

A N  
I N Q U I R Y

INTO THE

ORIGINAL of our IDEAS

OF

BEAUTY *and* VIRTUE;

IN TWO TREATISES.

I. Concerning BEAUTY, ORDER,  
HARMONY, DESIGN.

II. Concerning MORAL GOOD and  
EVIL.

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The Fourth Edition, Corrected.

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Itaque eorum ipsorum quæ aspectu sentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit. Quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem, constantiam, ordinem in consiliis, factisque conservandum putat. Quibus ex rebus conflatur & efficitur id quod quærimus honestum: Quod etiam si nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum fit: quodque etiam si à nullo laudetur, naturâ est laudabile. Formam quidem ipsam & tanquam faciem honesti vides, quæ si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores excitaret sapientiæ.

*Cic. de Off. lib. 1. c. 4.*

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
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— T O

HIS EXCELLENCY

J O H N,

Lord *CARTERET*,

Lord Lieutenant of *IRELAND*.

*May it please your Excellency,*

**W**HEN I publish'd these  
Papers, I had so lit-  
tle Confidence of their Suc-  
cess, that I was unwilling  
to own them; and what I

A 2

was

was unwilling myself to own, I durst not presume to inscribe to any great Name.

YOUR Excellency's favourable Reception of them, soon put me out of all Fears about their Success with the wiser and better Part of the World; and since this has given me Assurance to own them, I humbly presume to inscribe them in this second Edition to your Excellency, that I may have at once an Opportunity of expressing the sincerest Gratitude for the Notice you were pleas'd to take of me, and have the Pleasure also of letting the World know, that this small Work has your Excellency's Approbation.

THE

THE Praise bestow'd by Persons of real Merit and Discernment, is allow'd by all to give a noble and rational Pleasure. Your Excellency first made me feel this in the most lively manner; and it will be a Pleasure as lasting as it is great: 'twill ever be matter of the highest Joy and Satisfaction to me, that I am Author of a Book my LORD CARTERET approves.

I KNOW, my Lord, that much of your Commendation is to be attributed to your own Humanity: You can intirely approve the Works of those alone, who can think  
and

and speak on these Subjects as justly as Yourself; and that is what few, if any, even of those who spend their Lives in such Contemplations, are able to do. In the Conversation, with which your Excellency has been pleas'd to honour me, I could not, I own, without the utmost Surprize, observe so intimate an Acquaintance with the most valuable Writings of contemplative Men, Antient and Modern; so just a Taste of what is excellent in the ingenious Arts, in so young a Man, amidst the Hurry of an active Life. Forgive me, my Lord, that mention this Part of your Character: 'tis so uncommon, that  
it

it deserves the highest Admiration; and 'tis the only one which an obscure Philosopher, who has receiv'd the greatest Obligations from your Excellency, can with any Propriety take notice of.

THOSE other great Endowments which have enabled You, even in Youth, to discharge the most difficult Employments, with the highest Honour to Yourself, and Advantage to your Country, I dare not presume to describe. He who attempts to do Justice to so great and good a Character, ought himself to be one of uncommon Merit and Distinction: And yet the ablest  
Panc-

Panegyrist would find it difficult to add any thing to your Excellency's Fame. The Voices of NATIONS proclaim your Worth. I am,

*May it please your Excellency,*

*Your most obliged,*

*Most obedient, and*

*Most devoted humble Servant;*

Dublin,  
June 19.  
1725.

Francis Hutcheson.



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T H E

# P R E F A C E.

**T**HERE is no Part of Philosophy of more Importance, than a just Knowledge of Human Nature, and its various Powers and Dispositions. Our late Inquiries have been very much employ'd about our Understanding, and the several Methods of obtaining Truth. We generally acknowledge, that the Importance of any Truth is nothing else than its Moment, or Efficacy to make Men happy, or to give them the greatest and most lasting Pleasure; and Wisdom denotes only a Capacity of pursuing this End by the best Means. It must surely then be of the greatest Importance, to have distinct Conceptions of this End itself, as well as of the Means necessary to obtain it; that we may find out which are the  
a greatest

greatest and most lasting Pleasures, and not employ our Reason, after all our laborious Improvements of it, in trifling Pursuits. It is to be fear'd indeed that most of our Studys, without this Inquiry, will be of very little Use to us; for they seem to have scarce any other Tendency than to lead us into Speculative Knowledge itself. Nor are we distinctly told how it is that Knowledge or Truth is pleasant to us.

*T*HIS Consideration put the Author of the following Papers upon inquiring into the various Pleasures which Human Nature is capable of receiving. We shall generally find in our modern philosophick Writings, nothing farther on this Head, than some bare Division of them into Sensible, and Rational, and some trite Common-place Arguments to prove the latter more valuable than the former. Our sensible Pleasures are slightly pass'd over, and explain'd only by some Instances in Tastes, Smells, Sounds, or such-like, which Men of any tolerable Reflection generally look upon as very trifling

*trifling Satisfactions.* Our rational Pleasures have had much the same kind of Treatment. We are seldom taught any other Notion of rational Pleasure than that which we have upon reflecting on our Possession or Claim to those Objects, which may be Occasions of Pleasure. Such Objects we call advantageous; but Advantage, or Interest, cannot be distinctly conceiv'd, till we know what those Pleasures are which advantageous Objects are apt to excite; and what Senses or Powers of Perception we have with respect to such Objects. We may perhaps find such an Inquiry of more Importance in Morals, to prove what we call the Reality of Virtue, or that it is the surest Happiness of the Agent, than one would at first imagine.

IN reflecting upon our external Senses, we plainly see, that our Perceptions of Pleasure or Pain do not depend directly on our Will. Objects do not please us, according as we incline they should. The Presence of some Objects necessarily pleases us, and

*the Presence of others as necessarily displeases us. Nor can we, by our Will, any otherwise procure Pleasure, or avoid Pain, than by procuring the former kind of Objects, and avoiding the latter. By the very Frame of our Nature the one is made the Occasion of Delight, and the other of Dissatisfaction.*

*T H E same Observation will hold in all our other Pleasures and Pains. For there are many other sorts of Objects, which please, or displease us as necessarily, as material Objects do when they operate upon our Organs of Sense. There is scarcely any Object which our Minds are employ'd about, which is not thus constituted the necessary Occasion of some Pleasure or Pain. Thus we find ourselves pleas'd with a regular Form, a Piece of Architecture or Painting, a Composition of Notes, a Theorem, an Action, an Affection, a Character. And we are conscious that this Pleasure necessarily arises from the Contemplation of the Idea, which is then present*

*to*

*to our Minds, with all its Circumstances, altho' some of these Ideas have nothing of what we commonly call sensible Perception in them; and in those which have, the Pleasure arises from some Uniformity, Order, Arrangement, Imitation; and not from the simple Ideas of Colour, or Sound, or Mode of Extension separately consider'd.*

*THESE Determinations to be pleas'd with any Forms, or Ideas which occur to our Observation, the Author chooses to call SENSES; distinguishing them from the Powers which commonly go by that Name, by calling our Power of perceiving the Beauty of Regularity, Order, Harmony, an INTERNAL SENSE; and that Determination to approve Affections, Actions, or Characters of rational Agents, which we call virtuous, he marks by the Name of a MORAL SENSE.*

*HIS principal Design is to shew,  
 " That Human Nature was not left  
 " quite indifferent in the Affair of  
 " Virtue, to form to itself Observa-*

“ tions concerning the Advantage, or  
 “ Disadvantage of  $\Delta$ ctions, and accord-  
 “ ingly to regulate its Conduct.” The  
 Weakness of our Reason, and the Avoca-  
 tions arising from the Infirmitys  
 and Necessitys of our Nature, are so  
 great, that very few Men could ever  
 have form'd those long Deductions of  
 Reason, which shew some Actions to  
 be in the whole advantageous to the  
 Agent, and their Contrarys pernicious.  
 The AUTHOR of Nature has much  
 better furnish'd us for a virtuous Con-  
 duct, than our Moralists seem to ima-  
 gine, by almost as quick and powerful  
 Instructions, as we have for the Pre-  
 servation of our Bodys. He has given  
 us strong Affections to be the Springs  
 of each virtuous Action; and made  
 Virtue a lovely Form, that we might  
 easily distinguish it from its Contrary,  
 and be made happy by the Pursuit of  
 it.

*THIS* Moral Sense of Beauty in  
 Actions and Affections, may appear  
 strange at first View. Some of our  
 Moralists themselves are offended at it  
 in

*in my Lord SHAFTESBURY; so much are they accusom'd to deduce every Approbation, or Aversion, from rational Views of Interest, (except it be merely in the Simple Ideas of the external Senses) and have such a Horror at innate Ideas, which they imagine this borders upon. But this moral Sense has no relation to innate Ideas, as will appear in the second Treatise. Our Gentlemen of good Taste can tell us of a great many Senses, Tastes, and Relishes for Beauty, Harmony, Imitation in Painting and Poetry; and may not we find too in Mankind a Relish for a Beauty in Characters, in Manners? I doubt we have made Philosophy, as well as Religion, by our foolish Management of it, so austere and ungainly a Form, that a Gentleman cannot easily bring himself to like it; and those who are Strangers to it, can scarcely bear to bear our Description of it. So much it is changed from what was once the Delight of the finest Gentlemen among the Antients, and*

*their Recreation after the Hurry of publick Affairs!*

*IN the first Treatise, the Author perhaps in some Instances has gone too far, in supposing a greater Agreement of Mankind in their Sense of Beauty, than Experience will confirm; but all he is solicitous about, is to shew,*  
*“ That there is some Sense of Beauty*  
*“ natural to Men; that we find as*  
*“ great an Agreement of Men in their*  
*“ Relishes of Forms, as in their exter-*  
*“ nal Senses, which all agree to be*  
*“ natural; and that Pleasure or*  
*“ Pain, Delight or Aversion, are*  
*“ naturally join'd to their Perceptions.”*  
*If the Reader be convinc'd of such Determinations of the Mind to be pleas'd with Forms, Proportions, Resemblances, Theorems; it will be no difficult matter to apprehend another superior Sense, natural also to Men, determining them to be pleas'd with Actions, Characters, Affections. This is the Moral Sense, which makes the Subject of the second Treatise.*



*THE proper Occasions of Perception by the external Senses, occur to us as soon as we come into the World; whence perhaps we easily look upon these Senses to be natural: but the Objects of the superior Senses of Beauty and Virtue generally do not. It is probably some little Time before Children reflect, or at least let us know that they reflect upon Proportion and Similitude; upon Affections, Characters, Tempers; or come to know the external Actions which are Evidences of them. Hence we imagine, that their Sense of Beauty, and their moral Sentiments of Actions, must be intirely owing to Instruction and Education; whereas it is as easy to conceive, how a Character, a Temper, as soon as they are observ'd, may be constituted by NATURE the necessary Occasion of Pleasure, or an Object of Approbation, as a Taste or a Sound; tho' these Objects present themselves to our Observation sooner than the other.*

*THE first Impression of these Papers was so well receiv'd, that the*  
 Author

Author hopes it will be no Offence to any who are concern'd in the Memory of the late Lord Viscount MOLESWORTH, if he lets his Readers know that he was the Noble Person mention'd in the Preface to the first Edition, and that their being published was owing to his Approbation of them. It was from him he had that shrewd Objection, which the Reader may find in the first Treatise \*; besides many other Remarks in the frequent Conversations with which he honour'd the Author; by which that Treatise was very much improved beyond what it was in the Draught presented to him. The Author retains the most grateful Sense of his singular Civilities, and of the Pleasure and Improvement he receiv'd in his Conversation; and is still fond of expressing his grateful Remembrance of him: but,

Id cinerem, & Manes credas curare  
sepultos?

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\* Sect. v. Art. 2. the last Paragraph.

*TO* be concern'd in this Book can be no Honour to a Person so justly celebrated for the most generous Sentiments of Virtue and Religion, deliver'd with the most manly Eloquence: yet it would not be just toward the World, should the Author conceal his Obligations to the Reverend Mr. EDWARDSYNGE; not only for revising these Papers, when they stood in great need of an accurate Review, but for suggesting several just Amendments in the general Scheme of Morality. The Author was much confirm'd in his Opinion of the Justness of these Thoughts, upon finding that this Gentleman had fallen into the same way of Thinking before him; and will ever look upon his Friendship as one of the greatest Advantages and Pleasures of his Life.

*TO* recommend the Lord SHAFTESBURY's Writings to the World, is a very needless Attempt. They will be esteem'd while any Reflection remains among Men. It is indeed to be wish'd, that he had abstained from  
mixing

*mixing with such Noble Performances, some Prejudices he had receiv'd against Christianity; a Religion which gives us the truest Idea of Virtue, and recommends the Love of GOD, and of MANKIND, as the Sum of all true Religion. How would it have moved the Indignation of that ingenious Nobleman, to have found a dissolute Set of Men, who relish nothing in Life but the lowest and most sordid Pleasures, searching into his Writings for those Insinuations against Christianity, that they might be the less restrained from their Debaucherys; when at the same time their low Minds are incapable of relishing those noble Sentiments of Virtue and Honour, which he has placed in so lovely a Light!*

*WHATEVER Faults the Ingenious may find with this Performance, the Author hopes nobody will find any thing in it contrary to Religion, or good Manners: and he shall be well pleased, if he gives the learned World an Occasion of examining more thoroughly these Subjects, which are, he presumes,*

*presumes, of very considerable Importance. The chief Ground of his Assurance that his Opinions in the main are just, is this, That as he took the first Hints of them from some of the greatest Writers of Antiquity, so the more he has convers'd with them, he finds his Illustrations the more conformable to their Sentiments.*

*I N the first Edition of this Book there were some Mistakes in one or two of the Instances borrowed from other Sciences, to a perfect Knowledge of which the Author does not pretend; nor would he now undertake that this Edition is every way faultless. He hopes that those who are studious of the true Measures of Life, may find his Ideas of Virtue and Happiness tolerably just; and that the profound Connoisseurs will pardon a few Faults, in the Illustrations borrow'd from their Arts, upon which his Arguments do not depend.*

*I N this Edition, what Alterations are made, are partly owing to the Objections of some Gentlemen,  
who*

*who wrote very keenly against several Principles in this Book. The Author was convinced of some inaccurate Expressions, which are now altered; and some Arguments, he hopes, are now made clearer: but he has not yet seen Cause to renounce any of the Principles maintained in it. Nor is there any thing of consequence added, except in Sect. II. of Treatise 2d; and the same Reasoning is found in Sect. I. of the Essay on the Passions.*

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THE  
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AN  
INQUIRY

INTO THE  
Original of our IDEAS  
OF  
BEAUTY *and* VIRTUE.

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TREATISE . I.  
*Of Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design.*

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SECT. I.

*Concerning some Powers of Perception, distinct from what is generally understood by Sensation.*

**T**O make the following Observations understood, it may be necessary to premise some *Definitions*, and *Observations*, either universally acknowledg'd, or sufficiently prov'd by many Writers both antient and modern, concerning our Perceptions called *Sensations*, and the *Actions* of the Mind consequent upon them.

*Art. I.* THOSE *Ideas* which are rais'd in the Mind upon the Presence of external Ob-

B

jects,

*Sensation.*


Sect. 1. jects, and their acting upon our Bodys, are call'd *Sensations*. We find that the Mind in such Cases is passive, and has not Power directly to prevent the Perception or Idea, or to vary it at its Reception, as long as we continue our Bodys in a State fit to be acted upon by the external Object.

*Different  
Senses.*

II. WHEN two Perceptions are intirely different from each other, or agree in nothing but the general Idea of *Sensation*, we call the Powers of receiving those different Perceptions, *different Senses*. Thus *Seeing* and *Hearing* denote the different Powers of receiving the Ideas of Colours and Sounds. And altho' Colours have great Differences among themselves, as also have Sounds; yet there is a greater Agreement among the most opposite Colours, than between any Colour and a Sound: Hence we call all Colours Perceptions of the same Sense. All the several Senses seem to have their distinct Organs, except *Feeling*, which is in some degree diffus'd over the whole Body.

*The Mind  
how active.*

III. THE Mind has a Power of *compound-  
ing* Ideas, which were receiv'd separately; of *comparing* Objects by means of the Ideas, and of observing their *Relations* and *Proportions*; of *enlarging* and *diminishing* its Ideas at Pleasure, or in any certain *Ratio*, or *Degree*; and of considering *separately* each of the simple Ideas, which might per-  
haps

haps have been impress'd jointly in the Sen- Sect. 1.  
 sation. This last Operation we commonly   
 call *Abstraction*.

IV. THE Ideas of *Substances* are com- *Substances.*  
 pounded of the various simple Ideas jointly  
 impress'd, when they presented themselves  
 to our Senses. We define Substances only  
 by enumerating these sensible Ideas. And  
 such Definitions may raise an Idea clear  
 enough of the Substance in the Mind of one  
 who never immediately perceiv'd the Sub-  
 stance ; provided he has separately receiv'd  
 by his Senses all the simple Ideas which are  
 in the Composition of the complex one of  
 the Substance defin'd: But if there be any  
 simple Ideas which he has not receiv'd, or  
 if he wants any of the *Senses* necessary for  
 the Perception of them, no Definition can  
 raise any simple Idea which has not been  
 before perceiv'd by the *Senses*.

V. HENCE it follows, "That when *In- Education.*  
*struction, Education, or Prejudice* of any *Instruction.*  
 " kind, raise any Desire or Aversion toward  
 " an Object, this Desire or Aversion must  
 " be founded upon an Opinion of some  
 " Perfection, or of some Deficiency in those  
 " *Qualitys*, for Perception of which we  
 " have the proper Senses." Thus, if *Beauty*  
 be desir'd by one who has not the Sense of  
*Sight*, the Desire must be rais'd by some  
 apprehended Regularity of *Figure, Sweet-*

Señ. I. *ness of Voice, Smoothness, or Softness, or some other Quality perceivable by the other Senses, without relation to the Ideas of Colour.*

*Pleasure,  
Pain.*

VI. M A N Y of our sensitive Perceptions are pleasant and many painful, immediately, and that without any Knowledge of the Cause of this Pleasure or Pain, or how the Objects excite it, or are the Occasions of it; or without seeing to what farther Advantage or Detriment the Use of such Objects might tend: Nor would the most accurate Knowledge of these things vary either the Pleasure or Pain of the Perception, however it might give a rational Pleasure distinct from the sensible; or might raise a distinct Joy, from a Prospect of farther Advantage in the Object, or Aversion, from an Apprehension of Evil.

*Different  
Ideas.*

VII. T H E *simple Ideas* rais'd in different Persons by the same Object, are probably some way different, when they disagree in their Approbation or Dislike; and in the same Person, when his *Fancy* at one time differs from what it was at another. This will appear from reflecting on those Objects, to which we have now an Aversion, tho' they were formerly agreeable: And we shall generally find that there is some accidental *Conjunction* of a disagreeable Idea, which always recurs with the Object; as in those Wines to which Men acquire an Aversion,

Aversion, after they have taken them in an Emetick Preparation, we are conscious that the *Idea* is alter'd from what it was when that Wine was agreeable, by the Conjunction of the Ideas of Loathing and Sickness of Stomach. The like Change of *Idea* may be insensibly made by the Change of our Bodys as we advance in Years, or when we are accustomed to any Object, which may occasion an Indifference toward Meats we were fond of in our Childhood; and may make some Objects cease to raise the disagreeable Ideas, which they excited upon our first use of them. Many of our simple Perceptions are disagreeable only thro' the too great *Intenseness* of the Quality: thus moderate Light is agreeable, very strong Light may be painful; moderate Bitter may be pleasant, a higher Degree may be offensive. A Change in our Organs will necessarily occasion a Change in the *Intenseness* of the Perception at least; nay, sometimes will occasion a quite contrary Perception: Thus a warm Hand shall feel that Water cold, which a cold Hand shall feel warm.

WE shall not find it perhaps so easy to account for the Diversity of Fancy about more *complex Ideas* of Objects, in which we regard many Ideas of different Senses at once; as some Perceptions of those call'd *primary Qualitys*, and some *secondary*, as explain'd by Mr. LOCKE: for instance,

