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“GUSTAVE DE MOLINARI ON WAR AND PEACE”

By David M. Hart

[Created: 14 July, 2026]
[Revised: 14 July, 2026]

This is part of a collection of Papers by David M. Hart

Table of Contents

 


 

Introduction

The Franco-Belgian economist Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912) was one of the longest-lived and prolific classical liberals whose vast body of work is largely unknown today, even among libertarians. [1] He was remarkable in his efforts to apply economic analysis to every aspect of human life such as the family, the church, fashion, prostitution, public buildings and monuments, the rise of towns and cities, and the emergence of the state. [2]

If he is remembered at all it for his 1849 essay on "La production de la sécurité" (the production of security) in which he presented for the first time what later became known as "anarcho-capitalism", i.e. the private provision of police and defence by insurance companies offering their services competitively in a free market. [3] He followed this with a book-length treatment later that same year, Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare, in which he expanded his argument to include the private provision of all so-called "public goods". The private provision of "security" was further elaborated in the 11th "Soirée" or chapter. [4] He would continue to develop these radical ideas for the rest of his life, in spite of the scepticism and even opposition of his fellow political economists. [5]

The private provision of public goods was only one of several strands of his thinking which would occupy him over the course of his long life. They included the following:

  1. opposition to tariffs and protectionism
  2. opposition to coerced labour such as serfdom and slavery
  3. the importance of trade unions and labour exchanges (the working man's equivalent oif the stock exchange) in improving the lot of ordinary workers
  4. the historical evolution of the state and the class rule it engendered
  5. the historical evolution of free markets and the spread of competition
  6. the problem of population growth
  7. opposition to socialism and other forms of government intervention in the economy
  8. opposition to colonialism and imperialism
  9. the connection between religion and moral philosophy and the economy
  10. analysing contemporary politics and economic policies through his journalism and travel writing

These strands of thought were woven into a comprehensive and theoretically consistent social and economic theory of considerable depth and breadth, the only equivalent was that of his contemporary Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) who worked independently of Molinari but along parallel lines. [6] Also like Molinari, Spencer placed at the center of his theory of evolution the transition from the "militant type" of society in which violence and military organisation played the dominant role to the "industrial type" of society which was based upon voluntary cooperation, industrial production, and free exchange. [7] The Guillaumin publishing network in which Molinari moved was aware of Spencer's work and published seven of his works in translation between 1893 and 1899 but it is likely Spencer did not know of Molinari's work. [8]

In this paper I will deal with his writings on war and peace but this topic needs to be seen as being only a part of his much broader social and economic theory.

Molinari on War and Peace

One of Molinari's major interests was in war and peace, an interest which he pursued for over 50 years. He began with three entries on war and peace in the Dictionnaire de l'économie politique (1852-53) [9] and summed up his life's work on this topic in two books written at the end of the century, Grandeur et décadence de la guerre (The Rise and Fall of War) (1898) and Esquisse de l'organisation politique et économique de la Société future (A Sketch of the Political and Economic Organisation of the Society of the Future) (1899), and a third work in the early 20th century, Économie de l'histoire: Théorie de l'Évolution (The Economics of History: A Theory of Evolution) (1908). [10]

In his 1852 DEP entry on "Paix, Guerre" (War and Peace) he begins by saying: [11]

Dire que la paix est essentiellement bienfaisante, c'est énoncer une vérité qu'il est à peine nécessaire de démontrer, un truisme. Pour rendre cette vérité tout à fait sensible, il suffît d'examiner les résultats de la rupture de la paix, de la guerre, ou même du simple risque de guerre.

… that peace is essentially beneficial is to state a truth that hardly needs demonstration—a truism. To make this truth entirely clear, it suffices to examine the consequences of breaking the peace, of war, or even of the mere risk of war.

Envisagée au point de vue économique, la guerre a beaucoup de ressemblance avec l'inondation ou l'incendie. La seule différence qui existe entre ces fléaux, c'est que la guerre est causée par le déchaînement des passions de l'homme, tandis que l'inondation et l'incendie proviennent des débordements des forces de la nature. Mais elles ont un résultat commun : c'est la destruction de la vie des hommes et de leurs richesses. La société est, en conséquence, obligée d'entretenir un matériel spécial pour se préserver des ravages de la guerre, comme elle entretient des digues contre l'inondation et des appareils contre l'incendie.

Viewed from an economic perspective, war bears a strong resemblance to floods or fires. The only difference between these calamities is that war is caused by the unchecked passions of man, while floods and fires result from the uncontrolled forces of nature. But they share a common outcome: the destruction of human lives and wealth. Consequently, society is forced to maintain specialized resources to protect itself from the devastation of war, just as it builds dikes against floods and equips itself with fire prevention systems.

En vain on objectera que la guerre peut être une industrie productive; que les peuples peuvent s'enrichir en faisant la guerre aussi bien qu'en s'adonnant à l'agriculture, à l'industrie, au commerce et aux beaux-arts. L'objection ne résiste pas à un examen sérieux. Supposons que tous les hommes s'adonnent aux travaux pacifiques de la production : tous pourront s'enrichir. Il y a mieux ; les progrès des uns vers la richesse contribueront à la prospérité des autres. Supposons, an contraire, qu'ils détournent une portion de leurs capitaux de l'œuvre de la production pour l'appliquer à l'œuvre destructive de la guerre. La richesse générale ne sera-t-elle pas diminuée, en premier lieu, de toute la quantité de produits que ce capital détourné servait à créer; en second lieu, de toute la quantité de richesse que ce même capital servira désormais à détruire?

One might vainly object that war can be a productive industry—that nations can enrich themselves through war just as they do through agriculture, industry, commerce, and the arts. However, this objection does not withstand serious scrutiny. Suppose that all people devote themselves to peaceful, productive labor: all may grow wealthier. Even better, the progress of some toward prosperity will contribute to the well-being of others. Now suppose, on the contrary, that they divert a portion of their capital from production to the destructive endeavor of war. Will the overall wealth not be diminished, first by the loss of the products that the diverted capital would have created, and second by the additional wealth that this same capital will now be used to destroy?

A la vérité l'opération pourra être profitable, au moins d'une manière temporaire, à ceux qui l'auront entreprise. Elle le sera s'ils réussissent à s'approprier une portion considérable de la richesse d'autrui, sous forme de butin, de contributions de guerre, de conquêtes territoriales, etc. Mais voyez la différence qui existe entre l'industrie productive et l'industrie destructive : tandis que les acquisitions de la première profitent à tout le monde, celles de la seconde finissent, en dernière analyse, par ne profiter à personne. La richesse déplacée par la guerre n'est-elle pas, en effet, ordinairement dissipée dans l'oisiveté et la débauche? En outre, les peuples aux dépens desquels elle a été acquise ne finissent-ils pas le plus souvent par se réunir contre les spoliateurs et par leur ravir le fruit de leurs rapines? Si donc ceux-ci avaient continué de se livrer aux travaux pacifiques de la production, la richesse des autres peuples n'aurait reçu aucune atteinte, tandis que leur propre existence eût été plus assurée et leur prospérité plus durable.

It is true that war may be profitable—at least temporarily—for those who undertake it. This will be the case if they succeed in seizing a substantial share of the wealth of others, in the form of booty, war taxes, territorial conquests, and so forth. But consider the difference between productive industry and destructive industry: while the gains of the former benefit everyone, those of the latter ultimately benefit no one. The wealth displaced by war is ordinarily squandered in idleness and debauchery. Furthermore, the nations that have been conquered often end up uniting against their plunderers and reclaiming the spoils of their aggressors. If those plunderers had instead continued to engage in peaceful production, the wealth of other nations would have remained intact, while their own security and prosperity would have been far more assured and enduring.

Il suffît, comme on le voit, d'analyser les résultats de la guerre pour se convaincre qu'elle est toujours et pour tous un fléau. Mais les peuples sont-ils les maîtres d'éviter les atteintes de ce fléau ? sont-ils les maîtres de faire régner d'une manière permanente la paix dans le monde? Voilà ce qu'il est essentiel d'examiner.

As we can see, merely analyzing the effects of war suffices to establish that it is always, and for everyone, a scourge. But are nations capable of avoiding this scourge? Can they ensure that peace reigns permanently in the world? This is the question we must now examine.

Having laid out these ideas in this early piece Molinari would spend the rest of life exploring them and their political implications in great detail as the following essay will demonstrate.

The Problem of War and Peace during Molinari's Lifetime

The issue of war and peace was not just a theoretical one during Molinari's long life. The shadow overhanging French society during this period was of course the Napoleonic wars fought across all of Europe by Napoléon Bonaparte and his armies between 1793 and 1815, and its immediate aftermath of economic recovery and political reconstruction of the conservative monarchies. [12] Molinari was a young man when another Napoléon came to power during the Revolution of 1848 and as Emperor Napoléon III began another series of wars: [13] the Crimean War (1853–1856); the Second Italian War of Independence (1859), the French intervention in Mexico (1861–1867), and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) which had disastrous consequences for France. During the period of the Second Empire Molinari left Paris to return to his native Belgium (he refused to live in France under Napoléon III) where he worked as an academic teaching political economy and as an advocate for free trade and workers labour exchanges. He only returned to Paris after the death of his wife Edmée in 1868.

