

18093

THE
RELIGION
OF
NATURE
DELINEATED.



Ἔνοι φεύγοντες τὴν Δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐμπίπτουσιν
εἰς Ἀθεότηα τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀντίτυπον, ὑπερπεδήσαντες
ἘΝ ΜΕ' ΣΩ κειμένην τὴν Εὐσέβειαν.

Some, in order to avoid superstition, have fallen into the wildest and most obstinate atheism, and trampled upon that piety which lies between either extreme. PLUT.

Χαίρειν ἐν ἑάσας τὰς Τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν
ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἈΛΗΘΕΙΑΝ σκοπῶν, πειράσομαι
τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύναμαι βέλτιστος ὦν καὶ ζῆν, καὶ
ἐπιδὼν ἀποθνήσκω, ἀποθνήσκειν.

Wherefore bidding farewell to the honours of the multitude, and having my eye upon TRUTH, I will really endeavour, as far as I am able, to live in the best manner I can, and when I die, to die so. PLATO.

William
By Mr WOLLASTON.
THE SEVENTH EDITION.

To which is added,
A PREFACE containing a general Account of the Life, Character, and Writings of the AUTHOR :

Also a Translation of the NOTES into English.

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MDCCL.



MR WOLLASTON.

J.S. Müller sc:

A
P R E F A C E

CONTAINING

A General Account of the Life, Character, and Writings of the AUTHOR.

PERHAPS the Perusal of the following Sheets may excite the Curiosity of the Reader to wish for some *General Account* concerning the AUTHOR of them: And it is not improbable that He may desire to know, *in particular*, Whether the Person who composed them was a *mere Speculative Admirer* of VIRTUE; or whether He was HIMSELF an *Example* of that MORALITY which He has so strongly recommended to the *Practice* of OTHERS. If such a Curiosity shall happen to be raised in any One who was quite a Stranger to THIS GENTLEMAN'S *Life* and *Character*, This

Recd 4-22-28 MMS.

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SLIGHT SKETCH of *Both* may chance in *some Measure* to gratify it.

Mr WILLIAM WOLLASTON, the Author of the RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED, was descended from a Family which appears to have been ancient and considerable in the County of *Stafford*. It was, long since, divided into *Two* Branches: The former of which continued seated in *Staffordshire*; But the latter was in process of Time transplanted into other Counties. The Head of the *Second* Branch flourished formerly at *Oncot* in the County of *Stafford*; but, of late Years, at *Shenton* in the County of *Leicester*: and was possessed of a very considerable Estate in those and other Counties. From this *Second* Branch was our Author descended: And from a younger Brother of the same Branch sprung Sir JOHN WOLLASTON, Lord Mayor of *London*, well known in *that City* at the Time of the Civil War,

Mr WOLLASTON was born upon the 26th of *March* 1659. at *Coton-Clanford* in *Staffordshire*. When He was in the 10th Year of his Age, a *Latin* School was opened at
Shenton

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Shenston in *Staffordshire*, where his Father, a private Gentleman, of a small Fortune, then resided: And Mr WOLLASTON was immediately sent to the Master of it for such Instruction as He was capable to give Him; and continued near two Years under his Care. Afterwards He was sent to *Litchfield* School: in which a great Confusion soon after happened, and the Magistrates of the City turned the Master out of the School-House. Many Scholars followed the Ejected Master: And Mr WOLLASTON, amongst the rest. He remained with Him till He quitted his School, which was about three Years: And then, the Schism being ended, He returned into the Free-School, and continued there about a Year: This was *All* the *Schooling* Mr WOLLASTON ever had: And this Time was passed, not without Uneasiness. For, though He was always *very attentive to Books*, and *very desirous of Improvement*; Yet the *Rudeness* of a Great School was particularly disagreeable to his *Natural Disposition*: and, what was still worse, He began to be much infested with the *Head-Ach*, which seems to have been *constitutional* in Him.

Upon the 18th of *June* 1674. He was admitted a Pensioner in *Sidney College* in *Cambridge*; being then so much upwards of 15 Years of Age as from the 26th of the preceding *March*. But here He laboured under *various Disadvantages*: to which a Person so circumstanced as He then was, could not but be subject. He had *no Acquaintance* in the College, nor even in the University (to which He was come a Country Lad from a Country School;) *few Books* or other Advantages; no *Assistance* or *Direction* from any Body; nor *sufficient Confidence* to supply that Defect by Inquiry or Conversation. Add to this, That his *State of Health* was not quite firm: And that his *Allowance* was by no Means more than sufficient for bare Necessaries; his then Situation being that of younger Brother, descended from younger Brothers for several Successions. (Tho' indeed, his Grandfather *had had* a considerable Estate both Real and Personal, together with an Office of 700*l. per Annum.*) However, under All these Disadvantages, Mr WOLLASTON acquired a *great Degree of REPUTATION* in the University:

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verity: perhaps *too much*; For had it been *less*, it might have escaped the Tax of *Envy*, which probably was the Cause of His missing a *Preferment in the College*, which a Young Man of his Character had Reason to expect.

Upon the 29th of *September* 1681 He left the Univerfity: being then Twenty two Years and an Half Old. He had commenced *Master of Arts* the Summer before: And it feems to have been about this Time, that He took *Deacon's Orders*.

From *Cambridge* He went to pay his Duty to his Father and Mother, who now lived at *Great Bloxwyche*: having firft made a Three Weeks Vifit to the then Head of this Branch of the Family, his Coufin WOLLASTON of *Sbenton*. And He remained at *Bloxwyche*, with his Father and Mother (whom He had not feen for many Years before) till *May* or *June* 1682. About which Time, feeing no Profppect of *Preferment*, He fo far conformed Himfelf to the Circumftances of his Fortune as to become Affiftant to the Head-Mafter of *Birmingham School*: Who readily embraced the Opportunity of fuch a

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Co-Adjutor, and considered Mr WOLLASTON as one that prudentially stooped to an Employment below what He might have reasonably pretended to. And his Cousin of *Shenton* was far from being displeas'd at this Instance of his Relation's *humble Industry*.

In a short Time He got a small Lectorship at a Chapel about two Miles distant. But He did the Duty of the *Whole Sunday*: Which, together with the Business of a Great Free-School, for about four Years, began to break his Constitution; and, if continued, had probably overcome it quite, though the *Stamina* of it were naturally very strong.

During this Space He likewise suffered many Anxieties and underwent a Deal of Trouble and Uneasiness, in order to extricate Two of his Brothers from some Inconveniencies to which their own Imprudencies had subjected them. And in the good Offices which He did them at this Time, He seems to have rather *over-acted* his Part: For He indulg'd his Affection for them, more than was consistant with a due Regard
to

to his own Welfare, as He was then circumstanced.

When He had been about four Years at *Birmingham*, He was chosen Second Master of the School: In which there were three Masters, two Assistants, and a Writing-Master. It was pretended that He was *too Young* to be Head-Master of so great a School: But in Reality, the Old Master was turned out in order to make way for a *particular Person* to succeed Him. And some of the Governors even owned that Mr WOLLASTON had Wrong done Him, in not being preferred still higher. He kept this new Station about two Years. It was worth to Him about 70 *l. per Annum*. Upon this Occasion He took *Priest's Orders*: For the Words of the Charter were interpreted to require that the Masters should be in *These Orders*, and yet must take no Ecclesiastical Préferment.

The late Chief Master, a valuable and good Old Man, and for whom Mr WOLLASTON of *Shenton* had an Esteem, retired after his Expulsion to his Brother's House in
the

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the Neighbourhood of *Sbenton*. He once or twice waited upon Mr WOLLASTON of *Sbenton*: And undoubtedly informed Him of the Character, Learning, Conversation and Conduct of our AUTHOR; which He was *very capable of doing*, because they had lived together till the Time of this Old Gentleman's leaving *Birmingham*.

Mr WOLLASTON of *Sbenton* having now lately lost his *only Son*, and never intending (as appears from his *whole* Conduct) to give his Estate to his *Daughters*, pursued his Father's Design of continuing it in the MALE Line of his Family: and resolved to settle it upon our Author's Uncle and Father (his own *first Cousins* and his *nearest Male Relations*) in the same Proportions and Manner; exactly, in which it had been intailed formerly upon them by his Father. And accordingly He made such a Settlement: subject however to a *Revocation*.

Mr WOLLASTON all this While applied Himself to his Business: and never so much as waited upon his Cousin, or employed any one to speak or act any thing in his Behalf;

half; (tho' many then blamed Him for neglecting to do it.) Only *One Visit* He made Him, in the *November* before his Death; which was upon a *Saturday* in the Afternoon. He gave Him a Sermon the next Day; received his *Heartly* Thanks; and the next Morning desired Leave to return to the Duties of his Station: Without speaking or even insinuating any thing in relation to his ESTATE. His Cousin dismissed Him with great Kindness: And, by his *Looks* and *Manner*, seemed to have a PARTICULAR REGARD for him; but discovered nothing of his Intention by *Words*.

However, his Cousin of *Shenton* was used to employ Persons privately, to observe our Author's *Behaviour*: (who little suspected any such Matter.) And his *Behaviour* was found to be such, that the stricter the Observations were upon it, the more they turned to his Advantage. In Fine, Mr WOLLASTON became so thoroughly satisfied of our Author's *Merit*, that He *revoked* the before-mentioned Settlement, and made a WILL in his Favor.

In

In *August* following, Mr WOLLASTON OF *Shenton* fell sick: and sent *secretly* to our Author “to come over to Him as of his
“ own Accord without any Notice of his
“ Illness.” He complied with the Message: and staid some Days at *Shenton*. But whilst He was gone Home again, under a Promise of returning, his Cousin died:

It was the 19th of *August* 1688. when this Gentleman died. His WILL gave a new and a great Turn to our Mr WOLLASTON'S Affairs: who found Himself intitled by it to a *very ample Estate*.

The *Circumstances* relating to the Means whereby the last mentioned Mr WOLLASTON came to the Possession of his Estate, and the *Steps* which led to it, have been *the more minutely particularized* here; Because COMMON FAME has somehow caught up and forwarded a *groundless Imagination*,
“ That the Author was AN ABSOLUTE
“ STRANGER to the former Possessor and
“ to his Family, and happened to fall into
“ his Company, by MERE ACCIDENT, at
“ an

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“ an *Inn.*” Which is so far from being *true* or even bearing any *Resemblance to Truth*, That they were in Fact very *near Relations*; and *this very Estate* had been *twice* entailed upon Mr WOLLASTON's Uncle and Father.

Such a Sudden and Advantageous Alteration of Affairs would have *intoxicated* Many. But the same FIRMNESS OF MIND, which supported this Gentleman under the Pressures of his more *Adverse Fortune*, enabled Him to bear his *Prosperity* with *Moderation*: And his RELIGION and PHILOSOPHY taught Him to maintain a *due Equanimity* under either EXTREME.

In *November 1688* He came to *London*: And about a *Twelve-month* after, upon the *26th of November 1689*, He married Mrs CATHARINE CHARLTON, one of the Daughters of Mr NICHOLAS CHARLTON, an eminent Citizen of *London*; a fine Woman, with a *good Fortune* and a *most excellent Character*. They lived *extremely happy* in each other, till her Death left Him a mournful Widower, upon the *21st of July 1720*. By Her He had eleven Children: Of whom
four

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four died in his Life-time; the rest survived Him.

He may most truly be said to have *settled* in *London*: For He very seldom went out of it. He took no Delight in unnecessary Journeys: And, for above Thirty Years before his Death, had not been absent from his Habitation in *Charter-House Square*, so much as ONE *whole Night*.

In this his Settlement in *London*, He chose a *Private* and *Retired* Life. His *Carriage* was nevertheless *Free* and *Open*. He aimed at *solid* and *real* CONTENT, rather than SHEW and GRANDEUR: and manifested his Dislike of POWER and DIGNITY, by *refusing* one of the *highest Preferments* in the *Church*, when it was offered to Him. He endeavoured to *excel* in SINCERITY and USEFUL SENSE, more than in FORMALITIES and TRIFLES.

He was perfectly acquainted with the *Elementary Parts* of Learning: And with the *learned Languages*; Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, &c. He thought it necessary to add
to

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to These such a Degree of *Philology* and *Criticism* as seemed likely to be Useful to Him; and also *Mathematical Sciences*, or at least the *Fundamentals* of them; The *General Philosophy* of Nature; The *History and Antiquities* of the more known and noted States and Kingdoms; and such like ERUDITION. And in order to attain the Knowledge of TRUE RELIGION and the DISCOVERY OF TRUTH, (the Points which He always had *particularly* in View, and to which He *chiefly* directed all his Studies,) He *diligently inquired* into the *Idolatries* of the HEATHENS: And made Himself MASTER of the *Sentiments, Rites, and Learning* of the JEWS; the HISTORY of the *first Settlement* of CHRISTIANITY, and the *Opinions and Practices* introduced into it since. In the mean time He exercised and improved his MIND by *throwing off* PREJUDICES; using Himself to *clear* IMAGES; observing the *Influence and Extent* of AXIOMS, the *Nature and Force* of CONSEQUENCES, and the *Method* of investigating TRUTH. In *General*, He accustomed Himself to MUCH Thinking; as well as to much Reading.

By

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By this Method indeed He was rather qualified for *private Instruction*, than accomplished for public CONVERSATION and SHEW. But the *latter* was not his *Point*. He looked upon that *Specious* Sort of KNOWLEDGE which often gains a Man the Reputation of a SCHOLAR at a very *cheap* Rate, to be a FALSE LEARNING and of no kind of Service to HIM who was in Quest of REAL KNOWLEDGE.

He was of Opinion too That a Man might easily *read too much*: And he considered the HELLUO LIBRORUM and the TRUE SCHOLAR, as two *very different* Characters.

The LOVE of TRUTH AND REASON made Him love FREE THINKING: and, as far as the World would *bear* it, FREE SPEAKING too. This tended, He thought, to the *Discovery* of ERROR. Tho' He was not insensible that it might render Himself acceptable to many Persons: particularly, to those who perhaps have only just Sense enough to perceive their own Weakness;

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ness; or judge of Things by the Vogue they bear, or the Respect they have to their own Interest or Party; or can neither bear the Trouble of an honest Inquiry themselves, nor yet that another should know what they do not know; in short, to every *Prejudiced* Person whatsoever. But He took all Opportunities to *assert seriously and inculcate strenuously* the BEING AND PERFECTIONS of GOD; his PROVIDENCE, both *General* and *Particular*; the OBLIGATIONS we are under to adore HIM; the REASONABLENESS of VIRTUE; the IMMATERIALITY and IMMORTALITY of the SOUL; FUTURE REWARDS and PUNISHMENTS; and other *High and essential Points* of NATURAL RELIGION and the CHRISTIAN REVELATION. In fine, To *reason impartially*, and to *know where to stop*, was the Mark He always aimed at.

And He loved TRUTH, not in *Speculation only*, but also in *Practice*: For he loved PUNCTUAL HONESTY.

He likewise delighted in METHOD and REGULARITY: And chose to have his Labours

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bours and Refreshments *Periodical*; and that his Family and Friends should observe the *proper Seasons* of their *Revolutions*. The *Reverse* of this being the prevailing *Temper*, or at least *Practice* of Mankind, oftentimes either *deprived* Him of Conversation or rendered it *disagreeable* to Him.

The GENERAL CHARACTER of his NATURE was, That it was TENDER AND SENSIBLE. This TENDERNESS disposed Him to *feel and compassionate* the Miseries of others: Insomuch that He many times suffered more perhaps in *another man's* Case than *the man* did in his *own*. This TENDERNESS induced Him always to endeavour to *satisfy and convince*, in Cases where He *might have commanded despotically and absolutely*. Tho' it is not improbable that in this He was frequently *misunderstood* as if He meant to *chide*, when He only intended to *explain and convince*. To this TENDERNESS may also be ascribed that *excessive Modesty and Diffidence of Himself*, which made Him delight in *Privacy and Retirement*; and incapacitated Him in a great Measure from appearing, in Public, *at all like what*
He

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He *really* was ; and even occasioned Him sometimes to *seem inferior* to those, who exceeded Him in nothing but FORWARDNESS AND CONCEIT. Something of this might indeed be owing to the *Depression of his Spirits* in his younger Days. From the *same Causes* might arise his strong Apprehension of the UNREASONABLENESS AND INJUSTICE of those, who were designedly the Beginners of Quarrels or Abuses, or invaded without Provocation Another's Good Name. The same TENDERNESS rendered Him in a high Manner sensible of the *Desertion, Unkindness or Indifference* of FRIENDS.

He never indulged his PASSIONS to the Hurt of any One. If in any respect He shewed that He was not *so compleat a STOIC* as to have *eradicated* his PASSIONS, or *so perfect a PHILOSOPHER* as *never to be surprized by them* ; it was in the *Escape* of an *hasty Word or Expression* now and then, when He was put off of his Guard by Hurries, Indispositions, or such like Occasions. Yet He was not *always* angry, when the *Urgency of Business, the Straitness of Time, the Impertunity of impertinent People, or the like,*

caused Him to *talk louder* or *quicker* than ordinary; nor often, (if at all) without *sufficient Reason*; nor *ever so angry with any One else*, as He would be with HIMSELF for having been so. In short, If every One would restrain their Anger within the *same Bounds* as He did, there might be a *hasty Word or Expression* dropped sometimes upon *Provocation* or *Indisposition*: But there would never be RESENTMENT, WRATH or QUARREL more in the World.

He was most remarkably *Cheerful* and *Lively* in PRIVATE CONVERSATION; and by his Inclination *ready*, as well as by his Treasures of Learning *abundantly qualified*, to be *serviceable* to all sorts of Persons. This rendered his Company agreeable: and Himself worthy to be courted by the Learned and Virtuous. But a GENERAL ACQUAINTANCE was what He never cultivated: and it grew more and more his *Aversion*. So that He passed his Days mostly at Home, with a *few* Friends: with whom He could enjoy an *agreeable* RELAXATION OF MIND, and receive All the Advantages of a *sincere* and *open* FRIENDSHIP. This *Excessive Retirement*

tirement was however attended with *some Inconveniencies*. His *Intimates* were dropping off, and their *Places* remained *unsupplied*; His *own Infirmities* were *increasing*; The *Frequent Remission* of Study growing *more and more necessary*; and his *Solitudes* at the same Time becoming *less and less pleasant and agreeable*.

What Decays soever there might be in his **BODILY STRENGTH**, He nevertheless retained to the last the *Clearness and Perspicuity* of his **THOUGHTS**. But perceiving his *Designs* frustrated by the daily *Attacks* of **NATURE**, and that it would be impossible to *finish and compleat* them in the *Manner* He wished, it seems as if He had intended to destroy with his own Hand the *greatest Part* of his **WORKS**: And that *those few Manuscripts*, which were found after his *Death*, were indebted to the *Treachery of his Memory* for their Preservation. For He had within the last two or three Years of his Life *actually burnt* several *Treatises*, in the Composition whereof He had bestowed *no small Quantity* of **TIME** and **PAINS**. The following indeed *happened*

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to be spared: But from the *Place* in which they were deposited, and from *some other Circumstances*, 'tis probable that they owed their Escape to *mere Forgetfulness*. They were in Number thirteen, (besides about Fourscore Sermons) *viz.* 1. An *Hebrew Grammar*. 2. *Tyrocinia Arabica & Syriaca*. 3. *Specimen Vocabularii Biblico-Hebraici*, literis nostratibus quantum fert Linguarum Dissonantia descripti. 4. *Formulæ quædam Gemarinæ*. 5. De variis generibus *pedum, metrorum, carminum, &c.* apud *Judeos, Græcos & Latinos*. 6. De *Vocum Tonis* Monitio ad Tyrones. 7. *Rudimenta ad Matthesin & Philosophiam* spectantia. 8. *Miscellanea Philologica*. 9. *Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers*. 10. *Judaica*; sive *Religionis & Literaturæ Judaicæ* Synopsis. 11. A Collection of some Antiquities and Particulars in the History of Mankind: tending to shew that *Men have not been here upon this Earth from ETERNITY, &c.* 12. Some Passages relating to the *History of CHRIST*; collected out of the Primitive Fathers. 13. A Treatise relating to the *Jews*; of their *Antiquities, Language, &c.* And what renders it the
more

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more probable, or indeed almost beyond Doubt, That He would have destroyed *these likewise* if He had remembered them, is That several of these which remain *undestroyed* are only *Rudiments* or *rougher Sketches* of what He afterwards reconsidered and carried on much farther : and which, *even after such Revisal*, He nevertheless committed to the Flames, as being still (in his Opinion) *short* of that PERFECTION to which He *desired* and *had intended* to bring them.

It must be *owned* indeed that He had formerly published a PARAPHRASE *on part of the Book* of ECCLESIASTES, which He *had not corrected*. But *for that very Reason* He was afterwards *earnestly desirous* to *suppress* it. And He likewise composed and printed a little LATIN GRAMMAR. But this was only for the *Use* of his *Family*. The former was printed in the Year 1690 : The latter in 1703.

Not long before his Death, He published the ENSUING TREATISE, intitled “ THE “ RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED : ” in which the *Picture* of his LIFE is *most*

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fully drawn. *There* you may behold Him in his REAL CHARACTER: in the humble SUBMISSION AND RESIGNATION of Himself to the *unerring Will* of the DIVINE BEING; in his TRUE CONJUGAL AND PATERNAL AFFECTION to his *Family*; in his KIND REGARD AND BENEVOLENCE towards his *Fellow-Creatures*, according to their respective Stations in Life. For HE HIMSELF *steadily practised* those DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS, which He so earnestly recommended to OTHERS.

The *Great Demand* for THIS BOOK (of which more than Ten Thousand were sold in a very few Years) and the public Honours paid to the Memory of the Author, are sufficient Testimonies of its Value. He had, in the Year 1722, printed off a few Copies of it for *private Use*. And as soon as he had done so, He began to turn his Thoughts to the THIRD QUESTION: as appears by a Manuscript intitled *Heads and Materials for an Answer to Question 3. set down rudely and any how, in order to be considered, &c. after they are got into some Order.* July 4, 1723. Underneath which
He

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He has added. *They are written at Length (not in my Short-band) that so if this Answer should never be finished, they may however not be totally lost.* However, in *this Design* He had Opportunity to make but a *very small* Progress. For it was just about this Time that, at the Instances and Persuasion of his Friends, He set about *revising* and *publishing* the following Work; wherein he had answered the *two first* of the proposed Questions: Resolving, as soon as that should be done, to return to and finish his Answer to the **THIRD QUESTION.**

But in *that* He was disappointed. For immediately after he had completed the Revival and Publication of the following Treatise, an accident (of breaking his Arm) increased his Distempers, and accelerated his Death: which happened upon the 29th of *October* 1724, and has absolutely put an End to the Expectation of seeing *any more* of his **WORKS** in *Print*. For it would be *equally injurious to the AUTHOR, and disrespectful to the PUBLIC,* if his *Family* should *expose* his more **IMPERFECT SKETCHES**

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CHES in Print, *after his Death*: when **HE HIMSELF** had in his Life-time *destroyed* several *more finished* **PIECES**, because He judged them *not sufficiently accurate*.

His Body was carried down to *Great Finborough* in *Suffolk*, (one of his Estates, and the principal Residence of his now eldest Son) and laid close by the Side of his deceased Wife; agreeably to the two following Epitaphs, composed by Him for her and for himself, and inscribed upon their common Monument:

Hic,

Hic, ad imum parietem, sita est

CATHARINA,

GULIELMI WOLLASTON

Hujus Manerii *Finburiensis* Domini, &c.

Uxor *κρυδίαι* ac dilectissima :

E quâ prolem ille numerosam et pulchram
suscepit,

Ipsâ olim pulcherrimâ.

Ob. *Julii* 21, A. C. 1720, Æt. 50.

Sepulcrumque occupavit

Conjugi secum commune futurum :

Ut qui conjunctissimi vixerunt,

Etiâ Mortui, mistis cineribus, uniantur.

Nov.

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Nov. 6, 1724.

Juxta reliquias CATHARINÆ suæ
Ipfius GULIELMI WOLLASTON
Conditi sunt cineres promiffi.

Fuit is (fi quis aveat fcire)

Genere ortus perantiquo, nec ignobili ;
Academicis difciplinis imbutus Cantabrigiæ,
Quibus ibi ftuduit per annos plùs feptem ;
Hæreditate amplâ, Numine favente, auctus :
Valetudine tamen fuâ, parùm firmâ,
Hominumque corruptis moribus & judiciis
iniquis

Diligenter expenfis ac æftimatis,

Vitæ privatæ iter fumpfit :

Suorum faluti & commodis profpiciens ;
Bonis literis animum excolens, vel oblectans ;
Spretis famâ atque honoribus,
Etiam oblatis,

Veri confcientiâ tacitâ contentus.

Cum vixiffet ann. 65, di. 217,
Curfu quem Deus dederat peractò,
Fato ceffit. נ"ינ"י ט"ע

From

From all that has been said concerning Mr WOLLASTON, it appears that notwithstanding his Declining to accept of any Public Employment, yet his STUDIES were designed to be of *Public Use*: And his SOLITUDE was far from being employed in *vain and trifling Amusements*, terminating in *Himself alone*.

His latest Moments were *calm and easy*; Such as might be expected to close a Life spent like his: And He *left* the World, as He *sojourned* in it, *quietly and resignedly*. Both the *Manner* of his LIFE and *that* of his DEATH were well worthy of *Imitation*.

It is scarce worth while to take any Notice of an *idle* or *malicious* Reflection which has been cast, by some over-zealous Persons, upon this Gentleman's Memory, as if He had put a *Slight* upon CHRISTIANITY by laying so much Stress upon the *Obligations* of TRUTH, REASON, and VIRTUE: Or as if He could not have *believed aright*, because He did not think it necessary to *digress from his Subject* in Order to INSERT HIS
CREED.

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CREED. Surely, a Suspicion *thus founded* can deserve *no* Regard. However, it may not be amiss to observe, that it has probably been increased by a *vulgar* mistake that Mr WOLLASTON, the Author of the RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED, was the *same Person* with Mr WOOLSTON who wrote several Pieces, which grossly attacked the Literal Truth of the Miracles of JESUS CHRIST. And this Mistake, which arose originally from the *Similitude of Names*, might happen to be further confirmed by Mr WOOLSTON's intitling Himself "Late Fellow of SIDNEY COLLEGE in Cambridge:" At *which College* our Author Himself and Four of his Sons were educated.

T H E

THE RELIGION OF NATURE
DELINEATED being a Book
in great Esteem with her late Ma-
jesty Queen CAROLINE, she was
pleased to command me to translate
the Notes into *English* for her own
Use: And there being a Demand
for a new Edition, it was thought
proper to publish this Translation,
as these Notes are Illustrations and
Confirmations of the Sentiments of
the learned Author; and therefore I
have consented to the Publishing of
them.

JOHN CLARKE.

Salisbury,
17 April, 1750.

THE
R E L I G I O N
O F
N A T U R E
D E L I N E A T E D.

To A. F. Esq;

I WAS much surpris'd, SIR, when (some time ago) you so importunately desired *my thoughts* upon these questions,

I. *Is there really any such thing as natural religion, properly and truly so called?*

II. *If there is, what is it?*

III. *How may a man qualify himself, so as to be able to judge, for himself, of the other religions profess'd in the world; to settle his own opinions in disputable matters; and then to enjoy tranquillity of mind, neither disturbing others, nor being disturbed at what passes among them?*

With what view you did this; whether in expectation of some little degree of satisfaction; or merely to try my abilities; or (which I rather think) out of kindness to amuse me at a time,

B

when

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when I wanted something to divert melancholy reflexions, I shall not venture to guess. I shall only say, that could I have foreseen in due time, that such a task was to be imposed upon me, I might have been better prepared for it. I might have marked what was suitable to my purpose in those books, which I have read, but shall scarce ever return to read any more: many more I might have read too, which, not wanting them for my own conviction, I have neglected, and now have neither leisure nor patience to peruse: I might have noted what the various occurrences and cases, that happen in life, suggested: and, in general, I might have placed more of my time on such parts of learning, as would have been directly serviceable to me on the present occasion.

However, as I have not spent my days without *thinking* and reflecting seriously within my self upon the articles and duties of *natural religion*, and they are *my thoughts* which you require, I have attempted, by recollecting old meditations, and consulting a few scattered papers, in which I had formerly for my own use set down some of them (briefly, and almost solecistically), to give an answer to the *two first* of your questions, *together*: tho I must own, not without trouble in adjusting and compacting loose sentiments, filling up vacuities, and bringing the *chaos* into the shape of something like a system.

Notwithstanding what I have said, in a treatise of *natural religion*, a subject so beaten and exhausted in all its parts, by all degrees of writers, in which so many notions will inevitably occur that are no one's property, and so many things require to be proved,

proved, which can scarce be proved by any other but the old arguments (or not so well), you must not expect to find *much* that is new. Yet *something* perhaps you may. That, which is advanced in the following papers, concerning the nature of *moral good and evil*, and is the prevailing thought that runs thro them all, I never met with any where. And even as to those matters, in which I have been prevented by others, and which perhaps may be common, you have them, not as I took them from any body, but as they used to appear to me in my walks and solitudes. So that they are indeed *my thoughts*, such as have been *long mine*, which I send you; without any regard to what others have, or have not said: as I persuade my self you will easily perceive. It is not hard to discern, whether a work of this kind be all of a piece; and to distinguish the genuine hand of an author from the false wares and patch-work of a plagiarist. Tho after all, it would be madness in a man to go out of his right way, only because it has been frequented by others, or perhaps is the high road.

Sensible how unfinished this performance is, I call it only a *Delineation*, or rude draught. Where I am defective, or trip, I hope you will excuse a friend, who has now passed the threshold of old age; and is, upon that and other accounts, not able to bear much study or application. And thus I commit to your candor what follows: which, for the sake of order and perspicuity, I have divided into *sections*, and *propositions*.

SECT. I. *Of Moral Good and Evil.*

THE foundation of religion lies in that difference between the acts of men, which distinguishes them into *good, evil, indifferent*. For if there is such a difference, there must be religion; & *contra*. Upon this account it is that such a long and laborious inquiry hath been made after some general *idea*^a, or some *rule*^b, by comparing the fore-said acts with which it might appear, to which kind they respectively belong^c. And tho men have

^a So, in *Plato*, *Socrates* requires of *Euthyphro* not to teach him ἔν τι ἢ δύο διδάξαι τῶν πολλῶν ὁρίων· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ εἰδέναι, ὃ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὁσά ἐστι, κτλ, “one or two particulars of the multitude of things that are just and right; but to shew him the original pattern itself, by which every thing that is just and good becomes so.” And again, ταύτην τοίνυν με αὐτὴν διδάξεν τὴν ἰδίαν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποδείξω, ἢ χρώμενος αὐτῇ παραδείγματι, ὃ μὲν ἂν τοῦτον ᾖ, ὡς ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλός τις πράτῃ, φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι· ὃ δ' ἂν μὴ τοῦτον, μὴ φῶ. “Shew me the original image or picture, that I may see what sort of a thing it is, and when I look upon it, and make use of it as the original pattern, I may be able to affirm, that an action performed by you or any other person, if it be of such a sort, is just and good; and, if it be not of such a sort, then I cannot affirm it to be so.” *Posce exemplar honesti*. “Enquire after the original pattern of virtue.” *LUC.*

^b Οἶδε τό γ' αἰσχρὸν, κανὸν τῷ καλῷ μαθὼν. “He knows what vice is, having been taught by the rule of virtue.” *EURIP.* *Adfit Regula, peccatis quæ pœnas irroget æquas*, “We ought to have some Rule, whereby punishments may be proportioned to the crimes,” says *HORACE*. Now by the same rule, by which punishments are justly proportioned, crimes must be distinguished amongst themselves; and therefore much more, crimes from no-crimes, and crimes from good actions. So that it is at bottom a rule which can do this, that is required.

^c *Formula quædam constituenda est: quam si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio nunquam recedemus*. “There ought to be some rule established: which if we follow in comparing things with each other, we shall never fall short of our duty.” *CIC.*

not

not yet agreed upon any one, yet one certainly there must be^d. That, which I am going to propose, has always seem'd to me not only evidently true, but withal so obvi'ous and plain, that perhaps for this very reason it hath not merited the notice of authors: and the use and application of it is so easy, that if things are but fairly permitted to speak for themselves their own natural language, they will, with a moderate attention, be found *themselves* to proclaim their own rectitude or obliquity; *that is*, whether they are disagreeable to it, or not. I shall endeavour by degrees to explain my meaning.

I. *That act, which may be denominated morally good or evil, must be the act of a being capable of distinguishing, choosing, and acting for himself^e: or more briefly, of an intelligent and free agent.* Because in proper speaking no act at all can be ascribed to that, which is not indued with these capacities. For that, which cannot distinguish, cannot choose: and that, which has not the opportunity, or liberty of choosing for itself, and acting accordingly, from an internal principle, acts, if it acts at all, under a

d Πῶς οὐν τε ἀπέκμαρτα εἶναι καὶ ἀνεύρετα τὰ ἀναγκασιάτατα ἐν ἀνθρώποις; εἶναι ἂν [κατ'ὸν τίς] “How is it possible that those things which are necessary for men (*to know or to do*) should be such, as they can have no certainty of knowing or finding out? There must then be [some rule.]” ARRIAN.

^e *Ubi virtus, si nihil situm est in ipsis nobis?* “Where is virtue then, if there be nothing within our own power?” CIC.
 רשות לכל אדם נתונה אם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך טובה.
 “There is a power given to every man, if he be but willing to incline himself to the way that is good—This is the support of the law and the commandments.” MAIM. הַרְשׁוּת הַיָּא הַבְּחִירָה. “This power is what we call free will.” NAHH, AB.

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necessity incumbent *ab extra*. But that, which acts thus, is in reality only *an instrument* in the hand of something which imposes the necessity; and cannot properly be said *to act*, but *to be acted*. The act must be the act of an agent: therefore not of his instrument.

A being under the above-mentioned inabilities is, as to the morality of its acts, in the state of inert and passive matter, and can be but a *machine*: to which no language or philosophy ever ascribed $\eta\eta$ or *mores*.

II. *Those propositions are true, which express things as they are: or, truth is the conformity of those words or signs, by which things are expressed, to the things themselves.* Defin.

III. *A true proposition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by deeds, as well as by expressed words or another proposition.* It is certain there is a meaning in many acts and gestures. Every body understands weeping^f, laughing, shrugs, frowns, &c. these are a sort of universal language. Applications are many times made, and a kind of dialogue maintained only by casts of the eye and motions of the adjacent muscles^g. And

^f *Lacrymæ pondera vocis habent.* "Tears have the force of words." Ov.

^g *Oculi, supercilia, frons, vultus denique totus, qui sermo quidam: tacitus mentis est, &c.* "The eyes, the eyebrows, and indeed the whole countenance are a kind of tacit speech of the mind, &c." Cic. *Nutu signisque loquuntur.* "They (*Piramus* and *Thibbe*) speak to each other by nods and signs." Ov. *Est actio quasi sermo corporis.* "Every action is a sort of a speech of the body." Cic. and often repeated by him.

we

we read of feet, that *speak*^h; of a philosopher, who *answerd* an argument by only getting up and walkingⁱ; and of one, who pretended to *express* the same sentence as many ways by gesticulation, as even *Cicero* himself could by all his *copia* of words and eloquence^k. But these instances do not come up to my meaning. There are many acts of *other* kinds, such as constitute the character of a man's conduct in life, which have *in nature*, and would be taken by any indifferent judge to *have a signification*, and to *imply some proposition*, as plainly to be understood as if it was declared in words: and therefore if what such acts declare to be, is not, they must *contradict truth*, as much as any false proposition or assertion can.

If a body of soldiers, seeing another body approach, should fire upon them, would not this action declare that they were enemies; and if they were *not* enemies, would not this military language declare what was *false*? No, perhaps it may be said; this can only be called a mistake, like that which happened to the *Athenians* in the attack of *Epipolæ*^l, or to the *Carthaginians* in their last in-

^h אִישׁ אֶן מוֹלֵל בְּרַגְלָיו. "A wicked man speaks by his feet." A *Hebrew Proverb*.

ⁱ Τὸν κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως λόγον σιωπῶν, περιπατάσει. "Without saying any thing against the argument about motion, he got up and walked about." *SEXT. EMP.* So *Menedemus* reprov'd luxury by eating only olives. *DIOG. LAERT.* And others are mention'd by *Plutarch*, who ἀνευ φωνῆς ἂν δεῖ φράζειν, "did declare what they had to say without making use of words."

^k *Macrob.*

^l Where we find φίλους τε φίλοις, ἢ πολίτας πολίταις εἰς χεῖρας ἀλλήλοις ἐλθόντας, "that friends and fellow-citizens fell into each other's hands." *THUCYD.*

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campment against *Agathocles* in *Africa*^m. Suppose then, instead of this firing, some officer to have said they were enemies, when indeed they were friends: would not that sentence affirming them to be enemies be false, notwithstanding he who spoke it was mistaken? The truth or falshood of this affirmation doth not depend upon the affirmer's knowledge or ignorance: because there is a *certain* sense affixt to the words, which must either agree or disagree to that, concerning which the affirmation is made. The thing is the very same still, if into the place of *words* be substituted *actions*. The salute here was in *nature* the salute of an enemy, but should have been the salute of a friend: therefore it implied a falsity. Any *spectator* would have understood this action as I do; for a declaration, that the other were enemies. Now what is to be understood, has a meaning: and what has a meaning, may be either *true* or *false*: which is as much as can be said of any verbal sentence.

When *Popilius Lænas* solicited to have *Cicero* proscribed, and that he might find him out and be his executionerⁿ, would not his *carriage* have sufficiently signified to any one, who was ignorant of the case, that *Tully* either was some very bad man, and deserved capital punishment; or had some way grievously injured this man; or at least had not saved his life, nor had as much reason to expect *his* service and good offices upon occasion, as he ever had to expect *Tully's*? And all these things being

^m Τῶς δικαίως ὡς πολεμίως ἠμύνοντο. "They revenged themselves upon their own people, as if they had been their enemies." DIOD. SIC.

ⁿ *Val. Max.*

false,

false, were not his behaviour and actions *expressive* of that which was false, or *contradictions to truth*? It is certain he *acted as if* those things had been true, which were not true, and as if those had not been true which were true (in this consisted the fault of his ingratitude): and if he in words had *said* they were true or not true, he had done no more than *talk as if* they were so: why then should not to *act* as if they were true or not true, when they were otherwise, contradict truth as much as to *say* they were so, when they were not so?*

A pertinacious *objector* may perhaps still say, it is the business of soldiers to *defend* themselves and their country from enemies, and to annoy them as opportunity permits; and self-preservation requires all men not only barely to defend themselves against aggressors, but many times also to *prosecute* such, and only such, as are wicked and dangerous: therefore it is *natural* to conclude, that they are enemies against whom we see soldiers defending themselves, and those men wicked and dangerous, whom we see prosecuted with zeal and ardor. Not that those acts of defending and prosecuting *speak* or signify so much: but conjectures are raised upon the *common sense*, which mankind has of such proceedings. *Ans.* If it be *natural* to conclude any thing from them, do they not *naturally* convey the notice of something to be concluded? And what is conveying the *notice* of any thing but *notifying* or

* Ἀνθρώποισιν οὐκ ἔχρην ποτὲ τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν γλῶσσαν ἰσχύειν πλείον.
 “ There never could be any necessity that mens tongues should
 “ be of more force (to declare their intentions) than their actions.”
 EURIP. *Quasi intersit, audiam, an videam.* “ As if there were
 “ any difference whether I hear you, or see you.” Crc.

signifying

signifying that thing? And then again, if this signification is *natural* and founded in the *common* principles and sense of mankind, is not this more than to have a meaning which results only from the use of some *particular* place or country, as that of language doth?

If *A* should enter into a compact with *B*, by which he *promises* and engages never to do some certain thing, and after this he does that thing: in this case it must be granted, that his act *interferes* with his promise, and is *contrary* to it. Now it cannot interfere with his promise, but it must also interfere with the truth of that *proposition*, which says there was such a promise made, or that there is such a compact subsisting. If this proposition be true, *A* made such a certain agreement with *B*, it would be denied by this, *A* never made any agreement with *B*. Why? Because the truth of this latter is *inconsistent* with the agreement asserted in the former. The formality of the denial, or that, which makes it to be a denial, is this *inconsistence*. If then the behaviour of *A* be *inconsistent* with the agreement mentioned in the former proposition, that proposition is as much denied by *A's* behaviour, as it can be by the latter, or any other *proposition*. Or thus, If one proposition imports or contains that which is *contrary* to what is contained in another, it is said to *contradict* this other, and denies the existence of what is contained in it. Just so if one act imports that which is *contrary* to the import of another, it *contradicts* this other, and *denies its existence*. In a word, if *A* by his actions denies the engagements, to which he hath subjected himself, his actions deny them; just as we say, *Ptolomy* by his

his writings denies the motion of the earth, or his writings deny it P.

When the question was asked, *Whose sheep are these?* the answer was, *Ægon's: for he committed them to my care* ^q (he uses and disposes of them as his). By this act *Dametas* understood them to be *his*; and if they had *not* been his, but *Alphondas's* or *Melibæus's*, *Ægon*, by an act very intelligible to *Dametas*, had expressed what was not true. What is said here is the stronger, because he, who has the *use* and *disposal* of any thing, has *all* that he can have of it; and *v. v.* he who has the *all* (or property) of any thing, must have all the *use* and *disposal* of it. So that a man cannot more fully proclaim any thing to be *his*, than by *using* it, &c. But of this something more hereafter.

In the *Jewish* history we read, that when *Abimelek* saw *Isaac* sporting ^r with *Rebekah*, and taking conjugal liberties ^t, he presently knew her to be *Isaac's* wife; and if she had not been his wife; the case had been as in the preceding instance. If it be *objected*, that she might have been his mistress or a harlot; I answer, that so she might have been, tho' *Isaac* had told him by *words* that she was his wife. And it is sufficient for my purpose, and to make acts capable of contradicting truth, if they may be allowd to *express things as plainly and determinately as words can*. Certainly *Abimelek* gave greater credit to that information which passed

P Ἡμεῖς τὸν ἀνέμενον βιβλία Πλάτωνος ἀνείσθαι φημὲν Πλάτωνα, κλ.

"He who buys *Plato's* books, we say, buys *Plato*." PLUT.

q *Virg. et Theocr.*

r משמש מטתו. "On the bed together." RASHI.

t ענון נשוק וחיבוק, "kissing and embracing her," according to ALSHEK.

through

through his eye, than to that which he received by the ear^t; and to what *Isaac* did; than to what he *said*. For *Isaac* had told him, that she was not his wife, but his sister^u.

A certain author^w writes to this purpose, “ If a
 “ foldier, who had taken the oath to *Cæsar*, should
 “ run over to the enemy, and serve him against
 “ *Cæsar*, and after that be taken; would he not be
 “ punished as a deserter, and a perjured villain?
 “ And if he should plead for himself, that he
 “ never denied *Cæsar*; would it not be answerd,
 “ *That with his tongue he did not deny him, but with*
 “ *his actions (or by facts) he did?*” And in ano-
 “ ther place, “ Let us, *says he*, suppose some tyrant
 “ command a Christian to burn incense to *Jupiter*,
 “ without adding any thing of a verbal abnega-
 “ tion of *Christ*: if the Christian should do this,
 “ would it not be manifest to all, that *by that very*
 “ *act he denied him;*” (and I may add, consequently
 “ denied those *propositions* which affirm him to be the
 “ *Christ*, a teacher of true religion, and the like^x)?

^t Ὡτα γὰρ τοῖς ἄνθρωποις ἐόσια ἀπιστότερον ὀφθαλμῶν. “ Men do
 “ not usually give so much credit to their ears, as to their eyes.”

HEROD.

^u That instance of *Menelaus* and his guest *Alexander*, in *Ar-
 rian*, might be subjoind to this. Εἰ τις αὐτὸς εἶδε φιλοφρονούμενος ἀλ-
 λήλους, ἠπίσθην ἂν τῷ λέγοντι οὐκ εἶναι φίλους αὐτούς. “ If any one saw
 “ them treating each other in a very friendly manner; he
 “ would not believe a person who should say that they were
 “ not friends.”

^w *De Dupl. Mart.*

^x Something like this is that in one of *Gregory Nazianzen*'s
 orations. When some Christians, who had been infnared by
Julian, asked, πῶς Χριστὸν ἐρνήμεθα; “ How have we denied
 “ *Christ*?” They were answerd, ὅτι κατὰ τοῦ πυροῦ ἐδυμιάσατε,
 “ you have offerd incense on the altar.”

When

When a man lives, as if he had the estate which he has not, or *was* in other regards (all fairly cast up) what he *is not*, what judgment is to be passed upon him? Doth not his whole conduct breathe untruth? May we not say (if the propriety of language permits), that he *lives a lye*?

In common speech we say some actions are *insignificant*, which would not be sense, if there were not some that are *significant*, that have a tendency and meaning. And this is as much as can be said of articulate sounds, that they are either *significant* or *insignificant* ^z.

It may not be improperly observed by the way, that the *significancy* here attributed to mens acts, proceeds not always from nature, but sometimes from custom and agreement among people ^a, as that of words and sounds mostly doth. Acts of the latter kind may in different times and places have different, or even contrary significations. The generality of *Christians*, when they pray, take off their hats: the *Jews*, when they pray ^b or say any of their *Berakoth*, put them on. The same thing

γ τὰ ψευδῆ πράγματα διώκων. "Pursuing things that are false."
 CHRYS. Καὶ γολισμός ἀνδρός, ἢ γέλωσ, ἢ βῆμα ποδὸς ἀναγγέλλει περὶ αὐτοῦ,
 "Nay the habit of a man, or his laugh, or the step of his foot,
 "will discover who he is," as *Basil* speaks: and therefore greater things must do it more.

^z As that (word) βλίτρι, *Bliitri*, in *Diogenes Laertius* in the life of *Zeno*, which word has no meaning at all.

a Αἰγύπτιοι—τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ἑμπαλὺν τοῖσι ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐσχίσαισθε ἡσὶά τε καὶ νόμους, κτλ. "The *Egyptians*—have established a great
 "many laws and customs, quite contrary to those of other people." HEROD.

b —המתפלל לא יעמוד בתפלה—בראש מגולה. "He that
 "prays, must not have his head uncoverd whilst he is pray-
 "ing." MAIMON. and others every where.

which

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which among Christians denotes reverence, imports irreverence among the *Jews*. The reason is, because covering the head with a hat (if it has no influence upon one's health) is in itself an *indifferent* thing, and people by usage or consent may *make* it interpretable either way. Such acts seem to be adopted into their language, and may be reckond part of it. But acts of the former kind, such as I chiefly here intend, have an *unalterable* signification, and can by no agreement or force ever be made to express the contrary to it. *Aegon's* treating the flock, and disposing of it as if it was his, can by no torture be brought to signify, *that it was not his*. From whence it appears, that *facts* express more strongly, even than *words* themselves^c; or to contradict any proposition by facts is a fuller and more effectual contradiction, than can possibly be made by words only^d. *Words* are but *arbitrary signs*^e of our ideas, or indications of our

^c Θεὸν ὁμολογεῖσιν εἶδέναι, τοῖς δὲ ἔργοις ἀρνύνται. "They profess to know God, but in works they deny him." *Epist. to Titus*. And τὸ ἔργοις ἀρνεῖσθαι Θεὸν ὑπερ τὸ εἰπαῖν ἐν ῥήματι. "To deny God by our works is worse than to deny him by our words." CHRYS.

^d Λόγος ἔργου σκῆπη. "Words are the images of our deeds." PLUT. *Res loquitur ipsa: quæ semper valet plurimum*. "The thing speaks itself, which is always of very great force." CIC. *Quid verba audiam, cum facta videam?* "What signifies my hearing of words, when I see the facts?" *Id.* Αὐτὰ βοᾷ τὰ πραγματα, κἀν τῇ φωνῇ σιωπᾶς. "The facts themselves speak out aloud, though you are silent with your voice." BAS.

^e This we know. For they are different to different nations; we coin them as we please, &c. Φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων ἔδεν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔσαν γένηται σύμβολον. "The names of things are not founded in nature, but are only artificial signs." ARIST. And tho *Plato* seems to be of another mind, yet when *Cratylus* says, Ὀνόματι ἐθετέρια

our thoughts (that word, which in one language denotes *poverty*^f, in another denotes *riches*^g): but *facts* may be taken as the effects of them, or rather as the *thoughts themselves produced into act*; as the very conceptions of the mind brought forth, and grown to maturity; and therefore as the most natural and express representations of them. And, beside this, they bear certain *respects* to things, which are not arbitrary, but as determinate and immutable as any *ratio's* are in mathematics. For the facts and the things they respect are *just what they are*, as much as any two given quantities are; and therefore the respects interceding between those

ἑρθότερα εἶναι ἐκείνη τῶν ὄντων φύσει συμφωνίαν, “ that the propriety of “ the name is founded in the nature of every thing,” it is much to be questioned whether any thing more be meant than this, that some names of things are more natural or proper than others. For he says that this rectitude of names is the same, ἢ Ἕλλησι ἢ ἑσπερίοις, “ with the *Greeks* and with the *Barbarians* ;” that it is [only] such as is sufficient δηλῶν οἶον ἕκαστον ἐς τῶν ὄντων, “ to signify what every thing is ;” such as may render them κατὰ τὸ δύναντον ὁμοίαι—τοῖς πράγμασιν, &c. “ as like the things as is possible, &c.” That *lepidum* & *festivum argumentum*, “ that witty “ and jocular argument,” which *P. Nigidius* in *Aulus Gellius* makes use of to shew, *cur videri possint verba esse naturalia magis quam arbitraria*, “ why words seem rather to be natural “ than arbitrary,” deserves only to be laughed at.

^f ריש, the Hebrew word *Resh*.

יש, the Arabic word *Resh*. So *Aben Ezra* observes that אבה, *Abah*, in Hebrew is to *will*, in Arabic to *will* (tho in Arabic the word is written אבי *Abi*;) and in another place, that the *same* word even in the *same* language sometimes signifies ובר והפכו, a thing and its contrary. And every one knows, that the greater part of our words have different senses and uses. The word غنون *Gnigon* in Arabic, according to *Giggeius* and *Golius*, has 70 or 80, and some (two at least) contrary the one to the other.

must

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must be as *fixt*, as the *ratio* is which one of these bears to the other: that is, they must remain the same, and always speak the same language, till things cease to be what they are.

I lay this down then as a fundamental maxim, *That whoever acts as if things were so, or not so, doth by his acts declare, that they are so, or not so;* as plainly as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwise, his acts contradict *those propositions*, which assert them to be as they are^h.

IV. *No act* (whether wordⁱ or deed) *of any being, to whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes with any true proposition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right.* For,

1. If that proposition, which is false, be wrong^k, that act which *implies* such a proposition, or is founded in it, cannot be right: because it is the very proposition itself in practice.

2. Those propositions, which are true, and express things as they are, express the *relation* between

^h This is *ποιεῖν ψεῦδος*, “to act a lye.” *Revel. Plato* uses the same way of speaking. *ψεῦδος*, says he, *μηδεὶς μηδὲν—μῶτε λόγῳ μῶτε ἔργῳ πράξειε*, “No man should tell a lye either by word or deed.” The contrary to this is in *Aristotle ἀληθεύειν ἡμέωσ ἐν λόγοις ἢ πράξεσιν*; “to perform the truth both in words and in deeds;” and *ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύειν*, “to live in the truth.” And in *S. B. לכת באמת*, “to walk in the truth,” and *דרך אמת*, “in the way of truth.”

ⁱ *Actum generale verbum est, sive verbis sive re quid agatur.* “An act is a general expression, and signifies any thing that is acted either by words or deeds.” JUSTIN. Digest.

^k As it must be, because *Ὁρθὸν ἢ ἀλήθει' ἀεί.* “Truth is always right.” SOPH.

the

the subject and the attribute as it is; that is, this is either affirmed or denied of that according to the nature of *that relation*. And further, this relation (or, if you will, the nature of this relation) is determin'd and fixt by the natures of the things themselves. Therefore nothing can interfere with any proposition that is true, but it must likewise interfere with nature (the nature of the relation, and the natures of the things themselves too), and consequently be *unnatural*, or *wrong in nature*. So very much are those gentlemen mistaken, who by *following nature* mean only complying with their bodily inclinations, tho in opposition to truth, or at least without any regard to it. Truth is but a conformity to nature: and to follow nature cannot be to combat truth ¹.

3. If there is a supreme being, upon whom the existence of the world depends; and nothing can be in it but what He either causes, or permits to be; then to own things *to be as they are* is to own what He causes, or at least permits, *to be thus caused or permitted*: and this is to take things as He gives them, to go into His constitution of the world, and to submit to His will, reveal'd in the books of nature ^m. To do this therefore must be agreeable to *His will*. And if so, the contrary must be disagreeable to it; and, since (as we shall find in due

¹ Τῷ λογικῷ ζῳῳ ἡ αὐτὴ πράξις κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ ἢ κατὰ λόγον. "An action which is done according to nature, or according to reason, is the same in a creature endued with reason." (That is, according to truth, which it is the office of reason to discover).
 ANTON. *Nunquam aliud natura, aliud sapientia dicit.* "Nature never dic'tates one thing, and reason a different thing." Juv.
^m Ἐδωκεν [ὁ Θεός] ἀντὶ δίδαξαι τὸν κόσμον. "[God] has given us the world, as it were for a book to read in." CHRYS.

time) there is a perfect rectitude in His will, certainly *wrong*.

I desire that I may not be misunderstood in respect to the actings of wicked men. I do not say, it is agreeable to the will of God, that what is *ill* done by them, should be *so* done; *i. e.* that they should use their liberty ill: but I say, when they have done this and committed some evil, it is agreeable to His will, that we should allow it to *have been* committed: or, it would be disagreeable to His will, that we should *deny* it to have been committed.

As the owning of things, in all our conduct, *to be as they are*, is direct obedienceⁿ: so the contrary, not to own things *to be* or *to have been* that are or have been, or not *to be what they are*, is direct rebellion against Him, who is the Author of nature. For it is as much as to say, “ God indeed
 “ causes such a thing to be, or at least permits it,
 “ and it is; or the relation, that lies between this
 “ and that, is of such a nature, that one may be af-
 “ firmed of the other, &c. this is true: but yet to
 “ *me* it shall *not* be so: I will not indure it, or act
 “ as if it were so: the laws of nature are ill framed,
 “ nor will I *mind* them, or what follows from
 “ them: even existence shall be non-existence,

ⁿ What *Hierocles* says of his ἐγκόσμιοι Θεοὶ, “ Gods that govern
 “ this world,” is true in respect of every thing. τῶ Θεῶ νόμῳ
 κατακλυθέντων ἐστὶ—τὸ αὐτὸς εἶναι τίθεσθαι, ὃ γηγόνασι. “ The sup-
 “ posing them to be what they are—is paying obedience to
 “ the law of God.” There is a passage somewhere in *S. Iqqar*,
 much like this: where it is said (as I remember) that he, who
 worships an Angel מַצַּד מֵהָהוּא שְׁלִיחַ ה' (“ as being what he
 “ is, the messenger of God”) is not guilty of idolatry.

“ when

“ when my pleasures require.” Such an impious declaration as this attends every *voluntary* infraction of truth.

4. Things cannot be denied to be what they are, in *any instance* or *manner whatsoever*, without contradicting axioms and truths eternal. For such are these: *every thing is what it is; that which is done, cannot be undone*; and the like. And then if those truths be considered as having always subsisted in the Divine mind, to which they have always been true, and which differs not from the Deity himself, to do this is to act not only in opposition to His *government* or *sovereignty*, but to His *nature* ° also: which, if He be perfect, and there be nothing in Him but what is most right, must also upon this account be most *wrong*.

Pardon these inadequate ways of speaking of God. You will apprehend my meaning: which perhaps may be better represented thus. If there are such things as *axioms*, which are and always have been immutably true, and consequently have been always *known to God to be so*^p, the truth of them cannot be denied any way, either directly or indirectly, but the truth of the *Divine knowledge* must be denied too.

5. Designedly to treat things as being what they are not is the greatest *possible* absurdity. It is to put bitter for sweet, darkness for light, crooked for

° הקב"ה נקרא אמת וכו'. “The holy Being is called truth.” In *Resp. bhokm.* and others. And St *Chrysoſtom* defines *truth* in the same words, which philosophers apply to the Deity. Ἀλήθεια τὸ ὄντως ὄν. “Truth is that which hath a real existence.”

^p Ἀλήθεια γὰρ ἑταῖρος Θεῷ. “For truth is the companion of “God.” PH. JUD.

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streight, &c. It is to subvert all science, to renounce all sense of truth, and flatly to deny the existence of any thing. For nothing can be true, nothing does exist, *if things are not what they are.*

To talk to a *post*, or otherwise treat it as if it was a *man*, would surely be reckond an absurdity, if not *distrætion* ⁹. Why? because this is to treat it *as being what it is not*. And why should not the converse be reckond as bad; that is, to treat a man as a *post* ^r; as if he had no sense, and felt not injuries, which he doth feel; as if to him pain and sorrow were not pain; happiness not happiness. This is what the cruel and unjust often do.

Lastly, To deny things to be as they are is a transgression of the great *law of our nature*, the law of reason. For truth cannot be opposed, but reason must be violated. But of this more in the proper place.

⁹ Ποίμνας—ὡς ἀνδρας—ἔχων, “Treating his flocks—like men,” is in *Soph.* the character of *Ajax*, when his head was turned, in a fit of raving. And among the monstrous and mad extravagances of *C. Caligula* one is, that he treated his horse *Incitatus* as a man. Suet.

^r *Horace* argues after the same manner. *Si quis lætica mitidam gestare amet agnam; Huic vestem, ut natæ, paret, &c. Interdicto huic omne adimat jus Prætor, &c. Quid, si quis natam promutâ devovet agnâ. Integer est animi? ne dixeris.* “If any one should take pleasure in carrying a very pretty lamb about with him in his chariot, and clad it like his daughter; &c. ought not the Magistrate to take the power out of such an one’s hands? &c. But what if any man should attempt to offer his daughter as a sacrifice instead of a dumb lamb. *Would you say that he was in his right senses? I am sure you would not.*” If it be against truth and nature to use a lamb as a daughter, it will be as much against truth to use a daughter as a lamb.

Much

Much might be added here concerning the *amiable* nature^s, and great *force*^t of truth. If I may judge by what I feel within myself, the least truth cannot be contradicted without much reluctance: even to see other men disregard it does something more than displease; it is *shocking*.

V. *What has been said of acts inconsistent with truth, may also be said of many omissions, or neglects to act: that is, by these also true propositions may be denied to be true; and then those omissions, by which this is done, must be wrong for the same reasons with those assigned under the former proposition.*

Nothing can be asserted or denied by any act with regard to those things, to which it bears no relation: and here no truth can be affected. And when acts *do* bear such relations to other things, as to be declaratory of something concerning them, this commonly is visible; and it is not difficult to determine, whether truth suffers by them, or not. Some things cannot possibly be done, but truth must be *directly* and positively denied; and the

^s Καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν ψεύδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν· τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινεῖδον.
 “A lye is base and blame-worthy of itself, and truth is beautiful and praise-worthy.” ARIST. *Est quiddam, quod sua vi nos allicit ad sese, non emolumento captans aliquo, sed trahens sua dignitate: quod genus, virtus, scientia, veritas est.* “There is something that wins our affections by its own native force, something that does not catch us by any profit that it brings, but attracts us by its superior excellency; something of this kind is virtue, knowledge, truth.” CIC. Πλυκὸν ἡ ἀλήθεια. “Truth is a sweet thing.” A festival saying in *Plutarch*.

^t O magna vis veritatis, &c. “O the great force of truth, &c.” CIC. A good man עוֹשֵׂה אֱמֶת מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא אֱמֶת “does the truth, because it is the truth.” MAIM.

thing will be clear. But the cases arising from omissions are not always so well determin'd, and plain: it is not always easy to know *when* or *how far* truth is violated by omitting. Here therefore more latitude must be allow'd, and much must be left to every one's own judgment and ingenuity.

This may be said in general, that when any truth would be denied by acting, the omitting to act can deny no truth. For no truth can be contrary to truth^u. And there may be omissions in other cases, that are silent as to truth. But yet there are *some neglects* or refusals to act, which are manifestly inconsistent with it (or, with some true propositions).

We before^w suppos'd *A* to have engag'd *not to do* some certain thing, &c. if now, on the other side, he should by some solemn promise, oath, or other act undertake *to do* some certain thing before such a time, and he *voluntarily*^x omits to do it, he would behave himself as if there had been no such promise or engagement; which is equal to denying there was any: and truth is as much contradicted in this as in the former instance.

Again, there are some ends, which the nature of things and truth require us to aim at, and at which therefore if we do not aim, *nature* and *truth* are denied. If a man does not desire to prevent evils, and to be happy, he denies both his *own* nature and the nature and definition of *happiness* to be what they

^u *Plura vera discrepantia esse non possunt.* "Be there never so many truths, they cannot be inconsistent with each other." Cic.

^w P. 10.

^x *Oblivione voluntaria.* "By a voluntary forgetfulness." Cic. are,

are. And then further, willingly to neglect the *means*, leading to any such end, is the same as not to propose that end, and must fall under the same censure. As retreating from any end commonly attends the not advancing towards it, and that may be considered as an act, many omissions of this kind may be turned over to the *other side*, and brought under the foregoing proposition.

It must be confessed there is a *difficulty* as to the means, by which we are to consult our own preservation and happiness; to know what those are, and what they are with respect to us. For our abilities and opportunities are not equal: some labor under disadvantages invincible: and our ignorance of the true natures of things, of their operations and effects in such an irregular distemperd world, and of those many incidents, that may happen either to further or break our measures, deprive us of certainty in these matters. But still we may judge as well as we can, and do what we can²; and the neglect *to do this* will be an omission within the reach of the proposition.

There are omissions of other kinds, which will deserve to be annumerated to these by being either *total*, or *notorious*, or upon the score of some other *circumstance*. It is certain I should not deny the *Phœnissæ* of *Euripides* to be an excellent *drama* by not reading it: nor do I deny *Chibil-menâr* to be a

† In the Civil Law he is said to *act*, who *does* omit. *Qui non facit quod facere debet, videtur facere adversus ea quæ non facit.* “He who *does not do* what he ought to do, seems to *act* against those things which he does not do.” *Digest.*

² *Est quodam prodire tenus.* “It is something to go, tho it be but a little way, or to make a small progress.” *Hor.*

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rare piece of antiquity by not going to see it. But should I, having leisure, health, and proper opportunities, read nothing, nor make any inquiries in order to improve my *mind*, and attain such knowledge as may be *useful* to me, I should then deny my mind to be what it is, and that knowledge to be what it is. And if it doth not appear precisely, into what kind of studies this respect to truth will carry a man preferably to all others, how far it will oblige him to continue his pursuit after knowledge, and where the discontinuance begins to be no offence against truth, he must consult his own opportunities and genius, and judge for himself *as well as he can*^a. This is one of those cases which I said before were not so well determin'd.

If I give nothing to this or that poor body, to whom I am under no particular obligation, I do not by this deny them to be *poor*, any more than I should deny a man to have a squalid beard by not shaving him, to be nasty by not washing him, or to be lame by not taking him on my back.

Many things are here to be taken into consideration (according to the next proposition): perhaps I might intrench upon truth by *doing* this; and then I cannot by *not doing* it^b. But if I, being of ability to afford now and then something in charity to the poor, should yet *never* give them any thing at all, I should *then* certainly deny the condition of

^a *Disces quamdiu vales: tamdiu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non pœnitebit.* "You may learn as long as you please, and you ought to please, so long as you are not easy at any improvement of yourself." Says *Cicero* to his son.

^b *Nulla virtus virtuti contraria est.* "No one virtue can be contradictory to any other virtue." *SEN.*

the

the poor to be what it is, and my own to be what it is : and thus truth would be injured. So, again,

If I should not say my prayers at such a certain *hour*, or in such a certain *place* and *manner*, this would not imply a denial of the existence of God, His providence, or my dependence upon Him : nay, there may be reasons perhaps against *that particular* time, place, manner. But if I should *never* pray to Him, or worship Him at all, such a *total* omission would be equivalent to this assertion, *There is no God, who governs the world, to be adored* : which, if there is such a being, must be contrary to truth. Also *generally* and *notoriously* to neglect this duty (permit me to call it so), tho' not quite always, will *favor*, if not directly proclaim the same untruth. For certainly to worship God after this manner is only to worship him *accidentally*, which is to declare it a great accident that he is worshipd at all, and this approaches as near as it is possible to a *total* neglect. Beside, such a sparing and *infrequent* worshiper of the Deity betrays such an habitual disregard of Him, as will render every religious act insignificant and null.

Should I, in the last place, find a man grievously hurt by some accident, fallen down, alone, and without *present* help like to perish ; or see his house on fire, no body being near to help, or call out : in this extremity if I do not give him my assistance immediately, I do not do it *at all* : and by this refusing to do it according to my ability, I deny his case to be what it is ; human nature to be what it is ; and even those desires and expectations, which I am conscious to myself I should have under the like misfortune, to be what they are.

VI. *In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it must be considerd not only what it is in itself or in one respect, but also what it may be in any other respect, which is capable of being denied by facts or practice: and the whole description of the thing ought to be taken in.*

If a man steals a horse, and rides away upon him, he may be said indeed by riding him to use him as a horse, but not as *the horse of another man*, who gave him no licence to do this. He does not therefore consider him as being what he is, unless he takes in the respect he bears to his true owner, But it is not necessary perhaps to consider what he is in respect to his color, shape or age: because the thief's riding away with him may neither affirm nor deny him to be of any particular color, &c. I say therefore, that those, and *all* those properties, respects, and circumstances, which may be contradicted by practice, are to be taken into consideration. For otherwise the thing to be considerd is but imperfectly surveyd; and the whole compass of it being not taken in, it is taken not as being what it is, but as what it is *in part* only, and in other respects perhaps as being *what it is not*.

If a *rich* man being upon a journey, should be robbed and stript, it would be a second robbery and injustice committed upon him to take from him part of his then character, and to consider him only as a rich man. His character completed is a *rich man robbed and abused*, and indeed at that time a *poor* man^c and distressed, tho' able to repay afterwards the assistance lent him.

^c עני באותה שעה: "Poor at that particular time:" according to that determination in a case something like this, which occurs in *Talm. Meff. Phe*.

Moreover

Moreover a man in giving assistance of any kind to another should consider what *his own* circumstances are, as well as what the *other's* are^d. If they do not permit him to give it, he does not by his forbearance deny the other to want it: but if he should give it, and by that deny his own or his family's circumstances to be what they are, he would actually contradict truth. And since (as I have observed already) all truths are consistent, nor can any thing be true any further than it is compatible with other things that are true; when both parties are placed in a *right* light, and the case *properly* stated for a judgment, the latter may indeed be truly said to want assistance, but not the assistance of the former: any more than a man, who wants a guide, may be said to want a blind or a lame guide. By putting things thus may be *truly* known what the latter is with respect to the former.

The case becomes more difficult, when a man (A) is under some *promise* or *compact* to assist another (B), and at the same time bound to consult his own happiness, provide for his family, &c. and he cannot do these, if he does that, *effectually*. For what must A do? Here are not indeed opposite *truths*, but there are truths on opposite *sides*. I answer: tho' there cannot be two incompatible du-

^d *Utrique simul consulendum est. Dabo egenti; sed ut ipse non egeam, &c.* "Regard is to be had to both at the same time; I will give to one in want, yet so that I may not want myself; &c." SEN. *Ita te aliorum miserecat, ne tui alios misereat.* "Take pity of others, but do it in such a manner as not to stand in need of the pity of others yourself." PLAUT.

ties,

ties, or tho two inconsistent acts cannot be both A's duty at the same time (for then his duty would be an impossibility); yet an obligation, which I will call *mixt*, may arise out of those *differing* considerations. A should assist B; but *so*, as not to neglect himself and family, &c. and *so* to take care of himself and family, as not to forget the other engagement, as well and honestly as he can. Here the *importance* of the truths on the one and the other side should be diligently compared: and there must in such cases be always some *exception* or *limitation* understood. It is not in man's power to promise *absolutely*. He can only promise as one, who may be *disabled* by the weight and incumbency of truths not then existing.

I could here insert many instances of *partial* thinking, which occur in authors: but I shall choofe only to set down one in the margin^e,

^e *Sextus Empiricus* seems to be fond of that filthy saying of *Zeno*, in relation to what is storied of *Jocosta* and *Oedipus*: μή άτοπον είναι τὸ μορίον τῆς μητρός τρίψαι, κλ. any more, than to rub with the hand any other part of her, when in pain. Here only τρίψις is considerd; as if all was nothing more, but *barely* τρίψις; but this is an incomplete idea of the act. For τρίψις τῷ μορίῳ is more than τρίψις by itself: and τρίψις τῷ μορίῳ τῆς μητρός is still more: and certainly τρίψειν τὴν χεῖρα τῇ χειρὶ is a different thing from τρίψειν τὸ μορίον τῷ μορίῳ, &c. He might as well have said, that to rub a *red hot* piece of iron with one's bare hand is the same as to rub one that is *cold*, or any other innocent piece of matter: for all is but τρίψις. Thus men, affecting to appear free-thinkers, shew themselves to be but half-thinkers, or *less*: they do not take in the whole of that which is to be considerd.

In

Of Moral Good and Evil. 29

In short, when things are truly estimated, *persons* concerned, *times*, *places* ^f, *ends* intended ^g, and *effects* that naturally follow, must be added to them.

VII. *When any act would be wrong, the forbearing that act must be right : likewise when the omission of any thing would be wrong, the doing of it (i. e. not omitting it) must be right.* Because *contrariorum contraria est ratio.*

VIII. *Moral good and evil are coincident with right and wrong.* For that cannot be good, which is wrong ; nor that evil, which is right.

IX. *Every act therefore of such a being, as is before described, and all those omissions which interfere with truth (i. e. deny any proposition to be true, which is true ; or suppose any thing not to be what it is, in any regard ^h) are morally evil, in some degree or other : the forbearing such acts, and the acting in*

^f *Sunt res quædam ex tempore, & ex consilio, non ex sua natura considerandæ.—Quid tempora petant, aut quid personis dignum sit, considerandum est, &c.* “Some things are to be considered, not “as they are in their own nature, but the particular time and “the intention are to be taken into the account.—We are to “consider what the times require, and what is proper for such “and such persons, &c.” CIC.

^g Οὐ λέγετε φιλόπονον τὸν διὰ παιδικάριον ἀγρονύμφτα. “You will not “say that a person is industrious, because he once watchd all “night with his daughter” ARR. *Amico ægro aliquis assidet : probamus. at hoc si hæreditatis causâ facit, vultur est, cadaver expectat.* “A man watches with a sick friend : it is allowd to “be a good action ; but if he did it in order to make himself “his heir, he is a vulture, and watchd for the carcase.” SEN.

^h Οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἀρνήσεώς ἐστι τρέπῃ. “There are more ways than “one of denying a thing.” CHRYS.

opposition

opposition to such omissions are morally good: and when any thing may be either done, or not done, equally without the violation of truth, that thing is indifferent.

I would have it to be minded well, that when I speak of acts inconsistent with truth, I mean any truth; any true proposition whatsoever, whether containing matter of speculation, or plain fact. I would have every thing taken to be *what in fact and truth it is*ⁱ.

It may be of use also to remember, that I have added those words *in some degree or other*. For neither all evil, nor all good actions are equal^k. Those truths which they respect, tho they are equally true, may comprise matters of very different importance^l; or more truths may be violated one way

ⁱ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἢ ὁ ἴσχατος ἕρως τῆς πονηρίας τὸ ψεύδος. “Of all the good things in the world truth is the best, and falsehood is the utmost boundary of all evil.” *BAS.*

^k Notwithstanding that paradox of the *Scoics*, “Ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἀμαρτήματα, ἢ τὰ κατορθώματα,” “That all sins are equal, and all duties equal,” in *Cicero, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius*, and others, which might easily be confuted from their own words in *Cicero*. For if sinning be like passing a line, or limit; that is, going over or beyond that line: then, *to sin* being equal to *going beyond that line*, to go more (or farther) beyond that line must be to sin more. Who sees not the falsity of that, *nec bono viro meliorem, — nec forti fortioiorem, nec sapiente sapientioiorem posse fieri?* “that it is impossible for a good man to be better—or a strong man to be stronger, or a wise man wiser?” And so on. *Nullum inter scelus & erratum discrimen facere*, “to make no difference betwixt notorious wickedness and mere mistakes” (as *St Jerom* expresses their opinion: if that epistle to *Celantia* be his) is to alter or destroy the natures of things.

^l Sure that Wiseman was but a bad accountant, who reckoned, τὴν μεγίστην ὑστὶν ἀποβαλὼν, δραχμὴν μίαν ἐκβεβληκέναι, “that he who throws away the greatest estate, throws away but a drachm.” In *Plutarch*.

than

than another ^m: and then the crimes committed by the violation of them may be equally (one as well as the other) said to be crimes, but not *equal crimes* ⁿ. If A steals a *book* from B which was pleasing and useful to him, it is true A is guilty of a crime in not treating the book as being what it is, the book of B, who is the proprietor of it, and one whose happiness partly depends upon it: but still if A should deprive B of a *good estate*, of which he was the true owner, he would be guilty of a much greater crime. For if we suppose the book to be worth to him one pound, and the estate 10000 *l.* that truth, which is violated by depriving B of his book, is in effect violated 10000 times by robbing him of his estate. It is the same as to repeat the theft of one pound 10000 times over: and therefore if 10000 thefts (or crimes) are more, and all together greater than one, one equal to 10000 must be greater too: greater than that, which is but the 10000th part of it, sure. *Then*, tho the convenience and innocent pleasure, that B found in the use of the *book*, was a degree of happiness: yet the happiness accruing to him from the *estate*, by which

^m This is confessed in Cicero. *Illud interest, quod in seruo necando, si adsit injuria, semel peccatur: in patris vita violanda multa peccantur, &c. Multitudine peccatorum præstat, &c.* “There is this difference, that he who kills a slave, if it be done wrongfully, is guilty of sin in that one respect only; but he that wickedly takes away the life of his father, sins in many respects, &c. He excels in the multitude of his sins, &c.”

ⁿ This may serve for an answer to *Chrysoippus*, and them who say, εἰ ἀληθὲς ἀληθὺς μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅδε ψεῦδός· ψεύδους ἕτως ὅδε ἀπᾶν ἀπάτης ὅρι ἀμάρτημα ἀμαρτήματ^ο, κλ. “That if no one truth be greater than another truth, nor no one falsehood greater than another falsehood; then neither is one fraud nor one sin greater than another.” IN *DIOG. LAERT.*

he was supplied not only with necessaries, but also with many other comforts and harmless enjoyments, vastly exceeded it. And therefore the truth violated in the former case was, *B had a property in that, which gave him such a degree of happiness*: that violated in the latter, *B had a property in that, which gave him a happiness vastly superior to the other*. The violation therefore in the latter case is upon this account a vastly greater violation than in the former. *Lastly*, the truths violated in the former case might end in *B*, those in the latter may perhaps be repeated in them of his family, who subsist also by the *estate*, and are to be provided for out of it. And these truths are very many in respect of every one of them, and all their descendants: Thus the degrees of evil or guilt are as the *importance* and *number* of truths violated °. I shall only add, on the other side, that the value of good actions will rise at least in proportion to the degrees of evil in the omission of them: and that therefore they cannot be *equal*, any more than the opposite evil omissions.

But let us return to that, which is our main subject, the *distinction* between moral good and evil. Some have been so wild as to deny there is any such thing: but from what has been said here, it is manifest, that there is as certainly moral *good* and *evil* as there is *true* and *false*; and that there is as

° *Quis paria esse ferè placuit peccata, laborant Cùm ventum ad verum est: sensus morisque repugnant, Atque ipsa utilitas.* "They who would have all sins to be equal, labor under great difficulty, when they come to the truth; for they find it contrary to reason, to morality, and to the interest of mankind." HOR.

natural and immutable a difference between *those* as between *these*, the difference at the bottom being indeed the same ^p. Others acknowledge, that there is indeed moral good and evil; but they *want* some *criterion*; or mark; by the help of which they might know them asunder. And others there are, who pretend to have *found* that rule, by which our actions ought to be squared; and may be discriminated; or that *ultimate end*, to which they ought all to be referred ^q: but what they have advanced is either false, or not sufficiently guarded, or not comprehensive enough, or not clear and firm ^r, or (so far as it is just) reducible to *my* rule. For

They, who reckon nothing to be good but what they call *honestum*; may denominate actions according as that is, or is not the cause ^t or

^p Therefore they, who denied there was either *good* or *evil* (φύσει αγαθόν ἢ κακόν, “good or evil in the nature of things”) were much in the right to make thorough work, and to say there was nothing in nature either *true* or *false*. See *Sext. Emp.* and *Diog. Laert.*

^q *Quod* [extremum, s. ultimum bonorum] *omnium: philosophorum sententiâ tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat: ipsum autem nusquam.* “That which is the (ultimate end or final “good) according to the opinion of all philosophers, must be “something to which all other things ought to be referred, but “itself referred to nothing.” *Cic.*

^r There was among the old philosophers such an uncertainty and variety of opinions concerning the *finis bonorum & malorum*, “the limits of good and evil,” that if *Varro* computes rightly, the number might be raised to 288. *St Aug.*

^s *Quod honestum est, id bonum solum habendum est.* “That “which is truly honorable, and valuable upon it’s own account; “is the only thing that ought to be esteemed really good.” *Cato* in *Cic.*

^t *Qui* [omnes] *per multa ob eam unam causam faciunt—quia honestum est.* “Who (every body) do abundance of things for this “reason only—because they are honorable in themselves.” *Cic.*

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end^u of them : but then what is *bonestum*^w ? Something is still wanting to measure things by, and to separate the *bonesta* from the *inbonesta*.

They who place all in *following nature*^x, if they mean by that phrase acting according to the natures of things (*that is*, treating things as being what they in nature are, or according to truth) say what is right. But this does not seem to be their meaning. And if it is only that a man must follow his own nature^y, since his nature is not purely rational, but there is a part of him, which he has in common with brutes, they appoint him a guide which I fear will mislead him, this being

^u It is commonly placed among *ends*: and is considered as such in those ways of speaking; *bonestum esse propter se expetendum*, “ that which is honorable ought to be sought after for its own sake.” CIC. *Finem bonorum esse honestè vivere*, “ *The perfection of all goodness and virtue is to live by the rules of true honor.*” *Ib.* and the like.

^w To say, *Quod laudabile est, omne bonestum est*, “ what is truly praise-worthy, is truly honorable,” or any thing like that, is to say nothing. For how shall one know what is truly *laudabile*, “ praise-worthy ?”

^x Τέλει εἶπε [Ζήνων] τὸ ὁμολογούμεως (al. ἀκολούθως) τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν. Ἄρα γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμεῖς ἡ φύσις. “ *The perfection of man says (Zeno) is to live agreeably to, or to follow nature; and that is to live virtuously, for nature leads us to that.*” DIOG. LAERT.

^y *Vivere ex hominis naturâ*. “ *To live agreeably to the nature of man.*” CIC. It is true he adds, *undique perfectâ & nihil requirente*: “ every way perfect and wanting nothing:” but those words have either no meaning, or such as will not much mend the matter. For what is *natura undique perfectâ & nihil requirens*, “ a nature every way perfect and wanting nothing ?” Beside, moral religion doth not consist in following nature already perfect, but by the practice of religion we aim at the perfecting of our natures.

commonly

commonly more likely to prevail, than the rational part. At best this talk is loose.

They who make *right reason*² to be the law, by which our actions are to be judged, and according to their conformity, to this or deflexion from it call them *lawful* or *unlawful*, good or bad, say something more particular and precise. And indeed it is true, that whatever will bear to be tried by right reason, is right; and that which is condemned by it, wrong. And moreover, if by right reason is meant that which is found by the right use of our rational faculties, this is the same with truth: and what is said by them, will be comprehended in what I have said. But the manner in which they have delivered themselves, is not yet explicit enough². It leaves room for so many *disputes* and *opposite right-reasons*, that nothing can be settled, while every one pretends that *his* reason is right. And beside, what I have said, extends farther: for we are not only to respect those truths, which we discover by reasoning, but even such *matters of fact*, as are fairly discovered to us by our senses. We ought to regard things as being what they are, which way soever we come to the knowledge of them.

They, who contenting themselves with superficial and transient views, deduce the difference

² Celebrated every where.

• Τὸ μὲν ἐν ἑτῷ διορίσασθαι τὰς ἀγαθὰς πράξεις, τὰς κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν γινόμενας λόγον, ἢ τὰς πονηρὰς τέναντιον, ἀληθὲς μὲν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἱκανὸν τὰς πράξεις σημεῖναι. “To define good actions thus, viz. that they are done according to right reason, and bad actions the contrary; is indeed true, but is not sufficient to declare the nature of them by shewing what actions are truly such.” ANDRON. RHOD.

between good and evil from the *common sense* of mankind ^b, and certain *principles* ^c that are born with us ^d, put the matter upon a very *infirm* foot. For it is much to be suspected there are no such *innate* maxims as they pretend, but that the impressions of education are mistaken for them: and beside that, the sentiments of mankind are not so *uniform* and *constant*, as that we may safely trust such an important distinction upon them ^e.

They, who own nothing to be good but *pleasure*, or what they call *jucundum*, nothing evil but *pain* ^f, and distinguish things by their tendencies

to

^b *Nec solum jus & injuria a natura dijudicatur, sed omnino omnia honesta & turpia. Nam communis intelligentia nobis notas res efficit, easque in animis nostris inchoavit, ut honesta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia.* “Not only right and wrong are different
“ in the nature of things, but all sorts of honorable and base
“ actions are so likewise: for common sense makes us under-
“ stand things, and lays the first rudiments of them in our minds,
“ in such a manner, that we make honorable things to consist in
“ their being virtuous, and base things to consist in their being
“ vitious.” CIC. Κριτήρια φησιν [ὁ Χρύσιππος] εἶναι αἰσθησιν ἔν πρόληψιν.
“ *Chrysippus* says, that sensation and reflexion are the rules by
“ which we form our judgment of things.” DIOG. LAERT.