Seçt. 1. in the different Fancies about *Architecture*,  
 ~~~~~ *Gardening*, *Dress*. Of the two former we shall offer something in Seçt. VI. As to *Dress*, we may generally account for the Diversity of Fancies from a like Conjunction of Ideas: Thus, if either from any thing in Nature, or from the Opinion of our Country or Acquaintance, the fancying of *glaring Colours* be look'd upon as an Evidence of Levity, or of any other evil Quality of Mind; or if any *Colour or Fashion* be commonly us'd by Rusticks, or by Men of any disagreeable Profession, Employment, or Temper; these additional Ideas may recur constantly with that of the *Colour or Fashion*, and cause a constant Dislike to them in those who join the additional Ideas, altho' the Colour or Form be no way disagreeable of themselves, and actually do please others who join no such Ideas to them. But there does not seem to be any Ground to believe such a Diversity in human Minds, as that the same simple Idea or Perception should give Pleasure to one and Pain to another, or to the same Person at different times; not to say that it seems a Contradiction, that the same simple Idea should do so.

*Complex Ideas.*

VIII. THE only Pleasure of Sense, which many Philosophers seem to consider, is that which accompanys the simple Ideas of Sensation: But there are far greater Pleasures  
 in

in those complex Ideas of Objects, which Sect. I. obtain the Names of *Beautiful, Regular, Harmonious*. Thus every one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a just Picture, than with the View of any one Colour, were it as strong and lively as possible; and more pleas'd with a Prospect of the Sun arising among settled Clouds, and colouring their Edges, with a starry Hemisphere, a fine Landskip, a regular Building, than with a clear blue Sky, a smooth Sea, or a large open Plain, not diversified by Woods, Hills, Waters, Buildings: And yet even these latter Appearances are not quite *simple*. So in Musick, the Pleasure of *fine Composition* is incomparably greater than that of any one Note, how sweet, full, or swelling soever.

IX. LET it be observ'd, that in the following Papers,, the Word *Beauty* is taken for *the Idea rais'd in us*, and a *Sense* of Beauty for *our Power of receiving this Idea*. *Harmony* also denotes *our pleasant Ideas arising from Composition of Sounds*, and a good *Ear* (as it is generally taken) a *Power of perceiving this Pleasure*. In the following Sections, an Attempt is made to discover " what is the *immediate Occasion* of these " pleasant Ideas, or what real Quality in the Objects ordinarily excites them."

Sect. I. X. IT is of no Consequence whether we call these Ideas of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, Perceptions of the *External Senses* of Seeing and Hearing, or not. I should rather choose to call our Power of perceiving these Ideas, an INTERNAL SENSE, were it only for the Convenience of distinguishing them from other Sensations of Seeing and Hearing, which Men may have without Perception of *Beauty* and *Harmony*. It is plain from Experience, that many Men have, in the common Meaning, the Senses of Seeing and Hearing perfect enough; they perceive all the *simple Ideas* separately, and have their Pleasures; they distinguish them from each other, such as one Colour from another, either quite different, or the stronger or fainter of the same Colour, when they are plac'd beside each other, altho' they may often confound their *Names* when they occur apart from each other, as some do the Names of *Green* and *Blue*: they can tell in separate Notes the *higher, lower, sharper or flatter*, when separately sounded; in Figures they discern the *Length, Breadth, Wideness* of each Line, Surface, Angle; and may be as capable of hearing and seeing at great Distances as any Men whatsoever: And yet perhaps they shall find no Pleasure in Musical Compositions, in Painting, Architecture, natural Landskip; or but a very weak one in comparison of what others




others enjoy from the same Objects. This Sect. I. greater Capacity of receiving such pleasant Ideas we commonly call a *fine Genius* or *Taste*: In Musick we seem universally to acknowledge something like a distinct Sense from the External one of Hearing, and call it a *good Ear*; and the like Distinction we should probably acknowledge in other Objects, had we also got distinct Names to denote these *Powers* of Perception by.

XI. THERE will appear another Reason <sup>Different from Ex-</sup> perhaps hereafter, for calling this Power of <sup>ternal.</sup> perceiving the Ideas of *Beauty*, an *Internal Sense*, from this, that in some other Affairs, where our *External Senses* are not much concern'd, we discern a sort of Beauty, very like, in many respects, to that observ'd in sensible Objects, and accompany'd with like Pleasure: Such is that *Beauty* perceiv'd in *Theorems*, or universal Truths, in *general Causes*, and in some *extensive Principles* of Action.

XII. LET every one here consider, how different we must suppose the *Perception* to be, with which a Poet is transported upon the Prospect of any of those Objects of *natural Beauty*, which ravish us even in his Description; from that cold, lifeless *Conception* which we imagine in a *dull Critick*, or one of the *Virtuosi*; without what we call a *fine Taste*. This latter Class of Men may have

Sect. I. have greater Perfection in that Knowledge, which is deriv'd from external Sensation; they can tell all the *specifick Differences* of Trees, Herbs, Minerals, Metals; they know the *Form* of every Leaf, Stalk, Root, Flower, and Seed of all the Species, about which the Poet is often very ignorant: And yet the Poet shall have a much more delightful Perception of the Whole; and not only the Poet, but any Man of a fine Taste. Our External Senses may by measuring teach us all the Proportions of Architecture to the Tenth of an Inch, and the Situation of every Muscle in the human Body; and a good Memory may retain these: and yet there is still something farther necessary, not only to make a Man a complete Master in *Architecture, Painting* or *Statuary*, but even a tolerable Judge in these Works; or capable of receiving the highest Pleasure in contemplating them. Since then there are such different Powers of Perception, where what are commonly called the *External Senses* are the same; since the most accurate Knowledge of what the External Senses discover, often does not give the Pleasure of Beauty or Harmony, which yet one of a *good Taste* will enjoy at once without much *Knowledge*; we may justly use another Name for these higher and more delightful Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony, and call the *Power* of receiving such Impressions, an *Internal Sense*. The Difference of the Perceptions seems

seems sufficient to vindicate the Use of a Sect. 1. different Name, especially when we are told  in what Meaning the Word is applied.

XIII. THIS superior Power of Perception is justly called a *Sense*, because of its <sup>*Its Pleasures necessary and immediate.*</sup> Affinity to the other Senses in this, that the Pleasure does not arise from any *Knowledge* of Principles, Proportions, Causes, or of the Usefulness of the Object; but strikes us at first with the Idea of Beauty: nor does the most accurate *Knowledge* increase this Pleasure of Beauty, however it may superadd a distinct rational Pleasure from Prospects of *Advantage*, or from the Increase of Knowledge\*.

XIV. AND farther, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any *Prospect* of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object: For as in the external Sensations, no View of *Interest* will make an Object grateful, nor View of *Detriment* distinct from immediate *Pain* in the Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense; so propose the whole World as a *Reward*, or threaten the greatest Evil, to make us approve a deform'd Object, or disapprove a


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\* See above, Art. 6.

Sect. I. beautiful one; Diffimulation may be procur'd by Rewards or Threatnings, or we may in external Conduct abstain from any *Pursuit* of the Beautiful, and pursue the Deform'd; but our *Sentiments* of the Forms, and our *Perceptions*, would continue invariably the same.

*This Sense antecedent to, and distinct from Prospects of Interest.*

XV. HENCE it plainly appears, “ That some Objects are *immediately* the Occasions of this Pleasure of Beauty, and that we have Senses fitted for perceiving it, and that it is distinct from that *Joy* which arises upon Prospect of Advantage.” Nay, do not we often see Convenience and Use neglected to obtain Beauty, without any other Prospect of *Advantage* in the beautiful Form, than the suggesting the pleasant Ideas of Beauty? Now this shews us, that however we may *pursue* beautiful Objects from Self-love, with a View to obtain the Pleasures of Beauty, as in Architecture, Gardening, and many other Affairs; yet there must be a *Sense* of Beauty, antecedent to Prospects even of this Advantage; without which Sense, these Objects would not be thus *Advantageous*, nor excite in us this Pleasure which constitutes them advantageous. Our *Sense* of Beauty from Objects, by which they are constituted good to us, is very distinct from our *Desire* of them when they are thus constituted: Our *Desire* of Beauty may be counter-balanc'd by Rewards or Threatnings, but never our *Sense* of it;

it; even as Fear of Death may make us de- Sect. 1.  
 fire a bitter Potion, or neglect those Meats  which the *Sense* of Taste would recommend as pleasant; and yet no Prospect of Advantage, or Fear of Evil, can make that Potion agreeable to the Sense, or Meat disagreeable to it, which was not so antecedently to this Prospect. The same holds true of the Sense of Beauty and Harmony; that the *Pursuit* of such Objects is frequently neglected, from Prospects of Advantage, Aversion to Labour, or any other Motive of Interest, does not prove that we have no *Sense* of Beauty, but only that our Desire of it may be counter-balanc'd by a stronger Desire.

XVI. HAD we no such *Sense* of Beauty and Harmony; Houses, Gardens, Drefs, Equipage, might have been recommended to us as convenient, fruitful, warm, easy; but never as *beautiful*: And in Faces I see nothing which could please us, but Liveliness of Colour, and Smoothness of Surface: And yet nothing is more certain, than that all these Objects are recommended under quite different *Views* on many Occasions: And Custom, Education, or Example could never give us *Perceptions* distinct from those of the Senses which we had the Use of before, or recommend Objects under another *Conception* than grateful to \* them. But of

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\* See Art. 5.

Sect. 1. the Influence of Custom, Education, Example, upon the Sense of Beauty, we shall treat below \*.

*Beauty*  
*Original or*  
*Comparative.*

XVII. BEAUTY is either *Original* or *Comparative*; or, if any like the Terms better, *Absolute* or *Relative*: Only let it be observ'd, that by *Absolute* or *Original* Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos'd to be in the Object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any Mind which perceives it: For Beauty, like other Names of sensible Ideas, properly denotes the *Perception* of some Mind; so *Cold*, *Hot*, *Sweet*, *Bitter*, denote the Sensations in our Minds, to which perhaps there is no Resemblance in the Objects, which excite these Ideas in us, however we generally imagine otherwise. The Ideas of Beauty and Harmony being excited upon our *Perception* of some *primary Quality*, and having relation to *Figure* and *Time*, may indeed have a nearer Resemblance to Objects, than these Sensations, which seem not so much any *Pictures* of Objects, as *Modifications* of the perceiving Mind; and yet, were there no Mind with a *Sense* of Beauty to contemplate Objects, I see not how they could be call'd *beautiful*. We

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\* Sect. 7.

therefore by \* *Absolute* Beauty understand Sect. I. only that Beauty, which we perceive in Objects without *Comparison* to any thing external, of which the Object is suppos'd an Imitation, or Picture; such as that Beauty perceiv'd from the *Works of Nature, artificial Forms, Figures, Theorems. Comparative* or *Relative* Beauty is that which we perceive in Objects, commonly considered as *Imitations* or *Resemblances* of something else. These two Kinds of Beauty employ the three following Sections.

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\* *This Division of Beauty is taken from the different Foundations of Pleasure to our Sense of it, rather than from the Objects themselves: For most of the following Instances of relative Beauty have also absolute Beauty; and many of the Instances of absolute Beauty, have also relative Beauty in some respect or other. But we may distinctly consider these two Fountains of Pleasure, Uniformity in the Object itself, and Resemblance to some Original.*

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## S E C T. II.

## Of Original or Absolute Beauty.

*Sense of  
Men.*

I. **S**INCE it is certain that we have *Ideas* of Beauty and Harmony, let us examine what *Quality* in Objects excites these Ideas, or is the Occasion of them. And let it be here observ'd, that our Inquiry is only about the *Qualities* which are beautiful to *Men*; or about the Foundation of their Sense of Beauty: for, as was above hinted, Beauty has always relation to the *Sense* of some Mind; and when we afterwards shew how generally the Objects which occur to us, are *beautiful*, we mean that such Objects are agreeable to the Sense of *Men*: for there are many Objects which seem no way beautiful to Men, and yet other *Animals* seem delighted with them; they may have *Senses* otherwise constituted than those of Men, and may have the Ideas of Beauty excited by Objects of a quite different Form: We see Animals fitted for every Place; and what to Men appears rude and shapeless, or loathsome, may be to them a *Paradise*.

II. THAT we may more distinctly discover the general *Foundation* or Occasion of the Ideas of Beauty among Men, it will be  
 necessary



necessary to consider it first in its *simpler* Sect. 2. Kinds, such as occurs to us in regular Figures; and we may perhaps find that the same Foundation extends to all the more complex Species of it.

III. THE Figures which excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, seem to be those in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*. There are many Conceptions of Objects which are agreeable upon other accounts, such as *Grandeur, Novelty, Sanctity*, and some others, which shall be mention'd hereafter\*. But what we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak in the Mathematical Style, seems to be in a compound *Ratio* of *Uniformity* and *Variety*: so that where the *Uniformity* of Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as the *Variety*; and where the *Variety* is equal, the Beauty is as the *Uniformity*. This will be plain from Examples.

FIRST, the *Variety* increases the Beauty in equal *Uniformity*. The Beauty of an *equilateral Triangle* is less than that of the *Square*; which is less than that of a *Pentagon*; and this again is surpass'd by the *Hexagon*. When indeed the Number of Sides is much increas'd, the Proportion of them to the *Radius*, or *Diameter* of the Figure, or of the *Circle*, to which regular *Polygons* have

\* See Sect. vi. Art. 11, 12, 13.

Sect. 2. an obvious Relation, is so much lost to our  
 ~~~~~ Observation, that the Beauty does not al-  
 ways increase with the Number of Sides ;  
 and the want of Parallelism in the Sides of  
*Heptagons*, and other Figures of odd Num-  
 bers, may also diminish their Beauty.  
 So in *Solids*, the *Eicosiedron* surpasses the  
*Dodecaedron*, and this the *Octaedron*, which  
 is still more beautiful than the *Cube* ; and  
 this again surpasses the regular *Pyramid* :  
 The obvious Ground of this, is greater *Va-*  
*riety* with equal *Uniformity*.

*Uniformity.*

THE greater *Uniformity* increases the  
*Beauty* amidst equal *Variety*, in these In-  
 stances : An Equilateral *Triangle*, or even  
 an *Isofceles*, surpasses the *Scalenum* : A  
*Square* surpasses the *Rhombus* or *Lozenge*,  
 and this again the *Rkomboides*, which is  
 still more beautiful than the *Trapezium*, or  
 any Figure with irregular curve Sides.  
 So the *regular Solids* surpass all other Solids  
 of equal number of plain Surfaces : And the  
 same is observable not only in the Five per-  
 fectly *regular Solids*, but in all those  
 which have any considerable *Uniformity*,  
 as *Cylinders*, *Prisms*, *Pyramids*, *Obelisks* ;  
 which please every Eye more than any rude  
 Figures, where there is no *Unity* or Resem-  
 blance among the Parts.

*Compound*  
*Ratio.*

INSTANCES of the compound *Ratio*  
 we have in comparing *Circles* or *Spheres*,  
 with.


with *Ellipses* or *Spheroides* not very eccentric; and in comparing the *compound Solids*, the *Exoctaedron*, and *Eicosidodecaedron*, with the perfectly *regular* ones of which they are compounded: and we shall find, that the want of that most perfect *Uniformity* observable in the latter, is compensated by the greater *Variety* in the former, so that the *Beauty* is nearly equal.

IV. THESE Observations would probably hold true for the most part, and might be confirm'd by the Judgment of Children in the *simpler* Figures, where the *Variety* is not too great for their Comprehension. And however uncertain some of the particular aforesaid Instances may seem, yet this is perpetually to be observ'd, that Children are fond of all *regular* Figures in their little Diversions, altho' they be no more convenient, or useful for them, than the Figures of our common Pebbles: We see how early they discover a *Taste* or Sense of *Beauty*, in desiring to see Buildings, regular Gardens, or even Representations of them in Pictures of any kind.

V. THE same Foundation we have for our Sense of *Beauty*, in the Works of Beauty of Nature. NATURE. In every Part of the World which we call *Beautiful*, there is a surprizing *Uniformity* amidst an almost infinite *Variety*. Many Parts of the Universe seem not

Sect. 2. at all design'd for the Use of Man ; nay, it is but a very small Spot with which we have any Acquaintance. The *Figures* and *Motions* of the great Bodys are not obvious to our Senses, but found out by Reasoning and Reflection, upon many long Observations : and yet as far as we can by Sense discover, or by *Reasoning* enlarge our Knowledge, and extend our Imagination, we generally find their Structure, Order, and Motion, agreeable to our Sense of *Beauty*. Every particular Object in *Nature* does not indeed appear *beautiful* to us ; but there is a great Profusion of *Beauty* over most of the Objects which occur either to our Senses, or Reasonings upon Observation : For, not to mention the apparent Situation of the heavenly Bodys in the Circumference of a great Sphere, which is wholly occasion'd by the Imperfection of our Sight in discerning Distances ; the Forms of all the great Bodys in the Universe are nearly *Spherical* ; the *Orbits* of their Revolutions generally *Elliptick*, and without great *Eccentricity*, in those which continually occur to our Observation : now these are Figures of great *Uniformity*, and therefore pleasing to us.

FURTHER, to pass by the less obvious *Uniformity* in the Proportion of their *Quantities* of Matter, *Distances*, *Times*, of revolving, to each other ; what can exhibit a greater Instance of *Uniformity*, amidst *Variety*,


riety, than the constant Tenour of Revolu- Sect. 2.  
 tions in nearly equal Times, in each Planet,   
 around its Axis, and the central Fire or  
 SUN, thro' all the Ages of which we have  
 any Records, and in nearly the same Or-  
 bit? Thus after certain Periods, all the  
 same Appearances are again renew'd; the  
 alternate Successions of *Light* and *Shade*, or  
*Day* and *Night*, constantly pursuing each  
 other around each Planet, with an agree-  
 able and regular Diversity in the Times they  
 possess the several Hemispheres, in the *Sum-  
 mer*, *Harvest*, *Winter*, and *Spring*; and the  
 various *Phases*, *Aspects*, and *Situations*, of  
 the Planets to each other, their *Conjunctions*  
 and *Oppositions*, in which they suddenly dar-  
 ken each other with their Conick Shades in  
 Eclipses, are repeated to us at their fixed  
 Periods with invariable Constancy: These  
 are the *Beautys* which charm the *Astrono-  
 mer*, and make his tedious Calculations  
 pleasant.

*Molliter austerum studio fallente laborem.\**

VI. AGAIN, as to the dry Part of the <sup>Earth.</sup>  
 Surface of our Globe, a great Part of which  
 is cover'd with a very pleasant inoffensive  
 Colour, how *beautifully* is it diversify'd with  
 various Degrees of *Light* and *Shade*, ac-


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\* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 12.

Sect. 2. cording to the different Situations of the  
 Parts of its Surface, in *Mountains, Valleys, Hills,* and open *Plains,* which are variously inclin'd toward the great LUMINARY!

*Plants.*

VII. IF we descend to the minuter Works of NATURE, what great *Uniformity* among all the Species of *Plants* and *Vegetables* in the manner of their Growth and Propagation! how near the Resemblance among all the Plants of the same Species, whose Numbers surpass our Imagination! And this *Uniformity* is not only observable in the Form in gross; (nay, in this it is not so very exact in all Instances) but in the Structure of their minutest Parts, which no Eye unassisted with Glasses can discern. In the almost infinite Multitude of *Leaves, Fruit, Seed, Flowers* of any one Species, we often see a very great *Uniformity* in the Structure and Situation of the smallest Fibres. This is the *Beauty* which charms an ingenious *Botanist*. Nay, what great *Uniformity* and Regularity of Figure is found in each particular *Plant, Leaf, or Flower!* In all Trees and most of the smaller Plants, the Stalks or Trunks are either *Cylinders* nearly, or regular *Prisms*; the Branches similar to their several Trunks, arising at nearly regular Distances, when no Accidents retard their natural Growth: In one *Species* the Branches arise in Pairs on the opposite Sides; the perpendicular

pendicular Plain of Direction of the imme- Sect. 2.  
 diately superior Pair, intersecting the Plain   
 of Direction of the inferior, nearly at right  
 Angles: In another *Species*, the Branches  
 spring singly, and alternately, all around in  
 nearly equal Distances: And the Branches  
 in other *Species* sprout all in Knots around  
 the Trunk, one for each Year. And in each  
*Species*, all the Branches in the first Shoots  
 preserve the same Angles with their Trunk;  
 and they again sprout out into smaller  
 Branches exactly after the Manner of their  
 Trunks. Nor ought we to pass over that  
 great *Unity* of Colours which we often see  
 in all the Flowers of the same Plant or Tree,  
 and often of a whole *Species*; and their exact  
 Agreement in many shaded Transitions into  
 opposite Colours, in which all the Flowers  
 of the same Plant generally agree, nay, often  
 all the Flowers of a *Species*.

VIII. AGAIN, as to the *Beauty* of *Animals*.  
*Animals*, either in their inward Structure, which  
 we come to the Knowledge of by Exper-  
 iment and long Observation, or their out-  
 ward Form, we shall find surprizing *Uni-*  
*formity* among all the *Species* which are  
 known to us, in the Structure of those  
 Parts, upon which Life depends more im-  
 mediately. And how amazing is the *Unity*  
 of Mechanism, when we shall find an al-  
 most infinite Diversity of Motions, all their  
 Actions in *walking, running, flying, swim-*

Sect. 2. *ming*; all their serious Efforts for *Self-preservation*, all their freakish *Contortions* when they are gay and sportful, in all their various Limbs, perform'd by one simple Contrivance of a contracting *Muscle*, apply'd with inconceivable Diversities to answer all these Ends! Various Engines might have obtain'd the same Ends; but then there had been less *Uniformity*, and the *Beauty* of our Animal Systems, and of particular Animals, had been much less, when this surprizing *Unity* of Mechanism had been remov'd from them.

IX. AMONG Animals of the same Species, the *Unity* is very obvious, and this Resemblance is the very Ground of our ranking them in such *Classes* or *Species*, notwithstanding the great Diversities in Bulk, Colour, Shape, which are observ'd even in those call'd of the same Species. And then in each Individual, how universal is that *Beauty* which arises from the exact Resemblance of all the external double Members to each other, which seems the universal Intention of NATURE, when no Accident prevents it! We see the Want of this Resemblance never fails to pass for an Imperfection, and Want of *Beauty*, tho' no other Inconvenience ensues; as when the Eyes are not exactly like, or one Arm or Leg is a little shorter or smaller than its fellow.




As to that most powerful Beauty in *Countenances, Airs, Gestures, Motion*, we shall shew in the second Treatise\*, that it arises from some imagin'd *Indication* of morally good Dispositions of Mind. In Motion there is also a natural Beauty, when at fixed Periods like Gestures and Steps are regularly repeated, suiting the Time and Air of Music, which is observed in regular Dancing.

X. THERE is a farther *Beauty* in Ani-<sup>Proportion.</sup> mals, arising from a certain *Proportion* of the various Parts to each other, which still pleases the Sense of Spectators, tho' they cannot calculate it with the Accuracy of a *Statuary*. The *Statuary* knows what *Proportion* of each Part of the *Face* to the whole *Face* is most agreeable, and can tell us the same of the *Proportion* of the *Face* to the *Body*, or any Parts of it; and between the *Diameters* and *Lengths* of each Limb: When this *Proportion* of the Head to the Body is remarkably alter'd, we shall have a *Giant* or a *Dwarf*. And hence it is, that either the one or the other may be represented to us even in *Miniature*, without relation to any external Object, by observing how the Body surpasses the *Proportion* it should have to the Head in *Giants*, and falls

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\* Sect. vi. Art. 3.

Sect. 2. below it in *Dwarfs*. There is a farther  *Beauty* arising from that Figure, which is a natural Indication of *Strength*; but this may be pass'd over, because probably it may be alledg'd, that our Approbation of this Shape flows from an Opinion of *Advantage*, and not from the Form it self.

THE *Beauty* arising from Mechanism, apparently adapted to the Necessities and Advantages of any Animal; which pleases us, even tho' there be no Advantage to our selves ensuing from it; will be consider'd under the Head of *Relative Beauty*, or *Design*.\*

*Fowls.*


XI. THE peculiar *Beauty* of *Fowls* can scarce be omitted, which arises from the great *Variety* of Feathers, a curious Sort of Machines adapted to many admirable Uses, which retain a considerable Resemblance in their Structure among all the Species; and a perfect *Uniformity* in those of the same Species in the corresponding Parts, and in the two Sides of each Individual; besides all the *Beauty* of lively Colours and gradual Shades, not only in the external Appearance of the Fowl, resulting from an artful Combination of shaded Feathers, but often visible even in one Feather separately.

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\* See Sect. iv. Art. 7.

XII. IF our Reasonings about the *Nature* of *Fluids* be just, the vast Stores of *Water* will give us an Instance of *Uniformity* in *Nature* above Imagination, when we reflect upon the almost infinite Multitude of small, polish'd, smooth Spheres, which must be suppos'd form'd in all the Parts of this Globe. The same *Uniformity* there is probably among the Parts of other *Fluids* as well as *Water*; and the like must be observ'd in several other natural Bodys, as *Salts*, *Sulphurs*, and such like; whose uniform Propertys do probably depend upon an *Uniformity* in the Figures of their Parts.

XIII. UNDER *Original Beauty* we may include *Harmony*, or *Beauty of Sound*, if that Expression can be allow'd, because *Harmony* is not usually conceiv'd as an Imitation of any thing else. *Harmony* often raises Pleasure in those who know not what is the Occasion of it: And yet the Foundation of this Pleasure is known to be a sort of *Uniformity*. When the several Vibrations of one Note regularly coincide with the Vibrations of another, they make an agreeable Composition; and such Notes are call'd *Concords*. Thus the Vibrations of any one Note coincide in *Time* with two Vibrations of its *Octave*; and two Vibrations of any Note coincide with three of its *Fifth*; and so on in the rest of the *Concords*. Now no *Composition* can be  
harmony-

Seçt. 2. harmonious, in which the Notes are not,  for the most part, dispos'd according to these natural Proportions. Besides which, a due Regard must be had to the *Key*, which governs the whole, and to the *Time* and *Humour*, in which the Composition is begun: a frequent and inartificial *Change* of any of which will produce the greatest, and most unnatural *Discord*. This will appear, by observing the *Dissonance* which would arise from tacking Parts of different Tunes together as one, altho' both were separately agreeable. A like *Uniformity* is also observable among the *Bases*, *Tenors*, *Trebles* of the same Tune.

THERE is indeed observable, in the best Compositions, a mysterious Effect of *Discords*: They often give as great Pleasure as continu'd Harmony; whether by refreshing the Ear with *Variety*, or by awakening the Attention, and enlivening the Relish for the succeeding Harmony of *Concords*, as Shades enliven and beautify Pictures, or by some other means not yet known: Certain it is, however, that they have their Place, and some good Effect in our best Compositions. Some other Powers of *Musick* may be consider'd hereafter\*.

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\* See Seçt. vi. Art. 12.

XIV. BUT in all these Instances of *Beauty* let it be observ'd, That the Pleasure is communicated to those who never reflected on this general Foundation; and that all here alledg'd is this, "That the pleasant Sensation arises only from Objects, in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*:" We may have the Sensation without knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man's *Taste* may suggest Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters, tho' he be ignorant of the *Forms* of the small Bodys, or their Motions, which excite the Perceptions in him.

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## S E C T. III.

## Of the Beauty of Theorems.

*Theorems.* I. **T**HE Beauty of *Theorems*, or universal Truths demonstrated, deserves a distinct Consideration, being of a Nature pretty different from the former kinds of *Beauty*; and yet there is none in which we shall see such an amazing *Variety* with *Uniformity*: and hence arises a very great Pleasure distinct from Prospects of any farther Advantage.

II. F O R in one *Theorem* we may find included, with the most exact Agreement, an infinite Multitude of particular Truths; nay, often an Infinity of Infinites: so that altho' the Necessity of forming abstract Ideas and universal *Theorems*, arises perhaps from the Limitation of our Minds, which cannot admit an Infinite Multitude of singular Ideas or Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an Evidence of the Largeness of the human Capacity above our Imagination. Thus for instance, the 47<sup>th</sup> Proposition of the first *Book* of EUCLID'S *Elements* contains an infinite Multitude of Truths, concerning the infinite possible *Sizes* of right-angled *Triangles*, as you make the *Area* greater  
or

or less; and in each of these *Sizes* you may find an infinite Multitude of dissimilar *Triangles*, as you vary the Proportion of the *Base* to the *Perpendicular*; all which Infinitys of Infinites agree in the general *Theorem*. In *Algebraick*, and *Fluxional Calculations*, we shall still find a greater *Variety* of particular *Truths* included in general *Theorems*; not only in general *Equations* applicable to all Kinds of *Quantity*, but in more particular Investigations of *Areas* and *Tangents*: In which one Manner of Operation shall discover *Theorems* applicable to infinite *Orders* or *Species* of *Curves*, to the infinite *Sizes* of each *Species*, and to the infinite *Points* of the infinite *Individuals* of each *Size*.