Molinari was in Paris during the Franco-Prussian War and witnessed first hand the violence of the revolution, the repression of the socialists and "The Commune" by the army, the collapse of Napoléon's empire, and the creation of the Third Republic in 1875. [14] Following the creation of the Third Republic France would build the second largest colonial empire (after Britain) with, in addition to Algeria (conquered in 1830), possessions in the Pacific, West and Equitorial Africa, and Indochina. During this time he was the editor of the prestigious Journal des Débats, serving as chief editor between 1871 and 1876, before taking up the position of editor of the main organ of the French liberal political economists, the Journal des Économistes between 1881 and his retirement in 1909. It was in the pages of the JDD and the JDE that Molinari was able to write, in addition to more theoretical material, hundreds of articles commenting on the events of his day, especially the rise of protectionism, socialsm, colonialism, and militarism.

His views on the dangers of militarism and war came to the attention to English readers with the publication of a series of letters in The Times of London on organizing a "League of Neutrals" (28 July, 1887), " A Syndicat of Peace" (1 Nov. 1893), and "The Assurance of Peace" (21 Oct. 1895). These were written at a time of increasing tension between the great powers of Europe as a result of the scramble for colonies in Africa and Asia, the new tariff wars which had arisen after the introduction of the Méline Tariff in France in 1892, and the arms race (especially in naval spending).

There was another opportunity for English readers to learn about his views on war and peace with the translation of his late work Esquisse de l'organisation politique et économique de la Société future (1899) in 1904 with its detailed notes and appendices, two of which dealt with the cost of colonialism and the need for military disarmament. [15]

Molinari was not alone in trying to warn people about the dangers of war and militarism in the coming new century, especially the potentially huge costs which modern industrialised war would impose both in terms of labour conscripted, property destroyed, human lives taken, and the monetary costs of armaments and debt incurred. One should note here the work of the Polish banker and railway financier Jan Gotlib Bloch (Jean de Bloch) (1836-1902), [16] the Russian-French sociologist Jacques Novicow (1849-1912), [17] and the English journalist and Member of Parliament Norman Angell (1872-1967). [18] Molinari expressed his fears in a pair of articles published in the JDE at the turn of the century in which he summed up the achievements of liberal reforms during the 19th century and presciently predicted the coming of a devastating war the consequences of which would last for decades in the 20th century before a revival of classical liberal ideas would take place to rectify matters. [19]]

Molinari died in January 1912 at the age of 92, so only a few years before the outbreak of the world war would which would bring about the destruction of the liberal order in Europe and usher in decades of war, government interventionism, economic crises, and the spread of ideologies which supported the most extreme forms of statism, namely fascism and communism. The year before his death he wrote the rather dispairing but wittily entitled book Ultima verba: mon dernier ouvrage (Last Words) (1911) where he summed up his life's work in the Preface: [20]

Presque arrivé aux limites de la vie humaine — je suis maintenant dans ma 92e année — je vais publier mon dernier ouvrage. Il concerne tout ce qui a rempli ma vie: la liberté des échanges et la paix. Mais quoique la sphère de la paix se soit prodigieusement élargie et que les souverains prodiguent les démonstrations pacifiques, ces idées fondamentales sont partout en baisse. Pourtant il semblait vers le milieu du XIXe siècle qu'elles dussent désormais régir le monde civilisé. …

Having almost reached the limits of human life—I am now in my 92nd year—I am about to publish my last work. It concerns everything that has filled my life: free trade and peace. Yet, although the sphere of peace has prodigiously expanded and sovereigns pour out lavish statements about peace, these fundamental ideas are declining everywhere. However, it seemed in the middle of the 19th century that they were henceforth destined to govern the civilized world. …

Cependant depuis près d'un demi-siècle les intérêts militaires ont toujours paru prendre une prépondérance de plus en plus grande. C'est une contradiction qui tient à ce que, dans l'ensemble des nations, les gouvernements et la classe sur laquelle ils s'appuient de préférence sont ou se croient intéressés à l'état do guerre. Il est évident que la situation des classes influentes n'a pas été amoindrie par la guerre … les classes dominantes ont-elles intérêt à conserver la propriété des masses gouvernées qui leur fournissent la plupart des revenus militaires ou civils dont elles vivent.

However, for nearly half a century, military interests have always seemed to take on an increasingly dominant role. This contradiction arises because, across nations, governments and the class on which they primarily rely are or believe themselves to be interested in a state of war. It is evident that the status of the influential classes has not been diminished by war .. the ruling classes have an interest in maintaining control over the governed masses, who provide most of the military or civil revenues on which they live. …

Si, à l'encontre de ce que l'on espérait au début de ma carrière, en ces premières années du XXe siècle on peut constater le progrès des sentiments belliqueux dans les classes supérieures, on doit remarquer aussi que, dans ce même intervalle, le protectionnisme s'est étendu sur tout le monde civilisé, à l'exception de l'Angleterre restée jusqu'ici libre-échangiste. Cependant je demeure toujours un ferme partisan de la paix et de la liberté. ..

If, contrary to what was hoped at the beginning of my career, in these early years of the 20th century we observe an increase in belligerent sentiments among the upper classes, we must also note that, during this same period, protectionism has extended throughout the civilized world, with the exception of England, which has so far remained a free-trade state. However, I remain a firm supporter of peace and liberty. …

En faisant passer les ressources dés classes favorisées de la fortuné en des mains moins capables ou plus dispendieuses et en augmentant lès dépenses militaires, le protectionnisme et le fonctionnarisme, la richesse diminuera et les dettes s'accroîtront jusqu'à ce que le pays ne puisse plus en supporter le fardeau. Peut-être est-ce ainsi que, selon toute apparence et malgré le développement progressif de la civilisation, se perdront les Etats les plus florissants. C'est de cette sorte qu'a péri le monde romain, bien autrement civilisé que la nuée des barbares qui l'entourait. Les vices intérieurs et les dépenses excessives écraseront la civilisation actuelle comme les Barbares l'ont écrasée, dans l'antiquité. Ce sera un nouveau mode de destruction non moins certain et aussi complet que le précédent.

By diverting resources from the wealthier classes into the hands of those who are less capable or more wasteful, and by increasing military expenditures, protectionism, and rule by government bureaucrats, wealth will diminish and debts will grow until the nation can no longer bear the burden. Perhaps it is in this way that, despite the progressive development of civilization, the most prosperous states will ultimately collapse. This is how the Roman world perished—even though it was far more civilized than the swarms of barbarians surrounding it. Internal vices and excessive expenditures will crush modern civilization just as the barbarians crushed it in antiquity. This will be a new form of destruction, no less certain and just as complete as the previous one.

Molinari's Theory of War and Peace

Introduction

Molinari's theory of war and peace will be discussed in the remainder of this essay. It can be divided into three main aspects:

  1. war and peace in economic theory
  2. war and peace in the historical evolution of states and markets
  3. war and peace in politics

The role of the economist in all of these aspects was to serve as "les teneurs de livres de la politique” (the book-keepers of policy/politics) [21] who would tally up the balance sheet and bring to the attention of governments, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and the general public the costs and benefits of these policies (both in general and to the specific groups or classes who might gain or lose from these policies). [22]

War and Peace in Economic Theory

Production, Industry, and entrepreneurs

According to Molinari, any activity which involved costs and benefits, and supply and demand, should be seen as an "industry" which had (or would have if it were allowed to operate freely) its own set of producers, entrepreneurs, and consumers. These producers and consumers would engage in competition with each other (producers against other producers, and consumers against other consumers) to get the highest profits and the best possible deals which were available on the market. He thought these principles also applied to so-called "public goods", such as defence and protection, as well as other activities and institutions not normally thought of as "industries" such as prostitution, the family, the church, and the state. In the case of the state, one of its key functions was (or was supposed to be) "the production of security" both internal (police) and external (national defence), and this too was subject to the economic dictates of profit and loss, competition or monopoly, incentives and disincentives, and efficiency and inefficiency. But as was too often the case with other industries, these "security industries" could become monopolised by special interests who were protected from competition, granted guaranteed profits, and were free to exploit their supposed consumers instead of satisfying their needs. Hence in Molinari's view, government in general was "anti-economic" (in Molinari's terminology) or uneconomic [23] and its functions therefore should be drastically reduced in size and scope, privatised and exposed to competition, or simply abolished.

