1. The Powers, Privileges, and Immunities of the High Ranks and Orders in Society

Every independent state is divided into many different orders and societies, each of which has its own particular powers, privileges, and immunities. Every individual is naturally more attached to his own particular order or society, than to any other. His own interest, his own vanity, the interest and vanity of many of his friends and companions, are commonly a good deal connected with it. He is ambitious to extend its privileges and immunities. He is zealous to defend them against the encroachments of every other order or society.

Upon the manner in which any state is divided into the different orders and societies which compose it, and upon the particular distribution which has been made of their respective powers, privileges, and immunities, depends, what is called, the constitution of that particular state.

Upon the ability of each particular order or society to maintain its own powers, privileges, and immunities, against the encroachments of every other, depends the stability of that particular constitution. That particular constitution is necessarily more or less altered, whenever any of its subordinate parts is either raised above or depressed below whatever had been its former rank and condition.

[TMS II-101-02 <davidmhart.com/liberty/EnglishClassicalLiberals/Smith/TMS/1790/index.html#TMS2-p1195>]

2. On Deference to Rank and Authority

Even when the order of society seems to require that we should oppose them (men of high rank and authority] , we can hardly bring ourselves to do it. That kings are the servants of the people, to be obeyed, resisted, deposed, or punished, as the public conveniency may require, is the doctrine of reason and philosophy; but it is not the doctrine of Nature. Nature would teach us to submit to them for their own sake, to tremble and bow down before their exalted station, to regard their smile as a reward sufficient to compensate any services, and to dread their displeasure, though no other evil were to follow from it, as the severest of all mortifications. To treat them in any respect as men, to reason and dispute with them upon ordinary occasions, requires such resolution, that there are few men whose magnanimity can support them in it, unless they are likewise assisted by familiarity and acquaintance.

[TMS I-228 <davidmhart.com/liberty/EnglishClassicalLiberals/Smith/TMS/1790/index.html#TMS1-p1767>]

3. “the means by which they acquired it”

To attain to this envied situation, the candidates for fortune too frequently abandon the paths of virtue; for unhappily, the road which leads to the one, and that which leads to the other, lie sometimes in very opposite directions. But the ambitious man flatters himself that, in the splendid situation to which he advances, he will have so many means of commanding the respect and admiration of mankind, and will be enabled to act with such superior propriety and grace, that the lustre of his future conduct will entirely cover, or efface, the foulness of the steps by which he arrived at that elevation. In many governments the candidates for the highest stations are above the law; and, if they can attain the object of their ambition, they have no fear of being called to account for the means by which they acquired it. They often endeavour, therefore, not only by fraud and falsehood, the ordinary and vulgar arts of intrigue and cabal; but sometimes by the perpetration of the most enormous crimes, by murder and assassination, by rebellion and civil war, to supplant and [I-156] destroy those who oppose or stand in the way of their greatness.

[TMS I-155-56 <Smith/TMS/1790/index.html#TMS1-p2128>]

4. “this disposition of mankind”

**Upon this disposition of mankind, to go along with all the passions of the rich and the powerful, is founded the distinction of ranks, and the order of society.** Our **obsequiousness to our superiors** more frequently arises from our admiration for the advantages of their situation, than from any private expectations of benefit from their good-will. Their benefits can extend but to a few; but their fortunes interest almost every body. We are eager to assist them in completing a system of happiness that approaches so near to perfection; and we desire to serve them for their own sake, without any other recompense but the vanity or the honour of obliging them.

[TMS I-123-27 <Smith/TMS/1790/index.html#TMS1-p1675>]

5. “the fascination of greatness”

**Our respect for the great, accordingly, is most apt to offend by its excess; our fellow–feeling for the miserable, by its defect.** Moralists exhort us to charity and compassion. They warn us against **the fascination of greatness**. This fascination, indeed, is so powerful, that the rich and the great are too often preferred to the wise and the virtuous. **Nature has wisely judged that the distinction of ranks, the peace and order of society, would rest more securely upon the plain and palpable difference of birth and fortune, than upon the invisible and often uncertain difference of wisdom and virtue**

[TMS II-89-90 <Smith/TMS/1790/index.html#TMS2-p1050>]

6. “(those) who tyrannize the government, warp the positive laws of the country”

In all well-governed states too, not only judges are appointed for determining the controversies of individuals, but **rules are prescribed for regulating the decisions of those judges**; and these rules are, in general, intended to coincide with those of **natural justice**. It does not, indeed, always happen that they do so in every instance. Sometimes what is called **the constitution of the state, that is, the interest of the government; sometimes the interest of particular orders of men who tyrannize the government, warp the positive laws of the country from what natural justice would prescribe**.