III. THAT we may the better discern this Agreement, or *Unity* of an Infinity of Objects, in the general *Theorem*, to be the Foundation of the *Beauty* or *Pleasure* attending their Discovery, let us compare our Satisfaction in such Discoveries, with the uneasy State of Mind in which we are, when we can only measure Lines, or Surfaces, by a Scale, or are making Experiments which we can reduce to no general *Canon*, but only heaping up a Multitude of particular incoherent Observations. Now each of these Trials discovers a new Truth, but with no Pleasure or *Beauty*, notwithstanding

*Foundati-  
on of their  
Beauty.*

Sect. 3. ing the *Variety*, till we can discover some  
 ~~~~~  
 sort of *Unity*, or reduce them to some general Canon.

*Little  
 Beauty in  
 Axioms.*

IV. AGAIN, let us make a Metaphysical Axiom, such as this, *Every Whole is greater than its Part*; and we shall find no *Beauty* in the Contemplation. For tho' this Proposition contains many Infinities of particular Truths; yet the *Unity* is inconsiderable, since they all agree only in a vague, undetermin'd Conception of *Whole* and *Part*, and in an indefinite Excess of the former above the latter, which is sometimes great and sometimes small. So, should we hear that the *Cylinder* is greater than the inscrib'd *Sphere*, and this again greater than the *Cone* of the same Altitude, and Diameter of the Base, we shall find no Pleasure in this Knowledge of a general Relation of greater or less, without any precise Difference or Proportion. But when we see the universal exact Agreement of all possible Sizes of such Systems of Solids, that they preserve to each other the constant *Ratio* of 3, 2, 1; how beautiful is the *Theorem*, and how are we ravish'd with its first Discovery!

*Easy Theorems.*

WE may likewise observe, that *easy* or *obvious* Propositions, even where the *Unity* is sufficiently distinct, and determinate, do not please us so much as those, which being



being less *obvious*, give us some *Surprize* in the Discovery: Thus we find little Pleasure in discovering that *a Line bisecting the vertical Angle of an Iſoſceles Triangle, biſects the Baſe, or the Reverse*; or, that *Equilateral Triangles are Equiangular*. Theſe Truths we almoſt know *Intuitively*, without Demonſtration: They are like common *Goods*, or thoſe which Men have long poſſeſſed, which do not give ſuch ſenſible Joys as much ſmaller new *Additions* may give us. But let none hence imagine, that the ſole Pleaſure of Theorems is from *Surprize*; for the ſame *Novelty* of a ſingle Experiment does not pleaſe us much: nor ought we to conclude from the greater Pleaſure accompanying a *new, or unexpected Advantage*, that *Surprize, or Novelty* is the only Pleaſure of Life, or the only Ground of Delight in *Truth*. Another kind of *Surprize* in certain Theorems increaſes our Pleaſure above that we have in Theorems of greater Extent; when we diſcover a *general Truth*, which upon ſome confuſed Notion we had reputed falſe: as that *Aſſymptotes always approaching ſhould never meet the Curve*. This is like the Joy of unexpected Advantage where we dreaded Evil: But ſtill the *Unity* of many Particulars in the general Theorem is neceſſary to give Pleaſure in any Theorem.

Sect. 3.



Corollarys.

V. THERE is another *Beauty* in Propositions, when one *Theorem* contains a great Multitude of *Corollarys* easily deducible from it. Thus that *Theorem* which gives us the Equation of a *Curve*, whence perhaps most of its *Property*s may be deduc'd, does some way please and satisfy our Mind above any other Proposition: Such a *Theorem* also is the 35th of the 1st *Book* of EUCLID, from which the whole Art of measuring right-lin'd Areas is deduc'd, by Resolution into *Triangles*, which are the halves of so many *Parallelograms*; and these are each respectively equal to so many *Rectangles* of the *Base* into the perpendicular *Altitude*: The 47th of the 1st *Book* is another of like *Beauty*, and so are many others.

IN the Search of *Nature* there is the like *Beauty* in the Knowledge of some great *Principles*, or universal *Forces*, from which innumerable *Effects* do flow. Such is *Gravitation*, in Sir ISAAC NEWTON'S Scheme; such also is the Knowledge of the Original of *Rights*, *perfect* and *imperfect*, and *external*; *alienable* and *unalienable*; with their manner of *Translation*; from whence the greatest Part of moral *Dutys* may be deduc'd in the various *Relations* of human *Life*.

IT is easy to see how Men are charm'd with the *Beauty* of such Knowledge, besides its Usefulness; and how this sets them upon deducing the Propertys of each Figure from one *Genesis*, and demonstrating the mechanic Forces from one *Theorem* of the Composition of Motion; even after they have sufficient Knowledge and Certainty in all these Truths from distinct independent Demonstrations. And this Pleasure we enjoy even when we have no Prospect of obtaining any other *Advantage* from such Manner of Deduction, than the immediate Pleasure of contemplating the *Beauty*: nor could Love of *Fame* excite us to such regular Methods of Deduction, were we not conscious that Mankind are pleas'd with them immediately, by this *internal Sense* of their *Beauty*.


IT is no less easy to see into what absurd Attempts Men have been led by this Sense of *Beauty*, and an Affectation of obtaining it in the other Sciences as well as the *Mathematicks*. 'Twas this probably which set DESCARTES on that hopeful Project of deducing all human Knowledge from one Proposition, *viz. Cogito, ergo sum*; while others with as little Sense contended, that *Impossibile est idem simul esse & non esse*, had much fairer Pretensions to the Style and Title of *Principium humanæ Cognitionis ab-*

Sect. 3. *solutè primum.* Mr. LEIBNITZ had an equal Affection for his favourite Principle of a *sufficient Reason* for every thing in *Nature*, and brags to Dr. CLARKE of the Wonders he had wrought in the intellectual World by its Assistance; but his learned Antagonist seems to think he had not sufficient Reason for his Boasting\*. If we look into particular Sciences, we may see in the Systems learned Men have given us of them, the Inconveniencies of this Love of *Uniformity*. How awkwardly is PUFFENDORF forc'd to deduce the several Dutys of Men to *God, themselves, and their Neighbours*, from his single fundamental Principle of *Sociableness to the whole Race of Mankind?* This Observation might easily be extended farther, were it necessary; and is a strong Proof, that Men perceive the *Beauty of Uniformity* in the Sciences, even from the Contortions of common Sense they are led into by pursuing it.

VI. THIS Delight which accompanys Sciences, or universal *Theorems*, may really be call'd a kind of *Sensation*; since it necessarily accompanys the Discovery of any Proposition, and is distinct from bare Knowledge itself, being most violent at first, whereas the Knowledge is uniformly the

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\* See the Letters which pass'd between Dr. CLARKE, and Mr. LEIBNITZ, Pag. 23.

fame. And however Knowledge enlarges Sect. 3.  
 the *Mind*, and makes us more capable of   
 comprehensive Views and Projects in some  
 kinds of Business, whence *Advantage* may  
 also arise to us; yet we may leave it in the  
 Breast of every Student to determine, whe-  
 ther he has not often felt this Pleasure with-  
 out any such Prospect of Advantage from  
 the Discovery of his *Theorem*. All which  
 can thence be inferr'd is only this, that as  
 in our external Senses, so in our *internal* ones,  
 the pleasant Sensations generally arise from  
 those Objects which calm Reason would have  
 recommended, had we understood their Use,  
 and which might have engag'd our Pursuits  
 from *Self-Interest*.

VII. As to the Works of ART, were we *Works of*  
 to run thro' the various artificial Contrivan- *Art.*  
 ces or Structures, we should constantly find  
 the Foundation of the *Beauty* which appears  
 in them, to be some kind of *Uniformity*, or  
*Unity* of Proportion among the Parts, and  
 of each Part to the Whole. As there is a  
 great Diversity of Proportions possible, and  
 different Kinds of *Uniformity*, so there is  
 room enough for that Diversity of Fancys  
 observable in *Architecture*, *Gardening*, and  
 such like Arts in different *Nations*; they all  
 may have *Uniformity*, tho' the Parts in one  
 may differ from those in another. The  
*Chinese* or *Persian* Buildings are not like the  
*Grecian* and *Roman*, and yet the former has

Sect. 3. its *Uniformity* of the various Parts to each other, and to the Whole, as well as the latter. In that kind of Architecture which the EUROPEANS call *Regular*, the *Uniformity* of Parts is very obvious, the several Parts are *regular Figures*, and either *equal* or *similar* at least in the same Range; the Pedestals are *Parallelopipedons* or square *Prisms*; the Pillars, *Cylinders* nearly; the Arches *circu- lar*, and all those in the same Row *equal*; there is the same Proportion every-where observ'd in the same Range between the *Diameters* of Pillars and their *Heights*, their *Capitals*, the *Diameters* of *Arches*, the *Heights* of the *Pedestals*, the *Projections* of the *Cornice*, and all the Ornaments in each of our *five Orders*. And tho' other Countrys do not follow the *Grecian* or *Roman* Proportions, yet there is even among them a Proportion retain'd, a *Uniformity*, and Resemblance of corresponding Figures; and every Deviation in one Part from that Proportion which is observ'd in the rest of the Building, is displeasing to every Eye, and destroys or diminishes at least the *Beauty* of the Whole.

VIII. The same might be observ'd thro' all other Works of *Art*, even to the meanest *Utenfil*; the *Beauty* of every one of which we shall always find to have the same Foundation of *Uniformity amidst Variety*, without which they appear mean, irregular and deform'd.

## S E C T. IV.

## Of Relative or Comparative Beauty.

I. IF the preceding Thoughts concerning *Comparative Beauty* the Foundation of *absolute Beauty* be just, we may easily understand wherein *relative Beauty* consists. All *Beauty* is relative to the Sense of some Mind perceiving it; but what we call *relative* is that which is apprehended in any *Object*, commonly consider'd as an *Imitation* of some Original: And this *Beauty* is founded on a *Conformity*, or a kind of *Unity* between the Original and the Copy. The Original may be either some *Object* in *Nature*, or some *establish'd Idea*; for if there be any known *Idea* as a Standard, and Rules to fix this Image or *Idea* by, we may make a *beautiful Imitation*. Thus a *Statuary*, *Painter*, or *Poet*, may please us with an *HERCULES*, if his Piece retains that *Grandeur*, and those Marks of *Strength* and *Courage*, which we imagine in that Hero.

AND farther, to obtain *comparative Beauty* alone, it is not necessary that there be any *Beauty* in the Original; the *Imitation* of *absolute Beauty* may indeed in the whole make a more lovely Piece, and yet an exact

Sect. 4. Imitation shall still be *beautiful*, though the Original were intirely void of it: Thus the *Deformitys* of old Age in a Picture, the *rudest Rocks* or *Mountains* in a *Landskip*, if well represented, shall have abundant *Beauty*, tho' perhaps not so great as if the Original were *absolutely beautiful*, and as well represented: Nay, perhaps the *Novelty* may make us prefer the Representation of Irregularity.

*Description  
in Poetry.*

II. THE same Observation holds true in the Descriptions of the Poets either of *natural* Objects or Persons; and this *relative Beauty* is what they should principally endeavour to obtain, as the peculiar *Beauty* of their Works. By the *Moratæ Fabulæ*, or the  $\eta\theta\eta$  of ARISTOTLE, we are not to understand *virtuous Manners* in a moral Sense, but a *just Representation* of Manners or Characters as they are in *Nature*; and that the *Actions* and *Sentiments* be suited to the Characters of the *Persons* to whom they are ascrib'd in *Epick* and *Dramatick* Poetry. Perhaps very good Reasons may be suggested from the Nature of our *Passions*, to prove that a Poet should not draw his *Characters* perfectly *Virtuous*; these Characters indeed, abstractly consider'd, might give more Pleasure, and have more *Beauty* than the *imperfect* ones which occur in Life with a Mixture of Good and Evil: But it may suffice at present to suggest against this Choice, that



that we have more lively Ideas of *imperfect* Sect. 4.  
*Men* with all their Passions, than of *morally*  
*perfect Heroes*, such as really never occur to  
 our Observation; and of which consequently  
 we cannot judge exactly as to their Agree-  
 ment with the Copy. And farther, thro'  
 Consciousness of our own State, we are  
 more nearly touch'd and affected by the *im-*  
*perfect Characters*; since in them we see re-  
 presented, in the Persons of others, the *Con-*  
*trasts* of Inclinations, and the *Struggles* be-  
 tween the Passions of *Self-Love* and those of  
*Honour* and *Virtue*, which we often feel in  
 our own Breasts. This is the Perfection of  
*Beauty* for which HOMER is justly admir'd,  
 as well as for the *Variety* of his *Characters*.

III. MANY other Beautys of Poetry may  
 be reduc'd under this Class of *relative Beau-*  
*ty*: The *Probability* is absolutely necessary Probabili-  
 ty, Simile,  
 Metaphor.  
 to make us imagine *Resemblance*; it is by  
 Resemblance that the *Similitudes*, *Metaphors*  
 and *Allegorys* are made *beautiful*, whether  
 either the Subject or the Thing compar'd to  
 it have *Beauty* or not; the *Beauty* indeed is  
 greater, when both have some *original*  
*Beauty* or *Dignity* as well as *Resemblance*:  
 and this is the Foundation of the Rule of  
 studying *Decency* in *Metaphors* and *Similes*  
 as well as *Likeness*. The *Measures* and *Ca-*  
*dence* are Instances of *Harmony*, and come  
 under the Head of *absolute Beauty*.

Sect. 4. IV WE may here observe a strange  
 Proneness in our Minds to make *perpetual*  
 Comparisons of all things which occur to our  
 Observation, even of those which are very  
 different from each other. There are cer-  
 tain *Resemblances* in the Motions of all Ani-  
 mals upon like Passions, which easily found  
 a *Comparison*; but this does not serve to  
 entertain our Fancy: *Inanimate Objects* have  
 often such Positions as resemble those of the  
*human Body* in various Circumstances; these  
 Airs or Gestures of the *Body* are Indications  
 of certain Dispositions in the *Mind*, so that  
 our very *Passions* and *Affections*, as well as  
 other Circumstances, obtain a Resemblance  
 to *natural inanimate Objects*. Thus a *Tem-  
 pest* at Sea is often an Emblem of *Wrath*;  
 a *Plant* or *Tree* drooping under the Rain, of  
 a Person in *Sorrow*; a *Poppy* bending its  
 Stalk, or a *Flower* withering when cut by  
 the Plow, resembles the Death of a *blooming*  
*Hero*; an *aged Oak* in the Mountains shall  
 represent an *old Empire*, a *Flame* seizing a  
 Wood shall represent a *War*. In short,  
 every thing in *Nature*, by our strange  
 Inclination to *Resemblance*, shall be brought  
 to represent other things, even the most  
 remote, especially the Passions and Circum-  
 stances of human Nature in which we are  
 more nearly concern'd; and to confirm this,  
 and furnish Instances of it, one need only  
 look into HOMER or VIRGIL. A fruitful  
 Fancy

Fancy would find in a *Grove* or a *Wood*, Sect. 4. an Emblem of every *Character in a Commonwealth*, and every *Turn of Temper*, or *Station in Life*.

V. CONCERNING that kind of *compara-Intention.*  
*tive Beauty* which has a necessary relation to some establish'd Idea, we may observe, that some Works of *Art* acquire a *distinct Beauty* by their Correspondence to some universally suppos'd *Intention* in the Artificer, or the Persons who employ'd him : And to obtain this *Beauty*, sometimes they do not form their Works so as to attain the highest Perfection of *original Beauty* separately consider'd ; because a Composition of this *relative Beauty*, along with some Degree of the *original Kind*, may give more Pleasure, than a more *perfect original Beauty* separately. Thus we see, that strict *Regularity* in laying out of Gardens in *Parterres*, *Vistas*, *parallel Walks*, is often neglected, to obtain an Imitation of *Nature* even in some of its *Wildnesses*. And we are more pleas'd with this *Imitation*, especially when the Scene is large and spacious, than with the more confin'd Exactness of *regular Works*. So likewise in the *Monuments* erected in Honour of deceased *Heroes*, altho' a *Cylinder*, or *Prism* or *regular Solid*, may have more *original Beauty* than a very acute *Pyramid* or *Obelisk*, yet the latter pleases more, by answering better the suppos'd Intentions of *Stability*, and being

Sect. 4. ing *conspicuous*. For the same reason *Cubes*, or square *Prisms*, are generally chosen for the *Pedestals* of *Statues*, and not any of the more *beautiful Solids*, which do not seem so secure from rolling. This may be the Reason too, why *Columns* or *Pillars* look best when made a little taper from the middle or a third from the bottom, that they may not seem top-heavy, and in danger of falling.

VI. THE like Reason may influence Artists, in many other Instances, to depart from the Rules of *original Beauty*, as above laid down. And yet this is no Argument against our Sense of *Beauty* being founded, as was above explain'd, on *Uniformity amidst Variety*, but only an Evidence, that our Sense of *Beauty* of the *Original* Kind may be vary'd and over-balanc'd by another kind of *Beauty*.

VII. THIS *Beauty* arising from Correspondence to *Intention*, would open to curious Observers a new Scene of *Beauty* in the Works of NATURE, by considering how the *Mechanism* of the various Parts known to us, seems adapted to the Perfection of that Part, and yet in Subordination to the Good of some *System* or *Whole*. We generally suppose the Good of the *greatest Whole*, or of *all Beings*, to have been the *Intention* of the AUTHOR of *Nature*; and cannot avoid being pleas'd when we see any Part of  
this

this *Design* executed in the *Systems* we are Sect. 4. acquainted with. The Observations already made on this Subject are in every one's Hand, in the Treatises of our late Improvers of *mechanical Philosophy*. We shall only observe here, that every one has a certain Pleasure in seeing any Design well executed by curious *Mechanism*, even when his own Advantage is no way concern'd; and also in discovering the Design to which any complex *Machine* is adapted, when he has perhaps had a general Knowledge of the *Machine* before, without seeing its Correspondence or Aptness to execute any Design.

THE Arguments by which we prove *Reason* and *Design* in any *Cause* from the *Beauty* of the *Effects*, are so frequently us'd in some of the highest Subjects, that it may be necessary to inquire a little more particularly into them, to see how far they will hold, and with what degree of Evidence.

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## S E C T. V.

*Concerning our Reasonings about Design and Wisdom in the Cause, from the Beauty or Regularity of Effects.*

*Sense, arbitrary in its Author.* I. **T**HERE seems to be no necessary Connection of our pleasing Ideas of *Beauty* with the *Uniformity* or *Regularity* of the Objects, from the *Nature* of Things, antecedent to some *Constitution* of the AUTHOR of our Nature, which has made such Forms pleasant to us. Other *Minds* may be so fram'd as to receive no Pleasure from *Uniformity*; and we actually find, that the same regular Forms, seem not equally to please all the Animals known to us, as shall probably appear hereafter. Therefore let us make what is the most unfavourable Supposition to the present Argument, *viz.* That the Constitution of our Sense so as to approve *Uniformity*, is merely arbitrary in the AUTHOR of our Nature; and that there are an Infinity of *Tastes* or *Relishes* of *Beauty* possible; so that it would be impossible to throw together fifty or a hundred Pebbles, which should not make an agreeable Habitation for some Animal

Animal or other, and appear *beautiful* to it. Sect. 5.  
 And then it is plain, that from the Perception of *Beauty* in any one Effect, we should have no Reason to conclude *Design* in the *Cause*: for a Sense might be so constituted as to be pleas'd with such *Irregularity* as may be the Effect of an *undirected Force*\*. But then, as there are an Infinity of *Forms* possible into which any System may be reduc'd, an Infinity of *Places* in which Animals may be situated, and an Infinity of *Relishes* or *Senses* in these Animals is suppos'd possible; that in the immense Spaces any one Animal should by Chance be plac'd in a System agreeable to its Taste, must be improbable as *infinite to one* at least: And much more unreasonable is it to expect from Chance, that a Multitude of Animals agree-

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\* By undirected Force, or undesigning Force, is to be understood, That Force with which an Agent may put Matter into Motion, without having any Design or Intention to produce any particular Form. *The Conatus ad motum, without an actual Line of Direction, seems such a gross Absurdity in the Cartesian Scheme, that it is below the Dignity of common Sense to vouchsafe to confute it. But Men have so many confus'd Notions of some Nature, or Chance impressing Motions without any Design or Intention of producing any particular Effect, that it may be useful to shew, that even this very absurd Postulatum, tho' it were granted them, is insufficient to answer the Appearances in the Regularity of the World: and this is what is attempted in the first fourteen Articles of this Section. These Arguments would really be useless, if all Men were persuaded of what, to a Man of just Thought, will appear pretty obvious, that there can be no Thought's Agent; and that Chance and Nature are mere empty Names, as they are us'd on this Occasion, relative only to our Ignorance.*

ing

Sect. 5. ing in their Sense of *Beauty* should obtain  
 agreeable Places.

*Undirected  
 Force.*

II. THERE is also the same Probability, that in any one System of Matter an *Undirected Force* will produce a *regular Form*, as any one given *irregular* one, of the same degree of Complication: But still the *irregular Forms* into which any System may be rang'd, surpass in Multitude the *Regular*, as *Infinite* does *Unity*; for what holds in one small System, will hold in a *Thousand*, a *Million*, a *Universe*, with more Advantage, viz. that the *irregular Forms* possible infinitely surpass the *Regular*. For Instance, the *Area* of an *Inch Square* is capable of an Infinity of *regular Forms*, the *Equilateral Triangle*, the *Square*, the *Pentagon*, *Hexagon*, *Hep-  
 tagon*, &c. but for each one regular Form, there are an Infinity of irregular, as an Infinity of *Scalena* for the one equilateral Triangle, an Infinity of *Trapezia* for the one Square, of irregular *Pentagons* for the one Regular, and so on: and therefore supposing any one System agitated by *undesigned Force*, it is infinitely more probable that it will resolve itself into an *irregular Form*, than a *regular*. Thus, that a System of *six* Parts upon Agitation shall not obtain the Form of a regular *Hexagon*, is at least *infinite* to *Unity*; and the more complex we make the System, the greater is the Hazard, from a very obvious Reason.

W E



WE see this confirm'd by our constant Sect. 5.  
 Experience, that *Regularity* never arises from any *undefign'd Force* of ours; and from this we conclude, that where-ever there is any *Regularity* in the Disposition of a System capable of many other Dispositions, there must have been *Design* in the *Cause*; and the Force of this Evidence increases, according to the Multiplicity of Parts employ'd.

BUT this Conclusion is too rash, unless some farther Proof be introduc'd; and what leads us into it is this. Men, who have a Sense of *Beauty* in *Regularity*, are led generally in all their Arrangements of Bodys to study some kind of *Regularity*, and seldom ever design *Irregularity*: hence we judge the same of other Beings too, *viz.* that they study *Regularity*; and presume upon *Intention* in the *Cause* where-ever we see it, making *Irregularity* always a Presumption of want of *Design*: whereas if other Agents have different Senses of *Beauty*, or if they have no Sense of it at all, *Irregularity* may as well be design'd as *Regularity*. And then let it be observ'd, that in this Case there is just the same Reason to conclude *Design* in the Cause from any one irregular Effect, as from a regular one: for since there are an Infinity of other *Forms* possible as well as this irregular one produc'd; and since to such a

E Being

Sect. 5. Being \* void of a Sense of *Beauty*, all Forms are as to its own Relish indifferent, and all agitated Matter meeting must make some Form or other, and all Forms, upon Supposition that the Force is apply'd by an Agent void of a Sense of *Beauty*, would equally prove *Design*; it is plain that no one Form proves it more than another, or can prove it at all; except from a general metaphysical Consideration, that there is no proper Agent without *Design* and *Intention*, and that every *Effect* flows from the *Intention* of some *Cause*.

Similar  
Forms by  
Chance,  
impossible.

III. THIS however follows from the above mention'd Considerations, that supposing a Mass of Matter surpassing a *cubick* Inch, as *infinite* of the *first* Power does *Unity*, and that this whole Mass were some way de-

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\* There is a great Difference between such a Being as is here mention'd, and a Being which has no Intention for any Reason whatsoever to produce one Form more than another. This latter sort of Being, as to the present Argument, would be the same with Chance, but not the former. For tho' a Being has no Sense of Beauty, he may notwithstanding be capable of Design, and of Intention to produce regular Forms; and the Observation of greater Regularity in any Number of Effects, than could be expected from undirected Force, is a Presumption of Design and Intention in the Cause, even where the Cause is suppos'd to have no Sense of Beauty in such Forms, since perhaps he may have other Reasons moving him to chuse such Forms. Thus, supposing the DEITY not immediately pleas'd with Regularity, Uniformity, or Similarity in Bodies, yet there may be Reasons moving him to produce such Objects, such as the pleasing his Creatures, having given them a Sense of Beauty founded on these Qualities. See the two last Paragraphs of the last Section.

termin'd

termin'd from its own Nature without any Sect. 5.  
*Design* in a *Cause* (which perhaps is scarce possible) to resolve itself into Parts whose solid Contents were each a *cube* Inch, and into a *prismatick* Form whose *Base* should always be  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a *square* Inch; suppose these Conditions determin'd, and all others left to *undirected Force*; all which we could expect from *undirected Force* in this Case would be one equilateral *Prism*, or two perhaps: because there are an Infinity of Irregular *Prisms* possible of the same *Base*, and *solid Content*; and when we met with many such *Prisms*, we must probably conclude them produc'd by *Design*, since they are more than could have been expected by the Laws of *Hazard*.

IV. BUT if this *infinite* Mass was not determin'd to a *prismatick* Form, we could only expect from its *casual Concurrence* one *Prism* of any Kind, since there is an Infinity of other Solids into which the Mass might be resolv'd; and if we found any great Number of *Prisms*, we should have reason to presume *Design*: So that in a Mass of Matter as infinite of the *first* Power; we could not from any *Concurrence* or *Agitation* expect with any good ground a Body of any given Dimensions or Size, and of any given Form; since of any Dimension there are infinite Forms possible, and of any Form there are an Infinity of Dimensions; and if we found

Se<sup>ct.</sup> 5. several Bodys of the same Dimension and Form, we should have so much Presumption for *Design*.

V. THERE is one trifling Objection which may perhaps arise from the *crystallizing* of certain Bodys, when the Fluid is evaporated in which they were swimming: for in this we frequently see *regular Forms* arising, tho' there is nothing suppos'd in this Affair but an *undirected Force of Attraction*. But to remove this Objection, we need only consider, that we have good Reason to believe, that the smallest Particles of *Crystalliz'd* Bodys have fix'd *regular Forms* given them in the Constitution of *Nature*; and then it is easy to conceive how their *Attractions* may produce *regular Forms*: but unless we suppose some preceding *Regularity* in the Figures of *attracting* Bodys, they can never form any regular Body at all. And hence we see how improbable it is, that the whole Mass of *Matter*, not only in this Globe, but in all the fixed Stars known to us by our Eyes or Glasses, were they a thousand times larger than our Astronomers suppose, could in any *Concourse* have produc'd any Number of *similar* Bodys *Regular* or *Irregular*.

Combinations by Chance, impossible.

VI. AND let it be here observ'd, that there are many Compositions of Bodys which the smallest Degree of *Design* could easily effect, which yet we would in vain expect from all the

the Powers of *Chance* or *undesigned Force*, Sect. 5. after an *Infinity* of *Rencounters*; even sup-  
 posing a *Dissolution* of every Form except the *regular one*, that the Parts might be pre-  
 par'd for a new Agitation. Thus suppo-  
 sing we could expect *one* equilateral *Prism* of  
 any *given* Dimensions should be form'd from  
*undirected Force*, in an *Infinity* of Matter  
 some way determin'd to resolve itself into  
 Bodys of a *given* solid Content, ( which is all  
 we could expect, since it is *infinite* to *one*  
 after the *solid Content* is obtain'd, that the  
 Body shall not be *Prismatical*; and allow-  
 ing it *Prismatical*, it is *infinite* to *one* that it  
 shall not be *Equilateral*: ) And again, sup-  
 posing another *Infinity* of Matter determin'd  
 to resolve itself into *Tubes*, of *Orifices* exact-  
 ly equal to the *Bases* of the former *Prisms*,  
 it is again at least as the *second Power* of *In-*  
*finite* to *Unity*, that not one of these *Tubes*  
 shall be both *Prismatick* and *Equiangular*;  
 and then if the *Tube* were thus form'd, so as  
 to be exactly capable of receiving one of the  
*Prisms*, and no more, it is *infinite* to *one* that  
 they shall never meet in *infinite Space*; and  
 should they meet, it is *infinite* to *one* that  
 the *Axes* of the *Prism* and *Tube* shall never  
 happen in the same *strait Line*; and sup-  
 posing they did, it is again as *infinite* to  
*three*, that *Angle* shall not meet *Angle*, so as  
 to enter. We see then how infinitely im-  
 probable it is, " That all the Powers of  
 " *Chance* in *infinite Matter*, agitated thro'

Sect. 5. “ *infinite Ages*, could ever effect this small  
 “ Composition of a *Prism* entering a *Pris-*  
 “ *matick Bore*; and, that all our Hazard  
 “ for it would at most be but as *Three* is to  
 “ the *third Power of Infinite*.” And yet  
 the smallest *Design* could easily effect it.

VII. MAY we not then justly count it altogether absurd, and next to an absolute strict *Impossibility*, “ That all the Powers of  
 “ *undirected Force* should ever effect such a  
 “ complex Machine as the most imperfect  
 “ *Plant*, or the meanest *Animal*, even in  
 “ *one Instance*?” For the *Improbability* just increases, as the Complication of Mechanism in these *natural* Bodys surpasses that *simple* Combination above-mention’d.

VIII. LET it be here observ’d, “ That  
 “ the preceding Reasoning from the *Fre-*  
 “ *quency of regular Bodys* of one Form in  
 “ the *Universe*, and from the *Combinations*  
 “ of various Bodys, is intirely independent  
 “ on any Perception of *Beauty*; and would  
 “ equally prove *Design* in the *Cause*, altho’  
 “ there were no *Being* which perceiv’d  
 “ *Beauty* in any Form whatsoever:” for it is in short this, “ *That the recurring of any*  
 “ *Effect oftener than the Laws of Hazard*  
 “ *determine, gives Presumption of Design*;  
 “ *and, That Combinations which no unde-*  
 “ *sign’d Force could give us Reason to expect,*  
 “ *must necessarily prove the same; and that*  
 “ *with*

“ with superior Probability, as the Multitude Sect. 5.  
 “ of Cases in which the contrary might hap-  
 “ pen, surpass all the Cases in which this  
 “ could happen:” which appears to be in  
 the simplest Cases at least as *Infinite* does to  
*Unity*. And the Frequency of *similar irre-*  
*gular Forms*, or *exact Combinations* of them,  
 is an equal Argument of *Design* in the *Cause*,  
 since the *Similarity*, or *exact Combinations*  
 of *irregular Forms*, are as little to be ex-  
 pected from all the Powers of *undirected*  
*Force*, as any fort whatsoever.

IX. To bring this nearer to something  
 like a *Theorem*, altho' the *Idea* of *Infinite* be  
 troublesome enough to manage in Reasoning:  
 The Powers of *Chance*, with *infinite Mat-*  
*ter* in *infinite Ages*, may answer *Hazards* as  
 the *fifth* Power of *Infinite*, and no more:  
 thus the *Quantity* of *Matter* may be con-  
 ceiv'd as the third Power of *Infinite*, and no  
 more, the *various Degrees* of *Force* may  