^c They are usually called *principia naturæ, lex* (or *leges*) *naturæ*, *πρόληψεις, κοινὰ*, or *φυσικὰ ἔννοια*, νόμοι φυσικῶς, &c. “the
“ principles of nature, the law (or laws) of nature, first apprehensions of things, universal or natural notions, the law of
“ nature, &c.”

^d The set of these practical principles (or a habit flowing from them) is, what, I think, goes by the name of *Synteresis*.

^e *Unaquæque gens hoc legem naturæ putat, quod didicit.* “Every
“ nation think that to be the law of nature, which they have
“ been taught.” JEROM.

^f Under which word these delicate men comprehend *labor*. When *Epicurus*, in *Lucian*, is asked, *κακὸν ἢ γῆ τὸν πόνον*; “Whether
“ he thought labor an evil?” he answers, *Nai*: “Yea.” And

Mindyrides

to *this* or *that* ^ε, do not agree in what this pleasure is to be placed ^h, or by what methods and actions the most of it may be obtained. These are left to be questions still. As men have different tastes, different degrees of sense and philosophy, the same thing cannot be pleasant to *all*: and if particular actions are to be proved by this test, the morality of them will be very uncertain; the same act may be of *one* nature to one man, and of *another* to another. Beside, unless there be some strong *limitation* added as a fence for virtue, men will be

Mindyrides (Σμινδυρίδης, ap. Herod. ὃς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ χλιδὸς εἰς αὐτὴ ἀπέ-
 μετο, “*Smyndirides* it is in *Herodotus*, a man who carried luxury
 “to the highest degree”) proceeded so far in his aversion to
 labor, that *ejus latus alieno labore condoluit*—: *qui cum vidisset*
fadientem, & altiùs rastrum allevantem, lassum se fieri (ἔργμα λαβεῖν,
 in *Athen.*) *questus vetuit illum opus in conspectu suo facere*, “it
 “gave him a pain in his side to see another man labor—: when he
 “saw any one digging or lifting a heavy rake, he complained
 “that it made him weary (*demolishd him*, it is in *Athenæus*)
 “and forbad the person doing any more work in his sight.”

SEN.

ε *Ad hæc [voluptatem, & dolorem] & quæ sequamur, & quæ*
fugiamus, refert omnia [Aristippus]. “(*Aristippus*) referred every
 “thing (to pleasure and pain) which we pursue or avoid.”

CIC.

^h *Velim definias, quid sit voluptas: de quo omnis hæc quæstio*
est. “I would have you define what pleasure is, for this whole
 “question is about that.” CIC. The disputes about pleasure
 between the *Cyrenaics*, *Epicurus*, *Hieronymus*, &c. are well
 known: whether the end was pleasure of body or mind:
 whether it was *voluptas in motu*, or *in statu (stabilitate)*; *quæ*
suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet, or *quæ percipitur, omni*
dolore detracto; ἢ ἐν κινήσει, or ἢ κατὰ σταθεράτην, &c. “such pleasure
 “as arose from motion, or a fixed state; such as put nature in-
 “to a pleasing agreeable motion; or such as we feel, when
 “we are free from all pain; a pleasure that consists in motion,
 “or is fixed, &c.” CIC. *DIOG. LAERT.* and others.

apt to sink into gross voluptuousness, as in fact the generality of *Epicurus's* herd have doneⁱ (notwithstanding all his talk of temperance, virtue, tranquillity of mind, &c.); and the bridle will be usurped by those appetites which it is a principal part of all religion, *natural* as well as any other, to curb and restrain. So these men say what is intelligible indeed: but what they say is false. For not all pleasures, but only such pleasure as is *true*, or happiness (of which afterwards), may be reckoned among the *finēs*, or *ultima bonorum*.

He^k, who, having considered the two extremes in mens practice, in condemning both which the world generally agrees, places virtue in the *middle*, and seems to raise an idea of it from its situation at an equal distance from the opposite *extremes*^l, could

ⁱ *Negat Epicurus jucundè vivi posse, nisi cum virtute vivatur.*
 “*Epicurus* denies that any one can live pleasantly, that does not live virtuously.” CIC. But for all that their pleasures have not continued to be always like those in the little gardens of *Gargettus*. Nor indeed do they seem to be very virtuous even there. For *Epicurus* not only had his *Leontium* (or, as he amorously called her, *Λιοντάριον*, “his pretty poppet”) a famous harlot; but she *πᾶσι τε τοῖς Ἐπικουρείοις συνῆν ἐν τοῖς κήποις*, “laid with all the *Epicureans* in the gardens.” ATHEN. And in his book *περὶ τέλους* “of perfection” he is said to have written thus, Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τι νοσῶ τὰ γὰρ ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν (χειλῶν, *Athen.*) ἰδνας, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς διὰ ἀφροδισίων, κτ. “There is nothing that I esteem good, if you take away the pleasure which arises from eating and drinking and women.” See this and more in *DIOG. LAERT.*

^k *St Jerom* uses the plural number, as if this was the prevailing notion in his time. *Philosophorum sententia est, μεσότητις ἀρετῆς, ὑπερβολῆς κακίας εἶναι.* “It is the opinion of the philosophers, that virtues consist in the middle, and vices in the extremes.”

^l Ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτανείαι, καὶ ἡ ἑλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπιαινεῖται.—Ἐξ ἂν ἀρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξίς προαιρετικῆ, ἐν μεσότητι ἔσται, κτλ. Μεσότης δὲ, δὴ

could only design to be understood of such virtues, as have extremes. It must be granted indeed, that whatever declines in any degree toward *either* extreme, must be so far wrong or evil; and therefore that, which equally (or nearly) divides the distance, and declines *neither* way, *must be right*: also, that this notion supplies us with a good *direction* for common use in many cases. But then there are several obligations, that can by no means be derived from it: scarce more than such, as respect the virtues couched under the word *moderation*. And even as to these, it is many times difficult to discern, which is the *middle point*^m. This the author himself was sensible ofⁿ.

And when his master *Plato* makes virtue to consist in such a *likeness to God*^o, as we are capable of (and

δύο κακιῶν τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολήν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἕλλησιν. “ Every excess is a crime, and every defect is blame-worthy, but the medium is commendable.—Virtue then is a habit of our own procuring, and consists in the middle. Which middle is between the two extremes; the one of excess, and the other of defect.” ARIST. Perhaps *Pythagoras* (and after him *Plato*, and others) when he said (in *Diogenes Laertius*) τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι, “ that virtue was a kind of harmony,” might have some such thought as this.

^m When he says, it must be taken εἶταὺς ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος ἀπορᾶξῃ, “ according to the direction of right reason,” it is not by that ascertained. See before.

ⁿ Οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς, ἢ τίσι, κλ. “ It is not easy to determine the particular manner and the particular persons.” Therefore *Rabbi Albo* might have spared that censure, where he blames himself for expressing himself too generally, when he says, כמו שראוי ובעת הראוי ובמקום הראוי, “ after a due manner, in a convenient time, and in a proper place,” without telling him what that *manner, time, place* is.

^o That man, says he, cannot be neglected, who endeavors διακινῆσαι γίνεσθαι, ἢ ἐπιτελεῖν ἀρετὴν, εἰς ἕσπερον ἀνατὸν ἀνθρώπου ἐμοῦσθαι

(and God to be the great *exemplar*), he says what I shall not dispute. But since he tells us not how or by what means we may attain this likeness, we are little the wiser in point of practice: unless by it we understand the practice of truth, God being *truth*, and doing nothing contrary to it^p.

Whether any of those other *foundations*, upon which morality has been built, will hold better than these mentiond, I much question. But if the *formal ratio* of moral good and evil be made to consist in a conformity of mens acts to the *truth of the case* or the contrary, as I have here explaind it, the *distinction* seems to be settled in a manner undeniable, intelligible, practicable. For as what is meant by a *true proposition* and *matter of fact* is perfectly understood by every body; so will it be easy for any one, so far as he knows any such propositions and facts, to compare not only *words*, but also *actions* with them. A very little skill and attention will serve to interpret even these, and discover whether they *speak truth*, or not^q.

Δεῖν, “to make himself a righteous man, by laboring after virtue, that he may be as like God as it is possible for a man to be.” And in another place, our φυγὴ ἐθενδε is ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, “fleeing from thence is being like unto God so far as we can be.” St *Augustin* seems to agree with him, in that sentence of his, *Religionis summa est imitari quem colis*. “The highest pitch of religion is to imitate the being you worship.”

Ἡ Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτῆθεὶς, τί ποιεῖσιν ἄνθρωποι θεῷ ὁμοίον, ἔφη, ἴαν ἀληθεύωσιν. “*Pythagoras* being asked, What it was that any man could do like what God does, answerd, Speak the truth.”

STOB.

^q There is certainly not that difficulty or perplexity in morality, which *Cicero* seems to suppose, when he says, *Consuetudo exercitatioque capiendi, ut boni ratiocinatores officiorum esse possint*, “That use and exercise are necessary to make us good reasoners about what is our duty.”

X. If

X. *If there be moral good and evil, distinguished as before, there is religion; and such as may most properly be styled natural.* By religion I mean nothing else but an obligation to do (under which word I comprehend acts both of body and mind. I say, *to do*) what ought not to be omitted, and to *forbear* what ought not to be done. So that there must be religion, if there are things, of which some ought not to be done, some not to be omitted. But that there are such, appears from what has been said concerning moral good and evil: because that, which to omit would be evil, and which therefore being done would be good or well done, ought certainly by the terms *to be done*; and so that, which being done would be evil, and implies such absurdities and rebellion against the supreme being, as are mentioned under proposition the IVth. ought most undoubtedly *not to be done*. And then since there is *religion*, which follows from the distinction between moral good and evil; since this distinction is founded in the respect, which mens acts bear to truth; and since no proposition can be true, which expresses things otherwise than as they are in nature: since things are so, there must be religion, which is founded in nature, and may upon that account be most properly and truly called the *religion of nature* or *natural religion*; the great law of which religion, the law of nature, or rather (as we shall afterwards find reason to call it) of the Author of nature is,

XI. *That every intelligent, active, and free being should so behave himself, as by no act to contradict*

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diff truth; or, that he should treat every thing as being what it is ^r.

Objections I am sensible may be made to almost any thing ^s; but I believe none to what has been here advanced but such as may be answerd. For to consider a thing as being *something else* than what it is, or (which is the same) not to consider it as being what it is, is an absurdity indefensible. However, for a *specimen*, I will set down a few. Let us suppose some gentleman, who has not sufficiently considerd these matters, amidst his freedoms, and in the gaiety of humor, to talk after some such manner as this. “ If every thing must be treated
 “ as being what it is, what rare work will follow?
 “ For, 1. to treat my *enemy* as such is to kill him,
 “ or *revenge* myself soundly upon him. 2. To
 “ use a *creditor*, who is a spend-thrift, or one that
 “ knows not the use of money, or has no occasion
 “ for it, as *such*, is not to pay him. Nay further,
 “ 3. If I *want money*, don’t I act according to
 “ truth, if I take it from some body else to sup-
 “ ply my own wants? And more, do not I act
 “ contrary to *truth*, if I do *not*? 4. If one, who
 “ plainly appears to have a *design* of killing ano-

^r What it is in nature. כַּפ' מִן שְׁוֵהוּ, “ according to what
 “ the thing is,” to use *Maimonides*’s words. And thus that in *Ar-
 rianus* is true, Νόμος βιωτικός ἐστὶν ἕτερος, τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῆ φύσει παράδειγμα.
 “ The rule of life is, to do whatever is agreeable to nature.”
Omnī in re quid sit veri, videre & tueri decet. “ We ought to
 “ find out and to maintain what is true, about every thing.”
 CIC. This is indeed the way of truth.

^s Because there is scarce any thing, which one or other will not say. *Quid enim potest dici de illo, qui nigram dixit esse nivem, &c.* “ What can we say of a man that affirms black to be
 “ white, &c.” LACT.

“ ther,

“ ther, or doing him some great mischief, if he
 “ can find him, should ask me where he is, and I
 “ know where he is; may not I, to save life, say I
 “ do not know, tho that be false? 5. At this rate
 “ I may not, in a *frolick*, break a glass, or burn a
 “ book: because forsooth to use these things as
 “ being what they are, is to drink out of the one,
 “ not to break it; and to read the other, not burn
 “ it. *Lastly*, how shall a man *know* what is true:
 “ and if he can find out truth, may he not want
 “ the *power* of acting agreeably to it?”

To the *first* objection it is easy to reply from what has been already said. For if the objector's enemy, whom we will call E, was *nothing more* than his enemy, there might be some force in the objection; but since he may be considered as something else beside that, he must be used according to what he is in other respects, as well as in that from which he is denominated the objector's (or O's) enemy. For E in the first place is a *man*; and as such may claim the benefit of common humanity, whatever that is: and if O denies it to him, he wounds truth in a very sensible part. And then if O and E are *fellow-citizens*, living under the same government, and subject to laws, which are so many common covenants, limiting the behaviour of one man to another, and by which E is exempt from all private violence in his body, estate, &c. O cannot treat E as being what he is, unless he treats him also as one, who by common consent is under such a protection. If he does otherwise, he denies the existence of the foresaid laws and public compacts: contrary to truth. And beside, O should act with respect to *himself* as being what he

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he is; a man himself, in such or such circumstances, and one who has given up all right to *private revenge* (for that is the thing meant here). If truth therefore be observed, the result will be this. O must treat E as *something compounded* of a man, a fellow-citizen, and an enemy, all three: *that is*, he must only prosecute him in such a way, as is agreeable to the statutes and methods, which the society have obliged themselves to observe. And even as to *legal prosecutions*, there may be many things still to be considered. For E may shew himself an enemy to O in things, that fall under the cognizance of law, which yet may be of moment and importance to him, or not. If they are such things, as really affect the *safety* or *happiness* of O or his family, then he will find himself obliged, in duty and submission to truth, to take refuge in the laws; and to punish E, or obtain satisfaction, and at least security for the future, by the means there prescribed. Because if he does not, he denies the *nature* and *sense* of happiness to be what they are; the obligations, which perhaps we shall shew hereafter he is under to his *family* †, to be what they are; a *dangerous* and *wicked* enemy to be dangerous and wicked; the *end* of laws, and society itself, to be the safety and good of its members, by

† *Conveniet cum in dando munificum esse, tum in exigendo non acerbum:—à litibus verò quantum liceat, & nescio an paulo plus etiam quam liceat, abhorrentem.—Habenda est autem ratio rei familiaris, quam quidem dilabi finire flagitiosum est.* “It is but reasonable that we should be liberal in giving, and not severe in our demands:—we should be averse to any contention, as far as is lawful, nay I don’t know, if we should not go a little farther.—But we must have regard to our own private circumstances, for it is a wicked thing in us to hurt them.” Cic.

preventing

preventing injuries, punishing offenders, &c. which it will appear to be, when that matter comes before us. But if the enmity of E rises not beyond *trifling*, or *more tolerable* instances, then O might act against truth, if he should be at more charge or hazard in prosecuting E than he can afford, or the thing lost or in danger is worth; should treat one that is an enemy in little things, or a *little* enemy, as a *great* one; or should deny to make some allowances, and *forgive* such peccadillo's, as the common frailty of human nature makes it necessary for us mutually to forgive, if we will live together. *Lastly*, in cases, of which the laws of the place take *no notice*, truth and nature would be sufficiently observed, if O should keep a vigilant eye upon the steps of his adversary, and take the most *prudent* measures, that are compatible with the character of a private person, either to assuage the malice of E, or prevent the effects of it; or perhaps, if he should only *not* use him as a friend^u. For this if he should do, notwithstanding the rants of some men, he would cancel the natural differences of things, and confound truth with untruth.

The debtor in the *second* objection, if he acts as he says there, does, in the first *place*, make himself the *judge* of his creditor, which is what he is not. For he lays him under a heavy sentence, an incapacity in effect of having any estate, or any more estate. In the *next* place, he arrogates to himself more than can be true: that he perfectly *knows*, not only what his creditor and his circumstances

^u Τὸν φίλοντ' ἐπὶ δαΐτα καλεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν ἴασαι. "Invite your friend to supper, but let your enemy alone." HES.

are, but also what they ever *will* be hereafter. He that is now weak, or extravagant, or very rich, may for ought he knows become otherwise. *And*, which is to be considerd above all, he directly denies the money, which is the creditor's, to be the creditor's. For it is *supposed* to be owing or due to him (otherwise he is no creditor): and if it be due to him, he has a right to it: and if he has a right to it, *of right* it is his (or, it is *his*). But the debtor by detaining it uses it, as if it was his own, and therefore *not* the other's; contrary to truth. To pay a man what is *due* to him doth not deny, that he who pays may think him extravagant, &c. or any other truth; that act has no such signification. It only signifies, that he who pays *thinks* it due to the other, or that it is his: and *this* it naturally doth signify. For he might pay the creditor without having any other thought relating to him, but would not *without this*.

Ans. to *objection* the 3d. Acting according to truth, as that phrase is used in the objection, is not the thing required by my rule; but, so to act that *no truth* may be *denied* by any act. Not taking from another man his money by violence is a forbearance, which does not signify, that I do not want money, or which denies any truth. But taking it *denies* that to be his, which (by the supposition) *is his*. The former is only as it were silence, which denies nothing: the latter a direct and loud assertion of a falsity; the former what can contradict no truth, because the latter does. If a man wants money through his own extravagance and vice, there can be no *pretence* for making another man to pay for his wickedness or folly. We will suppose

suppose therefore the man, who wants money, to want it for *necessaries*, and to have incurred this want through some *misfortune*, which he could not prevent. In this case, which is put as strong as can be for the objector, there are ways of expressing this want, or acting according to it, without trespassing upon truth. The man may by honest *labor* and industry seek to supply his wants; or he may apply as a *supplicant* ^w, not as an enemy or robber, to such as can afford to relieve him; or if his want is very pressing, to the first persons he meets, whom truth will oblige to assist him according to their abilities: or he may do *any thing but* violate truth ^x; which is a privilege of a vast scope, and leaves him many resources. And such a behaviour as *this* is not only agreeable to his case, and expressive of it in a way that is natural; but he would deny it to be what it is, if he did not act thus. If there is no way in the world, by which he may help himself without the violation of truth (which can scarce be supposed. If there is no other way) he must e'en take it as his fate ^y. Truth will be truth, and must retain its character and force, let his case be what it will. Many things might be added. The man,

^w Τὸ πτωχεῖν οὐκ ὁμολογεῖν τινὲ ἀίσχρον, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἰσχρον. "For a poor man not to own himself to be poor is a base thing; but for him not to endeavor to be otherwise is a baser thing still." THUCYD.

^x For ἔργῳ γ' ἐδὲν ὄνειδος, "no endeavor is any reproach."

Hrs.

^y *Suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius, quam de alterius commodis detrahendum.* "Every man ought to bear the evils he is under, rather than deprive others of their advantages."

Cic. According to *Plato*, a man should choose to die, *πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν*, "rather than do an unjust thing."

from

from whom this money is to be taken, will be proved sect. vi. to have a right to *defend* himself and his; and not suffer it to be taken from him; perhaps he may stand as much in need of it, as the other, &c.

Ans. to *obj.* the 4th. It is certain, in the *first* place, that nothing may willingly be done, which in any manner promotes *murder*: whoever is necessary to that, offends against *many* truths of *great* weight. 2. You are not obliged to answer the *furi-oso's* question. Silence here would contradict no truth. 3. No one can tell, in strict speaking, where another is, if he is not within his view. Therefore you may *truly* deny, that you know where the man is. *Lastly*, if by not discovering him you should indanger your life (and this is the hardest circumstance, that *can* be taken into the objection), the case then would be the same, as if the inquirer should say, "If you do not murder such a one; I " will murder you." And then be sure you must not commit murder; but must defend yourself against this, as against other dangers, against Banditti, &c. *as well as you can.* Tho merely to deny truth by *words* (I mean, when they are not productive of facts to follow; as in judicial transactions, bearing witness, or passing sentence) is not equal to a denial by *facts*; tho an *abuse* of language is allowable in this case, if ever in any; tho all sins against truth are not equal, and certainly a little trespassing upon it in the present case, for the good of all parties ², as *little* a one as any; and tho one

² Οὐτως ἡ ἰατρὸς νοσῶντα ἐξαπατᾷ,—ἡ δὲ δίδωσιν ὕδιν. " Thus a physician deceives a sick person,—and there is nothing shocking " in it." MAX. TYR.

might

might look on a man in such a fit of rage as mad, and therefore talk to him not as a *man* but a *mad man*: yet truth is *sacred*^a, and there are other ways of coming off with innocence, by giving timely notice to the man in danger, calling in assistance, or taking the advantage of some seasonable incident^b.

The 5th *objection* seems to respect *inanimate* things, which if we must treat according to what they are, it is insinuated we shall become obnoxious to many *trifling* obligations; such as are there mentio'd. To this I *answer* thus. If the *glafs* be nothing else but an useful drinking-glafs, and these

^a To that question, *Si quis ad te confugiat, qui mendacior tuo possit à morte liberari, non es mentiturus?* "If a man should come to you, who should be saved from death by your telling a lye, would you tell one?" St *Austin* answers in the negative, and concludes, *Restat ut nunquam boni mentiantur.*—*Quanto fortius, quanto excellentius dices, nec prodam, nec mentiar.* "It remains then that good men should never tell a lye.—How much more courageous, how much better is it to say, I will neither betray him, nor tell a lye."

^b In such pressing cases, under imminent danger, the world is wont to make great allowances. Οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἡγῆται τὰ ψευδῆ λέγειν;—Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ σωθῆναι γὰρ τὸ ψεῦδος φέρει. "Is it not then a safe thing to say what is false?—No, not if the falsity will save any one." SOPH. Even they, who say, השח שיחה בטלה, עובר במעשה, "that he who speaketh falsehood transgresseth indeed;" and, מ"ע לרבר אמת אפילו במילי דעלמא, "that it is a positive precept to speak the truth in common discourse;" and, המשקר כאלו עובר ע"ו, "that a liar is like an idolater;" say also, אבל לשים שלום מותר, "that it is better to preserve peace." S. HAHAD (*et al. pass.*). And *Aben Ezra* says of *Abraham*, דחה אבימלך בדברים כפי צורך השעה, "that he urged *Abimelech* with such words as the necessity of that time required." In short, some have permitted, in desperate cases, *mendacio tanquam veneno uti*, "to make use of a lye as you do of poison." SEXT. PYTHAG.

E words

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 words fully exprefs what it is, to treat it accordingly is indeed to drink out of it, when there is occasion and it is truly useful, and to *break* it designedly is to do what is wrong ^c. For that is to handle it, as if it neither was useful to the objector himself, nor could be so to any one else; contrary to the description of it. But if there be any *reason* for breaking the glass, then something is wanting to declare fully what it is. As, if the glass be poisoned: for then it becomes a *poisoned drinking-glass*, and to break or destroy it is to use it according to this *true* description of it. Or if by breaking it any thing is to be obtained, which more than counter-weighs the loss of it, it becomes a *glass with that circumstance*: and then for the objector to break it, if it be his own, is to use it according to what it is. And if it should become by some circumstance *useless* only, tho' there should be no reason for breaking it, yet if there be none against it, the thing will be indifferent and matter of liberty. This answer, *mutatis mutandis*, may be adapted to other things of this kind; *books*, or any thing else. As the usefulness or excellence of some books renders them worthy of immortality, and of all our care to secure them to posterity ^d; so some may be used more like what they are, by tearing or burning them, than by preserving or reading them: the number of which, *large* enough already, I wish you may

^c אמור—לישבר כליו בחמתו וכו' "It is forbidden—to break your own vessels in your anger." S. HHAS.

^d Who doth not detest that thought of *Caligula, de Homeri carminibus abolendis, &c.*? about destroying Homer's verses, &c." SUET.

not

not think to be increased by this, which I here send you.

Here *two* things ought to be regarded. 1. That tho' to act against truth in any case is wrong, yet, the degrees of guilt varying with the importance of things, in some cases the importance one way or t'other may be so little as to render the crime *evanescent* or *almost* nothing^e. And, 2. that *inanimate* beings cannot be considered as capable of wrong treatment, if the respect they bear to living beings is separated from them. The drinking-glass before mentiond could not be considered as such, or be what it *now* is, if there was no drinking animal to own and use it. Nothing can be of any importance to that thing itself, which is void of all life and perception. So that when we compute what such things are, we must take them as being what they are *in reference* to things that have life.

The last and most material *objection*, or *question* rather, shall be *answerd* by and by. In the mean time I shall only say, that if in any particular case truth is inaccessible, and after due inquiry it doth not appear *what*, or *how* things are, then this will be true, *that the case* or thing under consideration is *doubtful*: and to act agreeably unto this truth is to be not opinionative, nor obstinate, but modest, cautious, docile, and to endeavour to be *on the safer side*. Such behaviour shews the case to be as it

^e The *Stoics* must certainly therefore be much too scrupulous, when they affirm (if they were in earnest), that ἂν δὲ τὸν δάκτυλον ὡς ἔτυχε σαλεύειν τῷ σοφῷ ὁ λόγος ἐπιτρέπει, "reason commands a wise man, not so much as to move his fingers as it were by chance." CLEM. ALEX. Especially since this is, at least ordinarily, a thing perfectly indifferent by prop. IX.

is. And as to the want of *power* to act agreeably to truth, that cannot be known till trials are made : and if any one doth try, and do his endeavor, he may take to himself the satisfaction, which he will find in sect. IV.

SECT. II. *Of* Happiness.

THAT, which demands to be next considered, is *happiness*; as being in itself most considerable; as abetting the cause of truth; and as being indeed so nearly allied to it, that they cannot well be parted. We cannot pay the respects due to one, unless we regard the other. Happiness must not be denied to be what it is : and it is by the practice of truth that we aim at that happiness, which is true.

In the few following propositions I shall not only give you my *idea* of it, but also subjoin some *observations*, which tho perhaps not necessary here, we may sometime hereafter think no loss of time or labor to have made *en passant* : such as men of science would call, some of them *porismata*, or corollaries, and some *scholia*, I shall take them as they fall in my way promiscuously.

I. *Pleasure is a consciousness of something agreeable, pain of the contrary : & v. v. the consciousness of any thing agreeable is pleasure, of the contrary pain.* For as nothing, that is agreeable to us, can be painful at the same time, and as such; nor any thing disagreeable pleasant, *by the terms*; so neither can any thing agreeable be *for that reason* (because it is agreeable) not pleasant, nor any thing disagreeable not painful, in some measure or other.

Obs.

Obf. 1. *Pleasures and pains are proportionable to the perceptions and sense of their subjects, or the persons affected with them.* For consciousness and perception cannot be separated: because as I do not perceive what I am not conscious to myself I do perceive, so neither can I be conscious of what I do not perceive, or of more or less than what I do perceive. And therefore, since the degrees of pleasure or pain must be answerable to the consciousness, which the party affected has of them, they must likewise be as the degrees of perception are.

Obf. 2. *Whatever increases the power of perceiving, renders the percipient more susceptible of pleasure or pain.* This is an immediate consequence; and to add more is needless: unless, that among the means, by which perceptions and the inward sense of things may in many cases be heightend and *increased*, the principal are *reflexion*, and the practice of thinking. As I cannot be conscious of what I do not perceive: so I do not perceive that, which I do not advert upon. That which makes me feel, makes me advert. Every instance therefore of consciousness and perception is attended with an act of advertence: and as the more the perceptions are, the more are the advertences or reflexions; so *v. v.* the more frequent or intense the acts of advertence and reflexion are, the more consciousness there is, and the stronger is the *perception*. *Further*, all perceptions are produced in time: time passes by moments: there can be but one moment present at once: and therefore all present perception considered without any relation to what is past, or

future, may be lookd upon as momentaneous only. In this kind of perception the percipient perceives, as if he had not perceived any thing before, nor had any thing perceptible to follow. But in reflexion there is a repetition of what is past, and an anticipation of that which is apprehended as yet to come: there is a *connexion* of past and future, which by this are brought into the sum, and superadded to the present or momentaneous perceptions. *Again*, by reflecting we practise our capacity of apprehending: and this practising will increase, and as it were *extend* that capacity, to a certain degree. *Lastly*, reflexion doth not only accumulate moments past and future to those that are present, but even in their passage it seems to *multiply* them. For time, as well as space, is capable of indeterminate division: and the finer or nicer the advertence or reflexion is, into the more parts is the time divided; which, whilst the mind considers those parts as so many several moments, is *in effect* renderd by this so much the longer. And to this experience agrees.

Obf. 3. *The causes of pleasure and pain are relative things: and in order to estimate truly their effect upon any particular subject they ought to be drawn into the degrees of perception in that subject.* When the cause is of the same kind, and acts with an equal force, if the perception of one person be equal to that of another, what they perceive must needs be *equal*. And so it will be likewise, when the forces in the producing causes and the degrees of perception in the sentients are *reciprocal*. For (which doth not seem to be considerd by the world, and therefore ought the more particularly to be noted) if

if the caufe of pleasure or pain fhould act but half as much upon A, as it does upon B; yet if the perceptivity of A be double to that of B, the fum of their pleasures or pains will be *equal*. In other cafes they will be *unequal*. As, if the *caufa dolorifica* fhould act with the same *impetus* on C with which it acts upon D; yet if C had only two degrees of perception, and D had three, the pain fustained by D would be half as much more as that of C: becaufe he would perceive or feel the acts and impressions of the caufe more by fo much. If it fhould act with twice the force upon D which it acts with upon C, then the pain of C would be to that of D as 2 to 6: *i. e.* as one degree of force multiplied by two degrees of perception to two degrees of force multiplied by three of perception. And fo on.

Obf. 4. *Mens refpective happineffes or pleasures ought to be valued as they are to the perfons themselves, whose they are; or according to the thoughts and sense, which they have of them: not according to the estimate put upon them by other people, who have no authority to judge of them, nor can know what they are; may compute by different rules; have less sense; be in different circumstances^f; or such as guilt has rendered partial to themselves. If that prince, who having plenty and flocks many, yet ravishd the poor man's single ewelamb out of his bosom, reckond the poor man's loss to be not greater, than the loss of one of his lambs would have been to him, he must be very*

^f *Tu si hinc fis, aliter sentias.* " You would be of another opinion, if you were in my circumstances." TER.

defective in moral arithmetic, and little understood the doctrine of proportion. Every man's happiness is *his* happiness, what it is to him; and the loss of it is answerable to the degrees of his perception, to his manner of taking things, to his wants and circumstances &c.

Obs. 5. *How judicious and wary ought princes, lawgivers, judges, juries, and even masters to be!* They ought not to consider so much what a stout, resolute, obstinate, hardend criminal may bear, as what the weaker sort, or at least (if that can be known) the persons immediately concern'd can bear: *that is*, what any punishment would be to them. For it is certain, all criminals are not of the former kind; and therefore should not be used as if they were. Some are drawn into crimes, which may render them obnoxious to public justice, they scarce know how themselves: some fall into them thro necessity, strength of temptation, despair, elasticity of spirits and a sudden eruption of passion, ignorance of laws, want of good education, or some natural infirmity or propension, and some who are really innocent, are oppress'd by the iniquity or mistakes of judges, witnesses, juries, or perhaps by the power and zeal of a faction, with which their sense or their honesty has not permitted them to join. What a difference must there be between the suf-

§ *Felicitas cui præcipua fuerit homini, non est humani judicii: cum prosperitatem ipsam alius alio modo, & suoapte ingenio quisque terminet.* "No man can judge what the happiness of another man consists in; because some make their happiness to consist in one thing, and some in another, according to their several dispositions." PLIN.

ferings

ferings of a poor wretch sensible of his crime or misfortune, who would give a world for his deliverance, if he had it, and those of a sturdy *veteran* in roguery: between the apprehensions, tears, faintings of the one, and the brandy and oaths of the other; in short, between a tender nature and a brickbat!

Obf. 6. *In general, all persons ought to be very careful and tender, where any other is concern'd. Otherwise they may do they know not what. For no man can tell, by himself, or any other way, how another may be affected.*

Obf. 7. *There cannot be an equal distribution of rewards and punishments by any stated human laws^b. Because (among other reasons) the same thing is rarely either the same gratification, or the same punishment to different persons.*

Obf. 8. *The sufferings of brutes are not like the sufferings of menⁱ. They perceive by moments, without reflexion upon past or future, upon causes, circumstances, &c.*

Time

^b It is not possible, in *Albo's* words, לתת לאיש כדרכיו, שווה בשווה ולשער העונשים במדה ובמשקל וכו' "to give to every man according to equity, with regard to his ways, and to estimate punishments by measure and weight."

ⁱ *Inter hominem & belluam hoc maxime interest, quod hæc—ad id solum quod adest, quodque præsens est, se accommodat, paululum admodum sentiens præteritum aut futurum, &c.* "Herein lies the chief difference between a man and a beast, that this latter conforms itself to that only which is present and before it, having but a very small sense of what is past or to come, &c."

Cic.

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Time and life without thinking are next neighbours to *nothing*, to no-time and no-life ^k. And therefore to kill a brute is to deprive him of a life, or a remainder of time, that is equal to little more than nothing: tho this may perhaps be more applicable to some animals than to others. That, which is chiefly to be taken care of in this matter, is, that the brute may not be killed unnecessarily; when it is killed, that it may have as few moments of pain as may be ^l; and that no young be left to languish. So much by the way here.

II. *Pain considerd in itself is a real evil, pleasure a real good.* I take this as a *postulatum*, that will without difficulty be granted. Therefore,

III. *By the general idea of good and evil the one [pleasure] is in itself desirable, the other [pain] to*

CIC. *Nos ̄ venturo torquemur ̄ præterito. Timoris enim tormentum memoria reducit, providentia anticipat. Nemo tantum presentibus miser est.* “But we torment ourselves with what is to come, and with what is past: for by our foresight we anticipate the torment of fear, and by our memory we bring back that torment which is past. No man is miserable by the present things alone.” SEN.

^k *Præsens tempus brevissimum est, adeo quidem, ut quibusdam nullum videatur, &c.* “The present time is as short as is possible, insofmuch that some have imagind it to be a mere nothing, &c.” SEN. “Όταν γὰρ αὐτοὶ μὴδὲν μεταβάλλομεν τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλάθομεν μετὰβάλλοντες, ἢ δεκεῖ ἡμῶν γελονίαι ὁ χρίσθαι.” “When we have no succession of thoughts, or if we have, but forget them, then time seems to us be nothing.” ARIST.

ו אִין הַשֵּׁם חַפֵּץ שְׂתִמּוֹת בַּחַמָּה חַנּוּם וְכוּ׃ “God takes no delight that a beast should die, if there be no reason for its dying.” AB. EZRA. בֵּא לְדַן וְכוּ׃ — “He that put a beast to any pain, without a just reason for so doing, shall be accountable for it.” S. HHAS.

be

be avoided. What is here said, respects mere pleasure and pain, abstracted from all circumstances, consequences, &c. But because there are some of these generally adhering to them, and such as enter so deep into their nature, that unless these be *taken in*, the full and true character of the other cannot be had, nor can it therefore be known what *happiness* is, I must proceed to some other propositions relating to this subject.

IV. *Pleasure compared with pain may either be equal, or more, or less: also pleasures may be compared with other pleasures^m, and pains with pains.* Because all the moments of the pleasure must bear some respect or be in some *ratio* to all the moments of pain: as also all the degrees of one to all the degrees of the other: and so must those of one pleasure, or one pain, be to those of another. And if the degrees of intenseness be multiplied by the moments of duration, there must still be some *ratio* of the one product to the other.

That this proposition is true, appears from the general conduct of mankind; tho in some particulars they may err, and wrong themselves, some more, some less. For what doth all this hurry of

^m The rants of those men, who assert, *μη διαφέρειν ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς, μηδὲ ἀδελφόν τι εἶναι*, “that there is no difference in pleasures, that nothing can be more than pleasant,” nay, *φύσει ἄδὴν ἡδύ, ἢ ἀηδές*, “that there is nothing that is naturally pleasant or unpleasant,” in *Diogenes Laertius*, can surely affect no body, who has sense, or is alive. Nor that of the *Stoics*, in *Plutarch*, *ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὁ χρόνος οὐκ αὐξάνει προσγιγνώμενον*, κτλ. “That the continuance of any good makes no addition to it.” As if an age was not more than a moment, and (therefore) an age’s happiness more than a moment’s.

business,

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business, what do all the labors and travels of men tend to, but to gain such advantages, as they think do exceed all their trouble? What are all their abstinences and self-denials for, if they do not think some pleasures less than the pain, that would succeed them? Do not the various methods of life shew, that men prefer one sort of pleasure to another, and submit to one sort of pain rather than to have another? And within ourselves we cannot but find an indifference as to many things, not caring, whether we have the pain with the pleasure obtained by it, or miss the pleasure, being excused from the pain.

V. *When pleasures and pains are equal, they mutually destroy each other: when the one exceeds, the excess gives the true quantity of pleasure or pain.* For nine degrees of pleasure, less by nine degrees of pain, are equal to nothing: but nine degrees of one, less by three degrees of the other, give six of the former *net and true.*

VI. *As therefore there may be true pleasure and pain: so there may be some pleasures, which compared with what attends or follows them, not only may vanish into nothing, but may even degenerate into pain, and ought to be reckoned as painsⁿ; and v. v. some pains, that may be annumerated to pleasures.* For the true quantity of pleasure differs not from that quantity of true pleasure; or it is so much of that

ⁿ *Nocet (fit noxa) empty dolore voluptas.* "Pleasure, that is procured by pain, is so much real hurt." HOR. And,—*multo corrupta dolore voluptas.* "Pleasure vitiated by much pain." *Ibid.*

kind

kind of pleasure, which is *true* (clear of all discounts and future payments): nor can the *true quantity of pain* not be the same with that *quantity of true or mere pain*. Then, the man who enjoys three degrees of such pleasure as will bring upon him nine degrees of pain, when three degrees of pain are set off to balance and sink the three of pleasure, can have remaining to him only six degrees of pain: and into these therefore is his pleasure finally resolved. And so the three degrees of pain, which any one indures to obtain nine of pleasure, end in six of the latter. By the same manner of computing some pleasures will be found to be the loss of pleasure, compared with greater: and some pains the alleviation of pain; because by undergoing them greater are evaded^o. Thus the natures of pleasures and pains are varied, and sometimes transmuted: which ought never to be forgot.

Nor this neither. As in the sense of most men, I believe, a *little* pain will weigh against a *great deal* of pleasure^p: so perhaps there may be some pains, which exceed all pleasures; *that is*, such pains as no man would choose to suffer for any pleasure *whatever*, or at least any that we know of in this world. So that it is possible the difference, or excess of pain, may rise so high as to become immense: and then the pleasure to be set against that pain will be but a point, or cypher; a quantity of no value.

^o As when that *Pompey*, mentioned by *Valerius Maximus*, by burning his finger escaped the torture.

^p *Bona malis paria non sunt, etiam pari numero: nec letitia ultra minimo mærore pensanda.* "Good things are not equal to evil things, tho they were the same in number; nor is any joy an equivalent for the least sorrow." PLIN.

VII. *Happiness differs not from the true quantity of pleasure, unhappiness of pain.* Or, *any being may be said to be so far happy, as his pleasures are true; &c.* That cannot be the happiness of any being, which is bad for him: nor can happiness be disagreeable. It must be something therefore, that is both agreeable and good for the possessor. Now present pleasure is for the present indeed agreeable; but if it be not true, and he who enjoys it must pay more for it than it is worth, it cannot be for his good, or good for him. This therefore cannot be his *happiness*. Nor, again, can that pleasure be reckoned happiness, for which one pays the full price in pain: because these are quantities which mutually destroy each other. But yet since happiness is something, which, by the general idea of it, must be desirable, and therefore agreeable, it must be some kind of pleasure⁹: and this, from what has been said, can only be such pleasure as is true. That only can be both agreeable and good for him. And thus every one's happiness will be as his true quantity of pleasure.

One, that loves to make *objections*, may demand here, whether there may not be happiness without pleasure: whether a man may not be said to be happy in respect to those evils, which he escapes, and yet knows nothing of: and whether there may not be such a thing as *negative* happiness. I answer, an exemption from misfortunes and pains is a high privilege, tho we should not be sensible what those

⁹ Οἰόμεθα δὲν ἕδονην παραμελεῖσθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. “We think that
 “happiness must have some pleasure mixt with it.” ARIST.

misfor-

misfortunes or dangers are, from which we are delivered, and in the larger use of the word may be styled a happiness. Also, the absence of pain or unhappiness may perhaps be called negative happiness, since the meaning of that phrase is known. But in proper speaking happiness always includes something positive. For *mere* indolence resulting from insensibility, or joined with it, if it be happiness, is a happiness infinitely diminished: *that is*, it is no more a happiness, than it is an unhappiness; upon the confine of both, but neither. At best it is but the happiness of stocks and stones^r: and to these I think happiness can hardly be in strictness allowed. 'Tis the privilege of a stock to be what it is, rather than to be a miserable being: this we are sensible of, and therefore, joining this privilege with our own sense of it, we call it happiness; but this is what it is in our manner of apprehending it, not what it is in the stock itself. A sense indeed of being free from pains and troubles is attended with happiness: but then the happiness flows from the *sense* of the case, and is a *positive* happiness. Whilst a man reflects upon his negative happiness, as it is called, and enjoys it, he makes it positive: and perhaps a sense of immunity from the afflictions and miseries every where so obvious to our observation is one of the *greatest* pleasures in this world.

VIII. *That being may be said to be ultimately happy, in some degree or other, the sum total of whose pleasures exceeds the sum of all his pains: or, ulti-*

^r Οἱ οἶονε καθύπνουτος κατὰς νοῖς, "like a man in a deep sleep."
ARIST. *ap. Diog. L.*

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mate happiness is the sum of happiness, or true pleasure, at the foot of the account. And so on the other side, that being may be said to be ultimately unhappy, the sum of all whose pains exceeds that of all his pleasures.

IX. *To make itself happy is a duty, which every being, in proportion to its capacity, owes to itself; and that, which every intelligent being may be supposed to aim at, in general*^s. For happiness is some quantity of true pleasure: and that pleasure, which I call true, may be considered by itself, and so will be justly desirable (according to prop. II, and III). On the contrary, unhappiness is certainly to be avoided: because being a quantity of mere pain, it may be considered by itself, as a real, mere evil, &c. and because if I am obliged to pursue happiness, I am at the same time obliged to recede, as far as I can, from its contrary. All this is self-evident. And hence it follows, that,

X. *We cannot act with respect to either ourselves, or other men, as being what we and they are, unless both are considered as beings susceptible of happiness and unhappiness, and naturally desirous of the one and averse to the other.* Other animals may be considered after the same manner in proportion to their several degrees of apprehension.

But that the nature of happiness, and the road to it, which is so very apt to be mistaken, may be

^s This is truly *Bonum summum, quò tendimus omnes*, "the chief good, which we all aim at." LUCR. "Ἀπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπέιν. ἰρίην χάριν αἰρέμεθα, πᾶσιν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τίλον γὰρ αὐτοῦ." "We choose all other things, except happiness, for the sake of something else; but that is itself the end." ARIST.

better

better understood; and true pleasures more certainly distinguish'd from false; the following propositions must still be added.

XI. *As the true and ultimate happiness of no being can be produced by any thing, that interferes with truth, and denies the natures of things: so neither can the practice of truth make any being ultimately unhappy.* For that, which contradicts nature and truth, opposes the will of the Author of nature (whose existence, &c. I shall prove afterwards); and to suppose, that an inferior being may in opposition to His will *break through* the constitution of things, and by so doing make himself happy, is to suppose that being more potent than the Author of nature, and consequently more potent than the author of the nature and power of that very being himself, which is absurd. And as to the other part of the proposition, it is also absurd to think, that, by the constitution of nature and will of its author, any being should be finally miserable only for *conforming* himself to truth, and owning things and the relations lying between them to be what they are. It is much the same as to say, God has made it natural to contradict nature; or unnatural, and therefore punishable, to act according to nature and reality. If such a blunder (excuse the boldness of the word) could be, it must come either thro' a defect of *power* in Him to cause a better and more equitable scheme, or from some *delight*, which he finds in the misery of his dependents. The former cannot be ascribed to the First cause, who is the fountain of power: nor the latter to Him, who gives so many proofs of his goodness and beneficence.

cence. Many beings may be said to be happy; and there are none of us all, who have not many enjoyments^t: whereas did he delight in the infelicity of those beings, which depend upon Him, it must be natural to Him to make them unhappy, and then not one of them would be otherwise in any respect. The world in that case instead of being such a beautiful, admirable system, in which there is only a *mixture* of evils, could have been only a scene of *mere* misery, horror, and torment.

That either the enemies of truth (*wicked men*) should be ultimately happy, or the religious observers of it (*good men*) ultimately unhappy, is such injustice, and an evil so great, that sure no *Manichean* will allow such a *superiority* of his evil principle over the good, as is requisite to produce and maintain it.

XII. *The genuine happiness of every being must be something, that is not incompatible with or destructive of its nature*, or the superior or better part of it, if it be mixt. For instance, nothing can be the true happiness of a *rational* being, that is inconsistent with *reason*. For all pleasure, and therefore be sure all clear pleasure and true happiness must be something agreeable (pr. I.): and nothing can be agreeable to a reasoning nature, or (which is the same) to the reason of that nature, which is repug-

^t *Non dat Deus beneficia. Unde ergo quæ possides? quæ*—“If God does not give us any good things, whence then comes all that we have? which—” SEN.

^u Παντὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτῆ κακία ἢ κακοδαμονία ἐστ. “Every thing that is contrary to the nature of any being, is evil and misery to it.” ARR.

nant

nant and disagreeable to reason. If any thing becomes agreeable to a rational being, which is not agreeable to reason, it is plain his reason is lost, his nature depressed, and that he now lifts himself among *irrationals*, at least as to that particular. If a being finds pleasure in any thing *unreasonable*, he has an *unreasonable* pleasure; but a rational nature can like nothing of that kind without a contradiction to itself. For to do this would be to act, as if it was the contrary to what it is. Lastly, if we find hereafter, that whatever interferes with reason, interferes with truth, and to contradict either of them is the same thing; then what has been said under the former proposition, does also confirm this: as what has been said in proof of this, does also confirm the former.

XIII. *Those pleasures are true, and to be reckoned into our happiness, against which there lies no reason.* For when there is no reason against any pleasure, there is always one for it^w, included in the term. So when there is no reason for undergoing pain (or venturing it), there is one against it.

Obs. There is therefore no necessity for men to torture their inventions in finding out arguments to justify themselves in the pursuits after worldly advantages and enjoyments, provided that neither

^w Τίνων ἡδονῶν ἢ κατὰ λόγον ἢ ἄλλῳ μεταλαμβάνομεν. "There are some pleasures which we claim by the dictates of right reason." SIMPL. *Rectè facit, animo quando obsequitur suo: quod omnes homines facere oportet, dum id modo fiat bono.* "He does right, who follows the dictates of his own mind, as all men ought to do, if they do it in a proper manner." PLAUT.

these enjoynments, nor the means by which they are attaind, contain the violation of any truth, by being unjust, immoderate, or the like *. For in this case there is no reason why we should not desire them, and a direct one, why we should; *viz.* because they are enjoynments.

XIV. To conclude this section, *The way to happiness and the practice of truth incur the one into the other* †. For no being can be styled happy, that is not ultimately so: because if all his pains exceed all his pleasures, he is so far from being happy, that he is a being unhappy, or miserable, in proportion to that excess. Now by *prop.* XI. nothing can produce the ultimate happiness of any being, which interferes with truth: and therefore whatever doth produce that, must be something which is consistent and *coincident* with this.

Two things then (but such as are met together, and embrace each other), which are to be religiously regarded in all our conduct, are *truth* (of which in the preceding sect.) and *happiness* (*that is,* such pleasures, as accompany, or follow the prac-

* *Habebit philosophus amplas opes; sed nulli detractas, &c.* “A philosopher would have large possessions, but then he would not have them taken from others, &c.” SEN. Here he seems to confess the folly of the *Stoics*, who denied themselves many pleasures, that were honest and almost necessary; living in tubs, feeding upon raw herbs and water, going about in a sordid garment, with a rough beard, staff and fatchel, &c.

† *Quid rectum sit, apparet: quid expediat, obscurum est: ita tamen, ut—dubitare non possimus, quin ea maxime conducant, quæ sunt rectissima.* “It is very evident what right is; but it is very difficult to say what is expedient; but yet there can be no doubt, but that those things which are most right, are most conducive to our happiness.” Crc.

tice

tice of truth, or are not inconsistent with it : of which I have been treating in this). And as that religion, which arises from the distinction between moral good and evil, was called *natural*, because grounded upon truth and the natures of things : so perhaps may that too, which proposes happiness for its end, in as much as it proceeds upon that difference, which there is between true pleasure and pain, which are physical (or *natural*) good and evil. And since both these unite so amicably, and are at last the same, here is *one* religion which may be called *natural* upon *two* accounts.

SECT. III. *Of Reason, and the ways of discovering truth.*

MY manner of thinking, and an *objection* formerly ² made, oblige me in the next place to say something concerning the means of knowing, what is *true* : whether there are any, that are *sure*, and which one may safely rely upon. For if there be not, all that I have written is an amusement to no purpose. Besides, as this will lead me to speak of *reason*, &c. some truths may here (as some did in the former section) fall in our way, which may be profitable upon many occasions; and what has been already asserted, will also be further confirmed.

I. *An intelligent being, such as is mentioned before², must have some immediate objects of his understand-*

² The last objection, p. 43.

³ Sect. I. prop. I.

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ing; or at least a capacity of having such. For if there be no object of his intellect, he is intelligent of nothing, or not intelligent. And if there are no immediate objects, there can be none at all: because every object must be such (an object) either in itself immediately; or by the intervention of another, which is immediate: or of several, one of which must at least be immediate.

II. *An intelligent being among the immediate objects of his mind may have some, that are abstract and general.* I shall not at present inquire, how he comes by them (it matters not *how*), since this must be true, if there is any such thing as a rational being. For that reason is something different from the knowledge of particulars may appear from hence; because it is not confined to particular things or cases. What is reason in one instance, is so in another. What is reasonable with respect to *Quintius*, is so in respect of *Nævius*^b. Reason is performed in *species*. A rational being therefore must have some of these *species* (I mean specific and abstract *ideas*) to work with; or some superior method, such as perhaps some higher order of reasoners may have, but we have not.

The knowledge of a particular *idea* is only the particular knowledge of that *idea* or thing: there it ends. But *reason* is something universal, a kind of general instrument, applicable to particular

^b *Quis hoc statuit, quod æquum sit in Quintium, id iniquum esse in Nævium?* "Who has decreed that what is equitable, with regard to *Quintius*, should be unjust, with respect to *Nævius*?" CIC.

things

things and cases as they occur. We reason about particulars, or from them; but not *by* them.

In fact we find within ourselves many *logical, metaphysical, mathematical ideas*, no one of which is limited to any particular, or individual thing: but they comprehend whole *classes* and kinds. And it is by the help of these that we reason, and demonstrate. So that we know from within ourselves, that intelligent beings not only may have such abstract *ideas*, as are mentioned in the proposition, but that some *actually have* them: which is enough for my purpose.

III. *Those ideas or objects, that are immediate, will be adequately and truly known to that mind, whose ideas they are.* For *ideas* can be no further the *ideas* of any mind, than that mind has (or may have) a perception of them: and therefore that mind must perceive the whole of them; which is to know them *adequately*.

Again, these *ideas* being immediate, nothing (by the term) can intervene to increase, diminish, or any way alter them. And to say the mind does not know them truly, implies a contradiction: because it is the same as to say, that they are misrepresented; *that is*, that there are intervening and misrepresenting *ideas*.

And *lastly*, there cannot be an immediate perception of that, which is not; nor therefore of any immediate object otherwise, than as it is. We have indeed many times wrong notions, and misperceptions of things: but then these things are not the immediate objects. They are things, which are notified to us by the help of organs and *media*,

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 which may be vitiated, or perhaps are defective at
 best and incapable of transmitting things as they
 are in themselves, and therefore occasion imperfect
 and false images. But then, even in this case, those
 images and *ideas* that are immediate to the perci-
 pient, are perceived as they are: and that is the
 very reason, why the originals, which they should
 exhibit truly, but do not, are not perceived as *they*
 are. In short, I only say the mind must know its
 own *immediate ideas*.

IV. *What has been said of these ideas, which are
 immediate, may be said also of those relations or re-
 spects, which any of those ideas bear immediately each
 to other: they must be known immediately and truly.*
 For if the relation be immediate, the ideas cannot
 subsist without it; it is of their nature; and there-
 fore they cannot be known adequately, but this
 must be known too. They are in this respect like
 the *ideas* of whole and part. The one cannot be
 without the other: nor either of them not discover
 that relation, by which the one must be always
 bigger and the other less.

To say no more, we may satisfy ourselves of the
 truth of this, as well as of the foregoing proposi-
 tions, from the experiences of our own minds:
 where we find many relations, that are immedi-
 ately seen, and of which it is *not in our power* to
 doubt^c. We are conscious of a knowledge, that
 consists

^c That question in *Plato*, τί ἂν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαι, εἴ τις
 ἔροισι νῦν ἄτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὡότερον καθεύδομεν, ἢ πάντα ἃ διανούμεθα
 ὄνειράτομεν, κτλ. "If any one should affirm, that all our thoughts
 " are only mere dreams, and that we are now asleep; what
 " demon-

consists in the *intuition* of these relations. Such is the evidence of those truths, which are usually called *axioms*, and perhaps of some short demonstrations.

V. *Those relations or respects, which are not immediate, or apparent at the first view, may many times be discovered by intermediate relations; and with equal certainty.* If the *ratio* of B to D does not instantly shew itself; yet if the *ratio* of B to C^d does, and that of C to D^e, from hence the *ratio* of B to D^f is known also. And if the mean quantities were ever so many, the same thing would follow; provided the reason of every quantity to that, which follows next in the *series*, be known. For the truth of this I vouch the *mathematicians*^g: as I might all, that know any science, for the truth of the proposition in general. For thus *theorems* and derivative truths are obtaind.

VI. *If a proposition be true, it is always so in all the instances and uses, to which it is applicable.* For otherwise it must be both true and false. Therefore

VII. *By the help of truths already known more may be discoverd.* For

1. *Those inferences, which arise presently from the application of general truths to the particular*

“demonstrative proof could be brought to the contrary?” may have place among the velitations of philosophers: but a man can scarce propose it seriously to himself. If he doth, the answer will attend it.

$$d = a.$$

$$e = e.$$

$$f = ae.$$

§ V. *Tacq. El. Geom.* l. 5. p. 3. n. XII. But the thing appears from the bare inspection of these quantities: *b, ab, aeb, aeib, acio, &c.*

things

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things and cases containd under them, must be just. *Ex. gr. The whole is bigger than a part: therefore A (some particular thing) is more than half A.* For it is plain that *A* is containd in the *idea* of whole, as half *A* is in that of part. So that if the antecedent proposition be true, the consequent, which is included in it, follows immediately, and must also be true. The former cannot be true, unless the other be so too. What agrees to the *genus, species, definition, whole,* must agree to the *species, individuals, thing defined, the part.* The existence of an *effect* infers directly that of a *cause*; of one *correlate* that of the other; and so on. And what is said here holds true (by the preceding proposition) not only in respect of axioms and first truths, but also and equally of theorems and other general truths, when they are once known. These may be capable of the like applications: and the truth of such consequences, as are made by virtue of them, will always be as evident as that of those theorems themselves.

2. All those *conclusions*, which are derived through mean propositions, that are true, and by just inferences, will be as true as those, from which they are derived. My meaning is this: every just consequence is *founded in some known truth*, by virtue of which one thing follows from another, after the manner of steps in an *algebraic* operation: and if inferences are so founded, and just, the things inferred must be true, if they are made from true premisses.

Let this be the form of an argument. $M = P$:
 $S = M$: ergo $S = P$. Here if $S = M$ be false, nothing is concluded at all: because the middle proposition

position is in truth not $S = M$, but perhaps $S = Ma$, which is foreign to the purpose. If $S = M$ be true, but $M = P$ false, then the conclusion will indeed be a right conclusion from those premisses: but they cannot shew, that $S = P$, because the first proposition if it was exprest according to truth would be $Me = P$, which is another thing, and has no place in the argument. But if these two propositions are both true, $M = P$, $S = M$, then it will not only be rightly concluded, but also true, that $S = P$. For the second or middle proposition does so connect the other two, by taking in due manner a term from each of them (or to speak with the *logicians*, by separately comparing the predicate or *major* term of the conclusion with the *medium* in the first proposition, and the subject or *minor* term with it in the second), that if the first and second are true, the third must be so likewise: all being indeed no more than this, $P = M = S$. For here the inference is just by what goes before, being founded in some such truth as this, and resulting immediately from the application of it, *Quæ eadem æqualia sunt, & inter se sunt æqualia*; or *Quæ conveniunt in eodem tertio, etiam inter se conveniunt*; or the like^h. Now if an inference thus made is justifiable, another made after the same manner, when the truth discovered by it is made one of the premisses, must be so too; and so must another after that; and so on. And if the last, and all the intermediate inferences be as right, as the first is sup-

^h If men in their illations, or in comparing their *ideas*, do many times not actually make use of such maxims; yet the thing is really the same. For what these maxims exprest, the mind sees without taking notice of the words.

posed

posed to be, it is no matter to what length the process is carried. All the parts of it being locked together by truth, the last result is derived through such a succession of mean propositions, as render its title to our assent not worse by being long.

Since all the forms of true *sylogisms* may be proved to conclude rightly, all the advances made in the *sylogistic* method toward the discovery or confirmation of truth, are so many instances and proofs of what is here asserted. So also are the performances of the *mathematicians*. From some self-evident truths, and a few easie theorems, which they set out with at first, to what immense lengths, and through what a train of propositions have they propagated knowledge! How numerous are their theorems and discoveries now, so far once out of human ken!

I do not enter so far into the province of the *logicians* as to take notice of the difference there is between the *analytic* and *synthetic* methods of coming at truth, or proving it; whether it is better to begin the disquisition from the subject, or from the attribute. If by the use of proper *media* any thing can be shewd to be, or not to be, I care not from what term the demonstration or argument takes its rise. Either way propositions may beget their like, and more truth be brought into the world.

VIII. *That power, which any intelligent being has of surveying his own ideas, and comparing them; of forming to himself out of those, that are immediate and abstract, such general and fundamental truths, as*
be

be can be sure ofⁱ; and of making such inferences and conclusions as are agreeable to them, or to any other truth, after it comes to be known; in order to find out more truth, prove or disprove some assertion, resolve some question, determin what is fit to be done upon occasion, &c. the case or thing under consideration being first fairly stated and prepared, is what I mean by the faculty of reason, or what intitles him to the epithet rational. Or in short, Reason is a faculty of making such inferences and conclusions, as are mentiond under the preceding proposition, from any thing known, or given.

The Supreme being has no doubt a direct and perfect intuition of things, with their natures and relations, lying as it were all before Him, and pervious to His eye: or at least we may safely say, that He is not obliged to make use of our operose methods by *ideas* and inferences; but knows things in a manner infinitely above all our conceptions. And as to superior finite natures, what other means of attaining to the knowledge of things they may have, is a thing not to be told by me; or how far they may excell us in this way of finding truth. I have an eye here chiefly to our own circumstances. Reason must be understood, when it is ascribed to God, to be the *Divine* reason; when to other beings above us, to be *their* reason; and in all of

ⁱ Under the word *reason* I comprehend the *intuition* of the truth of axioms. For certainly to discern the respect, which one term bears to another, and from thence to conclude the proposition *necessarily* true, is an act of *reason*, tho performd quick, or perhaps all at once.

them

them to transcend *ours*, as much as their natures respectively do our nature ^k.

It cannot be amiss to note *further*, that tho a man, who truly uses his rational powers, has abstract and universal ideas, obtained by reflexion; out of these frames to himself general truths, or apprehends the strength of such; and admits them, when they occur to him; by these; as by so many standards, measures and judges of things; and takes care to have the materials, which he makes use of in reasoning, to be rivetted and compacted together by them: yet by a *habit* of reasoning he may come to serve himself of them; and apply them so quick, that he himself shall scarce observe it. Nay, most men seem to reason by virtue of a habit acquired by conversation, practice in business, and examples of others, without knowing what it is, that gives the solidity even to their own just reasonings: just as men usually learn rules in arithmetic, govern their accounts by them all their days, and grow very ready and topping in the use of them, without ever knowing or troubling their heads about the *demonstration* of any one of them. But still tho this be so, and men reason without

^k If many believed, according to *Socrates ap. Luc.* that ὅσον ἔχει τὸ μέγεθος τῆ κόσμου τὴν ὑπεροχὴν πρὸς τὸ Σωκράτους ἢ Χαιρέφωνος εἶδος. τολικῆτον ἢ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶ, ἢ τὴν φρόνησιν, ἢ διάνοιαν ἀνάλογον διαφέρειν τῆς περὶ ἡμᾶς διαπίστεως, “ so much as the magnitude of the “ world exceeds the bulk of *Socrates* and *Cherophon*; so far are “ their powers, reason, and understanding beyond the capacity “ of one of us,” what may we think of the *God of the world*? Therefore *Tully* seems to express himself too boldly where he writes, *Est—homini cum Deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est.* “ That God and “ man are allied to each other by reason. And where reason “ is-in common to any persons, right reason is so likewise.”
adverting

adverting upon general ideas and abstract truths, or even being aware that there are any such, as it were by rule or a kind of rote; yet such there are, and upon *them* rests the weight of reason as its foundation.

This, *by the way*, helps us to detect the cause, why the generality of people are so little under the *dominion* of reason: why they sacrifice it to their interests and passions so easily; are so obnoxious to prejudices, the influence of their company, and din of a party; so apt to change, tho the case remains the very same; so unable to judge of things, that are ever so little out of the way; and so conceited and positive in matters, that are doubtful, or perhaps to discerning persons manifestly false. Their reasoning proceeds in that track, which they happen to be got into, and out of which they know not one step, but all is to them *Terra incognita*; being ignorant of the scientific part, and those universal, unalterable principles, upon which true reasoning depends, and to find which and the true use of them are required *cool* hours and an *honest* application, beside many *preparatives*.

In the *next place* it must be noted, that one may reason truly from that, which is only probable, or even false¹. Because just inferences may be made from propositions of these kinds: *that is*, such inferences may be made as are founded in certain truths, tho those propositions themselves are not certainly true. But then what follows, or is concluded from thence, will be only probable, or false,

¹ Upon this account it is, that I add the word *given* at the end of my description of reason.

according

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according to the quality of that proposition, or those propositions, from which the inference is made.

Again; it should be observed, that what I have said of reasoning, chiefly belongs to it as it is an *internal* operation. When we are to present our reasonings to others, we must transfer our thoughts to them by such ways as we can. The case is to be stated in a manner suitable to their capacities; a fair narration of matters of fact, and their circumstances, to be made; many times persons and things to be described by proper *diatypoſes*, and the like: all which are additional labor, and take up much room in discourses and books, and are performed by different authors, upon different subjects, and in different kinds of writing, with an infinite variety of methods and forms, according to mens different views and capacities; and many times not without a necessity of some condescensions, ascitious advantages, and even applications to the passions. But notwithstanding this, in strict reasoning nothing is required, but to lay steps in a due order, firmly connected, and exprest properly, without flourish ^m; and to arrive at truth by the *shortest* and *clearest* gradation we are able.

Once more; perhaps disputacious men may say I ascribe the investigation of truth to one faculty,

^m *Simplex & nuda veritas est luculentior; quia satis ornata per se est: adeoque ornamentis extrinsecus additis fucata corrumpitur: mendacium verò specie placet alienâ, &c.* “Pure and naked truth is so much the clearer, because it has ornaments enough of its own; and therefore, when it is dawbed over with external additional ornaments, it is corrupted by them: so that a lye is therefore pleasing, because it appears in the shape that is not its own, &c.” LACTANT.

when.

when it is in reality the joint business of several. For when we go about this work, we are forced to make use of subordinate powers, and even external helps; to draw *diagrams*, and put cases in our own imagination; to correct the images there, compound them; divide them; abstract from them; to turn over our memory, and see what has been entered and remains in that register; even to consult books, and use pen and ink. In short, we assemble all such axioms, theorems, experiments and observations, as are already known, and appear capable of serving us, or present themselves upon the opening and *analysis* of the question; or case before us. And when the mind has thus made its *tour*, fetched in materials from every quarter, and set them in its own view; then it contemplates, compares, and methodizes them; gives the first place to this, the second to that, and so on; and when trials do not succeed rightly, rejects some; adopts others, shifts their order, &c. till at last the *series* is so disposed, that the thing required comes up resolved, proved, or disproved by a *just* conclusion from proper premises. Now in this process there seem to be many faculties concerned; in these acts of circumspection, recollection; invention, reflexion; comparing, methodizing, judging. But what if all this be so? I do not *exclude* the use of such subservient powers, or other helps, as are necessary to the exerting this faculty of reason; nor deny the mind matter to work upon. I may allow all the intellectual faculties their proper offices, and yet make reason to be what I have described it to be.

IX. *There is such a thing as right reason: or, Truth may be discovered by reasoning* ⁿ. The word *reason* has several acceptations. *Sometimes* it is used for that power mentiond in the last proposition; as when we say, *Man is a being indued with reason*. And then the sense of this proposition must be this; that there is such a use to be made of this power, as is right, and will manifest truth. *Sometimes* it seems to be taken for those general truths, of which the mind possesses itself from the intimate knowledge of its own ideas, and by which it is governed in its illations and conclusions; as when we say, *Such a thing is agreeable to reason*: for that is as much as to say, it is agreeable to the said general truths, and that authentic way of making deductions, which is founded in them. And then the sense of this proposition is, that there are such general truths, and such a right way of inferring. Again; *sometimes* it seems to stand only for some particular truth, as it is apprehended by the mind with

ⁿ That way, which some *Sceptics* take to prove the inexistence of truth, has nothing in it, unless it be a contradiction. If any thing, say they, is demonstratd to be true, how shall it be known, that that demonstration is true? *Ἐι ἐξ ἀποδείξεως ζήτησεται πάλιν, πῶς ἔστι ἢ τῦτο ἀληθές ἐστι; ἢ ὕτως εἰς ἀπειρον.* “If by another demonstration, how shall we know that this is true? and so on for ever.” *SEXT. EMP.* Nor do I well comprehend *St Cbrystostom’s* meaning, when he says, *Τὸ λογισμοῖς ἀποδειχθῆναι, καὶ ἀληθές ἦ, ἀδίκῃ πληροφορίαν τῆ ψυχῆ παρέχει, ἢ κρίσιν ἰκανήν.* “That what is demonstratd by reasoning, tho it may indeed be true, yet it does not afford sufficient proof or conviction to the mind.” For as no man truly believes any thing, unless he has a reason for believing it: so no reason can be stronger than demonstration.

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the causes of it, or the manner of its derivation from other truth: *that is*, it differs not from truth except in this one respect, that it is considered not barely in itself, but as the effect and result of a process of reasoning; or it is truth with the arguments for our assent, and its evidences about it; as when it is said; *that such or such an assertion is reason*. And then the sense of the proposition is, that there are truths so to be apprehended by the mind. So all comes to this at last; truth (or there are truths, which) may be discovered, or found to be such, *by reasoning*:

If it were not so, our rational faculties, the noblest we have, would be vain.

Beside, that it is so, appears from the foregoing propositions and what we know within ourselves. 'Tis certain we have immediate and abstract *ideas*: the relations of these are adequately known to the mind, whose *ideas* they are: the propositions expressing these relations are evidently known to be true: and these truths must have the common privilege and property of all truths, to be true in all the particulars and uses; to which they are applicable. If then any things are notified to us by the help of our senses; or present themselves by any other way or means, to which these truths may be immediately applied; or from whence deductions may be made after the forementioned manner; new truths may be thus collected. And since these new truths, and the numerous descendents, that may spring from their loins, may be used still in the same manner, and be as it were the seed of more truth, who can tell at what undescried fields of knowledge even men may at length arrive? At least no

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body can doubt, but that much truth, and particularly of that kind, which is most *useful* to us in our conduct here, is discoverable by this method.

They, who oppugn the force and certainty of reason, and treat *right reason* as a *Chimera*, must argue against reason either with reason, or without reason. In the latter way they do nothing: and in the former they betray their own cause, and establish that, which they labor to dethrone. To prove there is no such thing as *right reason* by any good argument, is indeed impossible: because that would be to shew there is such a thing, by the manner of proving, that there is not.

And *further*, if this proposition be not true, there is no right reasoning in *Euclid*; nor can we be sure, that what is there demonstrated, is true. But to say this I am sure is absurd. Nor do I desire, that this proposition, which I here maintain, should be esteem'd more certain than those demonstrated by him: and so *certain* it must be; because there can be no certainty in them, if this be not true.

The great *objection* against all this is taken from the many instances of false reasoning and ignorance, with which the practices, discourses, writings of mankind are too justly taxed. But, in *answer* to it, I would have it minded, that I do not say, men may not by virtue of their freedom break off their meditations and inquiries prematurely, before they have taken a sufficient survey of things; that they may not be prepossessed with inveterate errors, biassed by interest, or carried violently down with the stream of a sect or fashion, or dazled by some
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darling notion or bright name^o; that they may not be unprovided of a competent stock of *præ-cognita* and preparative knowledge; that (among other things) they may not be ignorant of the very nature of reasoning, and what it is that gives fitness to an inference, and makes it just; that they may not want philosophy, history, or other learning requisite to the understanding and stating of the question truly; that they may not have the confidence to pretend to abilities, which they have not, and boldly to judge of things, as if they were qualified, when they are not; that they may not be impotent in their elocution, and misrepresent their own thoughts, by expressing themselves ill, even when within themselves they reason well; that many understandings may not be naturally gross, good heads often indisposed, and the ablest judges sometimes overseen, through inadvertence or haste: I say none of these things. The contrary I confess is manifest: and it is in opposition to those errors, which appear in these cases under the name of reason, that we are forced to add the epithet *right*, and to say *right reason* instead of *reason* only; to distinguish it from that, which wrongfully assumes that appellation. Nor, moreover, do I say, that by reasoning the truth is to be discovered in every case: that would imply an extent of knowledge, which we cannot pretend to. I only say, that there is such a thing as right reason, and truth discoverable by it.

^o *Haud alio fidei præiudicio lapsu, quàm ubi falsæ rei gravis auctor existit.* "Men being never more easily drawn into a wrong belief, than when the author of a falsity is a grave person."

PLINY.

I might add, that he, whose faculties are intire and sound, and who by a proper exercise of his mind in scientific studies first opens and enlarges its capacity, and renders his intellectuals active and penetrating; takes care to furnish himself with such leading truths, as may be useful to him, and of which he is assured in his own breast; and in treating any subject keeps them still in his eye, so that his discourse may be agreeable to them: I say, such a one is not in much danger of concluding falsely. He must either determin rightly, or soon find, that the subject lies out of his reach. However he will be sensible, that there are many things within his sphere, concerning which he may reason; and that there are truths to be found by this use of his faculties, in which he may securely acquiesce.

Thus that question supposed to be asked, p. 43. *How shall a man know, what is true?* is in part answerd. More shall be added by and by: only a proposition or two, which ought not to be omitted, must be first inserted.

X. *To act according to right reason, and to act according to truth are in effect the same thing.* For in which sense soever the word *reason* is taken, it will stand either for truth itself, or for that, which is instrumental in discovering and proving it to be such: and then, with respect to this latter sense, whoever is guided by that faculty, whose office consists in distinguishing and pointing out truth, must be a follower of truth, and act agreeably to it. For to be governed by any faculty or power is to act according to the genuin decisions and dictates of it.

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That reason, which is *right* (by the meaning of the words) must conclude *rightly*: but this it cannot do, if the conclusion is not true, or truth.

That is (for so I would be understood), if the principles and premisses from whence it results are true ^P, and certainly known to be so, the conclusion may be taken as certain and absolute truth: but otherwise the truth obtained at the end of the argument is but hypothetical, or only this, that such a thing is so, if such another, or such others are so or so.

XI. *To be governed by reason is the general law imposed by the Author of nature^q upon them, whose uppermost faculty is reason: as the dictates of it in particular cases are the particular laws, to which they are subject.* As there are beings, which have not so much as sense, and others that have no fa-

^P That manner of demonstration, in which it has been pretended truth is deduced directly from that which is false, is only a way of shewing, that an assertion is true, because its contradictory is false; founded in that known rule, *Contradictoria nec simul veræ, nec simul falsæ esse possunt*, &c. "That contradictory propositions can neither be true at the same time, nor false at the same time, &c."

^q *Cujus [summi rectoris & domini] ad naturam apta ratio vera illa & summa lex à philosophis dicitur.* "The reason (of the supreme lord and governor) which is accommodated to the nature of things, is, by philosophers, called the true and chief law." Cic. Νόμος ἀφειδής ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, ἕχ' ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ τοῦ θεῖου Σπυτοῦ φθαρτός, ἐν χαρτιδίοις ἢ στήλαις ἀψυχος, ἀψύχοις, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀθανάτου φύσεως ἀφθαρτός ἐν ἀθανάτῃ διανοίᾳ τυπωθεὶς. "Right reason is an unerring law, not to be defaced by any mortal man, as if it were a lifeless thing written upon paper or pillars which must decay: but it proceeds from an immortal being, and is itself immortal, and engraven on an immortal soul." Πη. JUD. More to this purpose might easily be collected.

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culty above it; so there may be some, who are indued with reason, but have nothing higher than that. It is sufficient at present to suppose there may be such. And then if reason be the *uppermost* faculty, it has a right to controll the rest by being *such*. As in sensitive animals sense commands gravitation and mechanical motions in those instances, for which their senses are given, and carries them out into spontaneous acts: so in rational animals the gradation requires, that reason should command sense.

It is plain, that reason is of a commanding nature: it enjoins this, condemns that, only allows some other things, and will be paramount (in an old word τὸ ἡγεμονικόν^s) if it is at all. Now a being, who has such a determining and governing power so placed in his nature, as to be essential to him, is a being certainly framed to be governed by that power. It seems to be as much designed by nature, or rather the Author of nature, that rational animals should use their reason, and steer by it; as it is by the shipwright, that the pilot should direct the vessel by the use of the rudder he has fitted to it. The rudder would not be there, if it was not to be used: nor would reason be implanted in any nature only to be not cultivated and neglected. And it is certain, it cannot be used, but it must command: such is its nature.

^r Λόγος ἐστὶν εἰκὼν Θεοῦ. "Reason is the image of God." PH. JUD.

^s Τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἢ κυριεῦον τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος. "The governing part of the soul." M. ANTON. Or as it is in *Plutarch*, τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνώτατον μέρος, "the supreme part of the soul." *Principatus*, "the principal part," in *Tully*. *Summus in anima gradus*, "the first quality in the soul." TERTUL.

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It is not in one's power deliberately to resolve not to be governed by reason. For (here the same way of arguing may be used, that was lately) if he could do this, he must either have some reason for making that resolution, or none. If he has none, it is a resolution, that stands upon no foundation, and therefore in course falls; and if he has some reason for it, he is governed by reason. This *demonstrates* that reason must govern.

XII. *If a rational being, as such, is under an obligation to obey reason, and this obedience, or practice of reason, coincides with the observation of truth, these things plainly follow.*

1. That what is said *sect. I. prop. IV.* must be true with respect to such a being for this further cause; because to him nothing can be right, that interferes with reason, and nothing can interfere with truth, but it must interfere with reason. Such a harmony there is between them. For whatever is known to be true, reason either finds it, or allows it to be such. Nothing can be taken for true by a rational being, if he has a reason to the contrary.

2. That there is to a rational being such a thing as *religion*, which may also upon this further account properly be called *natural*. For certainly to obey the law, which the Author of his being has given him, is religion: and to obey the law, which He has given or revealed to him by making it to result from the right use of his own natural faculties, must be to him his *natural religion*.

3. A careful observation of truth, the way to happiness, and the practice of reason are in the issue the same thing. For, of the two last, each falls in with the first, and therefore

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therefore each with other. And so, at last, natural religion is grounded upon this triple and strict alliance or union of *truth, happiness, and reason*; all in the same interest, and conspiring by the same methods, to advance and perfect human nature: and its truest definition is, *The pursuit of happiness by the practice of reason and truth.*

Permit me here again to insert an observation *obiter.*

Obs. The *κρίτηριον* of right reason and truth, or that which is to be regarded in judging of right and truth is *private*: that is, every one must judge for himself. For since all reasoning is founded originally in the knowledge of one's own private *ideas*, by virtue of which he becomes conscious of some first truths, that are undeniable; by which he governs his steps in his pursuits after more truths, &c. the *critèrium*, or that by which he tries his own reasonings, and knows them to be right, must be the *internalevidence* he has already of certain truths, and the agreeableness of his inferences to them. One man can no more discern the objects of his own understanding, and their relations, by the faculties of another, than he can see with another man's eyes, or one ship can be guided by the helm of another. They must be his *own* faculties and conscience, that must determin him. Therefore to demand another man's assent to any thing without conveying into his mind such reasons, as may produce a sense of the truth of it, is to erect a tyranny over his understanding, and to demand a tribute which it is *not possible* for him to pay¹. It is true indeed,

¹ *Religio cogi non potest, verbis potius quam verberibus vestiganda est, ut sit voluntas.* "Religion cannot be forced upon any
" one,

indeed, tho I cannot see with another man's eyes, yet I may be assisted by another, who has better eyes, in finding an object and the circumstances of it; and so men may be *assisted* in making their judgments of things. They may be informed of things, which they did not know before, and which yet require a place among those that are to be considered: and they may be directed what to advert principally upon; how to state the question; how to methodize their thoughts, and in general how to reason: especially if they want learning, or have only that part of it, which is little conversant in close reflexions, and doth not teach them to reason, or (as the case too often is) teaches them not to reason. But still this is all in order to produce such a light in them, that by it *they* may see and judge for themselves. An opinion, tho ever so true and certain to one man, cannot be transfused into another as true and certain by any other way, but by opening his understanding, and assisting him so to order his conceptions, that he may find the reasonableness of it *within himself*.

To prevent mistakes I pray take notice here, that, tho I say men must judge for themselves, I do not say they must in all cases *act* according to their private and single judgments. In respect of such things, as are private, and concern themselves *only*, or such as are left open and subject to every man's own sense, they may and ought; only preserving a due deference to them, who differ from them, and are known upon other occasions to have

"one, it must be done by words and not by blows, that it may be a thing of choice." LACTANT.

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more knowledge and literature than themselves: but when a society is concerned, and hath determin'd any thing, it may be consider'd as one person, of which he, who dissents from the rest, is only perhaps a small particle; and then his judgment will be in a manner absorb'd and drown'd in that of the majority, or of them to whom the power of judging is intrusted. But I must not digress too far from the main business, the ways of coming at truth.

XIII. *The reports of sense are not of equal authority with the clear demonstrations of reason, when they happen to differ.* It is true, the *ideas* caus'd by the impression of sensible objects are real ideas, and truly known to the mind as they are in themselves; and the mind may use them, and reason truly upon them: *that is*, the mind may make a right use of the *ideas*, which it finds in itself. But then whether these are the true eotypes of their originals, and drawn to the life, is many times a question; and many times it is evident they are not. For that which has been anticipated under pr. III. but properly belongs to this, must be acknowledged. They are convey'd through *media* and by instruments susceptible of different dispositions and alterations, and may consequently produce different representations: and these cannot all be right. But suppose those instruments and *media* to be as intire and pure, as when intirest and purest; yet still there may be in many respects an incapacity in the faculty to notify things just as they are. How mightily are the shape and size of a visible object varied upon us according to its distance, and the situa-

situation of the place, from whence the prospect is taken? Now these things cannot be said of the reports, or rather determinations of reason. For in pure reasoning we use our own ideas for *themselves*, and such as the mind knows them to be, not as representatives of things, that may be falsely exhibited. This *internal* reasoning may indeed be wrongly applied to *external* things, if we reason about them as being what they are not: but then this is the fault not of reason, but of sense, which reports the case wrong; or perhaps of the person, who has not been sufficiently industrious to inform himself.

That same familiar instance of vision proves further, that reason may be applied to *over-rule* and *correct* sense. For when the pictures of objects are pricked out by the pencils of rays upon the *retina* of the eye, and do not give the true figure of those objects (as they not always do, being diversly projected, as the lines proceeding from the several points happen to fall upon that concave surface); this, tho it might impose upon a being, that has no faculty superior to sense, doth not impose upon our reason, which knows *how* the appearance is altered, and *why*. To think the sun ^u is not bigger, than it appears to the eye to be ^w, seems to be the last degree of stupidity. He must be a brute (so far

^u *Tantulus ille—sol.* “The sun—that small thing.” LUCR. Poor creature!

^w *Nec nimio solis major rota—Esse potest, nostris quàm sensibus esse videtur.* “The orb of the sun cannot be much bigger than it appears to our senses.” LUCR. *Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse quàm videatur, &c.* “Epicurus thought it might be less than it appears, &c.” CIC.

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from being a philosopher); who does not know, that the same line (*v. g.* the diameter of the sun) at different distances subtends different angles at the eye. A small matter of reason may serve to confute sense in this and the like cases.