At the heart of Molinari's theory was a notion of "production" which had several variants:

  1. first there was "production proper" (not Molinari's term) which was the creation of "wealth" or things of "value" (whether material goods in the Smithian sense, or non-material goods or services in the Saysian sense) which were desired by consumers and provided on the free market;
  2. then there was "la spoliation" or plunder (the key term in the Saysian tradition) whereby things which had already been produced were forcibly taken from those who had produced them (the industrious classes) for the benefit of others (the "plundering class"); for most of its history Molinari thought that war had been the example of plunder par excellence
  3. as a result of government intervention in the economy and special privileges granted to a few, "les déplacements" (displacements, distortions) and "les perturbations" (disturbances, disruptions) were created in the economy, such as investments in industries and the expenditure of taxpayers's money which caused the "distortion" or misallocation of capital and production into the subsidised or protected industries and away from other industries which were would have been created in order to satisfy the needs of consumers. [24] Molinari thought that war industries had been a prime example of this distortion of production and capital investment.
  4. and finally there was the outright destruction of things which had been produced (a kind of "negative production" - not Molinari's term), which of course was a direct result of war [25]

This quadripartite notion of production was central to the Saysian tradition of political economy which had emerged in France under the influence of theorists like Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832), and his followers Charles Comte (1782-1837) and Charles Dunoyer (1786-1862), and Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850). This more nuanced understanding of "production" is one of the things which distinguished it from the parallel Smithian tradition which placed greater emphasis on just the "production" of material wealth rather than on its "spoliation" (plunder), its misallocation, or its destruction. Other things which made the Saysian tradition different from the Smithian tradition were its interest in the role of the entrepreneur and the importance of the production of "non-material" wealth or services.

The Saysian tradition distinguished between wealth acquired peacefully and voluntarily by means of "industry" (broadly defined as the production of any and all material and non-material goods (services), trade, and entrepreneurship) and wealth that had been acquired coercively. The social and economic system which was based upon the former means was called "l'industrialisme" (industrialism) by its two most important theorists Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer during the 1810s and 1820s. [26] For Dunoyer the endpoint of political and economic evolution was be "le régime industriel" where all people would lead a life which was "purement industrieux" (entirely, completely industrious and productive). [27] In the 1840s Bastiat explicitly built upon the Say-Comte-Dunoyer industrialist tradition with his theory of "la spoliation" (plunder) and rule by "la class spoliatrice" (the plundering class) which had evolved historically through a series of stages of simple and direct acts of "spoliation", to organised forms or institutionalised plunder by means of "guerre" (war), "esclavage" (slavery and serfdom),"théocratie" (theocratic plunder), "monopole" (monoploy), "exploitation gouvernementale" (plunder by government), and socialism and communism. [28]

For Molinari, who was influenced by this intellectual tradition, the endpoint of political and economic evolution, or what he called on many occasions "la société future" (the society of the future), would be

  • “un régime de pleine liberté” (a society of complete liberty) (S6 and Esquisse)
  • “un milieu libre” (a liberal milieu, or a liberal society) - possibly his favourite term which occurs throughout his work
  • "un régime de pleine concurrence " (a regime of full / complete competition or "la concurrence illimitée" (unlimited competition) (L'évolution économique (1880))
  • "un marché d'une étendue illimitée" (a market of unlimited extent) (L'évolution politique (1884), Grandeur (1898), and Esquisse (1899))
  • "la concurrence universalisée" (competition which has been made universal) (L'évolution politique (1884))
  • "la liberté de gouvernement" (liberty of government, which was his term for competing governments) (Lois naturelles (1887) and Esquisse (1899))
  • "un régime de liberté politique" (a regime based upon political liberty) (Lois naturelles (1887))

Whatever one called this future dociety, it would be one where coercion and the violation of property rights, whether "unorganised" by individuals or "organised" by governments, had been dramatically reduced or even eliminated. This future society would also be one where "permanent peace" reigned, thus fulfilling the dreams of theorists like Saint-Pierre and Immanuel Kant.

Writing in the 1850s, the new twist Molinari gave to this tradition was to argue that "spoliation" (plunder) in its more organised and permanent form was also an "industry" - "l'industrie de la spoliation" (the industry of plundering) [29] - which shared with other kinds of industry the desire for profits by a group of "owners" of "firms" who engaged in competition with other "firms" for "markets". The very important difference lay in how these profits were acquired: one group of industries operated non-coercively in a competitive and free market with willing consumers; the other group used coercion to exclude competitors from entering the market, forced "consumers" to pay for their goods and services (taxation), forced some people to work for them for little or no payment (slavery and serdom, conscription), or simply seized their property for their own benefit (requisitioning, confiscation and war booty). Until the modern period, slavery and war had been the premier plundering industries. With the introduction of mercantilist policies in the 17th and 18th centuries tariffs, subsidies, and the granting of monopoly privileges for certain industries had emerged as another form of the plundering industry which sat alongside war and served as part rival to and part ally of war as an industry of plunder. In the 19th century with the emergence of political parties and mass politics a third branch of the plundering industry was in the offing as party bosses offered bribes to the voters in exchange for either their votes (for those who were allowed to vote) or promises not to go on strike, rebel, or overthrow the government (for those who were not allowed to vote).

The economist as liberal "book-keeper" needed to dertermine what was the balance between the productive industries which created the wealth and the unproductive plundering industries which were parasitical on the productive industries. If the latter grew too big the former would struggle to produce the surpluses which the latter needed to operate. In addition, the economist as political reformer needed to assess the relative balance of power between the sub-industries which comprised the plundering sector of the economy. These included the traditional military elite and the industries which provided the ships and munitions, the large landowning nobility, the protected manufacturing industries and trading firms, and the old established and state banks. Given the disruption caused by the industrial revolution and the expansion of world trade during the second half of the 19th century the balance of political and economic power between these groups within the plundering industry, and between them and their rivals among the non-plundering industries, was uncertain and changing. When he turned to these questions again in the 1880s and 1890s it seemed to Molinari that the non-productive plundering industries were on the rise with the return of tariffs (both to protect the large landowners and the manufacturing industries) and the growing arms race (which favoured steel producers and the chemical industry). They were also protected by the new and growing class of professional politicians and bureaucrats who syphoned off tax money in the form of their salaries and other benefits.

Productive vs. Destructive Competition

According to Molinari, competition was a unversal phenomenon which could be productive (or "constructive") or unproductive (or "destructive") depending upon whether or not it improved the living conditions and welfare of the species, the race, the tribe, or the wider community. The form competition took changed over time as societies evolved.

The first kind is "la concurrence vitale" (competition to live or survive) [30] which was the competition between all species of animals to get food and to ward off predators in order to survive. Humans were part of this struggle but because they were endowed with intelligence they were able to create through their economic activity more effective "artificial weapons" to defeat the "natural weapons" of other predators and competitors ("tooth and claw"), including other human beings.

The second kind of competition was "la concurrence destructive" (destructive competition) which arose as organised groups of humans fought with each other for food and other resources. [31] The strongest group with the best weapons and most skilled warriors (an early form of the specialisation of labour) either killed or conquered the weaker groups and forced them into slavery or to pay the victors tribute. This was the beginning of the first states which were "owned" and ruled by a warrior class. The warrior class gradually learned that they could extract more "tribute" or taxes from the "conquered or subject classes" if they allowed them to keep some of the food they grew or goods they produced. Another aspect of "destructive competiton" was the rivarly between neighbouring states which lead to attempts to expand their territory at the expense of their weaker neighbours, thus removing their political competitors and expanding their tax base.

At the same time, the third form of competition grew and eventually became the dominant one, namely "la concurrence industrielle" (industrial or economic competition). [32] For Molinari this was most important stage in the evolution of society because it was the stage upon which later prosperity and innovation was built. However, in the beginning it required the ruling class to establish some rudimentary peace with its neighbours, to respect property rights to some degree, to lower taxation and reduce regulaton, and to allow free trade within the nation as well as with other nations. This gradual transition from a "régime of political and economic servitude" to a "regime of political and economic liberty" took several centuries to take place. The final stage he thought would be reached when there was "la concurrence illimitée" (unlimited competition) and "un marché d'une étendue illimitée" (a market of unlimited extent) which would the hallmark of "the society of the future".

The State as a profit-seeking Firm

One of Molinari's many theoretical innovations was to argue that the state should be regarded as a kind of "firm" (la société), or "la maison" (a family owned business), or "l'établissement " (business enterprise) which "owned" the state (la société propriétaire de l'Etat) [33] and sought profits for its "owners" and "shareholders" (les actionnaires) by means of taxes, monopolies, other privileges, and well-paid and secure jobs in the bureaucracy, church, or the military. Like any business, there was competition within the ruling class as different factions engaged in "la lutte" (struggle) to win supremacy over their rivals and to maintain their power within the firm. There was also a "struggle" against rival "foreign firms" as they tried to expand their "political market" [34] by seizing more territory and the number of serfs and taxpayers which that territoty contained, as well as providing more jobs within the state for its members and their families.

What began as a small band of warriors ("la société conquérante" (the conquering firm)) [35] who would periodically invade a territory in order to kill and pillage the inhabitants (what Mancur Olson called "roving bandits") [36] changed when they realised that they could increase their "profits" by remaining in place over time, subjecting the population to slavery or sefdom, letting them keep a small portion of what they produced for themselves, and confiscating the rest for their own benefit (what Olson called "stationary bandits"). The ruling "warrior class" also found it in their own interest to make alliances with other groups in order to manage better their control over the "subject population" and to "buy off" challenges to their rule.