 make *another* Power of *Infinite*, and the  
*Number* of *Rencounters* may make the *fifth*.  
 But this last only holds on Supposition, that  
 after every *Rencounter* there is no *Cohesion*,  
 but all is dissolv'd again for a new Con-  
 course, except in *similar Forms* or *exact Com-*  
*binations*; which Supposition is intirely  
 groundless, since we see *dissimilar Bodys* co-  
 hering as strongly as any, and *rude Masses*  
 more than any *Combinations*. Now to pro-  
 duce any *given Body*, in a *given Place* or

Sect. 5. Situation, and of *given* Dimensions, or Shape, the Hazards of the contrary are, *one* Power of *Infinite* at least to obtain the *Place* or *Situation*; when the *Situation* is obtain'd, the *Solid Content* requires *another* Power of *Infinite* to obtain it; the *Situation* and *Solidity* obtain'd require, for accomplishing the *simplest given* Shape, at least the other *three* Powers of *Infinite*. For instance, let the Shape be a four-sided *Prism* or *Parallelopiped*; that the *Surfaces* should be *Planes* requires *one* Power; that they should be *Parallel* in this Case, or *inclin'd* in any *given Angle* in any other Case, requires *another* Power of *Infinite*; and that they should be in any *given Ratio* to each other, requires at least the *third* Power: for in each of these Heads there is still an *Infinity* at least of other Cases possible beside the one *given*. So that all the Powers of *Chance* could only produce perhaps *one* Body of every simpler Shape or *Size at most*, and this is all we could expect: we might expect one *Pyramid*, or *Cube*, or *Prism* perhaps; but when we increase the Conditions requir'd, the Prospect must grow more improbable, as in more *complex Figures*, and in all *Combinations* of *Bodys*, and in *similar Species*, which we never could reasonably hope from *Chance*; and therefore where we see them, we must certainly ascribe them to *Design*.



X. THE Combinations of *regular Forms*, Sect. 5. or of *irregular ones* exactly adapted to each other, require such *vast Powers of Infinite* to effect them, and the Hazards of the *contrary Forms* are so *infinitely* numerous, that all *Probability* or *Possibility* of their being accomplished by *Chance* seems quite to vanish. Let us apply the Cases in *Art. vi.* of this *Section* about the *Prism* and *Tube*, to our simplest Machines, such as a *Pair of Wheels* of our ordinary Carriages; each *Circular*, *Spokes* equal in *length*, *thickness*, *shape*; the *Wheels* set *parallel*, the *Axle-tree* fix'd in the *Nave* of both, and secur'd from coming out at either End: Now the Cases in which the contrary might have happen'd from *undirected Concourses*, were there no more requir'd than what is just now mention'd, must amount in Multitude to a Power of *Infinite equal* to every Circumstance requir'd. What shall we say then of a *Plant*, a *Tree*, an *Animal*, a *Man*, with such *Multitudes* of adapted Vessels, such *Articulations*, *Insertions* of *Muscles*, *Diffusion* of *Veins*, *Arterys*, *Nerves*? The *Improbability* that such Machines should be the Effect of *Chance*, must be near the *infinitesimal* Power of *Infinite* to *Unity*.

XI. FURTHER, were all the former Reasoning from *Similarity* of Forms and Combinations groundless, and could *Chance* give

Sect. 5. give us ground to expect such Forms, with exact Combination, yet we could only promise ourselves *one* of these Forms among an *Infinity* of others. When we see then such a *Multitude* of Individuals of a Species, *similar* to each other in a great number of Parts; and when we see in each *Individual*, the corresponding Members so exactly like each other; what possible Room is there left for questioning *Design* in the *Universe*? None but the barest *Possibility* against an inconceivably great *Probability*, surpassing every thing which is not *strict Demonstration*.

XII. THIS Argument, as has been already observ'd\*, is quite abstracted from any Sense of *Beauty* in any particular Form; for the exact *Similarity* of a hundred or a thousand *Trapezia*, proves *Design* as well as the *Similarity* of *Squares*, since both are equally above all the Powers of *undirected Force or Chance*, as the *hundredth* or *thousandth* Power of *Infinite* surpasses *Unity*; and what is above the Powers of *Chance*, must give us proportionable Presumption for *Design*.

THUS, allowing that a *Leg*, or *Arm*, or *Eye*, might have been the Effect of *Chance*, (which was shewn to be *most absurd*, and next to absolutely *impossible*) that it should

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\* See above, *Art. viii.*

not have a corresponding *Leg, Arm, Eye*, Sect. 5. exactly *similar*, must be a Hazard of a Power of *Infinite* proportion'd to the Complication of Parts; for in Proportion to this is the Multitude of Cases increas'd, in which it would not have a corresponding Member *similar*: so that allowing twenty or thirty Parts in such a Structure, it would be as the *twentieth* or *thirtieth* Power of *Infinite* to *Unity*, that the corresponding Part should not be *similar*. What shall we say then of the *similar Forms* of a whole *Species*?


XIII. If it be objected, "That *natural* <sup>Gross Similarity by Chance, impossibl.</sup> Bodys are not *exactly similar*, but only *grossly so* to our Senses; as that a *Vein*, an *Artery*, a *Bone* is not perhaps exactly *similar* to its Correspondent in the same Animal, tho' it appears so to our Senses, which judge only of the Bulk, and do not discern the small constituent Parts; and that in the several Individuals of a Species the *Dissimilarity* is always sensible, often in the internal Structure, and always in the external Appearance:" To remove this Objection it will be sufficient to shew, "That the Multitude of Cases wherein *sensible Dissimilitude* could have happen'd, are still infinitely more than all the Cases in which *sensible Similitude* might be retained:" so that the same Reasoning holds from *sensible Similarity*, as from the *mathematically exact*: And again, "That  
" the

Sect. 5. " the Cases of *gross Dissimilarity* do in the  
 " same manner surpass the Cases of *gross*  
 " *Similarity* possible, as *infinite* does one.

XIV. To prove both these Assertions, let us consider a simple Instance. Suppose a *Trapezium* of a foot Square in *Area* should appear grossly *similar* to another, while no one *Side* differs, by  $\frac{1}{10}$  of an Inch; or no *Angle* in one surpasses the corresponding one in the other above ten Minutes: now this tenth of an Inch is *infinitely* divisible, as are also the ten Minutes, so that the Cases of *insensible Dissimilarity* under *apparent Similarity* are really *Infinite*. But then it is also plain that there are an *Infinity* of different sensibly dissimilar *Trapezia*, even of the same *Area*, according as we vary a *Side* by one Tenth, two Tenths, three Tenths, and so on, and vary the *Angles* and another *Side* so as to keep the *Area* equal. Now in each of these infinite Degrees of *sensible Dissimilitude* the several Tenths are *infinitely* divisible as well as in the first Case; so that the Multitude of *sensible Dissimilarities* are to the Multitude of *insensible Dissimilarities* under *apparent Resemblance*, still as the *second Power* of *Infinite* to the *first*, or as *Infinite* to *Unity*. And then how vastly greater must the Multitude be, of all possible *sensible Dissimilarities* in such complex Bodys as *Legs, Arms, Eyes, Arterys, Veins, Skeletons?*

XV. As

XV. As to the *Dissimilarities* of Animals Sect. 5.  
of the same Species, it is in the same manner plain, that the possible Cases of *gross Dissimilarity* are Infinite; and then every Case of *gross Dissimilarity* contains also all the Cases of *insensible Dissimilarity*. Thus, if we would count all Animals of a Species *grossly similar*, while there was no Limb which in Length or Diameter did exceed the ordinary Shape by above a Third of the Head; it is plain that there are an Infinity of sensibly different *gross Dissimilarities* possible, and then in each of these Cases of *gross Dissimilarity*, there are an Infinity of Cases of *nicer Dissimilarity*, since  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the Head may be infinitely divided. To take a low but easy Instance; two *Cockle-Shells* which fitted each other naturally, may have an Infinity of *insensible Differences*, but still there are an Infinity of possible *sensible Differences*; and then in any one of the *sensibly different* Forms, there may be the same Infinity of *insensible Differences* beside the *sensible one*: So that still the Hazard for even *gross Similarity* from *Chance* is *Infinite to one*, and this always increases by a Power of Infinite for every distinct Member of the Animal, in which even *gross Similarity* is retain'd; since the Addition of every Member or Part to a complex Machine, makes a new Infinity of Cases, in which *sensible Dissimilarity* may happen; and this Infinity combin'd with

Sect. 5. with the infinite Cases of the former Parts,  
 raises the Hazard by a Power of Infinite.

Now this may sufficiently shew us the Absurdity of the *Cartesian* or *Epicurean Hypothesis*, even granting their *Postulatum* of *undirected Force* impress'd on *Infinite Matter*; and seems almost a Demonstration of *Design* in the *Universe*.

XVI. ONE Objection more remains to be remov'd, *viz.* "That some imagine, this  
 " Argument may hold better *à Priori* than  
 " *à Posteriori*; that is, we have better  
 " Reason to believe, when we see a *Cause*  
 " about to act, without Knowledge, that  
 " he will not attain any given, or desir'd  
 " *End*; than we have on the other hand to  
 " believe, when we see the *End* actually at-  
 " tain'd, that he acted with Knowledge:  
 " Thus, say they, when a particular Per-  
 " son is about to draw a Ticket in a *Lot-*  
 " *tery*, where there is but one *Prize* to a  
 " thousand *Blanks*, it is highly probable that  
 " he shall draw a *Blank*; but suppose we  
 " have seen him actually draw for himself  
 " the *Prize*, we have no ground to con-  
 " clude that he had *Knowledge* or *Art* to  
 " accomplish this *End*." But the Answer  
 is obvious: In such Contrivances we generally have, from the very Circumstances of the Lottery, very strong moral Arguments, which almost demonstrate that *Art*  
 can

can have no Place; so that a Probability of Sect. 5.  
*a thousand to one*, may not surmount those Arguments: But let the Probability be increas'd, and it will soon surmount all Arguments to the contrary. For instance, If we saw a Man ten times successively draw Prizes, in a Lottery where there were but ten Prizes to ten thousand Blanks, I fancy few would question whether he us'd *Art* or not: much less would we imagine it were *Chance*, if we saw a Man draw for his own Gain successively a hundred, or a thousand Prizes, from among a proportionably greater Number of Blanks. Now in the Works of Nature the Case is intirely different: we have not the least Argument against *Art* or *Design*. An *Intelligent Cause* is surely at least as probable a Notion as *Chance*, *general Force*, *Conatus ad Motum*, or the *Clinamen Principiorum*, to account for any Effect whatsoever: And then all the *Regularity*, *Combinations*, *Similarity*s of Species, are so many Demonstrations, that there was *Design* and *Intelligence* in the CAUSE of this Universe: Whereas in fair Lotterys, all *Art* in drawing is made, if not actually impossible, at least highly improbable.


XVII. LET it be here observ'd also, *Irregularity*  
 " That a *rational Agent* may be capable of *ty does not*  
 " impressing Force without intending to *prove*  
 " produce any particular Form, and of de- *want of*  
 " signedly producing *irregular* or *dissimilar* *Design*,  
 " Forms,

Sect. 5. “Forms, as well as *regular* and *similar* :”  
 And hence it follows, “That altho’ all the  
 “ *Regularity, Combination* and *Similarity* in  
 “ the *Universe*, are Presumptions of *Design*,  
 “ yet *Irregularity* is no Presumption of the  
 “ contrary ; unless we suppose that the  
 “ *Agent* is determin’d from a Sense of *Beau-*  
 “ *ty* always to act *regularly*, and delight in  
 “ *Similarity* ; and that he can have no other  
 “ inconsistent Motive of Action :” Which  
 last is plainly absurd. We do not want in  
 the *Universe* many Effects which seem to  
 have been left to the general *Laws* of *Mo-*  
*tion* upon some great *Impulse*, and have ma-  
 ny Instances where *Similarity* has been plainly  
 design’d in some respects, and probably neg-  
 lected in others ; or even *Dissimilarity* de-  
 sign’d. Thus we see the *general exact Re-*  
*semblance* between the two *Eyes* of most  
 Persons ; and yet perhaps no other third  
*Eye* in the World is *exactly* like them. We  
 see a *gross Conformity* of Shape in all Persons  
 in innumerable Parts, and yet no two *Indi-*  
*viduals* of any Species are undistinguishable ;  
 which perhaps is intended for valuable  
 Purposes to the whole Species.

*Wisdom,*  
*Prudence.*

XVIII. H I T H E R T O the Proof amounts  
 only to *Design* or *Intention*, barely, in Oppo-  
 sition to *blind Force* or *Chance* ; and we see  
 the Proof of this is independent on the *arbi-*  
*trary Constitution* of our *internal Sense* of  
*Beauty*. *Beauty* is often suppos’d an Argu-  
 ment



ment of more than *Design*, to wit, *Wisdom* Sect. 5. and *Prudence* in the *Cause*. Let us inquire  also into this.

WISDOM denotes *the pursuing of the best Ends by the best Means*; and therefore, before we can from any Effect prove the *Cause* to be *wise*, we must know what is *best* to the *Cause* or *Agent*. . Among Men who have Pleasure in contemplating *Uniformity*, the *Beauty* of Effects is an Argument of *Wisdom*, because this is good to them; but the same Argument would not hold as to a *Being void* of this *Sense* of *Beauty*. And therefore the *Beauty* apparent to us in *Nature*, will not of itself prove *Wisdom* in the *Cause*, unless this *Cause* or AUTHOR of *Nature* be suppos'd BENEVOLENT; and then indeed the Happiness of Mankind is desirable or *Good* to the SUPREME CAUSE; and that Form which pleases us, is an Argument of his *Wisdom*. And the Strength of this Argument is increased always in proportion to the Degree of *Beauty* produc'd in *Nature*, and expos'd to the View of any *rational Agents*; since upon Supposition of a *Benevolent* DEITY, all the apparent *Beauty* produc'd is an Evidence of the Execution of a *Benevolent Design*, to give them the Pleasures of *Beauty*.

BUT what more immediately proves *Wisdom* is this; When we see any Machine with a great Complication of Parts actually ob-

F

taining

Sect. 5. taining an *End*, we justly conclude, “ That  
 “ since this could not have been the Effect  
 “ of *Chance*, it must have been *intended* for  
 “ that *End*, which is obtain’d by it;” and  
 then the *Ends* or *Intentions* being in part  
 known, the Complication of Organs, and  
 their nice Disposition adapted to this *End*,  
 is an Evidence “ of a *comprehensive large*  
 “ *Understanding* in the *Cause*, according to  
 “ the Multiplicity of Parts, and the Appo-  
 “ siteness of their Structure, even when we  
 “ do not know the *Intention* of the *Whole*.”

General  
 Causes.

XIX. THERE is another kind of *Beauty*  
 from which we conclude Wisdom in the  
*Cause*, as well as Design, *when we see many*  
*useful or beautiful Effects flowing from one*  
*general Cause*. There is a very good Reason  
 for this Conclusion among Men. *Interest*  
 must lead *Beings* of limited Powers, who are  
 incapable of a great Diversity of Operations,  
 and distracted by them, to choose this *frugal*  
*Oeconomy* of their Forces, and to look upon  
 such Management as an Evidence of *Wisdom*  
 in other *Beings* like themselves. Nor is this  
 speculative Reason all which influences  
 them; for even beside this Consideration of  
*Interest*, they are determin’d by a *Sense of*  
*Beauty*, where that Reason does not hold; as  
 when we are judging of the Productions of  
 other *Agents* about whose *Oeconomy* we are  
 not solicitous. Thus, who does not ap-  
 prove of it as a Perfection in *Clock-work*, that  
 three

three or four Motions of the *Hour, Minute, Sect. 5.*  
 and *second Hands*, and *monthly Plate*, should  
 arise from *one Spring* or *Weight*, rather than  
 from three or four *Springs* or *Weights*, in  
 a very compound Machine, which should  
 perform the same Effects, and answer all  
 the same Purposes with equal Exactness?  
 Now the Foundation of this *Beauty* plainly  
 appears to be an *Uniformity*, or *Unity* of Cause  
 amidst *Diversity* of Effects.

XX. WE shall \* hereafter offer some *General*  
 Reasons, why the AUTHOR of *Nature* *Laws.*  
 may choose to operate in this manner by  
*General Laws* and *Universal extensive Causes*,  
 altho' the Reason just now mention'd does  
 not hold with an *Almighty Being*. This is  
 certain, That we have some of the most  
 delightful Instances of *Universal Causes* in the  
*Works of Nature*, and that the most studious  
 Men in these Subjects are so delighted with  
 the Observation of them, that they always  
 look upon them as Evidences of *Wisdom* in  
 the Administration of *Nature*, from a  
 SENSE OF BEAUTY.

XXI. THE wonderfully simple *Mecha-*  
*nism* which performs all Animal Motions,  
 was mention'd † already; nor is *that* of the  
 inanimate Parts of *Nature*, less admirable.  
 How innumerable are the Effects of that one

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\* See the last Section.

† See above, Sect. ii. Art. 8.

Sect. 5. Principle of *Heat*, deriv'd to us from the *Sun*, which is not only delightful to our Sight and Feeling, and the Means of discerning Objects, but is the Cause of *Rains*, *Springs*, *Rivers*, *Winds*, and the universal Cause of *Vegetation*! The *uniform Principle of Gravity* preserves at once the *Planets* in their *Orbits*, gives *Cohesion* to the Parts of each *Globe*, and *Stability* to *Mountains*, *Hills*, and *artificial Structures*; it raises the *Sea* in *Tides*, and sinks them again, and restrains them in their *Channels*; it drains the *Earth* of its superfluous *Moisture*, by *Rivers*; it raises the *Vapours* by its Influence on the *Air*, and brings them down again in *Rains*; it gives an *uniform Pressure* to our *Atmosphere*, necessary to our *Bodys* in general, and more especially to *Inspiration* in *Breathing*; and furnishes us with an *universal Movement*, capable of being apply'd in innumerable *Engines*. How incomparably more *beautiful* is this *Structure*, than if we suppos'd so many *distinct Volitions* in the DEITY, producing every particular Effect, and preventing some of the accidental Evils which casually flow from the *general Law*! We may rashly imagine that this latter manner of Operation might have been more useful to us; and it would have been no Distraction to *Omnipotence*: But then the great *Beauty* had been lost, and there had been no more Pleasure in the Contemplation of this Scene, which is now so delightful. One would rather

rather choose to run the Hazard of its *casual* Sect. 5.  
*Evils*, than part with that *harmonious Form*,  
 which has been an unexhausted Source of  
 Delight to the successive Spectators in all  
 Ages.

XXII. HENCE we see, “That how-*Miracles*.  
 “ ever *Miracles* may prove the Superin-  
 “ tendency of a *voluntary Agent*, and that  
 “ the *Universe* is not guided by *Necessity* or  
 “ *Fate*, yet that *Mind* must be *weak* and  
 “ *inadvertent*, which needs them to confirm  
 “ the Belief of a *Wise* and Good DEITY;  
 “ since the Deviation from *general Laws*,  
 “ unless upon very extraordinary Occasions,  
 “ must be a Presumption of *Inconstancy*  
 “ and *Weakness*, rather than of *steady Wis-*  
 “ *dom* and *Power*, and must weaken the  
 “ best Arguments we can have for the Sa-  
 “ gacity and *Power* of the *universal MIND*.’

## S E C T. VI.

Of the Univerſality of the Senſe of  
Beauty among Men.

Internal  
Senſe not  
an imme-  
diate  
Source of  
Pain.

I. **W**E before \* inſinuated, “ That all  
“ *Beauty* has a relation to ſome  
“ *perceiving Power* ;” and conſequently ſince  
we know not how great a *Variety* of Senſes  
there may be among Animals, there is no  
Form in *Nature* concerning which we can  
pronounce, “ That it has no *Beauty* ;” for  
it may ſtill pleaſe ſome *perceiving Power*.  
But our *Inquiry* is confin'd to Men ; and be-  
fore we examine the *Univerſality* of this  
*Senſe of Beauty*, or their *Agreement* in ap-  
proving *Uniformity*, it may be proper to  
conſider, “ Whether, as the other *Senſes*  
“ which give us Pleaſure, do alſo give us  
“ Pain, ſo this *Senſe of Beauty* does make  
“ ſome Objects diſagreeable to us, and the  
“ Occaſion of Pain.”

T H A T many Objects give no pleaſure to  
our *Senſe* is obvious ; many are certainly  
void of *Beauty* : But then there is no Form  
which ſeems neceſſarily diſagreeable of it-  
ſelf, when we dread no other Evil from it,

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\* See above Sect. i. Art. 17; Sect. iv. Art. 1.

and compare it with nothing better of the Sect. 6. Kind. Many Objects are naturally displeasing, and distasteful to our *external Senses*, as well as others pleasing and agreeable; as *Smells, Tastes, and some separate Sounds*: but as to our *Sense of Beauty*, no Composition of Objects which give not unpleasant simple Ideas, seems positively unpleasant or painful of itself, had we never observ'd any thing better of the Kind. *Deformity* is only *the Absence of Beauty, or Deficiency in the Beauty expected in any Species*: Thus *bad Musick* pleases *Rusticks* who never heard any better, and the *finest Ear* is not offended with *tuning* of Instruments, if it be not too tedious, where no *Harmony* is expected; and yet much smaller *Dissonancy* shall offend amidst the Performance, where *Harmony* is expected. A *rude Heap* of Stones is no way offensive to one who shall be displeas'd with *Irregularity* in *Architecture*, where *Beauty* was expected. And had there been a Species of that Form which we now call *ugly* or *deform'd*, and had we never seen or expected greater *Beauty*, we should have receiv'd no Disgust from it, altho' the Pleasure would not have been so great in this Form as in those we now admire. Our *Sense of Beauty* seems design'd to give us positive Pleasure, but not a positive Pain or Disgust, any farther than what arises from Disappointment.

SECT. 6. II. THERE are indeed many Faces which at first View are apt to raise Dislike; but this is generally not from any Deformity which of itself is positively displeasing, but either from want of *expected Beauty*, or much more from their carrying some natural Indications of *morally bad Dispositions*, which we all acquire a Faculty of discerning in *Countenances, Airs, and Gestures*. That this is not occasion'd by any Form positively disgusting, will appear from this, That if upon long Acquaintance we are sure of finding *Sweetness of Temper, Humanity and Cheerfulness*, altho' the bodily Form continues, it shall give us no Disgust or Displeasure; whereas, if any thing were naturally disagreeable, or the Occasion of Pain, or positive Distaste, it would always continue so, even altho' the Aversion we might have toward it were counterbalanc'd by other Considerations. There are Horrors rais'd by some Objects, which are only the Effect of *Fear* for ourselves, or *Compassion* towards others, when either *Reason*, or some foolish *Association of Ideas*, makes us apprehend Danger, and not the Effect of any thing in the Form itself: for we find that most of those Objects which excite Horror at first, when Experience or Reason has remov'd the Fear, may become the Occasions of Pleasure; as *ravenous Beasts, a tempestuous Sea, a craggy Precipice, a dark shady Valley*.

~  
*Approba-  
 tion and  
 Dislike  
 from Af-  
 sociations  
 of Ideas.*



III. WE shall see \* hereafter, " That Sect. 6.  
 " *Associations of Ideas* make Objects plea-  
 " sant and delightful, which are not na-  
 " turally apt to give any such Pleasures; <sup>Associati-</sup>  
 " and the same way, the *casual Conjunctions* <sup>ons.</sup>  
 " of Ideas may give a Disgust, where there  
 " is nothing disagreeable in the Form it-  
 " self." And this is the Occasion of many  
 fantastick Aversions to Figures of some Ani-  
 mals, and to some other Forms: Thus  
*Swine, Serpents* of all Kinds, and some *In-*  
*sects* really beautiful enough, are beheld  
 with Aversion by many People, who have  
 got *some accidental Ideas associated* to them.  
 And for *Distastes* of this Kind, no other  
 Account can be given.

IV. BUT as to the *universal Agreement* <sup>Universa-</sup>  
 of Mankind in their *Sense of Beauty* from <sup>lity of this</sup>  
*Uniformity amidst Variety*, we must consult <sup>Sense.</sup>  
 Experience: and as we allow all Men Rea-  
 son, since all Men are capable of understand-  
 ing simple Arguments, tho' few are capable  
 of complex Demonstrations; so in this Case  
 it must be sufficient to prove *this Sense of*  
*Beauty universal*, " if all Men are better  
 " pleas'd with *Uniformity* in the simpler  
 " Instances than *the contrary*, even when  
 " there is no Advantage observ'd attending  
 " it; and likewise if all Men, according as

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\* See below Art. 11, 12. of this Section.

" their

Sect. 6. “ their Capacity enlarges, so as to receive  
 “ and compare more complex Ideas, have  
 “ a greater Delight in *Uniformity*, and are  
 “ pleas’d with its more complex Kinds,  
 “ both *Original* and *Relative*.”

Now let us consider if ever any Person was void of *this Sense* in the simpler Instances. Few Trials have been made in the simplest Instances of *Harmony*, because, as soon as we find an *Ear* incapable of relishing complex Compositions, such as our *Tunes* are, no farther Pains are employ’d about such. But in *Figures*, did ever any Man make choice of a *Trapezium*, or any irregular *Curve*, for the *Ichnography* or Plan of his House, without Necessity, or some great Motive of Convenience? or to make the opposite Walls *not parallel*, or *unequal* in Height? Were ever *Trapeziums*, irregular *Polygons* or *Curves* chosen for the Forms of *Doors* or *Windows*, tho’ these Figures might have answer’d the Uses as well, and would have often sav’d a great Part of the Time, Labour and Expence to Workmen, which is now employ’d in suiting the Stones and Timber to the *regular* Forms? Among all the fantastick Modes of *Dress*, none was ever quite void of *Uniformity*, if it were only in the *Resemblance* of the two Sides of the same *Robe*, and in *some general Aptitude* to the human Form. The *Pictish Painting* had always *relative Beauty*, by Resemblance

to other Objects, and often those Objects Sect. 6. were *originally beautiful*: however justly we might here apply HORACE'S Censure of impertinent Descriptions in *Poetry*,

*Sed non erat his locus* —\*.


But never were any so extravagant as to affect such Figures as are made by *the casual spilling* of liquid Colours. Who was ever pleas'd with an *Inequality* of Heights in *Windows* of the same Range, or *dissimilar Shapes* of them? with *unequal Legs* or *Arms*, *Eyes* or *Cheeks* in a *Mistress*? It must however be acknowledg'd, " That *Interest* may often counterbalance our *Sense of Beauty*, in this *Affair* as well as in others, and superior good *Qualities* may make us overlook such *Imperfections*."

V. NAY farther, it may perhaps appear, *Real Beauty* " That *Regularity* and *Uniformity* are so *co-* ty alone *piously diffus'd thro' the Universe*, and we pleases. " are so readily determin'd to pursue *this* as " the *Foundation of Beauty* in *Works of Art*, " that there is scarcely any thing ever *fan-* " *sy'd as Beautiful*, where there is not really " something of this *Uniformity* and *Regula-* " *rity*." We are indeed often mistaken in imagining that there is the greatest possible *Beauty*, where it is but very imperfect ; but

\* Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 19.

Seçt. 6. still it is some Degree of *Beauty* which pleases, altho' there may be higher Degrees which we do not observe; and our *Sense* acts with full Regularity when we are pleas'd, altho' we are kept by a false Prejudice from pursuing Objects which would please us more.

A GOTH, for instance, is mistaken, when from Education he imagines the *Architecture* of his Country to be the most perfect: and a *Conjunction* of some *hostile Ideas*, may make him have an Aversion to *Roman Buildings*, and study to demolish them, as some of our *Reformers* did the *Popish Buildings*, not being able to separate the Ideas of the superstitious Worship from the Forms of the Buildings where it was practis'd: and yet it is still *real Beauty* which pleases the GOTH, founded upon *Uniformity amidst Variety*. For the *Gothick Pillars* are *uniform* to each other, not only in their *Sections*, which are *Lozenge-form'd*; but also in their *Heights* and *Ornaments*: Their *Arches* are not one *uniform Curve*, but yet they are *Segments of similar Curves*, and generally equal in the same Ranges. The very *Indian Buildings* have some kind of *Uniformity*, and many of the *EASTERN NATIONS*, tho' they differ much from us, yet have great *Regularity* in their Manner, as well as the *ROMANS* in their. Our *Indian Screens*, which wonderfully supply our Imaginations with Ideas of Deformity, in which *Nature* is very churlish

lish and sparing, do want indeed all the Sect. 6.  
*Beauty* arising from Proportion of Parts, and   
 Conformity to *Nature*; and yet they cannot  
 divest themselves of all *Beauty* and *Uniformity*  
 in the separate Parts: And this diversifying  
 the human Body into various Contortions,  
 may give some wild Pleasure from  
*Variety*, since some *Uniformity* to the human  
 Shape is still retained.

VI. THERE is one sort of *Beauty* which *History*  
 might perhaps have been better mention'd *pleases in*  
 before, but will not be impertinent here, *like man-*  
 because the Taste or Relish of it is *universal*  
*ner.*  
 in all Nations, and with the Young as well  
 as the Old, and that is the *Beauty* of *History*.  
 Every one knows how dull a Study it is to  
 read over a Collection of *Gazettes*, which  
 shall perhaps relate all the same Events with  
 the *Historian*: The superior Pleasure then  
 of *History* must arise, like that of *Poetry*,  
 from the *Manners*; when we see a *Chara cter*  
 well drawn, wherein we find the secret Causes  
 of a great Diversity of seemingly inconsistent  
 Actions; or an *Interest of State* laid open, or  
 an *artful View* nicely unfolded, the Execution  
 of which influences very different and oppo-  
 site Actions as the Circumstances may alter.  
 Now this reduces the whole to an *Unity* of  
 Design at least: And this may be observ'd in  
 the very Fables which entertain Children,  
 otherwise we cannot make them relish them.

Sect. 6.



VII. WHAT has been said will probably be assented to, if we always remember in our Inquiries into the *Universality* of the *Sense of Beauty*, “ That there may be *real Beauty*, “ where there is not the *greatest*; and that “ there are an *Infinity* of different *Forms* “ which may all have some *Unity*, and yet “ differ from each other.” So that Men may have different *Fancies of Beauty*, and yet *Uniformity* be the *universal Foundation* of our *Approbation* of any *Form whatsoever* as *Beautiful*. And we shall find that it is so in the *Architecture, Gardening, Dress, Equipage, and Furniture* of Houses, even among the most uncultivated Nations; where *Uniformity* still pleases, without any other Advantage than the *Pleasure of the Contemplation* of it.

*Diversity of Judgments concerning our Senses.*

VIII. IT will deserve our Consideration on this Subject, how, in like Cases, we form very different Judgments concerning the *internal and external Senses*. Nothing is more ordinary among those, who after Mr. LOCKE have rejected *innate Ideas*, than to alledge, “ That all our *Relish for Beauty* “ and *Order*, is either from Prospect of *Advantage, Custom, or Education*,” for no other Reason but the *Variety of Fancies* in the World: and from this they conclude, “ That our *Fancies* do not arise from any “ *natural Power of Perception, or Sense.*”

And

And yet all allow our *external Senses* to be Sect. 6. *Natural*, and that the Pleasures or Pains of their Sensations, however they may be increas'd or diminish'd by *Custom* or *Education*, and counterbalanc'd by *Interest*, yet are really antecedent to *Custom*, *Habit*, *Education*, or Prospect of *Interest*. Now it is certain, "That there is at least as great a Variety of Fancies about their Objects, as the Objects of *Beauty*:" Nay, it is much more difficult, and perhaps impossible, to bring the Fancies or Relishes of the *external Senses* to any general Foundation at all, or to find any Rule for the *Agreeable* or *Disagreeable*: and yet we all allow, "that these are *natural Powers of Perception*."

IX. THE Reason of this different Judgment can be no other than this, That we have got distinct Names for the *external Senses*, and none, or very few, for the *Internal*; and by this are led, as in many other Cases, to look upon the former as some way more *fix'd*, and *real*, and *natural*, than the latter. The *Sense* of *Harmony* has got its Name, *viz.* a *good Ear*; and we are generally brought to acknowledge this a *natural Power of Perception*, or a *Sense* some way distinct from *Hearing*: now it is certain, "That there is as necessary a Perception of *Beauty* upon the Presence of *regular Objects*, as of *Harmony* upon hearing certain *Sounds*."