Obj. How can *reason* be more certain than *sense*, since reason is founded in abstractions; which are originally taken from sensible objects? *Ans.* Perhaps the mind may, by being exercised at first about particular objects, by degrees find in itself this *capacity* of considering things by their *species*; making abstractions, &c. which it would not have done, had it never known any of these particulars. But then after it has found this capacity in itself; and attained to the knowledge of abstract and general *ideas*; I do not see why this capacity of reasoning by the help of them may not be used, upon this proficiency, to censure and correct the advices of sense concerning even such particulars, as first gave occasion to the mind to exert this capacity and raise itself. Is it a new thing for a scholar to make such a progress in learning, as to be able *afterward* to teach the master, from whom he received his first rudiments? May not the modern philosophers correct the ancients, because these first shew'd them the way, and led them into the study of nature? If we look impartially into the history of learning; and even of religion, we shall find that truth has generally advanced by degrees; and many times (very many; as if that was the method of introducing knowledge among men) risen out of *fable* and *error*, which gave occasion to those inquiries, by which *themselves* were detected. Thus blind ignorance was succeeded by a twilight of sense: this
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brightend by degrees: at last the sun as it were rose upon some parts of the commonwealth of learning, and cleared up many things: and I believe many more will in time be cleared, which, whatever men think, are yet in their *dark* and *uncultivated* state. The understanding, tho it starts from *particulars*, in time makes a further progress, taking in *generals*, and such notions logical, metaphysical, &c. as never could possibly come in by the senses^x. Beside, further, the *capacity* itself of admitting and considering general *ideas* was originally in the mind, and is not derived from without. The intelligences communicated by sense are only an occasion of using what it had before^y. Just as a master may, by the exercises he sets, excite the superior capacity of his scholar.

In a word, no man doth, or can pretend to believe his senses, when he has a reason against it: which is an irrefragable proof, that reason is above sense and controlls it. But,

XIV. *The reports of sense may be taken for true, when there is no reason against it*^z. Because when

^x *Natura etiam nullo docente profecta ab iis, quarum, ex prima & imboata intelligentia, genera cognovit, confirmat ipsa per se rationem, & perficit.* "For nature, without any teaching, proceeds upon those general truths which we are convinced of, as soon as we begin to have any understanding, and confirms and perfects them by reason." CIC.

^y *Semina nobis scientiæ dedit [natura] scientiam non dedit.* "The seeds or principles of knowledge are given us (by nature) but not knowledge itself." SEN.

^z *Si sani sunt [sensus], & valentes, & omnia remouentur, quæ obstant & impediunt.* "If (the senses) be sound and strong, and if every thing be removed out of the way, that might obstruct or hinder them." CIC.

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there is *no* reason *not* to believe, that alone is a reason for believing them. And therefore,

XV. *In this case to act according to them (i. e. as taking the informations of sense to be true) is to act according to reason and the great law of our nature.*

Thus it appears that there are *two* ways, by which we may assure ourselves of the truth of *many* things^a; or at least may attain such a degree of certainty, as will be sufficient to determin our *practice*: by *reason*; and by *sense under the government of reason*; that is, when reason supports it, or at least doth not oppose it. By the former we discover speculative truths; by the latter, or both together, matters of fact.

XVI. *Where certainty is not to be had^b, probability must be substituted into the place of it: that is,*

^a *Socrates's saying, ap. Cic. nihil se scire, nisi id ipsum, "that he knew nothing but this," viz. that he knew nothing, favours of an affected humility, and must not be understood strictly. But they, who followd, went further (—omnes pæne veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt): ("—almost all the antients, who affirmd, that nothing could be known, nothing perceived, nothing understood"): and particularly Arcefilas negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: "Arcefilas denied that any thing could be certainly known, not so much as that, which Socrates reserved to himself." And thus the absurdity grew to a size, that was monstrous. For no man can act, or even be alive, if he knows nothing at all. Beside, to know that one knows no thing, is a contradiction: and not to know, that he knows even that, is not to know, whether he knows any thing or not; and that is to know for ought he knows.*

^b *Nec scire fas est omnia: "Nor is it possible to know all things." HOR.*

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it must be considerd, which side of the question is the more probable.

Probability, or that, which in this case may incline one to believe any proposition to be true rather than false, or any thing *to be* rather than *not to be*, or the contrary, will generally shew itself upon the application of these and such like rules.

1. That may be reckond probable, which, in the estimation of reason, appears to be more agreeable to the *constitution* of nature. No body can certainly foretell, that *sice-ace* will come up upon two dies fairly thrown before *ambs-ace*: yet any one would choose to lay the former, because in nature there are twice as many chances for that as for the other. If a strolling wolf should light upon a lamb, it is not evidently known, that he will tear the lamb: but there is such a natural propension in that kind to do it, that no body would much question the event. (This instance might have been taken from amongst men, who are generally, as far as they can be, wolves one to another.) If a parent causes his child to be instructed in the foundations of useful learning, educates him virtuously, and gives him his first impulse and direction in the way to true happiness, he will be more likely to proceed and continue in it; than he would be to hit upon it, and continue in it too; if he was left to himself to be carried away by his own passions, or the influence of those people, into whose hands he might fall, the bias of the former lying towards vice, and misery in the end; and the plurality of the latter being either wicked or ignorant or both. So that the advantage in point of probability is on

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the side of good education ^c. When *Herodotus* writes, that the *Egyptian* priests reported the sun had within the compass of 11340 years twice risen where it now sets, and set where it rises ^d, what is fit to be believed concerning the truth of this relation (as of many others), is easily discernable by this rule. *Herodotus*, possibly delighting in teratological stories, might tell what he never heard: or the passage may be an interpolation; or it may be altered in transcribing: or the priests, who pretended much to a knowledge of great antiquities, might out of mere vanity, to shew what children the *Greeks* were in respect of them, invent such a monstrous relation, and impose it upon them, whom they thought to have not much science among them: or it might be got into their memoirs before their time, who related it to *Herodotus*, and so pass upon posterity, as many other fictions and legends have done. These are such things, as are well known to have happen'd often. But that the diur-

^c This was the opinion of a wise man. חנוך לנער על פי דרכו וגב' כי זקין לא יסור ממנה "Train up a child in the way that he should go; and when he is old, he will not depart from it." *Proverbs*. For הל'מוד בימי הנערות הוא כפתוח על החול והל'מוד בימי הזקנה כפתוח על החול "learning, in the days of youth, is like grav'ing upon a stone,—and learning, in the days of old age, is like marking upon the sand." *Qab. ven.* Οὐ μικρὸν διαφέρει τὸ ἔτος ἢ ἔτος εὐθὺς ἐν νῶν ἐδ'ξισθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν. "It is not a small but a very great advantage, or indeed all that can be, to be accustomed to such and such things from our-very youth." *ARIST.*

^d Τετράκις ἔλεγον ἐξ ἡδίων τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατεῖλαι· ἐνθά τε νῦν καταδύεται ἐθεύτεν δις ἐπαντεῖλαι· ἢ ἐνθεν νῦν ἀνατέλλει, ἐνθαῦτα δις καταδύει. "That the sun had risen four times contrary to what it usually does, viz. risen twice where it now sets, and set twice, where it now rises."

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nal rotation of the earth about her axis should be inverted, is a *phenomenon*, that has never been known to happen by any body else; either before or since; that is favoured by no observation; and that cannot be without great alteration in the mundane system, or those laws by which the motions of the planets, and of our earth among the rest, are governd. That this account then may be false is very consistant with the humor and circumstances of mankind: but that it should be true is very inconsistent with those laws, by which the motions of the celestial bodies seem to be regulated, and tend to persevere in their present courses and directions. It is therefore *in nature* much more probable, that this account is false. The odds are on that side. 2. When any *observation* hath hitherto *constantly* held true; or *most commonly* proved to be so, it has by this acquired an establishd credit; the cause may be presumed to retain its former force; and the effect may be taken as probable, if in the case before us there doth not appear something particular, some reason for exception. No man can demonstrate, that the sun will rise again, yet every one doth, and must act, as if that was certain: because we apprehend no decay in the causes, which bring about this appearance, nor have any other reason to mistrust the event; or think it will be otherwise a few hours hence, than it has been hitherto. There is no apodictical argument to prove, that any particular man will die: but yet he must be more than mad, who can presume upon im-

עולם כמנהגו הולך. "The world goes on in its usual course."



mortality here, when he finds so many generations all gone to a man, and the same *enemies*, that have laid them prostrate, still pursuing their *victories*. These and such like, tho in strictness perhaps not certainties, are justly current for such. So great is their probability. There are other observations, which, tho not so infallible as those, deserve yet to be thought of, and to have a share in the direction of our judgments. *Ex. gr.* There have been men in the world and no doubt still are, who, having had opportunities of imposing falsities upon mankind, of cheating, or committing other wickedness, have yet in spite of temptation preserved their integrity and virtue: but, since opportunity has so seldom faild to corrupt them who have been in possession of her, and men's interests and passions continue in general the same, it is more probable her charms will still have the same power and effect, which they use to have; which whoever doth not mind, will be woefully obnoxious to be abused by frauds *pious* and *impious* ^f. Briefly, when there is no particular reason for the contrary, what has oftneft happend, may from experience most reasonably be expected to happen again. 3. When neither nature nor other observations point out the probable conjecture to us, we must be determind (if it be necessary for us to be determind at all) by the reports, and sense of them, whom we apprehend, judging with the best skill we have ^g,

^f פתִי יֵאמֹר לְכֹל דְּבַר. “A fool believes every thing that he hears.” *Proverbs*. (which sure one may convert thus, הַמֵּאֲמִין לְכֹל דְּבַר פִּתִי הוּא, “He that believes every thing that he hears, is a fool.”)

^g *Statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maxime videtur esse sapientis.* “It seems requisite that a man must be himself wise, in order to determine who is a wise man.” *Cic.*

to be most *knowing*^h and *honest*ⁱ. Of all these rules the *first* is that which deserves the principal regard: the other two are of use, when nature so utterly excludes us from her bosom, that no opportunity is allowd of making a judgment. *Lastly*, when nature, the frequent repetition of the same event, and the opinion of the best judges concur to make any thing probable, it is so in the highest degree.

It appears from what has been said concerning the nature and foundations of *probability*, that the force of it results from observation and reason together. For here the one is not sufficient without the other. Reason without *observation* wants matter to work upon: and observations are neither to be made justly by ourselves, nor to be rightly chosen out of those made by others, nor to be aptly applied, without the assistance of *reason*. Both together may support opinion and practice in the absence of knowledge and certainty. For those observations upon the nature of men and things,

^h *Non numero hæc judicantur, sed pondere*, “these are to be judged of, not by number, but by weight,” as *Tully* speaks upon another occasion. Therefore I cannot without a degree of indignation find a sort of writers pleasing themselves with having discovered some uncivilized nations, which have little or no knowledge of the Deity, &c. and then applying their observations to the service of atheism. As if *ignorance* could prove any thing, or alter its nature by being general!

ⁱ *Aristotle's* known rule is “*Ἐνδοξα, τὰ δοκῦντα πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς· ἢ ταῖσι, ἢ τοῖς πᾶσι, ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις, ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις ἢ ἐνδόξοις.*” “Those things are probable, which seem so to all men, or to most men, or to wise men: or which seem so to such as these, *viz.* to all, or to a great many, or to the most knowing and those of the best reputation.” But it is not applicable to all cases.

which we have made ourselves, we know; and our own reasoning concerning them, and deductions from them we know: and from hence there cannot but arise in many cases an internal obligation to give our assent to this, rather than that; or to act one way, rather than another. And as to the observations of others, they may be so cautiously and skilfully selected, as to become almost our own; since our own reason and experience may direct us in the choice and use of them. The remarks and advice of *old men*^k, who have gone through variety of scenes, lived long enough to see the consequences of their own and other peoples actions, and can now with freedom^l look back and tell where they erred, are ordinarily sure to be preferred to those of *young* and raw actors. The *gnomæ*, apologies, &c. of *wise men*, and such as have made it their business to be useful spies upon nature and mankind, national *proverbs*, and the like^m, may be taken as maxims commonly true. Men in their several professions and arts, in which they have been educated, and exercised themselves

^k Δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι παρ' αὐτῶν [πρεσβυτῶν] πυνθάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινα ἰδὼν προεληλυθότων, ἢν ἕ ἡμᾶς ἰσως διήσσει πορεύεσθαι, ποῖα τις ἔστι. "It seems best to enquire of old men, who have gone over the way that you are to go, what sort of a way it is." PLATO.

^l When *Sophocles*, now grown old, was asked, Πῶς ἔχεις παρὸς τ' ἀφραδίσια, "What relish he had of women," he answered, Εὐφρῆμαι, ὃ ἄνθρωπε· ἀσμενέσσια μὲν τοι αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυτῶντά τινα ἕ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγῶν.—παντάσσι γὰρ τῶν γε τοιούτων ἐν τῷ γήρῳ πολλὴ εἰρήνη γίνεται ἕ ἐλευθερία. "Be quiet, Sir, I flee from them as gladly as I would run away from a mad or a cruel master. —there is great ease and freedom from all such things when a man is grown old." PLATO, &c. *al.*

^m Ἐν βραχεῖ σφυρήλατον νῦν περιέχοντα. "That contains solid sense in a small compass." PLUT.

all

all their days, must be supposed to have greater knowledge and experience, than others can usually have: and therefore, if through want of capacity or honesty they do not either lose, or belie their opportunities and experience, they are in respect of those things, to which they have been bred and inured, more to be relied upon. And, lastly, *histories* written by credible and industrious authors, and read with judgment, may supply us with examples, parallel cases, and general remarks, profitable in forming our manners, and opinions too. And by the frequent perusal of them, and meditation upon them a dexterity in judging of dubious cases is acquired. Much of the temper of mankind, much of the nature and drift of their counsels, much of the course of Divine providence is visible in them.

To conclude; that we ought to follow *probability*, when certainty leaves us, is plain: because then it becomes the *only* light and guide we have. For unless it is better to wander and fluctuate in *absolute* uncertainty than to follow such a guide; unless it be reasonable to put out our *candle*, because we have not the light of the *sun*, it must be reasonable to direct our steps by probability, when we have nothing clearer to walk by. And if it be reasonable, we are obliged to do it by prop. XI. When there is nothing above *probability*, it doth govern: when there is nothing in the opposite scale, or nothing of equal weight, this in the course of nature must turn the beam. Tho a man, to resume the instance before, cannot demonstrate that *sice-ace* will come up before *ambs-ace*, he would find himself obliged (if he could be obliged to lay

at all) to lay on that side: nor could he not choose to do it. Tho he would not be certain of the chance, he would be certain of his own obligation, and on which side it lay.

Here then is another way of discovering, if not *truth*, yet what in practice may be supposed to be truth. *That is*, we may by this way discover, whether such propositions as these be true, *I ought to do this, rather than that*; or, *to think so, rather than the contrary*.

Obs. I have done now what I chiefly intended here. But, over and above that, we may almost from the premisses collect,

First, the principal causes of *error*, which I take to be such as these. 1. Want of *faculties*; when men pretend to judge of things above them. As some (straying out of their proper element, and falling into the dark, where they find no *ideas* but their own dreams, come to) assert what they have no reason to assert: so others deny what there is the highest reason to believe, only because they cannot *comprehend it*. 2. Want of due *reflexion* upon those *ideas* we have, or may have: by which it comes to pass, that men are destitute of that knowledge, which is gained by the contemplation of them, and their relations; misapply names, confusedly: and sometimes deal in a set of words and phrases, to which no *ideas* at all belong, and which have indeed no meaning. Of kin to this is, 3. Want of proper qualifications and *προπαιδεύματα*. As, when illiterate people invade the provinces of scholars; the half-lettered are forward, and arrogate to themselves what a *modest, studious* man dares notⁿ,

notⁿ, tho he knows more ; and scholars, that have confined themselves to one sort of literature, lanch out into another : unsuccessfully all. 4. Not understanding in what the nature and force of a just *consequence* consists. Nothing more common than to hear people assert, that such a thing follows from such a thing ; when it doth not follow : *i. e.* when such a consequence is founded in no axiom, no theorem, no truth that we know of. 5. Defects of *memory* and *imagination*. For men in reasoning make much use of these : memory is upon many occasions consulted, and sometimes draughts made upon the *phantasy*. If then they depend upon these, and these happen to be weak, clouded, perverted any way, things may be misrepresented, and men led out of the way by mis-shapen apparitions. There ought to be therefore a little *distrust* of these faculties, and such proper helps ought to be used, as perhaps the *best judgments* want the most. 6. Attributing too much to *sense*. For as necessary as our senses are to us, there are certainly many things, which fall not within their notice ; many, which cannot be exhibited after the manner of sensible objects, and to which no images belong. Every one, who has but just saluted the mathematics and philosophy, must be convinced, that there are many things in nature, which seem absurd to sense, and yet must be admitted. 7. Want of re-

ⁿ *Sicut ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄνησον φέρει (ἐ Thucyd.) ita
 recta ingenia debilitat verecundia, perversa confirmat audacia.
 " As ignorance carries impudence along with it (out of Thucydides) and reputation makes men lazy ; so modesty weakens
 " great genius's, and impudence confirms the obstinate."
 PLIN. jun.*

tirement,

tirement, and the practice of thinking and reasoning by ourselves °. A rambling and irregular life must be attended with a loose and irregular head, ill-connected notions, and fortuitous conclusions. Truth is the offspring of *silence*, unbroken meditations, and thoughts often revised and corrected.

8. The strength of appetites, passions, prejudices. For by these the understanding may be corrupted, or over-born: or at least the operations of the mind must be much obstructed by the intrusion of such sollicitors, as are no retainers to the rational powers, and yet strong, and turbulent. Among other prejudices there is one of a particular nature, which you must have observed to be one of the *greatest* causes of modern irreligion. Whilst some opinions and rites are carried to such an immoderate height, as exposes the absurdity of them to the view of almost every body but them who raise them, not only gentlemen of the *belles lettres*, but even men of common sense, many times see through them; and then out of indignation and an excessive renitence, not separating that which is true from that which is false, they come to deny both, and fall back into the contrary extreme, a contempt of all religion in general P. 9. Ill stating of a question; when men either put it wrong themselves, or ac-

° Όταν τι βυλόμεθα ακριβῆς νοῆσαι, εἰς ἡρμῖαν ἀποδιδράσκωμεν, καταμύομεν τὰς ὄψεις, τὰ ὄτα ἐπιφράττομεν, ἀποταίρομεθα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι.
 “ When we would consider a thing very exactly, we retire in-
 “ to some private place, we wink our eyes, and stop our ears,
 “ and renounce all our bodily senses.” PH. JUD.

P *Aliis nullus est deorum respectus, aliis pudendus.* “ Some do
 “ not worship the Gods at all, and others do it in a shameful
 “ manner.” PLIN. *sen.* The former part of this observation is
 in truth the effect of the latter.

cept

cept it so put from others. A small addition or falsity slipped into the case will ferment, and spread itself: an artificial color may deceive one: an incumberd manner may perplex one. The question ought to be presented before its judge clean, and in its natural state, without disguise or distortion. To this last may be subjoind another cause, nearly allied to it; not fixing the sense of *terms*, and (which must often follow) not rightly understanding what it is, that is to be examin'd and resolv'd.

Secondly, the reason why the *many* are commonly in the wrong and so wretchedly misjudge things. The generality of people are not sufficiently prepared, by a proper education, to find truth by reasoning. And of them, who have liberal education, some are soon immerf'd and lost in pleasures, or at least in fashionable methods of living, rolling from one visit or company to another⁹, and flying from nothing so much as from themselves and the quiet retreats proper for meditation and reasoning: others become involved in business and the intricate affairs of life, which demand their attention, and ingross their time: others fall into a slothful neglect of their studies and disuse of what they have learnt, or want help and means to proceed, or only design to deceive life and gratify themselves with the amusements and sensual parts of learning: and others there are, whose misfortune it is to begin wrong, to begin with the conclusion; taking their opinions from

⁹ *Pudet dicere frequentiam salutandi, &c.* "I am ashamed to relate what sort of visits they make to each other, &c."
JEROM.

places,

places, where they have been bred, or accommodating them to their situation in the world, and the conditions of that imployment, by which they are to get their bread, before they have ever considered them; and then making the subsequent business of their lives to dispute for them, and maintain them, right or wrong. If such men happen to be in the right, it is luck, and part of their portion, not the effect of their improvements: and if they happen to be in the wrong, the more they study, and the more learning they get, the more they are confirmed in their errors; and having set out with their backs upon truth, the further they go, the more they recede from it. Their knowledge is a kind of negative quantity, so much worse or less than no knowledge. Of this sort there are many: and very few indeed (with respect to the bulk of mankind), whose determinations and *tenents* were ever in the form of questions: there could not otherwise be so many sects and different denominations of men, as there are, upon the face of the earth. The sum of all in a few words is this: many qualifications are requisite in order to judge of some truths, and particularly those which are of *greatest importance*: proper learning and penetration, vacancy from business, a detachment from the interest of all parties, much sincerity and a perfect *resignation* to the government of reason and force of truth; which are things not to be reconciled with the usual ignorance, passions, tumultuary lives, and other circumstances which carry most men transverse.

SECT. IV. *Of the Obligations of imperfect Beings with respect to their power of acting.*

THERE remains yet *another* question, supposed also to be proposed by an objector, which must not be forgot; and upon which I shall bestow this very short section. The question was this, *If a man can find out truth, may he not want the power of acting agreeably to it?*

I. *Nothing is capable of no obligation.* For to oblige *nothing* is the same as *not* to oblige.

II. *So far as any being has no power, or opportunity of doing any thing, so far is that being incapable of any obligation to do it: or, no being is capable of any obligation to do that, which it has not power or opportunity to do.* For that being, which has not the faculties or opportunity necessary to the doing of any thing, is in respect of that thing a being utterly unactive, no agent at all, and therefore as to that act nothing at all.

To require or command one to do any thing is to require him to apply a power superior to the resistance to be met with in doing it. To require him to apply such a power is the same as to require that his power of such a kind and degree be applied. But if he has no such power, then his power of that kind and degree is *nothing*: and it is nothing, that is required to be applied. Therefore nothing is required to be done. It is just the same, as if a man was commanded to do something with his third hand, when he has but two: which would
be

be the same as to bid him to do it with *no* hand, or *not* bid him do it.

Without more ado, it is a truth confessed by every body, that no body is obliged to impossibilities.

From hence will follow, after the manner of *collaries*, the two following propositions.

III. *Inanimate and unactive beings are capable of no obligation: nor merely sensitive of any obligation to act upon principles, or motives above sense.*

IV. *The obligations of beings intelligent and active must be proportionable to their faculties, powers, opportunities; and not more.*

V. *To endeavour may fitly express the use of all the opportunities and powers, that any intelligent and active, but imperfect, being hath to act.* For to endeavour is to do what one can: and this as every such being may do, wherever he stands in the scale of imperfects, so none can do more. One may exert his endeavours with greater advantage or success, than another; yet still they are but *endeavours*.

VI. *The imputations of moral good and evil to beings capable of understanding and acting must be in proportion to their endeavours: or, their obligations reach, as far as their endeavours may.* This follows again from what has been said: and so does this,

VII. and lastly, *They who are capable of discerning truth, tho not all truths, and of acting conformably to it, tho not always or in all cases, are nevertheless obliged to do these, as far as they are able: or,*
it

it is the duty of such a being sincerely to endeavour to practise reason; not to contradict any truth, by word or deed; and in short, to treat every thing as being what it is.

Thus the general duties of rational beings, mentioned in or resulting from the preceding sections, are brought together, and finally fixt under the correction or limitation in this last proposition. This is the sum of their religion, from which no exemption or excuse lies. Every one can endeavour: every one can do what he can. But in order to that every one ought to be in earnest, and to exert himself heartily; not stifling his own conscience, not dissembling, suppressing, or neglecting his own powers.

And now needless to me seem those disputes about human liberty, with which men have tired themselves and the world. The case is much the same, as if a man should have some great reward or advantage offerd to him, if he would get up and go to such a place to accept it, or do some certain thing for it, and he, instead of going or doing any thing, falls into a tedious disquisition about his own freedom; whether he has the power to stir, or whether he is not chaid to his seat, and necessitated to sit still. The short way of knowing this certainly is to try. If he can do nothing, no labor can be lost; but if he is capable of acting, and doth not act, the consequences and blame must be justly chargeable upon himself. And I am persuaded, if men would be serious, and put forth themselves, they would find by experience, that

τὰ χρεὶς ἐπιστάμεθα, ἃ γινώσκομεν, οὐκ ἐκποιῶμεν δ'· οἱ μὲν ἀργίαις ἔπι, κτλ. "We know and understand what is good, but we do not labor after it; some out of laziness, &c." EURIP.

their

their wills are not so universally and peremptorily determin'd by what occurs, nor predestination and fate so rigid^s, but that *much* is left to their own conduct^t. Up and try^u.

Sure it is in a man's power to keep his hand from his mouth: if it is, it is also in his power to

• פֶּתַח "Fat" in Arabic is to die: and from hence the word *fatum*, "fate," seems to come (as many Latin words do from that and other Eastern languages), death, if any thing; being *fatal* and necessary. Yet it doth not follow, that therefore the time or manner of dying is unmoveably fixt. Οἱ πάντα καθαρῶς ἂν διὰ βίβηθην ἢ εἰμαρμένῃ περιέχει, ἀλλ' ἴσα καθόλου. "Fate does not contain in it all things clearly and distinctly, but only general things." PLUT. *Cbryſippus ap. A. Gell.* seems to explain himself much after the same manner. The ancients moreover seem many times to make fate conditional. *Similis si cura fuisset, Nec pater omnipotens Trojam, nec fata vetabant Stare, &c.* "If the same care had been taken, neither Jupiter nor fate would have hinderd Troy from standing at this time, &c." VIRG.

• What the Pharisees say, according to *Josephus*, seems to be right. Οἱ μὲν ἔν Φαρισαῖσι τινα καὶ ὅ πάντα τῆς εἰμαρμένης εἶναι λέγουσιν ἔργον, τινα δ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, συμβαίνειν τί καὶ ὄ γίνεσθαι. "The Pharisees say some things, but not all, are the work of fate, for some are in our own power, and some may by accident not come to pass." R. Albo, in relation to human actions (and the consequent events), explains this opinion thus. מִקְצַתֵּן בְּחִירִיּוֹת וּמִקְצַתֵּן מִכְרָחוֹת וּמִקְצַתֵּן מִעֲוֹבוֹת מִן הַהִכָּרָה וְכוּ. "Some of them are perfectly free, some of them are forced, and some of them have a mixture of choice and force." But for men to charge their own faults upon fate or fortune has been an old practice: ἐξελομακήσαντα—ἐπὶ τὴν κοινὴν ἑμῶν ἀπολογία καταφυγῖν, κλ. "voluntary evil-doers—have recourse to that common apology." LUCIAN.

• *Dimidium facti, qui caput, habet. sapere aude.* "He that has made a good beginning, has half finish'd his work: take courage then enough to be wise." HOR. *Aristotle* goes further than that old adagial saying (ἀρχὴ ἡμισυ πάντος. "The beginning is half the work.") His words are, Δοκεῖ ὡλεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ ἡμισυ τῷ πάντος εἶναι ἢ ἀρχή. "The beginning is more than half the whole business."

forbear

forbear excess in eating and drinking. If he has the command of his own feet, so as to go either this way or that or no whither, as sure he has, it is in his power to abstain from ill company and vicious places. And so on^w.

This suggests a very material thought: that *forbearances*, at least in all ordinary cases, are within our power^x; so that a man may if he will, forbear to do that, which contradicts truth: but where acting is required, that very often is not in his power. He may want abilities, or opportunities; and so may seem to contradict truth by his omission, which, if his infirmities and disadvantages were taken into the account, and the case was rightly stated, he would be found not to do.

SECT. V. *Truths relating to the Deity. Of his existence, perfection, providence, &c.*

I HAVE shewn in what the nature of *moral good* and *evil* consists; *viz.* a conformity or disagreement to *truth*, and those things that are coincident with it, *reason* and *happiness*: also, how truth is discovered; by *sense*, or *reason*, or *both*. I shall now specify some of those *truths*, which are of greatest

^w Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτιω κακῶς συντίθεται τῶν ψυχῶν ἔχόντων, ὅτι ἀβελύτῳ αὐτῷ προΐεναι πόδας, ἢ φθέρησθαι γλῶττιν, κτλ. “No living creatures are so badly constituted, as that their feet will move, and their tongues speak, whether they will or no.” PLUT. That in *Tibullus*, *Cum bene juravi, pes tamen ipso redit*, “Tho I had directly sworn to the contrary, yet my feet would come back again,” is a little poetic fally.

^x Ὅλας δὲ πᾶσα ἔργα ἢ τῆς τυχεύσεως πράξεώς ἐστιν εὐμαρῆς ἔρα ὅσον ἢ φονεύσεις, ἢ μοιχεύσεις, κτλ. “In general, the forbearing to do a thing is very easy: as thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery.” BAS.

↓

importance

importance and influence, and require more reasoning to discover them; leaving the rest (common matters of fact) to the common ways of finding them. They respect principally either the *Deity*, or *ourselves*, or the *rest of mankind*. The first sort are the subject of *this* section.

I. *Where there is a subordination of causes and effects, there must necessarily be a cause in nature prior to the rest, uncaused.* Or thus, *Where there is a series, in which the existence of one thing depends upon another, the existence of this again upon some other, and so upwards, as the case shall be, there must be some independent being, upon whom it doth originally depend.*

If Z (some body) be put into motion by Y, Y by X, and X by W, it is plain that X moves Y, and Y moves Z only as they are first moved, X by W, and Y by X: that Z, Y, X are *moveds*, or rather Z more Y more X, taken together, are *one moved*: that W stands here as the first mover, or author of the motion, unmoved by any other: that therefore without W there would be a *moved* without a *mover*, which is absurd²: and lastly, that of what length soever the *series* may be, the case will be ever the same; *i. e.* if there be no *First mover*²

¹ $Z + Y + X$, that is, Z, Y, and X added together.

² One might with the *στασιῶται*, “stationary philosophers” (so called by *Aristotle ap. Sext. Emp.* in opposition to those philosophers who maintained that nothing continued fixed, but every thing was in motion) as well deny, that there is any such thing as *motion*, as say there is *motion* without a *mover*; or, which is the same, a *first mover*.

² Πρῶτον μεταβάλλον. “Something that first causes any alteration to be made in a thing.” PLATO. Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἀπάσης. “The principle of all motion.” *Idem.* πρῶτον κινῶν “The first mover.” ARIST.

unmoved,

unmoved, there must be a *moved* without a *mover*.

Further, if W, whom we will suppose to be an intelligent being, and to have a power of *beginning* motion, hath this power *originally* in himself and *independently* of all others, then here not only the first mover in this *series*, but a *First being* and original cause is found. Because that, which has a power of beginning motion *independent* of any other, is a *mover independent*; and therefore *is independent*, or has an independent existence, since nothing can be a mover without *being*. But if W has not this power independently in himself, then he must receive it from some other, upon whom he depends, and whom we will call V. If then V has a power of *conferring a faculty* of producing motion originally and independently in himself, here will be a *First, independent cause*. And if it can be supposed, that he has it not thus, and that the *series* should rise too high for us to follow it; yet however we cannot but conclude, that there *is some* such *cause*, upon whom this train of beings and powers must depend, if we reason as in the former paragraph. For,

Universally, if Z be *any effect whatsoever*, proceeding from or depending upon Y as the *cause* of its existence, Y upon X, X upon W, it is manifest that the existence of all, Z, Y, X does *originally* come from W, which stands here as the Supreme cause, depending upon nothing: and that without it X could not be, and consequently neither Y, nor Z. Z, Y, X, being all effects (or dependents), or rather Z more Y more X *one effect*, without W there would be an effect without a

cause. Lastly, let this retrogression from effects to their causes be continued ever so far, the same thing will still recur, and without such a cause as is before mentioned the whole will be an effect without an efficient, or a dependent without any thing to depend upon; *i. e. dependent, and not dependent.*

Obj. The *series* may ascend *infinitely*^b, and for that reason have no *first* mover or cause. *Ans.* If
a *series*

^b The greatest men among the ancients denied the possibility of such an ascent. ΟΥΤΕ ΓΑΡ ΤΟΔ' ΕΚ ΤΥΔΕ ΔΕΥΑΤΟΝ ΙΕΝΑΙ ΕΙΣ ΑΠΕΙΡΟΝ. "It is impossible for one thing to proceed from another and so on for ever." ARIST. If there could be such a process, then all the parts of it but the last would be μέσσα, "intermediate ones:" and then εἴπερ μηδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλας αὐτῶν ἕδεν ἐστὶ, κλ. "if there be no first, there can be no cause at all." To suppose one thing moved by another, this by another, and so on ἐπ' ἀπείρον "infinitely," is to suppose ἕπερ ἐξ ἡ ἀδύνατον ἕδεν γὰρ ἕτως ἕτε μιν ἔσαι ἕτε μιν ἕμενον, μὴ ἕσης ἀρχῆς τῆς κινῆσης, "a thing that is impossible; for nothing can either move or be moved in this manner, without any beginning of motion." SIMPL. Not only those *Arabian* philosophers called *Hebr.* מדבריים, *Arab.* אלמתכלמן, "the rational" (a sect who maintained that the world was eternal) but many of the elder *Jews* have agreed with the *Greeks* in this matter, and added arguments of their own. Of the former see *Mor. nebock.* & al. and particularly *S. Kozri*: where their first argument seems to be strong (and much the same with the fourth in *S. Emunoth*). אם היה חולף אין לו ראשית הנה האישים הנמצאים בזמן החולף עד העת הזאת אין תכלית להם ומה שאין לו תכלית לא יצא אל הפועל. "If there be any succession which has no beginning, then the number of those men, who existed during that whole succession down to the present time, must be infinite, and that which is infinite cannot be the effect of any other thing." For tho, as *Muscatus* observes, these reasonings of the *Medaberim* [המורה] היו לפניו לא לרצון היו לפניו, "rational philosophers, were not agreeable to him;" yet most certainly let the *series* of causes and effects be what it will, it is just as long downward as upward; and if they are infinite and inexhaustible one way,

a series of bodies moved can be supposed to be infinite, then taken together it will be equal to an infinite body moved: and this moved will not less require a mover than a finite body, but infinitely more. If I may not be permitted to place a first mover at the top of the series, because it is supposed to be infinite, and to have no beginning; yet still there must of necessity be some cause or author of the motion, different from all these bodies, because their being (by the supposition) no one body in the series, that moves the next, but only in consequence of its being moved first itself, there is no one of them that is not moved, and the whole can be considered together but as an infinite body moved, and which must therefore be moved by something.

The same kind of answer holds good in respect of all effects and their causes in general. An infinite succession of effects will require an infinite efficient, or a cause infinitely effective. So far is it from requiring none.

Suppose a chain ^d hung down out of the heavens from an unknown height, and tho every link way, they must be so the other too: and then what Saad. Ga. says, takes place אִם לֹא תִגִיעַ הַהוּיָה אֲלֵינוּ לֹא נִהְיֶה וְכֹי " If we had no beginning, we could not now exist." There is another argument of this kind in Justin Martyr, which deserves notice, what stress soever may be laid upon it. Εἰ τὸ μέλλον μέρ[⊙] τῷ χρόνῳ, ἔπω ἔστιν ἦν δὲ ἡ τὸ γέγονός μέρ[⊙] τῷ χρόνῳ πρὸ τῷ γενέσθαι μέλλον· ἦν ἄρα ὅτε οὐκ ἦν τὸ γεγονός μέρ[⊙] τῷ χρόνῳ. " If the future part of time, says he, has no existence, and the part of time that is past was future before it was present, then there was a time when that part of time which is past had no existence."

^c Aristotle himself, who asserts the eternity of motion, asserts also the necessity of a first and eternal mover.

^d Σειρὴν χρυσεῖαν ἐξ ἑρανεῖθεν.— "A golden chain hanging down from heaven—" Hom. Aurea de caelo—funis, "a golden rope reaching down from heaven," is mentiond too by Lucretius.

of it gravitated toward the earth, and what it hung upon was not visible, yet it did not descend, but kept its situation; and upon this a question should arise, *What supported or kept up this chain*: would it be a sufficient answer to say, that the *first* (or lowest) link hung upon the second (or that next above it), the *second* or rather the *first and second together* upon the *third*, and so on *ad infinitum*? For what holds up the *whole*? A *chain* of *ten* links would fall down, unless something able to bear it hinderd: one of *twenty*, if not staid by something of a yet greater strength, in proportion to the increase of weight: and therefore one of *infinite* links certainly, if not sustained by something *infinitely* strong, and capable to bear up an infinite weight. And thus it is in a *chain* of causes and effects^e tending, or as it were *gravitating*, towards some end. The last (or lowest) depends, or (as one may say) is *suspended* upon the cause above it: this again, if it be not the first cause, is suspended as an effect upon something above it, &c.^f And if they should be

^e אִי אִשֶׁר שִׁישְׁתִּלְשֵׁל עֵינָיו מֵעֵלָה וְעֵלּוּל אֶל בִּלְתֵי תַכְלִית.
 “It is impossible that causes and effects can be connected with each other without end.” S. IQQAR. Where more may be seen of this השתלשלות “concatenation,” out of IBN SINAI, MAIM. &c.

^f The chain must be fastend *επι τῶν οὐρανίων*, “to the top of Olympus.” *Invenitur pressius intuenti à summo Deo usque ad ultimam rerum sæcem—connexio: & hæc est Homeri catena aurea, quam pendere de cælo in terras Deum jussisse commemorat.* “Whoever considers the thing closely, says *Macrobius*, will see that there is a connexion of things from the supreme God to the lowest dregs that are—: and this is *Homer’s golden chain*, which he tells you God commanded to hang down from heaven to the earth.” This matter might be illustrated by other

be infinite, unless (agreeably to what has been said) there is some *cause* upon which all hang or depend, they would be but an infinite effect without an efficient: and to assert there is any such thing, would be as great an *absurdity*, as to say, that a finite or *little* weight wants something to sustain it, but an infinite one or the *greatest* does not.

II. *A Cause or Being, that has in nature no superior cause, and therefore (by the terms) is also unproduced, and independent, must be self-existent: i. e. existence must be essential to him; or, such is his nature, that he cannot but be*. For every being must either

other similitudes (even שלשלת הקבלה “the chain of the “cabala” might serve for one): but I shall set down but one more: and in that indeed the motion is inverted, but the thing is the same taken either way. It occurs in *Hbob. haleb.* and afterward in *Resb, hbokm.* Suppose a row of blind men, of which the last laid his hand upon the shoulder of the man next before him, he on the shoulder of the next before him, and so on till the foremost grew to be quite out of sight; and somebody asking, what guide this string of blind men had at the head of them, it should be answered, that they had no guide, nor any head, but one held by another, and so went on, *ad infin.* would any rational creature accept this for a just answer? Is it not to say, that infinite blindness (or blindness, if it be infinite) supplies the place of sight, or of a guide?

§ So *Aristotle* says of the First mover, *ὄνκ ἰνδὶχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν ἢ ἀνάγκης ἔχει, κλ.* “It is impossible for it to be otherwise; it is necessary.” And after him the *Arabic* philosophers, *Maimonides, Albo, & al. pass.* teach all that God exists *necessarily*: מן השקר העדרו: “To suppose him not to be implies a falsity;” or, “He cannot be supposed not to be.” This seems to be the import of that name, by which God calls himself in *Moses’s* history; אהיה אשר אהיה, “I am that I am;” or in one word, אהיה, “I will be;” which in the mouth of one who speaks of Him in the third person is יהיה or יהוה, “He will

either exist *of itself*, or *not of itself*: that which exists not of itself must derive its existence from some other, and so be *dependent*: but the Being mentiond in the proposition is supposed to be *independent*, and *uncaused*. Therefore He must exist, not *this way*, but the *other*. The root of His existence can be sought for no where, but in His own nature: to place it any where else is to make a cause *superior* to the *Supreme*.

III. *There must be such a Being.* For (beside what has been said already) if there was not at

“ will be.” So *Philo* explains it; *Εἶναι σίφωνα*, “ Existence be-
 “ longs to his very nature.” So *Abarbanel*; *אני אהיה בעבור*, “ I am, be-
 “ cause I am; for my existence does not depend upon any
 “ thing without me, but is from myself:” adding moreover,
 that it shewd God to be, not like other beings, *איפשרי*
ההכזיאות “ a being that might or might not have existed,”
 but *כוחו יב הכזיאות מצד עצמו*, “ whose existence flows ne-
 “ cessarily from himself,” a *Necessary being*. And so *R. L. b.*
Gerfb. *יורה וזה השם שהוא דונמצא אשר ימצא מעצמותו*, “ The
 “ very name (of God) shews this; for it signifies a being that
 “ exists of itself, or from its own nature.” I omit others, who
 write after the same manner. There have been even Heathens,
 who seemd to think, that some such name as this belongd to the
 Deity, and for the same reason. For as *אהוה* *Eheveh*, “ I shall
 “ be,” and thence *יהוה* *Jehovah*, “ He shall be,” are used
 above, so *Plutarch* says, that in addressing to Him the second
 person *Εἰ* (*תהיה*, or *תהוה*) *Tehejeh* or *Teheveh* “ Thou shalt
 “ be,” is *αὐτοτελής τοῦ Θεοῦ προσαγόρευσις ἢ προσφώνησις*, “ the most
 “ complete appellation or title of God:” and that by this com-
 pellation we give him *ἀληθῆ ἢ ἀψευδῆ ἢ μόνον μόνω προσήμασαν τὴν*
τοῦ εἶναι προσαγόρευσιν. *Ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντως τοῦ εἶναι μέτερον ἔδεν*
 “ the true, the certain, and the only title that is peculiar to the
 “ self-existent being; for self-existence does not belong to any
 “ of us.” It is *τὸ αἰδιον ἢ ἀγεννητὸν ἢ ἀφθαρτον*, “ that which is eter-
 “ nal, which never had any beginning, and which is incor-
 “ ruptible;” that is *ὄντως ὄν*, “ the being that truly exists.”

least

least one such Being, *nothing could be* at all^h. For the *universe* could not *produce itself*ⁱ; nor could any *part* of it produce itself, and then produce the *rest*: because this is supposing a thing to *act* before *it is*.

IV. *Such a Being, as is before described, must not only be eternal, but infinite.* *Eternal* He must be, because there is no way, by which such a Being can either *begin* or *cease* to be, existence being of His essence. And *infinite* He must be, because He can be *limited* by no other as to his existence. For if there was any being able to limit Him, He must be *inferior* to that being. He must also in that case be *dependent*: because he must be beholden to that being for his being *what He is*, and that He is not confined within *narrower* limits. Beside, if His *presence* (whatever the manner of it is) was any where excluded, He would not be *there*; and if *not there*, He might be supposed to be *not elsewhere*: and thus he might be supposed *not to be at all*. But such a Being, as is described in the II. prop. cannot so much as be *supposed not to be*.

^h Something must be מוחייב המציאות, “necessarily existent,” otherwise ללא יהיה דבר נמצא כלל, “there could be no beings at all:” every thing cannot be אפשר מציאות, “precarious or such as might not have existed, &c.” MOR. NEB. §^o *al.*

ⁱ This needs no demonstration. But there is a very old one in *S. Emun.* and after in *Hhob. halleb.* עושה את עצמו אל ימלט מאחד משני דברים שעשה את עצמו קודם היותו או אחר היותו ושניהם אי אפשר וכו'. “He who makes himself, must be said to do one of these two things, *viz.* either to have made himself before he existed, or else to have made himself after he existed, either of which is impossible.”

V. *Such*

V. *Such a Being is above all things, that fall under our cognizance: and therefore his manner of existence is above all our conceptions.* For He is a necessary existent: but nothing within our comprehension is of this kind. We know no being, but what we can *imagine not to be* without any contradiction or repugnance to nature: nor do we know of *any* beside this Supreme being himself. For with respect to Him indeed we know, *by reasoning*, that there *must be* One being who cannot be supposed not to be; just as certainly as we know there is any thing at all: tho we cannot know *Him*, and how he exists. Adequate ideas of eternity ^k and

^k What relation or analogy there is between *time* (a flux of moments) and *eternal* (unchangeable) existence; how any being should not be older *now*, than he was 5000 years ago, &c. are speculations attended with insuperable difficulties. Nor are they at all clear by that of *Timæus ap. Plat.* 'Ὡς ποτ' αἰδίου παράδειγμα τὸν ἰδανικὸν κόσμον ὅδε ὠρανὸς ἐγενήθη, οὕτως ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα τὸν αἰῶνα ὅδε χρόνον· σὺν κόσμῳ ἰδαμιουργήθη; "As the heavens were formerly made according to the eternal pattern of the world in the intellectual mind, so time was made with this world according to the pattern of an age;" or that in *Philo*, 'Αἰὼν ἀναγράφεται τοῦ νοητοῦ βίου· κόσμος, ὡς αἰσθητοῦ χρόνον·. "An age is described to be the length of the intellectual world, as time is the length of the visible world." Many philosophers therefore have thought themselves obliged to deny that God exists *in time*. Τό, τ' ἔν, τό, τ' ἔσαι, χρόνος γεγονότ'· εἶδη, φέροντες λανθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὸν αἰδίου ὕψιαν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς, κλ. "Past and future are parts of that time which is made (with the world) and it is very wrong to apply these to an eternal being." PLATO. "Ἐσιν ὁ Θεὸς, χρὴ φάναι, ἢ ἔσι κατ' ὑδὲνα χρόνον ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τὸν ἀκίνητον, ἢ ἄχρονον ἢ ἀνεγκλητον, ἢ ἔ πρότερον, ὑδὲν ἔσιν, ὑδ' ὕστερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον· ἀλλ' εἰς ὧν ἐνὶ τῷ ἔσν τὸ αἰεὶ περιλήρωκε, κλ. "We must allow that God exists, tho not in any time, but in a duration that has no succession, that is eternal and invariable; before which there was nothing, nor

and infinity are above us, us finites ¹.

In inquiring after the causes of things, when we find (or suppose) this to be the cause of that, another thing to be the cause of this again, and so on, if we can proceed, it may always be demanded with respect to the last cause that we can compre-

“ nor will there be any after or later than it; and that he is a single being who fills all eternity as if it were a single moment.” PLUT. וכו' ובין הזמן וכו' יהוה יתעלה אין יחס בינו ובין הזמן וכו'. “ That name (*Jehovah*) shall be exalted, there is no proportion betwixt it and the present time.” MAIM. מינו מצוי בזמן. “ He (God) does not exist in time.” *Idem.* *Albo* has a whole chapter to shew, ה"ש מינו נופל תחת הזמן, “ that he, whose name is blessed, cannot be compared (as to his duration) with the time that now is.” But then he owns, that their *Rabbi's* do not mean הזמן בשלוח, “ time in general,” or זמן סתם, “ mere duration,” or that נספר ומשוער בלתי בלתי, “ time which cannot be reckoned, and which is duration itself, and was before the world was;” but הזמן המשוער בתנועת הגלגל, “ that time which is reckoned by the motion of the world, and is called the order or succession of time, and not absolute time.” In short, they reckon (to use *R. Gedal's* words) הזמן האמתי הוא נברא, “ that time, properly so called, is created, and that duration is not called time.” And so what they say, doth not include all the present difficulty, *time* in their use of the word being confined to the duration of this world, which according to them is new. Yet see b. 2. c. 19. ה"ש א"א שיאמר עליו שיש לו יותר זמן היום ממה שהיה לו בימי דוד, “ Blessed be that name (*Jehovah*) it is not possible to affirm concerning him, that he is older to-day, than he was in the days of *David*, or than he was when he first created this world.”

1 οἷδα μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν τρόπον.—ἔτι ἀναρχὸς ἐστίν [ὁ Θεός], ἢ ἀγέννητος, ἢ ἀίδιος, οἷδα τὸ δὲ πῶς οὐκ οἷδα. “ There are a great many things that I understand, without knowing the particular manner how they are so.—I know that God is without beginning and unbegotten, but I know not the manner how he is so.” So CHRYSOSTOM.

hend,

hend, *What is the cause of that?* So that it is not possible for us to terminate our inquiries of this kind but in something, which is to us *incomprehensible*. And therefore the Supreme cause must certainly be such ^m. But tho it is impossible for us to have an adequate notion of his manner of existence, yet we may be sure that,

VI. *He exists in a manner, which is perfect.* For He, who exists of himself, depends in no regard upon any other, and (as being a Supreme cause) is the fountain of existence to other beings, must exist in the *uppermost* and *best* manner of existing. And not only so, but (since He is *infinite* and *illimited*) He must exist in the best manner *illimitedly* and *infinitely*. Now to exist thus is infinite goodness of existence; and to exist in a manner *infinitely good* is to be *perfect*.

VII. *There can be but One such Being* ⁿ. That is, as it appears by prop. III. that there must be at least *one* independent Being, such as is mentioned in prop. I. so now, that in reality there is *but One* ^o.

^m *Simonides* had good reason still to double upon *Hiero* the number of days allowd for answering that question, *Quid, aut quale sit Deus?* "What or what sort of a being is God?" *ap. Cic.*

ⁿ *Nec viget quidquam simile aut secundum.* "Nor is there any being in the world like or any thing near to him." *HOR.*

^o In *Mor. neb. Maimonides* having proved, that there must be some Being, who exists *necessarily*, or whose existence is *necessary* עצמונית, "if we examine into his nature," proceeds from this necessity of existence to derive *incorporeity*, absolute *simplicity*, *perfection*, and particularly *unity*, המוחיב המציאות, "א' אפשר בו השנית כלל לא דומה ולא הפך וכו' " It is impossible that the number two can be applied to that which exists necessarily; there is nothing that can be compared to it, nor no reverse of it."

Because

Because his manner of existence being perfect and *illimited*, that manner of being (if I may speak so) is *exhausted* by Him, or belongs solely to Him ^p. If any other could partake with Him in it, He must want what that other had; be *deficient* and *limited*. Infinite and illimited inclose all ^q.

If there could be *two* Beings each by himself *absolutely* perfect, they must be either of the *same*, or of *different* natures. Of the *same* they cannot be; because thus, *both* being *infinite*, their existences would be *coincident*: that is, they would be but the *same* or *one*. Nor can they be of *different* natures: because if their natures were *opposite* or *contrary* the one to the other, being equal (infinite both and every where meeting the one with the other), the one would just *destroy* or be the *negation* of the other ^r: and if they are supposed to be only different, not opposite, then if they differ as *disparates*, there must be some *genus* above them; which cannot be: and however they differ, they

^p Therefore by *Plato* He is called 'ὁ εἷς, "the One."

^q *Deus, si perfectus est,—ut esse debet, non potest esse nisi unus, ut in eo sint omnia.* "God, if He is a perfect being,—as He must be, can be but One, that all things may be in him." If there could be more Gods than one, *tantum singulis deerit, quantum in cæteris fuerit*, "every one would want what the other had."

LACTANT.

^r As light and darkness are. Δύο γὰρ ἕξισάζοντα ἀλλήλοις κατ' ἐναντίωσιν φθαριτικὰ ἔσται πάντως τῆς ἀλλήλων συστάσεως. "For two things that are equal, and directly contrary, destroy each other entirely." BASIL. There can be no such law between them, as is said to be among the Heathen deities. Θεοῖσι δ' αὖδ' ἔχει νόμος. Οὐδὲς ἀπαντῶν βέλεται προθυμίᾳ τῆ τῷ θέλοντι, κλ. "The law amongst the Gods is this, that when any one of them would have any thing, no other God contradicts what he desires."

EURIP.

can

can only be said at most to be beings perfect in their *respective kinds*. But this is not to be *absolutely* perfect; it is only to be perfect in *this* or *that* respect: and to be only thus implies imperfection in *other* respects.

What has been here said is methinks sufficient to ruin the *Manichean* cause and exclude the *independent principle of evil*. For if we cannot account for the existence of that *evil*, which we find by experience to be in the world, it is but one instance out of many of our ignorance. There may be reasons for it, tho we do not *know* them. And certainly no such experience must make us deny *axioms* or *truths* equally certain ^s. There are, beside, some things relating to this subject, which deserve our attention. For as to *moral* good and evil, they seem to depend upon ourselves ^t. If we do but endeavour, the *most* we can, to do what we ought, we shall not be guilty of *not doing* it (sect. IV.): and therefore it is our fault, and not to be charged upon any other being ^u, if guilt and *evil* be introduced by *our* neglect, or abuse of our own liberty and powers ^w. Then as to *physical* evil; without it

^s 'Απόλων ἡ ἀλήθει', ἐπεὶ σὺ δυσυχεῖς: "So that, because things go ill with you, there must be an end of truth." EURIP.

^t Ψυχὴν ἔχεις αἰτεξέστιον.—ὅ γὰρ κατὰ γένεσιν ἄμαρτάνεις, ὅτε κατὰ τύχην πορνεύεις, κλ. "You have a soul that is absolutely free:— you were not created a finner, nor do you commit whoredom by chance." CYRIL of Jerusalem.

^u Ὡν αὐτὸς εἰ κύριος, τῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς μὴ ζητήσης ἐτήρωθεν. "Do not seek without you, for the causes of the things which are entirely in your own power." St BASIL.

^w Must God extinguish sun, moon, and stars, because some people worship them? Mishnah. Αὐτὸ τῷ ἐλομένῳ αἰτία, Θεὸς ἀνατιθεῖ. "The fault lies in him who chooses to do the thing, God is not to blame." MAX. TYR.

much

much physical *good* would be lost, the one necessarily inferring the other^x. Some things *seem* to be evil, which would not appear to be such, if we could see through the *whole* contexture of things^y. There are not *more* evil than good things in the world, but surely more of the *latter*^z. Many evils of *this* kind, as well as of the *former*, come by our own *fault*; some perhaps by way of *punishment*; some of *physic*^a; and some as the *means* to happiness, not otherwise to be obtained. And if there is a future state, that which seems to be wrong *now* may be rectified *hereafter*. To all which more may yet be added. As, that *matter* is not capable of perfection; and therefore where that is concerned, there *must be* imperfections, and consequently evils^b. So that to ask, why God permits evil, is to ask, why he permits a *material* world, or such a being as *man* is^c; indowd indeed with some noble

x Ἡ δίψα μὲν σώματι παρασκευάζει ἕδον ἰσχυρὰ, κλ. “It is thirst, that makes the pleasure of drinking agreeable to the body.” MAX. TYR. This observation might be extended a great way. If there was, *v. g.* no such thing as *poverty*, there could be no *riches*, or no great benefit by them; there would be scarce any arts or sciences, &c. Ἐὰν γὰρ ἀλέησιν τὴν πτωχείαν, τὰ βίαι τὴν σύστασιν ἀγέειλες ἄπασαν, κλ. “Take away poverty, and you destroy the whole state of life.” St CHRYSOST.

y Τὰ μέρη πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ σύμφωνα ἢ ἀρμότιστα ἐκείνῳ. “The parts must be compared with the whole, if we would see whether they are agreeable and fitted thereto” (with more to this purpose). PLOTIN.

z V. Mor. nebok. 3. 12.

a Πολυειδὴς ἢ τῷ Θεῷ ἰατρικὴ. “God has provided several sorts of physick.” SIMPL.

b Κακία βλάστημα τῆς ὕλης. “Evil is a bud that springs from matter.” PLUT.

c To that question, Why are we not so made, ὥστε μηδὲ βυλομένοις ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν; “as to be incapable of committing

ble faculties, but incumberd at the same time with *bodily* passions and propensions. Nay, I know not whether it be not to ask, why He permits any imperfect being; and that is, any being at all: which is a bold demand, and the answer to it lies perhaps too deep for us. If this world be design'd for a *palæstra*, where men ^d are to *exercise* their faculties and their virtues, and by that *prepare* themselves for a superior state ^e (and who can say it is not?) there must be *difficulties* and *temptations*, occasions and opportunities for this exercise. Lastly, if there are evils, of which men know not the true *origin*; yet if they would but seriously reflect upon the many marks of *reason*, *wisdom* and *goodness* every where to be observed in instances, which they *do* or *may* understand, they could scarce doubt but the same things prevail'd in those, which they *do not* understand. If I should meet with a *book*, the author of which I found had dispos'd his matter in beautiful order, and treated his subjects with

“mitting fin?” St *Basil* answers, Because ἀρετὴ ἐκ ᾤποιρέσεως ἢ ἐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται. “virtue is from our own choice; and not from any necessity.” And he who blames the Deity, because we are not impeccable, οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ τὴν ἄλογον φύσιν τῆς λογικῆς πρῶτιμῃ, ἢ τὴν ἀκίνητον ἢ ἀνόρητον τῆς προαιρετικῆς ἢ ἐμπράκτου, “does the very same thing as he does, who prefers a creature not indued with reason to one that is, and a creature that has not the power of moving itself, and is void of all appetites, to a free agent and one that can choose what he will do.”

^d Ἀδελφαὶ ἀρετῆς, “Champions for virtue,” as PHILO.

^e In *Cbryostom*'s stile, ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἢ καθάπερ ἐν θαλάσσει ἐπὶ τῷ παρόντι βίβη ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἵνα μετὰ τὸ λυθῆναι τὸ διάτρον λαμπρὸν ἀναδίσασθαι δυναθώμεν τὸν σέφανον. “To be industrious after virtue, and to strive in this present life, as in a place where exercises are to be perform'd; that, when we go off the stage, we may be crown'd with a crown of glory.”

reason

reason and exactness; but at last, as I red on, came to a few leaves written in a language which I did not know: in this case I should close the book with a full persuasion, that the same vein of good sense, which shewd itself in the former and much greater part of it, ran thro the other also: especially having arguments *à priori*, which obliged me to believe, that the author of it all was the same person. This I should certainly do, rather than deny the force of those arguments, in order to assert *two* authors of the *same* book. But the evil principle has led me too far out of my way, therefore to return.

VIII. *All other beings depend upon that Being mentiond in the foregoing propositions for their existence.* For since there can be but one perfect and independent being, the rest must be imperfect and dependent: and since there is nothing else, upon which they can, *ultimately*, depend beside Him, upon Him they *must* and *do* depend.

IX. *He is therefore the Author of nature: nor can any thing be, or be done, but what He either causes (immediately, or mediately), or permits.* All beings (by the last) depend upon Him for their existence: upon whom depends their existence, upon him also must depend the intrinsic manner of their existence, or the *natures* of these beings: and again upon whom depend their being and nature, upon Him depend the *necessary effects* and *consequences* of their being, and being such as they are in themselves. Then, as to the *acts* of such of them as may be *free agents*, and the effects of them, He is in-

deed *not* the Author of those; because by the terms and supposition they proceed from agents, who have no necessity imposed upon them by Him to act either this or that way. But yet however these *free agents* must depend upon Him *as such*: from Him they derive their power of acting: and it is He, who permits them to use their liberty; tho many times, through their own fault, they use it amiss. And, lastly, as to the nature of those *relations*, which lie between ideas or things really *existing*, or which arise from facts already *done and past*, these result from the natures of the *things* themselves: all which the Supreme being either causes, or permits (as before). For since things can be but in one manner at once, and their mutual relations, ratio's, agreements, disagreements, &c. are nothing but their manners of being with respect to each other, the natures of these *relations* will be determin'd by the natures of the *things*.

From hence now it appears, that whatever expresses the existences or non-existences of things, and their mutual relations *as they are*, is true by the *constitution* of nature: and if so, it must also be agreeable to His perfect *comprehension* of all truth, and to His *will*, who is at the head of it. Tho the act of A (some free agent) is the effect of his *liberty*, and can only be said to be *permitted* by the Supreme being; yet when it is once *done*, the relation between the *doer* and the *deed*, the agreement there is between A and the idea of one who has committed such a fact, is a *fixt* relation. From thenceforward it will *always* be predicable of him, that he was the doer of it: and if any one should deny this, he would go counter to nature and that
 great

great Author of it, whose existence is now proved. And thus those arguments in sect. I. prop. IV. which turned only upon a *supposition* that there was such a Being, are here *confirmed* and *made absolute*.

X. *The one supreme and perfect Being, upon whom the existence of all other beings and their powers originally depend, is that Being, whom I mean by the word GOD.*

There are other *truths* still remaining in relation to the Deity, which we *may know*, and which are *necessary to be known* by us, if we would endeavour to demean ourselves toward Him according to *truth* and what He is. And they are such, as not only tend to rectify our opinions concerning His nature and attributes; but also may serve at the same time as *further proofs* of His existence, and an amplification of some things touched perhaps too lightly. As,

XI. *GOD cannot be corporeal: or, there can be no corporeity in God.* There are many things in *matter* utterly inconsistent with the nature of such a *Being*, as it has been demonstrated God must be.

Matter exists in *parts*, every one of which, by the term, is *imperfect*^f: but in a Being absolutely perfect there can be nothing that is imperfect.

These *parts*, tho they are many times kept closely united by some occult influence, are in truth so

f Εἰ σῶμά ἐστι, φύσις δὲ σώματος περιζομένη εἰς πλείω, ἕκαστον τῶν μερῶν μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι (f. εἶσαι) τῷ ὅλῳ, "If it be made of matter, and "if it be the property of matter to be divided into a multitude of parts, every single part will not be the same as the "whole," says Plotinus, even of the soul.

many *distinct* bodies, which may, at least in our imagination, be disjointed or placed otherwise: nor can we have any idea of matter, which does not imply a natural discernibility and susceptibility of various shapes and modifications: *i. e.* mutability seems to be *essential* to it. But God, existing in a manner that is perfect, exists in a manner that must be *uniform*, always one and the same, and in nature *unchangeable*.

Matter is incapable of *acting*, *passive* only, and *stupid*: which are defects, that can never be ascribed to him who is the First cause or Prime agent, the Supreme intellect, and altogether perfect.

Then, if He is *corporeal*, where ever there is a *vacuum*, He must be *excluded*, and so becomes a being bounded, finite, and as it were full of chasms.

Lastly, there is no *matter* or body, which may not be *supposed not to be*; whereas the idea of God, or that Being upon whom all others depend, involves in it existence.

XII. *Neither infinite space, nor infinite duration, nor matter infinitely extended, or eternally existing, nor any, nor all of these taken together, can be God.*
For,

Space taken separately from the things, which possess and fill it, is but an empty scene or *vacuum*: and to say, that infinite space is God, or that God is infinite space, is to say that He is an infinite *vacuum*: than which nothing can be more *absurd*, or

Ἐ δίδεικται δὲ ὅτι μὴ ἔστι μέγεθος ὃδὲν ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ταύτην ὁσίαν ἀλλὰ ἁμερῆς ἢ ἀδιαίρετος ἔστιν. “ It has been shewn before, that no body
“ can be of this nature; it must be something indivisible, and
“ whose parts cannot be separated from each other.” ARIST.

blasphemous.

blasphemous. How can *space*, which is but a vast void, rather the negation of all things, than positively any thing, a kind of *diffused nothing*; how can this, I say, be the First cause, &c. or indeed any cause? What attributes beside penetrability and extension, what excellencies, what perfections is it capable of ^h?

As *infinite space* cannot be God, tho He be excluded from no place or space; so tho He is eternal, yet *eternity* or infinite duration itself is not God ⁱ. For duration, abstracted from all durables, is nothing actually existing by itself: it is the *duration of a being*, not *a being*.

Infinite space and *duration*, taken together, cannot be God: because an interminable space of infinite duration is still nothing but eternal space; and that is at most but an *eternal vacuum*.

^h They who call God מקום, “space” do it לפי שהוא הכל מקום, “because He is the space in which the whole universe is containd, and not because the universe is the space in which He is containd. *Thibbi*. Or, as *Phil. Aquin.* from the ancients, הקב"ה מקום של עולם, “The holy and blessed Being is the space in which the universe is containd, and not the universe the space in which He is containd.” Οὐ γὰρ περιέχεται [ὁ Θεός], ἀλλὰ περιέχει τὸ πᾶν. “For He (God) is not comprehended in any thing, but He comprehends all things.” PH. JUD. By which ways of speaking (tho there is a Cabbalistic reason assigned too) they intend chiefly to express his omnipresence and imminity. That in *Aet. Ap.* seems to be of the same kind, Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν, κινούμεθα, καὶ ἔσμεν. “In him we live, and move, and have our beings.”

ⁱ Such things as these, how incongruous and wild soever they are, have bin affirmed; that God is infinite duration, space, &c. What can be meant by that, καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ὁ αἰὼν Θεός, “God may be properly called eternity,” in *Plotinus*?

Since it has been already proved, that corporeity is inconsistent with Divine perfection, tho' *matter* should be *infinitely extended*, or there should be an infinite quantity of it, yet still where ever it is, it carries this *inconsistence* along with it.

If to *matter* be added *infinite duration*, neither does this alter the nature of it. This only supposes it to be eternally what it is, *i. e. eternally incapable* of Divine perfection.

And if to it you add the ideas of *both* infinite extension (or space) and duration too; yet still, so long as matter is matter, it must *always* and *every where* be incapable of Divinity.

Lastly, not the *universe* or sum total of finite beings, can be God. For if it is, then *every thing* is divine, *every thing* God, or of God; and so *all things* together must make but *one* being^k. But the contrary to this we see, there being evidently many beings distinct, and separable one from another, and independent each of other. Nay, this distinction and separation of existence, beside what we see without us, we may even *feel* within ourselves. We are *se-*

* Were not they, who converse with books, accustomed to such trials, it would be shocking to find *Balbus* in *Cicero* asserting, *esse mundum deum*, "that the world was God:" and yet in another place, that it is *quasi communis deorum, atque hominum domus, aut urbs utrorumque*, "as it were the common house of the Gods and of men, or the city of both of them;" and *deorum, hominumque causa factus*, "was made for the sake of the Gods and of men:" in another, *providentia deorum mundum, & omnes mundi partes & initio constitutas esse, & omni tempore administrari*, "that the world, and all the parts of the world, were in the beginning made by the providence of the Gods, and were always governed by the same:" in another, *mundum ipsum naturâ administrari*, "that the world itself is governed by nature:" with other like inconsistencies.

verally

verally conscious to ourselves of the individuation and distinction of our own minds from all other: nor is there any thing, of which we can be more certain. Were we all the *same* being, and had *one* mind, as in that case we must have, thoughts could not be private, or the peculiar thoughts of any one person; but they must be *common* acts of the whole mind, and there could be but one conscience *common* to us all^l. Beside, if all things conjunctly are God or the Perfect being (I dread the mention of such things, tho it be in order to refute them), how comes this remarkable instance of imperfection, among many others, to cleave to us, that we should *not know* even ourselves, and what we are^m? In short, no *collection* of beings can be *one* being; and therefore not God. And the universe itself is but a collection of distinct beingsⁿ.

XIII.

^l Ἄτοπον εἰ μὴ ἡ ἐμὴ [ψυχὴ] ἢ ἡ ὀτιῶν ἄλλη· ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἐμοῦ αἰσθανομένω, ἢ ἄλλον αἰσθάνεσθαι,—ἢ ὅλος ὁμοπαθεῖν ἡμᾶς τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἢ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν. “It is absurd that my (soul) and the soul of any other person should be one and the same; for then it must needs be, that when I perceived any thing, he would perceive it also,—and he and I and all the whole universe would be affected alike.” PLOTIN. Here this author is clear, tho at some other times very dark.

^m *Cur quidquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset Deus?* “If the soul of man were a God, how could it be ignorant of any thing?” CIC.

ⁿ The system of *Spinoza* is so apparently false, and full of impieties and contradictions, that more needs not be said against it: tho much might be. What *Velleius* says in *Cicero*, is not only true, *Si mundus est deus,—dei membra partim ardentia partim refrigerata dicenda sunt*, “that if the world be God,—then the members of God may be said to be some of them hot, and some of them cold:” but if there is but one substance, one nature, *one being*, and this being is God, then all the follies,

XIII. *It is so far from being true that God is corporeal, that there could be no such thing as either matter or motion, if there was not some Superior being, upon whom they depended. Or, God is such a being, that without Him there could be neither matter nor motion.* This must be true of *matter*: because it has been proved already, that there can be *but one* independent being; that he is *incorporeal*; and that the existence of all other beings must *depend upon Him*. But the same thing may be proved otherwise. If *matter* (I mean the existence of it) does not depend upon something above it, it must be an independent being; and if an independent being, a necessary being; and then there could be no such thing as a *vacuum*: but all bodies must be *perfectly solid*; and, more than that, the whole world could be but *one such* body, five times as firm as brass, and incapable of all motion. For that being which *exists necessarily* does *necessarily exist*: that is, it cannot *not exist*. But in a *vacuum* matter does not exist.

Moreover, if *matter* be an independent, necessary being, and exists of itself, this must be true of *every particle* of it: and if so, there could not only

madnesses, wickednesses that are in the world, are in God; then all things done and suffered are both done and suffered by Him; He is both cause and effect; He both wills and nills, affirms and denies, loves and hates the same things at the same time, &c. That such gross Atheism as this should ever be fashionable! *Atheism*: for certainly when we inquire, whether there *is* a God, we do not inquire, whether we ourselves and all other things which are visible about us do *exist*: something different from them must be intended. Therefore to say, there is no God different from them, is to say, there is no God at all.

be

be no *vacuum* but every particle must be *every where*. For it could not be limited to occupy only a place of such certain dimensions by its *own nature*; since this confinement of existence within certain bounds implies non-existence in other places beyond those bounds, and is equal to a negation of existence; and when *existence* is essential to any being, a *negation of existence* cannot be so. Nor, in the next place, could its existence be limited by *anything else*, because it is supposed to have its existence only of itself; *i. e.* to have a *principle* of existence in itself, or to have an existence that is not dependent upon or obnoxious to any other.

And I may add still, if *matter* be self-existent, I do not see, not only how it comes to be restrained to a place of some certain capacity, but also how it comes to be limited *in other respects*; or why it should not exist in a manner that is *in all respects* perfect. So that thus it appears, *matter* must derive its existence from some other being, who causes it to be just what it is. And the being, *who can do this*, must be God.

It is to no purpose to object here, that one cannot *conceive*, how the existence of matter can be derived from another being. For God being *above our conceptions*, the manner in which He operates, and in which things depend upon him, must also be *unconceivable*. Reason discovers, that this visible world must owe its existence to some invisible Almighty being; *i. e.* it discovers this to be fact, and we must not deny facts because we know not *how* they are effected. It is far from being new, that our faculties should disclose to us the existence
of

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of things, and then drop us in our inquiry *how* they
are. Thus much for *matter*.

As for *motion*; without a First cause, such as has
been described, there could be none: and much
less *such* motions as we see in the world. This may
be immediately deduced from the foregoing para-
graphs. For if *matter* itself could not be without
such a cause, it is certain *motion*, which is an affec-
tion of matter, could never be.

But further, there could be no *motion*, unless ei-
ther there be in matter itself a power of *beginning*
it; or it is communicated from body to body in an
infinite succession, or in a *circle*, and so has no begin-
ning; or else is *produced* by some incorporeal be-
ing, or beings. Now as hardy as men are in ad-
vancing opinions that favor their vices, tho never
so repugnant to reason, I can hardly believe any
one will assert, that a parcel of *mere matter* (let it
be great or small, of any figure whatsoever, &c.)
left altogether to itself, could ever of itself *begin* to
move. If there is any such bold assertor, let him
fix his eyes upon some lump of matter, *ex. gr.* a
stone, piece of *timber*, or a *clod* (cleard of all ani-
mals), and peruse it well; and then ask himself se-
riously, whether it is possible for him in earnest to
believe, that that *stone*, *log*, or *clod*, tho nothing cor-
poreal or incorporeal should excite or meddle with
it, might some time or other of itself begin to *creep*.
However, to be short, a power of *beginning* motion
is not in the idea of matter. It is passive, as we see,
to the impressions of motion, and susceptible of it;
but *cannot* produce it. On the contrary, it will al-
ways persist uniformly in its *present state*, either of
rest

rest or motion, if nothing stirs, diverts, accelerates, or stops it. Nor is there any thing in all physics better settled than that, which is called *vis inertiae*, or the *inertia* of matter.

The propagation of motion from body to body, *without any First mover*, or immaterial cause of motion, has been proved impossible, prop. I.

The supposition of a perpetual motion in a *circle* is begging the question. For if A moves B, B moves C, and so on to Z, and then Z moves A; this is the same as to say, that A moves A, by the intervention of B, C, D, --- Z: that is, A *moves itself*, or can *begin* motion °.

It remains then, that all corporeal motions come originally from some mover *incorporeal*: which must be either that Supreme and self-existing *spirit* himself, who is God; or such, as will put us into the way how to find, that there is such a Being. Turn back to p. 114.

If we consider *ourselves*, and the voluntary motions begun by us, we may there see the thing exemplified. We move our bodies or some members of them, and by these move other things, as they

° What *Censorinus* charges upon many great men (but upon some of them surely unjustly) is to me unintelligible. He says, they believed *semper homines fuisse, &c.* "mankind always existed, &c." and then, *Itaque & omnium, quæ in sempiterno isto mundo semper fuerunt, futuraque sunt, aiunt principium fuisse nullum; sed orbem esse quemdam generantium, nascentiumque, in quo uniuscujusque geniti initium simul & finis esse videatur.* "They say that there was no beginning of all those things, which have existed in that world which was from eternity; but that there is a certain round of things generated and springing up, which round seems to be both the beginning and the end of every thing that is produced."

again

again do others ; and know these motions to spring from the operations of our minds : but then we know also, that we have not an independent power of creating motion. If we had, it could not be so limited as our loco-motive faculties are, nor confined to small quantities and certain circumstances only : we should have had it from eternity, nor could we ever be deprived of it. So that we are necessitated to look up and acknowledge some Higher being, who is able not only to *produce* motion, but to impart a *faculty of producing it*.

And if the *petty* motions of us mortals afford arguments for the being of a God, much more may those *greater* motions we see in the world, and the *phenomena* attending them : I mean the motions of the *planets* and *heavenly bodies*. For *these* must be put into motion, either by one common mighty Mover, acting upon them immediately, or by causes and laws of His appointment ; or by their respective movers, who, for reasons to which you can by this time be no stranger, must depend upon some *Superior*, that furnishd them with the power of doing this. And granting it to be done *either* of these ways, we can be at no great distance from a demonstration of the *existence* of a Deity.

It may perhaps be said, that tho matter has not the power of moving itself, yet it hath an *attractive* force, by which it can move other parts of matter : so that all matter equally *moves* and is *moved*. But, allowing those things which are now usually ascribed to *attraction*, we shall still be necessitated to own some Superior being, whose *influence* mixes itself with matter, and operates upon it ; or at least who, some way or other, *imparts* this force.

force. For *attraction*, according to the true sense of the word, supposes one body to act upon another at a distance, or where it is not; but nothing can be an agent, where it is *not* at all. Matter can act only by *contact*, impelling contiguous bodies, when it is put into motion by something else, or resisting those which strike against it, when it is at rest. And this it does *as matter*; *i. e.* by being impenetrable to other matter: but attraction is not of the nature or idea of matter. So that what is called *attraction*, is so called only because the same things happen, as if the parts of matter did mutually attract: but in truth this can only be an effect of something, which acts upon or by matter according to a certain law. The parts of matter seem not only to gravitate *towards* each other, but many of them to *fly* each other. Now these two *contrary* motions and seeming qualities cannot *both* proceed from matter *quâ* matter; cannot *both* be of the nature of it: and therefore they must be owing to some *external* cause, or to some *other* being, which excites in them this, as it were love and discord P.

Beside, as to the *revolution* of a planet about the sun, *mere gravitation* is not sufficient to produce that effect. It must be compounded with a motion of *projection*, to keep the planet from falling directly into the sun, and bring it about: and from

P So what we call attraction and aversion (centripetal and centrifugal forces) seem to have been called by *Empedocles*: *φιλία ἢ συγκρίνεται* [τὰ σοιχεῖα], ἢ νεῖκος ἢ διακρίνεται, “ a kind of friendship by which they (the elements) are united together; and a sort of discord, whereby they are separated from “ each other.” *DIOG. L. (v. Emp.) V. Arist. Cic. & al.*

what

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what hand, I desire to know, comes this other motion (or direction)? Who impressed it?

What a vast field for *contemplation* is here opened! Such regions of matter about us, in which there is not the *least particle* that does not carry with it an argument of God's existence; not the *least stick* or *straw*, or other *trifle* that falls to the ground, but shews it; not the slightest motion produced, the *least whisper* of the air, but tells it.

XIV. *The frame and constitution of the world, the astonishing magnificence of it, the various phænomena and kinds of beings, the uniformity observed in the productions of things, the uses and ends for which they serve, &c. do all shew that there is some Almighty designer, an infinite wisdom and power at the top of all these things: such marks there are of both.* Or, *God is that Being, without whom such a frame or constitution of the world, such a magnificence in it, &c. could not be.* In order to prove to any one the *grandness* of this fabric of the world, one needs only to bid him consider the *sun* with that insupportable glory and lustre that surrounds it: to demonstrate the vast *distance, magnitude, and heat* of it: to represent to him the *chorus of planets* moving periodically, by uniform laws, in their several or-

9 So far is that from being true, *Nequaquam—divinitus esse creatam Naturam mundi, quæ tantâ est prædita culpâ*, "That the world could never be created by a divine Being, there are so many faults in it." LUCRET. Men rashly (impiously) censure what they do not understand. Like that king of *Cassile*, who fancied himself able to have contrived a better system of the world; because he knew not what the true system is, but took it to be as ascribed to him by *R. Is. ab Sid*, and other astronomers of those times.

bits

bits about it ; affording a regular variety of aspects ; guarded some of them by *secondary* planets, and as it were emulating the state of the sun ; and probably all possess by proper *inhabitants* : to remind him of those surprising visits the *comets* make us ; the large trains, or uncommon splendor, which attends them ; the far country they come from ; and the curiosity and horror they excite not only among us, but in the inhabitants of other planets, who also may be up to see the entry and progress of these ministers of fate^r : to direct his eye and contemplation, through those azure fields and vast regions above him, up to the *fixt stars*, that radiant numberless host of heaven ; and to make him understand, how unlikely a thing it is, that they should be placed there only to adorn and bespan-
gle a canopy over our heads (tho that would be a great piece of magnificence too), and much less to supply the places of so many glow-worms, by affording a feeble light to our earth, or even to all our fellow-planets : to convince him, that they are rather so many *other suns*, with their several regions and sets of planets about them : to shew him, by the help of glasses, still more and more of these *fixt* lights, and to beget in him an apprehension of their unaccountable *numbers*, and of those *immense spaces*, that lie retired beyond our *utmost* reach and even imagination : I say, one needs but to do this,

^r Since they have, or may have great effects upon the several parts of the solar system, one may speak thus without falling into the superstition of the multitude, or meaning what is intended by that, *Nunquam caelo spectatum impune cometen*, "A comet is never seen in the heavens but for some punishment" (in *Claudian*) or the like.

and

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 and explain to him such things as are now known almost to every body; and by it to shew that if the world be not infinite, it is *infinito similis* ^a; and therefore sure a *magnificent* structure, and the work of an *infinite* Architect. But if we could take a view of all the *particulars* contained within that astonishing compass, which we have thus *hastily* run over, how would wonders multiply upon us? Every corner, every part of the world is as it were made up of *other* worlds. If we look upon this *our seat* (I mean this earth), what scope is here for admiration? The great *variety* of mountains, hills, valleys, plains, rivers, seas, trees, plants! The many tribes of different *animals*, with which it is stocked! The multifarious *inventions* and *works* of one of these; that is, of us *men*, &c. And yet when all these (heaven and earth) are survey'd as *nice*ly as they can be by the help of our unassisted senses, and even of telescopical glasses, by the assistance of good *microscopes* in very *small* parts of matter as many *new* wonders ^c may perhaps be discover'd, as those already observed; new *kingdoms* of animals; new *architecture* and curiosity of work. So that as before our senses and even conception fainted in those *vast* journeys we were obliged to take in considering the expanse of the universe; so here again they fail us in our researches into the *principles* and constituent parts of it. Both the *beginnings* and the *ends* of things, the *least* and the *greatest*, all conspire to baffle us: and which way ever we pro-

^a *Finitus, & infinito similis.* "Finite, but very near to infinite." PLIN.

^c Ποικίλη θαυματουργία. "Variety of surprising things." PLO-TIN.

fecute

secute our inquiries, we still fall in with *fresh* subjects of amazement, and *fresh* reasons to believe that there are indefinitely still *more* and *more* behind, that will for ever escape our eagerest pursuits and deepest penetration.

This mighty *building* is not only thus grand, and the appearances stupendous in it, but the *manner* in which things are effected is commonly unintelligible, and their causes *too profound* for us. There are indeed many things in nature, which we know; and some, of which we seem to know the *causes*: but, alas! how *few* are these with respect to the whole sum? And the causes which we assign, what are they? Commonly such, as can only be expressed in general terms, whilst the *bottoms* of things remain unfathomable. Such, as have been collected from *experience*, but could scarcely be known beforehand, by any arguments *à priori*, to be capable of rendering such effects: and yet till causes are known after that manner, they are not *thoroughly* understood. Such, as seem disproportionate and *too little*, and are so insufficient and unsatisfactory, that one cannot but be inclined to think, that something *immaterial* and *invisible* must be immediately concerned. In short, we know many times, that such a thing will have such an effect, or perhaps that such an effect is produced by such a cause, but the manner *how* we know not; or but grossly, and if such an *hypothesis* be true. It is impossible for us to come at the true *principles* of things, or to see into the oeconomy of the *finest* part of nature and workings of the *first* springs. The causes that appear to us, are but *effects* of other causes: the *vessels*, of which the bodies of plants

and animals consist, are made up of *other, smaller* vessels: the *subtilest* parts of matter, which we have any notion of (as animal spirits, or particles of light), have *their parts*, and may for ought we know be *compound* bodies: and as to the *substances* themselves of all these things, and their *internal constitution*, they are hid from our eyes. Our philosophy dwells in the surface of nature.

However, in the next place, we ourselves cannot but be witnesses, that there are *stated methods*, as so many set forms of proceeding, which things punctually and religiously keep to. The same *causes*, circumstanced in the same manner, have always the same success: all the *species* of animals, among us, are made according to one general *idea*; and so are those of *plants* also, and even *minerals*: no *new* ones are brought forth or arisen any where: and the old are preserved and continued by the *old ways*.