Over time this arrangement evolved into a broader "oligarchie gouvernante" (ruling oligarchy) [37] which also included senior members of the church as well as the privileged members of "les corporations" which controlled industry and commerce. In the modern era when political parties had emerged to compete with each other to win office and control of the state, "l'oligarchie gouvernante" expanded again to include politicians (creating what he termed "le politicianisme" (rule by politicians)) [38] and government bureacrats (creating "le fontionnarisme" (rule by functionaries or civil servants)). [39]

What might seem unusual to modern-day libertarians was his idea that war served a very useful and productive purpose in the earliest stage of human evolution, since the earliest warrior class (or those who had greater skill in the use of coercion and vioence) did provide the useful and beneficial "service" of the protection of the life, liberty, and property of individuals who lived in a community from attacks from "outsiders", which initially was wild animals, then invading "barbarians", and later neighbouring predatory states. Hence the title of his late work Grandeur et décadence de la guerre (1898) which might be translated as "the rise and fall of war" or more litearlly as "the greatness and decadence of war"). [40] At this time as well he argued, the military was an early example of the benefits of the division and specialisation of labour, while the need for the organisation and provisioning of a large armed body of men resulted in an early example of large-scale organisation and management of subordinates and the large-scale production of goods necessary for war fighting which was a model for the later emergence of private and consumer-focused peaceful business and industrial organisations.

However, once the threat of barabarian invasion subsided [41] the owners and managers of the "firm" which was the feudal state did not adapt to the new conditions which peace made possible. To use the phrase used by Vifredo Pareto, the ruling elite "chrystalised" into a centralised, exploiting, ruling class which monopolised the "production of security" and other key sectors of industry and trade, and refused to allow alternative ways of providing this economic service. [42] Nevertheless, some economic growth and an increase in prosperity did occur as a result of the comparatively more peaceful conditions and some rudimentary protection of property rights and this turn allowed a growing middle class of "bourgeois" to emerge in the towns. Here they were able to struggle for and get some relief from taxation, conscription, economic regulations, monopolies, and tariffs within the "Free Cities" which were protected by the city charters which began to emerge in the 12th century. These charters, or early forms of constitutions, regularised and thus limtied tax payments with side-deals made with local feudal lords who wanted more predictable and regular payments. [43]

However, this period of partial peace and prosperity was constantly interrupted by periodic wars in the 16th century (the wars of religion between protestants and catholics), the 17th and 18th centuries with dynastic wars between the royal families which were competing with each other to considate and expand their realms, and then the conflicts between the great powers over colonial possessions particularly between France and Britain in North America. By the late 18th century highly centralised, high taxing and regulating states like France under Louis XIV created a series of economic crises which were the underlying cause of both the American and French Revolutions. This turning point in European economic and political evolution was much studied by liberals like Molinari, who argued that one outcome of the revolutions was, in the case of America in 1776, a successful liberal revolution which limited the power of the state and ended the policy of having expensive standing armies which drained the wealth of taxpayers; while another revolution in France had the opposite outcome where an entirely new kind of interventionist and militaristic state emerged under Napoleon, which set back the spread of liberal ideas and institutions in France for decades. [44]]

War and Peace in Politics

Long-Term political solutions

In the longer term Molinari was optimistic about the prospect of peace but very pessimistic in the short term, especially in the last two decades of his life.

What drove his long-term optimism about the prospects of peace was his theory of the evolution of markets, industrial development, free trade, and political "competition" between states. As with Spencer's theory of evolution, it is not clear to what extent this evolution was "inevitable" because of unstoppable political and economic processes, and to what extent it was the result of human-created policies. Both believed that "good" government policies (deregulation, lower taxes, free trade, and peace) would hasten economic and political progress and that "bad" policies would hamper this progress.

These long-term processes were a result of the fact that free markets and technological innovation were so incredibly productive, and that all government activities were inefficient, costly, and increasingly harmful, especially that of waging war. As the bulk of the people began to realise this they would put pressure on governments to reign in their harmful activities and thus allow the underlying progressive forces to operate to the full. The ruling elite were expected to also come to this conclusion, especially in the face of the much greater destructive power of war made possible by the industrial revolution. [45] The danger for the classical liberal movement was to submit to the temptation to sit back and wait for these inevitable evolutionary processes to do their work and not to engage in the difficult task of engaging in political and economic activity.

Medium Term

I don't think that Molinari made this error since he repeatedly came up with ideas which he thought in the medium and short-term would promote the cause of peace and prosperity. His medium-term solution was to spread classical liberal ideas by means of his journalism, university teaching, and the writing of nearly 40 books. On at least three occasions he turned his hand to the writing of popular works on economics (in particular free trade which was an essential ingredient of any peace policy) in order to reach a broader readership. For example in 1849 he wrote a collection of "soirées" or conversations between a conservative, a socialist, and an economist; in 1855 he wrote another collection of "conversations" this time between a "rioter" (protesting about high food prices), a protectionist, and an economist; and in 1886 a third between a protectionist, a "collectivist", and an economist. In the 1886 collection of conversations one of the main arguments of the economist was how war by disrupting trade increased the price of grain for ordinary workers. [46] He was clearly following in the footsteps of his friend and colleague Frédéric Bastiat but unfortuantely he was not nearly as gifted as Bastiat was in penning the witty remark or the memorable turn of phrase. However, he never gave up on this effort.

Another medium-term strategy was to be active in various political movements which aimed to garner the support of large numbers of ordinary people, such as the free trade movements in England and France (both of which had a very strong peace component), and the explicitly anti-war "Friends of Peace" movement. Molinari, along with other political economists like Frédéric Bastiat and Joseph Garnier (1813–1881), were active in the "Friends of Peace" movement in the 1840s, particpating in their international conference which was held in Paris in 1849, which was presided over by the novelist Victor Hugo, and for which both Bastiat and Richard Cobden gave important speeches outlining the classical liberal critique of war and militarism. [47] The young 30 year old Molinari attended the conference on behalf of the Journal des Économistes for which he wrote a report, and he would shortly afterwards write the key articles on war and peace for the flagship publication of the French political economists, the Dictionnaire de l'économie politique (1852-53).

As early as 1852 Molinari had written the two entries in the DEP on these movements. [48] He audaciously criticised Bastiat and the French Association for having watered down the radicalism of their call for free trade and peace and thus having lost the support of the working class to the more radical socialists. In his entry on the Friends of Peace Congress he criticised the delegates for overestimating the importance of agitating for a congress or league of nations and for an international arbitration tribunal at the present time when the intellectual foundation for mass support for such things had not yet been established. Too many liberals, he thought, still thought that war was a useful way to spread democracy and freedom. Perhaps this was a remnant of thinking from the French revolutionary and Napoleonic period when many supposedly liberal-minded people thought French armies could "liberate" the oppressed people of Europe by means of invasion, occupation, and the imposition of new French forms of government. As he observed in the entry on the peace associations: [49]

La plupart de ces résolutions ne peuvent qu'elle approuvées. Peut-être quelques-uns des promoteurs de l'agitation en faveur de la paix attribuent-ils une efficacité exagérée à l'institution d'un congrès des nations, d'un tribunal d'arbitrage, etc. ; mais tous ont compris qu'ils doivent s'appliquer surtout à convertir l'opinion. Montrer aux hommes, sous une forme claire, intelligible, populaire, que la guerre est une opération qui coûte toujours plus qu'elle ne rapporte, tel est le but qu'ils poursuivent avec une infatigable persévérance. Et si l'on songe aux préjugés qui règnent encore dans toutes les classes de la société au sujet de la prétendue utilité de la guerre, si l'on songe que les uns n'ont pas cessé de demander la guerre dans l'intérêt de la démocratie, les autres au profit de l'absolutisme, on se convaincra que l'œuvre de propagande des amis de la paix n'est nullement superflue. Assurément elle ne saurait avoir l'efficacité de mettre fin à la guerre; car la consolidation de la paix est œuvre complexe, qui dépend d'une multitude de progrès, et non d'un seul. Mais, alors même que les amis de la paix ne contribueraient que dans une faible mesure à avancer ce résultat si souhaitable, leurs efforts ne mériteraient-ils pas d'être encouragés et bénis?

Most of these resolutions can only be approved. Perhaps some of the promoters of the peace movement overestimate the effectiveness of the institution of a congress of nations, a tribunal of arbitration, etc.; but all have understood that their primary task is to convert public opinion. To demonstrate clearly, in a simple and accessible form, that war is always an operation that costs more than it yields—this is the goal they pursue with tireless perseverance. And if one considers the prejudices that still prevail in all classes of society regarding the alleged utility of war, if one remembers that some still advocate war in the name of democracy, while others support it in the name of absolutism, one will be convinced that the propaganda efforts of the friends of peace are by no means superfluous. Certainly, they cannot by themselves put an end to war, for the consolidation of peace is a complex undertaking, which depends on a multitude of advancements, not just one. But, even if the friends of peace only contribute modestly to bringing about this much-desired result, would their efforts not deserve to be encouraged and blessed?

He thought differently some 40 years later when he thought the time was ripe to appeal to the political elites to agitate for just that: the creation of a body for international arbitration of disputes and the formation of a military "League of Neutral Powers". He presented his ideas, interestingly in English, to the educated elite which read newspapers like the Times of London, in an article called "League of Neutrals" which was published in July, 1887. [50] The aim of the League he argued was to form an alliance between the middle and smaller powers of Europe to pool their military resources in order to deter any aggressive acts by the six "Great Powers" which were made up of Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia. This proposal came to nothing both because it was a forlorn hope to begin with, to expect the diverse smaller powers to come to any agreement, and impractical given the size of the military and the power of the vested interests within the great powers to continue their bellicose policies. But it is another example of Molinari's unwillingness to give up on the cause of peace.