X. BUT

Sect. 6.

X. BUT let it be observ'd here once for all, "That an *internal Sense* no more pre-  
 " supposes an *innate Idea*, or Principle of  
 " Knowledge, than the *external*." Both are  
 " *natural Powers of Perception*, or *Determina-*  
 " *tions of the Mind* to receive necessarily certain  
 Ideas from the Presence of Objects. The  
*Internal Sense* is, a *passive Power of receiving*  
*Ideas of Beauty from all Objects in which there*  
*is Uniformity amidst Variety*. Nor does there  
 seem any thing more difficult in this matter,  
 than that the Mind should be always deter-  
 min'd to receive the Idea of *Sweet*, when Par-  
 ticles of such a Form enter the Pores of the  
 Tongue; or to have the Idea of *Sound* upon  
 any quick Undulation of the Air. The one  
 seems to have as little Connection with its  
 Idea, as the other: And the *same Power*  
 could with equal Ease constitute the former  
 the Occasion of Ideas, as the latter.

*Associati-*  
*ons Cause*  
*of Disagree-*  
*ment.*

XI. THE *Association* of Ideas \* above  
 hinted at, is one great Cause of the apparent  
 Diversity of Fancys in the *Sense of Beauty*, as  
 well as in the *external Senses*; and often  
 makes Men have an Aversion to Objects of  
*Beauty*, and a Liking to others void of it, but  
 under different Conceptions than those of  
*Beauty* or *Deformity*. And here it may not  
 be improper to give some Instances of some

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\* See above *Art.* 3. of this Section.



of these *Associations*. The *Beauty of Trees*, Sect. 6. their *cool Shades*, and their *Aptness* to conceal from Observation, have made *Groves* and *Woods* the usual Retreat to those who love *Solitude*, especially to the *Religious*, the *Pensive*, the *Melancholy*, and the *Amorous*. And do not we find that we have so join'd the Ideas of these Dispositions of Mind with those external Objects, that they always recur to us along with them? The *Cunning* of the *Heathen Priests* might make such obscure Places the Scene of the fictitious Appearances of their *Deitys*; and hence we join Ideas of something *Divine* to them. We know the like Effect in the Ideas of our *Churches*, from the perpetual Use of them only in *religious Exercises*. The faint Light in *Gothick Buildings* has had the same Association of a very foreign Idea, which our *Poet* shews in his *Epithet*,

———— *A dim religious Light\**.

IN like manner it is known, That often all the Circumstances of *Actions*, or *Places*, or *Dresses* of Persons, or *Voice*, or *Song*, which have occur'd at any time together, when we were strongly affected by any *Passion*, will be so connected that any one of these will make all the rest recur. And this is often the occasion both of great Pleasure

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
\* Milt. Il Penferoso.

Se<sup>ct.</sup> 6. and Pain, Delight and Aversion to many Objects, which of themselves might have been perfectly indifferent to us: but these *Approbations*, or *Distastes*, are remote from the Ideas of *Beauty*, being plainly different Ideas.

*Musick,*  
*how it*  
*pleases*  
*differently.*

XII. THERE is also another Charm in *Musick* to various Persons, which is distinct from the *Harmony*, and is occasion'd by its raising agreeable Passions. The *human Voice* is obviously vary'd by all the stronger Passions; now, when our *Ear* discerns any Resemblance between the *Air* of a *Tune*, whether sung or play'd upon an Instrument, either in its *Time*, or *Modulation*, or any other Circumstance, to the Sound of the *human Voice*, in any Passion, we shall be touch'd by it in a very sensible manner, and have *Melancholy*, *Joy*, *Gravity*, *Thoughtfulness*, excited in us by a sort of *Sympathy* or *Contagion*. The same Connexion is observable between the very *Air* of a *Tune*, and the *Words* expressing any Passion which we have heard it fitted to, so that they shall both recur to us together, tho' but one of them affects our *Senses*.

Now in such a Diversity of pleasing or displeasing Ideas, which may be join'd with Forms of *Bodys*, or *Tunes*, when Men are of such different Dispositions, and prone to such a Variety of Passions, it is no Wonder, “ that they should often disagree in their Fancies  
“ of

“ of Objects, even altho’ their *Sense of Beauty* Sect. 6.  
 “ *ty and Harmony were perfectly uniform;*”   
 because many other Ideas may either please  
 or displease, according to Persons Tempers,  
 and past Circumstances. We know how  
 agreeable a very *wild Country* may be to any  
 Person who has spent the chearful Days of  
 his Youth in it, and how disagreeable very  
*beautiful Places* may be, if they were the  
 Scenes of his Misery. And this may help  
 us in many Cases to account for the Diver-  
 sitys of Fancy, without denying the *Unifor-*  
*mity of our internal Sense of Beauty.*

XIII. GRANDEUR and *Novelty* are two  
 Ideas different from *Beauty*, which often re-  
 commend Objects to us. The Reason of  
 this is foreign to the present Subject. See  
*Spectator*, N<sup>o</sup> 412.

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## S E C T. VII.

*Of the Power of Custom, Education, and Example, as to our internal Senses.*

I. **C**USTOM, *Education*, and *Example* are so often alledg'd in this Affair, as the Occasion of our Relish for *beautiful Objects*, and for our Approbation of, or Delight in, a certain *Conduct in Life* in a *moral Species*, that it is necessary to examine these three particularly, to make it appear, “ that there is a *natural Power of Perception*, or *Sense of Beauty* in *Objects*, antecedent to all *Custom*, *Education*, or *Example*.”

*Custom gives no new Sense.*

II. **C**USTOM, as distinct from the other two, operates in this manner. As to *Actions*, it only gives a *Disposition* to the *Mind* or *Body* more easily to perform those *Actions* which have been frequently repeated; but never leads us to apprehend them under any other *View*, than what we were capable of apprehending them under at first; nor gives us any new *Power of Perception* about them. We are naturally capable of *Sentiments of Fear*, and *Dread* of any powerful *Presence*; and

and so *Custom* may connect the Ideas of religious *Horror* to certain Buildings: but *Custom* could never have made a *Being* naturally incapable of *Fear*, receive such Ideas. So, had we no other Power of perceiving, or forming Ideas of Actions, but as they were *advantageous* or *disadvantageous*, *Custom* could only have made us more ready at perceiving the *Advantage* or *Disadvantage* of Actions. But this is not to our present Purpose.

As to our Approbation of, or Delight in external Objects; When the *Blood* or *Spirits*, of which *Anatomists* talk, are rous'd, quicken'd, or fermented as they call it, in any agreeable manner, by Medicine or Nutriment; or any *Glands* frequently stimulated to Secretion; it is certain, that to preserve the Body easy, we shall delight in Objects of Taste, which of themselves are not immediately pleasant to it, if they promote that agreeable State, which the Body had been *accustom'd* to. Farther, *Custom* will so alter the State of the Body, that what at first rais'd uneasy Sensations, will cease to do so, or perhaps raise another agreeable Idea of the same Sense; but *Custom* can never give us any Idea of a Sense different from those we had antecedent to it: It will never make the *Blind* approve Objects as *coloured*, or those who have no *Taste* approve Meats as *delicious*, however they might approve them as *strengthening* or *exhilarating*. Were our

Sect. 7. *Glands*, and the Parts about them, void of Feeling, did we perceive no Pleasure from certain brisker Motions in the *Blood*, *Custom* could never make stimulating or intoxicating Fluids or Medicines agreeable, when they were not so to the Taste: So, by like Reasoning, had we no *natural Sense* of *Beauty* from *Uniformity*, *Custom* could never have made us imagine any *Beauty* in Objects; if we had had no Ear, *Custom* could never have given us the Pleasures of *Harmony*. When we have these *natural Senses* antecedently, *Custom* may make us capable of extending our Views farther, and of receiving more complex Ideas of *Beauty* in Bodys, or *Harmony* in Sounds, by increasing our Attention, and Quickness of Perception. But however *Custom* may increase our Power of receiving or comparing complex Ideas, yet it seems rather to weaken than strengthen the Ideas of *Beauty*, or the Impressions of Pleasure from regular Objects; else how is it possible that any Person could go into the open Air on a sunny Day, or clear Evening, without the most extravagant Raptures, such as MILTON \* represents our *Ancestor* in, upon his first Creation? For such any Person would certainly fall into, upon the first Representation of such a Scene.

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\* See *Paradise Lost*, Book 8.

CUSTOM in like manner may make it Sect. 7.  
 easier for any Person to discern the Use of  
 a complex Machine, and approve it as *ad-  
 vantageous*; but he would never have imag-  
 in'd it *beautiful*, had he no *natural Sense*  
 of *Beauty*. *Custom* may make us quicker  
 in apprehending the Truth of complex *The-  
 orems*, but we all find the Pleasure or *Beauty*  
 of *Theorems* as strong at first as ever. *Custom*  
 makes us more capable of retaining and com-  
 paring complex Ideas, so as to discern more  
 complicated *Uniformity*, which escapes the  
 Observation of *Novices* in any Art; but all  
 this presupposes a *natural Sense* of *Beauty* in  
*Uniformity*: for, had there been nothing in  
 Forms, which was constituted the necessary  
 Occasion of Pleasure to our Senses, no Repe-  
 tition of indifferent Ideas as to Pleasure or  
 Pain, *Beauty* or *Deformity*, could ever have  
 made them grow pleasing or displeasing.

III. THE Effect of EDUCATION is this, *Nor Edu-  
 cation.*  
 that thereby we receive many speculative  
 Opinions, which are sometimes true, and  
 sometimes false; and are often led to believe,  
 that Objects may be naturally apt to give  
 Pleasure or Pain to our external Senses,  
 which in reality have no such Quality. And  
 farther, by *Education* there are some strong  
 Associations of Ideas without any Reason,  
 by mere Accident sometimes, as well as by  
 Design, which it is very hard for us ever

Sect. 7. after to break afunder. Thus Aversions are rais'd to Darkneſs, and to many kinds of Meat, and to certain innocent Actions: Approbations without Ground are rais'd in like manner. But in all theſe Inſtances, *Education* never makes us apprehend any Qualities in Objects, which we have not *naturally* Senſes capable of perceiving. We know what Sickneſs of the Stomach is, and may without Ground believe, that very healthful Meats will raiſe this; we by our Sight and Smell receive diſagreeable Ideas of the Food of Swine, and their Styas, and perhaps cannot prevent the recurring of theſe Ideas at Table: but never were Men naturally *blind* prejudic'd againſt Objects as of a diſagreeable Colour, or in favour of others as of a beautiful Colour; they perhaps hear Men diſpraiſe one Colour, and may imagine this Colour to be ſome quite different ſenſible Quality of the other Senſes, but that is all. And the ſame way, a Man naturally void of *Taſte* could by no *Education* receive the Ideas of Taſte, or be prejudic'd in favour of Meats as delicious: So, had we no *natural Senſe* of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, we could never be prejudic'd in favour of Objects or Sounds as *beautiful* or *harmonious*. *Education* may make an unattentive GOTH imagine that his *Countrymen* have attain'd the Perfection of *Architecture*; and an Aversion to their Enemyſ the ROMANS, may have join'd ſome diſagreeable Ideas to their very Buildings, and  
excited



excited them to their Demolition; but he Sect. 7.  
 had never form'd these Prejudices, had he   
 been void of a *Sense* of *Beauty*. Did ever  
*blind Men* debate whether *Purple* or *Scarlet*  
 were the finer *Colour*? or could any *Educa-*  
*tion* prejudice them in favour of either as  
*Colours*?

THUS *Education* and *Custom* may influ-  
 ence our *internal Senses*, where they are  
 antecedently, by enlarging the Capacity of  
 our Minds to retain and compare the Parts  
 of complex Compositions: And then, if the  
 finest Objects are presented to us, we grow  
 conscious of a Pleasure far superior to what  
 common Performances excite. But all this  
 presupposes our *Sense* of *Beauty* to be *natural*.  
*Instruction* in *Anatomy*, *Observation* of *Na-*  
*ture*, and of those *Airs* of the Countenance,  
 and *Attitudes* of Body, which accompany  
 any *Sentiment*, *Action*, or *Passion*, may en-  
 able us to know where there is a just Imita-  
 tion: but why should an exact Imitation please  
 upon Observation, if we had not *naturally* a  
*Sense* of *Beauty* in it, more than the observ-  
 ing the Situation of fifty or a hundred Peb-  
 bles thrown at random? and should we ob-  
 serve them ever so often, we should never  
 dream of their growing *beautiful*.

IV. THERE is something worth our Ob-  
 servation as to the manner of rooting out the <sup>Prejudices</sup>  
*Prejudices* of *Education*, not quite foreign to <sup>how remo-</sup>  
 the <sup>ved.</sup>

Sect. 7. the present Purpose. When the *Prejudice* arises from Associations of Ideas without any natural Connection, we must frequently force ourselves to bear Representations of those Objects, or the Use of them when separated from the disagreeable Idea; and this may at last disjoin the unreasonable Association, especially if we can join new agreeable Ideas to them: Thus, Opinions of *Superstition* are best remov'd by pleasant Conversation of Persons we esteem for their *Virtue*, or by observing that they despise such Opinions. But when the *Prejudice* arises from an Apprehension or Opinion of *natural Evil*, as the Attendant, or Consequent of any Object or Action; if the *Evil* be apprehended to be the constant and immediate Attendant, a few Trials, without receiving any Damage, will remove the *Prejudice*, as in that against *Meats*: But where the *Evil* is not represented as the perpetual Concomitant, but as what may possibly or probably at some time or other accompany the Use of the Object, there must be frequent Reasoning with ourselves, or a long Series of Trials without any Detriment, to remove the *Prejudice*; such is the Case of our Fear of *Spirits* in the *Dark*, and in *Church-yards*. And when the *Evil* is represented as the Consequence perhaps a long time after, or in a *future State*, it is then hardest of all to remove the *Prejudice*; and this is only to be effected by slow Processes of Reason, because in this Case there

can

can be no Trials made: and this is the Case Sect. 7.  
of *superstitious Prejudices* against Actions  
apprehended as offensive to the DEITY; and  
hence it is that they are so hard to be root-  
ed out.

V. EXAMPLE seems to operate in this Example  
manner. We are conscious that we act not the  
very much for *Pleasure*, or *private Good*; Cause of  
and are thereby led to imagine that others do internal  
so too: hence we conclude there must be Sense.  
some *Perfection* in the Objects which we see  
others pursue, and *Evil* in those which we  
observe them constantly shunning. Or, the  
*Example* of others may serve to us as so many  
Trials to remove the Apprehension of *Evil* in  
Objects to which we had an Aversion. But  
all this is done upon an Apprehension of  
Qualitys perceivable by the Senses which  
we have; for no *Example* will induce the  
*Blind* or *Deaf* to pursue Objects as *colour'd*  
or *sonorous*; nor could *Example* any more  
engage us to pursue Objects as *beautiful* or  
*harmonious*, had we no *natural Sense* of  
*Beauty* or *Harmony*.

EXAMPLE may make us conclude with-  
out Examination, that our Countrymen have  
obtain'd the Perfection of *Beauty* in their  
*Works*, or that there is less *Beauty* in the Or-  
ders of *Architecture* or *Painting*, us'd in other  
*Nations*, and so content ourselves with very  
imperfect Forms. And Fear of Contempt as  
void

Sect. 7. void of *Taste* or *Genius*, often makes us join  
in approving the Performances of the reputed  
Masters in our Country, and restrains those who have *naturally* a fine *Genius*, or the *internal Senses* very acute, from studying to obtain the greatest Perfection; it makes also those of a bad *Taste* pretend to a livelier Perception of *Beauty* than in reality they have: But all this presupposes some *natural Power* of receiving Ideas of *Beauty* and *Harmony*. Nor can *Example* effect any thing farther, unless it be to lead Men to pursue Objects by implicit Faith, for some Perfection which the Pursuer is conscious he does not know, or which perhaps is some very different Quality from the Idea perceiv'd by those of a good *Taste* in such Affairs.

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## S E C T. VIII.



*Of the Importance of the internal Senses in Life, and the final Causes of them.*

I. **T**H E busy part of Mankind may look upon these things as airy Dreams of an inflam'd Imagination, which a wise Man should despise, who rationally pursues more solid Possessions independent on Fancy: but a little Reflection will convince us, "That the Gratifications of our *internal Senses* are as *natural, real, and satisfying* Enjoyments as any sensible Pleasure whatsoever; and that they are the chief Ends for which we commonly pursue *Wealth and Power.*" For how is *Wealth* or *Power* advantageous? How do they make us *happy*, or prove *good* to us? No otherwise than as they supply Gratifications to our *Senses*, or Facultys of perceiving Pleasure. Now, are these *Senses* or Facultys only the *external ones*? No: Every body sees, that a small portion of *Wealth* or *Power* will supply more Pleasures of the *external Senses* than we can enjoy; we know that Scarcity often heightens these Perceptions more than Abundance, which cloyes that Appetite which

is

Sect. 8. is necessary to all Pleasure in Enjoyment:  
 and hence the *Poet's* Advice is perfectly  
 just;


————— *Tu pulmentaria quære*  
*Sudando* ————— \*

In short, the only Use of a great Fortune above a very small one (except in *good Offices*, and *moral Pleasures*) must be to supply us with the Pleasures of *Beauty*, *Order*, and *Harmony*.

IT is true indeed, that the noblest Pleasures of the *internal Senses*, in the Contemplation of the Works of *Nature*, are expos'd to every one without Expence; the *Poor* and the *Low*, may have as free Use of these Objects, in this way, as the *Wealthy* or *Powerful*. And even in Objects which may be appropriated, the *Property* is of little Consequence to the Enjoyment of their Beauty; which is often enjoy'd by others beside the *Proprietor*. But then there are other Objects of these *internal Senses*, which require *Wealth* or *Power* to procure the Use of them as frequently as we desire; as appears in *Architecture*, *Musick*, *Gardening*, *Painting*, *Dress*, *Equipage*, *Furniture*; of which we cannot have the full Enjoyment without

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\* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 2. v. 20.

*Property*. And there are some confus'd *Ima-* Sect. 8.  
*ginations*, which often lead us to pursue   
*Property*, even in Objects where it is not  
 necessary to the true Enjoyment of them.  
 These are the *ultimate Motives* of our pur-  
 suing the greater Degrees of *Wealth*, where  
 there are no generous Intentions of virtuous  
 Actions.

THIS is confirm'd by the constant Prac-  
 tice of the very Enemies to these *Senses*.  
 As soon as they think they are got above  
 the *World*, or extricated from the Hurrys  
 of *Avarice* and *Ambition*; banish'd *Nat-*  
*ure* will return upon them, and set them  
 upon Pursuits of *Beauty* and *Order* in their  
*Houses*, *Gardens*, *Dress*, *Table*, *Equipage*.  
 They are never easy without some Degree of  
 this; and were their Hearts open to our  
 View, we should see *Regularity*, *Decency*,  
*Beauty*, as what their Wishes terminate  
 upon, either to themselves or to their  
 Posterity; and what their Imagination is al-  
 ways presenting to them as the possible Effects  
 of their Labours. Nor without this could  
 they ever justify their Pursuits to themselves.

THERE may perhaps be some Instances  
 of human Nature perverted into a thorow  
*Miser*, who loves nothing but Money, and  
 whose Fancy arises no higher than the cold  
 dull Thought of Possession; but such an In-  
 stance in an Age, must not be made the  
 Stan-

Sect. 8. Standard of Mankind against the whole  
 Body.

IF we examine the Pursuits of the *Luxurious*, who is imagin'd wholly devoted to his Belly; we shall generally find that the far greater part of his Expence is employ'd to procure other Sensations than those of Taste; such as *fine Attendants, regular Apartments, Services of Plate*, and the like. Besides, a large Share of the Preparation must be suppos'd design'd for some sort of generous friendly Purposes, to please *Acquaintance, Strangers, Parasites*. How few would be contented to enjoy the same Sensations alone, in a Cottage, or out of earthen Pitchers? To conclude this Point, however these *internal Sensations* may be overlook'd in our Philosophical Inquiries about the human Facultys, we shall find in Fact, “ That they  
 “ employ us more, and are more efficacious  
 “ in *Life*, either to our *Pleasure* or *Uneasiness*, than all our *external Senses* taken  
 “ together.”

*Final Cause of the internal Senses.*

II. As to the *final Causes* of this *internal Sense*, we need not inquire, “ Whether, to  
 “ an *Almighty, and All-knowing Being*, there  
 “ be any real Excellence in *regular Forms*,  
 “ in acting by *general Laws*, in knowing by  
 “ *Theorems*?” We seem scarce capable of answering such Questions any way; nor need we inquire, “ Whether other Animals  
 “ may



“ may not discern *Uniformity* and *Regula-* Sect. 8.  
 “ *rity* in Objects which escape our Obser-  
 “ vation, and may not perhaps have their  
 “ Senses constituted so as to perceive *Beauty*  
 “ from the same Foundation which we do,  
 “ in Objects which our Senses are not fit to  
 “ examine or compare?” We shall confine  
 ourselves to a Subject where we have some  
 certain Foundation to go upon, and only in-  
 quire, “ if we can find any Reasons worthy  
 “ of the great AUTHOR of *Nature*, for ma-  
 “ king such a Connection between regular  
 “ Objects, and the Pleasure which accom-  
 “ panys our Perceptions of them; or, what  
 “ Reasons might possibly influence him to  
 “ create the *World*, as it at present is, as  
 “ far as we can observe, every-where full of  
 “ *Regularity* and *Uniformity*.”

LET it be here observ'd, that as far as we  
 know concerning any of the great Bodys of  
 the *Universe*, we see Forms and Motions  
 really *beautiful* to our Senses; and if we  
 were plac'd in any *Planet*, the *apparent*  
*Courses* would still be *regular* and *uniform*,  
 and consequently *beautiful* to us. Now this  
 gives us no small Ground to imagine, that  
 if the Senses of their Inhabitants are in the  
 same manner adapted to their Habitations,  
 and the Objects occurring to their View, as  
 ours are here, their Senses must be upon the  
 same general Foundation with ours.



BUT to return to the Questions: What occurs to resolve them, may be contain'd in the following Propositions.

1. THE Manner of Knowledge by *universal Theorems*, and of Operation by *universal Causes*, as far as we can attain it, must be most convenient for *Beings* of limited Understanding and Power; since this prevents Distraction in their Understandings thro' the Multiplicity of Propositions, and Toil and Weariness to their Powers of Action: and consequently their *Reason*, without any *Sense* of *Beauty*, must approve of such Methods when they reflect upon their apparent *Advantage*.

2. THOSE Objects of Contemplation in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*, are more distinctly and easily comprehended and retain'd, than *irregular Objects*; because the accurate Observation of one or two Parts often leads to the Knowledge of the Whole: Thus we can from a *Pillar* or two, with an intermediate *Arch*, and *Cornice*, form a distinct Idea of a whole *regular Building*, if we know of what Species it is, and have its Length and Breadth: From a *Side* and *solid Angle*, we have the whole *regular Solid*; the measuring one *Side*, gives the whole *Square*; one *Radius*, the whole *Circle*; two *Diameters*, an *Oval*; one *Ordinate* and *Ab-*  
*scissa*,

*scissa*, the *Parabola*; thus also other Figures, if they have any Regularity, are in every Point determin'd from a few *Data*: Whereas it must be a long Attention to a vast Multiplicity of Parts, which can ascertain or fix the Idea of any *irregular Form*, or give any distinct Idea of it, or make us capable of retaining it; as appears in the Forms of *rude Rocks*, and *Pebbles*, and *confus'd Heaps*, even when the Multitude of sensible Parts is not so great as in the *regular Forms*: for such *irregular Objects* distract the *Mind* with *Variety*, since for every sensible Part we must have a quite different Idea.

3. FROM these two Propositions it follows, "That *Beings* of limited Understanding and Power, if they act rationally for their own *Interest*, must choose to operate by the *simplest Means*, to invent *general Theorems*, and to study *regular Objects*, if they be as useful as *irregular ones*; that they may avoid the endless Toil of producing each Effect by a separate Operation, of searching out each different Truth by a different Inquiry, and of imprinting the endless *Variety* of dissimilar Ideas in *irregular Objects*."

4. BUT then, beside this Consideration of *Interest*, there does not appear to be any necessary Connection, antecedent to the Constitution of the AUTHOR of *Nature*, be-

Sect. 8. tween *regular Forms, Actions, Theorems,*  
 and that sudden sensible *Pleasure* excited in us upon Observation of them, even when we do not reflect upon the Advantage mention'd in the former Proposition. And possibly, the DEITY could have form'd us so as to have receiv'd no immediate Pleasure from such Object, or connected Pleasure to those of a quite contrary Nature. We have a tolerable Presumption of this in the *Beautys* of various Animals; they give some small Pleasure indeed to every one who views them; but then every one seems far more delighted with the peculiar *Beautys* of its own *Species*, than with those of a different one, which seldom raise any Desire. This makes it probable, that the *Pleasure* is not the necessary Result of the *Form* itself, otherwise it would equally affect all Apprehensions in what *Species* soever; but depends upon a voluntary *Constitution*, adapted to preserve the *Regularity* of the *Universe*, and is probably not the Effect of *Necessity*, but *Choice*, in the SUPREME AGENT, who constituted our *Senses*.

From the  
 divine  
 Goodness.

5. Now from the whole we may conclude, " That supposing the DEITY so kind  
 " as to connect *sensible Pleasure* with certain  
 " *Actions* or *Contemplations*, beside the  
 " *rational Advantage* perceivable in them;  
 " there is a great *moral Necessity*, from his  
 " *Goodness*, that the *internal Sense* of Men  
 " should

“ should be constituted as it is at present, so Sect. 8.  
 “ as to make *Uniformity amidst Variety* the  
 “ Occasion of Pleasure.” For were it not so,  
 but on the contrary, if *irregular Objects*,  
*particular Truths* and *Operations* pleased us,  
 beside the endless Toil this would involve us  
 in, there must arise a perpetual Dissatisfaction  
 in all rational Agents with themselves;  
 since *Reason* and *Interest* would lead us to  
 simple *general Causes*, while a *contrary Sense*  
 of *Beauty* would make us disapprove them:  
*Universal Theorems* would appear to our Un-  
 derstanding the best Means of increasing our  
 Knowledge of what might be useful; while  
 a *contrary Sense* would set us on the search  
 after *particular Truths*: *Thought* and *Re-  
 flection* would recommend Objects with *Uni-  
 formity amidst Variety*, and yet this *perverse  
 Instinct* would involve us in Labyrinths of  
*Confusion* and *Dissimilitude*. And hence we  
 see “ how suitable it is to the *sagacious Bounty*  
 “ which we suppose in the DEITY, to con-  
 “ stitute our *internal Senses* in the manner in  
 “ which they are; by which Pleasure is join’d  
 “ to the Contemplation of *those Objects* which  
 “ a finite *Mind* can best imprint and retain  
 “ the Ideas of with the least Distraction; to  
 “ *those Actions* which are most efficacious,  
 “ and fruitful in useful Effects; and to *those*  
 “ *Theorems* which most inlarge our *Minds*.”

III. As to the other Question, “ What <sup>Reason of</sup>  
 “ Reason might influence the DEITY, whom <sup>general</sup>  
 “ Laws.

Sect. 8. “ no Diversity of Operation could distract or  
 “ weary, to choose to operate by *simplest*  
 “ *Means*, and *general Laws*, and to diffuse  
 “ *Uniformity*, *Proportion*, and *Similitude*  
 “ thro’ all the Parts of *Nature* which we  
 “ can observe?” Perhaps there may be some  
 real Excellence in this Manner of Operation,  
 and in these Forms, which we know not:  
 but this we may probably say, that since the  
*divine Goodness*, for the Reasons above-men-  
 tion’d, has constituted our *Sense of Beauty*  
 as it is at present, the same *Goodness* might  
 have determined the *Great ARCHITECT* to  
 adorn this stupendous *Theatre* in a manner  
 agreeable to the Spectators, and that Part  
 which is expos’d to the Observation of Men,  
 so as to be pleasant to them; especially if  
 we suppose, that he design’d to discover him-  
 self to them as *Wise* and *Good*, as well as  
*Powerful*: for thus he has given them greater  
 Evidences, thro’ the whole *Earth*, of his  
*Art*, *Wisdom*, *Design*, and *Bounty*, than they  
 can possibly have for the *Reason*, *Counsel*,  
 and *Good-will* of their Fellow-Creatures,  
 with whom they converse, with full Per-  
 suasion of these Qualities in them, about  
 their common Affairs.

As to the Operations of the DEITY by  
*general Laws*, there is still a farther Reason  
 from a *Sense* superior to these already con-  
 sider’d, even that of VIRTUE, or the *Beauty*  
 of *Action*, which is the Foundation of our  
 greatest

greatest Happiness. For were there no *gene-* Sect. 8.  
*ral Laws* fix'd in the Course of *Nature*,  
 there could be no *Prudence* or *Design* in Men,  
 no *rational Expectation* of Effects from  
 Causes, no *Schemes* of Action projected, or  
 any *regular Execution*. If then, according  
 to the *Frame* of our *Nature*, our greatest  
 Happiness must depend upon our Actions,  
 as it may perhaps be made appear it does,  
 "the *Universe* must be govern'd, not by  
 " *particular Wills*, but by *general Laws*,  
 " upon which we can found our Expecta-  
 " tions, and project our Schemes of Action."  
 Nay farther, tho' *general Laws* did ordinarily  
 obtain, yet if the DEITY usually stopp'd  
 their Effects whenever it was necessary to  
 prevent any particular Evils; this would  
 effectually, and justly supersede all human  
*Prudence* and *Care* about Actions; since a  
 superior *Mind* did thus relieve Men from  
 their Charge.

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# TREATISE II.

AN

# INQUIRY

CONCERNING

MORAL GOOD *and* EVIL.

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## INTRODUCTION.

**T**HE Word MORAL GOOD-<sup>Moral</sup>NESS, in this Treatise, denotes <sup>Good and</sup> <sup>Evil.</sup> our Idea of *some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, attended with Desire of the Agent's Happiness.* MORAL EVIL denotes our Idea of a *contrary Quality, which excites Condemnation or Dislike.* Approbation and Condemnation are probably simple Ideas, which cannot be farther explained. We must be contented with these imperfect Descriptions, until we discover whether we really have such Ideas, and what general *Foundation* there is in Nature for this Difference of Actions, as *morally Good or Evil.*

THESE

THESE Descriptions seem to contain an universally acknowledg'd Difference of *Moral Good* and *Evil*, from *Natural*. All Men who speak of *moral Good*, acknowledge that it procures *Approbation* and *Good-will* toward those we apprehend possess'd of it; whereas *natural Good* does not. In this matter Men must consult their own Breasts. How differently are they affected toward these they suppose possess'd of *Honesty, Faith, Generosity, Kindness*; and those who are possess'd of the *natural Goods*, such as *Houses, Lands, Gardens, Vineyards, Health, Strength, Sagacity*? We shall find that we necessarily love and approve the Possessors of the former; but the Possession of the latter procures no *Approbation* or *Good-will* at all toward the Possessor, but often contrary Affections of *Envy* and *Hatred*. In the same manner, whatever *Quality* we apprehend to be *morally evil*, raises our Dislike toward the Person in whom we observe it, such as *Treachery, Cruelty, Ingratitude*; whereas we heartily love, esteem, and pity many who are expos'd to *natural Evils*, such as *Pain, Poverty, Hunger, Sickness, Death*.

Now the first Question on this Subject is, "Whence arise these different Ideas of Actions?"

