore having at their return assisted the Archon in putting the senat and the people or prerogative into motion, they abdicated the magistracy both of orators and legislators.


FOR the rest (says Plutarch, closing up the story of Lycurgus) when he saw that his government had taken root, and was in the very plantation strong enough to stand by it self, he conceiv’d such a delight within him, as GOD is describ’d by Plato to have don when he had finish’d the creation of the world, and saw his own orbs move below him: for in the art of man (being the imitation of nature, which is the art of GOD) there is nothing so like the first call of beautiful order out of chaos and confusion, as the architecture of a well-order’d commonwealth. Wherfore Lycurgus seeing in effect, that his orders were good, fell into deep contemplation how he might render them, so far as could be effected by human providence, inalterable and immortal. To which end he assembl’d the people, and remonstrated to them, That for ought he could perceive, their policy was already such, and so well establish’d, as was sufficient to intail upon them and theirs all that virtue and felicity wherof human life is capable: nevertheless that there being another thing of greater concern than all the rest, wherof he was not yet provided to give them a perfect account, nor could till he had consulted the oracle of Apollo, he desired that they would observe his laws without any change or alteration whatsoever, till his return from Delphos; to which all the people chearfully and unanimously ingag’d themselves by promise, desiring him that he would make as much haste as he could. But Lycurgus, before he went, began with the kings and the senators, and thence taking the whole people in order, made them all swear to that which they had promis’d, and then took his journy. Being arriv’d at Delphos, he sacrific’d to Apollo, and afterwards inquir’d if the policy which he had establish’d, was good and sufficient for a virtuous and happy life? By the way it has bin a maxim with legislators not to give checks to the present superstition, but to make the best use of it, as that which is always the most powerful with the people; otherwise tho Plutarch being a priest, was interested in the cause, there is nothing plainer than Cicero in his book De Divinatione has made it, that there was never any such thing as an oracle, except in the cunning of the priests. But to be civil to the author, The God answer’d to Lycurgus, that his policy was exquisit, and that his city, holding to the strict observation of his form of government, should attain to the height of fame and glory. Which oracle Lycurgus causing to be written, fail’d not of transmitting to his Lacedemon. This don, that his citizens might be for ever inviolably bound by their oath, that they would alter nothing till his return, he took so firm a resolution to dy in the place, that from thenceforward receiving no manner of food, he soon after perform’d it accordingly. Nor was he deceiv’d in the consequence; for his city became the first in glory and excellency of government in the whole world. And so much for Lycurgus, according to Plutarch.