Lastly, it appears I think plainly enough in the parts and model of the world, that there is a *contrivance* and a respect to certain reasons and *ends*. How the *sun* is posited near the middle of our system for the more *convenient* dispensing of his benign influences to the *planets* moving about him; how the plain of the earth's *equator* intersects that of her *orbit*, and makes a proper angle with it, in order to diversify the *year*, and create a useful variety of *seasons*, and many other things of this kind, tho a thousand times repeted, will *always* be pleasing meditations to good men and true scholars. Who can observe the *vapors* to ascend, especially from the sea, meet above in clouds, and fall again after condensation, and not understand this to be a kind of *distillation* in order to clear the water of
its

its groffer falts, and then by rains and dews to fupply the fountains and rivers with fresh and wholfom liquor; to nourifh the vegetables below by fhowers, which defcend in drops as from a *watering-pot* upon a garden, &c. who can view the *structure* of a plant or animal; the *indefinite* number of their fibres and fine veffels, the *formation* of larger veffels and the feveral members out of them, and the apt *difpofition* of all thefe; the way laid out for the reception and diftribution of *nutriment*; the *effect* this nutriment has in extending the veffels, bringing the vegetable or animal to its full growth and expansion, continuing the *motion* of the feveral fluids, repairing the *decays* of the body, and preferving *life*: who can take notice of the feveral *faculties* of animals, their *arts* of faving and providing for themfelves, or the ways in which they are provided for; the *ufes* of plants to animals, and of fome animals to others, particularly to mankind; the care taken that the feveral *species* fhould be *propagated* out of their proper feeds (without confufion ^u), the ftrong *inclinations* implanted in animals for that purpofe, their *love of their young*, and the like: I fay, who can do this, and not fee a *design*, in fuch *regular* pieces, fo nicely wrought, and fo preferved? If there was but *one* animal, and in that cafe it could not be doubted but that his *eyes* were made that he might fee

^u If any one, fitting upon mount *Ida*, had feen the *Greek* army coming on in proper order [*μετὰ πολλῆ κοσμῆς ἢ τάξεως τοῖς πεδίοις προσιῖσαν*], (“marching over the fields in rank and file”), he ought moft certainly, notwithstanding what *Sext. Empir.* fays, to have concluded, that there was fome commander, under whofe conduct they moved.

with them, his *ears* that he might *bear* with them and so on, through at least the most considerable parts of him; if it can much less be doubted, when the same things are *repeted* in the individuals of all the tribes of animals; if the like observations may be made with respect to *vegetables*, and other things: and if all these *kinds* of things, and therefore much more their *particulars*, upon and in the earth, waters, air, are unconceivably *numerous* (as most evidently they are), one cannot but be convinced from that, which is so *very* obvious to every understanding, and *plainly* runs through the *nobler* parts of the visible world, that not only they, but other things, even those that seem to be *less noble*, have their *ends* too, tho not so well understood.

And now since we cannot suppose the *parts* of matter to have *contrived* this wonderful form of a world among themselves, and then by agreement to have taken their respective posts, and pursued constant *ends* by certain methods and measures *concerted* (because these are acts, of which they are not capable), there must be some other Being, whose wisdom and power are equal to such a mighty work, as is the *structure* and *preservation* of the world. There must be some almighty *Mind*, who models and adorns it; lays the causes of things so deep; prescribes them such uniform and steady laws; destines and adapts them to certain purposes; and makes one thing to fit and answer to another ^w.

^w Τίς ὁ ἀρμόζων τὴν μάχαιραν πρὸς τὸν κολεόν, ἢ τὸν κολεόν πρὸς τὴν μάχαιραν, κτλ; “ Who was it that fitted the sword to the scabbard, “ and the scabbard to the sword ?” ARRIAN. Even such a thing as this doth not come by accident.

That

That *such* a beautiful scheme, *such* a just and geometrical arrangement of things, composed, of *innumerable* parts, and placed as the offices and uses and wants of the several beings *require*, through *such* an *immense* extent, should be the effect of *chance* only, is a conceit so prodigiously absurd, that certainly no one can espouse it heartily, who understands the *meaning* of that word. *Chance* seems to be only a term, by which we express our *ignorance* of the cause of any thing. For when we say any thing comes *by chance*, we do not mean, that it had no other cause; but only, that we do *not know* the true cause, which produced it, or interposed in *such* a manner, as to make that fall out which was not expected. Nor can I think, that any body has *such* an idea of *chance*, as to make it an *agent* or really existing and acting cause of any thing, and much less sure of all things. Whatever events or effects there are, they must proceed from some agent or cause, which is either *free* or *not free* (that is, necessary). If it be free, it wills what it produces: and therefore that which is produced is produced with *design*, not by chance. If it acts necessarily, the event must *necessarily* be, and therefore it is not by accident. For that, which is by accident or chance only, might not have been; or it is an accident only, that it is. There can be therefore *no such cause* as chance. And to omit a great deal that might yet be said, *matter* is *indefinitely* divisible, and the first particles (or atoms) of which it consists must be small beyond all our apprehension; and the chances, that must all hit to produce *one* individual of any *species* of material beings (if only chance was concerned),

must consequently be *indefinitely many*: and if *space* be also *indefinitely* extended, and the number of those individuals (not to say of the *species* themselves) which lie dispersed in it *indefinite*, the *chances* required to the production of them all, or of the universe, will be the rectangle of one *indefinite* quantity drawn into *another*. We may well call them *infinite*. And then to say, that any thing cannot happen, unless *infinite* chances coincide, is the same as to say, there are *infinite* chances against the happening of it, or odds that it will not happen: and this again is the same as to say, it is *impossible* to happen; since if there be a possibility that it *may* happen, the hazard is *not* infinite. The world therefore cannot be the child of *chance*^x. He must be little acquainted with the works of nature, who is not sensible how delicate and fine they are: and the *finer* they are, the *grosser* were those of *Epicurus*^y.

^x *Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intelligo cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius & viginti formæ literarum,—aliquid conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis annales Ennij, ut deinceps legi possint, effici: quod nescio anne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna.* “He who thinks that this is possible to be, I don’t see but he may as well think, that an infinite number of alphabets,—cast any where upon the ground at a venture, might come up the annals of *Ennius*, so as any one might read them; whereas I question whether chance is capable of producing one verse of them.” *CIC.* But alas, what are *Ennius*’s annals to such a work as the world is!

^y *H* was πολυγραφώτατος, πάντας υπερβαλλόμενος πλείους βιβλίων, “a great writer, and exceeded all others in the quantity of books.” *DIOG. LAERT.* But that part of his physics is here meant, in which he treated of the origin of the world; or rather of *infinite worlds*; which makes his thought the grosser still. For infinite worlds require *infinite* chances *indefinitely* repeated.

If

If it should be objected, that many things seem to be *useless*, many births are *monstrous*, or the like, such answers as these may be made. The *uses* of some things are known to *some* men, and not to *others*: the uses of some are known *now*, that were not known to any body *formerly*: the uses of many may be discovered *hereafter*: and those of some other things may *for ever* remain unknown to all men, and yet *be in nature*, as much as those discovered were before their discovery, or are now in respect of them who know them not. Things have not therefore no uses, because they are concealed from us. Nor is *nature* irregular, or without method, because there are some *seeming* deviations from the common rule. These are generally the effects of that influence, which free agents and various circumstances have upon natural productions; which may be deformed, or hurt by external *impressions*; heterogeneous *matter* introduced, or disagreeable and unnatural *motions* excited: and if the case could be *truly* put, it would no doubt appear, that nature proceeds as *regularly* (or the laws of nature have as regular an effect), when a *monster* is produced, as when the *usual* issue in common cases. Under these circumstances the monster is the *genuine* issue: that is, in the same circumstances there would always be the same kind of production. And therefore if things are now and then misshaped, this infers no unsteadiness or mistake in nature. Beside, the magnificence of the world admits of some *perturbations*; not to say, requires some *variety*. The question is, Could all those things, which we *do know* to have uses and ends, and to the production of which such wonderful contrivance

and the combinations of so many things are required, be produced, and method and regularity be preserved *so far as it is*, if nothing but *blind* chance presided over all? Are not the innumerable instances of things, which are *undeniably* made with reference to certain ends, and of those which are propagated and repeted by the *same* constant methods, *enough* to convince us, that there are ends proposed, and rules observed, even where we do not see them. And, lastly, if we should descend to particulars, what are those seemingly useless or monstrous productions in respect of the *rest*, that *plainly* declare the ends, for which they were intended, and that come into the world by the *usual* ways, with the *usual* perfection of their several kinds? If the comparison could be made, I verily believe these would be found to be almost infinite of the other; which ought therefore to be reputed as *nothing*.

They, who content themselves with words, may ascribe the formation of the world to *fate* or *nature*, as well as to *chance*, or better. And yet *fate*, in the first place, is nothing but a *series* of events, considered as necessarily following in some certain order; or, of which it has always been true, that they *would be* in their determinate times and places. It is called indeed a *series* of *causes*²: but then they are such causes as are also *effects*, all of them, if there is no First cause; and may be taken for *sub.* So that in this description is nothing like such a *cause*, as is capable of giving this form to the world.

² *Series implexa causarum.* “A series of causes connected with each other.” SEN.

A *series*

A *series* of events is the same with events happening *seriatim*: which words declare nothing concerning the *cause* of that concatenation of events, or why it is. Time, place, manner, necessity are but *circumstances* of things that come to pass; not causes of their existence, or of their being as they are. On the contrary, some external and superior cause must be supposed to put the *series* in motion, to project the order, to connect the causes and effects, and to *impose* the necessity ^a.

Then for *nature*, 1. If it be used for the *intrinsic manner* of existing; that constitution, make, or disposition, with which any thing is produced or *born*, and from which result those properties, powers, inclinations, passions, qualities, and manners, which are called *natural* (and sometimes *nature*), in opposition to such as are *acquired*, adventitious, or forced (which use is common): then to say, that nature formed any thing, or gave it its manner of

^a Seneca says himself, that in this series God is *prima omnium causa, ex qua cæteræ pendent*, “the first of all the causes, and upon him the rest depend.” Indeed it is many times difficult to find out what the ancients meant by *fate*. Sometimes it seems to follow the motions of the *heavenly bodies* and their aspects. Of this kind of fate is that passage in *Suetonius* to be understood, where he says that *Tiberius* was *addictus mathematicæ, persuasionisque plenus cuncta fato agi*, “given to mathematics, and fully persuaded that all things were governed by fate.” Sometimes it is confounded with *fortune*. So in *Lucian* we find τὴν τύχην πράξουσιν τὰ μεμορφωμένα, ἢ ἂ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνάσθη ἐπιπλάσθῃ, “fortune doing the things which are determined by fate, and destined to every one from the beginning.” And sometimes it is the same with God: as when the *Stoics* say, ἢ τε εἶναι θεὸν ἢ γῆν ἢ εἰμαρμένον ἢ Δία, “that God, and mind, and fate, and *Jupiter* are all the same,” *ap.* *DIOG. L.* and the like elsewhere.

existence, is to say, that it formed itself, or that the effect is the efficient^b. Beside, how can *manner* (manner of existing) be the cause of existing, or properly do any thing. An agent is an acting being, some substance, not a *manner* of being. 2. If it be used in that other sense, by which it stands for the *ideas* of things, what they are in themselves, and what in their circumstances, causes, consequences, respects; or, in short, that which determines them to be of this or that kind (as when we say, the *nature* of justice^c requires this or that; *i. e.* the idea of justice requires or supposes it: a crime is of such a *nature*; that is, bears such a respect to the law, and is attended with such circumstances, or the like): then none of *these* senses can do an atheist any service. 3. If it be used for the *world*^d (as, the laws of *nature* may be understood to be the laws of the world, by which it is governed, and the *phenomena* in it produced; after the same manner of speaking as when we say, the laws of *England, France, &c.*) then it stands for *that very thing*, the former and architect of which is the object of our inquiry; and therefore cannot be that architect *itself*. Under this sense may be comprehended that,

^b As when *Strato Lampf.* according to *Tully*, *docet omnia esse effecta naturâ*, “teaches that all things are the effects of nature.”

^c *Vis & natura justitiæ*. “The force and nature of justice.” *CIC.*

^d Almost as if it stood for *nata*, or *res natæ*; “all things that are produced.” (So *factura* seems to be put sometimes for *fætus*, “the child in the womb.”) *Sunt, qui omnia naturæ nomine appellant;—corpora, & inane, quæque his accidunt*. “Some persons use the word nature for every thing;—bodies and space, and all the properties of these.” *CIC.*

when

when it denotes *reality of existence*, as when it is said that such a thing is not in *nature* (not to be found in the *world*). 4. If it signifies the forementioned *laws* themselves; or that course, in which things by virtue of these laws proceed (as when the effects of these laws are styled the works of *nature*): then, laws suppose some legislator, and are posterior to that of which they are the laws. There can be no laws of any nation, till the people are of which that nation consists. 5. If it be used after the same manner as the word *habit* frequently is; to which many things are ascribed (just as they are to nature), though it be nothing existing distinct from the *habits*, which *particular* men or beings contract: then nature is a kind of *abstract* notion, which can *do* nothing. Perhaps *nature* may be put for *natures*, all natures, after the manner of a collective noun; or it may be mentioned as an *agent*, only as we personify virtues and attributes, either for variety, or the shorter and more convenient expressing of things. Lastly, if it denotes the *Author of nature*, or God^e (the *effect* seeming, tho by a hard metonymy in this case, to be put for the *efficient*): then, to *Him* it is that I ascribe the forma-

^e *Natura, inquit, hæc mihi præstat. Non intelligis te, cum hoc dicis, mutare nomen Deo? Quid enim aliud est Natura, quam Deus, & divina ratio, &c.* “ Nature, says he, gives me these “ things. Do you not see, when you say this, that you only “ put another name for God? For what else is nature, but “ God, and the divine reason, &c.?” SEN. When it is said, *Necesse est mundum ipsum natura administrari*, “ that the world “ must necessarily be governed by nature,” *ap. CIC.* what sense are those words capable of, if by *nature* be not really meant *God*? For it must be something different from the world, and something able to govern it.

tion

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 tion of the world, &c. To all which I must sub-
 join, that there is an unaccountable *liberty* taken in
 the use of this word : and that frequently it is used
 merely as a *word*, and nothing more, they who use
 it not knowing themselves, what they mean by it^f.
 However, in *no sense* can it supersede the being of
 a Deity.

XV. *Life, sense, cogitation, and the faculties of
 our own minds shew the existence of some superior Be-
 ing, from whom they are derived. Or, God is that
 Being, without whom neither could these be, any more
 than the things before mentiond.* That they cannot
 flow from the nature of any *matter* about us as mat-
 ter, or from any modification, size, or motion of
 it, if it be not already apparent, may perhaps be
 proved more fully afterwards. And that our *souls*
 themselves are not self-existent, nor hold their fa-
 culties independently of all other beings, follows
 from pr. IV. and VII. Therefore we must necessa-
 rily be indebted for what we have of this kind to
 some great Benefactor, who is the *fountain* of them.
 For since we are conscious, that we have them, and
 yet have them not of ourselves, we must have
 them from *some other*.

ⁱ *Alii naturam censent esse vim quandam sine ratione, cipientem
 motus in corporibus necessarios, &c.* “Some think nature to be a
 “certain power or force without reason, producing the neces-
 “sary motions in bodies, &c.” says *Balbus* in *Cicero*. What can
 this *vis* “power” be: *vis* “power” by itself, without the
 mention of any subject, in which it inheres; or of any cause,
 from whence it proceeds? A *soul* of the world, *plastic* nature,
hylarchic principle, שכל פועל, “an understanding principle,”
 and the like, are more intelligible than that.

A man

A man has little reason, God knows, to fancy the *suppositum* of his life, sense, and cogitative faculties to be an independent being, when he considers how *transitory* and *uncertain* at best his life and all his enjoyments are; *what* he is, *whence* he came, and *whither* he is going^e. The mind acts not, or in the most imperceptible manner *in animalculo*, or the seminal state of a man; only as a principle of vegetation in the state of an *embryon*; and as a sensitive soul in the state of *infancy*, at least for some time, in which we are rather below, than above, many other animals. By degrees indeed, with age and exercise and proper opportunities, it seems to open itself, find its own *talents*, and *ripen* into a rational being. But then it reasons not without labor, and is forced to take many tedious steps in the pursuit of truth; finds all its powers subject to great *eclipses* and diminutions, in the time of sleep, indisposition, sickness, &c. and at best reaching but a *few* objects in respect of all, that are in the immensity of the universe; and, lastly, is obnoxious to many painful sensations and reflexions. Had the *soul* of man the principle of its own existence and faculties *within itself*, clear of all dependence, it could not be liable to all these *limitations* and *defects*, to all these *alterations* and *removes* from one state to another: it must certainly be constant to itself, and persist in an *uniform* manner of being.

There may be perhaps who will say, that the *soul*, together with life, sense, &c. are propagated by *traduction* from parents to children, from them

דע כאין באת ולאן אתה הולך וכו' א
 "whence you came, and whither you are going." P. Ab.

to their children again, and so from eternity^b: and that therefore nothing can be collected from the nature of them as to the existence of a Deity. *Ans.* If there could be such a traduction, yet to suppose one *traduced* to come from another *traduced*, and so *ab eterno*, without any further account of the original of mankind, or taking in any author of this traductive power, is the same as to suppose an infinite series of *moveds* without a *mover*, or of *effects* without a *cause*: the absurdity of which is shewn already prop. I. But concerning this matter I cannot but think, further, after the following manner. What is meant by *tradux animæ* ought to be clearly explaind: for it is not easy to conceive how thought, or thinking substances, can be propagated after the manner of *branches*, or in any manner that can be *analogous* to it, or even warrant a *metaphorical* use of that phraseⁱ. It should also

^b For I cannot think that any body will now stand by that way of introducing men first into the world, which is mentiond by *Diodorus Sic.* but asserted by *Lucretius. Ubi quæque loci regio opportuna dabatur, Crescebant uteri terræ radicibus apti, &c.* “Where the country was proper for it, there grew wombs out of the earth, fixed to it by their roots, &c.”

ⁱ What by *Tertullian* in one place is called *animæ ex Adam tradux*, “a soul derived from Adam,” in another is *velut surculus quidam ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta*, “as it were a shoot derived from the womb of Adam, that the race might be continued,” and equally unintelligible. Nor doth he explain himself better, when he confesses there to be *duas species seminis, corporalem & animaleam* (al. *corporis semen & animæ*), “two sorts of seed, corporeal and animal (or a seed of the soul, and another of the body): or more fully, *semen animale ex animæ distillatione, sicut & virus illud, corporale semen, ex carnis defecatione*, “an animal seed flowing from the soul, as the bodily seed does from the body.”

be

be told, whether this traduction be made from *one* or from *both* the parents. If from one, from *which* of them is it? And if from both, then the same *tradux* or branch must always proceed from *two* stocks: which is a thing, I presume, that can no where else be found, nor has any parallel in nature. And yet such a thing may much better be supposed of vines, or plants, than of *thinking* beings, who are simple and uncompounded substances ^k.

This opinion of the *traduction* of souls seems to me to stand upon an unsound foundation. For I take it to be grounded chiefly on these two things: the *similitude* there is between the features, humors, and abilities of children and those of their parents ^l;

^k According to the fore-cited author the soul is derived from the *father* only, & *genitalibus fœminæ foventis commendata*, “and delivered to the womb of the mother;” and all souls from that of *Adam*. *Definimus animam, Dei fiatu natam, ex una redundantem*. “We, says he, define the soul to spring from the breath of God, and all souls to proceed from one:” and in another place, *ex uno homine tota hæc animarum redundantia agitur*, “all the souls that are, come originally from one man.” But this doth not well consist with his principal argument for traduction, *that children take after their parents*. For beside what will here be said by and by, if there is a traduction of all men from one man, and traduction causes likeness; then every man must be like the first, and (consequently) every other.

^l *Unde, oro te, similitudine animæ quoque parentibus de ingeniiis respondemus,—si non ex animæ semine educimur?* “Whence is it, I beseech you, says the same author, that we are so like our parents in the dispositions of our minds,—if we be not produced from the seed of the soul?” Then to confirm this, he argues like a father indeed, thus: *in illo ipso voluptatis ultimo æstu quo genitale virus expellitur, nonne aliquid de anima quoque sentimus exire?* “Do we not in the act of generation perceive some part of our very souls to go out of us?” I am ashamed to transcribe more.

and

and the difficulty men find in forming the *notion of a spirit*^m. For from hence they are apt to conclude, that there can be no other substance but *matter*: and that the *soul* resulting from some disposition of the body, or some part of it, or being some merely material appendix to it, must *attend* it, and come along with it from the parent or parents; and as there is a derivation of the *one*, so there must be also of the *other* at the same time.

Now the former of these is not always *true*; as it ought to be, to make the argument valid. Nothing more common than to see children *differ* from their parents; in their understandings, inclinations, shapes, complexions, and (*I am sure*) one from another. And this *dissimilitude* has as much force to prove there is *not* a traduction, as *similitude*, whenever that happens, can have to prove there is. Besides, it seems to me not hard to account for *some* likeness without the help of traduction. It is visible the meat and drink men take, the air they breathe, the objects they see, the sounds they hear, the company they keep, &c. will create *changes* in them, sometimes with respect to their intellectuals, sometimes to their passions and humors, and sometimes to their health and other circumstances of their bodies: and yet the *original stamina* and fundamental parts of the man remain still the *same*. If then the *semina*, out of which animals are produced, are (as I doubt not) *animalcula* already formedⁿ; which being distributed about, especially

^m Therefore the said father makes the soul to be corporeal:

ⁿ This might seem to be favored by them who hold, that all souls were created in the beginning (an opinion mentioned in

Nabb.

cially in some opportune places, are *taken in* with aliment, or perhaps the very air; being separated in the bodies of the *males* by strainers proper to every kind, and then lodged in *their* feminal vessels, do *there* receive some kind of addition and influence; and being thence transferred into the wombs of the *females*, are *there* nourishd more plentifully, and grow, till they become too big to be longer confined ^a: I say, if this be the case, why may not the *nutriment* received from the parents, being prepared by their vessels, and of the same kind with that with which they themselves are nourishd, be the same in great measure to the *animalcula* and *embrya* that it is to *them*; and consequently very much assimilate their young; without the derivation of any thing else from them? Many impressions may be made upon the *fœtus*, and many tinctures given to the *fluids* communicated to it from

Nabb. ab. & al. often), did not the same authors derive the body מִסֵּפֶת סְרוּחָה, “from a small seed:” as may be seen in *P. Abb. & pass.* Particularly *R. D. Zimbbi* says of man, מְסִיפֵת הַזֶּרַע אֲשֶׁר תִּהְיֶה לְדָם וּמוֹשֵׁם יִגְדֵל מֵעַט עַד שִׁישְׁתִּלְמוּ אִיבְרֵי, “That his body is produced out of a small seed, which is first converted into blood, and then increases by degrees, till all the members of it are complete.”

^a This account destroys that argument, upon which *Censorinus* says many of the old philosophers asserted the eternity of the world: *quod negent omnino posse reperiri, avise sine ante, an ova generata sint; cum & ovum sine ave, & avis sine ovo gigni non possit.* “Because they denied the possibility of finding out, which is first generated, the birds or the eggs; because an egg cannot be produced without a bird, nor a bird without an egg.” This question was once much agitated in the world, as may be seen by *Macrobius* and *Plutarch*; who calls it, τὸ ἀπρόβλεπτον ἢ πᾶσι ἀλύτῳ τῶν ζητητικῶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν—ἀπόβλεπτον, “a problem that cannot be solved, and which put the curious to great difficulties.”

the parents; and yet it, the *animal itself*, may not be originally begun in them, or traduced from them. This hypothesis (which has long been mine) suggests a reason, why the *child* is sometimes more like the *father*, sometimes the *mother*: viz. because the vessels of the *animalculum* are disposed to receive a greater proportion of aliment sometimes from the *one*, sometimes from the *other*: or the fluids and spirits in one may ferment and operate *more strongly* than in the other, and so have a *greater* and more signal effect. (Here it ought to be observed, that tho' what the *animalculum* receives from the father, is in quantity little in respect of all that nutriment, which it receives by the mother; yet the former, being the first accretion to the original *stamina*, adhering immediately, and being early interwoven with them, may affect it more.)

Since there cannot be a proper *traduction* of the child (*one* mind, and *one* body) from both the *two* parents, all the similitude it bears to *one* of them must proceed from some such cause as I have assigned, or at least not from *traduction*. For the child being *sometimes* like the father, and *sometimes* the mother, and the traduction either *always* from the father, or *always* from the mother, there must sometimes be *similitude*, where there is no *traduction*: and then if the child may resemble one of them without it, why not the other too? The account I have given, appears, many times at least, to be true in *plants*, which raised from the *same* seed, but in *different* beds and soil, will differ. The different nutriment introduces some diversity into the seed or original plant, and assimilates it in some measure to the rest raised in the same place.

The

The other thing, which I take to be one of the principal supports to this doctrine of *traduction* (a supposition, that the *soul* is merely material, or but the result of some disposition in matter) has been undertaken to be refuted hereafter. But I may premise this here: tho we can have no *image* of a *spirit* (because no being can be portraid or represented by an image, but what is material), yet we may have reason to assert the existence of *such* a substance°. *Matter* is a thing, which we converse with, of which we know pretty well the nature, and properties; and since we cannot find among them any that are *cogitative*, or such a thing as *life*, but several things *inconsistent* with them, we are under a necessity of confessing that there is some *other* species of substance beside that which is corporeal, and that our *souls* are of that kind (or rather of one of those kinds, which are not merely corporeal: for there must be more than one), tho we can draw no image of it in our own minds. Nor is it at all surprizing, that we should not be able to do this: for how can the mind be the object of itself? It may contemplate the body which it inhabits, may be conscious of its own acts, and reflect upon the ideas it finds: but of its own substance it can have no adequate notion, unless it could be as it were *object* and *spectator* both. Only that perfect Being, whose knowledge is infinite, can thus *intimately* know himself.

° This is as much as *Epicurus* had to say for his atoms: for they were only σώματα λόγῳ θεωρητά, κλ. “imaginary bodies.” JUST. MART.

P Οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ θεωρημένῳ τὸ θεωρεῖν. “For the thing which is “speculated upon, cannot speculate.” PLOTIN.

They, who found the *traduction* of the soul upon this presumption, that it is *material*; and attends the body as some part or affection of it, seem further to be most wofully mistaken upon this account: because the body *itself* is not propagated by *traduction*. It passes indeed *through* the bodies of the parents, who afford a transitory habitation and subsistence to it: but it cannot be *formed by* the parents, or *grow out* of any part of them. For all the *vital* and *essential* parts of it must be one *co-eval* system, and formed *at once* in the first article of the nascent *animalculum*; since no one of these could be *nourishd*, or ever come to any thing, without the rest: on the contrary, if any one of them could prevent and be before the rest, it would soon wither and decay again for lack of nourishment received by proper vessels; as we see the limbs and organs of animals do, when the supply due from the animal œconomy is any way intercepted or obstructed. And since an organized body, which requires to be thus *simultaneously* made (fashion'd as it were at one stroke) cannot be the effect of any natural and *gradual* process, I cannot but conclude, that there were *animalcula* of every tribe originally formed by the almighty Parent, to be the *seed* of all future generations of animals. Any other manner of production would be like that, which is usually called *equivocal* or spontaneous generation, and with great reason now generally *exploded*. And it is certain, that the analogy of nature in other instances, and microscopical observations do abet what I have said *strongly*.

Lastly, if there is no *race* of men that hath been from eternity, there is no man who is not descended

ed from two *first parents*: and then the souls of those two first parents could be traduced from *no other*. And that there is no such race (none that has been upon this earth from eternity), is apparent from the face of earthly things, and the *history* of mankind, arts, and sciences. What is objected against this argument from fancied *inundations, conflagrations, &c.* † has no weight with me. Let us suppose some such great calamity to happen now. It must be either universal, or not. If *universal*, so that no body at all could be saved, then either there must never be any more men, or they must begin again in some *first parents*. If it was only *topical*, affecting some one tract of the globe, or if the tops of mountains more eminent, or rocks more firm remained unaffected, or if there were *any* natural means left by which men might escape, considerable numbers must certainly *survive*: and then it cannot be imagined, that they should all be *absolutely so ignorant* of every thing, that no one should be able to give an account of such things as were *common*; no one able to write, or read, or even to recollect that there were such things as letters; none, that understood any trade;

‡ *Si nulla fuit genitalis origo terræ & cæli—Cur supra bellum Thebanum & funera Trojæ Non alias alii quoque res cecinere postea?* “ If the earth and the heavens never had any beginning,—how comes it to pass that the poets never celebrated “ any other matters before the wars of *Thebes* and the destruction of *Troy*?” LUCRET.

† Πολλὰς ἔκατα πολλὰ φθοραὶ γέγονασιν ἀνθρώπων, ἔϊσονται, περὶ μὲν ἔϊδατι μείρισται. “ There hath been great destruction made of “ mankind many times and in many places, and will be so a “ gain; the greatest of them have been by fire and water.” PLATO.

none, that could tell what kind of habitations they had, how they used to be clothed, how their meat dress, or even what their food was: nor can it be thought, that *all* books, arms, manufactures of every kind, ships, buildings, and all the product of human skill and industry now extant in the world should be so *universally* and *utterly* abolisht, that no part, no *vestigium* of them should remain; not so much, as to give a hint toward the speedy reitoration of necessary arts at least. The people escaping must sure have clothes on, and many necessaries about them, without which they could not escape, nor outlive such a dreadful scene. In short, no *conflagration*, no *flood*, no *destruction* can serve the objectors purpose, to reduce mankind to that state, which by ancient memoirs and many undeniable symptoms we find them to have been in *not many* thousands of years since; I say, no destruction can serve his purpose, but such an one as makes *thorough* work, only sparing two or three couples, stript of every thing and the most stupid and veriest blocks^s to be picked out of the whole number: natural fools, or mere *homines sylvestres* would retain habits, and fall to their old way of living, as soon as they had the opportunity to do it. And suppose they never should have such an opportunity; yet neither would *this* serve him effectually: since without some *supernatural* Power interposing, such a revolution could not be brought about, nor the naked creatures preserved, nor the earth reformed out of its ashes and ruins after such

^s Τῆς ἀγραιμίας; ἢ ἀμύτου, “Such as could not tell their letters, or distinguish one sound from another,” as *Plato* speaks.

a calcination, or dissolution, such a *total* demolition of every thing. To this give me leave to add, that tho many inundations, great earthquakes, vulcano's and fiery eruptions have been in particular countries; yet there is no memory or testimony of any such thing, that has ever been *universal*^t, except perhaps of one deluge: and as to that, if the the *genius* of the language in which the relation is deliverd, and the manner of writing history in it were well understood, some labor and moliminous attempts to account for it might have been prevented. And beside that, the same *record*, which tells the thing was, tells also how immediately God was concernd in it; that some persons actually were saved; and that the people who then perishd, as well as they who survived, all descended from two *first parents*: and if that authority be a sufficient proof of *one part* of the relation, it must be so of the *rest*.

We may conclude then, that the *human soul* with its faculties of cogitation, &c. depends upon a *Superior* being. And who can this be but the *Supreme* being, or God? Of whom I now proceed to affirm, in the next place, that,

XVI. *Though His essence and manner of being is to us altogether incomprehensible, yet we may say with*

^t For what has been said only in general, and presumptively, to serve a cause, signifies nothing: no more than that testimony in *Arnobius*, where he seems to allow, that there have been universal conflagrations. *Quando mundus incensus in favillas & cineres dissolutus est? Non ante nos?* "When, says he, was the world so burned as to be reduced to dust and ashes?" "Has it not been so formerly?"

assurance, that He is free from all defects : or One, from whom all defects must be removed.

This proposition hath in effect been proved already^u. However I will take the liberty to enlarge a little further upon it here. As our minds are *finite*, they cannot without a contradiction comprehend what is *infinite*. And if they were enlarged to ever so great a capacity, yet so long as they retain their general nature, and continue to be of the *same kind*, they would by that be only rendered able to apprehend *more and more finite* ideas ; out of which, howsoever increased or exalted, no positive idea of the *perfection* of God can ever be formed. For a *Perfect* being must be *infinite*, and perfectly *One* : and in such a nature there can be nothing *finite*, nor any *composition* of finites.

How should we comprehend the nature of the Supreme incorporeal being, or how He exists, when we comprehend not the nature of the most *inferior spirits*, nor have any conception even of matter itself divested of its accidents ? How should we attain to an *adequate* knowledge of the Supreme author of the world, when we are utterly incapable of knowing the *extent* of the world itself, and the numberless undescried regions, with their several states and circumstances, contained in it, never to be frequented or visited by our philosophy ; nor can turn ourselves any way, but we are still accosted with something *above* our understanding ? If we cannot penetrate so far into *effects*, as to discover them and their nature thoroughly, it is not to be expected, that we should, that we *can* ever be admitted to see through the mysteries of His na-

^u Prop. V, VI.

ture,

ture, who is the *Cause*, so far *above them all*. The Divine perfection then, and manner of being must be of a *kind* different from and above all that we can conceive.

However, notwithstanding our own defects, we may positively affirm there can be *none* in God: since He is *perfect*, as we have seen, He cannot be *defective* or *imperfect*. This needs no further proof. But what follows from it, I would have to be well understood and remembered: *viz.* that from Him must be removed *want of life and activity, ignorance, impotence, acting inconsistently with reason and truth*, and the like. Because these are *defects*; defect of knowledge, power, &c. These are defects and blemishes even in *us*. And tho his perfection is above all our ideas, and of a different *kind* from the perfections of men or any finite beings; yet what would be a defect in *them*, would be much more such in *Him*, and can by no means be ascribed to Him *.

Though we understand not His manner of knowing things; yet *ignorance* being uniform and the *same* in every subject, we *understand* what is meant by that word, and can literally and truly *deny* that to belong to Him. The like may be said with respect to His power, or manner of operating, &c. And when we speak of the *internal essential* attributes of God positively, as that He is omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, &c. the *intent* is only to say, that there is no object of knowledge or

* If that in *Terence* had been (not a question, as it is there; but) an affirmation, *Ego homuncio hoc non facerem*, "I, poor mortal, would not have done such a thing," what a bitter reflexion had it been upon the heathen deity?

power,

power, which He does not know or cannot do, He exists without beginning and end, &c. and thus we keep still within the limits allowed by the proposition^x. That is, we may speak *thus* without pretending to *comprehend* His nature. And so,

XVII. *We may consider God as operating in the production and government of the world, and may draw conclusions from His works, as they are called, notwithstanding any thing which has been said*^y. Because this we can do without comprehending the manner of His existence. Nay, the contemplation of His works leads us into a necessity of owning, that there must be an incomprehensible Being at the head of them.

Though I do not comprehend the *mode*, in which the world depends upon Him and He influences and disposes things, because this enters into His *nature*, and the one cannot be understood without the other: yet if I see things, which I know cannot be *self-existent*, and observe plainly an *oeconomy* and *design* in the disposition of them, I may conclude that there is *some Being*, upon whom their existence doth depend, and by whom they are modeld; may call this Being GOD, or the Author and Governor of the world, &c. without *contradicting* myself or truth: as I hope it will appear from what has been said, and is going to be said in the next proposition.

^x Λέγομεν ὁ μὴ εἶναι ὁ δὲ εἶναι, ἢ λέγομεν. "We affirm what He is not, but we do not affirm what He is." PLOTIN.

^y אין דרך להשיגו אלא ממעשי^ו. "There is no way to know what sort of being He is but by his works." MAIM.

XVIII. *God, who gives existence to the world, does also govern it by His providence. Concerning this grand question, Whether there is a Divine providence, or not, I use to think, for myself, after the following manner.*

First, The world may be said to be govern'd (at least cannot be said to be ἀνευθεύτως, or left to fluctuate fortuitously), if there are laws, by which natural causes act, the several phenomena in it succeed regularly, and, in general, the constitution of things is preserved: if there are rules observed in the production of herbs, trees, and the like: if the several kinds of animals are, in proportion to their several degrees and stations in the animal kingdom, furnish'd with faculties proper to direct and determine their actions; and when they act according to them, they may be said to follow the law of their nature: if they are placed and provided for suitably to their respective natures and wants^z, or (which amounts to the same thing) if their natures are adapted to their circumstances^a: if, lastly, particular cases relating to rational beings are taken care of in such a manner, as will at last agree best with reason.

^z מִקְרָנֵי רֵאמִים עַד בִּיצֵי כְּנִים. “From the horns of the
“unicorns to the feet of the lice,” as the Jews speak.

^a I shall not pretend here to meddle with particular cases relating to *inanimate* or *irrational* beings; such as are mention'd in *Mor. nebok.* (a leaf's falling from a tree, a spider's catching a fly, &c.) and which are there said to be בְּמִקְרָה גְּמוּרָה. “by
“mere accident.” Tho it is hard to separate these many times from the cases of rational beings; as also to comprehend what בְּמִקְרָה גְּמוּרָה, *perfect accident*, is.

Secondly,

Secondly, If there are such *laws* and *provisions*, they can come originally from no other being, but from Him who is the *Author of nature*. For those *laws*, which result from the *natures* of things, their *properties*, and the use of their *faculties*, and may be said to be written upon the things themselves, can be the *laws* of no other: nor can those things, whose very *being* depends upon God, exist under any condition *repugnant* to His will; and therefore can be subject to no *laws* or *dispositions*, which He would not have them be subject to; that is, which are not *His*. Beside, there is *no other* being capable of imposing *laws*, or any scheme of government upon the world; because there is no other, who is not himself *part* of the world, and whose own existence doth not *depend* upon Him.

Thirdly, By the *providence of God* I mean His governing the world by *such* *laws*, and making *such* *provisions*, as are mentiond above. So that if there are *such*, there is a Divine providence.

Lastly, It is not *impossible*, that there should be *such*: on the contrary, we have just reasons to believe there are. It would be an absurd assertion to say, that any thing is *impossible* to a being whose nature is infinitely above our comprehension, if the terms do not *imply a contradiction*: but we may with confidence assert, that it is *impossible* for any thing, whose *existence* flows from such a being, ever to grow so far out of His reach, or be so emancipated from under Him, that the *manner* of its existence should not be regulated and determind by Him.

As to *inanimate substances*, we see the case to be really just as it was supposed before to be. The heavenly and greater bodies keep their stations, or persevere

persevere to go the same circuits over and over by a *certain law*. Little bodies or particles, of the same kind, observe continually the same *rules* of attracting, repelling, &c. When there are any seeming variations in nature, they proceed only from the different circumstances and combinations of things, acting all the while under their ancient *laws*. We are so far acquainted with the *laws* of gravitation and motion, that we are able to calculate their effects, and serve ourselves of them, supplying upon many occasions the defect of power in ourselves by mechanical powers, which never fail to answer according to the *establishment*. Briefly, we see it so far from being *impossible*, that the *inanimate* world should be governd by *laws*, that all the parts of it are obnoxious to *laws* by them *inviolable*.

As to *vegetables*, we see also how they are determind by *certain methods* prescribed them. Each sort is produced from its *proper* seed; hath the *same* texture of fibres; is nourishd by the *same* kind of juices out of the earth, digested and prepared by the *same* kind of vessels, &c. Trees receive annually their *peculiar* liveries, and bear their *proper* fruits: flowers are dressd, each family, in the *same* colors, or diversify their fashions after a certain manner *proper* to the kind, and breathe the *same* essences: and both these and all other kinds *observe* their seasons; and seem to have their several professions and trades *appointed them*, by which they produce such food and manufactures (pardon the *catachresis*), as may *satisfy the wants* of animals. Being so very necessary, they, or at least the most useful, grow *easily*: being fixt in the earth,
insensible,

insensible, and not made for society, they are generally ἀρρενοθήλαα: being liable to a great consumption both of them and their seeds, they yield *great quantities* of these, in order to repair and multiply their race, &c. So that here is evidently a *regulation*, by which the several orders are preserved, and the ends of them answerd according to their first *establishment* too.

Then as to *animals*, there are *laws*, which *mut. mutand.* are common to them with inanimate beings and vegetables, or at least such as resemble ^b their laws. The individuals of the several kinds of those, as of these, have the *same* (general) shape and members, to be managed after the *same* manner: have the *same* vessels replenishd with the *same* kinds of fluids, and furnishd with the *same* glands for the separation and distribution of such parts of them, as answer the *same* intentions in them all: are stimulated by the *same* appetites and uneasinesses to take in their food, continue their breed, &c. And whatever it is, that proceeds thus in a manner so like to that of vegetables, according to *fixt* methods, and keeps in the same general track as they do, may be said to observe and be under some *like rule* or *law*, which either operates upon and limits it *ab extra*, or was given it with its nature. But there are, moreover, certain obligations resulting from the several degrees of reason and sense, or sense only, of which we cannot but be conscious in ourselves, and observe some faint indications in

^b *Pliny* in his chapter *De ordine naturæ in fatis*, &c. “concerning the course and order of nature in the growth of corn, &c.” treats of trees in terms taken from animals.

the kinds below us, and which can be lookt upon as nothing less than *laws*, by which animals are to move and manage themselves: that is, otherwise express'd, by which the Author of their natures *governs* them. 'Tis true *these laws* may not impose an absolute necessity, nor be of the same rigor with those of inanimate and merely passive beings, because the beings which are subject to these (men at least) may be supposed in some measure free, and to act upon some kind of principles or motives: yet still they may have the nature of *laws*, tho they may be broken; and may make a part of that *providence* by which God *administers* the affairs of the world. Whatever advantages I obtain by my own free endeavours, and right use of those faculties and powers I have, I look upon them to be as much the effects of God's *providence* and government; as if they were given me *immediately* by Him, without my acting; since all my faculties and abilities (whatever they are) depend upon *Him*, and are as it were *instruments* of His providence to me in respect of such things as may be procur'd by them^c.

To finish this head: it is so far from being *impossible*, that the several tribes of *animals* should be so made and placed, as to find proper ways of supporting and defending themselves (I mean, so far as it is consistent with the general oecconomy of the world: for some cannot well subsist without the destruction of some others), that, on the contrary, we see men, beasts, birds, fishes, insects all have

^c Therefore if those *Essenes* in *Josephus*, who are said ἐπι μὲν θεῷ καταλιπεῖν τὰ πάντα, "to leave all things to God," excluded human endeavours, they must be much in the wrong.

organs

organs and faculties adapted to their respective circumstances and opportunities of finding their proper food or prey, &c. even to the astonishment of them who attend to the history of nature. If *men*, who seem to have more wants than any other kind, meet with difficulties in maintaining life, it is because they themselves, not contented with what is *decent* and *convenient* only, have by their luxuries and scandalous neglect of their reason *made* life expensive.

The *world* then being not left in a state of confusion or as a chaos, but reduced into *order* and *methodized* for ages to come; the several species of beings having their offices and provinces *assigned* them; plants and animals subsistence *set out* for them; and as they go off, successors *appointed* to relieve them, and carry on the *scheme*, &c. that the *possibility* only of a *general* providence should be allowed, is certainly *too modest* a demand. We see, or may see, that *in fact* there is *such* a providence^d.

The great difficulty is, how to account for that *providence*, which is called *particular*; or that, which respects (principally) *particular* men. For rational beings and free agents are capable of doing and deserving *well*, or *ill*. Some *will* make a

^d *Ut si quis in domum aliquam, aut in gymnasium, aut in forum venerit, cum videat omnium rerum rationem, modum, disciplinam, non possit ea sine causa fieri judicare, sed esse aliquem intelligat, qui præsit, & cui pareatur, &c.* "In the same manner as if any one should come into a house or place of public exercise, or into any court of justice, and see every thing in exact order and according to strict discipline; such an one could not think that all those things were done without a cause, but he would immediately apprehend, that there was somebody at the head, whose commands were obeyed, &c." Cic.

right

right use of their faculties and opportunities, some will not: the vicious may, or may not repent, or repent and *relapse*: some fall into evil habits through inadvertence, bad examples, and the like, rather than any design: and these want to be reclaim'd: some may be supposed to worship God and to crave His protection and blessing, &c. and then a proper answer to their prayers may be humbly expected. Hence many and great differences will arise, which will require from a governor *suitable* encouragements, rewards, corrections, punishments; and that some should be protected and fortunate, others not, or less. Now the *good* or *ill* state of a man here, his safety or danger, happiness or unhappiness depend upon many things, which seem to be scarce *all capable* of being determin'd by providence. They depend upon what he does *himself*, and what naturally follows from his own behaviour: upon what is done by *others*, and may either touch him at the same time, or reach him afterward: upon the *course* of nature, which must affect him: and, in fine, upon many *incidents*, of which no account is to be given^e. As to what *he*
does

^e Little things have many times unforeseen and great effects: & *contra*. The bare sight of a fig, shewn in the senate-house at *Rome*, occasion'd *Carthage* to be destroy'd: *quod non Trebia, aut Trasymenus, non Cannæ busto insignes Romani nominis perficere potuerunt; non castra Punica ad tertium lapidem vallata, portæque Collinæ adequitans ipse Hannibal.* "Which neither the
 " river *Po*, nor the lake *Trasymenus*, nor the city of *Canna*,
 " famous for the overthrow of almost the whole *Roman* na-
 " tion, could do; no, nor the *African* camp intrenched for
 " three miles round, nor *Hannibal* himself who ventured to the
 " very gates of *Rome*." *PLIN.*

does himself, it is impossible for him, as things are in this maze of life, to know always what tends to happiness, and what not: or if he could know, that, which ought to be done, may not be within the compass of his powers. Then, if the actions of other men are *free*, how can they be determin'd to be only *such*, as may be either good or bad (as the *case requires*) for some other particular man; since such a determination seems inconsistent with liberty? Beside, numbers of men acting every one upon the foot of their own *private* freedom, and the several *degrees* of sense and ability which they *respectively* have, their acts, as they either conspire, or cross and obliquely impede, or perhaps directly meet and *oppose* each other, and have different effects upon men of different *makes*, or in different *circumstances*, must cause a strange embarras, and intangle the plot^f. And as to the *course of nature*, if a *good* man be passing by an infirm buikling, just in the article of falling, can it be expected, that God should *suspend* the force of gravitation till he

The whole story is thus related by the same author: *Cato*, being very sollicitous that *Carthage* should be utterly destroy'd, produced one day in the senate-house a ripe fig, which was brought from thence, and, shewing it to the senators, asked them, how long they thought it was, since that fig was pluck'd off the tree? They all agreed that it was very fresh; upon which he told them that it was pluck'd at *Carthage* but three days before; so near, says he, is the enemy to our walls. And this was the occasion of the third *Punic* war, in which *Carthage* was utterly destroy'd.

^f While every one pushes his own designs, they must interfere, and hinder one another. *Ad summum succedere bonorem Certantes, iter infestum fecere vias.* "By striving to get to the highest dignity, they render the way very dangerous." LUCRET.

is gone by, in order to his deliverance; or can we think it would be increased, and the fall hastend, if a *bad* man was there, only that he might be caught, crushd, and made an example ^g? If a man's safety or prosperity should depend upon winds or rains, must *new* motions be impress'd upon the atmosphere, and *new* directions given to the floating parts of it, by some *extraordinary* and *new* influence from God? Must clouds be so precipitated, or kept in suspension ^h, as the *case* of a particular man or two requires? To which add, that the differing and many times contrary interests of men are scarce to be *reconciled*. The wind, which carries one into the *port*, drives another back to *sea*; and the rains, that are but just sufficient upon the *bills*, may drown the inhabitants of the *valleys* ⁱ. In short, may we expect *miracles* ^k: or can there be a particular

^g Or is it not more likely, *απειρώσεως οἰκοδομίας, τὸν ὑποπεσόντα ἀφαιδανεύειν, ὃ ποιεῖς ποτ' ἂν ᾖ* "that when a house falls, he that it falls upon should be killed, what sort of a man soever he be (*good or bad*)" in *Plotinus's* words?

^h Something more than this we meet with in *Onq.'s* paraphrase, where it is said, that upon *Moses's* prayer, מִטְרָא דְהוּוּ, מִטְרָא עַל אֶרֶץ נַחֲתִית לֹא מִטְרָא, "the rain, that was falling, did not reach to the earth." Which same place *Rasbi* explains after the same manner; וְאִם אֶרֶץ לֹא הִגִּיעַ [מִטְרָא] לֹא הִגִּיעוּ לְאָרֶץ שֶׁהָיָה בְּאוֹיֵר לֹא הִגִּיעוּ לְאָרֶץ. "The rain came not to the earth, and also that of it, which was in the air, did not fall to the ground."

ⁱ In *Lucian*, τῶν πλεόντων δὲ μὲν βορίαν ἤχρητο ἐπισηπνῦσαι· ὃ δὲ, νότον δὲ δὲ γεωργὸς ἦται ἰετόν· ὃ δὲ πναφεύς, ἥλιον. "Some of the sailors pray for a north-wind, and some for a south-wind; the country-man wishes for wet weather, and the fuller for sun-shiny."

^k Some have talked to this purpose. So *R. Albo* says of some prophets and *bhafsdim*, "holy men," שִׁישְׁנו הַטְּבַע אוֹ שִׁישְׁנו הַטְּבַע, "that they can alter the course of nature,

particular providence, a providence that suits the *several cases* and prayers of individuals, without a continual *repetition* of them, and force *frequently* committed upon the laws of nature, and the freedom of intelligent agents? For my part, I verily believe there may. For,

1. It seems to me not *impossible*, that God should know *what is to come*: on the contrary, it is highly reasonable to think, that He does and must know things *future*. Whatever happens in the world, which does not come immediately from Him, must either be the effect of *mechanical causes*, or of the motions of living beings and *free agents*. For *chance* we have seen already is no cause. Now as to the former, it cannot be *impossible* for Him, upon whom the being and nature of every thing depends, and who therefore must *intimately* know all their powers and what effects they will have, to see through the whole *train* of causes and effects, and whatever will come to pass in *that way*¹: nay, it is

“ or it will be altered for them.” So *R. Is. Abub.* that the good or evil, which happens to a man in this world by way of reward or punishment, אין זה רק במעשה הנם והוא גם נסתד יחשוב, “ is not only by plain miracles, but also by obscure marks; as any one may imagine, who sees the manner of the world.” So *Abarb.* היכולת האלהי, “ It is that power of God which changes nature by his providence.” And accordingly in *Sed. tepb.* we find this thanksgiving: מודים אנחנו לך עמנו — “ We praise thee—for thy wonders which we behold every day.”

¹ What *Seneca* says of the Gods (in the heathen style), may be said of the true God. *Nota est illi operis sui series: omniumque illi rerum per manus suas iturarum scientia in aperto semper est; nec tibi ex abdito subit, &c.* “ Known unto him is the whole course
“ of

is impossible, that He should *not* do it. We ourselves, if we are satisfied of the goodness of the materials of which a machine is made, and understand the force and determination of those powers by which it is moved, can tell what it will do, or what will be the effect of it. And as to those things which depend upon the *voluntary* motions of free agents, it is well known, that men (by whom learn how to judge of the rest) can only be free with respect to such things as are within their *sphere*; not great, God knows: and their freedom with respect to these can only consist in a liberty either to act, without any incumbent necessity, as their *own reason* and judgment shall determine them; or to *neglect* their rational faculties, and not use them at all, but suffer themselves to be carried away by the tendencies and inclinations of the body, which left thus to itself acts in a manner *mechanically*. Now He, who knows what *is* in mens power, what not; knows the make of their bodies, and all the *mechanism* and propensions of them; knows the *nature* and *extent* of their understandings, and what will determine them this or that way; knows all the process of natural (or second) causes, and consequently how these may work upon them^m: He, I say, who knows all this, may know *what* men will do, if He can but know this one thing more, *viz.* whether they *will use* their rational faculties or *not*.

“ of his works; the knowledge of all those things, which are
 “ to pass through his hands, is clear to him, but obscure to
 “ us, &c.”

^m Ὁ γὰρ ζωοπλάστης θεὸς ἐπίσταται τὰ ἑαυτοῦ καλῶς δημιουργήματα.

“ God, who formed all living creatures, understands his own
 “ works thoroughly.” PH. JUD.

And since even we ourselves, mean and defective as we are, can *in some measure* conceive, how so much as this may be done, and seem to want but one step to finish the account, can we with any shew of reason deny to a *Perfect* being this one article more, or think that He cannot do that too; especially if we call to mind, that this very power of *using* our own faculties is held of Himⁿ?

Observe what a sagacity there is in some *men*, not only in respect of physical causes and effects, but also of the future actings of mankind; and how very easie it is many times, if the persons concernd, their characters, and circumstances are given, to foresee what they will do: as also to foretel many general events, tho the intermediate transactions upon which they depend are not known^o. Consider how much more remarkable this penetration is in *some men*, than in *others*: consider further, that if there be any *minds* more perfect than the human, (and who can be so conceited of himself as to question this?) they must have it in a still more eminent degree, *proportionable* to the excellence of their natures: in the last place, do but allow (as you must) this power of discerning to be

ⁿ *Ipsæ nostræ voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo, ejusque præscientia continetur, &c.* “Our wills themselves may be lookd upon as causes, the manner of which God certainly knows, and it is containd in his foreknowledge, &c.”
St AUST.

^o *Et si quem exitum acies habitura sit, divinare nemo potest; tamen belli exitum video, &c.* “Tho no body can tell what may happen to the army, yet I see what the event of the war will be, &c.” And after, *quem ego tam video animo, quam ea, quæ oculis cernimus,* “I see it as plainly in my mind, as I can see any thing with my eyes.” CIC.

in

in God *proportionable* to His nature, as in lower beings it is proportionable to *theirs*, and then it becomes *infinite*; and then again, the *future* actions of free agents are at once all unlocked, and exposed to His view. For that knowledge is not infinite, which is limited to things *past* or *present*, or which come to pass *necessarily*.

After all, what has been said is only a feeble attempt to shew, how far *even we* can go toward a conception of the *manner*, in which future things may be known: but as we have no adequate idea of an infinite and perfect Being, His powers, and among them His *power of knowing*, must infinitely pass all our understanding. It must be something different from and *infinitely* transcending all the modes of apprehending things, which we know any thing of P.

We know matters of fact by the help of our *senses*, the strength of *memory*, impressions made upon *phantasy*, or the *report* of others (tho that indeed is comprehended under *senses*. For that, which we know only by report, in proper speaking we only know the report of, or we have heard it); and all these ways do suppose those matters either to be *present*, or once to *have been*: but is it therefore *impossible*, that there should be any *other ways* of knowing? This is so far from being true, that, since God has no organs of sensation, nor such mean faculties as the best of ours are, and consequently cannot know things in the way which

אין זה ידיעה כמין ידיעתנו P. "His knowledge is not such a sort of a knowledge as ours is." MAIM. It differs not ברב ובמעט לבד אבל במין המציאה "only in degree, but in kind." *Id.*

we know them in, if He doth not know them by some *other* way, He cannot know them *at all*, even tho they were present: and therefore there must be *other* ways, or at least *another* way of knowing even matters of fact. And since the difficulty we find in determining, whether *future* matters of fact may be known, arises chiefly from this, that we in reality consider, without minding it, whether they may be known in *our way* of knowing; it vanishes, when we recollect, that they are and must be known to God by some other way: and not only so, but this must be some way, that is perfect and worthy of Him, *Future*, or what to us is future, may be as truly the object of Divine knowledge, as *present* is of ours: nor can we tell, what respect *past*, *present*, *to come*, have to the Divine mind, or wherein they differ. To deaf men there is no such thing as *sound*, to blind no such thing as *light* or *color*: nor, when these things are defined and explained to them in the best manner, which their circumstances admit, are they capable of knowing *how* they are apprehended. So here, we cannot tell *how* future things are known perhaps, any more than deaf or blind people what sounds or colors are, and *how* they are perceived; but yet there may be a way of knowing *those*, as well as there is of perceiving *these*. As they want a *fifth* sense to perceive sounds or colors, of which they have no notion: so perhaps we may want a *sixth* sense, or *some faculty*, of which future events may be the proper objects. Nor have we any more

⁹ *Ignari, quid queat esse, Quid nequeat*: "Who are ignorant of what can be, and what cannot be:" to use *Lucretius's* words more properly.

reason

reason to deny, that there is in nature *such* a sense or faculty, than the deaf or blind have to deny, that there is such a sense as that of *bearing* or *seeing*.

We can never conclude, that it is *impossible* for an infinitely perfect Being to know what a free agent will *choose* to do, till we can comprehend *all* the powers of such a Being, and that is till we ourselves are infinite and perfect^r. So far are we from being able to pronounce with any shew of reason, that it is *impossible* there should be such knowledge in God.

In the last place, this knowledge is not only not *impossible*, but that which has been already proved concerning the Deity and His perfection doth necessarily infer, that nothing can be hid from Him. For if *ignorance* be an imperfection, the ignorance of *future* acts and events must be so: and then if *all* imperfections are to be denied of Him, *this must*.

There is indeed a common prejudice against the *prescience* (as it is usually called) of God; which suggests, that, if God foreknows things, He foreknows them infallibly or *certainly*: and if so, then they are *certain*; and if certain, then they are no longer matter of *freedom*. And thus prescience and freedom are inconsistent. *But sure* the nature of a thing is not *changed* by being known, or known before hand. For if it is known truly, it is known to be what it is; and therefore is not altered by this. The truth is, God foresees, or rather sees the actions of free agents, because they *will be*; not that

^r To attempt to comprehend the manner of God's knowing is the same as to endeavour שנהיה אנחנו הוּא שנהיה, "to become what He is." MAIM.

they

they will be, because He *foresees* them^s. If I see an object in a certain place, the veracity of my faculties supposed, it is *certain* that object is there: but yet it cannot be said, it is there *because* I see it there, or that my seeing it there is the *cause* of its being there: but because it *is there*, therefore I *see* it there. It is the object, that determines my sensation: and so in the other case, it is a future *choice* of the free agent, that determines the prescience, which yet may be infallibly true^t.

Let us put these two contradictory propositions, *B* (some particular man) *will go to church next Sunday*, and *B will not go to church next Sunday*; and let us suppose withall, that *B* is *free*, and that his going or not going depends merely upon his *own will*. In this case he may indeed do either, but yet he can do but *one* of these two things, either *go*, or *not go*; and one he must do. One of these propositions therefore is now *true*; but yet it is not the truth of that proposition, which forces him *to do* what is contained in it: on the contrary, the *truth* of the proposition arises from what he shall *choose* to do. And if that truth doth not force him, the *foreknowledge* of that truth will not. We

ידיעתו במה שיהיה לא יוציא הדבר האפשר מטבעו.
 “ His knowledge of any thing that is future does not produce the thing that is possible in nature.” MAIM. Much might be inserted upon this subject (out of *Abarb.* particularly) which I shall omit.

^s *Sicut enim tu memoriâ tuâ non cogis facta esse quæ præterierunt; sic Deus præscientiâ suâ non cogit facienda quæ futura sunt,*
 “ As we do not force the things that are past to have been done by our remembering them; so God does not force the things that are future to be done by his foreknowing them.”
 St AVST.

may

may sure suppose B himself to *know certainly* before hand, which of the two he will choose to do, whether to go to church or not (I mean so far as it depends upon his choice only): and if so, then here is B's own *foreknowledge* consistent with his freedom: and if we can but, further, suppose God to know *as much* in this respect as B does, there will be God's *foreknowledge* consistent with B's *freedom*.

In a word, it involves no *contradiction* to assert, that God certainly knows what any man will choose; and therefore that he should do this cannot be said to be *impossible*.

2. It is not *impossible*, that such *laws* of nature, and such a *series* of causes and effects may be *originally* designed, that not only general provisions may be made for the several species of beings, but even *particular cases*, at least many of them, may also be provided for without *innovations* or *alterations* in the course of nature^u. It is true this amounts to a prodigious scheme, in which all things to come are as it were comprehended under one

^u Things come to pass ἢ κατὰ φυσικῆς ἀκολουθίας ἢ κατὰ λόγον
 “ according to their natural course, and according to reason;”
 and even τὰ σμικρότερα δὲ συντετάχθαι ἢ συνφάνθαι νομίζειν, “ the
 “ most minute things, we ought to think, are duly regulated
 “ and connected with each other.” PLOTIN. That in *Seneca*
 looks something like this: *Hoc dico, fulmina non mitti a Jove,*
sed sic omnia disposita, ut ea etiam, quæ ab illo non sunt, tamen
sine ratione non fiant: quæ illius est.—Nam etsi Jupiter illa nunc
non facit, fecit ut fierent. “ I affirm this, that lightning does
 “ not come immediately from *Jupiter* himself; but every thing
 “ is so orderd, that even those things, which are not done by
 “ Him, are notwithstanding not done without reason; which
 “ reason is his.—For tho *Jupiter* does not do these things at
 “ this time, yet He was the cause of their being done.”

view, estimated, and laid together: but when I consider, what a mass of *wonders* the universe is in other regards; what a Being God is, *incomprehensibly* great and perfect; that He cannot be ignorant of any thing, no not of the *future* wants and deportments of *particular* men; and that all things, which derive from Him as the First cause, must do this so as to be *consistent* one with another, and in such a manner, as to make *one compact* system, befitting so great an Author: I say, when I consider this, I cannot deny such an *adjustment* of things to be within His power ^w. The order of events, proceeding from the settlement of nature, may be as compatible with the due and reasonable success of *my* endeavours and prayers (as inconsiderable a part of the world as I am ^x), as with any other thing or *phenomenon* how *great* soever.

Perhaps my meaning may be made more intelligible thus. Suppose M (some man) certainly to *foreknow* some way or other that, when he should come to be upon his death-bed, L would *petition* for some *particular* legacy; in a manner so earnest and humble, and with such a good disposition, as would render it proper to grant his request: and upon this M makes his *last will*, by which he devises to L that which was to be asked, and then locks up the *will*; and all this many years before the death of M, and whilst L had yet no expecta-

^w This seems to be what *Eusebius* means, when he says, that Divine providence does (among other things) τοῖς ἐκτὸς συμμαρτυροῦσι τὴν θεῶν τάξιν ἀπορίμην, “appoint a proper course even to those things which we call accidental.”

^x Τὴν γὰρ ἑδέναιαν τὴν ἑμαυτῷ μετρεῖν ἕμιστον, “For I have learnt “what a mere nothing I am,” in *Philo's* words.

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tion or thought of any such thing. When the time comes, the *petition* is made, and *granted*; not by making any *new* will, but by the *old* one already made, and without *alteration*: which legacy had, notwithstanding that, never been left, had the petition never been preferred. The grant may be called an effect of a future act, and depends as much upon it, as if it had been made after the act. So if it had been foreseen, that L would not *so much as ask*, and had therefore been left out of the will; this *preterition* would have been caused by his carriage, tho much later than the date of the will. In all this is nothing hard to be admitted, if M be allowed to *foreknow* the case *v*. And thus the *prayers*, which good men offer to the *All-knowing* God, and the *neglects* of others, may find fitting effects *already* forecasted in the course of nature. Which *possibility* may be extended to the labors of men, and their behaviour in general.

It is obvious to every one's observation, that in *fact* particular men are very commonly (at least in some measure) rewarded or punished by the *general* laws and methods of nature. The *natural* (tho not constant) attendents and consequences of virtue are peace, health, and felicity; of vice, loss of philosophical pleasures, a diseased body, debts, and difficulties. Now then, if B be *virtuous* and *happy*, C *vitious* and at last *miserable*, laboring under a late and fruitless remorse; tho this comes to pass through the *natural tendence* of things, yet

v The case here put may perhaps supply an answer to that, which is said in *Mishn. mass. Berak.* תפלת הריוז תפלת צועק לשעבר הריזו תפלת. שוא וכו' "It is a vain prayer, to cry out for what is already past."

these

these two cases, being supposed such as require, the one that B should be favored, the other that C should suffer for his wickedness, are as effectually *provided for*, as if God exerted his power in some peculiar way on this occasion.

3. It is not *impossible*, that men, whose natures and actions are foreknown, may be introduced into the world in such *times, places, and other circumstances*, as that their acts and behaviour may not only coincide with the *general* plan of things, but also answer many *private* cases too^z. The *planets* and bigger parts of the world we cannot but see are disposed into such *places and order*, that they together make a noble *system*, without having their natural powers of attraction (or the force of that which is equivalent to attraction) or any of the laws of motion *restrained or altered*. On the contrary, *being rightly placed*, they by the observation of *these* become subservient to the main design. Now why may there not be in the Divine mind something like a projection of the *future history* of mankind, as well as of the order and motions and various aspects of the greater bodies of the world? And then why should it not be thought *possible* for *men*, as well as for *them*, by some secret law, tho' of another kind, or rather by the providence and guidance of an unseen governing power, to be

^z If *Plato* had not been born in the time of *Socrates*, in all probability he had not been what he was. And therefore, with *Lactantius's* favor, he might have reason to thank God, *quòd Atheniensis [natus esset], & quòd temporibus Socratis*, "that He was born at *Athens*, and in the days of *Socrates*." Just as *M. Antoninus* ascribes, gratefully, to the Gods τὸ γινῶναι Ἀπολλώνιον, Ῥόμιον, Μάξιμον, "that he was acquainted with *Apollonius, Maximus* (his tutor) *Apollonius and Rusticus*."

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brought into their places in such a manner as that by the *free* use of their faculties, the conjunctions and oppositions of their interests and inclinations, the natural influence and weight of their several magnitudes and degrees of parts, power, wealth, &c. they may conspire to make out the scheme? And then again, since generals consist of particulars, and in this scheme are comprehended the actions and cases of *particular* men, they cannot be so situated respectively among the rest of their species as to be serviceable to the principal intention, and fall properly into the *general diagram* of affairs, unless they and their several actings and cases do in the main correspond one to another, and fit among themselves, or at least are not *inconsistent*.

Here is no implication of any *contradiction* or *absurdity* in all this: and therefore it may at least be fairly *supposed*. And if so, it will follow, that a *particular providence* may be compatible with the natural *freedom* of mens actions. Such a supposition is certainly not beyond the power of an *almighty, perfect* Being: it is moreover worthy of Him, and what they, who can dwell a while upon those words, and take their import, must believe.

The ancients I am persuaded had some such thoughts as these. For they were generally *fatalists*, and yet do not seem to have thought, that they were *not masters* of their own actions^a.

^a *Plato* and the *Stoics*, ap. *Plut.* make *fate* to be συμπλοκὴν αἰτιῶν τεταγμένην, ἐν ἣ συμπλοκῇ ἢ τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς ὥστε τὰ μὲν εἶμαρθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀνειμάρθαι, “ a regular connexion of causes, and those things, “ which are in our power, to belong to this connexion. So “ that some things are decreed, and some things not.”

4. It is not *impossible* (for this is *all* that I contend for here), that many things, suitable to several cases, may be brought to pass by means of *secret* and sometimes *sudden influences* on our minds^b, or the minds of other men, whose acts may affect us. For instance; if the case should require, that N should be deliverd from some threatening *ruin*, or from some *misfortune*, which would certainly befall him, if he should go such a way at such a time, as he intended: upon this occasion some *new reasons* may be presented to his mind, why he should not go *at all*, or not *then*, or not *by that road*; or he may forget to go. Or, if he is to be deliverd from some dangerous *enemy*, either some new turn given to his thoughts may divert him from going where the *enemy* will be, or the enemy may be after the same manner diverted from coming where *he* shall be, or his [the enemy's] resentment may be *qualified*, or some proper method of *defence* may be suggested, or degree of resolution

^b The Heathen were of this opinion: otherwise *Homer* could have had no opportunity of introducing their Deities as he doth. Τῷ δ' ἄρ' ἐπι φρεσὶ θεῆε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη· Ἀλλὰ τις ἀθανάτων τρέψε φρένας· “*Minerva* put it into their minds. But some God alterd their minds;” and the like often. *Plutarch* explains these passages thus. Οὐκ ἀναίρῶντα ποιεῖ [“*Ομηροῦ*”] τὸν θεόν, ἀλλὰ κινῶντα τὴν προαίρεσιν· ἂδ' ὁρμᾶς ἐργαζόμενον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ὁρμῶν ἀγωγός· “(*Homer*) does not make God to destroy the will of “ man, but only to move him to will; nor does he produce “ the appetites themselves in men, but only causes such im- “ ginations as are capable of producing them.” And afterwards the Gods are said to help men, τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πρακτικὸν ἔν προαιρετικῶν ἀρχαῖς τισὶ ἔν φαντασίαις ἔν ἐπινοίαις ἐγείροντες, ἢ τὴν αὐτίαν ἀποσρέφοντες ἔν ἰσάντες, “ by exciting the powers and faculties of “ the soul, by some secret principles, or imaginations or “ thoughts, or on the contrary, by diverting or stopping them.”

and

and vigor excited. After the same manner not only deliverances from dangers and troubles, but advantages and successes may be conferred: or on the other side, men may, by way of punishment for crimes committed, incur mischiefs and calamities. I say, these things and such like *may be*. For since the motions and actions of men, which depend upon their wills, do also depend upon their judgments, as these again do upon the *present appearances* or *non-appearances* of things in their minds; if a *new* prospect of things can be any way produced, the lights by which they are seen *altered*, *new* forces and directions impressed upon the spirits, passions *exalted* or *abated*, the power of judging *invivend* or *debilitated*, or the attention taken off, without any suspension or alteration of the standing laws of nature, then without that *new* volitions, designs, measures, or a cessation of thinking may also be produced, and thus many things prevented, that otherwise would *be*, and many brought about, that would *not*. But that this is far from being *impossible*, seems clear to me. For the operations of the mind following in great measure the present disposition of the *body*, some thoughts and designs, or absences of mind, may proceed from *corporeal* causes, acting according to the common laws of matter and motion themselves; and so the case may fall in with n. 2. or they may be occasioned by something said or done by *other men*; and then the case may be brought under n. 3. or they may be caused by the suggestion, and impulse, or other silent communications of some *spiritual being*; perhaps the Deity himself. For that such imperceptible influences and still whispers may be, none of us all

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can

can positively deny: that is, we cannot know certainly, that there are no such things. On the contrary, I believe there are but few of them who have made observations upon themselves and their affairs, but must, when they reflect on life past and the various adventures and events in it, find many instances, in which their usual judgment and sense of things cannot but seem to themselves to have been *over-ruled*, they knew not *by what*, nor *how*^c, nor *why*, (i. e. they have done things, which afterwards they wonder how they came *to do*); and that these actions have had consequences very *remarkable* in their history^d. I speak not here of men dementated with wine, or enchanted with some temptation: the thing holds true of men even in their sober and more considering seasons.

That there may be *possibly* such inspirations of new thoughts and counsels may perhaps further appear from this; that we so frequently find thoughts arising in our heads, into which we are led by *no* discourse, *nothing* we read, *no* clue of reasoning; but they surprize and come upon us

^c Σφαλεις [ἡ μειρακίσκη] κύπελλον ὅπως, ἔμοι μὲν τὸ φάρμακον, Πτοιοδῶρων δὲ ἀφάρμακτον [κύλικα] ἐπέδωκε, “The young man by mistake
“some way, I know not how, gave the poisoned cup to me,
“and that which had no poison in it, to Ptæodorus,” says Cal-
lidemidas, who designed the poison for Ptæodorus, in Lucian.

^d When Hannibal was in fight of Rome, non ausus est obsidere, “he dared not besiege it.” St JEROM.—Sed religione quadam abstinuit, quod diceret, capiendæ urbis modo non dari voluntatem, modo non dari facultatem, ut testatur & Orosius. “But
“forbore upon some religious scruple, because he said that
“sometimes he had no mind, and at other times no power
“to take the city, as is related also by Orosius.” Schol.

from we know not what quarter ^e. If they proceeded from the mobility of spirits, straggling out of order, and fortuitous affections of the brain, or were of the nature of *dreams*, why are they not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as they are? Not to add, that the world has generally acknowledged, and therefore seems to have *experienced* some assistance and directions given to good men by the Deity; that men have been many times infatuated, and lost to themselves, &c. If any one should object, that if men are thus over-ruled in their actings, then they are deprived of their *liberty*, &c. the answer is; that tho man is a free agent, he may not be free as to *every thing*. His freedom may be restrained, and he only accountable for those acts, in respect of which he *is free*.

If this then be the case, as it seems to be, that men's minds are susceptible of such *insinuations* and *impressions*, as frequently by ways unknown do affect them, and give them an inclination toward this or that, how many things may be brought to pass by these means without *fixing* and *refixing* the laws of nature: any more than they are unfixt, when one man alters the opinion of another by throwing a book, proper for that purpose, in his way? I say, how many things may be brought about thus, not only in regard of *ourselves*, but *other people*, who may be concern'd in our actions, either *immediately* ^f, or *in time* through perhaps

^e *Non enim cuiquam in potestate est quid veniat in mentem.*
 "For it is not in any man's power, what shall come into his
 "mind." St AUSTIN.

^f They who call'd *Simonides* out from *Scopas* and his company, as if it were to speak with him, saved his life. The story known.

many intermediate events? For the prosperity or improsperity of a man, or his fate here, does not intirely depend upon his *own* prudence or imprudence, but in great measure upon his *situation* among the rest of mankind, and what *they* do. The natural effect of his management meeting with such things, as are the natural effects of the actions of other men, and being blended with them, the result may be something not intended or foreseen.

5. There *possibly* may be, and most probably are beings *invisible*, and *superior* in nature to us, who may by *other* means be in many respects *ministers* of God's providence, and authors under Him of many events to particular men, without *altering* the laws of nature. For it implies no *contradiction* or *absurdity* to say there are such beings: on the contrary we have the greatest reason to think what has been intimated already; that such imperfect beings, as we are, are far below the *top* of the scale. The *pictures* of spiritual beings cannot be drawn in our imagination, as of corporeal; yet to the upper and reasoning part of the mind the idea of *spiritual substance* may perhaps be as clear, as that of *corporeity* §. For what *penetrability* is, must be known just as well as what *impenetrability* is: and so on.

§ They, who believe there is nothing but what they can handle or see (οἱ ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ ἔαν δύνανται ἀπρὶξ ταῖν χειροῖν λαβέσθαι—ωἶν δὲ τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν ὑσίας μέρει) “ and “ do not allow any thing, that is invisible, to have any real “ existence;” are by *Plato* reckon'd to be void of all philosophy, ἀμήτοι, σκληροὶ, ἀντίτυποι, μάλ' εὖ ἄμωσοι, “ not so much as “ initiated, stupid, obstinate, and intirely illiterate.”

And

And since it has been proved (p. 137, 138), that all corporeal motions proceed originally from something *incorporeal*, it must be as certain, that there are incorporeal substances, as that there is motion. Beside, how can we tell but that there may be above us beings of greater powers, and more perfect intellects, and capable of mighty things, which yet may have *corporeal* vehicles as we have, but *finer* and *invisible*? Nay, who knows but that there may be even of these many *orders*, rising in dignity of nature, and amplitude of power, one above another? It is no way below the *philosophy* of these times, which seems to delight in enlarging the capacities of matter, to assert the *possibility* of this. But however, my own defects sufficiently convince me, that I have no pretension to be one of the *first* rank, or that which is *next under* the All-perfect.

Now then, as *we ourselves* by the use of our powers do many times interpose and alter the course of things within our sphere from what it would be, if they were left intirely to the laws of motion and gravitation, without being said to alter those *laws*; so may these *superior* beings likewise in respect of things within their spheres, much larger be sure, the least of them all, than ours is: only with this difference, that as their knowledge is more extensive, their intellects purer, their reason better, they may be much *properer* instruments of Divine providence with respect to *us*, than we can be with respect *one to another*, or to the *animals* below us. I cannot think indeed, that the power of these beings is so large, as to alter or suspend the *general laws* of the world; or that the world is like

a bungling piece of clock-work, which requires to be oft set backward or forward by them; or that they can at pleasure change their condition to ape us, or inferior beings; and consequently are not apt hastily to credit stories of *portents*, &c. such as cannot be true, unless the natures of things and their manner of being be quite renversed: yet (I will repeat it again) as men may be so placed as to become, even by the free exercise of their own powers, *instruments* of God's particular providence to other men (or animals); so may we well suppose, that these *higher* beings may be so *distributed* through the universe, and subject to such an œconomy (tho I pretend not to tell what that is), as may render *them also* instruments of the same providence; and that they may, in proportion to their greater abilities, be capable, *consistently with the laws of nature*, some way or other, tho not in our way, of influencing human affairs in proper places.

Lastly, what I have ventured to lay before you I would not have to be so understood, as if I peremptorily *asserted* things to be just in this manner, or pretended to *impose* my thoughts upon any body else: my design is only to shew, how I *endeavour* to help my own narrow conceptions. There must be *other ways* above my understanding ^h, by which such a Being as God is may take care of *private cases* without interrupting the order of the universe, or putting any of the parts of it out of their channels. We may be sure He re-

^h Οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀνδρῶν ἀμύνηται ἢ θεός. "God does not afford assistance in the same manner as man does." PH. JUD.

gards every thing *as being what it is*; and that therefore His *laws* must be accommodated to the true genius's and capacities of those things, which are affected by them. The *purely material* part of the world is governd by such, as are suited to the state of a being, which is *insensible, passive only*, and every where and always *the same*: and these seem to be simple and few, and to carry natural agents into one constant road. But *intelligent, active, free* beings must be under a government of another form. They must, truth requiring it, be considerd *as beings*, who may behave themselves as they ought, or not; *as beings* susceptible of pleasure and pain; *as beings*, who not only owe to God all that they are or have, but are (or may be) sensible of of this, and to whom therefore it must be *natural* upon many occasions to supplicate Him for mercy, defence, direction, assistance; lastly, *as beings*, whose cases admit great variety: and therefore that *influence*, by which He is present to them, must be different from that, by which gravitation and common *phænomena* are produced in matter. This seems to be as it were a public influence, the other private, answering private cases, and prayers; this to operate directly upon the body, the other more especially upon the mind, and upon the body by it, &c. But I forbear, lest I should go too far out of my depth: only adding in general, that God cannot put things so far out of His own power, as that He should not *for ever govern* transactions and events in His own world; nor can *perfect* knowledge and power ever want *proper* means to achieve what is fit to be done. So that, tho' what I have advanced should stand for nothing, there *may*

still be a *particular providence* notwithstanding the forementioned difficulty. And then, if there *may be* one, it will unavoidably follow, that there *is one*: because in the description of providence, p. 171. nothing is supposed with respect to *particular cases*, but that they should be provided for in such a manner as will at last *agree best with reason*; and to allow, that this may be done, and yet say, that it is not done, implies a blasphemy that creates horror; it is to charge the *Perfect* being with one of the greatest *imperfections*, and to make Him not so much as a *reasonable* being.

I conclude then, that it is as certain, that there is a *particular providence*, as that God is a Being of *perfect reason*. For if men are treated according to reason, they must be treated according to what they are: the virtuous, the just, the compassionate, &c. *as such*, and the vicious, unjust, cruel, &c. according to *what they are*: and their several cases must be taken and considered as *they are*: which cannot be done without *such* a providence.

Against all this it has been, as one might well expect, *objected* of old, that things do not seem to be dealt according to *reason*, virtuous and good men very oft laboring under adversity, pains, persecutions, whilst vicious, wicked, cruel men prevail and flourish¹. But to this an *answer* (in which
I shall

¹ *Si curent [Dei] homines, bene bonis fit, male malis: quod nunc abest.* "If they (the Gods) had any regard for men, things would go well with good men, and ill with bad men; but it is otherwise now." *Ap. Cic. The Jews*, who call this case צדיק ורע לו רשע וטוב לו "evil to the righteous, and good to the wicked," have written many things about it, to be seen

I shall a little further explain myself) is ready. It might be taken out of that, which has been given to the *Manichean* objection under prop. VII. But I shall here give one more direct : and let *that* and *this* be mutually assisting and supplements each to the other. 1. We are not always certain, who are *good*, who *wicked* ^k. If we trust to fame and reports, these may proceed, on the one hand, from partial friendship, or flattery ; on the other, from ill-natured surmises and constructions of things, envy, or malice ; and on either, from small matters aggrandized, from mistake, or from the unskilful relation even of *truth* itself. Opposite parties make a merit of blackening their adversaries ^l, and

seen in their books: *Mo. nebok. S. Iaquar. Men. hamma. Nabh. ab. &c.* So have the Heathen philosophers too ; *Seneca, Plutararch, Plotinus, Simplicius, al.* But the answers of neither are always just. God forbid that should be thought true, which is asserted by *Glauco, ap. Plat.* that the just, if they had *Gyges's* ring, would do as the unjust, and *ἔτι ἄδικεῖ ἰσὺν δίκαιου, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκασόμενος, &c.* “ that no man is just voluntarily, but is forced to be so.” Or that in *S. Hbasid. and Men. hamma.* צדיק ורע לו. “ Evil befalls the righteous, and the unrighteous inherit good.” The reason assigned for this case in another place is something better : לא היה אב לא היה צדיק. “ Wherefore let them not say, that if good does not befall such an one, then he is a wicked man.” But the way of solving it in *Nishm. hbaiy.* by הנשמות, “ a revolution of souls,” or what the Cabbalists call עיבור ; “ transmigration,” is worst of all.

^k *Cadit & Ripheus, justissimus unus Qui fuit in Teucris, & servantissimus æqui. Dis aliter visum.* “ *Ripheus* also was slain ; “ who was one of the most just men amongst the *Trojans*, and “ a very strict preserver of equity ; but the Gods must be submitted to.” *VIRG.*

^l *Virtutes ipsas invertimus.* “ We turn even virtues into vices.” *HOR.*

brightening

brightening their friends, *undeservedly* and *unmeasurably*: and to idle companions and gossips it is diversion, and what makes the principal part of their conversation ^m, to rehearse the characters of men, drest up out of their own *dreams* and *inventions*. And beside all this, the good or bad repute of men depends in great measure upon *mean* people, who carry their stories from family to family, and propagate them very fast: like little insects, which lay apace, and the *less* the *faster*. There are few, very few, who have the opportunity and the will and the ability to represent things *truly*ⁿ. Beside the matters of fact themselves there are many *circumstances* which, before sentence is passed, ought to be known and weighed, and yet scarce ever can be known, but to the person *himself* who is concernd. He may have other views, and another sense of things, than his judges have: and what he understands, what he feels, what he intends, may be a *secret* confined to his own breast. A man may through bodily indispositions and faults in his constitution, which it is not in his power to correct, be subject to *starts* and *inadver-*

^m Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτιος ἤδῃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὡς τὸ λαλεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια· ἢ μά-
λις αἰὲν τύχασιν ὑπ' εὐνοίας τινὸς ἢ μίσους ἐλκόμενοι, ὑφ' ὧν καὶ φιλεῖ κλέπ-
τεσθαι ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἡ ἀλήθεια. “ There is nothing so delightful
“ to men, as prating about things that don't belong to them,
“ especially if they are drawn into it by love or hatred, and
“ they are apt to conceal truth as they do most other things.”