BECAUSE we shall afterwards frequently <sup>Interest.</sup> use the Words *Interest*, *Advantage*, *natural* <sup>Advantage.</sup> *Good*, it is necessary here to fix their Ideas. The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of *natural Good* or *Happiness*; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this Pleasure are call'd *immediately good*. Those Objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are call'd *Advantageous*: and we pursue both Kinds from a View of *Interest*, or from *Self-Love*.

OUR *Sense* of Pleasure is antecedent to *Advantage* or *Interest*, and is the Foundation of it. We do not perceive Pleasure in Objects, because it is our *Interest* to do so; but Objects or Actions are *advantageous*, and are pursu'd or undertaken from *Interest*, because we receive *Pleasure* from them. Our Perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is *advantageous* or *naturally good* to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure *mediately*, or *immediately*. Such Objects as we know either from Experience of Sense, or Reason, to be *immediately* or *mediately advantageous*, or apt to minister Pleasure, we are said to pursue from *Self-Interest*, when our Intention is only to enjoy this Pleasure, which they have the Power of exciting. Thus *Meats*, *Drink*, *Harmony*, *fine Prospects*, *Painting*, *Statues*, are perceiv'd by our Senses to be *immediately good*;

good; and our Reason shews *Riches* and *Power* to be *mediately so*, that is, apt to furnish us with Objects of immediate Pleasure: and both Kinds of these *natural Goods* are pursu'd from *Interest*, or *Self-Love*.

Opinions  
about our  
Sense of  
moral Good  
and Evil.

N o w the greatest Part of our latter *Moralists* establish it as undeniable, " That all *moral Qualitys* have necessarily some Relation to the *Law* of a *Superior*, of sufficient *Power* to make us *happy* or *miserable*;" and since all *Laws* operate only by *Sanctions* of *Rewards*, or *Punishments*, which determine us to *Obedience* by *Motives* of *Self-Interest*, they suppose, " that it is thus that *Laws* do constitute some *Actions* *mediately Good*, or *Advantageous*, and others the same way *disadvantageous*." They say indeed, " That a *benevolent Legislator* constitutes no *Actions* *advantageous* to the *Agent* by *Law*, but such as in their own *Nature* tend to the *natural Good* of the *Whole*, or, at least, are not inconsistent with it; and that therefore we approve the *Virtue* of others, because it has some small *Tendency* to our *Happiness*, either from its own *Nature*, or from this general *Consideration*, That *Obedience* to a *benevolent Legislator* is in general *advantageous* to the *Whole*, and to us in particular; and that for the contrary *Reasons* alone, we disapprove the *Vice* of others, that is, the *prohibited Action*, as tending

“ to our particular *Detriment* in some degree.” And then they maintain, “ That we are determin’d to Obedience to *Laws*, or deterr’d from Disobedience, merely by Motives of *Self-Interest*, to obtain either the *natural Good* arising from the commanded Action, or the *Rewards* promised by the Sanction; or to avoid the *natural evil* Consequences of Disobedience, or at least the *Penaltys* of the *Law*.”

SOME other Moralists suppose “ an *immediate natural Good* in the Actions call’d *virtuous*; that is, That we are determin’d to perceive some *Beauty* in the Actions of others, and to love the Agent, even without reflecting upon any *Advantage* which can any way redound to us from the Action; that we have also a secret Sense of Pleasure arising from Reflection upon such of our own Actions as we call *virtuous*, even when we expect no other *Advantage* from them.” But they alledge at the same time, “ That we are excited to perform these Actions, even as we pursue, or purchase *Pictures, Statues, Landskips*, from *Self-Interest*, to obtain this Pleasure which arises from Reflection upon the Action, or some other future Advantage.” The Design of the following Sections is to inquire into this Matter; and perhaps the Reasons to be offered may prove,

I. “ That

*An Inquiry concerning*

I. "THAT some Actions have to Men  
 " an *immediate Goodness*; or, that by a  
 " *superior Sense*, which I call a *Moral one*,  
 " we *approve* the Actions of others, and  
 " perceive them to be their *Perfection* and  
 " *Dignity*, and are determin'd to love the  
 " Agent; a like Perception we have in re-  
 " flecting on such Actions of our own, with-  
 " out any View of *natural Advantage* from  
 " them."

II. IT may perhaps also appear, "That  
 " the *Affection, Desire, or Intention*, which  
 " gains *Approbation* to the Actions flowing  
 " from it, is not an Intention to obtain even  
 " this *sensible Pleasure*; much less the *future*  
 " *Rewards* from Sanctions of Laws, or any  
 " other *natural Good*, which may be the  
 " Consequence of the *virtuous Action*; but  
 " an intirely different Principle of Action  
 " from *Self-Love*, or Desire of private  
 " Good."

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## S E C T. I.

*Of the Moral Sense by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve or disapprove them in others.*

I. **T**HAT the Perceptions of *moral* Different *Good and Evil*, are perfectly different Ideas of from those of *natural Good or Advantage*, Moral and Natural every one must convince himself, by reflecting upon the different Manner in which he finds himself affected when these Objects occur to him. Had we no *Sense of Good* distinct from the *Advantage or Interest* arising from the external Senses, and the Perceptions of *Beauty and Harmony*; the Sensations and Affections toward a *fruitful Field*, or *commodious Habitation*, would be much the same with what we have toward a *generous Friend*, or any *noble Character*; for both are or may be *advantageous* to us: And we should no more admire any Action, or love any Person in a distant *Country*, or *Age*, whose Influence could not extend to us, than we love the *Mountains of PERU*, while we are unconcern'd in the *Spanish Trade*. We should have the same Sentiments and Affections toward *inanimate Beings*, which we have toward *rational Agents*, which yet every one knows to be false.

Sect. I. false. Upon Comparison, we say, “Why  
 “ should we approve or love *inanimate*  
 “ *Beings*? They have no Intention of Good  
 “ to us, or to any other Person; their *Nature*  
 “ makes them fit for our Uses, which they  
 “ neither know nor study to serve. But it  
 “ is not so with *rational Agents*: they  
 “ study the *Interest*, and desire the *Happiness*  
 “ of other Beings with whom they con-  
 “ verse.”

WE are all then conscious of the Difference between that *Approbation* or Perception of *moral Excellence*, which *Benevolence* excites toward the Person in whom we observe it, and that Opinion of *natural Goodness*, which only raises *Desire* of Possession toward the good Object. Now “what should make  
 “ this Difference, if all Approbation, or  
 “ *Sense of Good* be from Prospect of *Advantage*?  
 “ *Do not inanimate Objects* promote  
 “ our *Advantage* as well as *benevolent Per-*  
 “ *sons*, who do us Offices of *Kindness* and  
 “ *Friendship*? should we not then have the  
 “ same endearing Approbation of both? or  
 “ only the same cold Opinion of *Advantage*  
 “ in both?” The Reason why it is not so,  
 must be this, “That we have a distinct  
 “ Perception of *Beauty* or *Excellence* in the  
 “ kind Affections of *rational Agents*; whence  
 “ we are determin’d to admire and love such  
 “ *Characters* and *Persons*.”



SUPPOSE we reap the same *Advantage* from two Men, one of whom serves us from an *ultimate Desire* of our Happiness, or Good-will toward us; the other from Views of *Self-Interest*, or by *Constraint*: both are in this Case equally beneficial or *advantageous* to us, and yet we shall have quite different Sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other Perceptions of *moral Actions*, than those of *Advantage*: And that Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call'd a MORAL SENSE, since the Definition agrees to it, *viz.* a *Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us, independent on our Will\**.

THIS perhaps will be equally evident from our Ideas of *Evil*, done to us design-ly by a *rational Agent*. Our Senses of *natural Good and Evil* would make us receive, with equal Serenity and Composure, an *Assault*, a *Buffet*, an *Affront* from a *Neighbour*, a *Cheat* from a *Partner*, or *Trustee*, as we would an equal Damage from the Fall of a *Beam*, a *Tile*, or a *Tempest*; and we should have the same Affections and Sentiments on both Occasions. *Villainy*, *Treachery*, *Cruelty*, would be as meekly resent-<sup>Of Evil,  
Moral and  
Natural.</sup>ed as a *Blast*, or *Mildew*, or an *overflowing*

\* See the Preface, Page 6.

Sect. I. *Stream.* But I fancy every one is very differently affected on these Occasions, tho' there may be equal *natural Evil* in both. Nay, Actions no way detrimental may occasion the strongest Anger and Indignation, if they evidence only impotent Hatred or Contempt. And, on the other hand, the Intervention of *moral Ideas* may prevent our *Condemnation* of the Agent, or bad moral Apprehension of that Action, which causes to us the greatest *natural Evil*. Thus the Opinion of *Justice* in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideas of *moral Evil* in the Execution, or Hatred toward the *Magistrate*, who is the immediate Cause of our greatest Sufferings.


In Actions  
toward  
others.

II. IN our Sentiments of Actions which affect ourselves, there is indeed a Mixture of the Ideas of *natural* and *moral Good*, which require some Attention to separate them. But when we reflect upon the Actions which affect other Persons only, we may observe the *moral Ideas* unmix'd with those of *natural Good* or *Evil*. For let it be here observ'd, that those Senses by which we perceive Pleasure in natural Objects, whence they are constituted *Advantageous*, could never raise in us any Desire of *publick Good*, but only of what was good to ourselves in particular. Nor could they ever make us approve an Action merely because of its promoting the Happiness of others. And yet, as soon as any Action is represented to us

as flowing from *Love, Humanity, Gratitude*, Sect. 1. *Compassion*, a *Study* of the Good of others, and an ultimate Desire of their Happiness, altho' it were in the most distant Part of the World, or in some past Age, we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, and praise its Author. And on the contrary, every Action represented as flowing from Ill-will, Desire of the Misery of others without View to any prevalent Good to the Publick, or *Ingratitude*, raises Abhorrence and Aversion.

IT is true indeed, that the Actions we approve in others, are generally imagin'd to tend to the *natural Good* of Mankind, or of some *Parts* of it. But whence this *secret Chain* between *each Person* and Mankind? How is my *Interest* connected with the most distant *Parts* of it? And yet I must admire Actions which shew Good-will toward them, and love the Author. Whence this *Love, Compassion, Indignation* and *Hatred* toward even *feign'd Characters*, in the most distant Ages, and Nations, according as they appear *kind, faithful, compassionate*, or of the *opposite Dispositions*, toward their imaginary Contemporaries? If there is no *moral Sense*, which makes benevolent Actions appear *Beautiful*; if all Approbation be from the *Interest* of the Approver,

Sect. I.

 What's HECUBA to us, or we to HECUBA? \*

Moral  
Ideas not  
from Inter-  
est.

III. SOME refin'd Explainers of *Self-Love* may tell us, "That we approve or condemn *Characters*, according as we apprehend we should have been supported, or injur'd by them, had we liv'd in their Days." But how obvious is the Answer, if we only observe, that had we no Sense of *moral Good* in *Humanity, Mercy, Faithfulness*, why should not *Self-Love*, and our Sense of *natural Good* engage us always to the victorious Side, and make us admire and love the successful *Tyrant, or Traitor*? Why do not we love SINON or PYRRHUS, in the *Æneid*? for, had we been GREEKS, these two would have been very *advantageous Characters*. Why are we affected with the Fortunes of PRIAMUS, POLITES, CHOROEBUS or ÆNEAS? Would not the *Parsimony* of a Miser be as advantageous to his Heir, as the *Generosity* of a worthy Man is to his Friend? And cannot we as easily imagine ourselves Heirs to Misers, as the Favourites of Heroes? Why don't we then approve both alike? It is plain we have some *secret Sense* which determines our Approbation without regard to *Self-Interest*; otherwise we should always favour the *fortunate* Side without regard to

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\* Tragedy of Hamlet.

*Virtue*, and suppose ourselves engaged with that Party. Sect. 1.



SUPPOSE any great Destruction occasion'd by mere *Accident*, without any Design, or Negligence of the Person who casually was the Author of it: This Action might have been as *disadvantageous* to us as design'd *Cruelty*, or *Malice*; but who will say he has the same Idea of both Actions, or Sentiments of the Agents? Thus also an easy, indolent *Simplicity*, which exposes a Man of Wealth as a Prey to others, may be as advantageous a Disposition as the most *prudent Generosity*, to those he converses with; and yet our Sentiments of this latter Temper are far nobler than of the former. "Whence then this Difference?"

AND farther, Let us make a Supposition, which perhaps is not far from Matter of Fact, to try if we cannot approve even *disadvantageous Actions*, and perceive *moral Good* in them. A few ingenious *Artisans*, persecuted in their own Country, flee to ours for Protection; they instruct us in *Manufactures* which support Millions of Poor, increase the Wealth of almost every Person in the *State*, and make us formidable to our *Neighbours*. In a *Nation* not far distant from us, some resolute *Burgomasters*, full of Love to their *Country*, and Compassion toward their *Fellow-Citizens*, oppress'd in Body and

Sect. 1. Soul by a *Tyrant* and *Inquisition*, with *indefatigable Diligence*, *publick Spirit*, and *Courage*, support a tedious perilous War against the *Tyrant*, and form an *industrious Republick*, which rivals us in *Trade*, and almost in *Power*. All the World sees whether the *former* or the *latter* have been more *advantageous* to us: and yet let every Man consult his own Breast, which of the two Characters he has the most agreeable Idea of? whether of the *useful Refugee*, or the *publick-spirited Burgomaster*, by whose Love to his own *Country*, we have often suffer'd in our *Interests*? And I am confident he will find some other Foundation of Esteem than *Advantage*, and will see a just Reason, why the Memory of our *Artisans* is so obscure among us, and yet that of our *Rivals* is immortal.

Self-Love  
not the  
Ground of  
Approba-  
tion.

IV. SOME *Moralists*, who will rather twist *Self-Love* into a thousand Shapes, than allow any other Principle of Approbation than *Interest*, may tell us, “ That whatever profits  
“ one Part without Detriment to another,  
“ profits *the Whole*, and then some small  
“ Share will redound to *each Individual*;  
“ that those Actions which tend to the *Good*  
“ of *the Whole*, if universally perform'd,  
“ would most effectually secure to *each In-*  
“ *dividual* his own Happiness; and that con-  
“ sequently, we may approve such Actions,  
“ from the Opinion of their tending ulti-  
“ mately to our own *Advantage*.”

WE

WE need not trouble these *Gentlemen* to shew by their nice Train of Consequences, and Influences of Actions by way of Precedent in particular Instances, that we in this Age reap any *Advantage* from ORESTES's killing the *treacherous* ÆGYSTHUS, or from the Actions of CODRUS or DECIUS. Allow their Reasonings to be perfectly good, they only prove, that after long Reflection and Reasoning, we may find out some Ground to judge certain Actions advantageous to us, which every Man admires as soon as he hears of them; and that too under a quite different Conception.

SHOULD any of our Travellers find some old *Grecian Treasure*, the *Miser* who hid it, certainly perform'd an Action more to the Traveller's *Advantage*, than CODRUS or ORESTES; for he must have but a small Share of Benefit from their Actions, whose Influence is so dispers'd, and lost in various Ages and Nations: Surely then this *Miser* must appear to the Traveller a prodigious Hero in *Virtue*! For *Self-Interest* will recommend Men to us only according to the *Good* they do to *our Selves*, and not give us high Ideas of *publick Good*, but in proportion to our Share of it. But must a Man have the Reflection of CUMBERLAND or PUFENDORF, to admire *Generosity, Faith, Humanity, Gratitude?*

SECT. I. Or reason so nicely to apprehend the *Evil* in *Cruelty, Treachery, Ingratitude*? Do not the former excite our *Admiration*, and *Love*, and *Study* of Imitation, where-ever we see them, almost at first View, without any such Reflection, and the latter, our *Contempt*, and *Abhorrence*? Unhappy would it be for *Mankind*, if a *Sense of Virtue* was of as narrow an Extent, as a Capacity for such *Metaphysicks*.

Our Moral  
Sense can-  
not be  
brib'd.

V. THIS *moral Sense*, either of our own Actions, or of those of *others*, has this in common with our other Senses, that however our Desire of *Virtue* may be counterbalanc'd by *Interest*, our Sentiment or Perception of its *Beauty* cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of our Approbation were Views of *Advantage*. Let us consider this both as to our own Actions, and those of *others*.

In judging  
of our own  
Actions.

A COVETOUS *Man* shall dislike any Branch of Trade, how useful soever it may be to the Publick, if there is no Gain for himself in it; here is an Aversion from *Interest*. Propose a sufficient Premium, and he shall be the first who sets about it, with full Satisfaction in his own Conduct. Now is it the same way with our *Sense of moral Actions*? Should any one advise us to wrong a *Minor*, or *Orphan*, or to do an ungrateful Action, toward a *Benefactor*;

we



we at first View abhor it: Assure us that Sect. 1.  
 it will be very *advantageous* to us, propose even a *Reward*; our *Sense* of the Action is not alter'd. It is true, these Motives may make us undertake it; but they have no more Influence upon us to make us approve it, than a Physician's Advice has to make a nauseous Potion pleasant to the Taste, when we perhaps force ourselves to take it for the Recovery of Health.

HAD we no Notion of Actions, beside our Opinion of their *Advantage* or *Disadvantage*, could we ever choose an Action as *advantageous*, which we are conscious is still *evil*? as it too often happens in human Affairs. Where would be the need of such *high Bribes* to prevail with Men to abandon the Interests of a ruin'd Party, or of *Tortures* to force out the Secrets of their Friends? Is it so hard to convince Mens Understandings, if that be the only Faculty we have to do with, that it is probably more advantageous to secure present Gain, and avoid present Evils, by joining with the prevalent Party, than to wait for the remote Possibility of future Good, upon a Revolution often improbable, and sometimes unexpected? And when Men are over-persuaded by *Advantage*, do they always approve their own Conduct? Nay, how often is their remaining Life odious, and shameful, in their *own Sense* of it, as well as in that

Sect. I. that of *others*, to whom the base Action  
 was profitable?

IF any one becomes satisfy'd with his own Conduct in such a Case, upon what Ground is it? How does he please himself, or vindicate his Actions to others? Never by reflecting upon his *private Advantage*, or alledging this to others as a Vindication; but by gradually warping into the *moral Principles* of his *new Party*; for no Party is without them. And thus Men become pleas'd with their Actions under some Appearance of *moral Good*, distinct from *Advantage*.

*Our Moral Sense not founded on Religion.* It may perhaps be alledg'd, "That in those Actions of our own which we call good, there is *this* constant *Advantage*, superior to all others, which is the Ground of our Approbation, and the Motive to them from *Self-Love*, viz. That we suppose the DEITY will reward them." This will be more fully consider'd \* hereafter: At present it is enough to observe, that many have high Notions of *Honour*, *Faith*, *Generosity*, *Justice*, who have scarce any Opinions about the DEITY, or any Thoughts of *future Rewards*; and abhor any thing which is *treacherous*, *cruel*, or *unjust*, without any regard to *future Punishments*.

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\* See Sect. ii. Art. 7.

BUT farther, tho' these *Rewards* and Sect. 1.  
*Punishments*, may make my own Actions appear *advantageous* to me, yet they would never make me approve, and love *another* Person for the like Actions, whose Merit would not be imputed to me. Those Actions are *advantageous* indeed to the *Agent*; but his *Advantage* is not my *Advantage*: and *Self-Love* could never recommend to me Actions as *advantageous* to others, or make me like the Authors of them on that account.

THIS is the second thing to be con- Our Moral  
sider'd, "Whether our *Sense* of the *moral* Sense of  
" *Good* or *Evil* in the Actions of others, the Ac-  
" can be overbalanc'd, or brib'd by Views tions of  
" of *Interest*." Now I may indeed easily others, not  
be capable of wishing, that another would to be  
do an Action I abhor as *morally evil*, if brib'd.  
it were very *advantageous* to me: *Interest*  
in that Case may overbalance my Desire of  
*Virtue* in another: But no *Interest* to my-  
self, will make me approve an Action as  
morally good, which without that *Inte-*  
*rest* to myself, would have appear'd mo-  
rally evil; if upon computing its whole  
Effects, it appears to produce as great a  
Moment of Good in the Whole, when it  
is not beneficial to me, as it did before, when  
it was. In our *Sense* of *moral Good* or  
*Evil*, our own private Advantage or Loss  
is


Sect. 1. is of no more moment, than the Advantage or Loss of a third Person, to make an Action appear *Good* or *Evil*. This Sense therefore cannot be over-balanc'd by *Interest*. How ridiculous an Attempt would it be, to engage a Man by Rewards or Threatnings into a good Opinion of an Action, which was contrary to his *moral Notions*? We may procure Diffimulation by such means, and that is all.

Not occasion'd by Praise,

VI. A LATE witty Author \* says, " That the Leaders of Mankind do not really admire such Actions as those of REGULUS, or DECIUS, but only observe, that Men of such Dispositions are very useful for the Defence of any State; and therefore by *Panegyricks*, and *Statues*, they encourage such Tempers in others, as the most *tractable* and *useful*." Here first let us consider, If a *Traitor*, who would sell his own Country to us, may not often be as *advantageous* to us, as an *Hero* who defends us: And yet we can love the *Treason*, and hate the *Traitor*. We can at the same time praise a *gallant Enemy*, who is very *pernicious* to us. Is there nothing in all this but an Opinion of *Advantage*?

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\* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 34, 36. 3d. Edition.

AGAIN, upon this Scheme what could Sect. 1.  
 a *Statue* or *Panegyrick* effect? — Men love   
*Praise* — They will do the Actions which  
 they observe to be *praised* — *Praise*, with  
 Men who have no other Idea of *Good* but  
*Self-Interest*, is the *Opinion* which a *Nation*  
 or *Party* have of a *Man* as *useful* to them ----  
 REGULUS, or CATO, or DECIUS, had  
 no *Advantage* by the Actions which profited  
 their Country, and therefore they themselves  
 could not admire them, however the Persons  
 who reap'd the *Advantage* might praise such  
 Actions. — REGULUS or CATO could  
 not possibly praise or love another Hero for  
 a *virtuous Action*; for this would not gain  
 them the *Advantage* of *Honour*; and their  
 own Actions they must have look'd upon as  
 the hard Terms on which *Honour* was to  
 be purchas'd, without any thing amiable in  
 them, which they could contemplate or re-  
 flect upon with Pleasure. Nay, what should  
 excite a CATO or a DECIUS to desire  
 Praise, if it is only the cold Opinion of others  
 that they were useful to the State, without  
 any Perception of Excellence in such Con-  
 duct? — Now how unlike is this to what  
 the least Observation would teach a Man  
 concerning such Characters?

BUT says \* he, “ These wondrous cun-  
 “ ning Governors made Men believe, by

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\* See the same Author in the same Place.

“ their

Sect. 1. “ their *Statues* and *Panegyricks*, that there  
 “ was *publick Spirit*, and that this was in it-  
 “ self *excellent*; and hence Men are led to  
 “ admire it in others, and to imitate it in  
 “ themselves, forgetting the Pursuit of their  
 “ own *Advantage*.” So easy a matter it  
 seems to him, to quit judging of others by  
 what we feel in ourselves! — for a Person  
 who is wholly *selfish*, to imagine others to  
 be *publick-spirited*! — for one who has  
 no Ideas of *Good* but in his own *Advantage*,  
 to be led by the Persuasions of others, into a  
 Conception of *Goodness* in what is avowedly  
 detrimental to himself, and profitable to  
 others; nay, so intirely, as not to approve  
 the Action thorowly, but so far as he was  
 conscicus that it proceeded from a *disinterested*  
*Study* of the *Good* of others! — Yet this  
 it seems *Statues* and *Penegyricks* can ac-  
 complish!

*Nil intra est oleam, nil extra est in nuce  
 duri!* \*

IT is an easy matter for Men to assert any  
 thing in Words; but our own Hearts must  
 decide the Matter, “ Whether some *moral*  
 “ *Actions* do not at first View appear *ami-*  
 “ *able* even to those who are unconcern’d  
 “ in their Influence? Whether we do not

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\* Hor. Ep. 1. Lib. 2. v: 31.

“ sincerely *approve* and love a generous kind Sect. 1.  
 “ *Friend*, or *Patriot*, whose Actions pro-  
 “ cure *Honour* to him only, without any  
 “ *Advantage* to ourselves?” It is true, that  
 the Actions which we approve, are useful  
 to Mankind; but not always to the Appro-  
 ver. It would perhaps be useful to the  
*Whole*, that all Men agreed in performing  
 such Actions; and then every one would  
 have his Share of the *Advantage*: But this  
 only proves, that *Reason* and *calm Reflection*  
 may recommend to us, from *Self-Interest*,  
 those Actions, which at first View our *moral*  
*Sense* determines us to admire, without  
 considering this *Interest*. Nay, our *Sense*  
 shall operate even where the *Advantage*  
 to ourselves does not hold. We can approve  
 the Justice of a Sentence against ourselves:  
 A condemn'd *Traitor* may approve the Vi-  
 gillance of a C I C E R O in discovering Con-  
 spiracies, tho' it had been for the Traitor's  
*Advantage*, that there never had been in the  
 World any Men of such Sagacity. To say  
 that he may still approve such Conduct as  
 tending to the *publick Good*, is a Jest from  
 one whose only Idea of *Good* is *Self-Inte-*  
*rest*. Such a Person has no Approbation of  
*publick Spirit*, nor Desire of *publick Good*,  
 farther than it tends to his own *Advantage*,  
 which it does not at all in the present  
 Case.

Sect. 1. VII. IF what is said makes it appear,   
 that we have some other *amiable Idea* of   
 Actions than that of *advantageous* to our-   
 selves, we may conclude, "That this Per-   
 ception of *moral Good* is not deriv'd from   
 " *Custom, Education, Example, or Study.*"   
 These give us no new Ideas: They might   
 make us see *private Advantage* in Actions   
 whose Usefulness did not at first appear;   
 or give us Opinions of some Tendency of   
 Actions to our *Detriment*, by some nice De-   
 ductions of Reason, or by a rash Prejudice,   
 when upon the first View of the Action we   
 should have observ'd no such thing: but   
 they never could have made us apprehend   
 Actions as *amiable* or *odious*, without any   
 Consideration of our own *Advantage*.

VIII. IT remains then, "That as the   
 " AUTHOR of *Nature* has determin'd us   
 " to receive, by our *external Senses*, plea-   
 " sant or disagreeable Ideas of Objects, ac-   
 " cording as they are useful or hurtful to   
 " our Bodys; and to receive from *uniform*   
 " Objects the Pleasures of *Beauty* and *Har-*   
 " *mony*, to excite us to the Pursuit of Know-   
 " ledge, and to reward us for it; or to be   
 " an Argument to us of his *Goodness*, as the   
 " *Uniformity* itself proves his *Existence*;   
 " whether we had a *Sense* of *Beauty* in   
 " *Uniformity* or not; in the same manner   
 " he has given us a MORAL SENSE,   
 " to



“ to direct our Actions, and to give us still Sect. I.  
 “ *nobler Pleasures*: so that while we are   
 “ only intending the *Good* of others, we  
 “ undesignedly promote our own greatest  
 “ *private Good*.”

We are not to imagine, that this *moral* <sup>This Mo-  
ral Sense</sup> *Sense*, more than the other Senses, supposes <sup>does not</sup>  
 any *innate Ideas, Knowledge, or practical* <sup>infer in-  
nate Ideas</sup> *Proposition*: We mean by it only a *De-* <sup>or Proposi-  
tions.</sup>  
*termination of our Minds to receive the simple*  
*Ideas of Approbation or Condemnation, from*  
*Actions observ'd, antecedent to any Opinions*  
*of Advantage or Loss to redound to ourselves*  
*from them; even as we are pleas'd with a*  
*regular Form, or an harmonious Composition,*  
 without having any Knowledge of *Mathe-*  
*matics*, or seeing any *Advantage* in that  
 Form or Composition, different from the  
 immediate Pleasure.

THAT we may discern more distinctly  
 the Difference between *moral Perceptions*  
 and others, let us consider, when we taste  
 a pleasant Fruit, we are conscious of Plea-  
 sure; when another tastes it, we only con-  
 clude or form an Opinion that he enjoys  
 Pleasure; and, abstracting from some pre-  
 vious *Good-Will* or *Anger*, his enjoying this  
 Pleasure is to us a Matter wholly indifferent,  
 raising no new *Sentiment* or *Affection*.  
 But when we are under the Influence of a  
 virtuous Temper, and thereby engaged in

Sect. I. virtuous Actions, we are not always consci-  
 ous of any Pleasure, nor are we only pursu-  
 ing private Pleasures, as will appear hereaf-  
 ter: 'tis only by *reflex Acts* upon our Tem-  
 per and Conduct that we enjoy the Delights  
 of Virtue. When also we judge the Temper  
 of another to be virtuous, we do not necessa-  
 rily imagine him *then* to enjoy Pleasure, tho'  
 we know *Reflection* will give it to him: And  
 farther, our Apprehension of his virtuous  
 Temper raises Sentiments of *Approbation*,  
*Esteem* or *Admiration*, and the Affection of  
*Good-will* toward him. The Quality ap-  
 proved by our moral Sense is conceived to  
 reside in the Person approved, and to be a  
 Perfection and Dignity in him: *Approbation*  
 of another's Virtue is not conceived as making  
 the Approver happy, or virtuous, or worthy,  
 tho' 'tis attended with some small Pleasure.  
 Virtue is then called *amiable* or *lovely*, from  
 its raising *Good-will* or *Love* in Spectators to-  
 ward the Agent; and not from the Agent's  
 perceiving the virtuous Temper to be ad-  
 vantageous to him, or desiring to obtain it  
 under that View. A virtuous Temper is  
 called *good* or *beatifick*, not that it is al-  
 ways attended with Pleasure in the Agent;  
 much less that some small Pleasure attends  
 the Contemplation of it in the Approver:  
 but from this, that every Spectator is per-  
 suaded that the *reflex Acts* of the virtuous  
 Agent upon his own Temper will give him  
 the highest Pleasures. The admired Qua-  
 lity

lity is conceived as the Perfection of the Agent, and such a one as is distinct from the *Pleasure* either in the Agent or the Approver; tho' 'tis a sure Source of Pleasure to the Agent. The Perception of the Approver, tho' attended with Pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from this Pleasure; even as the Perception of *external Forms* is attended with Pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from this Pleasure. This may prevent many Cavils upon this Subject.

Sect. I.  
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## S E C T. II.

Concerning the immediate Motive to  
virtuous Actions.

*Nature.*

THE *Motives* of human Actions, or their *immediate Causes*, would be best understood after considering the *Passions* and *Affections*; but here we shall only consider the *Springs* of the Actions which we call *virtuous*, as far as it is necessary to settle the general Foundation of the *Moral Sense*.

*Affections,  
the Motives  
to Actions.*

I. EVERY Action, which we apprehend as either *morally good* or *evil*, is always suppos'd to flow from some *Affection* toward sensitive Natures; and whatever we call *Virtue* or *Vice*, is either some such *Affection*, or some *Action* consequent upon it. Or it may perhaps be enough to make an Action or Omission, appear *vitious*, if it argues the Want of such *Affection* toward rational Agents, as we expect in Characters counted *morally good*. All the Actions counted *religious* in any Country, are suppos'd, by those who count them so, to flow from some *Affections* toward the DEITY; and whatever we call *social Virtue*, we still sup-