My lord Archon, when he beheld not only the rapture of motion, but of joy and harmony, into which his spheres (without any manner of obstruction or interfering, but as if it had been naturally) were cast, conceiv’d not less of exultation in his spirit; but saw no more necessity or reason why he should administer an oath to the senat and the people that they would observe his institutions, than to a man in perfect health and felicity of constitution, that he would not kill himself. Nevertheless wheras Christianity, tho it forbids violent hands, consists no less in selfdenial than any other religion, he resolv’d that all unreasonable desires should dy upon the spot; to which end that no manner of food might be left to ambition, he enter d into the senat with a unanimous applause, and having spoken of his government as Lycurgus did when he assembl’d the people, he abdicated the magistracy of Archon. The senat, as struck with astonishment, continu’d silent; men upon so sudden an accident being altogether unprovided of what to say; till the Archon withdrawing, and being almost at the door, divers of the knights flew from their places, offering as it were to lay violent hands on him, while he escaping left the senat with the tears in their eyes, of children that had lost their father; and to rid himself of all farther importunity, retir’d to a country house of his, being remote, and very privat, in so much that no man could tell for some time what was becom of him.Never ingratitude, but too much love, the constant fault of the people. Thus the lawmaker happen’d to be the first object and reflection of the law made: for as liberty of all things is the most welcom to a people, so is there nothing more abhorrent from their nature than ingratitude. We accusing the Roman people of this crime against som of their greatest benefactors, as Camillus, heap mistake upon mistake; for being not so competent judges of what belongs to liberty as they were, we take upon us to be more competent judges of virtue. And wheras virtue, for being a vulgar thing among them, was of no less rate than jewels are with such as wear the most; we are selling this precious stone, which we have ignorantly rak’d out of the Roman ruins at such a rate as the Switzers did that which they took in the baggage of Charles of Burgundy. For that Camillus had stood more firm against the ruin of Rome than her capitol, was acknowleg’d; but on the other side that he stood as firm for the Patricians against the liberty of the people, was as plain: wherfore he never wanted those of the people that would dy at his foot in the field, nor that would withstand him to his beard in the city. An example in which they that think Camillus had wrong, neither do themselves right, nor the people of Rome; who in this signify no less than that they had a scorn of slavery beyond the fear of ruin, which is the height of magnanimity. The like might be shewn by other examples objected against this, and other popular governments, as in the banishment of Aristides the Just from Athens, by the ostracism, which, first, was no punishment, nor ever understood for so much as a disparagement; but tended only to the security of the commonwealth, thro the removal of a citizen (whose riches or power with a party was suspected) out of harm’s way for the space of ten years, neither to the diminution of his estate or honor. And next, tho the virtue of Aristides might in it self be unquestion’d, yet for him under the name of the Just to becom universal umpire of the people in all cases, even to the neglect of the legal ways and orders of the commonwealth, approach’d so much to the prince, that the Athenians, doing Aristides no wrong, did their government no more than right in removing him; which therfore is not so probable to have com to pass, as Plutarch presumes, thro the envy of Themistocles, seeing Aristides was far more popular than Themistocles, who soon after took the same walk upon a worse occasion. Wherfore as Machiavel, for any thing since alledg’d, has irrefragably prov’d that popular governments are of all others the least ingrateful; so the obscurity, I say, int which my lord Archon had now withdrawn himself, caus’d a universal sadness and clouds in the minds of men upon the glory of his rising commonwealth.

Much had bin ventilated in privat discourse, and the people (for the nation was yet divided into partys that had not lost their animositys) being troubl’d, bent their eys upon the senat, when, after some time spent in devotion, and the solemn action of thanksgiving, his excellency Navarchus de Paralo in the tribe of Dorean, lord Strategus of Oceana (tho in a new commonwealth a very prudent magistrat) propos’d his part or opinion in such a manner to the council or state, that passing the ballot of the same with great unanimity and applause, it was introduc’d into the senat, where it past with greater. Wherfore the decree being forthwith printed and publish’d, copys were return’d by the secretarys to the phylarchs (which is the manner of promulgation) and the commissioners of the seal, that is to say, the right honourable Phosphorus de Auge in the tribe of Eudia, Dolabella d’Enyo in the tribe of Turmæ, and Linceus de Stella in the tribe of Nubia, being elected proposers pro tempore, bespoke of the tribuns a muster of the people to be held that day six weeks, which was the time allow’d for promulgation at the Halo

The satisfaction which the people throout the tribes receiv’d upon promulgation of the decree, loaded the carriers with weekly letters between friend and friend, whether magistrats or privat persons. But the day for proposition being com, and the prerogative upon the place appointed in discipline, Sanguine de Ringwood in the tribe of Saltum, captain of the phœnix, march’d by order of the tribuns with his troop to the piazza of the pantheon, where his trumpets entering into the great hall by their blazon gave notice of his arrival; at which the serjeant of the house came down, and returning inform’d the proposers, who descending were receiv’d at the foot of the stairs by the captain, and attended to the coaches of state with which Calcar de Gilvo in the tribe of Phalera master of the horse, and the ballotins upon their great horses, stood waiting at the gate.