A more promising line of argument was the advocacy of international arbitration to resolve disputes between nations as a substitute for going to war. This was a strategy adopted by both socialists and classical liberals and there were positive signs that something along these lines might come about as a result of the action of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia in organising the Hague Convention of 1899. Molinari promoted the Tsar's ideas in the JDE and included copies of his proposal in an Appendix to his book Grandeur (1898) and then again in L'Esquisse (1899). [51] Also in these works he added appendices where, in typical Molinari fashion acting in his role as the "book-keeper" of government policies, he listed in great detail the latest economic data concerning the huge size of the army and navy budgets, the level of debt incurred in war expenditure, and revised data about the costs of the Napoleonic Wars earlier in the century. [52]

The idea of a League of Neutral Powers was a return to an idea he had first put forward in the DEP in 1852 in his biographical entry on the Abbe Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) which he later developed into a book-length treatment in 1857. [53] Saint-Pierre was an advocate for "perpetual peace" which was a plan for intellectuals like himself to persuade sympathetic monarchs (like Henry IV) to use their power and influence to persuade other monarchs to pursue peace policies in Europe in a top-down, rather than a bottom-up strategy to bring peace to Europe. This appeared to have been the idea of Tsar Nicholas II in 1897-98, but as Molinari observed it had been a feature of Russian foreign policy since Catherine II, Empress of Russia (1762-96), created a League of Armed Neutrality in 1780 to oppose the British seizure of ships during the American revolution; and then Alexander I, Emperor of Russia (1801-25), who created a Holy Alliance of the anti-liberal absolutist monarchies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia to "keep the peace" after the defeat of Napoleon. Even though illiberal in many ways, the Russian examples showed what might be possible. On several occasions Molinari dreamed about what might happen if the people of Europe, having been imbued with the ideas of peace and freedom, were willing and able to form their own radical liberal "Holy Alliance" in order to oppose that of the absolutist and militaristic monarchies. [54]

Classical Liberalism and the Problem of War

So what was Molinari's alternative to large, well-armed and funded nation states, with standing armies and navies manned with conscripts, and which pursued bellicose policies towards their neighbours both within Europe and in their colonial possessions in all four corners of world? The following are the views liberals held in increasing degrees of radicalism.

All classical liberals believed in introducing the policy of free trade in order to reduce international tension and to integrate economies in networks of trade and investment which would increase the cost of a state in going to war. They also wanted to eliminate conscription as a violation of individual liberty, or what French liberals called the "blood tax" on the poor.

Even moderate liberals wanted to cut spending on the military to a bare minumum. The problem was to define what that bare minumum was. Liberal imperialists thought national taxpapeyers should pay for the costs of protecting and maintaining far-flung colonies, like J.S. Mill in England and Leroy-Beaulieu in France.

More radical Cobdenite liberals wanted to cut spending further by eliminating colonies because they were a net drain on the budget because of the cost of their administration and because they provided opportunities for mercantilist policies of trade preferences to favoured national producers.

One of the most radical liberals was Bastiat who wanted to abolish the French standing army and replace it with local militias modelled on those of the United States. In his essay "The Utopian" (1847) and in the chapter on "Le licenciement " (Dismissing Members of the Armed Forces) in What is Seen and What is not Seen (1850) he called for immediately cutting the size of the military by 25% and then moving towards its complete "disbanding" in the near future. [55]

Most liberals were also in favour of expanding the role of international arbitration in order to resolve disputes between nations instead of resorting to violent conflict.

The most radical of the liberals was Molinari who wanted to completely break up the large centralised nation state and replace it with smaller entities which would compete against each other for consumers or citizens. These political entities could take a number of forms. The most radical was to abolish the government's monopoly of the provision of securitry at the local level (police) and the national level (national defence) by allowing private police and insurance companies ("producers of security") to compete against each other for the business of "consumers of security". He thought this would not only provide protection of life and property more cheaply and efficiently than government-run monoplies but also greatly reduce the risk of war and the damage it could do by removing the main cause of war which was rivalry between nation states with their large standing armies and navies. [56]

Another fully private entity which could provide a similar service were "proprietary communities" where property development companies would create entire communities or even mini-cities which would provide all so-called "public goods" like lighting, gas, roads, water, sewers, as well as police and defence to individuals who bought property within the confines of the community. Agreements between these private proprietary communities would settle by contract and in advance disputes which might arise between individuals living within the community or with other individuals who lived in other communities. [57]

In the meantime, until the entire globe was filled with such private communities, political entities would still exist but these he thought could be enticed by competition and the force of public opinion to move towards a situation of greater peace and prosperity by a process of secession. If provinces were able to secede from the central nation state they would compete against each other in order to attract tax-payers to their area by lowering costs (taxes, fees, and "insurance premiums" for protection), providing better and cheaper services, and a more peaceful and prosperous economic environment. [58] How far Molinari thought this process of secession might continue was left unstated but, given his views on the "production of security", it was probably "serial" in the sense that the province has the right to secede from the central nation state, the city had the right to secede from the province, and the individual had the right to either "produce" or to "consume" security at the corporate or even the personal level, in other words, to secede from the city if they so wished.

Conclusion

So without the monopoly power to conscript people into the army or nany, to tax individuals to provide public goods like police and defence, to take on massive and increasing levels of public debt, to threaten other nation states with trade restrictions and tariffs, and to invade or conquer other nations or peoples, the threat of large scale war and destruction would eventually disappear in Molinari's view. On the other side of the balance sheet or ledger was the spread of universal free trade, competition between firms and individuals which would encourage innovation, greater productivy, and cheapness of goods and services - or in other words global peace and prsoperity. As the "book-keeper" of policy, the economist in Molinari's view had only one option to recommend, the pursuit of peace and prosperity in a liberal milieu.

 


 

Endnotes

[1] See David M. Hart, "Molinari, Gustave de (1819-1912)," The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism (2008) [Online; and Gérard Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912) (2012).

[2] He first did this in his one volume survey of classical liberal policy Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare (1849) and then in a series of entries he wrote for the Dictionnaire d'économie politique (1852-53).

[3] This essay first came to the attention of English speakers in 1977 when the Center for Libertarian Studies published a translation by Huston McCulloch with a preface by Murray Rothbard in 1977.

[4] This was translated by me in 1979 as part of my Honours Thesis and later publshed as an appendix to an article in the Journal of Libertarian Studies in 1982. I have since translated the entire volume which is available online: Soirées on rue Saint-Lazare: Discussions about Economic Laws and a Defence of Property. Translated, edited, and with an Introduction by David M. Hart (2025).

[5] I have chronicled the evolution of his thinking about "the production of security" in the paper "Was Molinari a true Anarcho-Capitalist?: An Intellectual History of the Private and Competitive Production of Security" (2019).

[6] Spencer also wrote an early one volume survey of libertarian ideas in his book Social Statics (1851) and later turned to the evolution of the state and markets in The Principles of Sociology (1874 and 1896).

[7] Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Sociology, vol. 2 Part V. "Political Institutions" (1882), "XVII. The Militant Type of Society, pp. 568-602; "XVIII. The Industrial Type of Society, pp. 603-42. [HTML].

[8] I discuss the "Guillaumin network" in two papers "The Paris School of Liberal Political Economy, 1803-1853" (2022) and "A Monument to French Political Economy: the Dictionnaire de l'Économie Politique (1852-53)" (2025).

[9] In the DEP he wrote the entries on "Paix, Guerre (Peace and War)", DEP T. 2, pp. 307-14; "Paix (Société et Congrès de la Paix) (Peace Society and Peace Congress)", DEP T. 2, pp. 314-15; and "Saint-Pierre (abbé de)", DEP T. 2, pp. 565-66. He would return to writing about the life and thought of the early 18th century peace advocate Abbé Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) in a book-length treatment L'abbé de Saint-Pierre. Sa vie et ses Oeuvres (1857).

[10] His later books were Grandeur et décadence de la guerre (The Rise and Fall of War) (1898) in French [HTML] and English [HTML]; Esquisse de l'organisation politique et économique de la Société future (A Sketch of the Political and Economic Organisation of the Society of the Future) (1899) in French [HTML] and English [HTML]. The latter was translated into English in 1904. Part 1 of The Sketch dealt with "The State of War", pp. 3-43, and Part 2 dealt with "The State of Peace", pp. 47-205. And another late summary of his views can be found in Économie de l'histoire: Théorie de l'Évolution (1908). In French HTML].

[11] "Paix, Guerre", DEP, T. 2, p. 307, in French [HTML], and English [HTML].

[12] Molinari listed the economic and human costs of the wars up to the mid-19th century in his entry of "Paix, Guerre" in the DEP. A recent assessment of the economic devastation caused by the Napoleonic Wars is O'Rourke (2023). The entry on "Napoleonic Wars casualties", Wikipedia, gives figures of 2.5-3.5 million military deaths and a similar number of civilian deaths.

[13] In 1861 Molinari analysed Napoleon's economic and political ideas in Napoleon III publiciste (1861).