suppose to flow from Affections toward our Sect. 2.  
*Fellow-Creatures*: for in this all seem to agree, "That external Motions, when ac-  
 " company'd with no Affections toward  
 " GOD or *Man*, or evidencing no Want of  
 " the *expected* Affections toward either, can  
 " have no *moral Good* or *Evil* in them.

Ask, for instance, the most *abstemious Hermit*, if *Temperance* of itself would be *morally good*, supposing it shew'd no Obedience toward the DEITY, made us no fitter for Devotion, or the Service of Mankind, or the Search after Truth, than *Luxury*; and he will easily grant, that it would be no *moral Good*, tho' still it might be *naturally good* or *advantageous* to Health: And mere *Courage*, or Contempt of Danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the Defence of the Innocent, or repairing of Wrongs or Self-Interest, would only entitle its Possessor to *Bedlam*. When such sort of Courage is sometimes admir'd, it is upon some secret Apprehension of a good Intention in the Use of it, or as a natural Ability capable of an useful Application. *Prudence*, if it was only employ'd in promoting *private Interest*, is never imagin'd to be a *Virtue*: and *Justice*, or observing a strict Equality, if it has no regard to the *Good* of *Mankind*, the Preservation of *Rights*, and securing *Peace*, is a Quality properer for its ordinary *Gestamen*,

Sect. 2. *men*, a *Beam* and *Scales*, than for a *rational Agent*. So that these four *Qualitys*, commonly call'd *Cardinal Virtues*, obtain that Name, because they are *Dispositions* univerfally necessary to promote *publick Good*, and denote *Affections* toward *rational Agents*; otherwise there would appear no *Virtue* in them.

*Affections*  
*disinterest-*  
*ed.*

II. Now, if it can be made appear, that none of these *Affections* which we approve as *virtuous*, are either *Self-love*, or *Desire* of *private Interest*; since all *Virtue* is either some such *Affections*, or *Actions* consequent upon them; it must necessarily follow, "That *Virtue* springs from some other  
" *Affection* than *Self-Love*, or *Desire* of *private Advantage*. And where *Self-Interest*  
" excites to the same *Action*, the *Appro-*  
" *bation* is given only to the *disinterested*  
" *Principle*."

*Love of*  
*Compla-*  
*cence, and*  
*Hatred of*  
*Displience,*

THE *Affections* which are of most *Importance* in *Morals*, are commonly included under the Names *LOVE* and *HATRED*. Now in discoursing of *Love*, we need not be caution'd not to include that *Love* between the *Sexes*, which, when no other *Affections* accompany it, is only *Desire* of *Pleasure*, and is never counted a *Virtue*. *Love* toward *rational Agents*, is subdivided into *Love* of *Complacence* or *Esteem*, and *Love* of *Benevolence*: And *Hatred* is subdivided

vided into *Hatred of Displience* or *Contempt*, and *Hatred of Malice*. *Complacence* denotes *Approbation of any Person by our Moral Sense*; and is rather a Perception than an Affection; tho' the Affection of Good-will is ordinarily subsequent to it. *Benevolence* is the Desire of the Happiness of another. Their Opposites are called *Dislike* and *Malice*. Concerning each of these separately we shall consider, "Whether they can be influenc'd by Motives of *Self-Interest*." Sect. 2.

COMPLACENCE, *Esteem*, or *Good-liking*, at first View appears to be *disinterested*, and so *Displience* or *Dislike*; and are intirely excited by some *moral Qualitys*, *Good or Evil*, apprehended to be in the Objects; which *Qualitys* the very *Frame* of our *Nature* determines us to approve or disapprove, according to the *moral Sense* \* above explain'd. Propose to a Man all the Rewards in the World, or threaten all the Punishments, to engage him to *Esteem* and *Complacence* toward a Person intirely *unknown*, or if known, apprehended to be *cruel, treacherous, ungrateful*; you may procure external *Obsequiousness*, or good *Offices*, or *Disimulation*; but *real Esteem* no Price can purchase. And the same is obvious as to *Contempt*, which no Motive

\* See Sect. i.

Sect. 2. of *Advantage* can prevent. On the contrary, represent a Character as *generous, kind, faithful, humane*, tho' in the most distant Parts of the World, and we cannot avoid *Esteem* and *Complacence*. A *Bribe* may possibly make us attempt to ruin such a Man, or some strong Motive of *Advantage* may excite us to oppose his Interest; but it can never make us disapprove him, while we retain the same Opinion of his Temper and Intentions. Nay, when we consult our own Hearts, we shall find, that we can scarce ever persuade ourselves to attempt any Mischief against such Persons, from any Motive of *Advantage*; nor execute it without the strongest Reluctance and Remorse, until we have blinded ourselves into a false Opinion about his Temper.

*Benevolence disinterested.*

III. As to the *Love* of *Benevolence*, the very Name excludes *Self-Interest*. We never call that Man *benevolent*, who is in Fact useful to others, but at the same time only intends his *own Interest*, without any ultimate Desire of the *Good* of *others*. If there be any *Benevolence* at all, it must be *disinterested*; for the most useful Action imaginable loses all Appearance of *Benevolence*, as soon as we discern that it only flowed from *Self-Love*, or *Interest*. Thus, never were any human Actions more *advantageous*, than the Inventions of *Fire*, and *Iron*; but if these were casual, or if the *Inventor*



*ventor* only intended his own *Interest* in them, Sect. 2. there is nothing which can be call'd *benevolent* in them. Where-ever then *Benevolence* is suppos'd, there it is imagin'd *disinterested*, and design'd for the *Good* of others. To raise *Benevolence*, no more is required than calmly to consider any *sensitive Nature* not pernicious to others. *Gratitude* arises from Benefits conferred from Good-will on ourselves, or those we love; *Complacence* is a Perception of the moral Sense. *Gratitude* includes some *Complacence*, and *Complacence* still raises a stronger Good-will than that we have toward indifferent Characters, where there is no Opposition of Interests.

BUT it must be here observ'd, That as Self-Love all Men have *Self-Love*, as well as *Benevolence*, join'd with Benevolence. these two Principles may jointly excite a Man to the same Action; and then they are to be consider'd as two Forces impelling the same Body to Motion; sometimes they conspire, sometimes are indifferent to each other, and sometimes are in some degree opposite. Thus, if a Man have such strong *Benevolence*, as would have produc'd an Action without any Views of *Self-Interest*; that such a Man has also in View *private Advantage*, along with *publick Good*, as the Effect of his Action, does no way diminish the *Benevolence* of the Action. When he would not have produc'd so much *publick*

Sect. 2. *publick Good*, had it not been for Prospect of *Self-Interest*, then the Effect of *Self-Love* is to be deducted, and his *Benevolence* is proportion'd to the Remainder of *Good*, which pure *Benevolence* would have produc'd. When a Man's *Benevolence* is hurtful to himself, then *Self-Love* is opposite to *Benevolence*, and the *Benevolence* is proportion'd to the Sum of the *Good* produc'd, added to the Resistance of *Self-Love* surmounted by it. In most Cases it is impossible for Men to know how far their Fellows are influenc'd by the one or other of these Principles; but yet the general Truth is sufficiently certain, That this is the way in which the *Benevolence* of Actions is to be computed.

*Benevolence is disinterested.*

IV. T H E R E are two ways in which some may deduce *Benevolence* from *Self-Love*, the one supposing that "we voluntarily  
 " bring this Affection upon ourselves, when-  
 " ever we have an Opinion that it will  
 " be for our Interest to *have this Affec-*  
 " *tion*, either as it may be immediately  
 " pleasant, or may afford pleasant Reflec-  
 " tion afterwards by our Moral Sense, or as  
 " it may tend to procure some external Re-  
 " ward from G O D or Man." The other Scheme alledges no such Power in us of raising Desire or Affection of any kind by our *Choice* or *Volition*; but "supposes our  
 " Minds determined by the Frame of their  
 " Nature to desire whatever is apprehended

as

“ as the *Means* of any private Happiness; Sect. 2.  
 “ and that the *Observation of the Happiness of other Persons*, in many Cases is  
 “ made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure  
 “ to the Observer, as their *Misery* is the  
 “ Occasion of his Uneasiness: and in con-  
 “ sequence of this Connexion, as soon as we  
 “ have observed it, we begin to desire the  
 “ Happiness of others as the *Means* of ob-  
 “ taining this Happiness to ourselves, which  
 “ we expect from the Contemplation of  
 “ others in a happy State. They alledge it  
 “ to be impossible to desire either the Hap-  
 “ piness of another, or any Event whatso-  
 “ ever, without conceiving it as the *Means*  
 “ of some Happiness or Pleasure to our-  
 “ selves; but own at the same time, that  
 “ Desire is not raised in us directly by any  
 “ *Volition*, but arises necessarily upon our  
 “ apprehending any Object or Event to be  
 “ conducive to our Happiness.”

THAT the former Scheme is not just, The first  
contrary  
Opinion  
confuted.  
 may appear from this general Considera-  
 tion, that “neither Benevolence nor any  
 “ other Affection or Desire can be directly  
 “ raised by *Volition*.” If they could, then  
 we could be bribed into any Affection  
 whatsoever toward any Object, even the  
 most improper: we might raise *Jealousy*,  
*Fear*, *Anger*, *Love*, toward any sort of Per-  
 sons indifferently by an Hire, even as we  
 engage Men to external Actions, or to the  
 Dis-

Sect. 2. Diffimulation of Passions; but this every Person will by his own Reflection find to be impossible. The Prospect of any Advantage to arise to us *from having any Affection*, may indeed turn our Attention to those *Qualitys* in the Object, which are naturally constituted the necessary *Causes* or *Occasions* of the advantageous Affection; and if we find such *Qualitys* in the Object, the Affection will certainly arise. Thus *indirectly* the Prospect of Advantage may tend to raise any Affection; but if these *Qualitys* be not found or apprehended in the Object, no *Volition* of ours, nor *Desire*, will ever raise any Affection in us.

BUT more particularly, *that Desire* of the Good of others, which we approve as virtuous, cannot be alledged to be voluntarily raised from Prospect of any *Pleasure accompanying* the Affection itself: for 'tis plain that our Benevolence is not always accompanied with *Pleasure*; nay, 'tis often attended with Pain, when the Object is in Distress. Desire in general is rather uneasy than pleasant. 'Tis true, indeed, all the Passions and Affections *justify themselves*; while they continue, (as *Malebranch* expresses it) we generally approve our being thus affected on this Occasion, as an innocent Disposition, or a just one, and condemn a Person who would be otherwise affected on the like Occasion. So the *Sorrowful*, the *Angry*, the *Jealous*,

*Jealous*, the *Compassionate*, approve their several Passions on the apprehended Occasion; but we should not therefore conclude, that *Sorrow*, *Anger*, *Jealousy* or *Pity* are pleasant, or chosen for their concomitant Pleasure. The Case is plainly thus: The Frame of our Nature on the Occasions which move these Passions, determines us to be thus affected, and to approve our Affection at least as innocent. *Uneasiness* generally attends our Desires of any kind; and this *Sensation* tends to fix our Attention, and to continue the Desire. But the Desire does not terminate upon the *Removal of the Pain accompanying the Desire*, but upon some other Event: the concomitant Pain is what we seldom reflect upon, unless when it is very violent. Nor does any Desire or Affection terminate upon the Pleasure which may accompany the Affection; much less is it raised by an Act of our Will, with a View to obtain this Pleasure.

THE same Reflection will shew, that we do not by an Act of our Will raise in ourselves that Benevolence which we approve as virtuous, with a View to obtain future Pleasures of *Self-Approbation* by our Moral Sense. Could we raise Affections in this manner, we should be engaged to any Affection by the *Prospect of an Interest* equivalent

Sect. 2. equivalent to this of *Self-Approbation*, such as Wealth or sensual Pleasure, which with many Tempers are more powerful; and yet we universally own, that *that* Disposition to do good Offices to others, which is raised by these Motives, is not virtuous: how can we then imagine, that the virtuous Benevolence is brought upon us by a Motive equally *selfish*?

BUT what will most effectually convince us of the Truth on this Point, is Reflection upon our own Hearts, whether we have not a *Desire* of the Good of others, generally without any Consideration or Intention of obtaining these *pleasant Reflections* on our own Virtue: nay, often this Desire is strongest where we least imagine Virtue, in *natural Affection* toward Offspring, and in Gratitude to a great Benefactor; the *Absence* of which is indeed the greatest *Vice*, but the Affections themselves are not esteemed in any considerable degree virtuous. The same Reflection will also convince us, that these Desires or Affections are not produced by *Choice*, with a View to obtain this private Good.

IN like manner, if no *Volition* of ours can directly raise Affections from the former Prospects of Interest, no more can any *Volition* raise them from Prospects of *eternal Rewards*, or to avoid *eternal Punishments*. The former Motives differ from these only

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as smaller from greater, shorter from more Sect. 2.  
 durable. If Affections could be directly raised by Volition, the same Consideration would make us *angry* at the most innocent or virtuous Character, and *jealous* of the most faithful and affectionate, or *sorrowful* for the Prosperity of a Friend; which we all find to be impossible. The Prospect of a *future State*, may, no doubt, have a greater indirect Influence, by turning our Attention to the Qualitys in the Objects naturally apt to raise the required Affection, than any other Consideration\*.

'T I S

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\*THESE several Motives of Interest, which, some alledge, do excite us to Benevolence, operate upon us in a very different Manner. Prospect of external Advantage of any kind in this Life from our Fellows, is only a Motive to the Volition of external Actions immediately, and not to raise Desire of the Happiness of others. Now being willing to do external Actions which we know do in Fact promote the Happiness of others, without any Desire of their Happiness, is not approved as virtuous. Otherwise it were Virtue to do a beneficent Action for a Bribe of Money.

THE Prospect of Rewards from the DEITY, of future Pleasures from the Self-Approbation of our Moral Sense, or of any Pleasure attending an Affection itself, are only Motives to us to desire or wish to have the Affection of Benevolence in our Hearts; and consequently, if our Volition could raise Affections in us, these Motives would make us will or choose to raise benevolent Affections: But these Prospects cannot be Motives to us from Self-Love, to desire the Happiness of others; for, from Self-Love we only desire what we apprehend to be the Means of private Good. Now the having those Affections is the Means of obtaining these private Goods, and not the actual Happiness of others; for the Pleasure of Self-Approbation, and Divine Rewards,

Sect. 2. 'T IS indeed probably true in Fact, that those who are engaged by Prospect of future Rewards to do good Offices to Mankind, have generally the *virtuous Benevolence* jointly exciting them to Action; because, as it may appear hereafter, Benevolence is natural to Mankind, and still operates where there is no *Opposition of apparent Interest*, or where any contrary apparent Interest is overbalanced by a greater *Interest*. Men, conscious of this, do generally approve good Offices, to which Motives of a future State partly excited the Agent. But that the Approbation is founded upon the Apprehension of a *disinterested Desire* partly exciting the Agent, is plain from this, that not only Obedience to an *evil Deity* in doing Mischief, or even in performing trifling Ceremonies, only from Hope of Reward, or Prospect of avoiding Punishment, but even Obedience to a good DEITY only from the same Motives, without any *Love* or *Gratitude* towards him, and with a perfect Indifference about the Happiness or Misery of Mankind, abstracting from this private Interest, would meet with no *Approbation*. We plainly see that

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*wards, are not obtained or lost according as others are happy or miserable, but according to the Goodness of our Affections. If therefore Affections are not directly raised by Volition or Choice, Prospects of future Rewards, or of Self-Approbation, cannot directly raise them.*



a Change of *external Circumstances* of Interest under an evil DEITY, without any Change in the *Disposition* of the Agent, would lead him into every Cruelty and Inhumanity.

GRATITUDE toward the DEITY is indeed disinterested, as it will appear hereafter. This Affection therefore may obtain our Approbation, where it excites to Action, tho' there were no other Benevolence exciting the Agent. But this Case scarce occurs among Men. But where the *Sanction of the Law* is the only Motive of Action, we could expect no more *Benevolence*, nor no other *Affection*, than those in one forced by the *Law* to be *Curator* to a Person for whom he has not the least Regard. The Agent would so manage as to save himself harmless if he could, but would be under no Concern about the *Success* of his Attempts, or the *Happiness* of the Person whom he served, provided he performed the Task required by Law; nor would any Spectator approve this Conduct.

V. THE other Scheme is more plausible: That Benevolence is not raised by any *Volition* upon Prospect of Advantage; but that we desire the Happiness of others, as conceiving it necessary to procure some *pleasant Sensations* which we expect to feel

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upon


*The second Opinion confuted.*

Sect. 2. upon seeing others happy ; and that for like Reason we have Aversion to their Misery.

This Connection between the Happiness of others and our Pleasure, say they, is chiefly felt among *Friends, Parents and Children*, and eminently virtuous Characters. But this Benevolence flows as directly from *Self-Love* as any other Desire.

To shew that this Scheme is not true in Fact, let us consider, that if in our Benevolence we only desired the Happiness of others as the *Means* of this Pleasure to ourselves, whence is it that no Man *approves* the Desire of the Happiness of others as a means of procuring *Wealth* or *sensual Pleasure* to ourselves? If a Person had *wagered* concerning the future Happiness of a Man of such Veracity, that he would sincerely confess whether he were happy or not ; would this Wagerer's Desire of the Happiness of another, in order to win the Wager, be *approved as virtuous*? If not, wherein does this Desire differ from the former? except that in one case there is one pleasant Sensation expected, and in the other case other Sensations: For by increasing or diminishing the Sum wagered, the Interest in this Case may be made either greater or less than that in the other.

REFLECTING on our own Minds again will best discover the Truth. Many have never thought upon this *Connection*: nor do

we ordinarily intend the obtaining of any Sect. 2.  
 such Pleasure when we do generous Offices.   
 We all often *feel* Delight upon seeing others  
 happy, but during our Pursuit of their Hap-  
 piness we have no *Intention* of obtaining this  
 Delight. We often feel the Pain of Com-  
 passion; but were our sole ultimate Inten-  
 tion or Desire the *freeing ourselves* from this  
 Pain, would the Deity offer to us either  
 wholly to blot out all Memory of the Person  
 in Distress, to take away this Connection,  
 so that we should be easy during the Misery  
 of our Friend on the one hand, or on the  
 other would relieve him from his Misery, we  
 should be as ready to choose the former way  
 as the latter; since either of them would free  
 us from *our Pain*, which upon this Scheme  
 is the *sole End* proposed by the compassio-  
 nate Person.— Don't we find in ourselves  
 that our Desire does not terminate upon the  
 Removal of our own Pain? Were this our  
 sole Intention, we would run away, shut our  
 Eyes, or divert our Thoughts from the mi-  
 serable Object, as the readiest way of remov-  
 ing our Pain: This we seldom do, nay, we  
 croud about such Objects, and voluntarily  
 expose ourselves to this Pain, unless *calm*  
*Reflection* upon our Inability to relieve the  
 Miserable, countermand our Inclination, or  
 some *selfish Affection*, as *Fear of Danger*,  
 over-power it.

Sect. 2.

To make this yet clearer, suppose that the DEITY should declare to a good Man that he should be suddenly *annihilated*, but at the Instant of his Exit it should be left to his Choice whether his Friend, his Children, or his Country should be made happy or miserable for the future, when he himself could have no Sense of either Pleasure or Pain from their State. Pray would he be any more indifferent about their State now, that he neither hoped or feared any thing to himself from it, than he was in any prior Period of his Life? Nay, is it not a pretty common Opinion among us, that after our Decease we know nothing of what befalls those who survive us? How comes it then that we do not lose, at the Approach of Death, all Concern for our Families, Friends, or Country? Can there be any Instance given of our desiring any Thing only as the *Means of private Good*, as violently when we know that we shall not enjoy this Good many Minutes, as if we expected the Possession of this Good for many Years? Is this the way we compute the Value of *Annuities*?

How the disinterested Desire of the Good of others should seem inconceivable, 'tis hard to account: perhaps 'tis owing to the Attempts of some great Men to give Definitions of *simple Ideas*.—*Desire*, say they, is *Uneasiness, or uneasy Sensation upon the Absence of*

*of any Good.* — Whereas Desire is as distinct Sect. 2. from *Uneasiness*, as *Volition* is from Sensation. Don't they themselves often speak of our *desiring to remove Uneasiness*? *Desire* then is different from *Uneasiness*, however a Sense of *Uneasiness* accompanies it, as *Extension* does the Idea of *Colour*, which yet is a very distinct Idea. Now wherein lies the Impossibility of desiring the Happiness of another without conceiving it as the Means of obtaining any thing farther, even as we desire our own Happiness without farther View? If any alledge, that we desire our own Happiness as the *Means* of removing the *Uneasiness* we feel in the Absence of Happiness, then at least the Desire of *removing our own Uneasiness* is an *ultimate Desire*: and why may we not have other *ultimate Desires*?

“ BUT can any Being be *concerned* about  
 “ the Absence of an Event which gives it no  
 “ *Uneasiness*?” Perhaps superior Natures desire without *uneasy Sensation*. But what if we cannot? We may be uneasy while a desired Event is in Suspence, and yet not desire this Event only as the *Means* of removing this *Uneasiness*: Nay, if we did not desire the Event without View to this *Uneasiness*, we should never have brought the *Uneasiness* upon ourselves by *desiring* it. So likewise we may *feel Delight* upon the Existence of a desired Event, when yet we did not desire the Event only as the *Means* of obtaining this

Sect. 2. Delight; even as we often receive Delight  
 from Events which we had an Aversion to.

VI. IF any one should ask, since none of these Motives of Self-Interest excite our Benevolence, but we are in virtuous Actions intending solely the Good of others, to what Purpose serves our *moral Sense*, our *Sense of Pleasure from the Happiness of others*? To what Purpose serves the *wise Order of Nature*, by which Virtue is even made generally advantageous in this Life? To what End are *eternal Rewards* appointed and revealed? The Answer to these Questions was given partly already: all these Motives may make us desire to have *benevolent Affections*, and consequently turn our *Attention* to those Qualities in Objects which excite them; they may overbalance all apparent *contrary Motives*, and all Temptations to Vice. But farther, I hope it will be still thought an End worthy of the DEITY, to make the Virtuous happy, by a wise Constitution of Nature, whether the Virtues were in every Action intending to obtain this Happiness or not. Beneficent Actions tend to the publick Good; it is therefore good and kind to give all possible *additional Motives* to them; and to excite Men, who have some weak Degrees of good *Affection*, to promote the publick Good more vigorously by Motives of *Self-Interest*; or even to excite those who have no Virtue at all to external *Acts*  
 of

of Beneficence, and to restrain them from Sect. 2.  
Vice\*.

FROM

\* LET it be also remembered, that every Consideration suggested in the Gospel, as an additional Motive to beneficent Actions, is not immediately to be looked upon as the proper Motive to Virtue, or what would engage our Approbation of Actions flowing from it alone. We have the Promises of this Life as well as of the next, and yet the former alone was never thought a virtuous Principle. Some Texts are also brought to confute this Scheme of disinterested Affections as the only truly virtuous Principle, such as 1 Corinth. Ch. XV. ver. 32. which imports no more than this, "That if there were no Resurrection, and consequently Christ had not risen, and therefore his Religion only an Imposture, it had been the greatest Folly in the Apostle to have exposed himself to Persecution:" Not that the Prospect of a future Reward was the only Motive to Virtue, or that the only Affection of Mind which made the Apostle bear Persecution was, Hope of Reward.

ANOTHER Text insisted on is, Heb. XI. ver. 6. But this only means, either "that no Man can perform religious Acts acceptably to God, who does not believe his Existence and Goodness," which is self-evident: Or it is to be understood of "embracing the true Religion, and adhering to it under the most severe Persecutions, which we may allow no Man could do without Hopes of future Reward." Now this does not prove either that our sole, or our strongest Incitement to virtuous Actions is a Prospect of Interest, nor even that any Action is approved, because it springs from Hope of Reward.

HEB. XII. ver. 2. is chiefly urged, but with least Ground: if we have it well translated, it only asserts, "That the Hope of future Joy was one Incitement to our Saviour in enduring Sufferings," not that this was the principal Spring of his beneficent Actions, or that they were made amiable by arising from it. Nay, this Joy may be understood metonymically, for its Object, viz. the Salvation of Mankind. Not to mention another Translation long ago known to Criticks; some of whom insist that ἀντι is seldom used for the final Cause; but means instead of, in this Place, as well as in Texts debated with the Socinians: And then this Verse may be thus translated;

Sect. 2.



FROM the Whole it may appear, that there is in human Nature a *disinterested ultimate Desire* of the Happiness of others; and that our *Moral Sense* determines us only to approve Actions as virtuous, which are apprehended to proceed partly at least from such Desire.

Human  
Nature in-  
capable of  
sedate Ma-  
lice.

VII. As to Malice, *Human Nature* seems scarce capable of *malicious disinterested Hatred*, or a sedate ultimate Desire of the Misery of others, when we imagine them no way pernicious to us, or opposite to our *Interest*: And for that Hatred which makes us oppose *those* whose Interests are opposite to *ours*, it is only the Effect of *Self-Love*, and not of *disinterested Malice*. A sudden Passion may give us wrong Representations of our Fellow-Creatures, and for a little time represent them as *absolutely evil*; and during this


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“ Who instead of that Joy which was ready at hand, or in his Power to have enjoyed, as he had from the Beginning, he submitted to the Cross.” Nor is there any thing to confute this Translation; save that some Antithesis between our suffering from Faith in a Reward, and his suffering in like manner, is not kept up so well; as if it were a necessary Perfection in the Scriptures to abound in such Antitheses. For in this Translation there is good Reasoning, in shewing how our Saviour’s Sufferings are enhanced by his exchanging a State of Joy for them, parallel to Philip. II. ver. 6, 7.

WHOEVER would appeal to the general Strain of the Christian Exhortations, will find disinterested Love more inculcated, and Motives of Gratitude more frequently suggested, than any others.

Imagi-



Imagination perhaps we may give some Evi- Sect. 2.  
 dences of *disinterested Malice*: but as soon as   
 we reflect upon *human Nature*, and form  
 just Conceptions, this *unnatural* Passion is  
 allay'd, and only *Self-Love* remains, which  
 may make us, from *Self-Interest*, oppose  
 our Adversarys.

EVERY one at present rejoices in the De-  
 struction of our *Pirates*; and yet let us sup-  
 pose a Band of such Villains cast in upon  
 some desolate Island, and that we were as-  
 sur'd some Fate would confine them there  
 perpetually, so that they should disturb  
 Mankind no more: Now let us calmly re-  
 flect, that these Persons are capable of Know-  
 ledge and Counsel, may be happy and joy-  
 ful, or may be involv'd in Misery, Sorrow,  
 and Pain; that they may return to a State  
 of *Love, Humanity, Kindness*, and become  
*Friends, Citizens, Husbands, Parents*, with  
 all the sweet Sentiments which accompany  
 these Relations: then let us ask ourselves,  
 when *Self-Love*, or Regard to the Safety of  
 better Men, no longer makes us desire their  
 Destruction, and when we cease to look up-  
 on them under the Ideas suggested by fresh  
 Resentment of Injurys done to us or our  
 Friends, as utterly incapable of any good  
*moral Quality*; whether we would wish  
 them the Fate of CADMUS's *Army*, by  
 plunging their Swords in each others Breast,  
 or a worse Fate by the most exquisite Tor-  
 tures;

Señt. 2. tures; or rather, that they should recover the ordinary Affections of Men, become *kind, compassionate, and friendly*; contrive *Laws, Constitutions, Governments, Propertys*; and form an honest happy Society with *Marriages, and*

*Relations dear, and all the Charities  
Of Father, Son, and Brother——\*?*

I fancy the latter would be the Wish of every Mortal, notwithstanding our present just Abhorrence of them from *Self-Interest*, or *publick Love*, and Desire of promoting the Interest of our Friends who are expos'd to their Fury. Now this plainly evidences, that we scarce ever have any *sedate Malice* against any Person, or ultimate Desire of his Misery. Our calm Ill-will is only from Opposition of *Interest*; or if we can entertain *sedate Malice*, it must be toward a Character apprehended *necessarily and unalterably Evil* in a *moral Sense*; such as a sudden Passion sometimes represents our Enemies to us: yet perhaps no *such Being* occurs to us among the Works of a good DEITY.

*Other Af-  
fections dis-  
interested.*

VIII. HAVING offer'd what may perhaps prove, That neither our *Esteem* or *Benevolence* is founded on *Self-Love*, or Views of *Interest*; let us see “ if some *other Affec-*

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\* Milt. Par. Lost. B. iv. ver. 756.

“*tions*, in which *Virtue* may be plac'd, do Sect. 2.  
 “*arise from Self-Love* ;” such as *Fear*, or  
*Reverence*, arising from an Apprehension of  
*Goodness*, *Power*, and *Justice*. For no body  
 apprehends any *Virtue* in *base Dread* and  
*Servitude* toward a *powerful evil Being* :  
 This is indeed the *meanest Selfishness*. Now  
 the same Arguments which prove *Esteem* to  
 be *disinterested*, will prove this *honourable*  
*Reverence* to be so too ; for it plainly arises  
 from an Apprehension of *amiable Qualities* in  
 the Person, and *Love* toward him, which  
 raises an *Abhorrence* of offending him. Could  
 we reverence a *Being* because it was our *In-*  
*terest* to do so, a third Person might bribe  
 us into Reverence toward a *Being* neither  
*good*, nor *powerful*, which every one sees  
 to be a Jest. And this we might shew to be  
 common to all other Passions, which have  
 been reputed virtuous.

IX. THERE is one Objection against *dis-*  
*interested Good-Will*, which occurs from con-  
 sidering, “ That nothing so effectually ex-  
 cites our *Love* toward rational Agents, as  
 their *Beneficence*, and especially toward  
 ourselves ; whence we are led to imagine,  
 that our Love of Persons, as well as irra-  
 tional Objects, flows intirely from *Self-*  
*Interest*.” But let us here examine ourselves  
 more narrowly. Do we only wish well to the  
*Beneficent*, because it is our *Interest* to do so ?  
 Or do we choose to love them, because our  
 Love

Sect. 2. *Love* is the means of procuring their *Bounty*?