The proposers being in their coaches, the train for the pomp, the same that is us’d at the reception of ambassadors, proceded in this order: In the front march’d the troop with the cornet in the van, and the captain in the rear: next the troop came the twenty messengers or trumpets; the ballotins upon the curvet with their usher in the van, and the master of the horse in the rear: next the ballotins, Bronchus de Rauco in the tribe of Bestia king of the heralds, with his fraternity in their coats of arms; and next to Sir Bronchus, Boristhenes de Holiwater in the tribe of Ave, master of the ceremonys: the mace and the seal of the chancery went immediately before the coaches; and on either side, the doorkeepers or guard of the senat, with their poleaxes, accompany’d with som three or four hundred footmen belonging to the knights or senators; the trumpeters, ballotins, guards, postilions, coachmen and footmen, being very gallant in the liverys of the commonwealth; but all, except the ballotins, without hats, in lieu wherof they wore black velvet calots, being pointed with a little peak at the forehead. After the proposers came a long file of coaches full of such gentlemen as use to grace the commonwealth upon the like occasions. In this posture they mov’d slowly thro the streets (affording in the gravity of the pomp, and the welcomness of the end, a most reverend and acceptable prospect to the people all the way from the pantheon, being about half a mile) and arriv’d at the Halo, where they found the prerogative in a close body inviron’d with scaffolds that were cover’d with spectators. The tribuns receiv’d the proposers, and conducted them into a seat plac’d in the front of the tribe, like a pulpit, but that it was of som length, and well adorn’d by the heralds with all manner of birds and beasts, except that they were ill painted, and never a one of his natural color. The tribuns were plac’d at a table that stood below the long seat, those of the horse in the middle, and those of the foot at either end, with each of them a boul or bason before him, that on the right hand being white, and the other green: in the middle of the table stood a third which was red. And the housekeepers of the pavilion, who had already deliver’d a proportion of linen balls or pellets to every one of the tribe, now presented boxes to the ballotins. But the proposers as they enter’d the gallery, or long seat, having put off their hats by way of salutation, were answer’d by the people with a shout; wherupon the younger commissioners seated themselves at either end; and the first standing in the middle, spoke after this manner:

My lords, the people of Oceana,

“WHILE I find in myself what a felicity it is to salute you by this name, and in every face, anointed as it were with the oil of gladness, a full and sufficient testimony of the like sense, to go about to feast you with words, who are already fill’d with that food of the mind, which being of pleasing and wholsom digestion, takes in the definition of true joy, were a needless enterprize. I shall rather put you in mind of that thankfulness which is due, than puff you up with any thing that might seem vain. Is it from the arms of flesh that we derive these blessings? Behold the commonwealth of Rome falling upon her own victorious sword. Or is it from our own wisdom, whose counsils had brought it even to that pass, that we began to repent our selves of victory? Far be it from us, my lords, to sacrifice to our own nets, which we our selves have so narrowly escap’d! Let us rather lay our mouths in the dust, and look up (as was taught the other day when we were better instructed in this lesson) to the hills with our gratitude. Nevertheless seeing we read how God upon the neglect of his prophets has bin provok’d to wrath, it must needs follow that he expects honor should be given to them by whom he has chosen to work as his instruments. For which cause, nothing doubting of my warrant, I shall proceed to that which more particularly concerns the present occasion, the discovery of my lord Archon’s virtues and merit, to be ever plac’d by this nation in their true meridian.

My lords;

I am not upon a subject which persuades me to balk, but necessitats me to seek out the greatest examples. To begin with Alexander erecting trophys common to his sword and the pestilence; To what good of mankind did he infect the air with his heap of carcasses? The sword of war, if it be any otherwise us’d than as the sword of magistracy, for the fear and punishment of those that do evil, is as guilty in the sight of God, as the sword of a murderer; nay more, for if the blood of Abel, of one innocent man, cry’d in the ears of the Lord for vengeance, what shall the blood of an innocent nation? Of this kind of empire, the throne of ambition, and the quarry of a mighty hunter, it has bin truly said, that it is but a great robbery. But if Alexander had restor’d the liberty of Greece, and propagated it to mankind, he had don like my lord Archon, and might have bin truly call’d the Great. Alexander car’d not to steal a victory that would be given: but my lord Archon has torn away a victory which had bin stolen, while we went tamely yielding up obedience to a* nation reaping in our fields, whose fields he has subjected to our empire, and nail’d them with his victorious sword to their native Caucasus.