[14] He wrote two works on the Commune and the Revolution of 1871 in which he discussed, among other things, the economic problems of supplying a city under siege during war: Les Clubs rouges pendant le siège de Paris (The "Red" Clubs during the Siege of Paris) (1871) and Le Mouvement socialiste (The Socialist Movement) (1872). He also wrote his only work of political theory in 1873 during the discussion about the creation of the Third Republic, La République tempérée. (The Tempered or Limited Republic) (1873), where he argued for an upper house of tax-payers who could veto the taxing and spending powers of the lower house.

[15] The French edition had Appendix A "Le tsar et le désarmement" (The Tsar and Disarmament), pp. 209-224 and Appendix D "Ce que coûte et ce que rapporte le colonialisme d'Etat" (What are the costs and benefits of State Colonialism", pp. 230-35. The English translation The Society of Tomorrowr (1904) had an additional Appendix by the American anti-imperialist Edward Atkinson, "The Cost to the United States of War and of Preparation for War from 1898 to 1904".

[16] The Guillaumin firm published a French version of his multi-volume work La guerre (War) (1898-1900), which was translated into English in an abbreviated one as The Future of War in its Technical, Economics, and Political Relations volume version in 1903.

[17] His book La Guerre et ses prétendus biensfaits (War and its Alleged Benefits) was published in French in 1894 and English in 1912.

[18] See Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage (1st edition 1910, 4th enlarged edition 1913).

[19] "Le XIXe siècle," JDE, janvier 1901; "Le XXe siècle," JDE, janvier 1902. I have translated these articles into English.

[20] Ultima verba: mon dernier ouvrage (1911). "Préface," pp. i-xvii. French [HTML], and English [HTML].

[21] Molinari, Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériel (Revolutions and Despotism considered from the Perspective of Material Interests) (October 1852), p. 116 in French [HTML] and English [HTML].

[22] It was rare for economists then to focus on the economic and sociological aspect of war. In addition to Bastiat and Molinari another figure who should be mentioned in this regard is the French left-anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) who wrote La Guerre et la Paix. Recherches sur le Principe et la Constitution du Droit des Gens (War and Peace: Research on the Principle and the Constitution of International Law) (1861). Proudhon was well known among the Paris School of economists as Guillaumin had published one of his books and some of them held him in high regard as a theorist even if they disagreed with his conclusions. Bastiat for example spent considerable time shortly before he died engaging Proudhon in open debate over the question of the legitimacy of profit, interest, and rent. See, Gratuité du crédit (Free Credit) (1850).

[23] Molinari thought that all governmnet activity by its very nature was "anti-economic" because firms had a natural size limit beyond which they could not operate profitably and effectively (and government operations were always too big), that government tried to do too many things at once instead of specializing in one thing they could do well, because they were not subject to competition from rival firms governments had no interest in keeping their prices low and in providing a good service to the customers, and because they did not have to satisfy the needs of customers who might go elsewhere if the service provided was not satisfactory. On the “anti-economic” nature of government activity see his discussion in vol. 2 of Cours d’économie politique (1863), 12th Lesson on "Public Consumption", pp. 521-25 [HTML].

[24] "Displacement" was a key term for Bastiat and Molinari. Bastiat thought that "la déplacement" (displacement, distortion, misdirection) was a result of "les causes perturbatrices" (disturbing factors) in the economy which caused poverty and the loss of wealth. These were usually the result of the coercive actions of government such as subsidies and tariff protection for industry, but historically they had primarily been the result of war and plunder. See for example the many references to "déplacement" in his Economic Harmonies (1851).

[25] Compare this with Bastiat's witty description of the "negative railway" in the Economic Sophisms (1846) where he mocks those who wanted the government to force railway companies to increase the number of stops along a railway line in order to provide more jobs for the workers who would have to move the luggage and cargo and the innkeepers and restaurant owners who would benefit from having passengers stay an extra night. One could argue here that there is continuum from the production of wealth at one end and the destruction of wealth at the other, with other kinds of hampered production located somewhere between, such as dislocation, misallocation, waste, and the non-production or forgone production of wealth.

[26] Come and Dunoyer built upon the theoretical foundation which had been created by Say in his Traité de l'économie politique (1803, 1814) in a series of essays they wrote for their journal Le Censeur (1814-15) and Le Censeur européen (1817-1819) and then in several books published in the 1820s. On their theory of "industrialism" and class see Mark Weinburg, "The Social Analysis of Three Early 19th Century French Liberals: Say, Comte, and Dunoyer, Journal of Libertarian Studies (1978); David M. Hart, Class Analysis, Slavery and the Industrialist Theory of History in French Liberal Thought, 1814-1830: The Radical Liberalism of Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer (1994); and Robert Leroux, Aux fondements de l'industrialisme: Comte, Dunoyer et la pensée libérale en France (2015) and in English as The Foundations of Industrialism: Charles Comte, Charles Dunoyer and Liberal Thought in France (2016).

[27] Dunoyer, L'industrie et la morale (1825), pp. 321 ff.

[28] Bastiat's history of the evolution of plunder is discussed in my essay "Frédéric Bastiat on Plunder, Class, and the State" (2023).

[29] Cours, II, pp. 435, 438-9. [HTML].]

[30] See Grandeur, pp. 66-67, 71-74.

[31] See Esquisse, pp. ix-x, xv-xvi.

[32] There are many reference to "concurrence industrielle" in L'évolution politique, Lois naturelles, and Notions.

[33] See L'évolution politique, p. 154; Lois Naturelles, p. 100; Notions, p. 14; Grandeur, p. 26; Esquisse, p. xiii.

[34] See for example, L'évolution politique, p. 157; Lois naturelles, p. 166; Notions, p. 12; Grandeur, p. 41; Esquisse, p. 21.

[35] See L'évolution politique, p. 38; Notions, p. 12; Grandeur, p. 18; Esquisse, p. 59.

[36] Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity (2000). Especially Chapter 1 "The Logic of Power". Diacussion of "The Stationary Bandit" pp. 6ff.

[37] See L'évolution politique, p. 92; Notions, p. 38.

[38] See Notions, p. 52; Grandeur, p. 139.

[39] See LN, p. 274; Grandeur, Appendix E, pp. 221 ff.

[40] The first part of this book, some 75 pages, dealt with the "greatness of war". This was counterbalanced by the next 125 pages which dealt with the "decadence of war".

[41] It is not clear exactly when Molinari thought this threat began to subside but I would estimate that is was sometime in the middle period of the middle ages.

[42] On "la cristallisation des sociétés" (the christalisation of societies) or their increasing social and economic inflexibility and rigidification leading to stagnation and collapse, see TSG, Chapitre XIII. – L’équilibre social dans l’histoire, §. 2607 [HTML].

[43] Nineteenth century French liberal historians spent some time unearthing and discussing these early constitutions and charters which they believed were essential in the rise of the "Third Estate". See in particular the work of Augustin Theirry who had been an early collaborator of Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer, Essai sur l'histoire de la formation et des progrès du Tiers État (1853).

[44] Molinari chronicles this development in his pair of books published between 1880 and 1884: L'évolution économique du XIXe siècle (1880) and L'évolution politique et la Révolution (1884).

[45] This fact was pointed out in great detail in the multi-volume work by Jean de Bloch, La guerre (1898-1900), whose statistical tables and diagrams demonstrated with great effect the increased lethality of modern rifles among other weapons.

[46] Molinari, Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare (1849), Conservations familières sur le commerce des grains (1855); and Conversations sur le commerce des grains (1886).

[47] See Bastiat's speech on "Disarmament, Taxes, and the Influence of Political Economy on the Peace Movement" at the Friends of Peace Conference in Paris, 22 Aug., 1849. Published in Garnier (1849) and Anon., Report of the Proceedings (no date). Also his pamphlet on "Paix et liberté ou le budget républicain " (Peace and Freedom or the Republican Budget) (1849).

[48] "Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la) (Free Trade Associations)", T. 2, p. 45-49; "Paix (Société et Congrès de la Paix) (Peace Society and Peace Congress)", T. 2, pp. 314-15. He republished the Peace Society entry in Grandeur (1898), pp. 212-17.

[49] DEP, T2, p. 315. In French [HTML] and in English [HTML].

[50] "League of Neutrals" (28 July, 1887). He reprinted the article as an Appendix to his 1888 book La Morale économique (1888), Appendix II. "Projet a’association pour L’établissement d’une Ligue des Neutres," pp. 431-38, and then again in his book L'Esquisse (1899).]

[51] Grandeur (1898), pp. 265-76; L'Esquisee (1899), pp. 209-221.

[52] Grandeur (1898), appendices A, G, I, K, L, and M; in L'Esquisse (1899), appendix A.

[53] "Saint-Pierre (abbé de)", DEP (1852), T. 2, pp. 565-66; L'abbé de Saint-Pierre (1857).

[54] The idea of a "people's" Holy Alliance was promoted by the poet and song writer Pierre-Jean Béranger in "La sainte Alliance des peuples" (The Holy Alliance of the People) (1818). Molinari quotes the lines "People of the world, form a Holy Alliance / And take each other by the hand" in Soirée 11, p. 332. It had been used as one of the three slogans on the banner of the magazine, Jacques Bonhomme, which he, Bastiat, Charles Coquelin, Alcide Fonteyraud, and Joseph Garnier published and handed out on the streets of Paris during the June Days uprising in 1848. See Oeuvres complètes de P.J. de Béranger (1855), vol. 1, pp. 294-96.