GREG. Naz.

ⁿ Therefore, with *Socrates* in *Plato*, we ought not much to care what the multitude [οἱ πολλοὶ] say of us, ἀλλ' ὁ, τι ὁ ἐκείνων περὶ τῶν δικαίων, καὶ ἀδικῶν, ὁ εἶς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια, “ but what he says
“ who can distinguish betwixt the just and the unjust, the only
“ one who is truth itself.”

tencies,

tencies, or obnoxious to *snare*s, which he cannot be aware of; or through want of information or proper helps he may labor under *invincible* errors, and act as in the dark: in which cases he may do things, which are in themselves wrong, and yet be innocent, or at least rather to be pitied, than censured with severity. Or perhaps the *censurer*, notwithstanding this kind of men talk as if they were infallible, may be mistaken himself in his opinion, and judge that to be *wrong*, which in truth is *right*°. Nothing more common than this. Ignorant and superstitious wretches measure the actions of *lettered* and *philosophical* men by the tat-

° Or, *v. v.* he may judge that to be *right*, which is *wrong*. This seems to be pretty much the case in that enumeration of good men, who suffered, *ap. Cic. Cur duo Scipiones, fortissimos & optimos viros, in Hispania Pœnus oppressit? Cur Maximus extulit filium consularem? Cur Marcellum Annibal interemit, &c.* “How did it come to pass, that the *Carthaginians* overthrew the two *Scipio*’s in *Spain*, those brave and excellent men? How came *Maximus* to bury his son, when he was fit to be a consul? How came *Hannibal* to kill *Marcellus*? &c.” For here they are reckon’d *boni*, “good,” only because they were *fortes*, “valiant;” that is, because they had been zealous and successful instruments in conquering and destroying them, who happen’d to be so unfortunate as to be neighbours to the *Romans*, upon various pretences indeed, but in truth only to enlarge their own territories. Is this to be *good*? Doth it deserve such a particular observation, that *F. Maximus* buried a son, after he had been Consul too? How doth it appear, that *Marcellus* was a better man than *Hannibal*? Is it such a wonder, if they, who spend their lives in slaughter, should at length be slain themselves? If the margin permitted, more remarks might be made upon this catalogue: as also some upon that, which follows in the same place, of others, *quibus improbis optime evenit*, “who, tho they were very bad men, yet had very good fortune.”

tle of their nurfes or illiterate parents and companions, or by the fashion of the country: and people of differing religions judge and condemn each other by their own ~~tenets~~^{tenets}; when *both* of them cannot be in the right, and it is well if *either* of them are. To which may be added, that the true characters of men muſt chiefly depend upon the *unſeen* part of their lives; ſince the trueſt and beſt religion is moſt private, and the greateſt wickedneſs endeavours to be ſo ^p. Some are mo-deſt, and hide their virtues: others hypocritical, and conceal their vices under ſhews of ſanctity, good nature, or ſomething that is *ſpecious*: So that it is many times hard to diſcern, to which of the two ſorts, the *good* or the *bad*, a man ought to be aggregated. 2. It rarely happens, that we are competent judges of the *good* or *bad* fortune of other people ^q. That, which is diſagreeable to one, is many times agreeable to another, or diſagreeable in a leſs degree. The miſery accruing from any infliction or bad circumſtance of life is to be computed as in p. 53, 54: or according to the reſiſtence and capacity of bearing it, which it meets

^p *Vitæ poſſcencia celant*, “that part of life which they keep “ ſecret from the world” (in *Lucr.*) may be aptly applied to the wicked. *Multi famam, conſcientiam pauci verentur*. “Many “ are afraid of common report, but few ſtand in awe of their “ own conſciences.” *PLINY* jun.

^q *Neq; mala vel bona, quæ vulgus putat: multi, qui conſfic-tari adverſis videntur, beati; ac pleriq; quanquam magnas per opes, miſerrimi, &c.* “We are not to judge things to be good or “ bad, from the opinion which the vulgar have of them; for “ abundance of people are happy, who have many difficulties “ to ſtruggle with; and a great many men are very miſerable, “ though they be very rich.” *TACITUS*.

with.

with. If one man can carry a weight of four or five hundred pounds as well as another can the weight of one hundred, by these *different* weights they will be *equally* loaded. And so the same poverty or disgrace, the same wounds, &c. do not give the *same pain* to all men. The apprehension of but a *vein* to be opened is worse to some, than the *apparatus* to an execution is to others: and a *word* may be more terrible and sensible to tender natures, than a *sword* is to the senseless, or intrepid breed. The same may be said with respect to injunctions: men have different tastes, and the use of the same things does not beget *equal pleasure* in all. Beside, we scarce ever know the whole case. We do not see the *inward* stings and secret pains, which many of those men carry about them, whose *external* splendor and flourishing estate is so much admired by beholders: nor perhaps sufficiently con-

^r *Feliciorem tu Mecænatem putas, cui amoribus anxio, & morosæ uxoris quotidiana repudia desolenti, somnus per symphoniarum cantum, ex longinquo bene resonantium, quæritur? Mero se licet sopiat,—; tam vigilabit in plumâ, quàm ille [Regulus] in cruce. —ut dubium [non] sit, an electione fati datâ, plures Reguli nasci, quàm Mecænates velint.* “Do you think *Mecænas* was very
 “ happy, who was always solicitous about intrigues, and com-
 “ plaining of the refusals of an ill-natured wife, insomuch that
 “ he could have no other sleep, but what was procured by the
 “ agreeable sound of soft music, at a distance. Tho he
 “ dozes himself with wine,—he will be as restless in a bed of
 “ down, as (*Regulus*) upon a gibbet.—So that there is no
 “ doubt, but if fate would put it to men’s choice, there would
 “ more men choose to be born *Regulus’s* than *Mecænas’s*.” SEN.
Isti, quos pro felicibus aspicitis, si non qua occurrunt, sed qua latent, videritis, miseri sunt. “Those men which you look upon
 “ to be happy, if you were to see how different they are in
 “ private, from what they are in public, you would think
 “ miserable.” *Idem.*

sider

sider the *silent* pleasures of a lower fortune, arising from temperance, moderate desires, easy reflexions, a consciousness of knowledge and truth; with other pleasures of the *mind*, much greater many times than those of the *body*^s. Before one can pronounce another happy or otherwise, he should know all the other's enjoyments and all his sufferings^t. Many misfortunes are compensated^u by some larger endowments, or extraordinary felicities in other respects. But suppose the pleasures of some, and the sufferings of some others, to be just as they appear: still we know not the *consequences*

^s *Archimedes*, having found the way of solving a problem (*examinandi, an corona aurea prorsus esset*) ("viz. whether a crown was made of pure gold or no") ran in an ecstasy out of the bath, crying *Εύρηκα*, "I have found out a solution;" but who ever heard of a man, that after a luxurious meal, or the enjoyment of a woman, ran out thus, crying out *Βέβρωκα*, or *Πεφύθηκα*, "I have glugged myself, I have enjoyed her?" *PLUT.*

^t *Fatis contraria fata rependens*. "Balancing the loss determined by one fate, with the prospect of good determined by another." *VIRG.* See what *Pliny* writes of *Agrippa*, the other great favorite and minister of *Augustus*, whom he reckons to be the only instance of felicity among them who were called *Agrippæ*. *Is quoq; adversa pedum valetudine, misera juvena, exercito ævo inter arma mortisque,—infelici terris stirpe omni,—præterea brevitate ævi,—in tormentis adulteriorum conjugis, socrisq; prægravi servitio, luisse augurium præposteri natalis existimatur.* "He also by a disease in his feet, by a miserable young time, having spent his years amongst arms and death, —all his relations miserable upon earth,—beside, his life very short,—it was the general opinion, that what his unnatural birth foreboded was fulfilled, in the torments he incurred by his wife's adulteries, and the cruel bondage of his father-in-law."

^u *Ὀφθαλμῶν μὲν ἀμερσε δίδυ δ' ἠδείαν ἀοιδίην.* "The loss of his (*Homer's*) eyes was compensated by the gift of sweet harmony." *HOM.*

of

of them ^w. The pleasures of those men may lead to miseries greater than those of the latter, and be in reality the greater misfortune: and, again, the sufferings of these may be preludes to succeeding advantages ^x. So that indeed we know not how to name these outward appearances of particular men, nor which to call *happiness*, which the *contrary*; unless we knew the inward sense of the persons themselves, all their true circumstances, and what will be hereafter consequent upon their present success or adversity. 3. Men ought to be considered as *members* of families, nations, mankind, the universe, from which they cannot be separated: and then from the very *condition of their being* it will appear, that there must be great inequalities ^y; that the innocent cannot but be sometimes involved in general calamities or punishments, nor the guilty but share in public prosperities ^z; and that the good of the *whole* society or kind is to be regarded preferably to the present pleasure of any *individual*, if they happen to clash ^a. *Lastly*, if the

^w Zeno reckoned he made a good voyage, when he was shipwrecked. DIOG. L.

^x If a good man labors under poverty, sickness, or the like, εἰς ἀγαθὸν τι τελευτήσει, ζῶντι ἢ ἔκ ποθανόντι, “it must end in some-thing that is good, either in his life-time or after death;” for how can he be neglected of God, who studies according to his poor abilities to be like Him? PLATO.

^y Who blames a *drama*, because all the persons are not heroes? PLOT.

^z העולם נידון אחר רובו. “We must judge of the world, according to what it is as to the greatest part.” ABRAB. *ἔ* *pass.*

^a μέρος μὲν ἕνεκα ὅλου, ἢ ὅχ ὅλου μέρους ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται, πτλ. “The part is made for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part.” PLATO.

virtuous

virtuous man has undergone more in *this life*, than it would be reasonable he should suffer, if there was *no other*; yet those sufferings may not be unreasonable, if *there is* another. For they may be made up to him by such enjoyments, as it would be reasonable for him to prefer, even with those previous mortifications, before the pleasures of this life with the *loss of them*. And moreover, sometimes the *only* way to the felicities of a better state may lie through dark and difficult passes, discipline to some men being necessary, to bring them to reflect, and to force them into such *methods* as may produce in them proper improvements; such, as otherwise and of themselves they would never have fallen into. On the other side, if *vitious* and wicked men do prosper and make a figure; yet it is possible their sufferings hereafter may be such, as that the *excess* of them above their past enjoyments may be equal to the *just mulct* of their villanies and wickedness. And further, their worldly pleasures (which must be supposed to be such as are not philosophical, or moderated and govern'd by reason and habits of virtue) being apt to fill the mind, and ingross the whole man, and by that means to exclude almost all right reflexions, with the proper applications of them, may be the very causes of their ruin; whilst they leave them under such defects *at the end of their days*, as we shall see afterward tend to unhappiness.

If what is objected be in many instances true, this only infers the *necessity* of a future state: that is, if good and bad men are not respectively treated according to reason in *this life*, they may yet be so treated, if *this* and *another* to follow be taken together

together into the account ^b. And perhaps it is (as I have been always apt to think) in order to convince us of the certainty of a future state, that instances of that kind have been so *numerous*. For he must not only be guilty of blasphemy, but reduced to the greatest absurdity, who, rather than he will own there is such a state, is forced to make God an *unreasonable* Being ^c: which I think amounts to a strong demonstration, that *there is one*. But of that more hereafter.

XIX. *If we would behave ourselves as being what we cannot but be sensible we are, towards GOD as being what He is according to the foregoing propositions; or, if we would endeavour to behave ourselves towards him according to truth, we must observe these following and the like particulars.*

I. *We must not pretend to represent Him by any picture or image whatsoever* ^d. Because this is flatly

^b Divine providence and the immortality of the soul must stand and fall together. ἑτέρον ἢ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀπολιπεῖν ἀναιρῶντα τῷ ἑτέρῳ. "If you take away the one, the other will follow." PLUT.

^c Τὸ αὐτὸν ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ εἶσθαι εἶναι Θεόν· ἢ ὄντα μὴ προνοεῖν· ἢ προνοεῖν μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον. "It is the same thing to think there is no God, or if there be one, that he does not govern the world; or if he does govern it, he is not a good and just governor." HIEROCL.

^d Sure no body ever did *in reality* pretend to do this. According to *Diog. L. the Egyptians* set up ἀγάλματα, "some ornaments," in their temples, τῶ μὴ εἶδέναι τὴν τῷ Θεῷ μορφήν: for that very reason, because they did not know his shape; or, how to represent Him. Their images seem to have been symbols or hieroglyphics, expressing something of their sense or opinion concerning Him. For, as *Maimonides* observes, no man ever did or ever will worship an idol, made of metal, stone, or wood, as that Being who made heaven and earth.

to deny his incorporeity, incomprehensible nature, &c.^e.

2. *We ought to be so far from doing this, that even the language we use, when we speak of Him, and especially of His positive nature and essential properties, ought not only to be chosen with the utmost care, but also to be understood in the sublimest sense: and the same is true with respect to our thoughts, mut. mutand^f.* Or thus: we must endeavour to think and speak of Him in the most reverent terms and most proper manner we are able^g; keeping withal this general conclusion, and as it were habitual reflexion in our minds, that, tho we do the best we can, He is still something above all our conceptions; and desiring, that our faint expressions may be taken as aiming at a higher and more proportionable meaning. To do otherwise implies not only, that His mode of existence and essential attributes are comprehensible by us, but also (which is more) that our words and phrases, taken from

^e *Non est dubium, quin religio nulla sit, ubicunq; simulacrum est.* “Without doubt there can be no true religion, where there are any images.” LACT.

^f Ὡς γὰρ ἔργον σώματος τὸ σωματικῶς τι ἐπιτελεῖσαι, ἢ τῶ ἢ ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ταῖς ἐννοίαις τὰς ἀρεσκύσας φαντασίας τελειουργῆσαι ὡς θέλει, διὸ ἔχ τὰς ἐννοίας ἀμαρτίας μὴ ὡς φαντασίας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔργα ἐν ψυχῇ γινόμενα δίκαιον κρίνεσθαι. “For as, when any thing is done by the body, it is done grossly, so, when any thing is done by the soul, it is done according to its own will, and by such representations as are agreeable to it’s thoughts; wherefore it is but reasonable to think, that sins in our thoughts are not mere imaginations only, but works really done in the soul.” St BASIL.

^g Θεοπρεπῶς πάντα νοῦντες. “To think nothing but what is worthy of God.” St CHRYS.

among

among ourselves^b and the objects of our faculties, are adequate expressions of them: *contrary to truth*.

To explain myself by a few instances. When we ascribe *mercy* to God, or implore His *mercy*, it must not be understood to be *mercy* like that, which is called *compassion* in us. For tho this be a very distinguishing affection in human natureⁱ, to which we are made subject for good reasons, the constitution of the world and circumstances of our present state making it necessary for us to *compassionate* each the sufferings of another; yet it is accompanied with *uneasiness*, and must therefore not be ascribed strictly to God in that *sense*, in which it is used when ascribed to ourselves. It perhaps may not be amiss to call it *Divine mercy*, or the like; to distinguish it: and to shew, that we mean something, which, tho in our low way of speaking and by *way* of analogy we call it by the same name, is yet in the perfect nature of God very different. Or we may consider it in general as the manner, in which God *respects* poor suppliants and proper objects *for their good*. For certainly the *respect* or relation, which lies between God, considered as an *unchangeable* Being, and one

^b We use them (and speak, as the *Jews* every where inculcate, אֲדַבֵּר כְּלָשׁוֹן בְּנֵי אָדָם, “according to the language of men”) only ἀπορία οἰκτιρας προσηγορίας.—τὰ ὀνόματα παρ’ ἡμῶν ἀγαπώμενα μεταφέρουτες, “for want of proper words,—we convert our favourite words into metaphors.” PLOT.

ⁱ *Mollissima corda Humano generi dare se natura fatetur, Quæ lachrymas dedit, hæc nostri pars optima sensus.*—*separat hoc nos à grege mutorum, &c.* “Nature confesses that she has given to mankind hearts that are very soft (and easy to be affected). She has given them tears, which are the best part of our senses—for these distinguish us from *brute creatures*.”

Juv.

that is humble and supplicates and endeavours to qualify himself for mercy, cannot be the *same* with that, which lies between the same *unchangeable* God and *one* that is obstinate, and will not supplicate, or endeavour to qualify himself ^k: that is, the same thing, or Being, cannot respect *opposite* and *contradictory* characters in the same manner; him who does behave himself as before, and him who does not. Therefore when we apply to the mercy of God, and beg of him to pity our infirmities and wants, the design is not to move His *affections*, as good speakers move their auditors by the pathetic arts of rhetoric, or hearty beggars theirs by importunities and tears; but to express our own sense of ourselves and circumstances in such a manner, as may render us more *capable* of the emanations of Divine goodness, and *fit* to receive such instances of His beneficence, as to us may seem to be the effects of *compassion*, tho they proceed not from any alteration in the Deity. For it may be, and no doubt is agreeable to perfect reason *always* and *without alteration*, that he, who labors under a sense of his own defects, honestly uses his best endeavours to mend what is amiss, and (among other things) flies for relief to Him, upon whom his being and all that he has do depend, should have many things granted *him*, which are not given to the careless, obdurate, *un-asking* ^l part of mankind; tho his expressions and

^k The *ratio* of G to M + q is different from that of G to M - q: and yet G remains unalterd.

^l Πῶς ἂν δοῦν τῷ ἀπὸς τὰς ὀρέμας αὐτεξουσίᾳ μὴ αἰτῶντι ὁ δίδοναι ἀνεφικίως θεός; “Why should God, who is in his own nature beneficent, “give any thing to a being whose appetites are in his own “power, if he does not ask it?” HIEROCL.

manner

manner of address, with all his *care*, are still *inadequate*, and below the Divine nature. In short, by our applications we cannot pretend to produce any alteration in the Deity, but by an alteration in ourselves we may alter the relation or respect lying between him and us.

As God is a pure, uncompounded Being, His attributes of *mercy*, *justice*, &c. cannot be as we conceive them: because in him they are *one*. Perhaps they may more properly be called together *Divine reason*: which, as it exerts itself upon this or that occasion, is by us *variously* denominated.

Here it must not be forgot, that *mercy* or *mercies* are many times taken for advantages or benefits injoyd by us: and then they are *properly* ascribed to God, from whom they proceed as the effects of His beneficence and providence.

When we speak of the *knowledge* of God, we must not mean, that He knows things *in the way that we do*: that any intention or operation of His mind is requisite to produce it: that He apprehends things by any impressions made upon Him: that He reasons by the help of ideas: or even that the knowledge, which in us is most *intuitive* and *immediate*, does in any degree come up to the mode in which He knows things. We must rather intend, in general, that there is nothing, of which He is, or can be *ignorant*: which has been said already; and is, I am afraid, as much as we can *safely* say.

When *glory*, *honor*, *praise* ^m are given to God; or He is said to do any thing for His own *glory*, or
we

^m τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μείζον τι ἢ βέλτιον. “Some-
thing greater and better, than praise, belongs to that which

we to propose the *glory* of His name in what we do; those words should not be taken as standing for *that kind* of glory and applause, which is so industriously sought, and capriciouslyⁿ distributed among us mortals, and which I will take this opportunity to handle a little more *largely*, in order to give here a specimen of the world, and save that trouble in another place. Among us some are celebrated for small matters, either through the ignorance of the multitude, the partiality of a faction, the advantage of great friendships, the usual deference paid to men in eminent stations, or mere good luck^o; and others for achieving *such things*, as if they were duly weighed, and people were not imposed upon by *false notions*, first introduced in barbarous times, and since polished and brought into fashion by historians, poets, and flatterers, would appear rather to be a disgrace to *savages* than any recommendation of rational and *civilized* natures. Strength, and courage, and beauty, and parts, and birth are followed with *encomiums* and honors, which, tho they may be the felicities and *privileges* of the possessors, cannot be their *merit*, who received them *gratis*, and contributed no-

“ is perfectly good.” Therefore ὁ Θεὸς καὶ τὰ γὰρ ἄλλοι, “ God and “ perfect goodness” are above praise. ARIST. Οἱ τὰς θεῶν ἐπαίνωντες γελοῖοί εἰσιν, ἡμῖν αὐτὰς ἐξισώντες. “ They who praise the Gods, “ make themselves ridiculous, for that is to equal them with “ ourselves.” ANDRON. RHO.

ⁿ Cleon, only a songster [ᾠδὸς], had a statue at *Thebes*, kept as sacred, when *Pindar* himself had none. See the story in *Athenæus*.

^o What *Seneca* says of *Alexander*, is true of many an other hero: *pro virtute erat felix temeritas*, “ that his successful “ rashness was esteemed virtue.”

thing

thing^p themselves toward the acquisition of them: whilst real virtue and industry (which, even when unsuccessful, or oppressed by ill health or unkind fortune, give the *truest title* to praise) lie disregarded. Thirst after glory, when that is desired merely for its own sake, is founded in *ambition* and *vanity*^q: the thing itself is but a *dream*, and imagination; since, according to the differing humors and sentiments of nations and ages, the same thing may be either *glorious* or *inglorious*: the *effect* of it, considered still by itself, is neither more health, nor estate, nor knowledge, nor virtue to him who has it; or if that be any thing, it is but *what must cease* when the man^r dies: and, after all, as it lives but in the *breath* of the people, a little fly envy or a new turn of things extinguishes it^s, or perhaps it goes quite out of itself^t. Men please themselves with notions of *immortality*, and fancy a perpetuity of fame secured to themselves by books and testimonies of historians: but, alas! it is a stupid delusion, when they imagin themselves *present*,

^p *Tumes alto Drusorum sanguine, tanquam Feceris ipse aliquid, &c.* “You puff yourself up, because you are of the noble blood of the *Drusi*; as if you had done some (great) thing yourself.” JUV.

^q *Gloria quantalibet quid erit, si gloria tantum est?* “What signifies the highest degree of glory, if it be only mere glory?” JUV.

^r הַיּוֹם כֵּן וּמָחָר בַּקֶּבֶר הַיּוֹם חַי וּמָחָר רֵימָה. “To-day here, and to-morrow in the grave; now a man, and then a worm.” S. HHAS.

^s *Κτήμα σφαλερώτατον.* “A very uncertain possession.” PH. JUD.

^t Even the great *pyramid* in *Egypt*, tho it still remains, hath not been able to preserve the *true name* of its builder; which is lost, one may justly wonder how.

and *injoying* that fame at the reading of their story after their death. And, beside, *in reality* the man is not known ever the more to posterity, because his name is transmitted to them: *he* doth not live, because his *name* does. When it is said, *J. Cæsar* subdued *Gaul*, beat *Pompey*, changed the *Roman* commonwealth into a monarchy, &c. it is the same thing, as to say, the conqueror of *Pompey*, &c. was *Cæsar*: that is, *Cæsar* and the conqueror of *Pompey* are the same thing; and *Cæsar* is as much known by the one designation as by the other. The amount then is only this: that the conqueror of *Pompey* conquerd *Pompey*; or some body conquerd *Pompey*; or rather, since *Pompey* is as little known now as *Cæsar*, *some body* conquerd *some body*". Such a *poor business* is this boasted immortality ^w: and such, as has been here described, is the thing called *glory* among us! The notion of it may serve to excite them, who having abilities to serve their country in time of real danger, or want, or to do some other good, have yet not *philosophy* enough to do this upon principles of virtue, or to see through the glories of the world (just as we excite children by *praising* them; and as we see many good inventions and improvements proceed from emulation and vani-

u Τα ὀνόματα τῶν πάλαι πολυσημῶν ἢν τρόπον τινα γλωσσήματά ἐστι.

"The names of those, who in former times were very much celebrated, are now some way or other become quite ob-
lete." M. ANTON.

w Μικρὸν ἢ μικρὸν ἢ ὑπεροφημία, ἣ αὐτὴ δὲ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀνθρωπείων τά-
χιστα τεθνηξομένων, ἣ ἐκ εἰδότητων ἠδὲ ἑαυτῶς, ἕτε γε τὸν πρῶταλαί τεθνηκότα.

"The longest fame amongst posterity is but short, by reason
of the quick succession by poor mortals dying, who know
neither themselves, nor any that died some time ago." *Id.*

ty) : but to discerning men this *same* is mere air, and the next remove from nothing^x; what they despise, if not shun. I think there are two considerations, which may justify a desire of *some* glory or honor : and scarce more. When men have performed any *virtuous* actions, or such as fit easy upon their memories, it is a *reasonable pleasure* to have the testimony of the world added to that of their own consciences, that they have done well^y : and more than that, if the *reputation* acquired by any qualification or action may produce a man any *real* comfort or advantage (if it be only protection from the insolencies and injustice of mankind ; or if it enables him to do by his authority more good to others), to have this privilege must be a great satisfaction, and what a *wise* and *good* man may be allowd, as he has opportunity, to propose to himself. But then he proposes it no farther than it may be *useful* : and it can be no farther useful than he *wants* it. So that, upon the whole, *glory*, *praise*, and the like, are either mere *vanity*, or only valuable in proportion to our *defects* and *wants*. If then those words are understood according to the import and value they have *among men*, how dares any one think, that the Supreme being can propose such a *mean* end to Himself as our praises? He can neither *want*, nor *value* them. *Alexander*,

^x *Expende Hannibalem : quot libras in duce summo Invenies?*

“ Weigh *Hannibal* in the scales, and see how many pounds there remain of that great commander.” *JUV.*

^y Μέχρι τῦδε οἱ ἔπαινοι ἀνεκτοί εἰσιν, εἰς ὅσον ἂν ὁ ἐπαινέμενος γινώσκῃ ἑαυτὸν τῶν λεγομένων προσὸν ἑαυτῷ· τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῦτο, ἀλλότριον, κλ.

“ Praises may be borne, so long as the person praised knows that all the things which are said belong to him, but all, that is beyond this, is nothing to the purpose.” *LUCIAN.*

according

according to his taste of things, it may well be supposed would have been proud to have heard that he should be the subject of *some second Homer* ^z, in whose sheets his name might be embalmed for ages to come; or to have been celebrated at *Athens*, the mother of so many wits and captains: but sure *even he*, with all his vanity, could not propose to himself as the end of all his fatigues and dangers only to be praised by *children*, or rather by *worms* and *insects*, if they were capable of shewing some faint sense of his *greatness* ^a. And yet how far short is this comparison! In conclusion therefore, tho men have been accustomed to speak of the *Deity* in terms taken from *princes*, and such things as they have, in their weakness, admired; tho these are now incorporated into the language of *Divines*; and tho, considering what defects there are in our ways of thinking and speaking, we cannot well part with them all: yet we must remember to *exalt* the sense of them, or annex some *mental* qualification to the use of them. As, if God be said to do things for His own glory, the meaning I *humbly* conceive must be, that the transcendent excellence of His nature may be collected from the form of the world and administration of things in it; where there occur such *marks* of inexpressible wisdom and power, that He needed not to have given us *greater*, had He only intended His own

^z Μακαρίσας αὐτὸν [Ἀχιλλέω] ὅτι ἐν ζῶν φίλος πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἐν τελευτήσας μεγαλὰ κήρυκ' ἔτυχε. "He esteem'd him (*Achilles*) happy, because he had a faithful friend while living, and one that celebrated him highly after he was dead." PLUT.

^a As *Psfathon* was celebrated by the *birds*, singing *Μίγας θεός ψάφων*, "*Psfathon* is a great God." M. TYR.

glory :

glory: or something to this purpose. Or if the glory of what *we* do, be ascribed to *Him*; by this must be signified, that no glory is due to us, who have no powers, but what originally depend upon Him; and that we desire therefore to acknowledge Him to be the true author of all that, which is *laudable* in us ^b.

When we *thank God* for any deliverance or enjoyment, this must not be so understood, as if He could value Himself upon our *ceremonious acknowledgments*, or wanted complements, or any return from us. *It is* rather a profession of the *sense we have* of our wants and defects, of the beneficence of His nature, and the greatness or seasonableness of the mercies received: an effort of a poor dependent being, who desires to own things, as far as he is able, to be *what they are* ^c; and especially to beget in himself such a disposition of mind, as he ought to have towards his Almighty *benefactor*.

When we are said to be *servants of God*, or to *serve* Him, or do Him *service*, these phrases are not to be taken as when *one* man is said to be servant of *another*, or to do him service. For here it implies the doing of something, which is useful and

^b *Honoribus auēti—cūm diis gratias agimus, tum nihil nostræ laudi assumptum arbitramur.* “When honors are heaped up—on us—and we return thanks to the Gods, we do not then take any of the merit to ourselves.” CIC. “Ὅτι ἂν ἀγαθὸν πράττης εἰς Θεὸν ἀνάπεμπε.” “When you do any good thing, ascribe it to God.” A saying of *Bias ap. Diog. L.*

^c *Εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὴ δυνάμεθα κατ’ ἀξίαν ποτε τῦτο ποιῆσαι,—ἀλλ’ ὅμως τὴν κατὰ δυνάμειν ἀνεργασίην εὐχαριστῶν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη.* “For tho we cannot do the thing as it ought to be done—yet it is but just and fit that we offer up our thanksgiving, so far as is in our power.” CHRYS.

beneficial

beneficial to the man who is served, and what he *wants*, or fancies he wants: but nothing of *want* can be supposed in God, nor can we any way be *profitable* or *serviceable* to Him. To *serve Him* therefore must rather be *to worship* or adore Him (of which something by and by). And thus that word in another language, of which our *serve* is but the translation, is frequently used: as *to serve a graven image* ^d is *to worship the image*; but cannot signify the doing of any thing, which may be *serviceable* or *useful* to the dead stone. Or *to serve God* may be understood in a sense something like that: *Serve the king of Babylon* ^e. For they were said to serve the king of *Babylon*, who owned his authority, and lived according to his laws, tho' they did nothing, nor had any thing perhaps, which could be particularly *serviceable* to him: and so they may be said to *serve God*, or to be His *servants*, who live in a continual sense of His sovereign nature and power over them, and endeavour to conform themselves to the *laws* which He has imposed upon them ^f. In these senses we pray, that we may live *to serve Him*: that is, we pray, that we may live to worship Him, and practise those

^d כל עובדי פסל: את פסיליהם היו עובדים "all they who serve images, are worshippers of images," *Et sim. pass.* Deut. xii. mention is made of the places, אשר עבדו שם, הגוים וגו' "where the nations served their images, &c." in the *Chaldee paraphrase* it is said פלחו, "worshipped them;" and in the *Septuagint* it is said ἐλάτρευον, "worshipped them" (in the ecclesiastical sense) and the same in the *Vulgar Latin*.

^e עבדו את מלך בבל. "Serve the king of Babylon."

^f *Plato* applies the word *serve* even to the laws themselves in that phrase, *viz.* ἐλάτρευον τοὺς νόμους; "to serve the laws."

laws

laws of reason and virtue, to which rational natures are by Him subjected ^ε.

Many more reflexions might be made upon *epithets* and *ways of speaking*, introduced by custom, from rude antiquity, or by necessity following from the narrowness either of men's minds, or their language. It is plain, that *love, anger, hands, eyes, &c.* when ascribed to God, cannot import such *bodily* parts or passions as are found in us. Even the pronouns, *my, thy, his* (as His people, His house, &c.) require much *temper* in the use of them ^h.

3. *We shall find ourselves bound to worship Him, in the best manner we can.* For by worshipping Him I mean nothing but owning Him to be *what He is*, and ourselves to be *what we are*, by some more *solemn* and proper act: that is, by addressing ourselves *as His dependents* to Him *as the Supreme cause*, and *Governor of the world*, with acknowledgments of what we enjoy, petitions for what we really want, or He knows to be convenient for us ⁱ,
and

^ε Ἐκείνῳ ὑδὲν ἔξω φιλοδουλοῦντος γνώμης παρέχοντες. “ We give no more to Him, than to one whom we freely acknowledge to have the dominion over us.” PH. JUD.

^h כִּי יִבִּין. “ The wise will understand.”

ⁱ Care must be taken how we pray, lest we should ask what may be hurtful to us. Οὐκ αὖν δοκεῖ πολλῆς προμηθείας γε προσδεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ λήσῃ τις αὐτὸν εὐχόμενος μεγάλα κακά, δοκῶν δ' ἀγαθά, “ for there seems to be need of great prudence, lest a man, by not rightly understanding himself, should ask for such things as he imagins to be good for him, but which are indeed great evils.” PLATO. *Evertere domos totas, optantibus ipsis, Di faciles, &c.* “ the Gods who are ready (to grant men's petitions) have overthrown whole houses, at the request of the owners, &c.” is a Poet's observation. The author of
S. Hhaf.

prop. V. For never to acknowledge the enjoyments and privileges we have received, and hold of God, is in effect to *deny* that we receive them from Him; not to apply to Him for what we want is to *deny*, either our wants, or His power of helping us; and so on: all contrary to truth¹.

It must ever be own'd, that no worship can be proportionable to the Divine nature and perfections; but yet that we are obliged to do what we can: therefore I added those words *in the best manner we can*. And it must be acknowledged further, that those words do not oblige us to be *always* at our devotions neither ^m. For as in the worship of God we own Him to be *what He is*, so must we do this as not denying ourselves to be *what we are*: beings not capable of bearing continual *intention* of mind; beings, that are incompass'd with many *wants*, which by the constitution of our nature require to be supplied, not without *care* and *activity* join'd to our prayers; beings, that are made for many *harmless enjoyments*; beings, that have *many offices* to perform one for another; and beings, in whom, all things consider'd, it would

¹ התפלה—ענף מסתעף מן ההשגחה “Prayer — is a branch of providence shading us.” ALBO. כַּל מֵאֵמִין בַּהֲשִׁגְחָה יֵאֱמָר שֶׁהַתְּפִלָּה מוֹעִיל לּוֹ וְכֹן “He that believes in providence, must believe that prayer is profitable to him.” *Id.*

^m Like those Ἀκοιμηταὶ “wakeful people” at *Constantinople* particularly, who continued divine service night and day *without intermission*. Or the *Messalians* perhaps (Μεσσηλίται, Εὐχισταί), “(praying people)” who placed (or pretended to place) *all* religion in prayer, μόνη σχολάζειν τῇ προσευχῇ προσποιούμενοι, “and so managed themselves, as never to be at leisure for any thing else but prayer.” V. SUIC.

be *less respect* to be constantly in the formal act of devotion, than it is to address ourselves to Him with prepared minds, at certain times, or upon certain occasions. To be *always* thus engaged, if it could be, would be to make God *what He is not*: since it seems to suppose, that He wants it and we merit of Him by it; or that He is bound to give what we ask, without our endeavouring; or, at least, that He is a Being obnoxious to importunity and teasing. For these reasons I have also in the explication of my meaning inserted that limitation, *by some solemn and proper act.*

Tho every man knows best his own opportunities and circumstances, and therefore may be most able to judge for himself, how he may *best* perform this duty; yet in general it may be said, that to the doing of it *solemnly* and in the best manner we can these things are required: an intent *mind*ⁿ, proper *times* and *places*, a proper *form* of words, and a proper *posture*. For if the *mind* be absent, or attends not to what is said, it is not the *man* that prays: this is only as it were the noise of a machine, which is put into motion indeed, but without any consciousness of its own act. To repeat one's prayers with moving *lips*, but alienated *thoughts*, is not to pray in the *best* manner we can: because it is not in a manner agreeable to what we are, or to *truth*. For this is to do it only as *speaking*, and not as *thinking* beings.

ⁿ כל תפלה שאינה בכונה אינה תפלה. "If a prayer is not performed with earnestness, it is no prayer." MAIM. התפלה תלויה בלב. "A prayer suspended in the mind." S. HHAS. and the like every where.

lieve, that even the *deaf* and *dumb* form to themselves some kind of language: I mean something, which supplies the room of language.) For thoughts in their naked state, 'devested of all words, and taken *merely by themselves*, are such subtle and fleeting things, as are scarce capable of making any *appearance* in the mind; at least of being detain'd, compar'd together, and ranged into *sentences*. If a sentence may be so made up of sensible ideas as to subsist in the mind by the help of those images which remain in the phantasy, after the manner of a sentence express'd in *pictures*, or by *hieroglyphics*: yet such a sentence must be very imperfect, through the *want* of grammatical inflexions, particles, and other additions necessary to modify and connect the ideas, of which (particles, &c.) there can be no images; and indeed little more than a set of *dis-jointed* conceptions, scarce exhibiting *any sense* without the assistance of language to fill up the blanks: and beside that, a *prayer* cannot be made out of such sentences as those. It is by the help of *words*, at least in great measure, that we even reason and discourse within ourselves, as well as communicate our thoughts and discourse with others: and if any one observes himself well, he will find, that he *thinks*, as well as *speaks* in some language,

“ when it considers any thing.” And so *Plotinus*, ὁ ἐν φωνῇ λόγος μιμημα τῷ ἐν ψυχῇ, “ the vocal words are an imitation of those of the soul.”

“ *Multa sunt verba, quæ, quasi articuli, connectunt membra orationis, quæ formari similitudine nulla possunt.* “ There are many words (particles) which are like small joints, to connect the several sentences, which cannot be exhibited by any images.” *Cic.*

and

and that in thinking he supposes and runs over silently and habitually those sounds, which in speaking he actually makes. This is the cause, why men can scarce write *well* in any language but *their own*: for whilst they think in their own, their style and speech, which is but the portraiture of their thoughts, must have the *turn* and *genius* of their own language, to what language soever the particular words belong. In short, *words* seem to be as it were *bodies* or *vehicles* to the sense or meaning, which is the *spiritual part*^s, and which without the other can hardly be fixt in the mind. Let any man try ingenuously, whether he can think over but that short prayer in *Plato*, Τα μὲν ἐδδλὰ, κτλ. ^t, abstracted quite from those and all other *words*. One may apply his mind to the words of a prayer pronounced by *another*, and by taking them in make them *his own*; or he may be as it were his own reader, and pronounce them *himself*; or he may lay before him a prayer in *writing*, and so carry his eyes, and his mind together through it; or he may go over a form of words imprinted on his *memory*; or he may put words together in his mind *ex tempore*: but still in all these ways *words* and language are used. And since to *think* over a set of words cannot be a more adequate manner of

^s תפלה בלא כונה כגוף בלא נשמה. “ A prayer, without the intention of the mind, is like a body without a soul.”

NAHR. AB.

^t *Alcib.* 2. The words of the Poet in *Plato* are these: “ O *Jupiter*, our king, give us those things that are good for us, whether we ask for them or no; and command those things that are hurtful to be kept from us, though we pray for them.”

addressing to God (who neither speaks, nor thinks like us) than to *spe*ak it over and *think* too; and moreover, since the very *sound* of the words affects us, and, when the form is ready prepared, and the mind freed from the labor of composing, doth really help *attention* ^u: I say, since this is the case, it must be better, when we have opportunity, to *pronounce* a prayer ^w, than only to *think* it over. But then it should be spoken no louder (I mean when we pray privately), than just to make it audible to *ourselves* ^x. It is not upon God's account that we speak, since he would know even our thoughts:

^u דבור אדם הוא בכונה וכו' "When a man speaks distinctly, it is always with intenfeness." ABARB. That in *S. Hbared.* quoted out of סמ"ק "the lesser book of precepts," explains this thus: זיהבין מלה ומלה כאלו מונה וזהבין, "He will consider every word exactly, as if he was looking over his debts."

^w — *Ut eos [deos,] semper pura—mente & voce veneremur.* "—That we may always worship them" (the Gods, in the style of the Heathens) "with a pure—mind, and with pure words." CIC. "Ὁ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων ἰπὸ σῆ, Δέσποτα, κρείττους γέγοναμεν, τὰτα τὴν σῆ εὐλογεῖν μεγαλειότητα πρίπει." "That as thou, O Lord, hast made us better than other creatures, so it becomes us the more to praise thy greatness;" says *Solomon* in his prayer *ap. Joseph.*

^x This we find often among the *Dinim* "orders" of the *Jeus.* הברכות כולן צריך שישמיע לאוניו מה שהוא אומר. "It is necessary in all our prayers, that we so speak as to be heard by ourselves." MAIM. And *R. Elaz. Azquari,* having cited this passage, adds לא הסכימו רוב הפוסקים שאם לא השמיע לאוניו לא יצא וכו' "In general the judges agree in this, that if he does not hear his own self, he is guilty (of a crime.)" *Maimonides* in another place expresses himself thus: לא יתפלל בלבו [לבד] אלא מחתך הדברים בשפתיו: ומשמיע לאוניו בלחש "A man should not (only) pray in his mind, but pronounce the words distinctly with his lips, and

thoughts : but it is upon *our own* account, and to make our *adorations*, tho imperfect at the best, as compleat as we are able. (Which, by the way, is an answer to them, who object against prayer the *impertinence* of talking to God.) This being premised, and it being found that we must make use of *words*, it cannot be denied that we ought to use the *best* and *propereſt* we can. This cannot be done in *extemporaneous* effusions : and therefore there must be forms *premeditated* ; the *best*, that we are capable of making or procuring, if we would worship God to the best of our capacity. As a prayer ought to have all the marks of seriousness and being in earnest, it ought to be the *plainest*, and at the same time is perhaps the *hardest* of all compositions. It ought to take in a general view of what we have *injoyd*, what we *want*, what we have *done*, &c. and every thing ought to be exprest with *method*, in phrases that are *grave* and *pointing*, and with such a *true* eloquence, as engages all our attention, and represents our *deepest* sense, without *affectation* or *needless repetitions*. These considerations have caused me many times to wonder at those men, who dispute against pre-conceived forms of prayer. They, who talk so much of the spirit of prayer, seem to know but little of it.

As to the *posture*, that is best, which best *expresses* our humility, reverence, and earnestness,

“ and whisper so as to hear himself.” (That word לבר, “ only,” I inserted from *Shulbb. aruk.*) The same occurs in *Or hbadash*, & *pass.*

ז המתפלל—יחשוב כאילו שכינה כנגדו וכו' ז “ prays—should think about it as much as if the divine presence could appear to him.” *Or hba'iy.*

and affects us most. Tho perhaps some regard is to be paid to the customs of the *place* where we are; or of our own *country*, to which we have been most used. Several nations may denote the same thing by different gestures: and we may take these, as we do their words; *i. e.* as having that signification which they put upon them.

Tho I have not hitherto mentiond it, there ought to be also a *public worship* of the Deity. For a man may be considerd as a member of a *society*, and *as such* he ought to worship God (if he has the opportunity of doing it: if there are proper prayers used publicly, which he may resort to; and his health, &c. permit). Or the *society* may be considerd as *one body*, that has common interests and concerns, and *as such* is obliged to worship the Deity, and offer one common prayer. Beside, there are many, who know not of themselves, *how* to pray; perhaps cannot so much as read. These too must be taken *as they are*, and consequently some time and place *appointed*, where they may have suitable prayers red to them, and be guided in their devotions. And further, toward the keeping mankind in order, it is *necessary* there should be some religion professd, and even establishd; which cannot be without some public worship. And were it not for that sense of virtue, which is *principally* preservd (so far as it is preservd) by national *forms* and *habits* of religion, men would soon lose it *all*, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what else the worst of savages do.

But how does this *public worship*, it may be demanded, comport with that retreat and *privacy* recom-

recommended above? *Ans.* I spoke there of prayer *in general*, to which those circumstances give a great advantage: but then they are recommended no farther, than they can be had, and the nature of the prayer admits of them. Excuse a short reflexion here, which if it be not directly for the purpose, is not altogether foreign to it. Tho he who reads the form of public prayer reads it to *all* at the same time, that *all* may unite in one common act, which otherwise they could not do: yet still every *particular* person, who minds the prayers at all, has a separate perception of the words in his *mind*, and *there* he offers them, or the sense contained under them, with more or less application and ardor. And since no man can be said to *pray* any further than he *does this*: and it cannot be known to any body in the congregation beside himself, how far he *doth do it*; his prayer is in reality as *private*, as if he was inclosed within a thousand walls. So that, though there are reasons for a public worship, yet I will venture to affirm, that all *true* prayer is *private*: and the true seat of it being in the *mind*, toward the interesting of whose powers all the circumstances of worship are mainly designed to contribute, it may be said upon that account to be always made in the most retired and *undiscerned* of all retreats²: nor can more be said in respect of a worship, which by the terms is in other respects *public*. A man may be present in a congregation, and either pray the same prayer in which others seem to join, or some other,

² 'Εν τῷ εἰρηστικῷ βίῳ. "In a private retirement, as in a temple." PLOTIN.

or none at all ^a, for ought any body there can tell besides himself.

I am not insensible how much I may expose myself by these things to the laughter of some, who are utter strangers to all this language. What a stir is here, *say they*, about *praying*? Who ever observed, that they who pray are more *successful* or happy, than they are who do not? *Ans.* All observations of this kind must be very *lubricous* and uncertain. We neither *know* what other men are inwardly and really ^b, nor how they pray ^c, nor what to call success ^d. That, which is *good* for one, may be *bad* for another: and that, which seems good at present, may at length be evil, or intro-

^a S. *Chrysofom* says some are so unmindful of what they are about, that they know not so much as what they say themselves. Εἰσέρχονται πολλοὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, — καὶ ἐξέρχονται, καὶ οὐκ οἶδασι τί εἶπον· τὰ χεῖλη κινεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ οὐκ ἀκούει. “ A great many come “ to church,—and go home again, without so much as know- “ ing what they have said. Their lips moved, but their words “ were not heard.”

^b The very Heathens thought, that the Gods would not hear the prayers of wicked men. *Bias* happening to be with some such in the same ship, when a great storm arose and they (being now frightened) began to invoke their deities, cries out, Σιγᾶτε, μὴ αἰσθῶνται ἡμᾶς ἐνθάδε πλόντας. “ Hold your tongues, “ they’ll take no notice of us, while we sail here.” *D. L.*

^c *C. Cestius ap. Tac.* says, *principes quidem instar deorum esse: sed neque a diis nisi justas supplicum preces audiri.* “ Princes indeed are like Gods, but the Gods themselves will not hear “ the prayers of the supplicant, unless they be just.”

^d Sometimes πλεον ἡμισυ παντός, “ half is better than the “ whole:” that is, as *Plato* paraphrases those words of *Hesiod*, τὸ ἡμισυ τῷ παντός πωλλάκις ἐστὶ πλεον, ὁπόταν ἢ τὸ μὲν ὅλον λαμβάνειν ζημιώδες, κλ. “ Many times half is better than the whole, “ and when it is so, to receive the whole is an injury to us.”

*

duce

duce something which is so ^c. And as to the *prosperity* of them, who endeavour to worship God in a proper and reasonable manner, *whatever it is*, perhaps it might be *less*, if they did not; or their misfortunes might be *greater*: who can be certain of the contrary? If these gentlemen have any way of discovering it, I wish they would impart their *secret*. In the mean time sure they cannot expect, that even in the most imperfect sketch of *natural religion* the *worship of the Deity* should be omitted: that very thing, which hath been principally intended by the word *religion* ^f.

4. And lastly, to deliver what remains, summarily; *Rational beings, or they, to whom reason is the great law of their nature, if they would behave themselves as above, should consider in earnest, what a mighty being He is, who by the constitution of their nature has laid them under an obligation of being governd by it, and whose laws the dictates of right reason may be said to be.* They ought to keep it well imprest upon their minds, that He is the be-

^c *Quid quod iste calculi candore laudatus dies originem mali habuit? Quam multos accepta afflixere imperia? quam multos bona perdidere, & ultimis mersere suppliciis?* “What if that day, which came up lucky, should be the beginning of evil? How many, in great power, have been ruined by it? How many hath prosperity destroyd, and subjected them to the greatest punishments?” PLIN.

^f *Religio deorum cultu pio continetur.* “Religion consists in a devout worshipping of the Gods.” CIC. *Qui omnia, quæ ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent, & tanquam relegerent, sunt dicti religiosi, &c.* “They are called religious persons, because they are continually revolving and repeating over and over again the things that belong to the worship of the Gods.” *Id.*

ing,

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 ing, upon whom their very *existence* depends: that it is He who superintends and administers the affairs of the world by His *providence*: that the effects of His *power* and *influence* are visible before their faces, and round about them, in all the *phænomena* of nature, not one of which could be without Him: that they are always in His *presence*: that He is a being of *perfect reason*: that, if it be *reasonable*, that the transgressors of *reason* should be punishd, they will most certainly, *one time or other*, be punishd, &c. And then, if they do this, it is easy to see what effect it must have upon all their *thoughts*, *words* †, and *actions*.

By what is said here, no *superstition* is intended to be introduced: it is only the practice of *reason* and *truth*, which is required: and any thing, that is *not inconsistent with them*, may be freely done, tho under the inspection of our great Lawgiver himself.

SECT. VI. *Truths respecting Mankind in general, antecedent to all human laws.*

IN this and the following sections I shall proceed as in the foregoing.

I. *Every man hath in himself a principle of individuation, which distinguishes and separates him from all*

‡ Particularly with respect to *customary swearing*; which, beside the ill consequences it has in making oaths cheap, &c. is a great instance of disregard and irreverence. For they, who use themselves to it do, *at least*, make the tremendous name of God to serve for an *expletive* only; and commonly to rude, passionate,

all other men in such a manner, as may render him and them capable of distinct properties in things (or distinct subjects of property). That is, B and C are so distinguished, or exist so *distinctly*, that if there be any thing which B can call *his*, it will be for that reason *not* C's: and *v. v.* what is C's will for that reason not be B's. The proof of this I put upon every man's own conscience. Let us see then whether there is any thing, which one man may truly call his.

II. *There are some things, to which (at least before the case is altered by voluntary subjection, compact, or the like) every individual man has, or may have, such a natural and immediate relation, that be only of all mankind can call them his.*

The *life, limbs, &c.* of B are as much *his*, as B is *himself*^h. It is impossible for C, or any other to see with the *eyes* of B: therefore they are *eyes* only to B: and when they cease to be *his eyes*, they cease to be *eyes at all*. He then has the sole *property* in them, it being impossible in nature, that the eyes of B should ever be the eyes of C.

Further, the *labor* of B cannot be the labor of C: because it is the application of the organs and powers of B, not of C, to the effecting of something; and therefore the *labor* is as much B's, as the *limbs* and *faculties* made use of are his.

passionate, or debauched discourse (λέγων ἀναπλήρωμα ποιούμενοι τὸ ἁγιώτατον ἢ θεῖον ὄνομα, “making use of the most holy name of “ God, only to fill up the sentence with.”) PH. JUD.

h Οὐδὲν ἕτως ἡμέτερον ἐστίν, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. “ Nothing is so “ much our own, as we ourselves are.” XEN.

Again,

Again, the *effect* or *produce* of the labor of B is not the effect of the labor of C : and therefore this effect or produce is B's, not C's ; as much B's, as the *labor* was B's and not C'sⁱ. Because, what the labor of B causes or produces, B produces by his labor ; or it is the product of B by his labor : that is, it is B's product, not C's, or any other's. And if C should pretend to any *property* in that, which B only can truly call *his*, he would act contrary to *truth*^k.

Lastly, there may be *many* things, which B may truly call *his* in some such *sense*, or upon some such account, as *no other* can ; and to which C has no more right than D, nor D than F, &c. the *property* of which will therefore be in B. Because C has no more title than D, nor D than F, &c. and that, to which every one *besides B* has an *equal* title, no one besides B can have *any title* to at all^l, their pretences mutually balancing and *destroying* each other, whilst his only *remains*. And in this case a small matter, being opposed to nothing, will be strong enough to maintain the claim of B.

ⁱ And therefore the produce of a man's labor is often still called his *labor*. So יבזו זרֵיָם יגיעוּ, “strangers devour his labor :” and יגיע כפיך תאכל, “thou shalt eat the labor of thine hands ;” in *Psalms*. & *al. passim*.—*Iliadumque labor vestes*. “—Garments which were the labor of the Trojan women.” VIRG.

^k If B works for another man, who pays him for his work, or labor, that alters not the case. He may commute them for money, because they are *his*.

^l *Tanquam Sparti illi poetarum, sic se invicem jugulant, ut nemo ex omnibus restet*. “Like those Spartans mentioned by the Poets, who cut one another's throats, so that not one of them all remaind,” as *Lactantius* says in another case.

III. *Whatever is inconsistent with the general peace and welfare (or good) of mankind, is inconsistent with the laws of human nature, wrong, intolerable.* Those maxims may be esteem'd the natural and true laws of any particular society, which are most proper to procure the *happiness* of it. Because *happiness* is the end of society and laws: otherwise we might suppose *unhappiness* to be propos'd as the right end of them; that is, *unhappiness* to be desirable, contrary to *nature* and *truth*. And what is said of a *particular* society is not less true, when applied to the *universal* society of mankind. Now those things are *most apt* to produce happiness, which make the *most men* happy. And therefore those maxims or principles, which promote the general *tranquillity* and *well being* of mankind, if those words express the *happiness* of mankind, must be the *true* laws of humanity, or the basis of them: and all such practices, as interfere with these, must also interfere with those. It is contradictory to say, that any thing can be a *general* law of *human nature*, which tends only to favor the pleasures of *some particulars* to the prejudice of the rest, who partake of the same common nature; and especially if these pleasures are of the lower and *brutal* kind. As a *million* of men are more than *one*; so in fixing the public laws of human nature, and what ought to be, or not to be, they must in reason be more regarded by a *million of times*: for here we consider men only as men.

It will be easy now to shew, that the *transgression* of these laws, conducing to the general good of the world, is *wrong* and *morally evil*. For if man-
kind

kind may be said in general to be a *rational animal*, the general welfare of it must be the welfare of a *rational nature*: and therefore that, and the laws which advance it, must be founded in *reason*; nor can be opposed by any thing, but what is opposite to *reason*, and consequently to *truth*.

Let us suppose *some* rule, by which if all mankind would agree to govern themselves, it would be in general good for the world: that is, such a practice would be agreeable to the *nature* and *circumstances* of mankind. If *all* men should transgress this rule, what would be the consequence of such an *universal* revolt? A general *evil*, or something disagreeable to our *nature* and the *truth* of our circumstances: for of contrary practices there must be contrary effects; and contraries cannot both be agreeable to the same thing. This then would be *wrong* by the terms. And as wrong it would be in any *one* man: because all the individuals have *equal* right to do it, one as much as another; and therefore *all* as much as any *one*. At least it is certain, that whoever should violate that *rule*, would contribute his share towards the introduction of universal *disorder* and *misery*; and would for his part *deny* human circumstances to be what they are, public happiness to be what it is, and the rule to be what it really is, as much as if all others conspired with him in this iniquity and madness.

With what face can any *particular* man put his own humor or unreasonable pleasure into the scale against such a weight of happiness as that of *all the world*? Does not he, who thus centers in *himself*, disregard the good of *every body else*, and intirely

tirely separates his enjoyments and interests from those of the *public*; does not he, I say, strike himself out of the roll of *mankind* ^m? Ought he to be ownd as one of them? Ought he not rather to be repelled and treated as an *alien* and *enemy* to the common happiness and tranquillity of our *species*?

IV. *Whatever is either reasonable or unreasonable in B with respect to C, would be just the same in C with respect to B, if the case was inverted* ⁿ. Because reason is universal, and respects cases ^o, not persons. (See sect. III. pr. II.)

Cor. Hence it follows, that a good way to know what is right or wrong in relation to *other men*, is to consider what we should take things to be, were *we* in their circumstances ^p.

V. *In a state of nature men are equal in respect of dominion* ^q. I except for the present the case of *pa-*

^m ἄνθρωπόμορφον θηρίον. “A wild beast in the shape of a
“man.” PH. JUD.

ⁿ Nec enim æquus judex aliam de suâ, aliam de alienâ causâ,
sententiam fert. “A fair judge will not give a different sen-
“tence in his own cause, from that which he gives in the
“cause of another.” SEN.

^o Ἄει ταυτὰ περὶ γὰ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται. “We must always un-
“derstand the same things relating to the same things.” ISOC.

^p אל תדין חברך עד שתביע למקומו. “You must not judge
“your companion, till you have put yourself in his place.”

P. ABOOTH. *Eo loco nos constituamus, quo ille est, cui irascimur.*
“We ought to put ourselves in the place of him we are an-
“gry with.” SEN.

^q He was a mere flatterer, who told *Cyrus*, βασιλεὺς μὲν ἔμοι
γὰ δακῆς σὺ φύσει προσηκόναι ἔδδὲν ἥτιον ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ σμήνει φέμεν τῶν με-
λιτῶν ἡγεμόν. “You seem to me to be born a king as much by
“nature, as he who is born in the hive is the king of the bees.”

XEN.

rents

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rents and their *children*, and perhaps of some few other near relations. Here let me be understood to mean only those, between whom there is no family relation (or between whom all family relation is vanished).

In a state, where no *laws* of society make any subordination or distinction, *men* can only be considered *as men*, or only as individuals of the same *species*, and equally sharing in one common definition ^r. And since by virtue of this *same* definition B is the *same* to C, that C is to B; B has no more *dominion* over C than C *reciprocally* has over B: that is, they are in this regard *equal*.

Personal excellencies or defects can make no difference here: because, 1. Who must *judge*, on which side the advantage lies? To say B (or D, or any body else) has a right to judge to the disadvantage of C, is to *suppose* what is in question, a dominion over him; not to *prove* it. 2. Great natural or acquired *indowments* may be privileges to them who have them: but this does not deprive those, who have less, of *their title* to what they have; or, which is the same, give any one, who has greater abilities, a *right* to take it, or the use of it from them. If B has better *eyes* than C, it is well for him: but it does not follow from this, that C should not therefore see for himself, and use *his eyes*, as freely as B may *his*. C's eyes are accommodated by nature to his use, and so are B's to

^r *Nihil est unum uni tam simile, tam par, quàm omnes inter nosmet ipsos sumus.—Quæcumq; est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet.* “There is no one thing more like or equal to another, than we all are amongst ourselves.—Whatever definition we

“give of a man, the same will hold good of us all.” Cico:

his;

his; and each has the sole property in his own: so their respective properties are *equal*. The case would be parallel to this, if B should happen to have better *intellectual faculties* than C. And further, if B should be *stronger* than C, he would not yet for that reason have any right to be his *lord*. For C's less degree of strength is *as much his*, as B's greater is *his*: therefore C has as much *right* to his, and (which is the natural consequence) to use his, as B has to use his: that is, C has as much right to *resist*, as B has to impose or *command*, by virtue of his strength: and where the *right* (tho not the power) of resisting is equal to the right of commanding, the right of commanding or *dominion* is nothing. 3. Since strength and power are most apt to pretend a title to dominion^s, it may be added further, that *power* and *right*, or a power of doing any thing, and right to do it, are quite different ideas: and therefore they may be separated, nor does one infer the other. *Lastly*, if *power*, *quà* power, gives a right to dominion, it gives a right to *every thing*, that is obnoxious to it; and then nothing can be done that is wrong. (For no body can do any thing which he has not the *power* to do.) But this is not only contrary to what has been proved in sect. I. but to assert it would be to advance a plain *absurdity* or *contradiction* rather.

^s When the *Romans*, in *Livy*, asked the *Galls*, *Quodnam jus esset, agrum à possessoribus petere, aut minari arma*, "Where is the justice of demanding the lands of the owners, or else threatening them with the sword;" they answer, *se in armis jus ferre, & omnia fortium virorum esse*, "that their swords were their law, and that valiant men had a right to every thing." Like barbarians indeed!

For then to oppose the man who has this *power*, as far as one can, or (which is the same) as far as one has the *power* to do it, would not be wrong: and yet so it must be, if he has a right to dominion, or to be not opposed. Moreover, that a man should have a *right* to any thing, merely because he has the *power* to take it, is a doctrine indeed, which may serve a few tyrants, or some *banditti* and rogues, but directly opposite to the peace and general good of mankind; and therefore to be exploded, by prop. III. It is also what the powerful themselves could not allow, if they would but imagine themselves to be in the state of the *weak* and more *defenceless*; and therefore unreasonable, by prop. IV^t.

VI. *No man can have a right to begin to interrupt the happiness of another.* Because, in the first place, this supposes a dominion over him, and the most *absolute* too that can be. In the next, for B to begin to disturb the peace and happiness of C is what B would think *unreasonable*, if he was in C's case. In the last, since it is supposed, that C has never invaded the happiness of B, nor taken any thing from him, nor at all meddled with him, but the *whole transaction* begins originally from B (for all this is couchd in the word *begin*), C can have nothing that is B's; and therefore nothing, to

^t *Josephus*, when he says, νόμον γε μὴν ἀπλοῦσαι, ἢ παρὰ θηρίων ἰσχυρότατον, ἢ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις, εἶναι τοῖς δυνατωτέροις, “ that it is an
“ established law, and it is the strongest amongst both beasts
“ and amongst men, *viz.* to submit to them that have the
“ most power,” can only mean, that necessity, or perhaps prudence, *obliges* to do this; not any law in the stricter sense of that word.

which

which C has not at least *as good a title* as B has; or, in other words, nothing, which C has not as much right to *keep* as B to *claim*. These two rights being then *at least* equal, and counterpoising each other, no alteration in the present state of things can follow from any superiority of right in B: and therefore it must of right remain as it is; and what C has must, for any right that B has to oppose this settlement, remain with C in his *undisturbed* possession. But the argument is still stronger on the side of C: because he seems to have such a *property* in his own happiness, as is mentiond in prop. II. such a one as no other can have ^u.

VII. *Tho no man can have a right to begin to interrupt another man's happiness, or to hurt him; yet every man has a right to defend himself and his against violence, to recover what is taken by force from him, and even to make reprisals, by all the means that truth and prudence permit* ^w. We have seen already, that there are some things, which a man may truly call *his*; and let us for the present only suppose, that there may be *more*. This premis'd, I proceed to make good the proposition.

To deny a man the privilege mentiond in it is to assert, contrary to *truth*, either that he *has not* the

^u *Societatis [inter homines] arctissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari esse contra naturam, hominem homini detrahere, sui commodi causa, quam omnia incommoda subire, &c.* "The strongest bond of society amongst men is, to think that it is more contrary to nature, for one man to take away that which belongs to another, to advantage himself, than it is to undergo all the inconveniences that can be, &c." Cic.

^w All this is supposed to be in a state of nature and the absence of human laws.

faculties and powers, which he *has*; or that the Author of nature has given them to him in vain. For to what end has he them, if he may not *use* them? And how may he use them, if not for his own *preservation*, when he is attackd, and like to be abusd, or perhaps destroyd?

All *animals* have a principle of *self-preservation*, which exerts itself many times with an uncontrollable impetuosity. Nature is *uniform* in this, and every where constant to itself. Even *inanimate* bodies, when they are acted upon, react. And one may be sure, that no position can have any foundation *in nature*, or be consistent with *it* and *truth* (those inseparable companions), which turns upon nature itself, and tends to *its destruction*.

Great part of the general happiness of mankind depends upon those *means*, by which the innocent may be saved from their cruel invaders: among which the opportunities they have of *defending* themselves may be reckond the chief. Therefore to debar men of the use of these opportunities, and the right of defending themselves against injurious treatment and violence must be inconsistent with the laws of nature by prop. III.

If a man has no right to *defend* himself and what is his, he can have no right to *any thing* (the contrary to which has been already in part, and will by and by be more amply proved); since that cannot be his right, which he may not *maintain* to be his right.

If a man has no right to *defend* himself against insults, &c. it must be because the aggressor has a right to *assail* the other, and *usurp* what is his: but this pretension has been prevented in the foregoing

ing proposition. And, more than that, it includes a great absurdity, to *commence* an injury, or to *begin* the violence, being in nature more than only to *repell* it. He, who begins, is the true cause of all that follows: and whatever falls upon him from the opposition made by the defending party, is but the effect of his own act: or, it is that violence, of which he is the author, *reflected* back upon himself. It is as when a man spits at heaven, and the spittle falls back upon his own face.

Since he, who begins to violate the happiness of another, does what is *wrong*, he, who endeavours to obviate or put a stop to that violence, does in that respect what is *right*, by the terms.

Lastly, since every man is obliged to consult his own happiness, there can be no doubt but that he not only *may*, but even *ought* to defend it (sect. II. prop. IX); in such a manner I mean, as does not interfere with *truth* *, or his own design of being happy. He ought indeed not to act *rashly*, or do *more* than the end proposed requires: that is, he ought by a prudent carriage and wise forecast to shut up, *if he can*, the avenues by which he may be invaded; and when that *cannot be done*, to use arguments and persuasives, or perhaps withdraw out of the way of harm: but when these measures are ineffectual or impracticable, he must take such other as he can, and confront *force* with *force*. Otherwise he will fail in his duty to himself, and deny happiness to be happiness,

* For εἰ ἡ ἀδικίαν κενῶς ποιεῖ, ἢ ἀντιποιῶν κενῶς ἀδὲν ἕτερον ποιεῖ κενῶς, καὶν ἀμύνηται, "if he who does an act of injustice does an ill thing, he that returns the injustice, does a thing equally ill, tho' it be by way of retaliation." MAX. TYR.

By the same means, that a man may *defend* what is his, he may certainly endeavour to *recover* what has been by any kind of violence or villainy taken from him. For it has been shewn already, that the *power* to take any thing from another gives no *right* to it. The *right* then to that, which has been taken from its owner against his will, remains still where it was: he may still truly call it *bis*: and if it be *bis*, he may use it as *bis*: which if he who took it away, or any other, shall hinder him from doing, that man is even here the aggressor, and the owner does but *defend* himself and what is his. Besides, he, who uses any thing as *bis*, when it is *bis*, acts *on the side* of truth: but that man, who opposes him in this, and consequently asserts a right to that, which is not his, acts *contrary* to truth. The former therefore does what cannot be amiss: but what the latter does, is wrong by that fundamental proposition, sect. I. prop. IV.

Then further, if a man hath still a *right* to what is forceably or without his consent taken from him, he must have a right to the *value* of it. For the thing is to him what it is *in value* to him: and the right he has to it, may be considered as a right to a thing of *such a value*. So that if the very thing which was taken be destroyd, or cannot be retrieved, the proprietor nevertheless retains his right to a thing of *such a value to him*; and something must be had *in lieu* of it: that is, he has a right to make *reprisals*. Since every thing is to every man what it is *in value* to him, things of the same *value* to any one may be reckond as to him *the same*, and to recover the *equivalent* the same as to recover the *thing itself*: for otherwise it is not an equivalent.

lent. If the thing taken by way of reprisal should be *to the man*, from whom it is taken, of *greater value* than what he wrongfully took from the recoverer, he must charge himself with that loss. If injustice be done him, it is done by himself, the other has no more than what he has a right to. To which add, that as a man has a right to recover *what is his*, or *the equivalent*, from an invader; so he seems for the same reasons to have a right to an equivalent for the *expense* he is at in recovering his own, for the loss of *time* and *quiet*, and for the *trouble*, *hazards*, and *dangers* undergone: because all these are the effects of the invasion, and therefore to be added to the invader's account.

VIII. *The first possession of a thing gives the possessor a greater right to it, than any other man has, or can have, till he and all, that claim under him, are extinct.* For, 1. till then no other man can be the *first possessor* again: which is more than *nothing*; since he comes into it by God's providence, and as it were *donation*. 2. That, which no man has yet any title to, the finder may take without the violation of *any truth*. He doth not *deny* that to be another man's, which is another man's: he doth not *begin* to interrupt the happiness of any body; &c. Therefore to possess himself of it is *not wrong*. So far from it, that, since every man is *obliged* to consult his own happiness (that is, his own interest and advantages, whenever he can do it without

¶ *Nam propriæ telluris herum natura neq; illum, Nec me, nequequam statuit.* "For nature did not make him, nor me, nor any one else, the owner of any particular piece of land."
HOR.

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the violation of truth) not to act consonantly to this *obligation* is an omission that would be *wrong*. What he does therefore is *right*. And then if he does right in taking possession of it, he must from thence be the *rightful possessor*; or, it becomes his.

3. There are many things, which cannot be possessed without *cultivation* and the contrivance and labor of the first possessor. This has generally been the case of *lands*: and these are indeed more eminently meant by the word *possessions*. Now to deprive a man of the fruit of *his own* cares and sweat, and to enter upon it, as if it was the effect of the *intruder's* pains and travel, is a most manifest violation of *truth*. It is asserting in fact that to be his, which cannot be his. See prop. II.

4. The contrary doctrine, *viz.* that *prime occupancy* gives no right, interferes with prop. III. for it must certainly be inconsistent with the *peace* and *happiness* of mankind in general to be left in endless wars and struggles for that, which *no man* can ever have any right to. And yet thus it must be, if that doctrine was true: because it has been demonstrated, that *power* confers no right; and therefore the *first right* to many things can only accrue from the first possession of them. 5. If B should endeavour by force (or fraud) to eject C out of the possession of any thing, which C enjoys, and obtained without *expelling* or *disturbing* any body, he would certainly do that, which he himself would judge *unreasonable*, were he in C's place. Therefore he acts, as if that was not reason with respect to C, which would be reason in respect of B; contrary to the nature of *reason*, and to prop. IV. 6. To endeavour to turn a man violently out of his possession.

possessions is the same as to *command* him to leave them, upon pain of suffering for non-obedience. But this is usurping a *dominion*, which he has no right to; and is contrary to prop. V. 7. No man can expell another out of his possession without *beginning* to interrupt his happiness: nor can any one do this without contravening the *truth* contained in prop. VI. This therefore secures the possessor in his possession for ever: that is, it confirms his *right* to the thing possesst. *Lastly*, the *first possessor*, of whom I have been speaking, has undoubtedly a right to defend *his person*, and such other things as can *only be his*, against the attempts of any aggressor (see prop. II.): therefore these no one can have a right to violate. And therefore again, if he cannot be forceably dispossesst without violence offerd to *these*, no one has any right to dispossesst him. But this must be the case, where the possessor does not quit his possession *willingly*. The *right* consequently must remain solely in him, unless he consents to quit it.

N. The *successors* of an invader, got into possession wrongfully, may acquire a right *in time*^z, by the failure of such, as might claim under him who had the right. For he, who happens to be in possession, when all these are extinct, is in the place of a *prime occupant*.

^z Τὰς κτήσεις, ἢ τὰς ἰδίαις ἢ τὰς κοινὰς ἢ ἐπιγίνονται ὡσαύτῃ χρόνῳ, κτήσεις ἢ πατρῴας ἀπαρτίς εἶναι νομιζουσιν. "They think, that possessi-
 ons, whether private or public, after they have continued
 " for a long time, are secure, and belong to the family."
 ISOCR.

IX. *A title to many things may be transferred by compact or donation* ^a. If B has the sole right in lands, or goods, nobody has any right to the disposal of them besides B: and he has a right. For disposing of them is but using them as *his*. Therefore the act of B in *exchanging* them for some thing else, or *bestowing* them upon C, interferes not with *truth*: and so B does nothing that is wrong. Nor does C do any thing against *truth*, or that is wrong, in taking them: because he treats them as being *what they are*; as things, which come to him by the act of that person, in whom is lodged the sole power of *disposing* of them. Thus C gets the title *innocently*.

But in the case of *compact* the reason, on which this transaction stands, is more evident still. For the contractors are supposed to receive each from other the *equivalent* of that which they part with; or at least what is equivalent to *them respectively*, or perhaps by each party *preferable*. Thus neither of them is hurt: perhaps both advantaged. And so each of them treats the thing, which he receives upon the innocent exchange, as being *what it is*: better for him, and promoting his convenience and happiness. Indeed he, who receives the *value* of any thing, and what he likes as well, in effect has it still. His *property* is not diminished: the situation and matter of it is only altered.

^a To this may be reduced that title to things, which *Tully* mentions as conferred by some law (*lege*); and even those, which accrue *conditione*, "by covenant," or *sorte*, "by lot." For I suppose the government to have a right of giving them thus.

Mankind could not well subsist without *bartering* one thing for another: therefore whatever tends to take away the benefit of this intercourse, is inconsistent with the *general good* of mankind, &c. If a man could find the *necessaries* of life without it, and by himself, he must at least want many of the *comforts* of it.

X. *There is then such a thing as property, founded in nature and truth*^b: or, *there are things, which one man only can, consistently with nature and truth, call his*: by prop. II, VIII, IX. ^c.

^b Which must not give way to the opinions of *fitness*, &c. The master was in the right, who corrected *Cyrus* for adjudging the great coat to the great boy, and the little one to the little. He was not τῷ ἀριότιοντι κριτὴς, “a judge of the fitness,” but of *the property*. *Omnium, quæ in hominum doctorum disputatione versantur, nihil est profecto præstabilius, quàm planè intelligi nos ad justitiam esse natos, neque opinione, sed naturâ constitutum esse jus.* “Of all the things that learned men dispute about, there is none better than this, that we should be thoroughly convinced, that we were born to do what is right, and that right is not made by *opinion* but by *nature*.” CIC.

^c There is another way of acquiring a title mentioned: which is, by the right of war, as it is called. *Sunt privata nulla naturâ: sed aut veteri occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt; aut victoriâ, ut qui bello potiti sunt, &c.* “Nothing belongs to particular persons by nature: but either by long possession, as when men, a long while since, came into lands which had no owners; or else by victory, as they who enjoy them from war, &c.” CIC. And so in *Xenophon* it is said to be an eternal law among men, that if a city be taken in war, the bodies and goods of the people in it are the conqueror's; and they may possess them as their own, not ἀλλότρια, “as belonging to others.” But sure this wants limitations,

XI. *Those things, which only one man can truly and properly call his, must remain his, till he agrees to part with them (if they are such, as he may part with) by compact or donation; or (which must be understood) till they fail, or death extinguishes him and his title together, and he delivers the lamp to his next man. Because no one can deprive him of them without his approbation, but the depriver must use them as his, when they are not his, in contradiction to truth. For,*

XII. *To have the property of any thing and to have the sole right of using and disposing of it are the same thing; they are equipollent expressions. For when it is said, that P has the property, or that such a thing is proper to P, it is not said, that P and Q or P and others have the property (*proprium* limits the thing to P only): and when any thing is said to be *his*, it is not said that *part of it only* is his. P has therefore the *all* or all-hood^d of it, and consequently *all the use* of it. And then, since the *all* of it to him, or *all* that P can have of it, is but the *use and disposal* of it^e,
he*

^d *Allodium, "Freehold."*

^e Πολλάκις ἐγέλασα διαθήκας ἀναγινώσκων λεγούσας ὁ δούνα μὲν ἔχτωσιν τὴν δεσποτείαν τῶν ἀγρῶν, ἢ τῆς οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ χρῆσιν ἄλλῳ. Πάντες γὰρ τὴν χρῆσιν ἔχουμεν, δεσποτείαν δὲ ἕτεροις.—ὃ ἰκόντες, ἢ ἀκόντες ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ παραχωρήσομεν ἑτέροις, τὴν χρῆσιν καρπωσάμενοι μόνον. "I have oftentimes laughd, when I read any of those wills, in which it is said, let such or such an one be the real owner of the lands or houses; and let another person have the use of them; for the use is all that belongs to any of us, we are not the real owners.—After death they go to others, whether we will or no, when we have enjoyd the use only." S. CHRYS.

Τέτον

he who has this has the thing itself, and it is his^f.

Laws indeed have introduced a way of speaking, by which the *property* and the *usufruct* are distinguished; but in truth the usufructuary has a *temporary* or *limited* property; and the proprietary has a *perpetual* usufruct, either at present, or in reversion. Propriety without the *use* (if the use is never come to the proprietary) is an empty found.

I have before upon some occasions taken it as granted, that he, who uses any thing as *bis*, when it is *not bis*, acts against *truth*, &c. but now I say further, that,

XIII. *He, who uses or disposes of any thing, does by that declare it to be bis.* Because this is all, that

Τέτων μὲν φύσει ἰδνός ἔσμεν κύριοι, νόμος δὲ ἢ διαδοχῇ τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν εἰς ἄλλους παραλαβάνοντες, ἔλιγοχρόνιοι δεσπότηαι νομιζόμεθα. κἀπειδὴν ἡ προθεσμία παρέλθῃ τῆνικαῦτα παραλαβῶν ἄλλο ἀπολαύει τὸ ὄνομα.

“ We are not by nature the real owners of any of these things, but are invested by law or by succession with the use of them for an uncertain time, and are therefore called temporary tenants; and when the time prescribed is past, then they go to another, and he enjoys the same title.”
Luc.

f *Qui te pascit ager, tuus est,* “ The field that maintains you, is your field, &c.” *Horace*, alluding to this truth. *Περὶ παντός,* “ As to the matter of injuries,” says *Plato*, ἐν εἰρησθε τοιοῦδε δὲ τι νόμιμον βιαίων ἰστέρι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μηδὲνα μηδὲν φέρειν μηδὲ ἔγειν “ there is only some such general law as this for every man, *viz.* that no man should plunder, or by violence take any thing that belongs to another:” and then proceeds, μηδ’ αὖ χρῆσθαι μηδὲν τῶν τῷ πτέλας, ἰὰν μὴ πείσῃ τὸν κερτημένον, κτλ. “ nor make any use of any thing that comes in their way, without the leave of the owner.” In *Plutarch* the thing is carried farther: where it is said, that a man passing by another man’s door ought μὴ βλέπειν εἰσω, κτλ. “ ought not to look in;” according to a saying of *Xenocrates*, μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἢ τῶς πιδας ἢ τῶς ἐφθαλμῶς εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν οἰκίαν τιθέναι, “ there is no difference between twixt looking in, and going into another man’s house.”

he,

he, whose it really is, can do. *Borrowing* and *hiring* afford no objection to this. When the borrower or hirer uses the thing borrowd or hired, he uses what is *his own* for the time allowd: and his doing so is only one of *those ways*, in which the true proprietary disposes of it.

XIV. *To usurp or invade the property of another man is injustice: or, more fully, to take, detain, use, destroy, hurt, or meddle & with any thing that is his without his allowance, either by force or fraud or any other way, or even to attempt any of these, or assist them, who do, are acts of injustice. The contrary; to render and permit quietly to every one what is his, is justice.* Def.

XV. *He that would not violate truth, must avoid all injustice: or, all injustice is wrong and evil.* It interferes with the truths ^h here before laid down, and perhaps more. It denies men to be *subjects* capable of distinct properties: in some cases it denies them to have a property even in their own *bodies, life, fame, and the like*: the practice of it is incompatible with the *peace and happiness* of mankind: it is what every man thinks unreasonable *in his own case*, when the injury is done to himself:

^g *Furtum fit,—cum quis alicquam rem invito domino contrahat.* “It is real theft—to meddle with any thing that belongs to another against his will.” JUST. *inst.*

^h On the contrary נעשה דין—נעשה אמת “We shall make justice, we shall make truth.” A saying of ריב”ל, “*Rabbi Joshuab the son of Levi.*” And Cicero more than once uses the word *verum* “true” for *justum* “just,” and *veritas* “truth” for *bonitas* “goodness” or *probitas* “probity.”

to take any thing from another only because I think I want it, or because I have power to take it, and will have it, without any title to it, is the highest pretence to *dominion*, and denial of our *natural equality*: it is setting up a right to *begin* to disturb the happiness of others: and lastly, it is to deny there is any such thing as *property*, contrary to *truth*.

Briefly, if there be any thing which P can truly and properly call *his*, then, if T takes or uses it without the consent of P, he declares it to be *his* (for if it was *his* he could do no more) when it is *not his*, and so acts a lyeⁱ: in which consists the *idea* and *formal ratio* of moral evil.

The very *attempting* any instance of injustice, or *assisting* others in such an attempt, since it is attempting and promoting what is *wrong*, is being in the wrong as much as one is *able* to be; or doing what one *can* to atchieve that which is *evil*: and to do this, by the *terms*, must be *wrong* and *evil*.

Even the *desire* of obtaining any thing unjustly is evil: because to desire to do *evil*, by the terms again, is an *evil* or criminal *desire*. If the act fol-

ⁱ Account τὸ σὸν μόνον σὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον, ὥσπερ ἐστὶν, ἀλλότριον,
 “ that only your own, which really is so; and look upon that
 “ as another's, which really is so.” *Epicletus's* words. *Justi-*
tia primum munus est, ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacesitus inju-
ria; deinde, ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut
suis. “ The first property of justice is, that no man should do
 “ any hurt to another, unless provoked by some injury; after
 “ this, he is to make use of those things that are common, in
 “ common with others, and use the things that belong to him-
 “ self as his own.” *Cic.* This is to use things as being what
 they are.

lows such a desire, it is the child and product of it : and the desire, if any thing renders the fulfilling of it impracticable, is the act obstructed in the beginning; and stifled in the womb.

Let it be observed here by way of *scholion* concerning the thing called *covetousness*, that there seem to be three sorts of it. One is this here mentiond : a desire of getting from others, tho it be *unjustly*. This is wrong and wicked. Another is an immense desire of heaping up what one can by just methods, but without any *reasonable end* proposed ^k, and only in order to *keep* ^l, and as it were *bury* it ^m : and the more he accumulates, the more he craves ⁿ. This also intrrenches upon truth, and seems to be a vice. But to *covet* to obtain what is another man's by *just means*, and with his consent, when it may contribute to the happiness of ourselves or families, and perhaps of the other person too, has nothing surely that looks *unfriendly* upon

^k *Blephas* ὁ δανιζὴς, "the usurer," in *Lucian*, dies of hunger (λιμῶ ἄδλω εὐλγέτο ἀπισκληκίνας, "the miserable wretch is reported to have pined away till he died"). Ridiculous enough.

^l Or only *πρὸς τὸ ἀριθμεῖν*, "to be perpetually telling it over," as *Anacharsis* said of some *Greeks*. ATHEN.

^m As that man, in *Athenæus*, indeavourd literally to do; of whom it is reported, that, being much in love with his money, before he died he swallowd as much of it as he could (καταπίοντα ἐν ἄλγος χρυσῆς ἀποθανεῖν, "he swallowd a great many pieces of gold and then died").