[TMS II-395-99 <Smith/TMS/1790/index.html#TMS2-p4788>]

7. “political speculators”

**It is of all political speculators, sovereign princes are by far the most dangerous.** This arrogance is perfectly familiar to them. [II-112] They entertain no doubt of the immense superiority of their own judgment. When **such imperial and royal reformers**, therefore, condescend to contemplate the constitution of the country which is committed to their government, they seldom see any thing so wrong in it as the obstructions which it may sometimes oppose to the execution of their own will. They hold in contempt the divine maxim of Plato, and **consider the state as made for themselves, not themselves for the state**.

[TMS II-111-12 <Smith/TMS/1790/index.html#TMS2-p1305>]

8. “violent political faction”

Times of violent religious controversy have generally been times of equally violent political faction. Upon such occasions each political party has either found it, or imagined it, for its interest to league [II-379] itself with some one or other of the contending religious sects. But this could be done only by adopting, or at least by favouring, the tenets of that particular sect. The sect which had the good fortune to be leagued with the conquering party, necessarily shared in the victory of its ally, by whose favour and protection it was soon enabled in some degree to silence and subdue all its adversaries. Those adversaries had generally leagued themselves with the enemies of the conquering party, and were therefore the enemies of that party. The clergy of this particular sect having thus become complete masters of the field, and their influence and authority with the great body of the people being in its highest vigour, they were powerful enough to over-awe the chiefs and leaders of their own party, and to oblige the civil magistrate to respect their opinions and inclinations. Their first demand was generally, that he should silence and subdue all their adversaries and their second, that he should bestow an independent provision on themselves. As they had generally contributed a good deal to the victory, it seemed not unreasonable that they should have some share in the spoil.

[WN,V i.g.7:791-92; <Smith/WoN/1776-edition/index.html#WoN2-p1508>]

9. “(the vain man) courts the company of his superiors”

It is quite otherwise with the vain man. He **courts the company of his superiors** as much as the proud man shuns it. Their splendour, he seems to think, reflects a splendour upon those who are much about them. **He haunts the courts of kings and the levees of ministers, and gives himself the air of being a candidate for fortune and preferment**, when in reality he possesses the much more precious happiness, if he knew how to enjoy it, of not being one. **He is fond of being admitted to the tables of the great, and still more fond of magnifying to other people the familiarity with which he is honoured there**.

[TMS VI.iii.40, p. 257; II-172-73 <Smith/TMS/1790/index.html#TMS2-p1983>]

10. “People of the same trade seldom meet together …” (1)

[WN I-160-61 <`Smith/WoN/1776-edition/index.html#WoN1-p316`>]People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the **conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public**, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. **But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary**.

[WN I-160-61 <`Smith/WoN/1776-edition/index.html#WoN1-p316`>]

11. “People of the same trade seldom meet together …” (2)

People **in government, the church, and the military** seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the publick, or in some contrivance to **raise taxes, censor heretics, or increase spending**. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people **in government, the church, and the military** from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.

[Invention of DMH]

12. “the prudent man”

The prudent man is not willing to subject himself to any responsibility which his duty does not impose upon him. He is **not a bustler in business** where he has no concern ; is **not a meddler in other people's affairs** ; is **not a professed counsellor or adviser**, who obtrudes his advice where nobody is asking it. **He confines himself, as much as his duty will permit, to his own affairs**, and has no taste for that foolish [II-60] importance which many people wish to derive from appearing to have some influence in the management of those of other people. He is **averse to enter into any party disputes, hates faction**, and is not always very forward to listen to the voice even of noble and great ambition. When distinctly called upon, he will not decline the service of his country, but he **will not cabal in order to force himself into it**, ...

[TMS II-59-60 <Smith/TMS/1790/index.html#TMS2-p693>]

13. “the love of domination and authority”

**The love of domination and authority over others, which I am afraid is naturall to mankind, a certain desire of having others below one, and the pleasure it gives one to have some persons whom he can order to do his work rather than be obliged to persuade others to bargain with him, will for ever hinder this from taking place**.

[LJ(B) Wed Feb 16, 1763, pp. 129-30 <`Smith_LecturesJurisprudence.html#LJ-p247`>]

14. “dangerous disorders (and) still greater disorders”

Such are the unfortunate effects of all the regulations of the mercantile [427] system! They not only introduce very dangerous disorders into the state of the body politick, but disorders which it is often difficult to remedy, without occasioning, for a time at least, still greater disorders. In what manner, therefore, the colony trade ought gradually to be opened; what are the restraints which ought first, and what are those which ought last to be taken away; or in what manner **the natural system of perfect liberty and justice** ought gradually to be restored, we must leave to the wisdom of future statesmen and legislators to determine.

[WN II-211 <Smith/WoN/1776-edition/index.html#WoN2-p1254]