[55] In 1849 the French government spent 465 million francs on the military (domestic and colonial) and had 460,000 men undder arms. See “L’Utopiste” (The Utopian), Economic Sophisms (1848), SE 11, pp. 101-11. [HTML]; and "Le licenciement " (Dismissing Members of the Armed Forces) in WSWNS (1850) Chap. 2 [HTML].

[56] See the article "De la production de la sécurité,", DEP (1849) and S11 of Les Soirées (1849).

[57] He first put forward the idea of proprietary communities providing all public goods including police and defence in L'évolution politique et la Révolution (1880), pp. 392-93.

[58] In the last two decades of his life (1893-1912) Molinari talked more about how existing political entities might introduce more competition in the provision of police and defence services. See, Précis (1893); Comment se résoudra la question sociale (1896), "La révolution silencieuse"; L'Esquisse' (1899), "La constitution libre des gouvernements"; and Les Problèmes du XXe siècle (1901), "Le problème du gouvernement collectif."

 


 

Bibliography

Works by Molinari

Gustave de Molinari, "De la production de la sécurité," Journal des Économistes, T. 22, no. 95, (15 February, 1849), pp. 277-90.

Gustave de Molinari, The Production of Security, trans. J. Huston McCulloch and a Preface by Murray N. Rothbard. Occasional Papers Series #2 (Richard M. Ebeling, Editor), New York: The Center for Libertarian Studies, May 1977.

Gustave de Molinari, Les Soirées de la rue Saint-Lazare; entretiens sur les lois économiques et défense de la propriété (Paris: Guillaumin, 1849). In French [HTML].

Gustave de Molinari, Soirées on rue Saint-Lazare: Discussions about Economic Laws and a Defence of Property. Translated, edited, and with an Introduction by David M. Hart (Pittwater Free Press, 2025). In English [HTML].

  • S11 appeared as an Appendix to my article "Gustave de Molinari and the Anti-statist Liberal Tradition" Journal of Libertarian Studies, Part III, pp. 88-102.

Gustave de Molinari, The Collected Articles from the Dictionnaire de l'Économie politique (1852-53). Edited by David M. Hart (The Pittwater Free Press, 2023). In French [HTML].

Gustave de Molinari, The Collected Articles from the Dictionnaire de l'Économie politique (1852-53). Edited and translated into English by David M. Hart (March, 2025 draft). In English [HTML].

His entries on war and peace are:

  • "Paix, Guerre (Peace and War)", DEP (Guillaumin, 1852), T. 2, pp. 307-14; in French [HTML] and English [HTML];
  • "Paix (Société et Congrès de la Paix) (Peace Society and Peace Congress)", DEP (1852), T. 2, pp. 314-15; in French [HTML] and English [HTML];
  • "Saint-Pierre (abbé de)", DEP (1852), T. 2, pp. 565-66. in French [HTML] and English [HTML].

see also his entries on free trade:

  • "Liberté des échanges (Associations pour la) (Free Trade Associations)", T. 2, p. 45-49.
  • "Liberté du commerce, liberté des échanges (Liberty of Commerce, Free Trade)", T. 2, pp. 49-63.

Gustave de Molinari, Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériels; précédé d'une lettre à M. le Comte J. Arrivabene, sur les dangers de la situation présente, par M. G. de Molinari, professeur d'économie politique (Brussels: Meline, Cans et Cie, 1852).

  • "Deuxième Partie. Les Révolutions et le despotisme envisagés au point de vue des intérêts matériels", pp. 81-152. French [HTML].
  • "Second Part: Revolutions and Despotism considered from the Perspective of Material Interests" English [HTML].

Gustave de Molinari, Conservations familières sur le commerce des grains. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1855).

Gustave de Molinari, L'abbé de Saint-Pierre. Membre exclu de l'Académie Française. Sa vie et ses Oeuvres. Précédées d'une appreciation et d'un Précis historique de l'idée de la Paix Perpétuelle, suivies du Jugement de Rousseau sur le Projet de Paix Perpétuelle et la Polysynodie ainsi que du Projet attribué à Henri IV, et du Plan d'Emmanuel Kant pour rendre la Paix Universelle, etc., etc. Avec des Notes et des Éclaircissements. Par M. G de Molinari. Membre de la Société libre d'Économie politique de Paris, professeur an Musée royal de l'Industrie belge, etc., etc. (Paris: Guillaumin et Cie, 1857). In French [HTML] and [PDF.

Gustave de Molinari, Napoleon III publiciste; sa pensée cherchée dans ses écrits; analyse et appréciation de ses oeuvres (Bruxelles: A. Lacroix, Van Meenen, 1861).

Gustave de Molinari, Cours d’économie politique, professé au Musée royal de l’industrie belge, 2 vols. 2nd revised and enlarged edition (Bruxelles et Leipzig: A Lacroix, Ver Broeckoven; Paris: Guillaumin, 1863). In French [HTML].

  • I have translated the important 12th Lesson on "Public Consumption", Quatrième partie. De la Consommation. Douzième leçon. Les Consommations publiques, pp. 480-534; In English [HTML].

Gustave de Molinari, Les Clubs rouges pendant le siège de Paris (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1871).

Gustave de Molinari, Le Mouvement socialiste et les réunions publiques avant la révolution du 4 septembre 1870, suivi de : la Pacification des rapports du capital et du travail (Paris : Garnier frères, 1872).

Gustave de Molinari, La République tempérée. (Paris: Garnier, 1873).

Gustave de Molinari, L'évolution économique du XIXe siècle: théorie du progrès (Paris: C. Reinwald 1880). In French [HTML].

Gustave de Molinari, L'évolution politique et la Révolution (Paris: C. Reinwald, 1884). In French [HTML].

Gustave de Molinari, Conversations sur le commerce des grains et la protection de l’agriculture (Nouvelle édition) (Paris: Guillaumin, 1886).

Gustave de Molinari, Les Lois naturelles de l’économie politique (Paris: Guillaumin, 1887). In French [HTML].

Gustave de Molinari, La Morale économique (Paris: Guillaumin, 1888). In French [HTML]

Gustave de Molinari, Les Bourses du Travail (Paris: Guillaumin, 1893).

Gustave de Molinari, Précis d’économie politique et de morale. (Paris: Guillaumin et cie, 1893).

Gustave de Molinari, Comment se résoudra la question sociale (Paris: Guillaumin, 1896). [In French [HTML].

Gustave de Molinari, Grandeur et décadence de la guerre (The Rise and Fall of War) (Paris: Guillaumin, 1898). In French [HTML] and English [HTML].

Gustave de Molinari, Esquisse de l'organisation politique et économique de la Société future (A Sketch of the Political and Economic Organisation of the Society of the Future) (Paris: Guillaumin, 1899) in French [HTML] and my recent translation into English [HTML].

  • the older 1904 translation: Gustave de Molinari, The Society of Tomorrow: A Forecast of its Political and Economic Organization, ed. Hodgson Pratt and Frederic Passy, trans. P.H. Lee Warner (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904). [HTML]. The English translation has an additional Appendix by Edward Atkinson, "The Cost to the United States of War and of Preparation for War from 1898 to 1904".

Gustave de Molinari, Économie de l'histoire: Théorie de l'Évolution (Paris: F. Alcan, 1908). In French [HTML].

Gustave de Molinari, A series of letters in The Times of London on organizing a "League of Neutrals" (28 July, 1887), " A Syndicat of Peace" (1 Nov. 1893), and "The Assurance of Peace" (21 Oct. 1895).

Gustave de Molinari, Thoughts on the Future of Liberty (1901-1911). The French language edition. Edited by David M. Hart (The Pittwater Free Press, 2023). In French [HTML]. This contains:

  • "Le XIXe siècle," Journal des Économistes, janvier 1901, pp. 5-19;
  • "Le XXe siècle," Journal desÉconomistes*, janvier 1902, pp. 5-14.

Gustave de Molinari, Thoughts on the Future of Liberty (1901-1911). The English language edition. Edited by David M. Hart (The Pittwater Free Press, 2025). In English [HTML].

Gustave de Molinari, Les Problèmes du XXe siècle (Paris: Guillaumin, 1901). In French [HTML].

Gustave de Molinari, Économie de l'histoire: Théorie de l'Évolution (Paris: F. Alcan, 1908). In French [HTML].

Gustave de Molinari, Ultima verba: mon dernier ouvrage (Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1911).

Other Primary Works

Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage. (1st edition 1910, 4th enlarged edition (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1913).

Anon., Report of the Proceedings of the Second General Peace Congress, held in Paris, on the 22nd, 23rd and 24th of August, 1849. Compiled from Authentic Documents, under the Superintendence of the Peace Congress Committee. (London: Charles Gilpin, 5, Bishopsgate Street Without, 1849).

  • Cobden's speech pp. 53-54

Frédéric Bastiat, "XVII, Un chemin de fer négatif," SE1, pp. 122-23. Sophismes économiques. Par M. Frédéric Bastiat, Membre du Conseil général des Landes (Paris: Guillaumin, 1846). In French [HTMl.