ⁿ Of such it is, that *Diogenes* used to say, Ὁμοίως τὰς φιλαργύρους τοῖς ἰδρωπικαῖς, κλ. "That covetous men were like men that had the dropsy." STOB. The *Mamsbilim*, that is, "the writers of proverbs," mentiond in *Nabb. Ab.* compare them לְצִמְאָה שִׁישְׁתָּה מֵהַמֵּיִם הַמְּלֹחִים כִּי כָל עוֹר שִׁישְׁתָּה יוֹסִף לְצִמְאָה, "to thirsty people drinking salt water, the more they drink, the drier they are."

truth,

truth, or is blameable, in it. This, if it may be called covetousness, is a virtuous covetousness.

XVI. *When a man cares not what sufferings he causes to others, and especially if he delights in other men's sufferings and makes them his sport, this is what I call cruelty. And not to be affected with the sufferings of other people, tho they proceed not from us, but from others, or from causes in which we are not concern'd, is unmercifulness. Mercy and humanity are the reverse of these.*

XVII. *He, who religiously regards truth and nature, will not only be not unjust, but (more) not unmerciful, and much less cruel. Not to be affected with the afflictions of others, so far as we know them, and in proportion to the several degrees and circumstances of them, tho we are not the causes of them, is the same as to consider the afflicted as persons not in affliction; that is, as being not what they are, or (which is the same) as being what they are not: and this contradicts matter of fact.*

One can scarce know the *sufferings* of another without having at least some image of them in his mind: nor can one have these images without being conscious of them, and as it were feeling them. Next to suffering itself is to carry the representation of it about with one. So that he, who is not affected with the calamities of others, so far as they fall within his knowledge, may be said to know and not to know; or at least to cancel his knowledge, and contradict his own conscience.

There is something in *human nature* ° resulting from our very make and constitution, while it retains its genuin form, and is not *alterd* by vitious habits; not *perverted* by transports of revenge or fury, by ambition, company, or false philosophy P; nor *opprest* by stupidity and neglecting to observe what happens to others: I say, there is *something*, which renders us obnoxious to the pains of others, causes us to sympathize with them, and almost comprehends us in their case. It is grievous to see or hear (and almost to hear of) any man, or even any animal whatever, in *torment*. This *compassion* appears eminently in them, who upon other accounts are justly reckond amongst *the best of men* †: in some degree it appears in *almost* all; nay, even

° Properly called *humanity*; because nothing of it appears in brutes. בהמה אינה מקפדת וחוששת בצער חברתה, “for brutes have no concern or uneasiness at their companions being in pain.” S. HNAS.

P When *Seneca* says, *Clementiam—omnes boni præstabunt, misericordiam autem vitabunt*, “all good men should shew mildness, but avoid shewing pity,” he seems only to quibble. He has many other weak things upon this subject. That (sentence) *succurret [sapiens] alienis lacrymis, non accedet*, “a wise man will relieve a person in tears, but not cry himself,” owns one use of tears: they obtain succour even from a *Stoic*.

† Ἄγαθοὶ ἀριδάρκεις ἄνδρες. “Good men are very apt to shed tears.” They, who of all writers undertake to imitate nature most, oft introduce even their heroes weeping. (See how *Homer* represents *Ulysses* Od. ε. 151,—2,—7,—8.) The tears of men are in truth very different from the cries and ejaculations of children. They are *silent streams*, and flow from other causes; commonly some tender, or perhaps philosophical, reflexion. It is easy to see how hard hearts and dry eyes come to be fashionable. But for all that, it is certain the *glandula lacrymales*, “the glands we use when we cry,” are not made for nothing.

some-

sometimes, when they more coolly attend to things, in those hardend and execrable *monsters* of cruelty themselves, who seem just to retain only the least tincture of humanity that can be. The *Pheræan* tyrant, who had never wept over any of those murders he had caused among his own citizens, *wept* when he saw a tragedy but acted in the theatre^r: the reason was, his attention was caught here, and he more observed the sufferings of *Hecuba* and *Andromache*, than ever he had those of the *Pheræans*; and more impartially, being no otherwise concerned in them but as a common spectator. Upon this occasion the principle of *compassion*, implanted in human nature, appeared, overcame his habits of cruelty, broke through his petrification, and would shew that it could not be totally eradicated. It is therefore according to *nature* to be affected with the sufferings of other people: and the contrary is *inhuman* and *unnatural*.

Such are the *circumstances* of mankind, that we cannot (or but very few of us, God knows) make our way through this world without encountering *dangers* and suffering many *evils*: and therefore since it is for the good of such, as are so exposed or actually smarting under pain or trouble, to receive comfort and assistance from others, without which they must commonly continue to be miserable, or perish, it is for the common good and welfare of the *majority at least* of mankind, that they should *compassionate* and *help* each other^s. To

^r *Plut.*

^s A generous nature pities even an enemy in distress. Ἐποικτεῖρω δὲ νῦν Δύσωνον ἔρασις, καὶ περὶ ὄντα δυσμενῶν. "I always pity a man in misery, altho he be my enemy." ΣΟΦΗ.

do the contrary must therefore be contrary to nature and *wrong* by prop. III. And beside, it is by one's behaviour and actions to affirm, that the circumstances of men in this world are *not* what they are; or that peace, and health, and happiness, and the like, are not what *they* are.

Let a man *substitute himself* into the room of some poor creature dejected with invincible poverty, distracted with difficulties, or groaning under the pangs of some disease, or the anguish of some hurt or wound, and without help abandon'd to want and pain. In this distress what reflexions can he imagine *he should have*, if he found that every body neglected him, no body so much as pitying him, or vouchsafing to take notice of his calamitous and sad condition? It is certain, that what it would be reasonable or unreasonable for others to do in respect of *him*, he must allow to be reasonable or unreasonable for him to do in respect of *them*, or deny a manifest *truth* in prop. IV.

If unmercifulness, as before defined, be wrong, no time need to be spent in proving that *cruelty* is so. For all that is culpable in unmercifulness, is contain'd in cruelty, with *additions* and *aggravations*. Cruelty not only denies due regard to the sufferings of others, but *causes* them; or perhaps *delights* in them, and (which is the most insolent and cruel of all cruelties) makes them a *jest* and subject of raillery. If the one be a *defect* of humanity, the other is diametrically opposite to it^t. If

^t *Est hominum naturæ, quam sequi debemus, maximè inimica crudelitas.* "Cruelty is the most contrary that can be to human nature, which we ought to follow." CIC.

the one does *no good*, the other does *much evil*. And no man, how cruel soever in reality he was, has ever liked to be *reckond* a cruel man: such a confession of guilt does nature extort; so universally doth it reject, condemn, abhor this character.

XVIII. *The practice of justice and mercy is just as right, as injustice, unmercifulness, and cruelty are wrong.* This follows from the nature of contraries. Beside, not to be just to a man is to be not just, or unjust to him: and so not to be merciful is to be unmerciful, or perhaps cruel.

Here I might end this section: but perhaps it may not be improper to be a little more particular. Therefore,

XIX. *From the foregoing propositions may be deduced the heinousness of all such crimes, as murder, or even hurting the person of another any how, when our own necessary defence does not require it* (it being not possible, that any thing should be more *his*, than *his own* person, life and limbs); *robbing, stealing, cheating, betraying; defamation, detraction; defiling the bed of another man, et cæt. with all the approaches and tendencies to them.* For these are not only comprised within the definition of injustice, and are therefore violations of those truths, which are violated by that; but commonly, and some of them always, come within the description of *cruelty* too. All which is evident at first sight with respect to murder, robbery, cheating, slandering, &c. especially if a man brings *himself* into the case, and views himself in his own imagination as rendered scandalous by calumniators and lyers; stript

by thieves; ruind in his fortunes and undone by knaves; struggling to no purpose, convulsed and agonizing under the knife of some truculent ruffian; or the like.

The same is altogether as plain in the case of *adultery* ^u, when any one ^w insnares, and corrupts the wife of another; notwithstanding the protection it gains from false notions, great examples ^x, and the commonness of the crime ^y. For (the nature of *matrimony* being for the present supposed to be such, as it will appear by and by to be) the adulterer denies the *property* a husband has in his wife by compact, the most express and sacred that can possibly be made: he does that, which tends to subvert the peace of families, confounds relation, and is altogether inconsistent with the *order* and *tranquillity* of the world, and therefore with the laws of human nature: he does what no man in his wits could think *reasonable*, or even *tolerable*, were he the person wrongd ^z: briefly, he impudently

^u Δεινὸν μὲν ὁ κλέπτης, ἀλλ' ἔχ' ἔτιω ὡς ὁ μοιχός. "A thief is a horrid creature, but not so bad as an adulterer." CHRYS.

^w One of the *Subseffores alienorum matrimoniorum*, "them that lie in wait for other men's wives," as they are calld in *Valerius Maximus*.

^x *Palam apparet, adhuc ætate Divi Hieronymi adulterium capite solere puniri: nunc magnatum lusus est.* "It is very manifest that, in the time of St Jerom, adultery was punishd with death: but now it is the sport of great men." *Scholiasst on St JEROM.*

^y For hence follows impunity, *שְׂרָפוּ מִנֵּאֲפִים פֶּסְקוּ* *מִן הַמַּיִם הַבְּרִיָּים*. "From the overflowing of it, the adulterous derive bitter waters." *Mishn.*

^z *Is, qui nullius non uxorem concupiscit, — idem uxorem suam aspicere non vult: Et fidei acerrimus exactor, est perfidus: & mendacia*

dently treats a woman as *his own woman* (or *wife*^a), who is *not his*, but *another's*, contrary to *justice*, *truth* and *fact*^b. Nor is this simple injustice only, but injustice, for which *no reparation* can be made if the injured man thinks so; as he generally does (see sect. II. prop. I. obs. 4.) injustice accompanied with the greatest *cruelty*; so complicated, as scarce any other can be. The *husband* is for ever robbed of all that pleasure and satisfaction, which arises from the wife's fidelity and affection to him^c; pre-fuming upon which he took her to be not only the partner of his bed, but the companion of his life, and sharer in all his fortunes^d: and into the

dacia persequitur, ipse perjurus. "He who desires every other man's wife—will not have his own look'd upon; and is very strict with other men to keep their word, but breaks his own; prosecutes others for *lying*, and is perjured himself." SEN.

^a ἰδιῶν, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα, "His own wife."

^b What a monster in nature must he be, who, as if it was meritorious to dare to act against all these, (to use *Seneca's* words again) *satis justam causam putat amandi, quod aliena est* [*uxor*]? "Who thinks it a sufficient reason to be in love with her, because she is another man's wife."

^c Οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷτ' ἕνεστιν εἰπεῖν, ὡς τὸ σῶμα μόνον διαφθείρεται τῆς μοιχευομένης γυναίκος, ἀλλ' εἰ δεῖ τάληθες εἰπεῖν, ἡ ψυχὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς ἀλλοτριότητα ἐδίξεται, διδασκομένη πάντα τρόπον ἀποτρέφασθαι ἢ μισεῖν τὸν ἄνδρα, ἢ ἕτερον ἂν ἦν δεινόν, εἰ τὸ μῖσος ἐπιδείκνυτο ἐμφάνεις, κτλ. "For we may not only affirm, that the body of an adulterous woman is not all that is corrupted; but if we would speak the truth, that her mind is more habitually alienated (from her husband) than her body; for she is taught to have an utter aversion and hatred to him, and it is no wonder if she shews her hatred in public." PH. JUD.

^d Marriage is κοινανία παντὸς τοῦ βίου, —οἰκιοτέρα ἢ κοίτην τῶν ἄλλων [κοινομένων], "the partaking equally of every thing in life—more freely and familiarly, than in any other (society)." ISOCR.

room of them succeed painful and destructive passions. The poor woman ^e herself, tho she may be deluded ^f, and not see at present her guilt, or the consequences of it, usually pays dear for her security and want of guard, the husband becoming cold ^g and averse to her, and she full of apprehensions and fears ^h, with a particular dread of his further repentment. And their *affairs*, in this disjointed and distracted condition, are neglected; *innocent children* slighted, and left unprovided for, without so much as the comfort of any *certain* relations to pity them ⁱ, &c.

The adulterer may not be permitted to extenuate his crime by such impertinent *simile*'s and raskish talk, as are commonly used for that purpose ^k.

When

^e Ἀπαλὸν ζῶον. "The soft creature." St BAS.

^f Ἐπεισας, ἐξέδωψας, "over-persuaded and enticed," says the penitent woman in *Sophocles*. PLUT.

^g Ψυχρὸν παραγκάλισμα—Γυνὴ κακῇ ζύειν. "A cold embrace—to have a lewd woman for a wife." SOPH.

^h *Quid enim salvi est mulieri, amissa pudicitia?* "What else can be safe, when the woman has lost her modesty?" LIVY.

ⁱ Οἱ μηδὲν ἰδικηκότες ἀδελφοὶ παῖδες μηδ' ἐτέρω γένει προσωπευθῆναι δυνάμενοι, μή τε τῶ τῷ γήμαντι, μή τε τῶ τῷ μοιχῷ. "The miserable children, who have done no body any injury, will not be own'd by any relations, either of the married person or of the adulterer." PH. JUD.

^k Such as *Aristippus* uses to *Diogenes*, *ap. Athen.* Ἄρα γε μή τι σοὶ ἀποπὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι Διογενὲς οἰκίαν οἰκῆν, ἐν ἣ ὑπὸν ὄκησαν ἄλλοι; ἢ γὰρ ἔφη. τί δὲ ναῦν, ἐν ἣ σφόδρα ἀππλευμασιν; ἠδὲ τῷτο ἔφη. Ἔτως— "Do you see any absurdity, *Diogenes*, in living in a house, that another person has lived in before? No, says he; or in sailing in a ship where a great many have failed? No, nor in that neither, says he. No more is there in—" Senseless stuff. Nor is that of the adulterous woman in *Prov. S.* better: where בעלמה נברך נברך בעלמה, "the way of a man with a maid," is placed with the way of an eagle in the air, of a serpent

When any one wrongs another of his property, he wrongs him of *what it is to him*, the proprietor: and the value must be set according to what *he* esteems it to be, not what the injurer, who perhaps has no taste of virtuous pleasures, may think it to be. (See p. 54, 55. obs. 3, 4.) Nor may these thefts be excused from their secrecy. For 1. the injustice of the fact is the *same in itself*, whether known, or not. In either case *truth* is denied: and a *lye* is as much a lye, when it is *whisperd*, as when it is *proclaimd* at the market-cross. 2. It has been shewd (sect. II.) that the rectitude of our actions and way to happiness are coincident; and that such acts, as are disagreeable to *truth*, and wrong in themselves, tend to make men ultimately *unhappy*¹. Things are so orderd and disposd by the Author of nature, or such a constitution of things flows from him, that it *must* be so. And since no *retreat* can be impervious to his eye, no *corner* so much out of the way, as not to be within his plan, no doubt there is to every wrong and *vitious* act a suitable degree of unhappiness and *punishment* annex, which the criminal will be sure to meet with *some time or other*^m. For his own sake therefore he ought not to depend upon the dark-

serpent upon a rock, and of a ship in the sea, שלא יעשה בה, רישום יוכר אחר שעה, “which leave no track to be seen after them;” and therefore she מטטה פיה של מטה, “wipes her mouth,” and then thinks that לא תוכל לומר לה, “she may say afterwards, What have I done amiss?” See *Qab venaqi*.

¹ *Nemo malus felix: minimè corruptor, &c.* “No bad man can be happy, to be sure no debauchee can, &c.” Juv.

^m Ἄναπύρατος γὰρ ὁ θεῖος νόμος. “There is no escaping the divine law.” PLOTIN.

ness

ness of the deed. But *lastly*, it can hardly be, but that it must be *discoverd*ⁿ. People generally *rise* in vice, grow impudent and vain and careless, and discover themselves^o: the opportunities contrived for it must be liable to *observation*: some *confidents* must be trusted, who may betray the secret, and upon any little distaste probably *will* do it: and beside, *love* is quick of apprehension^p.

It will be easily perceived from what has been said, that if to *murder, rob, &c.* are unjust and crimes of a heinous nature, all those things which have any *tendency* toward them, or *affinity* with them, or any way *countenance* them, must be in their degree criminal^q: because they are of the same complexion with that which they tend to, tho not of the same growth, nor matured into the gross act, or perhaps do not operate so presently, apparently, or certainly. *Envy, malice,* and the like, are *conatus*'s toward the destruction or ruin of the person, who is the object of these unhappy passions. To *throw dust*^r upon a man's reputation by *innuendo*'s, ironies, &c. may not indeed fully it all at once, as when *dirt* is thrown, or *grass* ca-

η και γὰρ ἂν παραυτίκα κρύψῃς, ὕστερον ἀφθήσῃ. "For, if you are
"hid for the present, you will be found out afterwards."
ISOOCR. Μαρτυρήσωμαι—ἡ κλίνη καὶ ὁ λύχνος ὁ Μεγαπένθους. "The bed,
"the lamp, will bear testimony, O Megapenthus." LUCIAN.

ο Ἥδον μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀλαζονέεσσαν. "Pleasure is the aptest of
"any thing to boast." PLATO.

p *Quid non sentit amor?* "What is it that love can't see?"
OVID.

q Ἄγαθὸν ἂ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴδὲ ἐθέλειν. "To be good is
"not only not to do an injury, but not so much as to desire
"to do one." A *gnome* "saying" of Democrates.

r אבק לשון הרע. "The dust of an ill tongue."

lummies;

lunnies ; yet it infects the air, and may destroy it by a lingring poison. To *expose* another by the strength of a jesting talent, or harder temper of face, is to wound him, though it be in an *invisible* place ^s. Many *freedoms* and reputed civilities of barbarian extract, and especially gallantries ^t, that proceed not to consummate wickedness, nor perhaps are intended to be carried so far, may yet divert people's affections from their proper object, and debauch the mind ^u. By *stories* or *insinuations* to sow the *seeds* of discord and quarrels between men is to murder, or hurt them, by another hand. Even for men to *intermeddle* in other people's affairs, as busy bodies and ἀλλοτριοεπίσημοι do, is to assume a province, which is *not* theirs ; to concern

• המלבין פני חבירו ברבים אין לו חלק לעה"ב. "He, that puts his companion to shame in public, shall have no portion in the next life." MAIM. & *sim. pass.* For, according to the *Jewish* doctors, he who does this breaks the sixth commandment. ABARB.

• See how chaste the *Romans* were once. *Quo matronale decus verecundiæ munimento tutius esset, in jus vocanti matronam corpus ejus attingere non permiserunt, ut involata manûs alienæ tactu stola relinqueretur.* "That the decent modesty of a matron might the more securely be preserved, if any man sued her, he was not allowd so much as to touch her, that her garment might remain undefiled by the hands of any stranger." VAL. MAX. And it is told of P. Mænius, that *tristi exemplo præcepit [filix suæ], ut non solum virginitatem illibatam, sed etiam oscula ad virum sincera perferret.* "He gave it in charge to his daughter with a severe threat, that she should carry to her husband, not only her virginity untouched, but her kisses chaste." *Id.*

^u *Quanto autem præstantior est animus corpore, tanto sceleratius corrumpitur.* "By how much the mind is more excellent than the body, by so much is the corrupting of it a greater wickedness." ST AUSTIN.

them-

themselves with things, in which they are *not* concern'd ; to make that *public*, which in itself is *private* ; and perhaps to rob the person, into whose business they intrude themselves, of his *quiet*, if of nothing else. For indeed this intermeddling looks like setting up a pretence to something further ; like an unjust attack begun at a distance. All which declares what an enemy, and how irreconcilable to *truth*, this pragmatistical humor is. And so on.

If these things are so, how guilty must they be, who are design'dly the *promoters* or *instruments* of injustice and wickedness ; such as mercenary swearers, and false witnesses ; traders in scandal ; solicitors in vice ; they who intend by their *conversation* to relax men's principles too much, and (as it seems) prepare them for knavery, lewdness, or any flagitious enterprize ^w.

There are other crimes, such as *infidelity* to friends or them who intrust us with any thing, *ingratitude*, all kinds of wilful *perjury*, and the like, which might have been *mention'd* in the proposition, being great instances of injustice : but because they are *visibly* such, and their nature cannot be mistaken, I comprise them in the *et cæt.* there. Any one may see, that he, who acts *unfaithfully*, acts against his promises and engagements, and therefore denies and sins against *truth* ; does what it can never be for the *good of the world* should become an universal practice ; does what he would

^w Οὗτοι εἰσιν οἱ λοιμοὶ οἱ τὸ ἴδιον κακὸν ἐπὶ πάντας ἀγειν φιλονεικῶντες, κλ.
 " These are the pestilent fellows, who labour to persuade every body to be guilty of the same crimes with themselves." St BASIL.

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not have *done to himself*; and *wrongs* the man, who depends upon him, of what he justly might expect. So the *ungrateful* man treats his benefactor as not being *what he is*, &c. And the *false-swearer* respects neither things, nor himself, nor the persons affected, nor mankind in general, nor God himself as being *what they are*. All this is obvious*.

SECT. VII. *Truths respecting particular Societies of Men, or Governments.*

I. **M**AN is a social creature: that is, a single man, or family, cannot subsist, or not well, alone out of all society. More things are necessary to sustain life, or at least to make it in any degree pleasant and desirable, than it is possible for any one man to make and provide for himself merely by his own labor and ingenuity. Meat, and drink, and clothing, and house, and that frugal furniture which is absolutely requisite, with a little necessary physic, suppose many arts and trades, many heads, and many hands. If he could make a shift in time of *health* to live as a wild man under the protection of trees and rocks, feeding upon such fruits, herbs, roots, and other things, as the earth should afford, and happen to present to him; yet what could he do in *sickness*, or *old age*, when he would not be able to stir out, or receive her beneficence.

* *Omnes enim immemorem beneficii oderunt.* “For every body hate a man that forgets the kindnesses that have been done to him.” CIC. And the same may be said of the unfaithful, perjured, &c.

If

If he should take from the *other sex* such a help, as the common appetite might prompt him to seek, or he might happen to meet with in his walks; yet still if the *hands* are doubled, the *wants* are doubled too: nay more, additional wants, and great ones, attending the *bearing* and *education* of children.

If we could suppose all these difficulties surmounted, and a family grown up, and doing what a *single* family is capable of doing by itself; supporting themselves by gardening, a little agriculture, or a few cattle, which they have some how got, and tamed (tho even this would be hard for them to do, having no markets, where they might exchange the produce of their husbandry, or of their little flock, or herd for other things; no shops to repair to for tools; no servant, or laborer to assist; nor any public invention, of which they might serve themselves in the preparation of their grain, dressing their meat, manufacturing their wool, and the like); yet still it is only the *cortex* of the man, which is provided for: what must become of the interior part, the *minds* of these people? How would those be fed, and improved? *Arts* and *sciences*, so much of them as is necessary to teach men the use of their faculties, and unfold their reason, are not the growth of single families so imployd. And yet for men to lay out all their pains and time in procuring only what is proper to keep the blood and humors in *circulation*, with-

‣ *Quid ergo, anima nullane habet alimenta propria? an ejus esca scientia nobis videtur?* “What then is there no proper nourishment for the mind, does not knowledge seem to be the food of it?” St *AUST.*

out

out any further views, or any regard to the nobler part of themselves, is utterly incongruous to the idea of a being formed for *rational* exercises.

If all the *exceptions* against this separate way of living could be removed; yet as mankind increases, the *little plots*, which the several families possess, and cultivate, must be enlarged, or multiplied: by degrees they would find themselves straitened: and there would soon be a *collision* of interests, from whence disputes and quarrels would ensue. Other things too might minister matter for these. And beside all this, some men are *naturally* troublesome, vitious, thievish, pugnacious, rabid; and these would always be disturbing and flying upon the next to them: as others are ambitious, or covetous, and, if they happen to have any advantage or superiority in power, would not fail to make themselves yet greater or stronger by eating up their neighbours, till by repeated incroachments they might grow to be *formidable*².

Under so many *wants*, and such *apprehensions*, or *present dangers*, necessity would bring some families into terms of *friendship* with others for mutual comfort and defence: and this, as the reason of it increased, would become stronger, introduce stricter engagements, and *at last* bring the people to mix and unite. And then the weak being glad to shelter themselves under the protection and conduct of the more able, and so naturally giving way for these to ascend, the several forts would at

² *Alter in alterius exitium levi compendio ducitur.* "They destroy one another in the shortest way that they can."

SEN.

length

length *settle* into their places, according to their several weights and capacities with respect to the common concern. And thus some form of a *society* must arise: men cannot subsist otherwise.

But if it was possible for a man to preserve life by *himself*, or with his *petit* company about him: yet no body can deny, that it would be infinitely *better* for him, and them, to live in a society, where men are serviceable to themselves and their neighbours at the same time, by *exchanging* their money, or goods, for such other things as they want more; where they are capable of doing *good offices* each for other in time of need; where they have the *protection* of laws, and a public security against cheats, robbers, assassines, and all enemies to property; where a common force or *army* is ready to interpose between them and foreign invaders; and where they may enjoy those *discoveries* which have been made in arts and learning, may improve their faculties by *conversation* and innocent conflicts of reason, and (to speak out) may be made *men*.

If, when we have the *privilege* of society and laws, we can scarce preserve our own, or be safe, what a woful condition should we be in *without them*; exposed to the insults, rapines, and violence of unjust and merciless men, not having any *sanctuary*, any thing to take refuge in? So again, if notwithstanding the help of *friends* and those about us, and such conveniencies as may be had in cities and peopled places, we are forced to bear many pains and melancholy hours, how *irksome* would life be, if in sickness or other trouble there was no body to administer either *remedy* or *consolation*?

Lastly,

Lastly, society is what men generally *desire*. And tho' *much* company may be attended with much vanity, and occasion many evils ^a, yet it is certain, that absolute and perpetual *solitude* has something in it very irksome and hideous ^b. Thus the social life is *natural* to man; or, what his nature and circumstances require:

II. *The end of society is the common welfare and good of the people associated.* This is but the consequence of what has been just said. For because men cannot subsist *well*, or not *so well*, separately, therefore they unite into greater bodies: that is, the *end* of their uniting is their better subsistence; and by how much their manner of living becomes better, by so much the more effectually is this *end* answered:

III. *A society, into which men enter for this end, supposes some rules or laws, according to which they agree all to be governd; with a power of altering or adding to them as occasion shall require.* A number of men met together without any *rules*, by which they submit to be governd, can be nothing but an *irregular* multitude. Every one being still *sui juris*, and left intirely to his own private choicē,

^a Aristotle says a good man would be neither ἀφιλῶ, "without a friend," nor πολύφιλῶ, "have a great number of friends." This is just. Therefore Seneca seems to go a little too far, when he writes, *Omnes amicos habere operosum esse, satis esse inimicos non habere*, "It requires great pains to make all men our friends, it is sufficient to have no enemies."

^b Ζῶν συναγελᾶσικὸν ἢ ἀνδρῶνῶ. "Man is a sociable creature."
St. BASIL.

by whatever kind of judgment or passion or caprice that happens to be determin'd, they must needs *interfere* one with another: nor can such a concurrence of people be any thing different from an indigested *chaos* of dissenting parts, which by their *confused* motions would damnify, and destroy each other. This must be true, if men *differ* in the size of their understandings, in their manner of thinking, and the several turns their minds take from their education, way of living, and other circumstances; if the greatest part of them are under the direction of *bodily affections*; and if these *differ* as much as their shapes, their complexions, their constitutions do^c. Here then we find nothing but *confusion* and *unhappiness*.

Such a combination of men therefore, as may produce their *common good* and *happiness*, must be such a one as, in the first place, may render them *compatible* one with another: which cannot be without *rules*, that may direct and adjust their several motions and carriages towards each other, bring them to some degree of *uniformity*, or at least restrain such *excursions* and *enormities*, as would render their living together inconsistent.

Then, there must be some express declarations and *scita* to *ascertain properties* and titles to things by common consent: that so, when any altercations or disputes shall happen concerning them (as be sure many must in a world so unreasonable and prone to iniquity), the appeal may be made to

^c Man is, in *Greg. Naz.*'s words, τὸ πολυτροπάτατον τῶν ζώων, ἢ ποικιλώτατον, "a creature who loves to turn his thoughts to
" variety of things, and to employ himself in different ways."

their

their own settlements; and by the application of a general undisputed rule to the particular case before them it may appear, on which side the obliquity lies, the controversy may be fairly decided, and all mouths eternally stopped. And then again, that they may be protected and persevere in this agreeable life, and the enjoyment of their respective properties be secured to them, several things must be forecasked by way of precaution against foreign invasions; punishments must be appointed for offences committed amongst themselves, which being known may deter men from committing them, &c. These rules, methods, and appointments of punishments, being intelligibly and honestly drawn up, agreed to, and publishd, are the mutual compacts^d under which the society is confederated, and the laws of it.

If then to have the members of a society capable of subsisting together, if to have their respective properties ascertained, if to be safe and quiet in the possession of them be for the general good of the society, and these things cannot be had without laws; then a society, whose foundation and cement is the public good, must have such laws, or be supposed at least to design such.

As to the making of any further laws, when the public interest and welfare require them, that is but repeating the same power in other instances, which they made use of before in making their first laws: and as to altering or repealing, it is certain the power of making and unmaking here are

^d Πᾶς ἐς τὸ νόμος—πῶς αὖτε συνθήκη κοινή. “Every law—is the general compact of the city.” DEMOSTH.

equal. Beside, when men are incorporated and live together for their mutual good, this *end* is to be considered at *one* time as much as at *another*; not only in their first constitution and settlement.

IV. *These laws and determinations must be such, as are not inconsistent with natural justice.* For 1. To ordain any thing that interferes with truth is the same as to ordain, that what is *true* shall be *false*; or *v. v.* ^e which is absurd. 2. To pretend by a law to make that to be *just*, which before and in itself was *unjust*, is the same as to ordain that which interferes with truth: because justice is founded in truth (as before), and every where the same ^f. Therefore, 3. by a law to enact any thing which is *naturally* unjust is to enact that which is absurd; that which by sect. I. is morally evil; and that which is opposite to *those laws*, by which it is manifestly the will of our Creator we should be governed ^g. And to enact what is thus evil must be *evil*

^e Νόμος ἐστὶ τῷ ὄντι εὐρεσις. “The law is the finding out and specifying that which really is.” ΣΤΟΒ. ἐ Πλατ.

^f Δίκαιον φύσει, ἀκίνητον, ἡ πανταχῶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ ἢ ἐνθάδε ἢ ἐν Πέρσῃσι καί. “Justice is founded in nature, is unalterable, and is equally in force every where; in the same manner as the fire burns here and in *Perfia*.” ΑΡΙΣΤ.

^g Even the Heathens believed, that above all human κηρύγματα, “edicts,” there were ἀγραπτα κἀσφαλῆ θεῶν νόμιμα, “unwritten and unalterable laws of the Gods,” which mortals ought not to transgress: ἡ γὰρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθεις ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ πῶτε ζῆ ταῦτα, “because these are in force, not only for a day or two, but for ever.” ΣΟΦΗ. *Nec si regnante Tarquinio nulla erat Romæ scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra—legem sempiternam Sex. Tarquinius vim Lucretiæ—attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta à γεννῆι natura, & ad rectè faciendum impellens, & à delicto avocans;*

evil indeed. Lastly, to establish injustice must be utterly inconsistent with the general good and happiness of any society; unless to be unjustly treated, pilled, and abused can be happiness^h. And if so, it is utterly inconsistent with the end of society; or, it is to deny that to be the end of it, which is the end of it.

V. *A society limited by laws supposes magistrates, and a subordination of powers: that is, it supposes a government of some form or other.* Because, where men are to act by rules or laws for the public weal, some must of necessity be appointed to judge, when those laws are transgressed, and how far; to decide doubtful cases, and the like: there must be

cans: quæ non tum deniq; incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est. Orta autem simul est cum mente divina. “Wherefore if, in the reign of Tarquin, there were no written laws at Rome against whoredom, yet nevertheless Sextus Tarquinius acted contrary to an eternal law, when he ravished Lucretia; for there is such a thing as reason, which proceeds from the nature of things, and which urges us to do that which is right, and forbids us to commit any crimes; which (reason) does not then begin to be a law when it is written down, but was from the beginning; that is, it began when the divine mind began.” CIC.

^h *Si tanta potestas est stultorum sententiis atq; jussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur; cur non sanciant, ut, quæ mala perniciosaq; sunt, habeantur pro bonis, ac salutaribus? aut cur, cum jus ex injuria lex facere possit, bonum eadem facere non possit ex malo?* “If the opinions or commands of weak and foolish men are of so great force, as to overturn the nature of things by their majority; why do they not establish it by a law, that those things, which are evil and pernicious, shall become good and advantageous? And why cannot the same law make the things that are good evil, as well as make an injury a lawful thing?” CIC.

some armed with authority *to execute* those judgments, and to *punish* offenders: there must be persons chosen not only to punish and *prevent* public evils, but also to do many other things, which will be required in *advancement* of the public good: and then the power of making *new laws*, and abrogating or mending *old ones*, as experience may direct or the case at any time require; as also of providing presently and legally for the safety of the public in time of *sudden danger*, must be lodged somewhere.

If there are no *executors* of the laws, the laws cannot be executed: and if so, they are but a dead letter, and equal to *none*: and if the society has none, it is indeed *no society*, or not such a one as is the subject of this proposition. Guardians and executors of laws are therefore the *vitals* of a society, without which there can be no *circulation* of justice in it, no care of it taken, nor can it continue. And since men can be but in one place at once, there must be *numbers* of these proportionable to the greatness and extent of it.

And further, since the concerns of a whole society, and such things as may fall within the compass of a statute book, are *various*, requiring several sorts and sizes of *abilities*, and lying one *above* another in nature; since not only private men want to be *inspected*, but even magistrates and officers themselves, who (tho they oft forget it) are still *but men*; and since the whole society is to be *one*, one compact body: I say, since the case is thus, there must be men to act in several elevations and qualities as well as *places*, of which the *inferior* sort in their several quarters must act immediately

mediately under their respective *superiors*; and so this class of superiors in their several provinces under *others above them*; till at last the ascent is terminated in some *head*, where the legislative power is deposited, and from whence spirits and motion are communicated through the whole body. An *army* may as well be supposed to be well disciplined, well provided, and well conducted without either *general* or *officers*, as a society without *governors* and their *subalterns*, or (which is the same) without *some form* of government, to answer the end of its being.

VI. *A man may part with some of his natural rights, and put himself under the government of laws, and those, who in their several stations are intrusted with the execution of them, in order to gain the protection of them, and the privileges of a regular society.* Because by this he doth but exchange one thing for another, which he reckons *equivalent*, or indeed *preferable* by much: and this he may do without acting against *any truth*. For the liberties and natural rights, which he exchanges, are *his own*, and therefore no other man's property is *denied* by this: nor is the nature of happiness *denied* to be what it is, since it is happiness which he *aims at* in doing this. On the contrary, he would rather offend against *truth*, and deny *happiness* to be what it is, if he did not do it; especially seeing, that here his *own* happiness coincides with the *general* happiness and more convenient being of the kingdom or commonwealth, where his *lot* falls, or his *choice* determines him to live.

If the question should be asked, *what* natural rights a man may part with, or *how far* he may part with them; the *general* answer, I think, may be this. Some things are *essential* to our being, and some it is *not in our power* to part with. As to the *rest*, he may depart from them so far as it is consistent with the *end*, for which he does this: not further, because beyond that lies a contradiction. A man cannot *give away* the natural right and property he has in any thing, in order to *preserve* or *retain* that property: but he may consent to contribute *part* of his estate, in order to preserve the *rest*, when otherwise it might *all* be lost; to take his *share* of danger in defence of his country, rather than *certainly* perish, be enslaved, or ruined by the conquest or oppression of it; and the like.

VII. *Men may become members of a society (i. e. do what is mentiond in the foregoing proposition) by giving their consent, either explicitly, or implicitly.* That a man may subject himself to laws, we have seen. If he does this, he must do it either in *his own person*; or he must do it by some *proxy*, whom he substitutes in his room to agree to public laws; or his consent must be *collected* only from the conformity of his carriage, his adhering to the society, accepting the benefits of its constitution, and acquiescing in the established methods and what is done by virtue of them. By the *two first* ways he declares himself *explicitly*, and *directly*: nor can he after that behave himself as if he was no member of the society, without acting as if he had *not done* what he *has done*. And this is the case not only of *them, who have been concernd in the first formation*

tion of any government, but also of them, who have in the said manners¹ given their consent to any *subsequent* acts, by which they ownd, confirm'd, and came into what their ancestors had done, or who have by *oaths* put themselves under obligations to the public. By the *last* of the three ways mention'd a man's consent is given indeed *implicitly*, and less directly; but yet it is given, and he becomes a party. For suppose him to be *born* in some certain kingdom or commonwealth, but never to have been *party* to any law, never to have taken any *oath* to the government, nor ever formally to have engag'd himself by any *other act*. In this case he cannot methinks but have some *love* and *sympathy* for that place, which afforded him the first air he drew; some *gratitude* towards that constitution, which protect'd his parents, while they educated and provided for him; some *regard* to those obligations, under which perhaps they have laid him, and with which limitations as it were they (or rather the Governor of the world by them) convey'd to him his very life.

If he *inherits* or takes any thing by the laws of the place, to which he has no indefeasible right in nature, or which, if he had a natural right to it, he could not tell how to *get*, or *keep*, without the aid of laws and advantage of society; then, when he takes this inheritance, or whatever it is, *with* it he takes and owns the *laws* which give it him.

Indeed since the *security* he has from the laws of the country in respect of his person, and rights, whatever they either are, or may happen to be hereafter, is the general *equivalent* for his *submis-*

¹ In person, or by proxy.

sion

son to them, he cannot accept *that* without being obliged in equity to pay *this*.

Nay, lastly, his very *continuing* and *settling* in any place shews, that either he *likes* the constitution, or likes it *better* than any other, or at least thinks it better in *his circumstances* to conform to it than to seek any other : that is, he consents to be comprehended in it ^k.

VIII. *When a man is become a member of a society, if he would behave himself according to truth, he ought to do these things : viz. to consider property as founded not only in nature, but also in law; and men's titles to what they have, as strengthened by that, and even by his own concession and covenants; and therefore by so much the more inviolable and sacred : instead of taking such measures to do himself right, when he is molested, or injured, as his own prudence might suggest in a state of nature, to confine himself to such ways as are with his own consent markt out for him : and, in a word, to behave himself according to his subordination or place in the community, and to observe the laws of it. For it is containd in the idea of a law, that it is intended to be observed : and therefore he, who is a party to any laws, or professes himself member of a society formed upon laws, cannot willingly transgress those laws without denying laws to be what they are, or himself to be what he is supposed or professes himself to be : and*

^k *Plato* says, when any man has seen our form of government, &c. and remains under it, ἤδη φημὲν τῦτον ψιμολογηκέναι ἔρση ἡμῖν, “ that then we say, such an one does indeed agree with us.”

indeed

indeed without contradicting all or most of those *truths* containd in the foregoing propositions.

IX. *In respect of those things, which the laws of the place take no cognizance of, or when if they do take cognizance of them, the benefit of those laws cannot be had* (for so it may sometimes happen. I say, in respect of such things), *he who is a member of a society in other respects retains his natural liberty, is still as it were in a state of nature, and must endeavour to act according to truth and his best prudence.* For in the former case there is nothing to limit him, by the supposition, but truth and nature. And in the other it is the same as if there was nothing; since in effect there is no law, where no effect or benefit from it is to be had. As, for example, if a man should be attacked by thieves or murderers, and has no opportunity or power to call the proper magistrate or officer to his assistance.

There is a third case, which perhaps may demand admission here: and that is, when laws are plainly contrary to *truth* and *natural justice*. For tho they may pass the usual forms, and be styled laws; yet, since no such law can abrogate that law of nature and reason, to which the Author of our being hath subjected us, or make falsehood to be truth; and two inconsistent laws cannot both oblige, or subsist together; one of them must give way: and it is easy to discern, *which* ought to do it¹.

There

¹ *Illud stultissimum, existimare omnia iusta esse, quæ scita sint in populorum institutis, aut legibus.—Si populorum iussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis iudicum, jura constituerentur, jus esset latrocinari: jus, adulterare: jus, testamenta falsa supponere, si hæc*

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There remains one *truth* more to be annexed here, which may be contradicted by the practices and pretences of Enthusiasts^m.

X. *The societies intended in this section, such as kingdoms and commonwealths, may defend themselves against other nations: or, war may lawfully be waged in defence and for the security of a society, its members and territories, or for reparation of injuries.* For if one man may in a state of nature have a right to defend himself, (see sect. VI. prop. VII.) two may, or three, and so on. Nay, perhaps two may have a double right, three a threefold right, &c. At least, if the *right* be not *greater*, the *concern* is greater: and there will be more reason, that two, or three, or more should be *saved*, than one only; and therefore that two, or three, or more should *defend* themselves, than that one should. And if this may be done by men in a state of nature, it may be done by them when confederated among themselves: because with respect to other nations they are still in *that state*. I mean, so far as they have not limited themselves by *leagues* and *alliances*.

hæc suffragiis aut scitis multitudinis probarentur. "That's very foolish indeed, to imagin that all those things are just, which are established by the decrees and laws of the people. * —If right were made by the ordinances of the people, by the decrees of princes, or by the sentences of judges, it would be right to rob on the highway; it would be right to commit adultery; it would be right to forge wills; supposing all these were allowed by the majority, and by the decrees of the populary." CIC.

^m *Manicheans* of old, and some moderns.

Beside,

Beside, if a man may defend himself, he may defend himself by what *methods* he thinks most *proper*, provided he trespasses against no truth; and therefore, by getting the *aid* and assistance of others. Now when *war* is levied in defence of the public, and the people in general, the thing may be considered as if *every particular man* was defending himself with the assistance of *all the rest*, and so be turned into the same case with that of a *single man*.

In truth the condition of a nation seems to be much the same with that of a *single person* when there is no law, or no benefit of law, to be had: and what one man may do to another in *that position*, may be done by one nation or politic body with respect to another: and perhaps by this rule, regard being had to what has been deliverd in sect. VI. the *justice* of foreign wars may be not untruly estimated.

Mutual defence is one of the great ends of society, if not the greatest, and in a particular and eminent manner involves in it defence against *foreign enemies*. And whoever signalizes himself, when there is occasion for his service, merits the grateful acknowledgements and celebrations of his country-men: so far at least as he acts generously and with a *public spirit*, and not in pursuance *only* of *private views*.

As to those *wars*, which are undertaken by men out of ambitionⁿ, merely to inlarge empire, or to shew

ⁿ Like those particularly of *J. Cæsar*: of whom it is reported, that, *animadversâ apud Herculis templum magni Alexandri imagine, ingemuit; quasi pertæsus ignaviam suam, quod nihil*

shew the world, how terrible they are, how many men they are able to slay, how many slaves to make °, how many families to drive from their peaceful habitations, and, in short, how much mischief and misery they are able to bring upon mankind; these are founded upon false notions of glory: *imbellish'd* indeed by fervile wits and misplaced eloquence, but *condemned* by all true philosophy and religion.

SECT. VIII. *Truths concerning Families and Relations.*

THIS section shall begin, as relation itself does, with *marriage*.

I. *The end of marriage is the propagation of mankind, and joint happiness of the couple intermarrying, taken together; or the latter by itself* P. The dif-

nihil dum à se memorabile actum esset in ætate quâ jam Alexander orbem terrarum subegisset, “upon viewing the statue of Alexander the Great in the temple of Hercules, he gave a sigh, as it were, to reproach his own sluggishness, that he had done no memorable thing, at an age when Alexander had conquered the whole world.” SUEB.

° Some go to war ὡσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν ἢ κυνηγείαν ἀνθρώπων, “in order to hunt down and worry men.” PLUT. Not out of necessity, and in order to peace; which is the true end of war. Πολεμῶμεν, ἵνα εἰρήνην ἀγώμεν. “We go to war, that we may procure peace.” ARIST. *Ita bellum suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud quàm pax quæsitâ videatur.* “War should be undertaken in such a manner, that nothing else but peace may be seen to be aimed at by it.” CIC.

P Οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἔ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας χάριν συνοικῶσιν, ἀλλὰ ἢ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον, κλ. “Men do not marry for the sake of having children only, but for all the other purposes of life.” ARIST.

ference

ference of the *sexes*, with the strong inclination they have each to the injoyment of the other, is plainly ordaind by the Author of nature for the *continuance* of the *species*, which without that must be soon extinguishd. And tho' people, when they marry, may have many times not so much the increase of their family in their design or wishes, as the *gratification* of an importunate appetite; yet since nature excites the appetite, and that tends to this end, *nature* (or rather its great Author) may be said to make this an end of the marriage, tho' the *bridegroom* and *bride* themselves do not.

And then as to that other thing, which either accompanies the aforesaid end of marriage, or is (as in many cases it can only be) the *end itself*, the joint

¶ Ἄνδρὶ ἢ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν. ἀνδρῶπ^ο γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν. “ It is natural for a man to love a woman; for man is as much made for the society of a woman, as for the society of each other.” ARIST. Ὡς γὰρ ἡ μαγνήτις λίθ^ο—πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τὸν σίδηρον ἔλκει· ἔτω τὸ τῷ θεῷ σῶμα—τὸ τῷ ἄρρην^ο σῶμα πρὸς τὴν μίξιν ἔλκει. “ For as the loadstone draws iron, so the woman attracts the man to unite with her.” St BASIL.

¶ That sure is a hard law in *Plato*, which enjoins ἀπέχουσαι ἀρύρας θελησίας πάσης, ἐν ἧ μὴ βούλοιο εἶν σοι φύεσθαι τὸ σπαρίν, “ men to have no familiarity with a woman, without wishing for the success of it.” That mentiond in *S. Hbared.* says otherwise: וכו' לק"ם אדם עונתו ואף כשאשתו מעוברת וכו'. “ It is an affirmative precept, that a man should act the part of a husband, tho' his wife is incapable of having any children.” Many opinions are taken up upon slight reasons. When *Ocellus Lucanus* says, Αὐτὰς τὰς δυνάμεις, ἢ τὰ ὄργανα, ἢ τὰς ἐρῆσεις τὰς πρὸς τὴν μίξιν ὑπὸ θεῷ δεδομένας ἀνθρώποις, ἕχ ἡδονῆς ἔννεμα διδύσθαι συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς εἰς τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον διαμονῆς τῷ γένει, “ that the powers, the organs, and the desire of procreation, were given men by God, not for the sake of pleasure, but for the perpetual

joint happiness of the *conjuges*, no body can be supposed to marry in order and on set purpose to make him or herself *unhappy*: no nor without a presumption of being *more happy*. For without an apprehension of some *degree* of happiness to accrue, or what presents itself to the imagination as such, and is taken for such, what can induce people to alter their condition? Something there must be, by which (however things prove upon trial) they *think* to better it. And indeed if their *circumstances* are such, as may inable them to maintain a family, and provide for children, without difficul-

“ perpetual continuation of mankind,” how doth he know that they were not given for both these ends, in a regular way? And so when *Clemens Alex.* shews his zeal against τὰς ἀκάθαρους σποράς, τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἐγκύους ὁμιλίαν, “ such familiarities as produce no effect, meddling with pregnant women,” &c. adding, ψιλὴ γὰρ ἡδονή, καὶ ἐν γάμῳ παρανοφθῆ, παρανομός ἐστι, καὶ “ that such mean pleasure is unlawful, even in married persons,” he does this because ὁ Μωσῆς ἀπάγει τῶν ἐγκύων τὰς ἀνδράς, “ *Moses* forbids a man coming near a pregnant woman;” and then cites a text to prove this, which is nothing to the purpose, nor I believe any where to be found: Οὐκ ἐδισαι τὸν λαγῶν, ὑδὲ τὴν ἕαιναν. (*Quem interpretem secutus sit Clemens nescio.* “ Thou shalt not eat a hare or a hyæna. (What commentator *Clement* followed, I know not.” *Gent. Herv.*) Certainly the *Jesus* understand their lawgiver otherwise. See how that Πῖνυ, “ conjugal due,” mentiond in the law is explaind by *Maim. in hilk. isb.* Nor are the suffrages of Christians wanting. *Deus, cum cæteras animantes, suscepto fœtu, maribus repugnare voluisset, solam omnium mulierem patientem viri fecit;—ne feminis repugnantibus, libido cogeret viros aliud appetere, &c.* “ When God made all other female animals, so as to refuse the males when they are pregnant, he made women only capable of men;—lest, upon their refusal, men’s violent passions should force them to go after others, &c.” that is, that the man and wife might be kept inseparably together. **LACT:**

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ties and an over-burden of cares, and if they in good earnest resolve to behave themselves as they ought, and reciprocally to be helpful and loving each to other, much comfort and happiness ^s may justly be expected from this intimate union ^t, the interchange of affections, and a conspiracy of all their counsels and measures ^u, the qualities and abilities of the one sex being fitted and as it were tallying to the wants of the other. For to pass over in silence those joys, which are truest when most conceal'd ^w, many things there are, which may be useful, perhaps necessary to the man, and yet require the delicates hand or nicer management and genius of the woman ^x: and so, *vicissim*, the woman

^s Καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἢ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. “ There seems to be both profit and pleasure in this sort of friendship.” ARIST. כְּרֵאוֹ שְׂכִינָה בִּיְנִיהָ כְּרֵאוֹ שְׂכִינָה בִּיְנִיהָ. “ When the man and the wife behave themselves towards each other as they ought, they are then most intimately united.” *Resb. bhokm.*

^t Ἔρως—καθάρως ἐνὸς ζώου διττὰ τμήματα—εἰς ταυτὸν ἀρμύττεται. “ Love—is like two parts of the same living creature—united into one.” PH. JUD.

^u True love is to be found in marriage, or no where. Πόρνη γὰρ φιλεῖν οὐκ ἐπίσταται, ἀλλ' ἐπιβουλεύει μόνον. “ For there is no real love in whoring; nothing but ensnaring one another.” St CHRYS. ערוותה מגולה והלב מכוסה. “ They discover their nakedness, but hide their real sentiments;” a homely, but true saying of a Jewish commentator.

^w Quod facere turpe non est modo occultè; id dicere obscœnum est. “ That which has no evil in it, when it is done in private, may be obscene, when spoke publicly.” CIC.

^x Ἐὰν γὰρ ᾗ κοσμίᾳ ἢ ἐπιεικῆς, ἢ μόνον τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς κοινωνίας παραμυθίαν παρήξει τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασὶ πολλὴν τῆς ἑαυτῆς χρείαν ἐπιδηλεῖται, κλ. “ For, if she be neat and good-natured, she will not only in general be a comfort to her husband, but will be very useful to him in every particular.” St CHRYS.

cannot but want many things, which require the more robust and active powers or greater capacity of the *man*. Thus, in lower life, whilst the wheel, the needle, &c. employ *her*, the plough or some trade perhaps demands the muscles and hardiness of *him*: and, more generally, if *she* inspects domestic affairs, and takes care, that every thing be provided regularly, spent frugally, and injoyd with neatness and advantage, *he* is busied in that profession, or the oversight and improvement of that estate, which must sustain the charge of all this; he presides, and directs in matters of greater moment; preserves order in the family by a gentle and prudent government, &c.²

As then I founded the *greater societies* of men upon the mutual convenience, which attends their living regularly together; so may I find this *less*, but *stricter alliance* between the man and the woman in their *joint-businness*². Nature has a *further aim*, the preservation of the kind.

II.

γ Διόρηται τὰ ἔργα, ἣ ἔστιν ἕτερα ἀνδρός, ἣ γυναικός. ἑπαρκῶσιν ἕν ἀλλήλοις εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια. “ Their business is different, there is one sort of employment for the man, and another for the woman; so that they are assistant to each other, by joining their forces together.” ARIST.

² See the conversation between *Ischomachus* and his wife in *Xenophon*.

² Tho *Plato* (like most of the old *Greeks* and *Romans*) among many very fine things hath now and then some that are weak, and even absurd; yet I cannot think, that by his *community* of women he meant any thing like that, which is said, *ap. Athen.* to have been practised *παρὰ Τυρρηνῶν ἐκτίπας, τρυφήσασιν*, “ among the *Tyrrhenians*, who were exceedingly debauched;” or that his thought could be so gross, as *Lactantius* represents it: *Scilicet ut ad eandem mulierem multi viri, tanquam canes, confluerent*,

II. That marriages are made by some solemn contract, vow, or oath (and these perhaps attended-with some pledge, or nuptial rites)^b, by which the parties mutually

rent, “namely, that several men, like so many dogs, should “run after one woman.” For thus, property being taken out of the world, a great part of virtue is extinguishd, and all industry and improvements are at end. And beside that, many of the most substantial comforts and innocent delights of this life are destroyd at once. *Si omnes omnium fuerint & mariti, & patres, & uxores, & liberi, quæ ista confusio generis humani est? — Quis aut vir mulierem, aut mulier virum diligit, nisi habitaverint semper unà? nisi devota mens; & servata invicem fides individuum fecerit caritatem, &c.* “If all were the husbands “and fathers, and wives and children of all, what a confusion would there be amongst mankind?—for how can the “man love the woman, and the woman the man, unless they “live always together? unless their minds be devoted to each, “and their fidelity mutual, which will make their affections “inseparable, &c.” *Id.* However it must be confessd, that *Plato* has advanced more than was consistent with his own gravity, or with nature. The best excuse to be made for him, that I know of, is that in *Athenæus*, “*Εοικεν ὁ Πλάτων μὴ τοῖς ὄσιν ἀνδράποισι γράψαι τὰς νόμους, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτῷ διαπλάττομένοις,*” “That “*Plato* seems to have made his laws not for such as men now “are, but for men of his own imagination:” or perhaps to say, that he was so intent upon strengthening and defending his common-wealth, that he forgot, if men must live after his manner, there would be little in it worth defending. After all, his meaning to me is not perfectly clear.

^b Every one knows how marriages were made among the *Romans*, *confarreatione*, “by offering up of burnt cakes,” *coemptione*, “by the man and his wife, as it were, buying one “another, by giving and taking a piece of money,” *usu*, “or by use, when the woman had lived with the man a whole “year:” of which ways the two former were attended with many ceremonies: and the *legitimæ tabellæ*, “writings appointed by law,” or at least consent of friends (which could

usually ingage to live together in love, and to be faithful, assisting, and the like, each to other, in all circumstances of health and fortune, till death parts them; I take for granted. For all nations have some *form* or other upon these occasions: and even private contracts cannot be made without some *words* in which they are containd, nor perhaps without some kind of significant, tho private, *ceremony* between the lovers; which lose nothing of force with respect to them by their being both *parties* and *witnesses* themselves. Something must pass between them, that is *declarative* of their intentions, *expresses* their vows, and binds them each to the other. There is no coming together after the manner of *man* and *wife* upon any other foot.

not be given without some solemnity) preceded all, *auspicia* "omens" were usually taken, public notaries and witnesses assisted, &c. Among the *Greeks* men and women were espoused by mutual promises of fidelity: beside which there were witnesses, and dotal writings (*προικῆα*); at the wedding, sacrifices to *Diana* and other deities, and the *γαμήλιοι εὐχαι*, "nuptial prayers;" and after that, perhaps the being shut up together, eating the *κυδώνιον*, "quince, together," a formal *λύσις ζώνης*, "untying of the bride's girdle," &c. The *יְדוּשׁוּת*, "nuptials," of the *Jeews* have been performed *בכסף*, "by money," or *בשטר*, "by writings of contract," or *בביתא*, "by going into the house:" the ceremonies accompanying which may be seen particularly in *Shulbb. ar.* with the additions of *R. Mo. Iserles* (*Eben ex.*) And (to pass by other nations) the form of solemnization of matrimony, and the manner, in which persons married give their *troth* each to other among us, are extant in our public offices: where they may be seen by such, as seem to have forgot what they are.

• *Connubio stabili.* "By a lasting marriage." VIRG.

III. *That intimate union, by which the conjuges become possessors each of the other's person^d, the mixture of their fortunes^e, and the joint-relation they have to their children^f, all strengthen the bonds and obligations of matrimony.* By every act done in pursuance of a covenant, such as the matrimonial is, that covenant is owned, ratified, and as it were made *de integro*, and repeated.

Possession is certainly more than nothing. When this therefore is added to a former title, the title must needs be corroborated.

When *two* persons throw their *all* into one stock as *joint-traders for life*, neither of them can consistently with truth and honesty take his share out and be gone (*i. e.* dissolve the partnership) without the *concurrence* of the other; and sometimes it may not be easy, perhaps possible, to do it at all. Each therefore is even by this bound, and becomes obnoxious to the other.

And as to the present case, if the marriage be not altogether unfruitful, since *both the parents*

והיו לבשר אחד דרך ררכה לאת יחדא דכר ונוקבא וכו' בקירוב בשר—דלא יהא דבר חוצץ וכו' "And they became one flesh, for it is the custom for men and women to come together,—and that they be no more divided." In *Resph. b'hotm.*

^e Αὐτῆ χρημάτων κοινωνία προσήκει μάλιστα τοῖς γαμήσιν, εἰς μίαν ὕσταν πάντα καταχαρμένοις ἢ ἀναμίχασιν, μὴ τὸ μέρ^ο ἰδίου, ἢ τὸ μέρ^ο ἀλλότριον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἰδίον ἠγεῖσθαι, ἢ μηδὲν ἀλλότριον. "It belongs chiefly to married persons to mix their fortunes together, so as to have but one common stock; and not for them to think that part of it belongs particularly to one and part to the other, but the whole is their own jointly." PLUT.

^f Σύνδισμα τὸ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι. "Children seem to be the bond (of matrimony)." ARIST.

are immediately related to the *same child*, that child is the *medium* of a fixt, unalterable relation between them. For, being both of the *same blood* with the child ^g, they themselves come to be of the *same blood*: and so that *relation* which at first was only moral and legal, becomes *natural*; a relation in nature, which can never cease, or be disannulled. It follows now that,

IV. *Marrying, when there is little or no prospect of true happiness from the match* ^h, and especially if there are plain presages of unhappiness; after marriage adultery; all kinds of infidelity; transferring that affection, which even under the decays of nature ought to preserve its vigor, and never to degenerate (at worst) but into a friendship of a superior kind ⁱ,
and

^g In respect of which that in *Plutarch* particularly is true, Ἡ φύσις μίγνυσι διὰ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡμᾶς, ἢ ἐξ ἑκατέρων μέρους λαβῆσα, ἢ τυχεύασα, κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδῶ τὸ γενόμενον, “Nature, by means of
“ our bodies, so intermixes us, that what is produced becomes
“ common to both, being a part of each, when united to-
“ gether.”

^h *Socrates ab adolescentulo quodam consultus, uxorem duceret, an se omni matrimonio abstineret, respondit, Utrum eorum fecisset, acturum penitentiam. Hic te, inquit, solitudo, hic orbitas, hic generis interitus, hic hæres alienus excipiet: illic perpetua solitudo, contextus querelarum,—incertus liberorum eventus.* “*Socrates* being consulted by a young man, whether he should
“ take a wife or abstain wholly from matrimony, answered,
“ that, which of them so ever he did, he would repent of it.
“ On the one hand, says he, solitariness, want of children,
“ the death of relations, want of an heir, will attend you; on
“ the other hand (you will find) perpetual anxiety, uninter-
“ rupt complaints,—and the uncertain event of children.”

VAL. MAX.

ⁱ Χρόνῳ συνθεσίας ἐντεκύσεως πᾶσι ἀποθάνεται τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ φίλειν ἢ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιτελειόμενον. “When by living a long time together
“ their

and the like, are all wrong^k. Because the first of these is belying one's own sense of things, and has an air of *distraktion*; or however it is to act as if that was the *least* and most trifling of all transactions in life, which is certainly one of the *greatest* and most delicate. And to offend in any of the *other* ways is to behave, as if the *end* of marriage was not what it is; as if no such *league* had been made between the persons married, as has been made, *actually*, and *solemnly*, and is still *subsisting* between them; as if they were not *possess* each of the other; their *fortunes* not interwoven; nor their children so equally related to them, as they are; and therefore the misbehaviour, being repugnant to *truth*, is a sin against it, and the mighty Patron of it.

If the most *express* and *solemn* contracts, upon which persons, when they marry, do so far depend, as in confidence of their being *religiously* observed to *alter quite* their condition, begin a new *tbred* of life, and *risque* all their fortune and happiness: I say, if such sacred compacts as *these* are allowed to

“ their mutual affection is established, we find that, which was
“ at first passion, is by reason become true friendship and love.”

PLUT.

^k It is visible that *polygamy*, *pellicate*, &c. must be included here. They are not only inconsistent with our forms and the very *letter* of the marriage-contract, but with the *essence* of marriage, which lies in such a union and love as can *only* be between *two*. *Aristotle* doth not allow there can be even perfect *friendship* between more than two: much less therefore, perfect *love*. Πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον, κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ ἂν ἱρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα. “ It is impossible to be a friend to a
“ great many, I mean, to be in perfect friendship with them,
“ as it is impossible to have a love for a great many at the
“ same time.” *Etb.* Ἐστὶ γὰρ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός. “ For a friend
“ is a second self.” *Ibid.*

be broken, there is an end of all *faith*; the obligation of *oaths* (not more binding than *marriage vows*) ceases; no *justice* can be administered; and then what a *direful influence* must this have upon the affairs of mankind upon *that*, and other accounts ¹?

Allowance, by sect. IV. ought to be made for incapacities, and involuntary failings. A person's age, health, estate, or other circumstances may be such, and without any *fault*, that he or she cannot do what they would; or perhaps instead of that one of them may come to want the *pity* and *assistance* of the other. In this case (which requires the philosophy and submission proper in afflictions) it is the duty of the one not only to *bear with*, but also to *comfort*, and do what may be done for the other. This is part of the happiness *proposed*, which consists not only in *positive* pleasures, but also in *lessening* pains and wants; whilst the pair have each in the other a refuge at hand.

N. I have designedly forbore to mention that *authority* of a husband over his wife, which is usually given to him, not only by private writers, but even by laws; because I think it has been carried *much too high*. I would have them live so far upon the *level*, as (according to my constant lesson) to be govern'd *both* by reason ^m. If the *man's* reason

¹ *Fœcunda culpæ sæcula nuptias Primùm inquinavere, & genus, & domos. Hòc fonte derivata clades In patriam, populumque fluxit.* "The ages, that were fruitful in vice, first defiled "marriages, corrupted relations and families. From this "fountain flowed that destruction, which overwhelmed the "country and its inhabitants." HOR.

^m Κρατεῖν δὲ τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς γυναῖκος ἕχ' ὡς δεσπότην κτήματ^ς, ἀλλ' ὡς ψυχὴν σώματ^ς, συμπαιδύοντα ἢ συμπεφυκότα τῇ εἰσότητι. "The husband

"band

son be stronger, or his knowledge and experience greater (as it is commonly supposed to be), the woman will be obliged upon that score to pay a deference, and submit to himⁿ.

Having now considered the *man* and *woman* between themselves, I proceed in the order of nature to consider them as *parents*; and to see (in a few propositions following) how things will be carried between *them* and their *children*, as also between other *relations*, coming at first from the same bed, if *truth* and *matters of fact* (to be named, where the argument shall call for them) are not denied.

V. *Parents ought to educate their children, take the best care of them they can, endeavour to provide for them, and be always ready to assist them.* Because otherwise they do not carry themselves towards their children as being what they are, *children* and *theirs*: they do not do what they would desire to have done to *themselves*, were they again to pass through that feeble and tender state; or perhaps what has been done to them^o: and beside, they transgress

“band ought to have a power over the wife, not such as a man has over his goods, but such as the soul has over the body, sympathizing and becoming one in benevolence.”
 PLUT. (A sentence, which deserves to be written in letters of gold.) “Ὅπου σὺ Γάϊος, ἐγὼ Γαΐα.—ὅπου σὺ κύριος ἢ οἰκοδεσπότης, ἢ ἐγὼ κυρία ἢ οἰκοδέσποινα. “Where you are the man *Gajus*, I am the woman *Gaja*; where you are master and governor, I am mistress and governess.” *Ap. eund.*

“κατὰ φύσιν οἱ ἄρρενες ἢ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἄρχουσι. “Nature has appointed the males to govern, not only amongst mankind, but amongst all other living creatures.” PLATO *ap. Diog. L.*

“Ὁ Πολυπλίδης δὲ σοὶ γυίας λείψω. πατὴρ γὰρ ταῦτ' ἰδεξάμεν πάρα. “I shall leave you a very good estate. For I had such an one
 “from

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transgresses the *law* establiſhd by nature for the preservation of the race, which, as things are, could not without a parental care and affection be continued; a *law*, which is in force among all the other tribes of *animals*, so far as there is occasion for it.

Not to do what is here required, is not *barely* to act against truth and nature, not *only* such an omission as is mentiond in sect. I. pr. V. but a heinous instance of *cruelty*. If any one can deny this, let him better consider the case of an *infant*, neglected, helpless, and having nothing so much as to sollicit for him, but his *cries* and (that which will do but little in this world) his *innocence*: let him think what it would be to turn a *child*, tho a little grown up, out of doors, destitute of every thing, not knowing whither to fly ^p, or what to do; and whether it is not the same thing, if he be left to be turned out by any body else *hereafter*, or (in general) to conflict with *want* and *misery*: let him reflect a while upon the circumstances of poor *orphans* ^q left unprovided for, to be abused by every body ^r, &c. and then let him say, whether it is *pos-*

“ from my father.” EUR. *Parentes vos alendo nepotum nutriendorum debito (si quis est pudor) alligaverunt.* “ Your parents, in maintaining you, made it a debt upon you (if you have any sense of shame) to maintain your children.” VAL. MAX.

^p *Incertus quò fata ferant, ubi sistere detur,* “ it is uncertain which way fate will carry me, or where I shall settle,” in the poet’s language.

^q See that moving description of the ἡμᾶς ὀρφανικόν, “ an orphan” in *Homer*.

^r I could never think of that *Arabic* saying without pity, *The barber [אֵלְהָא] learns to shave upon the head of an orphan.*

fible

sible for a *parent* to be so void of bowels, as not to be moved with these considerations; or what *epithet* he deserves, if he is not. If any of them who have been thus abandon'd, and turned adrift, have *done well*, those instances ought to be placed among *particular providences*: as when a vessel at sea, without pilot or sailor, happens to be blown into the port.

Not only the *care*, but the *early care* of parents is required, lest death should prevent them; death, which skips none, and surprises many. Not to remember this, and act accordingly, is in practice to contradict one of the most *certain* and *obvious* of all truths.

VI. *In order to the good of children, their education, &c. there must be some authority over them lodged by nature in the parents*: I mean, *the nature of the case is such, as necessarily requires there should be in the parents an authority over their children in order to their good. At first* if some body did not nurse, feed, clothe, and take care of *children*, the interval between their first and last breath would be very short. They, on whom it is incumbent to do this, are undoubtedly their *parents*: to do this is their duty by the foregoing proposition. But then they must do it as they can, and according to their judgment: and this is plainly an act of *authority*, to order and dispose of another according to one's judgment, tho it be done according to the *best* of one's judgment.

As the child *grows up*, the case is still the same in some degree or other, till he arrives at the age reckon'd *mature*; and very often longer. He is become

come able perhaps to walk by himself, but what *path* to choose he knows not; cannot distinguish his safety and his danger, his advantages and disadvantages; nor, in general, good and evil: he must be warned, and directed, and watched still by his *parents*, or some body intrusted by them, or else it might have been possibly much better for him to have *expired* under the midwife's hands, and prevented the effects of his own ignorance.

When he not only runs about, but begins to fancy himself capable of *governing himself*, by how much the *more* he thinks himself capable, by so much the *less* capable may he be, and the *more* may he want to be governd. The avenues of *sense* are open: but the *judgment* and *intellectual faculties* are not ripend but with time and much practice. The *world* is not easily known by persons of *adult* abilities; and, when they become tolerably acquainted with it, yet they find things in it so intricate, dubious, difficult, that it is many times hard for *them* to resolve, what measures are fittest to be taken: but they, who are not, or but lately, past their *nuts*, cannot be supposed to have any extent of knowledge, or to be, if they are left to themselves, any thing else but a *prey* to the villain who first seizes upon them. Instead of judgment and experience we find *commonly* in youth such things as are remotest from them, childish appetites, irregular passions, peevish and obstinate humors; which require to be *subdued*, and taught to give way to wholesome counsels. Young people are not only obnoxious to their *own* humors and follies, but also to those of their *companions*. They are apt to hearken to them, and to imitate one another

thers misconduct: and thus folly mingles with folly, and increases prodigiously. The judgment therefore of the *parents* must still interpose, and preside, and *guide* through all these *stages* of infancy, childhood, and youth; *according to their power* improving the minds of their children, breaking the strength of their inordinate passions, cultivating rude nature, forming their manners, and shewing them the way which they *ought* to be found in.

These things are so in *fact*, and a *parent* cannot acquit himself of the duty imposed upon him in the preceding proposition, if he acts so as to *deny* them: but then he cannot act so as *not to deny* them (*that is*, so as to subdue the passions of the child, break his stomach, and cause him to mind his instructions) without some sort of *discipline*, and a proper severity; at least very rarely^s.

To all this, and much more that might be urged, must be superadded, that the *fortunes* of children, and their manner of setting out in the world depending (commonly) upon their parents, their parents must upon this account be their *directors*, and *govern* their affairs.

N. 1. It appears now from the premises, that even *parents* have not properly a *dominion* over their *children*, such as is intended sect. VI. prop. V. from which this *parental authority* is a very different thing. This only respects the *good* of the chil-

^s For certainly, when it can be, *Hoc patrium est, potius consuefacere filium sua sponte recte facere, quam alieno metu*, "It is the duty of a father to accustom his son to do right from his own good-will, rather than from the fear of others."

dren, and reaches not beyond the means, which the *parents*, acting according to the best of their skill, abilities, and opportunities, find most conducive to *that end*: but dominion only respects the *will* of the lord, and is of the same extent with his *pleasure*. Parents may not, by virtue of this authority, command their children to do any thing which is in itself *evil*: and if they do, the children ought not to obey ^t. Nor may they do *any thing*, what they please, to them. They may not kill, or maim; or expose them ^u: and when they come to be *men* or *women*, and are possessors of estates, which either their parents (or any body else) have given them, or they have acquired by their own labor, management; or frugality, they have the same *properties* in these with respect to *their parents*, which they have with respect to *other people*: the parents have no more right to take them by force from them, than the rest of the world have ^w. So that
 what

^t Πρὸς ταῦτα μόνον ἀπειθῶντες γονεῦσι, πρὸς ἃ ἢ αὐτοὶ τοῖς θεοῖσι νόμοις ἢ πείθονται. “ We should refuse obedience to parents, only in such things as are contrary to the laws of God.” HIER.

^u The barbarity of the thing at length put a stop to the custom of exposing children: but it had been practised by the *Perfians*; *Greeks*, &c. *Romulus*’s law only restrained it, but did not abolish it. For it enjoined his citizens only, *ἅπασαν ἄρρενα γενεάν ἐκτρέφειν, ἢ θυγατέραν τὰς πρωτογένους ἀποκτείνουσαι δὲ μηδὲν τῶν γενομένων νεώτερον τριτῆς, πλὴν εἰ τι γένοιτο παιδίον ἀνάπηρον*, κλ. “ to bring up all the males, and the first-born of the daughters; and not to destroy any of them, after they were three years old, unless they were maimed.” DION. HALICARN. And beside, *ἅπασαν, ὡς εἰπὴν, ἔδωκεν ἐξουσίαν πατρὶ καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ἢ παρὰ πάντα τὸν τῷ βίῳ χρόνον*, κλ. “ the father had absolute power over the son given him, and that during his whole life.” *Id.*

^w Ῥωμαίοις ὁ θεὸς ἐξουσίαν ἐπέθηκεν ἐπὶ τῶν πατέρων, ἀλλὰ ἢ τὰ χρήματα ἢ τὰ σώματα τῶν παιδῶν ὅ, τι βύλοιται διατιθέναι τοῖς πατέρας ἀποδίδεται

what occurs in the place abovementiond remains *firm*, notwithstanding any thing that may be objected from the case of *parents* and *children*. And moreover,

N. 2. They, who found *monarchy* in paternal authority, gain little advantage with respect to *despotic* or *absolute* power. A power to be exercised for the *good* of subjects (like that of parents for the *good* of their children), and that principally, where they are *incapable* of helping themselves, can only be derived from hence. The *father* of his country cannot by this way of reasoning be demonstrated to be the *absolute lord* * of the lives, and limbs, and fortunes of the people, to dispose of them as he *pleases* †. The authority of parents goes *not this length*. Beside, if a parent hath an authority over his children, it doth not follow, that the *eldest son* should have the same authority, be it what it will, over his *brothers* and *sisters*: and much less, that the *beir* of the *first parent* should in succeeding generations have it over all the *collaterals*. The very *relation* between them soon vanishes, and comes at last in effect to nothing, and this *notion* with it.

ἀποδίδουαι. “ Amongst the *Romans*, children had nothing of “ their own whilst their fathers were alive; but the goods and “ the bodies of the children were intirely at the disposal of “ the fathers, to do what they would with them.” *Id.* These are instances of such laws, as should not be, by prop. IV. sect. VII.

* *Roma patrem patriæ Ciceronem libera dixit.* “ When “ *Rome* had *liberty* to speak, she called *Cicero* the father of “ his country.” *JUV.*

† Ὡς λογικῶν ἡμῶν ἄρξον. “ That should govern us as rational “ creatures.” *ARR.*

*

VII.

VII. *As parents are obliged to educate their children, &c. so children ought to consider parents as the immediate authors (authors under the first and great Cause²) of their being; or to speak more properly, of their being born. I know children are apt (not very respectfully, or prudently) to say; that their parents did not beget them for their sakes, whom they could not know before they were born, but for their own pleasure. But they, who make this a pretext for their disobedience, or disregard, have not sufficiently thought, what pain, what trouble, how many frights and cares^a, what charges, and what self-denials parents undergo upon the score of their children: and that all these, if parents only rush'd into pleasure, and consulted nothing else, might easily be avoided, by neglecting them and their welfare^b. For as to those parents, who do this, let them speak for themselves: I shall not be their advocate.*

VIII. *A great submission and many grateful acknowledgements, much respect and piety are due from children to their parents. For if there is an autho-*

^a שלשתן שותפין ביצירתם. “All the three had a share in the formation of them.” S. HHARED.

^a *Utinam oculos in pectora possent Inserere, & patrias intus deprendere curas.* “I wish they could look into their breasts, and see what the inward cares of parents are.”

^b I confess in *Seneca's* words, *minimum esse beneficium patris matrisque concubitum, nisi accesserint alia, quæ prosequerentur hoc initium muneris, & aliis officiis hoc ratum facerent,* “that parents merely begetting of their children is the smallest kindness, if there were nothing else which followed this first office, and confirmed it by other duties.”

rity in parents (as before) this must be answered by a proportionable submission on the other side: since an authority, to which *no obedience* is due, is equal to *no authority*.

If the thought of *annihilation* be generally disagreeable, as it seems to be, then merely to be conscious of *existence* must have in it something desirable^c. And if so, our parents must be considered as the authors, or at least the instruments of *that good* to us, whatever it is: which cannot be done, unless they are treated with *distinction* and great regard, being to us what no other *is*, or *ever can be*.

God, as the first cause of all beings, is often styled metaphorically, or in a large sense of the word, the *Father* of the world, or of us all: and, if we behave ourselves towards Him as *being such*; we cannot (according to sect. V. pr. XIX. n. 3.) but *adore* Him. Something *analogous*; tho in a low degree, to the case between God and his offspring there seems to be in the case between *parents and their children*. If that requires *divine worship*, this will demand a great *respect* and reverence^d. Nor can I believe, that a child, who doth not honor his *parent*, can have any disposition to worship his

^c Τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔτι ζῆ τῶν ἰδίων καθ' αὐτὸ φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ζωή.
 "To feel that we are alive is a real pleasure of itself; for life
 "is naturally a good thing." ARIST. The sense of life (of being
 alive) seems to be something more than what *Seneca* calls
muscarum ac vermium bonum, "the good of flies and worms."

^d Οἱ πάλαιοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων νόμοι, κλ.—οἱ δὲ ἔτι περὶ αἰετοῦ τοσούτο τὰς
 γονίας ἐσέφθησαν, ὡς εἰ θεοὺς αὐτὰς ὀμιῆσαι καλεῖν. "The antient laws
 "of the *Romans*,—and they that are older yet, paid so much
 "reverence to parents, as to oblige us to call them Gods."

SIMPL.

X

Creator^e

Creator^c. The precept of *honoring parents*, to be found in almost all nations and religions, seems to proceed from some such sentiment: for in books we meet with it commonly following, or rather adhering to that of *worshipping the Deity*^f. In laying children under this obligation they have all conspired, tho scarce in any thing else^g.

^c *Meo judicio pietas fundamentum est omnium virtutum.* “In my opinion, piety is the foundation of all virtues.” The same author reckons among those things, that are laudable, *parentem vereri ut deum (neq; enim multo secus parens libris)*, “to reverence a parent as a God (for the relation of a parent to his children is pretty much the same.)” οὐδ’ αὖ πάλιν μείζων ἐπίδειξις ἀθεῖν γέγονε τῆς περὶ γονεῖς ὀλιγωρίας ἢ πηλημελείας. “There is no greater demonstration of an atheist, than is shewn in the contemning or abusing parents.” PLUT.

^f Πάντες—λέγουσι ἢ ἄδουσιν, ὡς γονεῦσι τιμὴν μετὰ θεῶν πρώτην ἢ μεγίστην ἢ τε φύσις, ὃ, τε τὴν φύσιν σάζων νόμοι ἀπέδωκε. “All writers in prose or poetry affirm, that nature, and the laws that are agreeable to nature, command the first and greatest reverence to be paid to parents next to the Gods.” PLUT. *Τονέων τιμὴν μετὰ τὴν πρὸς Θεὸν δευτέραν ἔταξε* [Μωυσοῦς]. “(Moses) commanded that honour should be paid to parents next to God.” JOSEPH. We indeed usually divide the two tables of *Moses’s* law so, that the fifth commandment (*Honor thy father and thy mother*) falls in the second: but the *Jews* themselves divide them otherwise; ὡς εἶναι τῆς μὲν μιᾶς γραφῆς τὴν ἀρχὴν Θεὸν ἢ πατέρα—τῷ παντός, τὸ δὲ δὲ εἰς γονεῖς, κλ. “so that the first table begins with (the duty to) the God and father—of all, and ends with (the duty to) parents.” PH. JUD. Agreeably to this, *Josephus* says that οἱ δέκα λόγοι, “the ten commandments,” were written upon two tables, ἀνά πέντε μὲν εἰς ἑκατέραν [πλάνα], “five upon each (table).” *Abarbanel* reckons the fifth commandment the last of the first table; and says their *Hbakamim* “wise men” do so: and in the offices of that nation these commandments are mentiond as written *הַשְּׁמִינִי עַל הַלְּוִיָּהּ* “five upon each table.”

^g *Prima igitur ἔσ’ optima rerum natura pietatis est magistra,* &c. “The nature of things, which is the first and best rule of all, teaches us what piety is, &c.” VAL. MAX.

The

The *admonitions* of a parent must be of the greatest weight with his children, if they do but remember, that he hath lived longer, and had repeated occasions to *consider things*, and *observe events*; hath *cooler passions*, as he advances in years, and sees things more *truly* as they are; is able in a manner to predict what *they themselves* will desire to have done, when they shall arrive at his age; may upon these accounts, ordinarily, be presumed to be a more competent *judge* than themselves ^h; and lastly from his relation to them must be more *sincerely* inclined to tell them truth, than *any other person* in the world can be supposed to be ⁱ. I say, if young people reflect well upon these things, they cannot in *prudence*, or even kindness to *themselves*, but pay the utmost *deference* to the advertisements and directions of a parent.

And to conclude, if *parents* want the assistance of their *children*, especially in the declension of their age, and when they verge towards a *helpless* condition again, they cannot deny or withhold it, but they must at the same time *deny* to requite the care and tenderness shewd by their parents towards them in *their* helpless and dangerous years; that is, without being *ungrateful*; and that is, without being *unjust*, if there be injustice in ingratitude ^k.

Nor

^h Ὁ χρόνος, τὰλλα πάντα ἀφαιρῶν, τῷ γήρα προσέθησι τὴν ἐπιστήμην.

“ Time, which takes away every thing else from us, adds knowledge to old age.” PLUT.

ⁱ יִגַּדְךָ אָבִיךָ לֵאמֹר : *ask thy father, and he will shew thee.*
Deut.

^k Δόξειε δ' ἂν προφῆς γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλιστα ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας, ἢ τοῖς αἰτίοις τῷ εἶναι.—ὁ τιμὴν δὲ καθάπερ θεοῖς. “ We ought in the first place to supply the necessities of our parents, as a debt

Nor (which is more still) can they do this without denying what they may *in their turn* require of their children¹. In effect they do thus by their actions *deny* that to have been, which has been; and those things to be possible, which may be hereafter.

Not only *bodily* infirmities of parents, but such decays of their *minds* as may happen, ought to be pitied, their little hastinesses and mistakes dissembled, and their defects supplied, *decently* ^m.

IX. That *εοργη* or affection on both sides, which naturally and regularly is in parents towards their children, and vicissim ⁿ, ought to be observed and followed, when there is no reason to the contrary.

We have seen before, and it is evident from the terms, that *sense* ought to govern, when *reason* does not interpose; *i. e.* when there is *no reason*, why it should not. If then this *εοργη* or mutual affection be an inward *sense* of the case between parents and children, which, without much think-

“ due to them, who are the authors of our being,—and to reverence them as Gods.” ARIST. Amongst the ancients *δραστηρία*, “ the rewards of education,” and *τροφεία*, “ maintenance of parents,” were reckoned *due*. And he, who doth not requite to his parents *הטובה שנמלכהו*, “ the good which they have bestowed on him,” is called *κατ' ἐξοχην ἕψυ*, “ in an eminent *sense* wicked.” S. HBAR.

1 *Τοῦτ' ἔστι γινῆσθαι περὶ τὰς γονεῖς, οἷός ἐστιν εὐχαιοῦσθαι περὶ σεαυτῶν γενέσθαι τὰς σεαυτῶν παῖδας.* “ Do you behave yourself to your parents, as you would wish your children to behave themselves towards you.” ISOCR.

^m That epithet *pious* (*pious Æneas*) shines in *Virgil*.

ⁿ *Posita est inter parentes ac liberos honesta contentio, dederint majora, an receperint.* “ There is a very laudable contest betwixt parents and children, *viz.* whether they have given or received most.” SEN.

ing

ing upon it, is *felt* by them, and sits upon their natures^o, it may be comprised in prop. XIV, and XV. of sect. III. But whether it is or not, the same may be said (which must be repeted in another place) of every *affection*, passion, inclination in general. For when there is no reason, why we should not comply with them, their own very sollicitation, and the agreeableness we apprehend to be in complying, are *preponderating* arguments. This must be true, if *something* is more than *nothing*; or that ought to be granted, which there is no reason to deny. So that if this *σοφὴ* be only taken as a kind of *attraction*, or *tendence*, in the mere matter of parents and children; yet still this physical motion or *sympathy* ought not to be over-ruled, if there be not a *good* reason for it. On the contrary, it ought to be taken as a *suggestion* of nature, which should always be regarded, when it is not superseded by something *superior*; that is, by *reason*. But further, here reason doth not only not gain-say, by its silence and consent, and so barely leave its right of commanding to this bodily inclination; but it comes in strongly to *abet* and *inforce* it, as design'd for a reasonable end: and therefore not to act *according to* it is not to act according to reason, and to deny that to be which is.

X. *The same is true of that affection, which other relations naturally have, in some proportion or other, each for other. To this they ought to accommo-*

^o That is, methinks, a moving description in St Basil (Περὶ ἀλαστονείας) of a conflict which a poor man had within himself, when he had *no other* way left to preserve life but by selling one of his children.

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date themselves where reason does not prohibit: The proof of this assertion is much the same with that of the foregoing *mut. mutand.*

The foundation of all *natural relation* is laid in *marriage* ^p. For the *husband* and *wife* having solemnly attachd themselves each to other, having the same children, interests, &c. become so intimately related as to be reckond united, *one flesh*, and in the laws of nations many times *one person* ^q. Certainly they are such with respect to the posterity, who proceed from them jointly ^r. The *children* of this couple are related between themselves by the mediation of the parents. For every one of them being of the *same blood* with their common parents, they are all of the same blood (truly *consanguinei*), the relations, which they respectively

^p *Prima societas in ipso conjugio est: proxima in liberis, &c.*
 “The strongest alliance is in marriage itself, the next in children, &c.” CIC.

^q *Mulier conjuncta viro concessit in unum.* “After the man and woman are joind together, they become *one*.” LUCR.
 כַּחַד גּוּפָא קַשׁוּבָא. “They are lookd upon as one body.”

Ap. R. Elaz. Azq. & pass.

^r Ἡ συγγενικὴ [φιλία] φαίνεται πολυειδὴς εἶναι, ἢ ἡρτᾶσθαι πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς πατρικῆς· οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐργάζονται τὰ τέκνα, ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα· τὰ δὲ τέκνα τῆς γονεῖς, ὡς ἀπ’ ἐκείνων τι ὄντα.—Ἀδελφοὶ δὲ ἀλλήλους [φιλοῦσι] τῶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι.—Ἀνεψιοὶ δὲ ἕ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς—τῶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι· γίνονται δ’ οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι, οἱ δ’ ἀλλοτριώτεροι, κτλ. “There are a great many sorts of friendship amongst relations, all of them depending upon the parents. For parents have a tender affection for their children, because they are part of themselves; and so have the children for the parents, because they are derived from them.—Brothers also (love) one another, because they are born of the same parents.—Cousins also and other relations,—because they proceed from the same parents also.—And there are some nearer related, and some further off.” ARIST.

bear

bear to their parents, meeting there as in their center. This is the *nearest* relation that can be ^s, next to those of man and wife, parents and their children, who are *immediately* related by contact or rather continuity of blood, if one may speak so. The relation between the children of these children grows more *remote* and *dilute*, and in time wears out. For at every *remove* the natural tincture or sympathy may be supposed to be weakend; if for no other reason, yet for this. Every *remove* takes off *half* the common blood derived from the grand parents. For let C be the son of A and B, D the son of C, E of D, F of E: and let the *relation* of C to A and B be as 1: then the *relation* of D to A and B will be but $\frac{1}{2}$; because C is but one of the parents of D, and so the *relation* of D to A and B is but the half of that, which C bears to them. By proceeding after the same manner it will be found, that the *relation* of E to A and B is $\frac{1}{4}$ (or half of the half), of F $\frac{1}{8}$: and so on. So that the *relation*, which *descendents* in a direct line have by blood to their grand parents, *decreasing* thus in geometrical proportion^t, the *relation* between them of *collateral* lines, which passes and is made out

^s *Quàm copiosæ suavitatis illa recordatio est? In eodem domicilio, antequam nascerer, habitavi: in iisdem incunabulis infantie tempora peregi: eosdem appellavi parentes, &c.* “How very pleasant is the remembrance of these things? I dwelt in the same dwelling (with such an one) before I was born; I passed my infancy in the same cradle; I called the same persons my parents, &c.” VAL. MAX.

^t There is no name for any descendent, who is more than *trinepos*, “three degrees removed from us.”

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through the grand parents, must soon be reduced
to an inconsiderable matter ^u.

If then we suppose this *affection* or sympathy,
when it is permitted to act regularly and accord-
ing to nature, no reason intervening to exalt or
abate it, to operate with a strength nearly *propor-*
tionable to the quantity or degree of relation, com-
puted as above, we may perhaps nearly discern the
degrees of that obligation, which persons related
lie under, to assist each other, *from this motive*.

But there are many circumstances and incidents
in life capable of affecting this *obligation*, and al-
tering the degrees of it. A man must weigh the
wants of *himself* and his own *family* against those of
his *relations*: he must consider their *sex*, their *age*,
their *abilities* and opportunities, how *capable* they are
of good offices, how they will take them, what use
they will make of them, and the like. He, who
designs to act agreeably to *truth*, may find many
such things demanding his regard; some justly
moving him to compassion, others holding back
his hand. But however this may in general be
taken as evident, that *next after* our parents and
own offspring ^w nature directs us to be helpful, in
in the *first place* to brothers and sisters, and *then* to
other relations according to their respective dis-
tances in the genealogy of the family, *preferably*
to all foreigners ^x. And tho our power, or oppor-

^u It becomes ἀμυδρά, “very obscure.” ANDR. RHOD.

^w *Man* and *Wife* are supposed to be one, and therefore
have no place here; any more than a *man* and his *self*. Other-
wise considered distinctly, the one of them ought always to be
the *first* care of the other.

^x Μὴδὲ κασιγνήτω ἴσον ποιεῖσθαι ἑταίρον. “We must not treat a
“friend equally with a relation.” HES.

tunities

tunities of helping them in their wants should be but little; yet we ought to preserve our affection towards them, and a disposition to serve them, as far as we *honestly* and *prudently* can, and whenever the proper opportunity shall present itself. This *nature* and *truth* require.

SECT. IX. *Truths belonging to a Private Man, and respecting (directly) only himself.*

I. **E**VERY man knows (or may ^y know) best, what his own faculties, and personal circumstances are, and consequently what powers he has of acting, and governing himself. Because he only of all mankind has the *internal* knowledge of himself, and what he is; and has the only opportunity by *reflexion* and *experiments* of himself to find, what his own abilities, passions, &c. truly are ^z.

II. *He, that well examines himself, I suppose, will find these things to be true* ^a.

^y For many I acknowledge there are, who seem to be without reflexion, and almost thought. *Τίς ἀγνοεῖ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν; πολλοί· τάχα δὲ πάντες, πολλὴν δλίγων.* “Who is there that does not understand what he himself is? A great many truly; nay, all but a very few.” St CHRYS.

^z *Nec se quaesiverit extra.* “Let him not seek for himself out of himself.”

^a *Illud γινώσκει σιαυτὸν noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam solum esse dictum, verum etiam ut bona nostra norimus.* “Do not imagine that that (precept) understand yourself thoroughly, was said only to lessen men’s pride, but further that they might know all the good things which belong to them.” CIC. ad Qu. fr.

I. That

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1. That there are *some* things *common* to him not only *with sensitive animals* and *vegetables*, but also with *inanimate matter*: as, that his body is subject to the general law of gravitation; that its parts are capable of being separated, or dislocated; and that therefore he is in danger from falls, and all impressions of violence.

2. That there are *other* things *common* to him with *vegetables* and *sensitive animals*: as, that he comes from a seed (such the original *animalculum* may be taken to be); grows, and is preserved by proper matter, taken in and distributed through a set of vessels; ripens, flourishes, withers, decays, dies; is subject to diseases, may be hurt, or killed; and therefore wants, as they do, nourishment, a proper habitation, protection from injuries, and the like.

3. That he has *other* properties *common* only to *him* and the *sensitive tribe*: as, that he receives by his senses the notice of many external objects, and things; perceives many affections of his body; finds pleasure from some, and pain from others; and has certain powers of moving himself, and acting: *that is*, he is not only obnoxious to hurts, diseases, and the causes of death, but also *feels* them^b; is not only capable of nourishment, and
many

^b *Non sentire mala sua non est hominis: & non ferre non est viri.* “Not to be sensible of the evils we lie under is not to be a man, and not to be able to bear them is to want the courage of a man.” SEN. who condescends here to be something like other men. As also when he says, *Alia sunt, quae sapientem feriunt, etiamsi non pervertunt; ut dolor capitis, &c.* *Hæc non nego sentire sapientem, &c.* “There are some things
“ which

Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 315

many other provisions made for him, but also *injoys* them; and, beside, may *contribute* much himself to either his *injoyments*, or his *sufferings*.

4. That *beside these* he has *other faculties*, which he doth not apprehend to be either in the inert mass of matter, or in vegetables, or even in the sensitive kind, at least in any considerable degree; by the help of which he investigates truth, or probability, and judges, whether things are agreeable to them, or not, after the manner set down in sect. III. or, in a word, that he is *animal rationale*^c.

5. That he is conscious of a *liberty* in himself to act or not to act; and that therefore he is *such a being* as is described sect. I. prop. I. a being, whose acts may be *morally good or evil*. Further,

6. That there are in him many *inclinations and aversions*; from whence flow such affections, as desire, hope, joy, hatred, fear, sorrow, pity, anger, &c. all which *prompt* him to act this or that way.

7. That he is sensible of *great defects and limitations* in the use of his rational faculties, and powers of action, upon many occasions: as also, that his passions are many times apt to take wrong turns, to grow warm, irregular, excessive^d. In

“ which strongly affect a wise man, though they don't quite overpower him, as *the head-ach*, &c. I do not deny but that a wise man feels such things,” &c.

^c *Qui se ipse norit, aliquid sentiet se habere divinum, &c.*
“ He that understands what sort of a being he himself is, will perceive that he has something that is divine in him.”
C1c.

^d טבע החומר ויצר הרע, “ nature which is backward, and a will corrupted,” are (in *Jewish* language) שאור בעיסה, “ the leaven in the lump.”

other

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other words, that he is in many respects fallible,
and infirm ^c.

Lastly, that he desires *to be happy*: as every thing
must, which understands what is meant by that
word.

III. *If he doth find these things to be so, then if
he will act as he ought to do (that is, agreeably to
truth and fact) he must do such things as these.*

1. *He must subject his sensual inclinations, his bo-
dily passions, and the motions of all his members ^f to
reason; and try every thing by it.* For in the climax
set down he cannot but observe, that as the prin-
ciple of *vegetation* is something above the *inertia*
of mere matter, and *sense* something above that
again; so *reason* must be something above all
these ^g: or, that his uppermost faculty is *rea-*

^c Ἀμύχανον εἶναι ἀνθρώπον τινα ἀναμάρτητον. “It is next to im-
possible for a man to be free from all sin.” CHRYS.

^f The author of *S. Hbared.* reckons *eight*, the right use of
which comprehends all practical religion: the heart, the eye,
the mouth, nose, ear, hand, foot, and רֵאשׁ הַגּוֹי, “the prin-
cipal member.” The duties respecting these are the sub-
ject of that (not bad) book.

^g *Cum tria sint hæc, esse, vivere, intelligere: & lapis est, &
pecus vivit, nec tamen lapidem puto vivere, aut pecus intelligere:
qui autem intelligit, eum & esse & vivere certissimum est. Quare
non dubito id excellentius judicare, cui omnia tria insunt, quam id
cui duo vel unum desit.* “Since there are these three things, to
“ exist, to live, and to have understanding; and a stone ex-
“ ists, beasts live, for I cannot think that a stone lives, or a
“ beast has understanding; it is most certain, that the being,
“ which has understanding, both exists and lives. Wherefore
“ I don’t at all scruple to declare him that has in him all
“ these three, to be a superior being to him who wants one or
“ two of them.” St AVST. Thus reason sets man above the
other visible orders of beings, &c.

son ^h.

son^h. And from hence it follows, that he is one of those beings mentiond sect. III. prop. XI. and that the great law imposed upon him is to be governd by reason.

Any man may prove this to himself by experiment, if he pleases. Because he cannot (at least without great violence to his nature) do any thing, if he has a greater reason against the doing of it than for it. When men do err against reason, it is either because they do not (perhaps *will not*) advert, and use their reason, or *not enough*; or because their faculties are defective.

And further, by sect. III. prop X. to endeavour to act according to right reason, and to endeavour to act according to truth are in effect the same thing. We cannot do the one, but we must do the other. We cannot act according to truth, or so as *not to deny any truth*, and that is we cannot act *right*, unless we endeavour to act according to *right reason*, and are led by it.

Therefore not to subject one's *sensitive* inclinations and passions to *reason* is to *deny* either that he is rational, or that reason is the supreme and ruling faculty in his nature: and that is to desert mankindⁱ, and to *deny* himself to be what he knows

^h *Præsto est domina omnium & regina ratio— Hæc ut imperet illi parti animi, quæ obedire debet, id videndum est viro.* “Reason, the governor and ruler of all things, is ready—; every man therefore is to see that she governs that part of the soul, which ought to be obedient to her.” CIC.

ⁱ *Abjecto homine in sylvestre animal transire.* “To cast off the man, and become a wild creature.” SEN. Ἐν τῷ λογικῷ τίνας χωρίζομεθα; τῶν θηρίων.—Ὅρα ἔν μή τι πῶς ὡς θηρίων ποιήσῃ. “Whom are we distinguishd from by our reason?—from the beasts;

knows himself by experience and in his own conscience upon examination to be, and what he would be very angry if any body should say he was not.

If a *beast* could be supposed to give up his *sense* and activity; neglect the calls of hunger, and those appetites by which he (according to *his nature*) is to be guided; and refusing to use the powers, with which he is indued in order to get his food and preserve his life, lie still in some place, and expect to grow, and be fed like a *plant*; this would be much the same case, only not so bad, as when a *man* cancels his *reason*, and as it were strives to metamorphoze himself into a *brute*. And yet this he does, who pursues only sensual objects, and leaves himself to the impulses of appetite and passion. For as in that case the *brute* neglects the law of *his nature*, and affects that of the order *below* him: so doth the *man* disobey the law of *his nature*, and put himself under that of the *lower animals*; to whom he thus makes a defection^k.

If this be so, how wretchedly do they violate the *order* of nature, and transgress against *truth*, who not only *reject* the conduct of reason to follow sense and passion, but even make it *subservient*

“beasts; take care then that you do not imitate the beasts in any thing.” ARRIAN. *Pertinet ad omnem officii quaestionem semper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisque belluis antecedit.* “In all enquiries concerning our duty, we ought always to have this uppermost, *viz.* how much the nature of man is superior to that of cattle or any other beasts.” CIC.

^k Πρὸς τὴν τῶν θηρίων ἀλογίαν ἐκπεσόν. “To sink into as little reason as a beast has.” CHRYS.

to them¹; who use it only in finding out means to effect their wicked ends^m, but never apply it to the consideration of those ends, or the nature of those means, whether they are just or unjust, *right* or *wrong*? This is not only to *deviate* from the path of nature, but to *invert* it, and to become something *more* than brutish; *brutes with reason*, which must be the most enormous and worst of all brutes. When the *brute* is governd by sense and bodily appetites, he observes *his proper* rule; when a *man* is governd after that manner in defiance of reason, he *violates* his; but when he makes his rational powers to *serve* the brutish part, to assist and promote it, he heightens and increases the *brutality*, enlarges its field, makes it to act with greater force and effectⁿ, and becomes a *monster*.

His duty then, who is *conscious* to himself of the truth of those things recounted under the fore-

¹ A thing too often done. *Quæ enim libido, quæ avaritia, quod facinus aut suscipitur nisi consilio capto, aut sine—ratione perficitur?* “For what sensual pleasure, what avaritious thing is undertaken, without first advising about it; or com-

“pleated,—without making use of reason?” Cotta *ap. Cic.*
^m Something like him, who in *Chrysoptom’s* words, διὰ τῆν οἰάνων καταδύει τὸ σκάφος, “made use of the rudder to sink the
 “ship.”

ⁿ This makes Cotta say, *Satius fuit nullam omnino nobis à diis immortalibus datam esse rationem, quàm tanta cum pernicie datam,* “That it had been better that the immortal Gods had never given us any reason at all, than to have given it us in so destructive a manner:” with other bitter things. Tho an answer to this may be given in the words which follow afterward: *A deo tantum rationem habemus, si modo habemus: bonam autem rationem, aut non bonam, à nobis;* “The reason which we have (the faculty) is given us by God, but whether it be
 “good or bad, that is from ourselves.”

going

going proposition, is to examine every thing carefully, and to see that he complies with no *corporeal* inclination at the expence of his *reason*; but that all his *affections*, concupiscible and irascible, be directed towards such *objects*, and in such *measure, time, and place*, as that allows. Every word^o and action, every motion and step in life should be conducted by *reason* P. This is the foundation and indeed the sum of all virtue.

2. *He must take care not to bring upon himself want, diseases, trouble; but, on the contrary, endeavor*

^o This certainly excludes all that talk, which familiarizes vice, takes off those restraints which men have from nature or a modest education, and is so utterly destructive of virtue, that *Aristotle* banishes it out of the commonwealth. "Ὁλως μὲν αἰσχρολογία ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὡς περ ἄλλο τι, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν" Ἐκ τῆ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὅτι ἐν τῶν αἰσχροῶν ἢ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεργος. "A lawgiver ought above all things entirely to banish all filthy discourse out of a city, for men easily go from saying filthy things to doing them."

P True, manly reason: which is a very different thing from that superstitious preciseness, which carries things too far. As v. g. when the *Jews* not contented to condemn נבלה, "obscene discourse," or נבלות הפה, "filthy talk," and every where to express גודל האסור, "the heinousness of the thing forbidden," go so far as to comprehend under it אשתו עם משיח עמו, "that trifling discourse which passes betwixt a man and his wife;" and to add, מוציא מלה לבטלה זרע כמוציא זרע לבטלה וכו', "that bringing forth an idle word is like bringing forth idle seed." There are other sayings of this kind to be seen, many of them, among those, which *R. El. de Vidas* has collected: as that particularly, כן ענין ראות צריך שלא להוציא לבטלה וכו', "that a man should not make an idle use of his eyes." What *Ælian* reports of *Anaxagoras* and others, belongs to this place; that they never laughed: with many other unnecessary austerities, which might be added.

א. אן אני לי מי לי. "If I don't take care of myself, who will take care of me?" P. AB.

YOUR



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your to prevent them, and to provide for his own comfortable subsistence, as far as he can without contradicting any truth (that is, without denying matters of fact, and such propositions, as have been already or will in the sequel here be shewn to be true, concerning God, property, the superiority of reason, &c.) To explain this limitation: if a man should consider himself as obnoxious to hunger, weather, injuries, diseases, and the rest; then, to supply his wants, take what is his neighbour's property; and at last, in vindication of himself, say, "I act according to what I am, a being obnoxious to hunger, &c. and to act otherwise would be in compliance with truth;" this would not be sufficient to justify him. The grand rule requires,

ἢ Προσδιΐται τέτων [τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν] ὁ ἀνθρώπῳ βίῃ κέραι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. "These (external goods) are necessary to the life of man, but virtuous actions are necessary to his happiness." ARIST. They, who treated the body and things pertaining to it as merely ἀλλότρια, "things that did not belong to them;" distinguishing between τὰ ἡμέτερα, "such things as are our own," and τὰ τῷ σώματι, "such as belong to the body;" making these latter to be ἕδεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, "nothing to us," and leaving the body as it were to itself (αὐτὸ [σώματιον] μεριμνάτω, — εἴ τι πάσχει,) ("to be solicitous for itself,—if it suffers any thing:)" they, I say, might enjoy their own philosophy; but they would scarce gain many profelytes now a days, or ever persuade people, that the pains they feel are not theirs, or any thing to them. Nor indeed do I much credit many stories that are told of some old philosophers: as that of Anaxarchus, when he was put to a most cruel death by Nicocreon, (viz. pounded in a mortar) ἢ φροντίσαντα τῆς τιμωρίας, εἰπεῖν — Πίστε τὸν Ἀναξάρχου θύλακον, Ἀναρχον δὲ ἢ πῶλλῃεις, "not valuing the punishment, cried out, —You may beat the bag of Anaxarchus, but you cannot strike Anaxarchus himself." See Epict. Arr. Simpl. Anton. D. Laert. and others.

Y

true

that what he does, should *interfere with no truth* : but what he does interferes with *several*. For by taking that, which (by the supposition) is *his neighbour's*, he acts as if it was not *his neighbour's*, but *his own*, and therefore plainly contradicts *fact*, and those *truths* in sect. VI, VII. respecting property : when, by not taking what is his neighbour's, he would contradict no truth, he would not deny himself to be obnoxious to hunger, &c. There are other ways of furnishing himself with conveniences, or at least necessities, which are consistent with *property* and all *truth* : and he can only be said to deny himself to be *what he is* by *omitting* to provide against his wants, when he omits to provide against them by some of *those ways* ; and then indeed he doth do it. (See p. 46. Anf. to Obj. 3.)

So again, when a man does any thing to *avoid* present suffering or dangers *contrary* to the express dictates of reason, and the tenor of forementioned truths, he acts as a *sensitive* being only, not as being what he *really is*, *sensitivo-rationalis*. But when there is no good argument *against* his doing of any thing, that may gain him protection from evil, or a better condition of life, he may then look upon himself *only* as a being, who needs that which is to be obtained by doing it : and *in that case*, if he should not do it, he would be false to himself, and deny the circumstances of his own nature.

Certainly when a man may *without transgressing* the limits prescribed consult his own safety, support, and reasonable satisfaction, and does not ; and especially when he takes a counter-course, and
exposes

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exposes himself^s, he forgets *many* of the foregoing *truths*, and treats himself as *not being* what he is. This is true with respect to *futurity*, as well as the *present time*; and indeed by how much future time is more than the present, by so much the more perhaps ought *that* to be regarded. At least enjoyments ought to be taken and adjusted in such a manner, that no one should preclude, or spoil *more*, or *greater* to come.

It may easily be understood here; that *those evils*, which it is not in a man's power to prevent, he must endeavour to bear *patiently* and *decently*, i. e. as such; and moreover, such as are made by this means *lighter*^t: for when they cannot be totally prevented, as much of the *effect* must be prevented, or taken off, as can be. And in order to this it is good to be prepared for all attacks; especially the *last, great one*^u.

3. He must consider even *bodily and sensual affections, passions, and inclinations as intimations, which many times be not only may, but ought to bearken to.* What is said before of the subjection of passions and appetites to *reason* must always be remembered. They are not to proceed from unjustifiable causes, or terminate in wrong objects; not be unseasonable or immoderate. Being *thus regulated*, set to a

^s *Ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa; quo nihil potest esse stultius.—In tranquillo tempestatem adversam optare dementis est.*

^t “Nothing can be more foolish than to run ourselves into dangers without any reason.—He is a mad man that wishes for a storm when the weather is good.” CIC.

^u *Levius fit patientia, Quicquid corrigere est nefas.* “What cannot be quite cured, is made easier by patience.” HOR.

^v ΜΕΛΕΤΗ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΥ, “a meditation upon death,” was a great man's definition of *philosophy*.

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true bias, and freed from all eruptions and violence, they become *such as are here intended*; gentle ferments working in our breasts, without which we should settle in inactivity ^w; and what I think may be taken for just *motives* and *good* arguments to act upon.

For if a man finds, that he has *not only* a superior faculty of reason, but *also* an inferior appetitive faculty, under which are containd many propensions and averfions, *these* cannot be denied to be any more than *that*; tho they must be taken indeed for what they *really are*, and not *more*. When they are checked by reason and truth, or there lies a reason *against* them (as there always will, when they are not within the foresaid restrictions), they must be taken *as clogd* with this circumstance, as things *overruled* and *disabled*: but when they are under no prohibition from the *superior powers* and *truth*, then they are to be considered as unfetterd and free, and become governing principles. For (as it has been observed upon a particular occasion before p. 309.) when there is *no reason against* the complying with our senses, there is always *one for* it by prop. XIV. sect. III. the inclination itself, being precluded by nothing above it, is in this case *uppermost*, and in course takes the commanding post: and then a man must act as being what he is in n. 3. under prop. II. of this section.

The *springs* of all human actions are in fact, either a sense of *duty*, or a prospect of some *pleasure*

^w Ἡ ὀργή—ἵπνυλδὲν ἐμῶν διεγείρει. “Anger—is to excite the
“drowfy.” CHRYS.

or profit to be obtained, some evil or danger to be avoided ; that is, either the reasonableness of what is done, or the manner, in which something doth or is like to affect the agent : and that is again, human actions are founded either in *reason*, or *passion* and *inclination*. (I need not add they may be in both.) This being so, what should hinder, when *reason* does not work, but that the *inferior springs* should retain their nature, and act ?

Bodily inclinations and passions, when they observe their due *subordination* to reason, and only take place, where that leaves it open for them, or allows them to be as it were assessors to it upon the throne, are of admirable use in life, and tend *many times* to noble ends. This is applicable to the irascible, as well as the concupiscible affections and the whole animal system. *Love* of that which is amiable, *compassion* * toward the miserable and helpless, a natural *abhorrence* and resentment † of

* When the Stoics say, that a wise man may relieve one, who wants his help, without *pitying* him ; I own indeed he *may*, but I very much doubt whether he *would*. If he had not some compassion, and in some measure felt the ills or wants of the other, I scarce know how he should come to take him for an object of his charity.

γ Ὁ μὲν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἐτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται. “ He is to be commended, who is angry with those persons that he ought to be angry with, and for such things as he ought to be angry for, and in such a manner, and in the proper time, and only for so long, as he ought.” ARIST. To be angry under these conditions is a different thing from *rage*, and those *transports* which perhaps scarce comply with any one of them : such as that of *Alexander*, who, because his ἐρώμενος, “ beloved friend” died, commanded the Ἀσκληπεία, “ temples of *Æsculapius*” to be all burnt. ARR.

that which is villainous or vitious or base^z, *fear*^a of evils, are things, which *duly* temperd have laudable effects: and without them mankind could not well subsist. By which it appears, that the Author of nature has placed these *conatus*'s, these tendencies, and reluctancies in us, to dispose us for action, when there are no arguments of a *higher nature* to move us. So far are they, *rightly managed*, from being mere infirmities. And certainly the *philosopher*, who pretends to absolute *apathy*, maims nature, and sets up for a half-man, or I don't know what^b.

I must confess however, that our *passions* are so *very apt* to grow upon us, and become exorbitant, if they are not kept under an *exact discipline*, that by way of prevention or caution it is advisable rather to affect a *degree* of apathy, or to recede *more* from the worse extreme^c. This very proposition

^z There is, according to *Tully*, *Civile odium, quo omnes improbos odimus*, “ a public hatred, by which we hate all wicked persons in general.”

^a Φοβόμεθα διπλοῦντι τὰ φοβερά.—φοβόμεθα οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά οἷον ἀδοξίαν, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀφιλίαν, θάνατον.—ἓνα γὰρ ἢ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι, ἢ καλόν τὸ δὲ μὴ, αἰσχρὸν, κλ. “ We are afraid indeed of such things as are really dreadful;—and therefore we are afraid of all real evils, such as disgrace, poverty, diseases, want of friends, and death.—It is right to be afraid of some things, and wicked not to be afraid of them.” ARIST. When one called *Xenophanes* coward, because he would not play at dice with him, ὁμολογεῖ πᾶνθ δειλὸς εἶναι πρὸς τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἢ ἀτολμῶ, “ he owned that he was a coward, and had no courage, with regard to things that are wicked.” PLUT.

^b A wise man is not ἀπαθής, “ entirely without passions,” but μετριοπαθής, “ has them in a moderate degree.” ARIST. *ap. Diog. L.*

^c Δεῖ τὸν τοχαζόμενον τῷ μέσῳ ἀποχωρεῖν τῷ μᾶλλον ἑναντίῳ.—τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων, τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον τὸ δὲ ἥττον. “ He who aims at a medium,

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position itself, which, when *reason* is absent, places *sense* and *inclination* in the chair, obliges not to permit the reins to our passions, or give them their full career; because if we do, they may (and will) carry us into such *excesses*, such *dangers* and *mischiefs*, as may sadly affect the sensitive part of us: that part itself, which now governs. They ought to be watched, and well examined; if *reason* is on their side, or stands neuter, they are to be heard (this is all, that I say): in *other cases* we must be deaf to their applications, strongly guard against their emotions, and *in due time* prevent their rebelling against the sovereign faculty.

I cannot forbear to add, tho I fear I shall tire you with repetitions, that from what is said here and just before, not only the *liberty* men take in preferring what they like best, among present enjoyments, meats, drinks, &c. so far as they are *innocent*; but all those *prudential* and *lawful* methods, by which they endeavour to secure to themselves a comfortable and pleasant being, may be justified, and that obs. under prop. XIII. in sect. II. strengthen.

“ medium, should depart from that (extreme) which is most
 “ contrary;—for one of the two extremes has more of vice in
 “ it than the other.” ARIST.—In the same chapter he gives
 two other excellent rules, which I cannot but set down here.
 Σκοπεῖν δὲ πρὸς ἅ αὐτοὶ εἰκατάφοροι ἔσμεν—εἰς τὸναντίον δ' ἐκὐτὲς ἀφέλ-
 χειν—ἕπερ οἱ τὰ διεσραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ἰρθεῖντες ποιῶσιν. “ We ought
 “ to consider what (vices) we are most inclined to,—and to
 “ bend ourselves to the contrary;—as they do, who endea-
 “ vour to make crooked sticks straight.” And after, Ἐν παντί δε
 μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ, ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν· ἃ γὰρ ἀδίκασαι κρῖνομεν αὐτήν.
 “ In every thing, we should take great care as to the pleasure
 “ of it; for we are very apt to have our judgment corrupted
 “ by pleasure.”

If the gratification of an appetite be incompatible with *reason* and *truth*, to treat that appetite according to what it is, is to *deny* it: but if it is not, to use it as it is, is to consider it as an appetite clear of all objections, and this must be to *comply* with it. The humoring of *such appetites*, as lie not under the interdict of truth and reason, seems to be the *very means*, by which the Author of nature intended to *sweeten* the journey of life: and a man may upon the road as well muffle himself up against sun-shine and blue sky, and expose himself bare to rains and storms and cold, as debar himself of the *innocent delights* of his nature for affected melancholy, want, and pain. Yet,

4. *He must use what means he can to cure his own defects, or at least to prevent the effects of them; learn to deny temptations, or keep them at a proper distance^d; even mortify, where mortification is necessary^e; and always carry about him the sense of his being but a man.* He who doth not do this, doth not conform himself to the *seventh* particular under the preceding prop. (doth not own that to be *true*,

d Ἀγασιλᾶν μέχρι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν προσελθῶν ὁ ἔρωσ, ἐνταῦθα ἔστη ἐπὶ θύραις τῆς ψυχῆς. “When love was got to the eyes of *Agasilas*, “it stood then at the door of his mind.” MAX. TYR.—To appoint things, as the *Jewish* doctors have done, to be עֵינַי לַתּוֹרָה, “a fence for the law,” or כְּדִי לְהַרְחִיק אֶת הָאָדָם מִן הָעֲבִירָה, “to remove men as far as can be from sin,” would be right, if they were judiciously chosen, and not so very particular and trifling. Some of their cautions are certainly just: as that יִסְתַּכֵּל אָדָם בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ וּבִשְׂאָר בָּנָי, “A man should not trifle with another man’s wife, nor with nakedness, lest he be ensnared by them.” *Passim*.

^e *What should a man do to live?* מִיָּמִית עַצְמוֹ? “Should he “destroy himself?” *Mishn.*

which

which he is supposed to have found *true* in himself); denies a *defect* to be what it is, to be something which requires to be supplied, or amended; and is guilty of an *omission*, that will fall under sect. I. prop. V.

I might here mention some *precautions*, with some kinds and degrees of *mortification* or *self-denial*, which men will commonly find to be necessary. But I shall not *prescribe*; leaving them, who best know their own weak places and diseases, to select for themselves the proper *remedies*.

I shall only take notice, that since the *self-denial* here recommended can only respect things in themselves *lawful* and not unreasonable, and in favor of such our bare *inclinations* have been allowed to be taken for arguments and directions, it looks as if this advice to *deny one's self* or *inclinations* inferred a contradiction. But this knot will be quickly untied. For when we deny our inclinations in order to better our natures, or prevent crimes, tho' to follow those inclinations might *otherwise* be right; yet in *these circumstances* and under this view there arises a good reason against it, and they, according to the *establish'd rule*, must therefore give way: which is all that is intended ^f.

The last clause of the proposition takes in a *great compass*. It will oblige men, if they do but think well what *they* are, and consequently what *others* of the same kind with themselves also are, not to be proud, conceited, vain; but modest, and humble, and rather diffident of themselves: not to censure the failings of others too hardly, not to be over-

^f No *monkery*, no superstitious or phantastical mortifications are here recommended.

severe

severe in punishing or exacting justice ^g, and particularly not to be revengeful; but candid, plausible, manfuete: and so forth.

5. *He ought to examine* ^h *his own actions and conduct, and where he finds he has transgressed* ⁱ, *to repent.* That is, if the transgression be against his neighbour, and the nature of it admits, to make *reparation*, or at least as far as he can: in other cases, when that which is done cannot be *recalled*, or *repaired*, or terminates in *himself* only, to live however under a sense of his fault, and to prove by such acts as are proper, that he desires *forgiveness*, and heartily wishes it undone; which is as it were an essay towards the *undoing* of it ^k, and all that now can be ^l: and lastly, to use all possible care not to *relapse*. All this is involved in the *idea* of a fault, or action that is wrong, as it presents itself to a rational mind. For such a mind cannot approve what is unreasonable, and repugnant to

החסיד עושה טובה לפניו משורת הדין ^g, “the merciful man does good according to the best of his judgment,” (which words I understand in the sense, that *Rasbi* seems to put upon them, *Gen.* xlv. 10.)

h Πῶς παρέσθην; τί δ' ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον ἔτι τέλεισθαι; “Wherein have I transgressed? and what have I done? wherein have I failed in what was my duty?” *Aur. Carm.*

i Τίς γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα τῷ βίῳ παρελθῶν ἀπώτατος ἔμαυνη; τίς δ' ἔτι ἰπποκλεισθεὶς; εὐδαίμων δ' μὴ πολλὰνίς. “For who has gone through the circuit of life, and kept his legs? nay, who is there that has not fallen quite down? He is a happy man, if he has not done so a great many times.” *PH. JUD.*

k *Quem pœnitet peccasse, penè est innocens.* “He that repents of his crime is almost innocent.” *SEN.*

l Even a *Yew* says, [תשובה] שקולה כנגד כל הקרבנות, “that repentance may be weighed against any sacrifice.” *S. HHASID.*

truth;

truth; that is, what is *wrong*, or a *fault*: nay more, it cannot but disapprove it, detest it. No *rational* animal therefore can act according to *truth*, the *true* nature of himself and the idea of a crime, if he doth not endeavour not to commit it; and, when it is committed, to repair it, if he can, or at least shew himself to be *penitent*^m.

If when a man is *criminal*, he doth not behave himself *as such*; or, which is the same, behaves himself as being *not such*, he opposes *truth* confidently.

And further, to act agreeably to what he is supposed to find himself *to be*, is to act as one who is in danger of *relapsing*: which is to be upon his guard for the future.

6. *He must labor to improve his rational faculties by such means, as are (fairly) practicable by him, and consistent with his circumstances.* If it be a disadvantage to be obnoxious to *error*, and act in the dark, it is an advantage to know such *truths* as may prevent this: if so, it is a greater advantage to know, or be capable of knowing, *more* such *truths*ⁿ: and then again, not to endeavour to improve those faculties, by which these *truths* are apprehended, is to shut them out, as being not what they are^o.

^m Ἐλοιδύρησας; εὐλόγησον ἐπλεονέκτησας; ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡμετέρου; νήρευσον.
 “Have you spoke evil of any man? speak well of him for the future. Have you over-reached any man? make him satisfaction. Have you been drunk? then fast.” St BASIL.

ⁿ Ἐστὶ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι φιλοσοφία μέγιστον κτήμα. “For philosophy is really the best of all possessions.” JUST. M.

^o And perhaps as if our own minds were not what they are. For πάντες ἄνθρωποι τῷ εἶδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει, “all men have naturally a thirst after knowledge.” ARIST.

And

And moreover, by the enlargement of our rational faculties we become *more rational*; that is, we advance our natures ^P, and become more attentive to *rational enjoyments*.

The *ordinary* means indeed of improving our minds are the instruction of able men, reading, observation, meditation: but every man has not proper *opportunities*, or *capacity* for these, or but in some low degree; and no man is obliged beyond his abilities, and opportunities (by sect. IV. prop. II.) Therefore that mollification is added, *by such means, &c.*

Beside *health*, a comfortable and suitable provision of *externals* is so necessary to the well-being of the *whole man*, that without it the rational part cannot dwell easy, all pursuits of knowledge will be liable to interruption, and improvements (commonly) imperfect ^q. And so *reason* itself (which cannot betray its own interest) must for its own sake concur in seeking and promoting that, which tends to the preservation and happiness of

^P *Aristotle* being asked, *what he got by philosophy*, answered, τὸ ἀνεπιτάκτως ποιεῖν ἢ τινες διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων φόβον ποιῶσιν, “*To do that without being commanded, which other people do out of fear of the laws.*” And another time, *how the learned differd from the unlearned*, said, “*Ὅσοι οἱ ζῶντες τῶν τηθνηκότων τὴν παιδείαν ἔλεγον ἐν μὲν εὐτυχίαις εἶναι κόσμον, ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καταφυγὴν.*” “*As much as the living do from the dead. Learning, he said, was an ornament to men when they were in prosperity, and a refuge for them to flee to when they were in adversity.*” D. LAERT.

^q Ἀδύνατον γὰρ, ἢ ἂν ῥᾶδιον, τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχωρήγητον ὄντα· πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται καθ’ ἅπερ δι’ ὀργάνων, κτλ. “*It is impossible, at least it is very difficult for a man to do much good, if he want the necessaries of life; for many things are done as it were by instruments.*” ARIST.

the

the *whole*. But the doing of this ingrosses time and industry; and before that which is sought can be obtained (if it is ever obtained), probably the *use* of it is lost: except where men live by the profession of some part of learning.

And as to them who are *more free* from worldly cares, or whose business and employment brings them into a stricter acquaintance with letters, after all their endeavours (such is the great variety of human circumstances in *other respects*) they must be contented with several *degrees* and *portions* of knowledge. Some are blest with clean and strong constitutions, early instructions and other helps, succeeding encouragements, useful acquaintance, and freedom from disturbance: whilst others, under an ill state of body, or other disadvantages, are forced to be their own guides, and make their way as well as they can.

But notwithstanding all this, every man may *in some degree or other* endeavour to cultivate his nature, and possess himself of useful truths. And not to do this is (again) to cast off *reason* (which never can be *reasonable*), apostatize from humanity, and recoil into the bestial life †.

7. *He must attend to instruction^s, and even ask advice; especially in matters of consequence.* Not to do

† *Nam fuit quoddam tempus, cum in agris homines passim bestiarum modo vagabantur, &c.* “For there was a time, when men wandered about the fields just as the beasts do now, &c.” CIC.

‡ The effect, which *Xenocrates*'s lecture had upon *Polmo*, is remarkable: *unius orationis saluberrima medicina sanatus, ex infami ganeone maximus philosophus evasit.* “He was restored
“ by

do this is to *deny*, that his faculties are limited and defective, or that he is fallible (which is *contrary* to that, which he is presumed to be conscious of); and perhaps, that it is possible for another to *know* what he *doth* not.

Advice every man is capable of hearing, and the meaner a man's own improvements are, the *more* doth truth press him to submit to the counsel and opinions of others. Nor is every one only *capable*, but every one *wants* upon some occasions to be informed. In how many country affairs must the *scholar* take the *rustic* for his master? In how many other men of business, *traders* and *mechanics*? And on the other side, in respect of how many things does the generality of the world want to be taught by them; who are *learned* and *honest*?

There is or should be a *commerce* or interchange of counsel and knowledge, as well as of other things: and where men have not these of their *own growth*, they should thankfully receive what may be imported from other quarters.

I do not mean, that a man ought *implicitly* and *blindly* to follow the opinion of another † (this other being *fallible* too, as well as himself), unless he has *in himself* a good reason so to do, which many times happens; but by the assistance of another, and hearing what he has to say, to *find out*

“ by the most wholesome physic of one oration, and from
“ an infamous debauchee became a very great philosopher.”
VAL. M.

† Like them, who submit to their *Hbakamim*, “ wise men,”
‘אפילו יאמרו על ימין שהוא שמאל וכו’ “ though they should
“ affirm a man's right-hand to be his left.” In *S. Iqquar*.
Many more instances might easily be given.

more

more certainly on which *vide reason, truth, and happiness* (which always keep close together) do lie. And thus it is indeed a man's *own reason* at last, which governs.

He, who is governd by what *another* says (or does) without understanding it and making the reason of it his own, is not governd by his *own reason*, and that is, by *no reason that he has*. To say one is led by the nose (as we commonly speak ^u) gives immediately the idea of a brute ^w.

Lastly, *He must labor to clear his mind of those preoccupations and incumbrances which hang about it, and hinder him from reasoning freely, and judging impartially*. We set out in life from such poor beginnings of knowledge, and grow up under such remains of superstition and ignorance, such influences of company and fashion, such insinuations

^u Not only we. *Τῆς μὲν εἰλεσθαι*, "To lead a man by the nose," was used in the same sense by the Greeks.

^w *Nihil magis præstandum est, quam ne, pecorum ritu, sequamur antecedentium gregem, pergentes non qua eundum est, sed qua itur*. "We ought to take the greatest care, not like cattle, to follow the crowd that go before, and so go where others go, and not where we should go." SEN. Something may perhaps be expected in this place concerning *vogue and fashion*, which seem to be public declarations of some general opinion; shewing how far they ought to sway with us. I think, *so far* as to keep us from being contemned, derided, or marked, where that may lawfully and conveniently be done; especially in respect of trifling and little matters. But *further* a wise man will scarce mind them. That is a good sentence in *Demophilus*, *Ποῦν ἂ κριτικὸν εἶναι καλὸν, καὶ ποιῶν μάλιστα ἀδοξήσων φαῦλον* γὰρ κριτικὸς καλῶν πραγμάτων ἐχθρὸς, "Do those things that you yourself judge to be right, though men may have an ill opinion of you for so doing; for the multitude are very ill judges of what is right."

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of pleasure, &c. that it is no wonder, if men get habits of thinking only in *one way*; that these habits in time grow confirmed and obstinate; and so their minds come to be overcast with thick *prejudices*, scarce penetrable by any ray of truth or light of reason. He therefore, who would use his rational faculties, must in the first place disentangle them, and render them *fit* to be used: and he, who doth not do this, doth hereby declare, that he doth not *intend* to use them; that is, he proclaims himself *irrational*, contrary to truth, if supposition the fourth be *true*.

The sum of all is this: it is the duty of every *man*, if that word expresses such a being as is before described, to behave himself in all respects (which I cannot pretend to enumerate) as far as he is able according to reason. And from hence it will follow, further, that,

IV. *Every man is obliged to live virtuously and piously.* Because to practise *reason*^x and *truth*^y is to live after that manner. For from the contents of the foregoing sections it is apparent, that one cannot practise reason (or act according to truth) without behaving himself *reverently* and *dutifully* toward that Almighty being, on whom he depends; nor without *justice* and a tender regard to the properties of other men: that is, unless his enjoyments be free from impiety, virtuous and harm-

^x *Ipsa virtus brevissimè recta ratio dici potest.* "Virtue may briefly be called right reason." CIC. *Quæ non aliud est quàm recta ratio.* "It is nothing else but right reason." SEN.

^y *Idem esse dicebat Socrates veritatem & virtutem.* "Socrates said, that virtue and truth were the same thing." *Id.*

less.

less. And as to those virtues, which respect a *man's self*, the same thing ² will be as apparent, when I have told what I mean by some of the *principal* ones.

Prudence, the queen of virtues, is nothing but choosing (after things ³ have been duly weigh'd) and using the most reasonable means to obtain some end, that is reasonable. This is therefore *directly* the exercise of reason.

Temperance permits us to take meat and drink not only as physic for hunger and thirst, but also as an *innocent cordial* and fortifier against the evils of life, or even sometimes, reason not refusing that liberty, merely as matter of *pleasure*. It only confines us to such *kinds, quantities, and seasons*, as may best consist with our health ^b, the use of our faculties ^c, our fortune, &c. and shew, that we do not think ourselves made *only* to eat and drink here ^d; that is, such as speak us to be *what we are*.

Chastity

² *Viz.* That a man cannot practise reason without practising them.

^a Τά τ' ἔόντα, τά τ' ἐσσόμενα, πρὸ τ' ἔόντα. “The things that are, the things that will be, and the things that have been.”

^b That saying of *Timotheus* to *Plato*, with whom he had supped the night before in the Academy, should be remembered. Ἔμεις οὐ δειπνέετε—εἰς τὴν ἑσπεράαν—ἡμέραν. “This supper will be of great use to us to-morrow (from the conversation we have had.)” *Ap.* *ATHEN.*

^c *Corpus onustum Hesternis vitiis animam quoque prægravat unà, &c.* “A body overcharged with yesterday's vices is a load upon the mind also, &c.” *HOR.*

^d *Quibus in solo vivendi causa palato est.* “Who live only to please their palates.” *JUV. Sic prandete commilitones tanquam apud inferos cœnaturi.* “Come, fellow-foldiers, let us dine to day in such a manner, as if we expected to sup

Chastity does not pretend to *extinguish* our tender passions, or cancel one part of our nature: it only bids us not to indulge them against *reason* and *truth*^e; not give up the *man* to humor the *brute*^f; nor hurt *others* to please *ourselves*; to divert our inclinations by business, or some honest amusement, till we can gratify them *lawfully, conveniently, regularly*^g; and even then to participate of the mysteries of love with *modesty*, as within a veil or sacred inclosure, not with a canine impudence^h.

“ amongst the dead.” (LEONID. *ap. Val. Max.*) may be turned to a general *memento*, no man knowing, how near his death may be.

^e τί εἶδες; ;—καλὴν; Ἐπαγε τὸν κανόνα. “ What is it you look upon?—a beautiful woman. Observe the rule (of right.)”
ARR.

^f *Venerem incertam rapientes, more ferarum.* “ Laying hold of any women they meet, like beasts.” HOR.

^g In which words are comprehended *naturally* (Τὸ μὴ τὰς παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονὰς διώκειν, “ not to pursue pleasures in an unnatural way.”)

^h Not as *Crates* and *Hipparchia* (of whom see *Diog. L. Sext. Emp. & al.*), and indeed the *Cynics* in general are said to have done: *quibus in proptulato coire cum conjugibus mos fuit*, “ who used to lie with their wives in public.” LACT. Of whom therefore *Cicero* says with good reason, *Cynicorum ratio [al. natio] tota est ejicienda. Est enim inimica verecundiæ, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum.* “ The method (*some call it*, the nation) of the *Cynics*, ought entirely to be rejected; for they are enemies to modesty, without which nothing can be right, nothing virtuous.” אַל אִשְׁתּוֹ אֵל אֶעֱבֹד [אֵשׁ] אֵל אֵשׁ. “ A man should go in unto his wife in private.” S. HHAS. That in *Herodotus*, “ Ἀμα κισῶν ἐκδυμένῃ συνεκδέεται ἔτην αἰδῶ γυνῆ, “ that a woman should put off her modesty with her cloaths,” ought not to be true. *Verecundiæ naturali habent provisum lupanaria ipsa secretum.* “ Even public streets have a private place provided, out of natural modesty.” ST AVST.

Frigality

Frugality indeed looks forward, and round about; not only considers the man *himself*, but *compassionates* his *family*; knows, that, when the exactest computation is made that can be beforehand, there will still be found many unforeseen *desiderata* in the calendar of his expences; is *apprehensive* of the world, and accidents, and new occasions, that may arise, tho they are not yet in beingⁱ; and therefore endeavours wisely to lay in as much, as may give him some kind of security against *future* wants and casualties, without which provision no man, whose sense is not quite lost, or circumscribed within the present minute, can be very easy^k. To this end it not only cuts off all *profusion* and *extravagance*, but even deducts something from that, which according to the present appearance might be *afforded*^l; and chooses rather that he should live upon half allowance now, than be exposed (or expose any body else) to the danger of starving hereafter^m, when full meals and former plenty shall make *poverty* and *fasting* more insupportable. But still it forbids no instance of *generosity*, or even *magnificence*, which is agreeable to

ⁱ Εἰς τὸ τῆς τύχης ἀτεκμάρτον ἀφορῶσα. “Providing for contingences that we cannot so much as guess at.” PH. JUD.

^k *Simonides* was wont to say, *βυλιέμην ἂν ἀποθανὼν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς μᾶλλον ἀπολιπεῖν, ἢ ζῶν δεῖσθαι τῶν φίλων*, “I had rather leave something to my enemies when I die, than want friends whilst I am alive.” STOB.

^l *Non intelligunt homines quàm magnum veelligat sit parsimonia.* “Men don’t understand how great a revenue sparingness is.” CIC.

^m Like them, who ἐν τῇ νεότητι τὰ τῷ γήρως ἐφίδια προκαταναλισχυσιν, “in their youth devoured the provision that should have supported them in their old age,” as in ATHEN.

the man's station and circumstances, or (which is tantamount) to the *truth* of his case ⁿ.

After the same manner I might proceed upon other *particular* virtues. But my notion of them must by this time be sufficiently understood: and therefore I shall only give this *general* advice. That you may take the truer prospect of any act, place yourself in your imagination *beyond it* (beyond it in time), and suppose it *already done*, and then see how it looks; always remembering, that a long *repentance* is a disproportionate price for a *short enjoyment*. Or, fancy it done by some *other man*, and then view it in that *speculum*: we are commonly sharper-sighted in discerning the faults of others, than of ourselves ^o. And further, as to those *virtues*, which are said to consist in the mean, it may be sometimes safer to incline a *little more* to one of the *extremes*, than to the other: as, rather to *stinginess*, than *prodigality*; rather to *inflexibility*, and even a *degree* of ill nature, than to dangerous complaisance, or easiness in respect of vice, and such things as may be hurtful; and so on ^p.

Since

ⁿ *Ea liberalitate utamur, quæ proſit amicis, noceat nemini.*

“ We should use such liberality, as may be of advantage to our friends, but not to the hurt of any body else.” CIC.

^o *Non eſt incommodum, quale quodq;—ſit, ex aliis judicare: ut ſi quid dedecet in aliis, vitemus & ipſi. Fit enim neſcio quo modo, ut magis in aliis cernamus, quàm in nobiſmet ipſis, ſi quid delinquitur.* “ It is by no means an ill way of judging of any thing, by ſeeing how it looks in others; ſo that, if any thing is unbecoming them, we may avoid it ourſelves. For I don't know how it is, but we are apt to ſee faults in others more than in ourſelves.” CIC.

^p Οἷον, ἐν δειπνῷ ἀποτίπει τις ἄδην ἔχοντι; μὴ δυσαπειθεῖς; μηδὲ ἀποσιγήσῃς σεαυτὸν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θεὸν ποτιτίθει, κλ. “ As if, at an entertain-
“ ment,

Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 341

Since then to live *virtuously* is to practise *reason* and act conformably to *truth*, he, who lives so, must be *ultimately happy*, by sect. II. prop. XIV. and therefore not only the commands of reason, but even the desire of happiness (a motive, that cannot but work strongly upon all who *think*) will oblige a man to live so.

It may be collected even from *experience*, that the *virtuous life* compared with the *contrary*, if one looks no further than the present state, is the *happier life* ^q; or, that the virtuous pleasures, when the whole account is made up, are the truer ^r. Who sees not, that the *vitious* life is full of dangers and sollicitudes, and usually ends ill; perhaps in rottenness and rags, or at least in a peevish and despicable discontent ^s?

I am not of opinion, that *virtue* can make a man happy upon a rack ^t, under a violent fit of the

“ment, any one drinks to another that has drunk enough, he ought not to be out of countenance, nor force himself, but refuse the cup.” PLUT.

^q Even *Epicurus* himself ἀχώριστον φησὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὴν ἀρετὴν μόνον, “says that it is virtue only that is necessarily attended with pleasure;” and διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰς ἀρετὰς δεῖν αἰρεῖσθαι, “that we ought to chuse virtue for the sake of such pleasure.” DIOG. LAERT.

^r *Isocrates* gives one reason for this, where he compares vitious pleasures with virtue. Ἐκεῖ μὲν πρῶτον ἡσθητικῆς, ὕστερον ἐλυπηθημεν ἐνταῦθα δὲ μετὰ τὰς λύπας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχομεν. “In the one case, we have the pleasure first and the uneasiness afterwards; in the other case (that of virtue) we have the uneasiness first, and the pleasure afterwards.”

^s Whereas virtue is ἐφόδον πρὸς γῆρας, “like provision which will maintain us till we are old.” BIAS ap. S. Baf.

^t For who can bear such rants as that, *Epicurus* ait, sapien-tem, si in Phalaridis tauro peruratur, exclamaturum, Dulce est,

the stone, or the like^u; or that *virtue* and *prudence* can always exempt him from wants and sufferings, mend a strait fortune, or rectify an ill constitution: amidst so many enemies to virtue, so many infirmities as attend life, he cannot but be *sometimes affected*. But I have said, and say again, that the *natural* and *usual* effect of virtue is happiness; and if a virtuous man should in some respects be unhappy, yet still his virtue will make him *less unhappy*: for at least he enjoys inward tranquillity, and a breast conscious of no evil. And which kind of life I pray ought one to prefer: that, which *naturally* tends to *happiness*, tho it may be disturbed; or that, which *naturally* tends to *unhappiness*? In brief, *virtue* will make a man *here*, in any given circumstances, as happy as a man can be in those circumstances: or however it will make him happy *hereafter* in some other state: for *ultimately*, all taken together, happy he *must be*.

Some may possibly wonder, why among virtues I have not so much as once named one of the *cardinal*, and the only one perhaps which they pretend to: I mean *fortitude*. That *that*, by which

Et ad me nihil pertinet? "Epicurus says, that, if a wise man were burnt alive in Phalaris's bull, he would cry out, How agreeable a thing is this, and it does not affect me at all?" SEN. Tully reports the same.

^u It is in the power of very few to act like him, *qui dum varices exciscardas præberet, legere librum perseveravit*, "who continued reading in a book, whilst they were cutting swellings out of his legs:" or him, *qui non desit ridere, cum ob hoc ipsum irati tortores omnia instrumenta crudelitatis experirentur*, "who continued laughing, though his tormentors, who were enraged at him for it, tried all their instruments of cruelty upon that very account." SEN.

so many heroes have triumphed over enemies, even the greatest, *death itself*; that, which distinguishes nations, raises empires, has been the grand theme of almost all wits, attracts all eyes, opens all mouths, and assumes the name of *virtue* by way of excellence; that, *this* should be forgot!

To atone for this omission I will make this *appendix* to the foregoing brief account. If *fortitude* be taken for natural courage (*i. e.* strength, activity, plenty of spirits, and a contempt of dangers resulting from these), this is constitution and the *gift of God*^w, not any *virtue* in us: because if it be *our* virtue, it must consist in something, which *we* produce, or do ourselves^x. The case is the same with that of fine features and complexion, a large inheritance, or strong walls, which may indeed be *great advantages*, but were never called *virtues*^y. To *have these* is not virtue; but to *use them rightly*, or according to reason, if we have them.

That this is justly said, may perhaps appear from what is to be said on the *other side*. It may be a man's *misfortune*, that he has not more courage, a greater stock of spirits, firmer health, and

^w Εἰ μάλ᾽ ἀκαρτερὸς ἔσσι, θεὸς πᾶσι σοὶ τὸ γ' ἔδωκεν. "If you are a very valiant man, yet it is the gift of God that you are so." HOM.

^x Propter virtutem jure laudamur, & in virtute recte gloriamur. Quod non contingeret, si id donum à Deo, non à nobis haberemus. "We are justly commended upon the account of our virtue, and it is right in us to boast of our virtue; which it would not be, if it were the gift of God, and we had it not from ourselves." CIC.

^y As that word is used here. For when it is used as in that *ap. Luc.* Ἀρετὴ μὲν σώματος ἰσχύς, "virtue is the strength of the body," and the like passages, it has another meaning.

stronger limbs, if he has a just occasion to use them; but it never can be reckoned a *vice* or fault not to *use* what he *has not*: for otherwise it might be a crime not to be able to carry ten thousand pound weight, or outrun a cannon-ball.

Fortitude considered as a *virtue* consists in standing and endeavouring to overcome dangers and oppositions, when they cannot be avoided without the violation of *reason* and *truth*. Here it is, that he, who is endowd with natural bravery, a healthful constitution, good bones and muscles, ought to *use* them, and be *thankful* to the *Doner*: and he who is not so favored, must yet do *what he can*: if he cannot conquer, he must endeavour to be patient and prudent. And thus he, who is naturally timorous, or weak, or otherwise infirm, *may* have as much, or more of the *virtue* of fortitude, than the *hero* himself; who apprehends little, and feels little, compared with the other, or *possibly* may find pleasure in a scene of dangerous action.

If a man can *prevent*, or *escape* any peril or trouble, *salvâ veritate*, he ought to do it: otherwise he neither considers *himself*, nor *them* as being what they are; them not as *unnecessary*, himself not as capable of *being hurt* by them; and so dashes against truth on the worse side ^z. But where that cannot be done, he must exert himself according to his *abilities*, whether *great* or *little*, and refer the success to the Divine providence. This is the true *virtue* of *fortitude*, which is nothing but *endeavouring* firmly and honestly to act as *truth requires*; and

^z Καπνῷ ἢ κύματι ἐκτός ἔργου Νηῶ. “ Guide the ship on the “ outside of the smoke and waves.” HOM.

therefore

therefore is directly deducible from that notion, on which we have founded the morality of human acts.

It has for its *object* not only adversaries, noxious animals, and bold undertakings, but in general all the *evils of life*^a; which a man must labor by prudence to ward off, and where this cannot be done to bear with resignation, decency, and an humble expectation of an adjustment of all events in a *future state*: the belief of which I am now going to prove, *in my manner*, to be no vain nor groundless conceit.

V. *Every one, that finds himself as before in prop. I. finds in himself at the same time a consciousness of his own existence and acts* (which is life), *with a power of apprehending, thinking, reasoning, willing, beginning and stopping many kinds and degrees of mo-*

a Εἰσὶ δ' οἱ καὶ ἐν οἰκίᾳ διατρίβοντες, τῶν σωμάτων αὐτοῖς ἢ μακρᾷς νόσοις, ἢ ἐπιπύονα γῆρα κατεσκελετευμέναν, — τὴν ἀληθῆ διαπούσιν ἀνδρίαν, ἀσκητὰς σοφίας ὄντες. “ There are some that live retired in their own
“ houses, who have their bodies reduced to mere skeletons,
“ either by wasting diseases or laborious old age; — they, who
“ labour for true courage, are such as exercise themselves in
“ true wisdom.” PH. JUD. *Non in viribus corporis & lacertis tantummodo fortitudinis gloria est, sed magis in virtute animi. — Jure ea fortitudo vocatur, quando unusquisque seipsum vincit, iram continet, nullis illecebris emollitur atque inflectitur, non adversis perturbatur, non extollitur secundis, &c.* “ The true excellency of courage does not consist so much in the strength
“ of the body and arms, as in the virtue of the mind; — that
“ is truly called courage, when a man subdues himself, keeps
“ under his passions, is not weakend or drawn aside by any
“ temptations; is not depressed in adversity, nor puffed up in
“ prosperity, &c.” ST AMBR.

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tion in his own members, &c. ^b. He, who has not these powers, has no power to dispute this with me: therefore I can perceive no room for any dispute here, unless it be concerning the power of *beginning motion*. For they, who say there is always the same quantity of motion in the world, must not allow the production of any *new*; and therefore must suppose the animal spirits not to be put into motion by the mind, but only being already in motion to receive from it their directions into these or those canals, according as it intends to move this or that limb. But to this may be answerd, that, if the mind can give these *new directions* and turns to the spirits, this serves my purpose as well, and what I intend will follow as well from it. And besides, it could not do this, if it could not excite those spirits being at rest.

It is plain I can *move* my hand upward or downward or horizontally, faster or slower or not at all, or stop it when it is in motion, *just as I will*. Now if my hand and those parts and spirits, by which it is put into motion, were left to be governd by the law of gravitation, or by any motions already imprest upon them, the effects would be *determind* by rules of mechanism, and be *necessary*: the motion or rest of my hand would not attend upon *my will*, and be alterable upon a thought at *my pleasure*. If then I have (as I am sensible I have) a *power of moving* my hand in a manner, which it would not move in by those laws, that mere bodies al-

^b *Qui se ipse norit, primum aliquid sentiet se habere divinum, &c.* "He that understands what sort of a being he himself is, will find that he hath something divine in him, &c." CIC.

ready

ready in motion or under the force of gravitation would observe, this motion depends solely upon *my will*, and *begins there* ^c.

VI. *That, which in man is the subject or suppositum of self-consciousness, thinks, and has the fore-said faculties, must be something different from his body or carcass.*

For, first, he doth not I suppose find himself to think, see, hear, &c. *all over*, in any part of his body: but the seat of cogitation and reflexion he finds in his *head* ^d: and the nerves, by which the knowledge of external objects is conveyd to him, *all* tend to the same place. It is plainly something, which resides *there* ^e, in the region of the brain, that by the mediation of these nerves governs the body and moves the parts of it (as by so many reins, or wires) ^f, feels what is done to it,

^c Εἰ μήτε ἔξωθεν κινεῖται [τὸ σῶμα] ὡς τὰ ἀψυχα, μήτε φυσικῶς ὡς τὸ πῦρ, δῆλον ὅτι ὑπὸ ψυχῆς κινεῖται, κλ. “ If (the body) be not moved “ by something external, as things inanimate are; or if it has “ not a natural motion, as fire has, it is manifest, that it must “ then be moved by the soul.” GREG. THAUM.

^d Which is, ὡς εἰπεῖν, αἰκός ἐστι τῶν αἰσθήσεων, “ as it were the “ seat of sensation.” ARTEM.

^e “Ὅπου ὁ βασιλεὺς, ἐκεῖ ἔσσι οἱ δορυφόροι· δορυφόροι δὲ αἰσθήσεις τῷ νῷ, περὶ κεφαλῆν ἔσσι. “ Where the king is, there are his guards also; “ now the senses are the guards of the mind, and these are “ about the head.” PH. JUD.

^f Τὰ μέρη τῷ σώματι ἀλογά ἐσσι, ἀλλ’ ἔταν ὀρεῖα γένηται, σείσαντ’ ὡσπερ ἵνιαι τῷ λογισμῷ, πάντα τέτακται ἔσσι συνήκται ἔσσι ὑπακούει. “ The “ members of the body are not endued with reason, but, as “ soon as any appetites arise, the reason directs them as a “ bridle, and all things are regulated, adjusted, and submit “ to it.” PLYT.

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 sees through the eyes, hears through the ears,
 &c. &c.

Upon amputation of a limb ^h this thing (what-
 ever it is) is not found to be *diminishd* ⁱ, nor any of
 its faculties *lost*. Its *sphere* of acting, while it is con-
 fined to the body, is only contracted, and part of
 its *instrument* lost. It cannot make use of that
 which is not, or which it has not.

If the *eyes* be shut, or the *ears* stopt, it cannot
 then see, or hear: but remove the obstruction, and
 it instantly appears that the *faculty*, by which it ap-
 prehends the impressions made upon the organs of
 sensation, remaind all that while intire; and that
 so it might have done, if the eyes, or ears had ne-
 ver been open'd again; or, if the eyes had been

^g *Nos ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea, quæ videmus: neque enim est ullus sensus in corpore, sed—viæ quasi quædam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares à sede animi perforatæ. Itaque sæpe aut cogitatione, aut aliqua vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris & oculis & auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus: ut facillè intelligi possit, animum & videre, & audire, non eas partes, quæ quasi fenestræ sunt animi: quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat, & adsit.* “ We do not now see objects with our eyes; for there is no perception in the body,—but there are particular passages which go from the seat of the soul to the eyes, the ears, and the nose. Wherefore when we are very thoughtful, or when we are hinderd by any violent disease, we neither see nor hear, though our eyes and ears be open and sound; whence we may easily apprehend, that it is the soul that sees and hears, and not those parts, which are as it were the windows of the soul, and which it cannot make use of, unless it be present and attends to it.” CIC.

^h Or even *detracto corpore multo*, “ if a great part of the body were pulled off,” as *Lucretius* speaks.

ⁱ Πολλάκις ἔ τῶν χειρῶν ἔ τῶν ποδῶν ἐκκεκομμένων, ὁλόκληρον ἐκεῖνον [ἢ ψυχὴ] μένει. “ Very often when the hands and legs are cut off, yet the soul remains entire.” CHRYS.

out,

out, or the ears quite disabled. This shews in general, that, when any *sense* or *faculty* seems to be impaired or lost by any bodily hurt, after a fever, or through age, this doth not come to pass, because it is *the body* that perceives and has these faculties in itself; but because the body loses its *instrumentality*, and gives that which is the *true subject* of these faculties no *opportunity* of exerting them, or of exerting them *well*: tho it *retains* them as much as in the case before, when the eyes or ears were only shut ^k. Thus distinct are it and its faculties from the body and its affections. I will now call it the *soul*.

Again, as a man peruses and *considers* his own *body*, doth it not undeniably appear to be something different from the *considerer*? And when he uses this expression *my body*, or *the body of me*, may it not properly be demanded, who is meant by *me*, or what *my* relates to? It cannot be the *body* itself: that cannot say of itself, *it is my body*, or *the body of me*. And yet this way of speaking we naturally fall into, from an inward and habitual sense of ourselves, and what we are, even tho we do not advert upon it.

What I mean is this. A *man* being supposed a *person* consisting of *two* parts, soul and body, the *whole person* may say of this or that part of him, *the soul of me*, or *the body of me*: but if he was ei-

^k Therefore *Aristotle* says, if an old man had a young man's eye, βλέπει ἄν ὡσπερ ἡ ὁ νέος. "Ὡς τὸ γῆρας, ἢ τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν περιπεθεῖναι τι, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ καθάπερ ἐν μέσσοις ἢ νέοις, κτλ. " He would " see like a young man. So that, in old age, the soul is not " affected; but is in the same state, as when a man is in " drink, or in any distemper."

ther *all soul*, or *all body*, and nothing else, he could not then speak in this manner: because it would be the same as to say *the soul of the soul*, or *the body of the body*, or *the I of me*. The pronoun therefore (in that saying *my body*, or *the body of me*) must stand for something else, to which the body belongs¹; or at least for something, of which it is only a part, *viz.* the person of the *whole man*^m. And then even this implies, that there is another part of him, which is not *body*.

It is plain there are two *different interests* in menⁿ; on the one side reason, on the other passion: which, being many times directly *opposite*, must belong to *different subjects*. There are upon many occasions contests, and as it were wars between the *mind* and the *body*: so far are they from being the *same thing*.

Lastly, there is we may perceive *something within us*, which supports the body (keeps it up), directs its motion for the better preservation of it, when any hurts or evils befall it, finds out the means of its cure, and the like; without which it would fall to the ground, and undergo the fate of common matter. The *body* therefore must be considered as being under the *direction* and *tuition* of

¹ *Hierocles* (with others) accounts the soul to be the true man. Σὺ γὰρ εἶ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ δὲ σῶμα σὸν. "It is the soul that is you, and the body that is yours."

^m So *Plato* uses the word αὐτὸς, "Self," for the *whole* of the man; by which the soul, as one part of it, is called κτήμα, "a possession."

ⁿ φαίνεται ἐν αὐτῷ; ἢ ἀλλό τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται τε ἢ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. "It is evident, that there is something else in us beside reason, which wars against and contradicts reason." ARIST.

some

some other thing, which is (or should be) the governor of it, and consequently upon this account must be concluded to be *different* from it.

VII. *The soul cannot be mere matter.* For if it is, then either *all matter* must think ; or the difference must arise from the different *modification, magnitude, figure, or motion* ° of some parcels of matter in respect of others ; or a faculty of thinking must be *superadded* to some systems of it, which is not superadded to others. But,

In the first place, that position, which makes *all matter* to be cogitative, is contrary to all the apprehensions and knowledge we have of the nature of it ; nor can it be true, unless our senses and faculties be contrived only to *deceive* us. We perceive not the least symptom of *cogitation, or sense* in our tables, chairs, &c.

Why doth the scene of thinking lie in our *heads*, and all the ministers of sensation make their reports to something *there*, if *all matter* be apprehensive, and cogitative ? For in that case there would be as much thought and understanding in our *heels*, and every where else, as in our *heads*.

If *all matter* be cogitative, then it must be so *quatenus matter*, and thinking must be of the essence and definition of it : whereas by *matter* no

° Whether any form, modification, or motion of matter can be a human soul, seems to be much such another question as that in one of Seneca's epistles, *An justitia, an fortitudo, prudentia, ceteræque virtutes, animalia sint.* " Whether justice, " or fortitude, or prudence, and the rest of the virtues, be " living creatures."

more.

more is meant but a substance extended and impenetrable to other matter. And since, for this reason, it cannot be *necessary* for matter to think (because it may be matter without this property), it cannot think as *matter only*.

If it did, we should not only *continue* to think always, till the matter of which we consist is annihilated, and so the assertor of this doctrine would stumble upon *immortality* unawares; but we must also have thought always *in time past*, ever since that matter was in being; nor could there be any the least intermission of *actual thinking*: which does not appear to be our case.

If thinking, self-consciousness, &c. were *essential* to matter, *every part* of it must have them: and then no *system* could have them. For a system of material parts would be a system of things conscious *every one by itself* of its own existence and individuality, and consequently thinking *by itself*: but there could be no *one act* of self-consciousness or thought common to the *whole*. Juxta-position in this case could signify nothing: the distinction and individuation of the several particles would be as much retained in their vicinity, as if they were separated by miles.

In the next place, the faculties of thinking, &c. cannot arise from the *size, figure, texture, or motion* of it: because bodies by the alteration of these only become greater or less; round or square, &c. rare, or dense; translated from one place to another with this or that new direction, or velocity; or the like: all which *ideas* are quite different from that of *thinking*; there can be *no relation*

tion between them ^p. These modifications and affections of matter are so far from being *principles* or *causes* of thinking and acting, that they are themselves but *effects*, proceeding from the action of some other matter or thing upon it, and are proofs of its passivity, deadness, and utter incapacity of becoming *cogitative*. This is evident to sense.

They, who place the essence of the soul in a certain *motion* given to some matter (if any such men there really be) should consider, among many other things, that to *move* the body spontaneously is one of the faculties of the soul ^q; and that this, which is the same with the *power of beginning motion*, cannot come from *motion already begun*, and impressed *ab extra*.

Let the materialist examine well, whether he does not feel something within himself, that acts from an *internal principle*: whether he doth not experience some *liberty* some power of *governing* himself, and *choosing*: whether he does not enjoy a kind of *invisible empire*, in which he commands his own thoughts, sends them to this or that place,

^p Νοῦν ἕδιν σῶμα γενᾶ· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἀνόητα τοῦν γενήσῃσι. “No body can produce a mind, for how can understanding come out of that which has no understanding?” SALLUST.

^q That the soul is the principle of motion, or that which begins it in us, is (tho it wants no testimony) often said by the ancients. Φασὶ γὰρ ἱστοί, ἡ μάδισα, ἡ πρῶτος ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινῶν. “Some affirm, that the soul is the chief and the first mover.” ARIST. Ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἴδουσι, κινῶν τὰ σώματα, ἡ αὐτοκίνητον. “It is the soul that moves the body from within, and is a self-moving being.” SIMPL. Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. “The principle of motion.” PLOTIN.

employs them about this or that business^r, forms such and such designs and schemes: and whether there is any thing like this in *bare matter*^s, however fashion'd, or proportion'd; which, if nothing should protrude or communicate motion to it, would for ever remain fixt to the place where it happens to be, an eternal monument of its own being dead. Can such an *active* being as the *soul* is^t, the subject of *so many powers*, be itself nothing but an *accident*?

When I begin to *move* myself, I do it for some *reason*, and with respect to some *end*, the *means* to effect which I have, if there be occasion for it, concerted within myself: and this doth not at all look like motion *merely material* (or, in which *matter* is only concern'd), which is all mechanical. Who can imagine *matter* to be moved by *arguments*, or ever placed *sylogisms* and *demonstrations* among levers and pulleys?

† Ἡ ψυχὴ περίεσι πᾶσαν γῆν, ἐκ γῆς ἐπ' ἕρασαν, κλ. “The soul can take a view over the whole earth, and ascend from thence into heaven.” MAX. TYR.

‡ What a ridiculous argument for the materiality of the soul is that in *Lucretius*? *Ubi propellere membra, Conripere ex somno corpus, &c. videtur (Quorum nil fieri sine tactu posse videmus, Nec tactum porro sine corpore); nonne fatendum est Corporeâ naturâ animum constare, animamq;* “For do we not see that the mind moves the several members, wakes the body out of sleep, &c. (none of which can be done without touching it, and there can be no such thing as touching, without matter) must not we own then, that the soul and mind are material?” If nothing can move *the body*, but another body, what moves this? *The body* might as well move itself, as be moved by one that does.

† Τέχιστον οὐδὲ δια παντός γὰρ τρέχει. “The soul is very quick, for it runs every where.” THAL. ap. Diog. L.

†

We

We not only *move* ourselves upon reasons, which we find in ourselves, but upon reasons imparted by *words* or *writing* from others, or perhaps merely at their desire or bare suggestion. In which case, again, no body sure can imagine, that the *words* spoken or written (the sound in the air, or the strokes on the paper) can by any natural or mechanical *efficiency* cause the reader or hearer to *move* in any determinate manner (or at all). The reason, request, or friendly admonition, which is the true *motive*, can make no impression upon *matter*. It must be some *other kind* of being, that apprehends the force and sense of them.

Do not we see in conversation, how a pleasant thing said makes people break out into *laughter*, a rude thing into *passion*, and so on? These affections cannot be the *physical effects* of the words spoken: because then they would have the same effect, whether they were understood, or not. And this is further demonstrable from hence, that tho the *words* do really contain *nothing*, which is either pleasant, or rude; or perhaps words are thought to be spoken, which are not spoken; yet if they are *apprehended* to do that, or the sound to be otherwise than it was, the effect will be the *same*. It is therefore the *sense* of the words, which is an immaterial thing, that by passing through the *understanding* and causing that, which is the subject of the intellectual faculties, to influence the body, produces these *motions* in the spirits, blood, muscles.

They, who can fancy, that *matter* may come to live, think, and act spontaneously, by being reduced to a certain *magnitude*, or having its parts placed after a certain *manner*, or being invested

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with such a *figure*, or excited by such a particular *motion*: they, I say, would do well to discover to us that *degree* of fineness, that *alteration* in the situation of its parts, &c. at which matter may *begin* to find itself alive and cogitative; and which is the *critical minute*, that introduces these important properties. If they cannot do this, nor have their eye upon any *particular crisis*, it is a sign they have no good reason for what they say. For if they have no reason to charge this change upon any *particular degree* or *difference*, one more than another, they have no reason to charge it upon *any* degree or difference *at all*; and then they have no reason, by which they can prove that such a change is made *at all*. Besides all which, since magnitude, figure, motion are but *accidents* of matter, not *matter*, and only the *substance* is truly matter; and since the *substance* of any one part of matter does not differ from that of another, if *any* matter can be by nature cogitative, *all* must be so. But this we have seen cannot be.

So then in conclusion, if there is any such thing as *matter that thinks*, &c. this must be a particular *privilege* granted to it: that is, a *faculty of thinking* must be *superadded* to certain parts or parcels of it. Which, by the way, must infer the existence of some Being able to confer this faculty; who, when the ineptness of matter has been well considered, cannot appear to be less than *omnipotent*, or God. But the truth is, matter seems not to be *capable* of such improvement, of being made to think. For since it is not of the *essence* of matter, it cannot be *made to be so* without making matter *another kind* of substance from what it is. Nor can it

be made to arise from any of the modifications or accidents of matter; and in respect of what else can any matter *be made* to differ from other matter?

The *accidents* of matter are so far from being made *by any power* to produce cogitation, that some *even of them* shew it incapable of having a faculty of thinking superadded. The very *divisibility* of it does this. For that which is made to think must either be *one* part, or more *parts* joind together. But we know no such thing as a part of matter purely *one* (or indivisible). It may indeed have pleased the Author of nature, that there should be *atoms*, whose parts are *actually* indiscernible, and which may be the *principles* of other bodies: but still they consist of *parts*, tho' firmly adhering together. And if the seat of cogitation be in *more* parts than one (whether they lie close together, or are loose, or in a state of fluidity, it is the same thing), how can it be avoided, but that either there must be so many several minds, or *thinking substances*, as there are *parts* (and then the consequence, which has been mentiond, would return upon us again); or else, that there must be *something else* superadded for them to center in, to unite their acts, and make their thoughts to be *one*? And then what can this be, but some other *substance*, which is purely *one*? ~~ascertain~~

Matter by itself can never ~~ascertain~~ *abstracted* and *general ideas*, such as many in our minds are". For could it reflect upon what passes within itself,

^u *Diogenes*, tho' he could see the *table*, and the *pot*, could not by his eyes see *Plato's* *τραπέζιον*, & *κωδόνιον*, "tableity, or "potteity;" that is, he could not see, what it was that constituted them a table or a pot." *DIOG. L.*

it could possibly find there nothing but *material* and *particular* impressions; abstractions and metaphysical ideas could not be printed upon it^w. How could one abstract *from matter* who is himself nothing *but matter*? And then as to *material* images themselves, which are usually supposed to be impressed upon the brain (or some part of it), and stock the *phantasy* and *memory*, that which perceives the impressions and traces there (or any where) must be something distinct from the *brain*, or *that* upon which these impressions are made: otherwise it must contemplate itself, and be both *reader* and *book*. And this other distinct contemplating *being* cannot be merely corporeal, any more than the body can perceive and think without a soul. For such a corporeal being must require *sense*, and suitable *organs*, to perceive and read these characters and *vestigia* of things; and so *another* organized body would be introduced, and the same questions and difficulties redoubled, concerning the soul of that body and its faculties^x.

If my *soul* was mere matter, external visible objects could only be perceived within me according to the *impressions* they make upon matter, and not otherwise. *Ex. gr.* the image of a *cube* in my mind (or my idea of a cube) must be always un-

^w *Plato*, & οἱ σοφοί, “the wise men” (more generally) say, that the soul indeed perceives objects of sense by the mediation of the body; but there are νοητά, “intellectual things,” which it doth καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, “meditate upon by itself.” *Id.*

^x Such a soul must be indeed as *Greg. Thaum.* has it, σῶμα ἐμψυχον. Ἄτοπον δὲ ψυχῆς ψυχὴν λέγειν, “an animated body. For “it is absurd to speak of the soul of a soul.”

der some particular *prospect*, and conform to the rules of *perspective*; nor could I otherwise represent it to myself: whereas now I can form an idea of it as it is *in itself*, and almost view all its *bedræ* at once, as it were incompassing it with my mind.

I can within myself *correct* the external appearances and impressions of objects; and advance, upon the reports and hints received by my senses, to form ideas of things that are *not extant* in matter. By seeing a *material circle* I may learn to form the idea of a *circle*, or figure generated by the revolution of a ray about its center: but then recollecting what I know of matter upon other occasions, I can conclude there is no *exact* material circle. So that I have an idea, which perhaps was raised from the hints I received *from without*, but is *not truly* to be found there. If I see a *tower* at a great distance, which according to the impressions made upon my material organs seems *little* and *round*, I do not therefore conclude it to be *either*: there is something within, that reasons upon the circumstances of the appearance, and as it were commands my sense, and corrects the impression: and this must be something superior to matter, since a *material soul* is no otherwise impressible itself, but as *material organs* are. Instances of this kind are endless. (v. p. 92, 93.)

If we know any thing of *matter*, we know, that *by itself* it is a lifeless thing, inert, and passive only; and acts *necessarily* (or rather is acted) according to the laws of motion and gravitation. This passiveness seems to be *essential* to it. And if we know any thing of *ourselves*, we know, that we are conscious of our own existence and acts (*i. e.*

that we *live*); that we have a degree of *freedom*; that we can move ourselves *spontaneously*; and in short, that we can, in many instances, take off the effect of gravitation, and impress new motions upon our spirits (or give them new directions), *only by a thought*. Therefore to make *mere matter* do all this is to change the *nature* of it; to change death into life, incapacity of thinking into cogitativity, necessity into liberty. And to say, that God may *superadd* a faculty of thinking, moving itself, &c. to matter, if by this be meant, that he may make matter to be the *suppositum* of these faculties (that substance, in which they inhere), is the same in effect as to say, that God may superadd a faculty of *thinking* to *incogitativity*, of acting *freely* to *necessity*, and so on. What sense is there in this? And yet so it must be, while matter continues to be matter.