Frédéric Bastiat, Sophismes économiques. Première et Deuxième Séries (1846-48) In French [HTML].

Frédéric Bastiat, “L’Utopiste” (The Utopian), Le Libre-échange, 17 January 1847, pp. 63–64; reprinted in Economic Sophisms (Second Series) (1848), SE 11, pp. 101-11. In French [HTML].

Frédéric Bastiat, "Peace and Freedom or the Republican Budget" (Paix et liberté ou le budget républicain) (February 1849), published as a pamphlet, Paix et Liberté, ou le Budget républicain (Peace and Freedom, or the Republican Budget) (Paris: Guillaumin, 1849).

Frédéric Bastiat, A speech on "Disarmament, Taxes, and the Influence of Political Economy on the Peace Movement." A speech at the Friends of Peace Conference in Paris, 22 Aug., 1849. A short version (1 1/2 pages, 1,300 words) is in French in Joseph Garnier, Congrès des amis de la paix universelle réuni à Paris en 1849, pp. 25-26; a longer longer version in English (3 1/2 pages, 2,600 words) in Report of the Proceedings of the Second General Peace Congress, held in Paris, on the 22nd, 23rd and 24th of August, 1849 (translator unknown), pp. 49-52.

Frédéric Bastiat, Gratuité du crédit. Discussion entre M. Fr. Bastiat et M. Proudhon (Free Credit. A Discussion between M. Fr. Bastiat and M. Proudhon) (Paris: Guillaumin, 1850).

Frédéric Bastiat, Ce qu’on voit et ce qu’on ne voit pas, ou l’Économie politique en une leçon. Par M. F. Bastiat. Représentant du Peuple à l’Assemblée Nationale, Membre correspondant de l’Institut (Paris: Guillaumin, 1850). In French [HTML].

Frédéric Bastiat, Harmonies économiques. 2me Édition. Augmentée des manuscrits laissés par l’auteur. Publiée par la Société des amis de Bastiat. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1851). In French [HTML].

Bérenger, Pierre Jean de. Oeuvres complètes de P.J. de Béranger contenant les dix chanson nouvelles, avec un Portrait gravé sur bois d’après Charlet (Paris: Perrotin, 1855).

Jean de Bloch, La guerre. Traduction de l’ouvrage russe “La guerre future aux points de vue technique, économique et politique (Paris: Guillaumin, 1898-1900).

Jean de Bloch, The Future of War in its Technical, Economics, and Political Relations. Translated by R.C. Long, and with a Conversations with the Author by W.T. Stead, and an Introduction by Edwin D. Mead (Boston: Published for the International Union, Ginn and Company, 1903).

Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer, An Anthology of Articles from 'Le Censeur' (1814-1815) and 'Le Censeur européen' (1817-1819). Ed. David M. Hart (2021). In French [HTML] and my English translation:

Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer, Censoring the State Part 1: An Anthology of Articles by Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer from 'Le Censeur' (1814-1815). Edited and translated by David M. Hart (Pittwater Free Press, 2026). In English [HTML].

Coquelin and Guillaumin, Dictionnaire de l'Économie Politique, contenant l'exposition des principes de la science, l'opinion des écrivains qui ont le plus contribué à sa fondation et à ses progrès, la Bibliographie générale de l'économie politique par noms d'auteurs et par ordre de matières, avec des notices biographiques et une appréciation raisonnée des principaux ouvrages, publié sous la direction de MM. Charles Coquelin et Guillaumin (Paris: Librairie de Guillaumin et Cie, 1852-1853), 2 vols.

Charles Dunoyer, L'industrie et la morale considérées dans leurs rapports avec la liberté (Paris: Sautelet, 1825). In French [HTML].

Joseph Garnier, Congrès des amis de la paix universelle réuni à Paris en 1849 : compte-rendu, séances des 22, 23, 24 Aout; - Résolutions adoptées; discours de Mm. Victor Hugo, Visschers, Rév. John Burnett; Rév. Asa Mahan, de l'Ohio; Henri Vincent, de Londres; Ath. Coquerel; Suringar, d'Amsterdam; Francisque Bouvet, Émile de Girardin; Ewart, membre du Parlement; Frédéric Bastiat; Richard Cobden, Elihu Burritt, Deguerry; Amasa Walker, de Massachussets; Ch. Hindley, membre du Parlement, etc., etc.; Compte-rendu d'une visite au Président de la République, de trois meetings en Angleterre; statistique des membres du congrès, etc.; précédé d'une Note historique sur le mouvement en faveur de la paix, par M. Joseph Garnier. (Paris: Guillaumin, 1850).

Jacques Novikov, La Guerre et ses prétendus biensfaits (Paris: Armand Colin, 1894). English translation: War and its Alleged Benefits (London: Willaim Heinemann, 1912).

Vilfredo Pareto, Traité de sociologie générale. Édition française par Pierre Boven. Revue par l’auteur. 2 Volumes (Paris: Librairie Payot, 1917, 1919). In French [HTML].

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Œuvres Complètes de P.-J. Proudhon. Tome XIII. La Guerre et la Paix. Recherches sur le Principe et la Constitution du Droit des Gens. Par P.-J. Proudhon. Nouvelle Édition. (Paris: Librairie Internationale 15, Boulevard Montmartre. A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven & Cie, éditeurs. A Bruxelles, à Leipzig et à Livourne, 1869). In French [HTML].

Herbert Spencer, Social Statics: or, The Conditions essential to Happiness specified, and the First of them Developed (London: John Chapman, 1851). [HTML].

Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Sociology, in Three Volumes (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1898). Authorized third edition. [HTML].

  • vol. 2 Part V. "Political Institutions", "XVII. The Militant Type of Society, pp. 568-602; "XVIII. The Industrial Type of Society, pp. 603-42. [HTML].

Augustin Thierry, Essai sur l'histoire de la formation et des progrès du Tiers État: Suivi de deux fragments du recueil des monuments inédits de cette histoire. Nouv. éd., rev. (Paris: Garnier, 1853). English trans. The Formation and Progress of the Tiers État, or Third Estate in France, translated from the French by the Rev. Francis B. Wells, Two volumes in One (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1859).

Secondary Works

Anon., "Napoleonic Wars casualties", Wikipedia [HTML].

David M. Hart, Class Analysis, Slavery and the Industrialist Theory of History in French Liberal Thought, 1814-1830: The Radical Liberalism of Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer (King's College Cambridge, 1994). HTML].

David M. Hart, "Gustave de Molinari and the Anti-statist Liberal Tradition" Journal of Libertarian Studies, in three parts, (Summer 1981), V, no. 3: 263-290 [HTML] ; (Fall 1981), V. no. 4: 399-434 [HTML]; (Winter 1982), VI, no. 1: 83-104 [HTML]. At my website [HTML].

David M. Hart, "Molinari, Gustave de (1819-1912)," The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism (2008), pp. 336-37. HTML]

  • The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism. Editor-in-Chief Ronald Hamowy. Assistant Editors Jason Kuznicki and Aaron Steelman. Consulting Editor Deirdre McCloskey. Founding and Consulting Editor Jeffrey D. Schultz. (Los Angeles: Sage, 2008. A Project of the Cato Institute).

David M. Hart, "Was Molinari a true Anarcho-Capitalist?: An Intellectual History of the Private and Competitive Production of Security". A paper presented at the Libertarian Scholars Conference, NYC (Sept. 2019). [HTML].

David M. Hart, "The Paris School of Liberal Political Economy, 1803-1853". A Paper given at the History of Economic Thought Society of Australia Annual Conference, Melbourne VIC, 22 Sept. 2022. [HTML].

David M. Hart, "Frédéric Bastiat on Plunder, Class, and the State". This essay was written to accompany an anthology of Bastiat's writings on plunder, class, and the state: Frédéric Bastiat, La Spoliation, la Classe, et l’État (Plunder, Class, and State): An Anthology of Texts (1845-1851). Edited and with an Introduction by David M. Hart (Sydney: The Pittwater Free Press, 2023). [HTML].

David M. Hart, "A Monument to French Political Economy': the Dictionnaire de l'Économie Politique (1852-53). The Contributions of Gilbert-Urbain Guillaumin (1801-1864), Charles Coquelin (1802-1852), and Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912". A Paper given at the annual conference of the History of Economic Thought Society of Australia, the University of Western Australia, Perth, 17-18 July, 2025. [HTML].

Robert Leroux, Aux fondements de l'industrialisme: Comte, Dunoyer et la pensée libérale en France (Paris: Hermann, 2015) and in English as The Foundations of Industrialism: Charles Comte, Charles Dunoyer and Liberal Thought in France (New York: Peter Lang, 2016).

Gérard Minart, Gustave de Molinari (1819-1912): Pour un gouvernement à bon marché dans un milieu libre (Paris: Éditions de l'Institut Charles Coquelin, 2012).

Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

O'Rourke, Kevin H., "The Worldwide Economic Impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars", (May 2005, 2023). NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research) Working Paper No. w11344, Available at SSRN: [HTML].

Mark Weinburg, "The Social Analysis of Three Early 19th Century French Liberals: Say, Comte, and Dunoyer, Journal of Libertarian Studies, 1978, vol. 2. no. 1, pp. 45-63.