That *faculty of thinking*, so much talked of by some as superadded to certain *systems* of matter, fitly disposed, by virtue of God's omnipotence, tho it be so called, must *in reality* amount to the same thing as another *substance* with the faculty of thinking. For a faculty of thinking *alone* will not make up the idea of a human *soul*, which is indued with *many faculties*; apprehending, reflecting, comparing, judging, making deductions and reasoning, willing, putting the body in motion, continuing the animal functions by its presence, and giving life; and therefore, *whatever it is* that is superadded, it must be *something* which is indued with all those other faculties. And whether that can be a *faculty of thinking*, and so these other faculties
be

be only *faculties of a faculty*^y; or whether they must not all be rather the faculties of some *substance*^z, which, being (by their own concession) *superadded* to matter, must be *different* from it, I do leave the unprejudiced to determin.

If men would but seriously look into themselves, I am persuaded the *soul* would not appear to them as a *faculty* of the body, or kind of *appurtenance* to it; but rather as some *substance*, properly placed in it, not only to use it as an instrument, and act by it, but also to govern it (or the parts of it; as the tongue, hands, feet, &c.) according to its own reason. For I think it is plain enough, that the *mind*, tho it acts under great limitations, doth however in many instances *govern* the body *arbitrarily*: and it is monstrous to suppose this governor to be nothing but some fit *disposition* or *accident* (superadded) of that matter which is governd. A *ship* it is true would not be fit for *navigation*, if it was not built and provided in a proper manner:

^y This is worse than $\psi\chi\eta\ \psi\chi\eta\sigma$, "the soul of a soul," in *Max. Tyr.* and the place just before cited. The author of the *Essay conc. Hum. Underst.* has himself exploded it, or what is very like it. To ask, says he, *whether the will has freedom, is to ask, whether one power has another power, one ability another ability; a question at first sight too grossly absurd to make a dispute, or need an answer. For who is it that sees not, that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of substances, and not of powers themselves?* There is, if my memory does not deceive me, another passage some where in the same book as much (or more) to my purpose: but at present I cannot find it.

^z If the soul is only an accident (or attribute) of the *body*, how comes this accident to have (or be the support of) other accidents, contrary ones too? As when we say, נפש חכמה (נפש סכלה) "a wife soul, or a foolish soul." S. HAEMUN.

but

but then, when it has its proper form, and is become a *system* of materials fitly disposed, it is not this *disposition* that governs it. It is the *man*, that other substance, who sits at the helm, and they, who manage the sails and tackle, that do this. So *our vessels* without a proper organization and conformity of parts would not be capable of being acted as they are; but still it is not the shape, or modification, or any other accident, that can govern them. The *capacity* of being governd or used can never be the *governor*, applying and using^a that capacity. No there must be at the helm *something distinct*, that commands the body, and without which it would run adrift, or rather sink.

For the foregoing reasons it seems to me, that *matter* cannot think, cannot *be made* to think. But if a *faculty of thinking* can be superadded to a system of matter, without uniting an immaterial substance to it^b; I say, if this *can be*, yet a *human body* is not such a system, being plainly void of thought, and organized in such a manner as to transmit the impressions of sensible objects up to the brain, where the *percipient*, and that which *reflects* upon them, certainly resides: and therefore that, which *there* apprehends, thinks, and wills, must be *that system of matter* to which a faculty of thinking is superadded. All the premisses then well considerd, judge I beseech you, whether instead of saying,

^a "Ἐτερον δὴ τότε χρῶμενον ἢ ᾗ χρῆται. "For that which uses, and that which is used, are two different things." PLATO.

^b Or, *if to a thinking substance can be superadded the modification of solidity*. Which way of speaking, tho I do not remember to have met with it any where, nor doth it seem to differ much from the other, yet would please me better.

that

that this *inhabitant* of our heads (the *soul*) is a system of matter, to which a faculty of thinking is superadded, it might not be more reasonable to say, it is a *thinking substance intimately united to some fine material vehicle, which has its residence in the brain*. Tho I understand not perfectly the manner, how a *cogitative* and *spiritual* substance can be thus closely united to such a *material* vehicle; yet I can understand this union as well, as how it can be united to the body in general (perhaps, as how the particles of the body itself cohere together), and much better than how a thinking faculty can be superadded to matter: and beside, several *phenomena* may more easily be solved by this *hypothesis*; which (tho I shall not pertinaciously maintain it) in short is this. *Viz.* that the the human *soul* is a *cogitative* substance, clothed in a *material* vehicle, or rather united to it, and as it were *inseparably* mixt (I had almost said *incorporated*) with it^c: that these act in *conjunction*, that, which affects the one, affecting the other: that the *soul* is detain'd in the *body* (the head or brain) by some *sympathy* or *attraction* between this material vehicle and it, till the habitation is spoild, and this mutual tendency interrupted (and perhaps turned into an aversion, that makes it fly off), by some hurt, or disease, or by the decays and ruins

^c It is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirit, and passive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created spirits are not totally separate from matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only passive; those Beings, that are both active and passive, we may judge to partake of both. Hum. Underst.

of

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of old age, or the like, happening to the body :
and that in the *interim* by means of this vehicle
motions and impressions are communicated to and
fro. But of this perhaps something more by and
by.

VIII. *The soul of man subsists after the dissolution
of his body : or, is immortal.* For,

1. If it is *immaterial*, it is *indiscernible*, and there-
fore *incapable* of being dissolved or demolishd, as
bodies are ^d. Such a being can only perish by *an-*
ihilation : that is, it will continue to subsist and
live, if some other being, able to do this, doth not
by a particular act *annihilate* it. And if there is any
reason to believe, that at the death of every man
there is always such a particular annihilation, let
him that knows it produce it. Certainly to reduce
any *substance* into *nothing* requires just the same
power as to convert *nothing* into *something* : and I
fancy they, who deny the immortality of the soul,
will be cautious how they admit any such power.

2. If the soul *could be material* ; that is, if there
could be any *matter*, that might be the subject of
those faculties of thinking, willing, &c. yet still,
since we cannot but be sensible, that all these are
faculties of the *self-same thing* ; and that all the fe-
veral acts of the mind are acts of the *same thing*,
each of them *individual* and truly *one* : I say, since

^d This is *Socrates's* argument in *Plato*. The soul is altoge-
ther ἀδιάλυτος, “ indissoluble,” and therefore ἀνώλεθρον, “ can-
not be destroyd.” Which *Cicero* interprets thus : *nec dif-*
cerpi, nec distrabi potest ; nec interire igitur, “ it can neither be
^b divided nor separated into parts, and consequently cannot
^m be destroyd.”

Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 365

it is so, this matter must be so *perfectly united* in itself, so absolutely *one*, as no matter knowable by us can be. And then the *least* that can be allowed is that it should be truly solid, and not *actually divisible*; that is, such as no *natural cause* could destroy.

To introduce matter with a faculty of thinking, or a *thinking matter*, is to introduce matter with a new and opposite property; and that is to introduce a *new species* of matter^e, which will differ as essentially from the other common *unthinking* kind, as any species whatsoever doth from its opposite in *scala prædicamentali*, even as *body* doth from *spirit*. For thinking and unthinking differ as corporeal and incorporeal. And if so, this *thinking matter* must always continue to think, till either it is *annihilated*, or there is a *transmutation* of one species into another: and to take refuge in either of these expectations is at least to expect omnipotence should interpose to help out a bad cause.

If any one should say, that God might by virtue of his omnipotence superadd to certain parcels of matter a *fourth dimension*, I should not perhaps dispute the Divine power: but I might say, that such matter, existing under four dimensions,

^e *Lucretius* seems to be aware of this. *Jam triplex animi est natura reperta: Nec tamen hæc sat sunt ad sensum cuncta creandum, &c. Quarta quoq; his igitur quædam natura necesse est Attribuat: ea est omnino nominis expers.* "The soul is found to be made up of three parts, nor are all these sufficient to produce understanding, &c. It is necessary therefore that some other particular fourth nature should be added to these; and this we have no name at all for."

would

would *essentially* differ from that, which cannot exist under four, or which can exist but *only under three*; and that this four-dimensioned matter must *always* remain such, because no substance can be changed into or become another, essentially different, nor do we know of any, that by the course of nature ceases totally to be, or is reduced to nothing.

3. The next argument shall proceed by way of *objection* and *answer*. Because a removal of the principal objection *against* any thing is a good argument *for it*. *Obj.* It seems as if *thinking* was not essential to the soul, but rather a *capacity of thinking* under certain circumstances. For it doth *not think*, when it lies conceal'd in the primitive rudiment of the man, in the womb, perhaps in the beginnings of infancy, in sleep, in a swoon: and the reason of this seems to lie in the circumstances of the *body*, which either is not sufficiently extended, and prepared; or for a while employs the spirits wholly in the digestion of its aliment, and other offices in the animal œconomy; or by some external attack, or the working of some enemy got into it, hath its parts disorder'd, and the passages so possess'd, that the blood and other fluids can scarce break through; or after some such manner is preternaturally affected. And therefore the question to be resolv'd is not, whether the soul is *material* or *immaterial*; and much less, whether it will be *annihilated* at death; but, whether that soul (be it what it will), which ceases to think, when the body is *not fitly disposed*, can think at all, when the body is *quite dissolved*, and leaves the soul no opportunity of actuating

ating it any more, or operating by it^f. *Ans.* If this objection cannot be fully answerd, till we know more of the nature of *spiritual* beings, and of that *vinculum*, by which the soul and body are connect- ed, than we do at present, it must not therefore be lookd upon as certainly *unanswerable* in itself; and much less, if only it cannot be answerd *by me*. It may perhaps be possible to turn it even into an argument *for the immortality of the soul*.

The soul it cannot be denied is a limited being, or a being, which acts *under limitations*: these limi- tations at different times are *different*, its activity and faculties being more obstructed or clogd at *one time* than *another*, and most of all in sleep, or a *deliquium*: as these obstructions are removed, it acts more *clearly* and *freely*: and therefore if the state of the soul in the body (its confinement there) may be considerd as one *general* and *great limitation*, why, when this limitation shall be taken off (this great obstruction removed), may it^g not be allowd to act with still *greater* freedom and clearness; the *greatest* it is capable of? Whilst it remains in the brain, it can as it were look out at a *few apertures*; that is, receive the notices of many things by those nerves and organs, which

^f If *Lucan* by *sensus* "sense," means all manner of apprehension and knowledge, there is no room for that disjunction: *Aut nihil est sensus animis à morte relictum, Aut mors ipsa nihil.* "Either there remains no sense at all in the soul after death, or death itself is nothing." For if the former part be true, the other will follow.

^g *Velut è diutino carcere emissus [animus].* " (The soul) is " as it were let out of a prison, in which it has been a long " while." *SEN.*

are

are the instruments of *sensation*: but if any of those avenues to it be stopt, that branch of its knowledge is for a time cut off. If those tracks in the brain, or those *marks*, whatever they are, and where ever they are imprinted, upon which our *memory* and *images* of things seem to depend, are filled up or overcast by any vapor, or otherwise darkend, it can read them no more, till the cloud is disperfed. (For it cannot *read* what is not *legible*, and indeed for the present not there.) And since even in *abstracted reflexions* the mind is obliged to make use of *words*^h, or some kind of signs, to fix its ideas, and to render them tractable and stable enough to be perused, compared, &c. and this kind of *language* depends upon *memory*; whilst this is intermitted, the use of the other is taken away, with all that depends upon it. This is the *present state* of the soul: and from hence the reason appears in some measure, why we do not think in sound *sleep*, &c. but it does not follow from hence, that the soul cannot subsist and act under *more enlarged circumstances*. That, which, being confined to the body, and able to act only according to the opportunities this affords, can now perceive visible objects only with *two eyes* (at two windowsⁱ), because there *are no more*, might doubtless see with *four*, if there were so many properly placed

^h Those kinds of animals, which do not *speak*, do not *reason*: but those, which do the one, do the other. Therefore דהי מדבר, “a living” (or Arab. *קאמ*), “a speaking animal” is a *rational animal*: and λογος signifies both *speech* and *reason*, as going together.

ⁱ Ουπίδες γὰρ ὄντας τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ αἰσθήσεις. “The senses are the windows of the soul.” *BAS.*

and

and disposed; or if its habitation were *all eye* (window all round), might see all round. And so, in general, that, which now can know many things by the impressions made at the ends of the nerves, or by the intervention of our present organs, and in this *situation* and *inclosure* can know them no other way, may for all that, when it comes to be *loosed* out of that prison^k, know them *immediately*, or by some *other medium*. That, which is now forced to make shift with *words* and *signs* of things in its reasonings, may, when it shall be set at liberty and can come at them, reason upon the intuition of *things themselves*, or use a language more *spiritual* or *ideal*. I say, it is not *impossible*, that this should be the case; and therefore no one can say, *with reason*, that it is not: especially, since we find by experience, that the soul is limited; that the limitations are variable; that we know not enough of the nature of spirit to determin, how these limitations are effected: and therefore cannot tell, how far they may be carried on, or taken off. This suffices to *remove the force* of the objection. But further,

A man, when he *wakes*, or *comes to himself* (which phrase implies what I am going to say), immediately knows this, and knows himself to be the *same soul* that he was before his sleep, or fainting away. I will suppose, that he is also conscious to himself, that in those intervals he thought *not at all* (which is the same the objector must suppose):

^k "Ἀσφαλῶς ἢ ἀσώματ' ἐν τῷ τῷ παντί; θεάτρῳ διημερεύουσα. "When it shall dwell upon the stage of the universe, without flesh and without a body." PH. JUD.

that is, if his body had been cut to pieces, or moulderd to dust, he could not have thought *less*: for there is no thinking *less* than thinking *not at all*. From hence then I gather, that the soul *preserves* a capacity of thinking, &c. under those circumstances and indispositions of the body, in which it thinks *no more*, than if the body was *destroyd*; and that therefore it may, and will *preserve* it, when the body is *destroyd*. And if so, what can this *capacity* be preserved for? Certainly *not*, that it may *never* be exerted. The Author of nature doth not use to act after *that manner*. So that here is this *dilemma* to be opposed to the objection. In sleep and swoonings the soul doth either *think*, or *not*. If it *does*, the objection has no foundation: and if it *doth not*, then all that will follow, which I have just now said.

If we should suppose the *soul* to be a being by nature made to inform some *body*, and that it cannot exist and act in a state of *total separation* from all body; it would not follow from hence, that what we call death, must therefore reduce it to a state of absolute *insensibility* and *inactivity*, which to it would be equal to *non-existence*. For that *body*, which is so necessary to it, may be some *fine vehicle*, that dwells with it in the brain (according to that *hypothesis* p. 361.) and goes off with it at death. Neither the answers to the objection, nor the case after death will be much altered by such a *supposition*. And since I confess I see no absurdity in it, I will try to explain it a little further. We are sensible of many *material* impressions (impressions made upon us by material causes, or bodies): that there are such we are sure. Therefore there must be
some

some matter within us, which being moved or pressed upon; the soul apprehends it *immediately*. And therefore, again, there must be *some matter* to which it is *immediately* and *intimately united*, and *related* in such a manner, as it is *not related* to any other. Let us now suppose this said *matter* to be some refined and spirituous *vehicle*¹, which the soul doth immediately inform; with which it sympathizes; by which it acts, and is acted upon; and to which it is *vitally* and *inseparably* united: and that this animated vehicle has its abode in the *brain*, among

¹ So Hierocles distinguishes τὸ αὐγοειδὲς ἡμῶν σῶμα, ὃ ἔστι ψυχῆς λεπτόν ὄχημα, "our glorious body, and the thin vehicle of the soul," from that, which he calls τὸ θνητὸν ἡμῶν σῶμα, "our mortal body," and to which the former communicates life. τῶ αὐγοειδῆ ἡμῶν σώματι προσέφθι σῶμα θνητὸν ἔν. "The mortal and the glorious body adhere to, and grow up with each other." *Id.* This fine body he calls also ψυχικὸν σῶμα, "a living body," and πνευματικὸν ὄχημα, "a spiritual vehicle." In *Nisbm. bhay.* there is much concerning that *fine body*, in which the soul is clothed, and from which it is never to be separated, according to an old tradition. *Men. b. Isr.* gives us the sum of it in such words as these. יש גוף דק עד מאד בו מתלבש הנשמה, "There is a very thin fine body, with which the soul is clothed, before it comes into the world:" and afterward, הנשמות המה בכריאתם הראשונה נקשרות עם גשמים דקים רוחניים מהטבע השמימי בלתי מושגים לחוש הראות. והנשמות לא יתפרדו מאותם הגשמים הדקים הרוחניים כל ימי עולם אם קודם בואם לגוף ואם בהיותם עמו וגם אחרי הפרדם ממנו. "These souls, at their first creation, were joined with some thin, spiritual, and celestial bodies, which cannot be perceived by our eyes. Neither can these thin spiritual bodies be separated from those souls so long as the world lasts, neither before they came into this (gross) body, nor whilst they remain in it, nor after they are separated from it." *Saadias* long before him joins to the soul עצם דק, "a thin substance;" which he says is מן הגלגלים [יותר נך], "thinner than the ether in the skies," &c.

the heads and beginnings of the nerves. Suppose we also, that when any *impressions* are made upon the organs or parts of the body, the effects of them are carried by the *nerves* up to their fountain, and the place, where the soul in its vehicle is; and there they communicate their several motions or tremors to this material *vehicle* (or by their motions, or tendency to motion, press upon) it; so that the *soul*, which inhabits it in a peculiar manner, and is thoroughly possess'd of it, shall be apprehensive of these motions or pressures: and moreover, that this *vehicle* so *guarded* and *incompass'd* by the body as it is, can be *come at* or *moved* by external objects no other way, but by the mediation of the nerves; nor the *soul*, by consequence, have any direct intelligence concerning them, or correspondence with them, any *other* way. And as we suppose the *soul* to receive notices of things from without in this manner, so let us suppose, on the other side, that by moving its own *vehicle* it may produce motion in the contiguous *spirits* and *nerves*, and so move the body: I mean, when nothing renders them unfit to be moved. Let us suppose further, that the *soul* by means of this *vehicle* feels or finds those prints and portraits, or those *effects* and *remains* left by objects on the mind in some manner or other, which cause the *remembrance* of words and things: I mean again, when they are not filled up, or obscured by any thing; or, when there are any such to be felt. And lastly, let us suppose, that if the *soul* in its more *abstracted* and *purser* reasonings, or more spiritual acts, has any occasion for *matter*, to serve it, the matter of this *vehicle* is that which is always with it, and serves it. All which

which it is easy to understand, and perhaps not very difficult to suppose. On the contrary, by many symptoms it appears most probable, that *that* matter, to which the mind is *immediately* present, and in which is its true *shakinah*, is not the whole gross body, but some *subtile body*, placed (as I have said) in the region of the brain. For *there* all the conveyances of sensible *species* conspire to meet, and *there* in reflexion we find ourselves: when a limb is lost, the soul, 'tis true, loses an *opportunity* of receiving intelligence from or by it, and of using it, but perceives no loss *in itself*: and tho the *body*, many parts of it at least, are in a perpetual flux and continually altering, yet I know that the substance, which *thinks* within me *now* (or rather, which is I), is, notwithstanding all the changes my body has undergone, the *very same* which *thought* above fifty years ago, and ever since; when I playd in such a field, went to such a school, was of such a university, performed such and such exercises, &c^m. If you would permit me to use a school term, I would say the *egoity*ⁿ remains.

^m *Cum corpora quotidie nostra fluant, & aut crescant aut decrescant, ergo tot erimus homines, quot quotidie commutatur? aut alius fui, cum decem annorum essem; alius, cum triginta; alius cum quinquaginta, alius, cum jam toto cano capite sum?* "Be-
" cause our bodies are continually altering, and either in-
" creasing or diminishing, shall we therefore be as many dif-
" ferent men, as we undergo perpetual changes? Or was I
" one person when I was ten years old, another when I was
" thirty, another when I was fifty, and another now I am
" grey-headed." St JEROM. So it must be, if our souls are
nothing different from our bodies.

ⁿ I would say the *egoity* remains, that is, *that* by which I am the same I was; Tully has his *Lentulitas* "Lentulity," and

remains. Now to *answer* the objection, and apply all this to our purpose. Why do we not perceive external objects in our *sleep*, or a *swoon*? Because the *passages* are become impracticable, the *windows* shut, and the *nerves*, being obstructed, or some how renderd for the time uselefs, can transmit no information to it. Why however does it not reason and think about *something or other*? Because, all the *marks* by which things are rememberd being for the present choked up or disorderd, the remembrance of those *objects*, about which it is wont to imploy itself, and even of the *words* (or other signs), in which it uses to reason, and to preserve the deductions and conclusions it makes, is all suspended and lost for the time; and so its tables being coverd, its books closd, and its tools locked up, the requisites for reasoning are wanting, and no subject offers itself, to exercise its thoughts, it having yet had little or no opportunity to take in *higher objects* and more *refined matter* for contemplation. And to conclude, if it be demanded, why any one should imagin, that the *soul* may think, perceive, act *after death*, when it doth not do this *in sleep*, &c. the answer is; because those *inclosures* and *impediments*, which occasiond the forementiond intermissions, and those great limitations under which it labors at all times, will be *removed* with its enlargement out of the body. When it shall in its *proper* vehicle be let go, and take its flight into the open fields of heaven, it will then be bare to the *immediate* impressions of ob-

Appietas “ *Appiety* ;” that is, *that* by which *Lentulus* remaind *Lentulus*, and *Appius* remaind *Appius* ; in the same form, tho not just the like sense.

jects ;

jects: and why should not those impressions, which affected the *nerves* that moved and affected the vehicle and soul in it, *affect the vehicle immediately*, when they are *immediately* made upon it, without the interposition of the nerves? The *hand*, which feels an object at the end of a *staff*, may certainly be allowed to feel the same much better by *immediate contact*, without the staff. Nay, why should we not think, that it may admit of *more* objects and the knowledge of more things, than it can now; since being exposed *all round* to the influences of them, it may be moved not only by visible objects just at the extremities of the *optic* nerves, by sounds at the ends of the *auditory*, &c. but become as it were *all eye* to visible objects, *all ear* to audible, and so on? And why should we not think this the rather, because then the *soul* may be also perceptive of *finer* impressions and *ethereal* contacts, and consequently of *more kinds* of objects, such as we are now incapable of knowing? And then, this being so, why should we not preface, that *other endowments*, as faculties of reasoning, communicating thoughts, and the like, will be *proportionable* to such noble opportunities of knowledge? There seems to be nothing in this account *impossible*; and therefore nothing, but what *may be*.

If we do but attend, we must see every where, that *many* things are by ways, which we *do not*, nor *can* understand; and therefore we must be convinced, even from hence, that *more* may be; and therefore that the objection before us, tho we could not solve the *difficulties* in it, and what is supposed here should be all rejected as *chimerical*, yet ought to be no prejudice against the belief of the

immortality of the soul, if there is *any* (but *one*) good reason for it.

But if we can in any *tolerable* manner (which in our present circumstances is as much, as can be expected) account for the difficulties objected, and those the *greatest* belonging to this matter, and shew how it is *possible* that they may consist with immortality, this will greatly *corroborate* the arguments for it, if not be one *itself*. This I hope is done: or if I have not spoke directly to *every part* of the objection, from what has been done that defect may easily be supplied.

4. We may conclude the souls of men to be immortal from the *nature of God*. For if he is (which sure no body doubts) a Perfect being, He, as such, can do nothing inconsistent with *perfect* or *right reason*. And then no *being*, nor *circumstance* of any being, can come from Him as its cause, which it is not agreeable to *such reason* should be: or (which is the same), He cannot but deal *reasonably* with all His dependents. And then again, if we are in the number of these, and the *mortality* of the human soul does not consist with reason, we may be sure it is *immortal*: as sure as we can be of any thing by the use of our faculties; and that is, as sure as we can be of any thing. Whether therefore that doth *consist* with reason, or *not*, is to be inquired.

To produce a being into a state of *clear happiness*, in any degree, can be no injury to it; or into a state of *mixt happiness*, provided the happiness certainly *overbalances* the contrary, and the unhappy or suffering part be not greater than what that being would *choose* in order to obtain the happiness,

or

or rather than lose it. Nor, again, can any wrong be done by producing a being *subject* to more misery than happiness, if that being hath it in *his own power* to avoid the misery, or so much of it, as may leave the remainder of misery not greater, than what he would rather sustain than miss the proportion of happiness. The only case then, by which wrong can be done in the production of any being, is, when it is *necessarily* and *irremediably* to be *miserable*, without any recompense, or balance of that misery °: and this indeed is a case so grievous, so utterly irreconcilable to all *reason*, that the heart of a reasoning and considering man can scarce bear the thought of it. So much every one must understand of the nature of reason and justice as to allow these things for truths incontestable.

Now then he, who says the *soul* of man is *mortal*, must say one of these *two* things: either that God is an unreasonable, unjust, cruel Being; or that no man in respect of this life (which according to him is *all*), has a greater share of misery, *unavoidable*, than of happiness. To say the *former* is to contradict that, which I presume has been proved beyond contradiction. To which I may add here, that this is to avow such an unworthy, im-

° That passage in *S. Iqquar.* imports much the same thing, that has been said here: הוא מבואר שהדבר שמציאותו טוב ראושימצאומה ראושימצא והדבר שמציאותו רע אין ראוי שימצאומה שמציאותו מעורב מן הטוב והרע אם הטוב הוא הגובר ראושימצאואם הרע הוא הגובר אין ראוי שימצא " This " is manifest, that that thing, whose existence is good, ought " to exist; and that thing, whose existence is evil, ought not " to exist; and if the existence of any thing is made up of a " mixture of good and evil, if the good prevail, it ought to " exist; and, if the evil prevail, it ought not to exist."

pious

pious notion of the *Supreme being*, as one would not entertain without caution even of the *worst of men*; such a one, as even the person himself; who says this, must know to be *false*. For he cannot but see, and must own many instances of the *reasonableness* and *beneficence* of the Deity: not *one* of which could be, if cruelty and unreasonableness were His inclination; since He has power to execute His own inclinations *thoroughly*, and is a Being *uniform* in his nature. Then to say the *latter* is to contradict the *whole story* of mankind, and *even one's own senses*. Consider well the dreadful effects of many *wars*, and all those barbarous desolations, which we read of: what cruel *tyrants* there are, and have been in the world, who (at least in their fits) *divert themselves* with the pangs and convulsions of their fellow-creatures ^P: what *slavery* is ^q, and *how* men have been brought into that

^P C. Cæsar—Senatores & Equites—cecidit, torfit, non quaestio- nis, sed animi causâ. Deinde quosdam ex illis—ad lucernam de- collabat.—Torserat per omnia, quæ in rerum natura tristissima sunt, fidiculis, &c. “C. Cæsar—the Senators and the Knights—
“killed and put to the rack (a great many) not in order to
“find out the truth, but for *their own pleasure only*. After-
“wards he cut off the heads of some—by candle-light—
“tormented others, by all the most cruel tortures that could
“be thought of in nature; stretched them with cords, &c.”
SEN. Homo, sacra res, jam per lusum & jocum occiditur. “A
“man, who is a divine creature, is slain out of *sport and jest*.”
Id.

^q Slaves were reckond among beasts of old. Οὔτε γὰρ γυνὴ
πίφιικας, οὔτ' ἐν ἀνδράσι σύγ' εἶ. “For you are not really a woman,
“nor are you to be reckond of human race.” EURIP. And
sometimes as mere instruments and tools. Ὁ γὰρ δῆλος ἔμψυχον
ἄγγεον τὸ δ' ἔργον ἀψυχόν δῆλος. “For a slave is a living instru-
“ment:

that lamentable state: how many have been ruined by *accidents* unforeseen: how many have suffered or been undone by *unjust* laws, judges, witnesses, &c^r. how many have brought *incurable diseases*, or the *causes* of them, and of great torments, into the world with them: how many more, such bodily infirmities and disadvantages, as have rendered

“ment: and an instrument is a lifeless slave.” ARIST. Their sad condition I will set down in *Plato's* words. Οὐκ ἀνδρὸς τῷ τῷ ἔστι τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ ἀνδραπόδα τινός, ὃ κρεῖττον τεθῆναι ἔστιν ἢ ζῆν' ὅστις ἀδικώμενος, ἢ προσηλακίζόμενος, μὴ οἷός τε ἔστιν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ βουθεῖν, μηδὲ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἂν κήθηται. “To be injured is not the suffering of a man but of a slave, to whom death is better than life: who, if he be unjustly treated and abused, is wholly unable to help himself, and no body else has any concern for him.”

† Those ἀρήτοι ἢ ἄπιστοι δυσυχταί, “unspeakable and incredible calamities,” which the τελεῶναι, “collectors of the taxes,” had brought upon the cities of *Asia*, are too many to be transcribed: but some account of them is to be seen in *Plut. v. Luc.* which may serve for one instance out of thousands. It may be reckoned madness indeed, *maximas virtutes, quasi gravissima delicta, punire*, “to punish the greatest virtues, as if they were the greatest crimes;” as *Val. M.* says, speaking of *Phocion's* case: but such madness has been very common, and men have suffered even for their virtue. *Ochus* cruelly put to death, *Ochus sororem—, & patrum cum centum amplius filiis ac nepotibus—, nulla injuria lacepsitus, sed quod in his maximam apud Persas probitatis & fortitudinis laudem consistere videbat*, “his sister *Ocha*—, and his uncle with a hundred of his sons and grandsons—, without being provoked by any injury, but only because he saw that they were in great reputation amongst the *Persians* for *probity* and *valour*.” *Id.* And *Seneca* having recommended the example of *Græcinus Julius* (*Julius Græcinus, ap. Tacit.* the father of *Julius Agricola*), adds, *quem C. Cæsar occidit ob hoc unum, quod melior vir erat, quam esse quemquam tyranno expediret*, “whom *C. Cæsar* killed for this reason only, because he was a better man, than it was expedient for a tyrant that any man should be.”

their

their *whole lives* uneasy: how many are born to no other inheritance but *invincible poverty* and trouble? Instances are endless: but, for a *little taste* of the condition of mankind here, reflect upon that story related by *Strabo* (from *Polybius*) and *Plutarch*, where, even by order of the *Roman senate*, *P. Æmylius*, one of the best of them too, at one prefix hour sacked and destroyed *seventy* cities, unawares, and drove *fifteen myriads* of innocent persons into *captivity*; to be sold, only to raise pay for the merciless soldiers and their own executioners. Peruse that account of the gold-works in the confines of *Egypt* given by *Diodorus*: and think over the circumstances of the unfortunate laborers there, who were not only criminals, or men taken in war, but even such as *calummy*, or *unjust* power had doomed (perhaps for being *too good*) to that place of torment; many times with all their relations and poor *children*^s. Or, once for all, take a view of *servitude*, as it is described by *Pignorius*. To pass over the *Sicilian* tyrants, him of *Pheræ*, *Apollodorus*^t, and the like, of which history sup-

^s Οἱ ἀδικαῖς διαβολαῖς περιπεσόντες, ἢ διὰ θυμὸν εἰς φυλακὰς παραδεδομένοι, ποτὲ μὲν αὐτοὶ, ποτὲ δὲ ἢ μετὰ πάσης συγγενείας. “Some fell either by false accusations, or they were arbitrarily delivered up to prison, sometimes themselves only, and sometimes all their relations with them.”

^t Mentioned by *Cicero* with *Phalaris*. He was tyrant of *Cassandria*, and is represented (out of *Polyænus*) as φοινικώτατος ἢ αἰμότατος πάντων, ἔσοι παρ’ Ἑλλήσιν ἢ παρὰ βαρβάρους ἐτυράνησαν, “as the bloodiest and most cruel of all the tyrants that ever reigned in *Greece*, or amongst the *Barbarians*.” Yet *Ælian* says, Ἐκ τῷ οἴνῳ ὑπαναφλεγόμενος ἢ ὀπεξαπτόμενος, ἐγίνετο φοινικώτερος, κλ. “That, when he was heated and inflamed with wine, then “he was still more bloody.”

plies

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plies plenty; consider those terrible proscriptions among the *Romans* ^u, with the reigns of most of their *emperors*, more bloody than *Lybic lion*, ^v or *Hyrcanian tiger*, even some of the *Christian emperors* not excepted. Read the direful and unjust executions reported by *Amm. Marcellinus*: among hundreds of others that of *Eusebius* ^w. Every *whisper* in those times or *light suspicion* brought upon men the question and tortures inconceivable. Men's very *dreams* were once interpreted to be treason; and they durst scarce own, that they had ever slept ^x. What inhuman punishments were used among the *Persians* ^y, in an arbitrary manner too; and many times extended to whole families, and all the kindred, tho not concerned ^z? But instead of enumerating here burnings, crucifixions, breakings upon the wheel, impalings, *σκαφισμὸς*, &c. I choose to refer

^u It is said of *Sylla's peace*, after *Marius's party* were broken, *Pax cum bello de crudelitate certavit, & vicit*, "That the peace rivalled the war in cruelty, and overcame it." *St Aust.*

^w *Qui ita evisceratus, ut cruciatibus membra deessent, implorans celo justitiam, torvum renidens fundato pectore mansit immobilis, &c.* "Whose bowels were torn out in such a manner, that they wanted members to torment; he called upon heaven for justice, and looking sternly with a calm countenance; he continued unmoved by his firm resolution, &c." In the reign of *Constantius*.

^x *Marebantque docti quidam, quod apud Atlanteos nati non essent, ubi memorantur somnia non videri.* "Some learned men were very sorry that they were not born amongst the *Atlantes*, of whom it is reported that they never dream."

^y *V. Plut. in v. Artax.*

^z *Ob noxam unius omnis propinquitas perit.* "All the whole neighbourhood perished for the fault of one single person." *AMM. MARC.*

you

you to those authors, who have designedly treated of the *torments* and *questions* of the ancients. Look into the history of the *Christian Church*, and her martyrologies: examine the prisons of the *inquisition*, the *groans* of which those walls are conscious, and upon what *sight* occasions men are racked and tortured by the tormentors there: and, to finish this detail (hideous indeed, but too true) as fast as I can, consider the many massacres, persecutions, and miseries consequent upon them, which *false religion* has caused, authorized, sanctified. Indeed the *history* of mankind is little else but the history of uncomfortable, dreadful passages: and a great part of it, however things are palliated and gilded over, is scarcely to be read by a *good-natured* man without amazement, horror, tears. One can scarce look into a *news-paper*, or out at his *window*, but hardships and sufferings present themselves, in one shape or other. Now among all *those millions*, who have suffered *eminently*, can it be imagined, that there have not been *multitudes*, whose griefs and pangs have *far outweighed* all their enjoyments; and yet who have not been able, either by their innocence, their prudence, or any power in them, to escape that *bitter draught*, which they have drunk? And then, how can we acquit the *justice* and *reasonableness* of that Being, upon whom these poor creatures depend, and who leaves them such great losers by their existence, if there be no *future state*, where the proper amends may be made? So that the argument is brought to this undeniable issue; if the *soul* of man is not *immortal*, either there is *no God*, upon whom we depend; or He is an *unreasonable Being*; or there never has been
any

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any man, whose sufferings in this world have exceeded his enjoyments, without his being the cause of it himself. But surely *no one* of these three things can be said. *Ergo*—

That, which aggravates the *hard case* of the poor sufferers mentiond above, if there be no *future state*, in which their past sufferings may be brought into the account, and recompensed, is, that many times their *persecutors* and *tormentors* pass their lives in plenty and grandeur: that is, the *innocent* have not only the portion, that properly belongs to the criminal and unreasonable part of mankind, but the *guilty* have that, which belongs rather to the innocent^a. Such a *transposition* of rewards and punishments, ending in itself, without any respect to something which is to follow hereafter, can never consist with the nature of a Governor, who is not very much *below* rational: a thought, which *God forbid* any one should dare to admit of Him. To suppose the *virtuous* and *wise* left ultimately but in the same state with the unjust and profligate is to suppose such a *constitution* of nature, as never can flow from a principle of reason, a God of *truth* and *equity*: and therefore such a constitution, as leaves the former in a *worse* condition than the other, can *much less* be supposed.

^a *Dies deficiet, si velim numerare, quibus bonis male evenerit: nec minus, si commemorem, quibus improbis optime.* “The day would not hold out, if I should undertake to enumerate all the good men whom evil befel; nor would it, if I should reckon up all the wicked men, that have fared best of all.” CIC. This is justly said; tho I account his instances not the most apposite.

Obj.

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Obj. It hath been said, that *virtue* tends to make men's lives happy even here, &c. and how then can the virtuous be supposed ever to be so *very miserable*? *Ans.* In ordinary cases *virtue* doth produce happiness: at least it has indeed a *natural tendency* to it; is the mean, by which it is most likely to be attained; and is therefore the way, which a wise man would choose for his own sake. But then it doth not follow from hence, that there are no *perturbations* in human affairs; no cases, in which the usual effect of virtue may be *overpowered* by diseases, violence, disasters. It doth not render men *invulnerable*; cannot command the *seasons*; nor prevent many great calamities, under which virtue and vice must fall *undistinguished*. (There may be a *direct road* to a place, and such a one, as he, who sets out for that place, ought to be found in, and yet it is possible he may meet with *robbers* or *accidents* in it, that may incommode, or hurt him in his journey.) On the other side, *vice* and *wickedness* may be so circumstantiated as to be attended with much greater *pleasure* than *pain*, contrary to the tendency of its nature: that is, a *wicked man* may be of a healthful make, born to riches or power, or fortunately placed for attaining them; and from the advantage of a strong body, an ample fortune, many friends, or lucky hits, he may derive *pleasures*, which shall exceed the present *inconveniencies* and *sufferings* naturally following from his vices ^b.

Men's

^b Yet according to *Aristotle* he cannot be happy for all that. His opinion *Diog. L.* represents thus: τὴν ἀρετὴν μὴ εἶναι αὐτάρακον πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν· ἀποδείξεται γὰρ τῶν τε περὶ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν—
τις

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Men's *circumstances* have a natural influence with respect to the present pleasures or sufferings, as well as their *virtue* or *vice*. No body sure ever said, that *all* depends *only* upon these: nor, when the natural tendency of *them* is asserted, is the natural tendency or effect of the *other* denied. Therefore indeed, when it is said that virtue *naturally* tends to make men happy even here, the meaning only is, that it tends to make men happy in *proportion* to their circumstances; and vice does the *contrary*. It is naturally productive of that part of happiness, which is in our *own power*, and depends upon *ourselves*; makes men more truly happy, whatever their circumstances are, than they could be *without it*, and *commonly* tends to mend their worldly circumstances too: but it is not asserted, that virtue can *always intirely* correct them, or make men so *completely* happy in this life, as that their enjoyments shall exceed their mortifications; no more than the vices of some particular men, tho they bereave them of many solid pleasures, and bring troubles upon them too, do hinder their worldly enjoyments from being greater than their present sufferings. Not only our *being*, but our *place*, with the *time*, and *manner* of our being in this world depend upon the Author of the scheme, the manner of *behaving ourselves* in our station (ac-

τὴν μὲν τοὶ κακίαν αὐτάρκει πρὸς κακοδαίμονίαν, κἀν ὅτι μάστις παρῆ αὐτῆ
τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ περὶ σῶμα. " Virtue is not alone sufficient
" to produce happiness, because external good things and
" things relating to the body are also necessary—; but vice is
" of itself sufficient to produce misery, and especially, if ex-
" ternal good things and the things relating to the body are
" joined with it."

according to our indowments, and the talents we have) only depends upon us. And perhaps (which has been hinted already) He has so orderd things on purpose, that from the *various compositions* of men's circumstances with the natural effects of their virtues and vices, and the many *inequalities* arising thence, they might see the *necessity* and *certainty* of another state: and that for this reason there should always be some remarkable instances of *opprest innocence* and *flourishing wickedness*.

The upshot is, that upon comparing *those pleasures*, which are the natural effects of virtue, with *those sufferings*, which are the natural effects of ill constitution or other calamity, *these* are many, very many times found to exceed: and *è contrario*, upon balancing *those evils*, which are the genuin effects of vice, against the *advantages* resulting from a fortunate estate, *these* may often be found to outdo the other. *Both contrary to reason*, if all ends with this life, and after death be nothing. For my part, if there were only some *few*, nay but *one* instance of each kind in the world (unfortunate virtue, and prosperous wickedness), it would be to me a sufficient argument for a *future state*: because God cannot be unjust or unreasonable in any *one* instance. It must not be forgot here, that many times men of *great vices* have also *great virtues*, and the natural effect of these may qualify that of the other, and being added to their favourable circumstances may help to turn the scale.

If there is no other beside the present being, the *general* and *usual* state of mankind is scarce consistent with the idea of a *reasonable Cause*. Let us consider

consider it a little ^c. Not to mention what we must suffer from the *very settlement* and *condition* of this world by hunger, thirst, heat, cold, and indispositions; like *leaves* one generation drops, and another springs up, to fall again, and be forgotten ^d. As we come into the world with the labor of our *mothers*, we soon go out of it with *our own*. *Childhood* and *youth* are much of them lost in insensibility or trifling, vanity and rudeness; obnoxious to many pains and accidents; and, when they are spent in the best manner, are attended with *labor* and *discipline*. When we reach that *stage of life*, which usually takes us from our nearest relations, and brings us out into the world, with what difficulty are proper *employments* and *stations* found for us? When we are *got out*, and left to scramble for ourselves, how many *hardships* and *tricks* are put upon us, before we get the sagacity and dexterity to save ourselves? How many *chances* do we stand? How troublesome is *business* made by unreasonableness, ill nature, or trifling and want of punctuality in the persons with whom we deal? How do we find ourselves instantly surrounded with *snare*s from de-

^c *Et quibus annales nostrorum audire laborum.* “And it may be of use to hear a catalogue of *our* misfortunes.” For as *Seneca* says, *Nulli contigit impune nasci*, “No man is born free of them.”

^d Οἴηπερ φύλλον γενεῆ, τοιῆδε ἢ ἀνδρῶν.—ἢ μὲν φύει, ἢ δ' ἀπολόηγει.
 “The life of man is like the leaves of trees;—some spring forth, and others wither.” *HOM.* This is true not only of single men, but even of cities (famous ones), kingdoms, empires. One may say the same concerning many of them, that *Florus* says of *Vcii*: *Laborat annalium fides, ut Vcios fuisse credamus.* “The credit of history is not quite sufficient, to convince us that there ever was any such city as *Vcii*.”

figning men, knaves, enemies (of which the best men have some), opposite interests, factions, and many times from a mischievous breed, whose *childish* or *diabolical* humor seeks pleasure in the uneasiness of other people? Even in many of those *enjoyments*, which men principally propose to themselves, they are greatly *disappointed*, and experience shews, how unlike they are to the antecedent images of them. They are commonly mixt^e: the *apparatus* to most of them is too operose: the completion of them seldom depends upon *ourselves alone*, but upon a concurrence of things, which rarely hit *all* right^f: they are generally not only less in practice, than in theory, but die almost as soon as they are: and perhaps they intail upon us a tax to be paid after they are gone. To go on with the history of *human life*: tho' affairs go prosperously, yet still perhaps a *family* is increasing, and with it new occasions of *solicitude* are introduced, accompanied with many *fears* and *tender apprehensions*. At length, if a man, through many cares and toils and various adventures, arrives at *old age*, then he feels most commonly his *pressures* rather increased, than diminishd, and himself *less able* to support them^g. The business he has to do

^e *Labor voluptasq; dissimillima naturâ, societate quadam inter se naturali sunt juncta.* "Pain and pleasure, tho, in the nature of things, the most unlike each other, yet are united by some natural bond." LIVY.

^f Sensible of this, *Socrates* used to say, δὲν τὰς ἡδονὰς, μὴ παρ' ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλὰ παρ' ἑμῶν θηρᾶσθαι, "We ought to seek pleasures from ourselves, and not from others." STOB.

^g *Senex, & levissimis quoq; curis impar,* "I am an old man, and unequal to the smallest cares:" as *Seneca*, of himself; in *Tacitus*.

grows

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grows *urgent* upon him, and calls for *dispatch*: most of his *faculties* and active powers begin now to fail him apace: *relations* and *friends*, who might be helpful to him (and among them perhaps the dear Consort of all his joys, and all his cares ^h) leave him, *never to return more*: wants and *pains* all the while are multiplying upon him: and under this *additional load* he comes melancholy behind, tottering, and bending toward the earth; till he either stumbles upon something which throws him into the graveⁱ, or fainting falls of himself. And must he *end here*? Is this the *period* of his being? Is this *all*? Did he come into the world only to *make his way* through the press, amidst many justlings and hard struggles, with at best only a few deceitful, little, fugacious pleasures interspersed, and so *go out of it* again? Can this be an end worthy a first Cause *perfectly reasonable*? Would even any *man*, of common sense and good nature, send another upon a *difficult journey*, in which, tho he might perhaps now and then meet with a little smooth way, get an interval for rest and contemplation, or be flattered with some verdures and the smiles of a few daisies on the banks of the road; yet upon the whole he must travel through much dirt, take many wearisom steps, be continually inquiring after some clew or directions to carry him through the turnings and intricacies of it, be puzzled how to get a competent *viaticum* and pay his reckonings, ever and

^h *Rogus aspiciendus amatæ Conjugis, &c.* “ You must see the funeral pile of your beloved Wife.” JUV.

ⁱ Σμίκρα πωλαιὰ σώματ' ἐνέζει ροπή. “ A small matter will push an old man into his grave.” SOPH.

anon be in danger of being lost in deep waters, and beside forced all the while to fence against weather, accidents, and cruel robbers, who are every where lying in wait for him: I say, would any one send a man upon *such a journey* as this, *only* that the man might faint and expire at the end of it, and all his thoughts perish; that is, either for *no end* at all, or for the *punishment* of one, whom I suppose never to have hurt him, nor ever to have been capable of hurting him? And now can we impute to God that, which is below the common size of *men*^k?

I am apt to think, that even among those, whose state is beheld with envy, there are *many*, who, if at the end of their course they were put to their *option*, whether, without any respect to a *future state*, they would repeat all the pleasures they have had in life, *upon condition* to go over again also all the same disappointments, the same vexations and unkind treatments from the world, the same secret pangs and tedious hours, the same labors of body and mind, the same pains and sicknesses, would be *far from accepting* them at that price^l.

^k Πάντες ἐσμεν ἐν ὁδῷ.—ἴδες ἐπὶ τῆς ὁδοῦ φυτὸν ἢ ψόαν ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ ὅ, τι ἂν τύχῃ τῶν ἀξίων θεάματ[Ⓞ]· μικρὸν ἐτέρφθης; εἶτα παρέδραμες· πάλιν ἐνέτυχες λίθοις ἢ φάραγγιν ἢ κρήμνοις ἢ σκοπέλοις, ἢ πλουτῆσι καὶ θηρίοις, κλ. Τοιῦτ[Ⓞ] ὁ βί[Ⓞ]. “We are all upon a road.—When you see upon “the road plants, and herbs, and water, and whatever else “happens to be worth seeing there, are you not a little delighted with it? Then you go on, and meet with stones, and “vallies, and precipices, and rocks, and sometimes with wild “beasts. Life is very like this.” BAS.

^l *Non mehercule quisquam accepisset [vitam], nisi daretur infans.* “Truly nobody would accept of (life), if it was not given “them when they did not know it.” SEN.

But

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But here the case, as I have put it, only respects them, who may be reckond among the *more fortunate* passengers: and for *one*, that makes his voyage so well, *thousands* are tost in tempests, and lost ^m. How many never attain any comfortable settlement in the world? How many fail, after they have attaind it, by various misfortunes? What melancholy, what distractions are caused in families by inhumane or vitious husbands, false or peevish wives, refractory or unhappy children; and, if they are otherwife, if they are good, what sorrow by the loss of them? How many are forced by necessity upon drudging and very shocking employments for a poor livelihood? How many subsist upon begging, borrowing, and other shifts, nor can do otherwife? How many meet with sad accidents, or fall into deplorable diseases? Are not all companies, and the very streets filled with complaints, and grievances, and doleful stories? I verily believe, that a great part of mankind may ascribe their deaths to want and dejection. Seriously, the *present state* of mankind is unaccountable, if it has not some connexion with *another*, and be not as it were the porch or entry to it ⁿ.

^m *Paulisper te crede subduci in montis ardui verticem celsiorem; speculari inde rerum infra te jacentium facies; & oculis in diversa porrectis, fluctuantis mundi turbines intueri. Jam seculi & ipse miseraberis, &c.* “Imagin yourself to be removed to the top
“ of some very high mountain, and see how the things that
“ are below you look; and turning your eyes every way, be-
“ hold *the trouble* of a stormy world. And then you will take
“ pity on the inhabitants, &c.” St CYPR.

ⁿ העולם הזה דומה לפרוזדור בפני העולם הבא. “This
“ world is only like a porch to the world to come.” P.

ABOTH.

There is one thing more, of which notice ought to be taken. To one, who carefully peruses the story and face of the world, what appears to *prevail* in it? Is it not corruption, vice, iniquity, folly, at least? Are not debauching^o, getting *per fas aut nefas*, defaming one another, erecting tyrannies of one kind or other, propagating empty and senseless opinions with bawling and fury the great business of *this world*? And are not all these contrary to *reason*? Can any one then with reason imagin, that *reason* should be given, tho it were but to a few, only to be run down and trampled upon, and then *extinguish'd*? May we not rather conclude, that there must be *some world*, where *reason* will have its turn, and prevail and triumph? Some kingdom of *reason* to come?

5. In the last place, that *great expectation* which men have, of continuing to live in another state, *beyond the grave*, has I suppose been commonly admitted as one proof, that they *shall live*; and does seem indeed to me to add some weight to what has been said. That they generally have had such

^o *O si possis in illa sublimi specula constitutus oculos tuos inferre secretis, recludere cubiculorum obductas fores, & ad conscientiam luminum penetralia occulta referare, &c.* “O that, when “you are placed upon the top of that high tower, you could “cast your eyes into the secret places, and unbar the doors “of bedchambers, and lay open their secret recesses to the “discovery of the light, &c.” CYPR.

P Beside, there being no satiety of knowledge in this life, we may hope for future opportunities, when our faculties shall be exalted, &c. *Τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ δία τὸ ἐν ὁδοῖς ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἑρῶντων ἐνέπληστον ἑαυτὸν ἰκανῶς, κτλ.* “They who are desirous of “truth, and of seeing things as they really are, can never be “fully satisfied here.” PLUT.

an *expectation*, can scarce be denied. The histories of mankind, their deifications, rites, stories of apparitions, the frequent mention of a *hades*, with rewards and punishments hereafter, &c. all testify, that even the Heathen world believed, that the *souls* of men *survived* their bodies. Their ignorance indeed of the seats and circumstances of the departed has begot many *errors* and *superstitions*; and these have been multiplied by licentious *poets* and idle *visionairs*: but this, being no more than what is usual in the like cases, ought to be no prejudice against the *fundamental opinion itself*.

Cicero⁹, tho he owns there were different opinions among the *Greek* philosophers about this matter; that, *quod literis extet, Pherecydes Syrus primum dixit, animos hominum esse sempiternos*; that *Pythagoras* and his school confirmed this opinion; that *Plato* was the man, who brought a reason for it, &c. yet tells us plainly, *naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare*; that *nescio quomodo inheret in mentibus quasi sæculorum quoddam augurium*; that *permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium*; and more to this purpose. Now if this consent was only the effect of some *tradition*, handed from parents to their children; yet since we meet with it in *all the quarters* of the world (where there is *any* civility or sense), and in *all ages*, it seems to be *coeval* to mankind itself, and born with it. And this is sufficient to give a great *authority* to this opinion of the soul's immortality. But this is not all. For it is supported by all the foregoing arguments, and many other reasonings and symptoms which we may find within

⁹ In *Tusc. disp.*

ourselves.

ourselves. All which, put together, may at least justify an expectation of a future state: that is, render it a just or reasonable expectation: and then this *reasonable expectation* grows, by being such, into a further argument, that there *will be* such a state.

+ Fancy a man walking in some *retired field*, far from noise, and free from prejudice, to debate this matter with himself, and then judge, whether such *meditations* as these would not be just. " I think I " may be sure, that neither *lifeless matter*, nor the " *vegetative tribe*, that stone, that flower, that tree " have any reflex thoughts: nor do the *sensitive* " *animals*, that sheep, that ox, seem to have any " such thing, or but in the lowest degree, and in " respect of present objects only. They do not " *reason*, nor *discourse*. I may therefore certainly " pretend to be something *much above* all these " things^r. I not only apprehend and consider " these *external objects* acting at present upon my " nerves, but have *ideas* raised within myself of a " higher order, and many: I can, not only repre- " sent to myself things, that *are*, or *have been*, but " *deduce* many other from them, make excursions " into *futurity*, and foresee much of what will be, or at least may be; by strict thinking, I had al-

within

Mr. Pope, though with inferior appearance, seems to me to stand in this way. See the following passage in his Essay on Criticism.

Methinks those philosophers make but an odd appearance in story, who, looking big and fastuous, at the same time professed, that their own souls were not superior to those of gnats, &c. οἱ τὰς ὀφρῦς ἀνεσπικνότες μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν ὄσιν διαφέρειν ἀπεφάνοντο ἐμπροσθε τοῦ ἐλλέος, ἢ μύιας, — ἢ σοῦς ψυχῆς — τὴν σφῶν αὐτῶν φιλοσοφωτάτων ψυχῆν. " These men, who are so swelled with pride, affirm, that, as to the substance, there is no difference betwixt the soul of a philosopher, and that of a gnat, or a worm, or a fly, — or the soul of a hog," as *Euseb.*

Wandering thoughtful in the silent wood, Observest the duties of the wise, & good. —

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“ most said, get into *another world* before-hand :
“ and, whether I shall live in some other state af-
“ ter death, or not, I am certainly a *being* capable
“ of such an *expectation*, and cannot but be solici-
“ tous about it : none of which things can be said
“ of these *clods*, or those *brutes*°. Can I then be
“ designd for *nothing further*, than just to eat,
“ drink, sleep, walk about, and act upon this
“ earth † ; that is, to have no further being, than
“ what these brutes have, so far beneath me ? Can
“ I be made capable of such *great expectations*,
“ which those animals know nothing of (happier
“ by far in this regard than I am, if we must die
“ alike), only to be *disappointed at last* ? Thus
“ placed, just upon the confines of another bet-
“ ter world, and fed with hopes of penetrating in-
“ to it, and enjoying it, only to make a *short ap-*
“ *pearance* here^u, and then to be *shut out*, and *to-*
“ *tally sunk* ? Must I then, when I bid my last
“ farewell to these walks, when I close these lids,
“ and yonder blue regions and all this scene dark-
“ en upon me and go out, must I *then* only serve
“ to furnish dust to be mingled with the ashes of
“ these *berds* and *plants*, or with this *dirt* under
“ my feet ? Have I been set *so far above them* in
“ life, only to be *leveld with them* ⁱⁿ death ?”

° Alexander after death might be in the same state with his muletier (M. Anton.), but sure not with his mule.

† *Brevis est hic fructus homullis*, “ this is the short-lived pleasure of frail man,” may be justly said for all *Lucretius*.

u ‘Ο κόσμος σκηνή, ὁ βίος παράδος’ ἡλθεσ, ἰδες, ἀπῆλθεσ. “ This world is a stage, life is the play ; we come on, look about us, and go off again.” DEMOCR.

or looks on them as more than
free soul expatiated with the
his kindred stars of the sky
familiar
more
the

This argument grows *stronger* in the apprehension of one, who is conscious of abilities and *intellectual improvements*, which he has had no opportunity here of shewing and using, through want of health, want of confidence^w, want of proper place, want of liberty. Such improvements, and the knowledge consequent upon them, cannot ultimately respect *this state*: they can be only an enlargement, and *preparation* for another. That is all they *can be*: and if they are not that, they are *nothing*. And therefore he may be supposed thus, further, to argue within himself. “ Can the “ Author of my *reasoning* faculties be Himself so “ *unreasonable* as to give me them, either not to “ imploy them, or only to weary myself with *useless* “ *pur*suits, and then drop me? Can He, who “ is privy to all my *circumstances*, and to these “ very *thoughts* of mine, be so insensible of my “ case, as to have *no regard* to it, and not provide “ for it?”

It grows *stronger still* upon the mind of one, who reflecting upon the hard treatment he has met with from this world, the little cause he has given for it, the pains and secret uneasiness he has felt upon that score, together with many other sufferings which it was not in his power to prevent, cannot but make a *silent, humble appeal* to that Being, who is his *last and true refuge*, and who he must believe will not *desert him thus*.

Lastly, it is *strongest of all* to one, who, besides all this, *endeavours* in the conduct of his life to ob-

^w אֵת צְנוּעֵי הַכֹּמָה. “ Wisdom is in modest men.”
Prv. v.

serve the laws of *reason* (that is, of *his nature*; and that is, of the *Author of nature*, upon whom he depends); laments, and labors against his own *infirmities*; implores the Divine *mercy*; prays for some *better state* hereafter; acts and lives in the *hopes* of one; and *denies* himself many things upon that view: one, who by the exaltation of his *reason* and upper faculties, and that, which is certainly the effect of real and useful philosophy, the practice of *virtue*, is still approaching toward a higher manner of being, and doth already taste something spiritual and above this world. To such a one there must be a strong expectation *indeed*, and the argument built upon it must be proportionable. For can he be indowd with such capacities, and have as it were *overtures* of immortality made him, if after all there is no such thing? Must his *private* acts and *conceald* exercises of religion be all lost *? Can a perfect Being have so little regard to one, who however inferior and *nothing* to Him, yet regards Him according to *his best abilities* in the government of himself?

Are such *meditations* and reflexions as these well founded, or not? If they are, it must be reasonable to think, that God will satisfy a *reasonable expectation*.

There are *other arguments* for the immortality of the soul, *two* of which I will leave with you, to be at your leisure ponderd well. The *one* is, that, if the *souls* of men are *mortal* (extinguishd at death), the case of *brutes* is by much preferable to that of *men*. The *pleasures* of brutes, tho but

* *Hic pietatis honos?* "Is this the reward of piety?"

Quid vos sacra juvant? sensual,
Sutra? *quid in vacuo* *secundum* *hunc* *Aegypti*
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fenfual, are more fincere, being palled or diminished by no diverting confideration: they go *wholly* into them; and when they have them not, they feem lefs to want them, not thinking of them. Their *sufferings* are attended with no reflexion γ , but are fuch as they are faid to be p. 57. obf. 8. They are void of *cares*; are under no apprehenfion for families and pofterity; never fatigue themfelves with vain inquiries, hunting after *knowledge* which muft perifh with them; are not anxious about their *future ftate*^z, nor can be difappointed of any hopes or expectations; and at laft fome fudden blow (or a few minutes of *unforefeen* pain) finifhes them, having never *fo much as known* that they were mortal.

The *other* is, that the foul is a *principle of life*: that, which brings vitality to the body. For how fhould that, which has been proved to be a fubftance, and at the fame time is alfo a principle of life, and *as fuch* (as being what it is) is *alive*; I fay, how can that *die*^a, unlefs it is annihilated?

Here

γ *Feræ pericula, quæ vident, fugiunt: cum effugere, securæ funt, &c.* “ Wild beafts, when they fee any dangers, avoid them; and, after they have avoided them, they look no no further, &c.” SEN.

^z לא יצטערו בהיותם משערים שסופם למות כאדם וכו'. “ They are not uneasy as men are whilst they are alive, imagining that the end of them is to die.” S. IQQUAR.

^a *Sic mihi persuasi, sic sentio, cum—semper agitetur animus, nec principium motus habeat, quia se ipse moveat; ne finem quidem habiturum esse motus, quia nunquam se ipse sit relicturus.* “ I do verily believe, it is my real opinion, that because— “ the foul is always in action, and has not any (external) “ caufe of its motion, becaufe it moves itfelf; therefore nei- “ ther will it ever have any end of its motion, becaufe it will “ never

Here I begin to be very sensible how much I want a *guide*. But as the religion of *nature* is my theme, I must at present content myself with that light which *nature* affords; my business being, as it seems, only to shew, what a Heathen *philosopher*, without any other help, and almost *αὐτοδίδακτος*, may be supposed to think. I hope that neither the doing of this, nor any thing else containd in this *Delineation*, can be the least prejudice to any other *true* religion. Whatever is immediately *reveald* from *God*, must, as well as any thing else, be treated as being *what it is*: which cannot be, if it is not treated with the highest regard, *believed* and *obeyd*. That therefore, which has been so much insisted on by me, and is as it were the burden of my song, is so far from undermining true *reveald* religion, that it rather paves the way for its reception. This I take this opportunity to remark to you once for all. And so returning to my *philosopher*, I cannot imagin but that *even he* would have at least some such general thoughts as these,

“ never desert itself.” Cic. That in *Greg. Thaum.* is like this thought of *Tully*: Ἡ ψυχὴ, αὐτοκίνητος ὄνσα, ὡδέποτε τῷ εἶναι διαλείπει· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ αὐτοκίνητῳ τὸ ἀεὶ κινητὸν εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ κινητὸν ἀπαυσθὲν ἐστι, κλ. “ The soul, because it is able to move itself, can never cease to be; for it is a necessary consequence of self-motion, to be always in motion; and what is always in motion, cannot cease to move.” But that in *St Austin* comes something nearer to my meaning: *Est animus vita quaedam, unde omne quod animatum est vivit.—Non ergo potest animus mori. Nam si carere poterit vita, non animus sed animatum aliquid est.* “ The soul is a sort of life, whence it follows, that every thing which has a soul is alive;—wherefore the soul cannot die; for, if it could be without life, it would not be a soul, but something *with a soul*.”

which

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which make up almost the remainder of this last
section:

IX: *The soul, when it parts from this gross body, will pass by some law into some new seat, or state, agreeable to the nature of it* ^b. Every species of beings must belong to *some* region, or state. Because nothing can be; but it must be *some where*, and *some how*: and there being different kinds of abodes and manners of subsisting in the universe, and the natures of the things; that are to exist in them, being also different, there will be a greater *congruity* between these several *natures* respectively and some particular *places*, or *states*, than there is between them and others; and indeed such a one, that out of those perhaps they cannot subsist, or not *naturally*. To those therefore must be their respective *tendencies*: to those they are *adjudged* by the course of nature, and constitution of things, or rather by the Author of them ^c.

While the soul is in the body, it has some powers and opportunities of moving it spontaneously, or otherwise than it would be moved by the mere laws of gravitation and mechanism. This is evi-

^b The *transmigration* of souls has been much talked of: but *ea sententia, — quoniam ridicula, & mimo dignior quam scholâ, ne refelli quidem seriò debet; quod qui facit, videtur vereri, ne quis id credat*, “that opinion—is so ridiculous, that it is
“fitter for the stage than the schools, and therefore ought
“not seriously to be confuted; and he who attempts it, seems
“to be afraid that nobody should believe it.” So *Lactantius*. Indeed who can but laugh, when he reads in *Lucian* of *Homer*’s having been a camel in *Bactria*, &c.

^c *Χαρτῶν γὰρ ἀνάγκη τὸ ὁμοίον πρὸς τὸ ὁμοίον*. “For, of necessity,
“like things must go to each other.” *HIEROCL.*

dent.

dent. But yet, notwithstanding this, the weight of that *body*, to which at present it is limited (among other causes) constrains it to act for a while upon *this stage*. That general law, to which bodies are subjected, makes it sink in this fluid of air, so much lighter than itself; keeps it down; and so determines the seat of it, and of the soul in it, to be upon the surface of this *earth*, where, or in whose neighbourhood it was first produced. But then, when the soul shall be disengaged from the gross matter, which now incloses and incumbers it, and either become *naked spirit*, or be only veild in its own fine and obsequious *vehicle*, it must at the same time be either freed from the *laws* of bodies, and fall under *some other*, which will carry it to some *proper* mansion, or state^d; or at least by the *old ones* be capable of mounting upwards^e, in proportion to the volatility of its vehicle, and of emerging out of these regions into some *medium* more suitable, and (if the philosopher may say so) equibrious. Thus much as to the *general state* of souls after death. But then,

^d *Ex humili atque depresso in eum emicabit locum, quisquis ille est, qui solutas vinculis animas beato recipit sinu.* “It will mount up from this low mean place, into that, whatever it be, which receives those souls, that are freed from their imprisonment, into its happy bosom.” SEN. Ἡ τῆς θνητῆς προσπαθείας ἀποβολή, ἢ ἡ τῶν ἀρετῶν, εἰν ὑπερῶν τιῶν, ἐκφυσις πρὸς τὸν τῶν καλῶν καθαρὸν τόπον, εἰς τὴν θείαν εὐζωίαν ἡμᾶς ἀνάξει. “The putting off these human affections, and putting on virtues, as so many wings, will carry us to that pure region of virtue, where we shall live a divine life.” HIEROCL.

^e *Depositâ sarcinâ, levior volabit ad cælum.* “Having laid down our burden, we shall fly the lighter to heaven.” ST JEROM.

X. *In this new state, or place of abode, there may be different stations befitting the differences of particular souls among themselves, as they are more or less perfect in their kind.* We see even inanimate bodies, which have different gravities, figures, impulses, &c. settle into some order among themselves, agreeable to these differences. And so by the same universal rule in nature (*viz.* that differences in things are attended with answerable relations and effects) souls must also take their situation in some kind of order according to their differences.

XI. *The great difference of human souls, with respect to perfection and imperfection, lies in their different degrees and habits^f of reasonableness or unreasonableness^g.* That is to say, not only in men's different improvements, or neglects and abuse of their

^f The Jews, who generally say, that by the practice of religion the soul acquires perfection and life eternal, lay such a stress upon habits of piety, that *R. Albo* makes the effect of giving 1000 *zuzin* "pence" in charity at once by no means equal to that of giving one *zuz* "penny," and repeating it 1000 times. התמדת עשיית פעל אחד בעצמו יקנה מדרגה אחת יותר גדולה מעשיית הפעל ההוא פעם אחת. "The continuing to repeat the doing of a thing will procure a higher degree (of reward) than the doing the whole at once."

^g כל עושה מצות הבורא יתברך ימצא שכל טוב—והגמול הנמשך אחר השכל האמיתי הוא השארת הנפש אחר כלות הגוף והדבוק בשכל הפועל והיותו קיים לעד. "He that doth the commandment of the Creator, shall be blessed; he shall find good understanding—and that reward which follows good understanding, is, that the soul shall continue after the body is consumed, and shall be united to the understanding of its Maker, and be established to eternity." *Is. LEVI.*

rational

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rational faculties ; but also in the greater or less influence of these upon their actions, and by consequence in their different degrees of *virtue*, or *vice*. For a man is accounted a *reasonable* man, when he reasons rightly, and follows his reason : in which expression virtue must be included, being (as p. 336, & *al.*) nothing but the *practice of reason and truth*.

That men are reasonable, or the contrary, in *different degrees* is plain. Some reason well upon *some* subjects, but in respect of *others*, to which they have not been accustomed, are dim and confused : or they are partial to their vices and passions, their old impressions and parties ; and so their reason is not *general*, nor has its due *extent*, or *influence*. Others, whose reason is uncultivated and weak, tho they have virtuous inclinations, many times fall into *superstition* and *absurdities* ; misled by authorities, and over-awed by old or formal modes of speaking, and *grave non-sense*. Many, if not the most, seem to have scarce any *notion* of reason or virtue *at all*, but act fortuitously, or as they see other folks act ; moved either by bodily propensities, or by example. Some *few* there are, who *endeavour* to improve their understandings, to discover what is agreeable to reason, and to fix their *opinions* ; and conduct their *lives* accordingly. And in all these *several kinds* there are various degrees of elevation in knowledge and virtue, and of immersion in vice and ignorance, and new differences arising endlessly. All this is visible.

Now the soul, reflecting, finds in itself *two* general faculties, *one*, by which it understands, and

judges, and reasons (all which I comprehend under the term *rational faculties*, or *reason*); and *another*, by which it wills, or determines to act, according to the judgments and conclusions made in the upper part of it. And the more *perfectly* it performs these operations (*i. e.* the more *truly* it reasons, and the more *readily* it wills and executes the decisions of reason), the more *perfect* certainly it must be in its kind; and the more imperfectly, the more imperfect. The accomplishments therefore and *perfections* of human souls, and the *contrary*, must be in proportion to the forementioned *differences*.

XII. *According to these differences then it is reasonable to think the souls of men will find their stations in the future world* ^h. This is but a corollary from what goes before.

Obj. Why should we think, that God causes things to be in such a manner, as that in the *future state* men shall be placed and treated according to their merit, and the progress they have made in reason and virtue, when we see the case to be widely different *in this*? *Ans.* It must be remembered, that this is one of those very *reasons* on which the belief of the soul's immortality is founded. Now, if it be reasonable to believe there is a future state, because things are dealt *unequally* now, upon that very score it will be reasonable to think, that they are dealt *equally* ⁱ in that other state.

^h Τόπως προσήκοντας τῇ ἀρετῇ. "Places fitted for virtue." PLATO.

ⁱ With an equal or impartial regard to every man's deserts: equitably.

Here *bodily* wants and affections, and such things as proceed from them, do intermix with human affairs, and do confound *merit* with *demerit*, *knowledge* with *ignorance*: and hence it comes to pass many times, that bad men enjoy much, and good men suffer, and both are, if there is no other state, in their wrong places. But, when the *corporeal causes* of misplacing shall be removed, *spirits* (or spirits and their σώματα πνευματικά) may be supposed more regularly to take their *due* posts and privileges: the impudent and vicious will have no such *opportunities* of getting into circumstances, of which they are unworthy, nor improved and virtuous minds find such *obstructions* to keep them down in circumstances unworthy of them. Be sure the more advanced and pure any state is, the more *properly* will the inhabitants be ranked, and the *juster* and more *natural* will the subordination of its members be.

Even *here* we commonly find men in that kind of business for which they are educated and *prepared*; men of the same professions generally keeping together; the virtuous and reasonable *desiring* to be (tho they not always can be) with *their like*^k; and the vicious (as they scarcely cannot be) with *theirs*. And why should we not think, that an *association* and *communion* of souls with those of their own size, disposition, and habits may be more *universal* and *complete*, when those things, which in great measure hinder it here, shall be no more?

^k Ἀγαθῶν ἐνὶ δαίρας ἴσεν Αὐτόματοι ἀγαθῶν. "Good men, when left to their own liberty, go to those entertainments where good men are." E. PLAT.

If we may think this, certainly those fields or states, in which the *virtuous* and *wise*¹ shall meet, must be different from those in which the *foolish* and *wicked* shall herd together^m. The very difference of the *company* will itself create a vast difference in the manner of their living.

XIII. *The mansions, and conditions of the virtuous and reasoning part must be proportionably better than those of the foolish and vitious.* The proposition cannot be inverted, or the case be otherwise, if the constitution of things depends upon a reasonable cause: as I have endeavourd to shew it does.

Cor. Hence it follows, that *the practice of reason* (in its just extent) *is the great preparative for death, and the means of advancing our happiness through all our subsequent duration.* But moreover,

XIV. *In the future state respect will be had not only to men's reasoning, and virtues, or the contrary, but also to their enjoyments and sufferings here*ⁿ. Because the forementiond *inequalities* of this world

¹ Οἱ ἀριφίλοσοφότες ὄντως, ἢ οἱ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι, “they who rightly philosophize, or they who are truly philosophers,” in *Plato's* style.

^m Τελευτήσαντας αὐτὸς ἐκεῖν μὲν ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέχεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς αἰεὶ ἔχουσι, κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες. “That place, in which there are no evils, will not receive them (the wicked) but they shall be with one another, and continue for ever to lead the same sort of life that they led here.” *PLATO.*

ⁿ Εἰ πλεον τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων κολάζεται [ὁ δίκαιος], προσθήκη δικαιοσύνης αὐτῷ λογίζεται. “If (a good man) be punished (here) beyond what his sins deserve, all that is above what he justly deserves, shall be accounted for to him.” *CHRY.*

can

can by no means be redrest, unless men's enjoyments and sufferings, taken together with their virtues and vices, are compared and balanced. I say, *taken together*: because no reason can be assigned, why a vitious man should be recompensed for the pains and mischiefs and troubles, which he *brings upon himself* by his vices, as the natural consequences of them; nor, on the other side, why any deductions should be made from the future happiness of a good man upon the score of those *innocent* enjoyments, which are the genuin fruit of his moderation, regularity, other virtues, and sound reasoning.

Cor. Wicked men will not only be less happy than the wise and virtuous, but be really unhappy in that state to come. For when all the happiness, that answers to those degrees of virtue, which they had, and those sufferings, which they underwent, above what was the natural effect of their wickedness; I say, when that is subtracted, what remains upon the account will be something below no-happiness: which must be some quantity of *positive unhappiness*, or misery.

Thus there will be *rewards*, and *punishments* hereafter: and men will be *happy*, or *unhappy*, according to their behaviour, enjoyments, and sufferings in this present life. But,

XV. *If the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated, yet it is certain the contrary cannot.* To say,

° Sure those arguments in *Lucretius* can convince nobody. *Nunc quoniam, quassatis undique vasis, Diffluere humorem, & laticem discedere cernis; Crede animam quoque diffundi, &c.* "For

say, when a *house* is ruinous and fallen, that it once had an *inhabitant*, and that he is escaped out of it, and lives in some other place, can involve no contradiction, or absurdity *P.* And,

XVI. *If the immortality of the soul should be considered only as a probability, or even as a chance possible, yet still a virtuous life is to be preferred before its contrary.* For if the soul be *mortal*, and all perception perishes for ever at our death, what in this

“ we see that, as soon as the vessel is broken in pieces, the liquor runs all about; so the soul likewise will be dissipated, “ *ἔc.*” And *Præterea gigni pariter cum corpore ἔc unà Crescere sentimus, pariterque senescere mentem, &c. Quare animum quoque dissolvi fateare necesse est; Quandoquidem penetrant in eum contagia morbi.* “ Further we see that the soul and the body are “ produced together, and increase and grow old together also, “ *ἔc.* Wherefore we cannot but own, that the soul must be “ dissolved: for the contagion of the disease reaches to it.” Nor those in *Pliny* (*N. H.* 7. 55.): if there really are any at all. For to plead the *antegenitale experimentum*, “ argument “ drawn from what we were before we were born,” is to beg question; which may be put thus, Whether we shall after death be more conscious of our existence, than we were before we were born. And if *Dicæarchus's Lesbians* were extant, I believe we should find nothing stronger in them. The truth seems to be, *οὐ βέλεται ὁ κακὸς ἀθάνατον εἶναι τὴν αὐτῷ ψυχὴν*, “ That a “ wicked man does not desire that his soul should be immortal;” but he comforts himself with this thought, that *ἂ μετα θάνατον ὕδνια ἑαυτοῦ*, “ the being nothing after death,” will prevent future sufferings. This is *εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι καταφυγῆς*, “ to have recourse to non-existence.” **HIEROCL.**

P Nor that the soul still exists *ἔρημον καταλιπέσα ζωῆς τὸν ἡμέτερον οἶκον*, “ having left the house, in which it lived, desolate.” *PH. JUD. Domus ab habitatore deserta dilabitur:—ἔc corpus, relictum ab anima, defluit.* “ A house that is forsaken by the “ inhabitants, becomes ruinous:—and a body, after it is forsaken by the soul, decays.” **LACT.**

case

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case does a good man *lose* by his virtue? Very rarely more than some acts of *devotion*, and instances of *mortification*, which too by custom grow habitual and easy^q, and it may be *pleasant* by being (or seeming at least to be) reasonable. On the other hand, what does a vitious man *gain*? Only such enjoyments, as a virtuous man *leaves*: and those are such, as most commonly owe their being to a vitiated taste; grow insipid in time; require more trouble and contrivance to obtain them, than they are worth; go off disagreeably; are followed many times by sharp reflexions and bitter penances in the rear; and at best after a short time end in nothing, *as if they had never been*. This is all^r. But then if the soul prove to be *immortal* (as we have all the reason in the world to think it will), what does the virtuous man *gain*? His present pleasures (if not so many) are more *sincere*^s and *natural*^t; and the effect of his self-denials and submission to reason, in order to prepare himself for a future state, is the happiness of that state: which,

q Μακρὸς δὲ ἔστι θρόνος ὁμοίος ἐπ' αὐτὴν [ἀρετὴν], καὶ τραχὺς τὸ πρῶτον. ἐπὶ δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἕψαι, ῥηιδίη δ' ἦνετα σίλει. “The way to virtue is
“ long and steep, and very rugged at first; but, after you are
“ come at the top, it then becomes easy.” HESIOD.

r *Cælo præfertur Adonis*. “Adonis is preferred to heaven.”

s Ὁ ἀρετῇ διαρέπων ἢ ἡδονὰς ἀμεταμελήτως καρπῦται. “He who
“ excels in virtue, reaps pleasures that can never be repented
“ of.” HIEROCL.

t If the soul was mortal, yet the virtuous man τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελει-
ότητα ἀπολαμβάνων, τὸ οἰκεῖον καρπύμενος ἀγαθόν, εὐδαιμον ὄντως ἐστὶ ἢ
μακάριος· ἢ γὰρ ἢ τὸ σῶμα, κτλ. “becomes as perfect as he can be,
“ reaps his own proper good, being truly blessed and happy:
“ and the body also, &c.” SIMPL.

without

without pretending to describe it, may be presumed to be *immortal*, because the soul is so; and to be purer and of a more exalted nature (*i. e.* *truer*, and *greater*) than any of these low enjoyments here, because that state is every way in nature above this. And again, what does the wicked man *lose*? That happiness, which the virtuous gain *as such*; and he sinks, beside, into some degree of the *unhappiness* of that future state: of which one may say in general, that it may be as much greater than the unhappiness or sufferings of this world, as the happiness and joys of that are above those of this.

In a state that is *spiritual* and clear every thing will be purer, and operate more directly and strongly, and (if the expression may be tolerated) *with more spirit*: there will be fewer obstructions to either happiness or unhappiness: the soul will lie *more open*, and have more *immediate* and acute perceptions of either: so that each of them in their kind will be more *intense*, the one nearer to pure or mere happiness, the other to the contrary^u. But to enter further into the nature and oeconomy of the yet unknown world is too arduous an undertaking for my *philosopher*.

I shall only add, that the *reasoning* and *virtuous* man has at least this advantage over the *foolish* and *profligate*, that, tho. his wisdom and virtue cannot *always* rectify that which is amiss in himself or his

^u "Ὡς ἂν μὴ μόνον τῷ καλῷ περιεῖναι τὸν σπυδαῖον τῷ φαύλῳ, ἀλλὰ ἡ αὐτῇ τῇ ἡδονῇ νικᾶν, δι' ἣν μόνον δοκεῖ εἰς κακίαν ὁ φαῦλος ὑπάγεσθαι. " So that " a good man excels a bad man not only in goodness, but he " exceeds him in pleasure also, by which alone the bad man " was led to be wicked." HIEROCL.

circum-

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circumstances, they will find means to *alleviate* his pressures and disadvantages, and support him under all the anomalies of life, with *comforts* of which the other knows nothing: particularly this, the enjoyment of an humble, but well grounded expectation of *felicity hereafter*, sincere and durable ^w.

XVII. *He therefore, who would act according to truth, must, in the last place, not only consider what he is, and how circumstantiated in this present state, and provide accordingly; but, further, must consider himself also as one whose existence proceeds on into another, and provide for that too.* How I think this is to be done, by this time I hope you fully apprehend.

For a *conclusion* of the whole matter; let our conversation in this world, so far as we are concerned, and able, be such as acknowledges every thing to be *what it is* (what it is in *itself*, and what with regard to *us*, to other *beings*, to *causes*, *circumstances*, *consequences*): that is, let us by no act *deny* any thing to be *true*, which is *true*: that is, let us act according to *reason*: and that is, let us act according to the *law of our nature*. By *honestly endeavouring* to do this we shall express our duty ^x to

^w Οἱ γὰρ δίκαιοι τῶν ἀδίκων, εἰ μὴδὲν ἄλλο πλεονεκτήσιν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἐλπίσι γε σπουδαίαις ὑπερέχουσιν. “If the righteous do not excel the wicked in any thing else, yet they do in their expectations of happiness.” ISOOCR.

^x Τρόπος γὰρ Θεῷ θεραπειᾶς ἕτος ὁσιώτατος [ἀσκεῖν ἀρετὴν]. “For (to practise virtue) is the most sacred manner of worshipping God.” Jos.

Him,

Him, who is the Author of it, and of that law; and at the same time prosecute our own *proper* happiness (the happiness of *rational* beings): we shall do what tends to make us easy here, and be qualifying ourselves and preparing for our removal hence to our long home; that great *revolution*, which, at the farthest, cannot be very far off.

And now, *Sir*, the trouble is almost over for the present, not properly which I give you, but which you have brought upon yourself, these being the *Thoughts*, which you *desired*: unless I have anywhere misrepresented myself through *inadvertence*; which I own may be. At the foot of the page I have in some places subjoined a *few little* strictures principally of *antiquity*, after the manner of annotations: such as, when I came to revise these sheets, I could recollect upon the sudden^y; having no common-place book to help me, nor thought of any such thing before that time. They may serve perhaps sometimes a little to explain the text; and sometimes to add weight; but chiefly to *divert* you, who know very well how to improve any the *least hint* out of the Ancients, and I fear will *want* to be diverted. I have also printed a few copies of this *Sketch*, not with any design to make it public, but merely to save the trouble of *transcribing*^z; being minded, since I have made it, to leave it not only with *you*, but perhaps also with two or

^y Some more were added in the second impression.

^z Nothing more was intended at first.

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three other *friends*: or however, with my *Family*,
as a *private monument* of one that meant well.
Tho, as to the disposal and fate of it, much will
depend upon your judgment and manner of ac-
ceptance.

WILLIAM WOLLASTON.

מִכֵּי וְתוֹלָא

“ Who is like unto God ? ”

And “ Praised be God.”



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