~~~~~ If it be so, then we could indifferently love any Character; even to obtain the *Bounty* of a third Person; or we could be brib'd by a third Person to love the greatest Villain heartily, as we may be brib'd to external Offices: Now this is plainly impossible. Nay, farther, is not our *Good-will* the Consequent of *Bounty*, and not the Means of procuring it? External Shew, Obsequiousness, and Diffimulation may precede an Opinion of *Benevolence*; but *real Love* always presupposes it, and will necessarily arise even when we expect no more, from Consideration of past Benefits.

OR can any one say he only loves the *Benevolent*, as he does a *Field* or *Garden*, because of its *Advantage*? His *Love* then must cease toward one who has ruin'd himself in kind Offices to him, when he can do him no more; as we cease to love an inanimate Object which ceases to be useful, unless a Poetical *Prosopopœia* animate it, and raise an imaginary Gratitude, which is indeed pretty common. *Benevolence* then must increase our *Good-will*, as it raises *Complacence*, which is still attended with stronger Degrees of *Benevolence*: and hence we love even those who are *benevolent* to others.


IN the Benefits which we receive ourselves, we are more fully sensible of their Value, and of the Circumstances of the Action, which are Evidences of a generous Temper in the *Donor*; and from the good Opinion we have of ourselves, we are apt to look upon the Kindness as better employ'd, than when it is bestow'd on others, of whom perhaps we have less favourable Sentiments. It is however sufficient to remove the Objection, that *Bounty* from a *Donor* apprehended as *morally evil*, or extorted by *Force*, or conferr'd with some View of *Self-Interest*, will not procure *real Good-will*; nay, it may raise *Indignation*, if we suspect *Disimulation* of Love, or a Design to allure us into any thing dishonourable: whereas wisely employ'd *Bounty* is always approv'd, and gains Love to the Author from all who hear of it.

IF then no *Good-will* toward Persons arises from *Self-Love*, or Views of *Interest*, and all *Virtue* flows from *Good-will*, or some other Affection equally *disinterested*; it remains, "That there must be some other Affection than *Self-Love*, or *Interest*, which excites us to the Actions we call *Virtuous*."

HAD we no other *ultimate Desire* but that of *private Advantage*, we must imagine

Sect. 2. *agine that every rational Being acts only for its own Advantage; and however we may call a beneficent Being a good Being, because it acts for our Advantage, yet upon this Scheme we should not be apt to think there is any beneficent Being in Nature, or a Being who acts for the Good of others. Particularly, If there is no Sense of Excellence in publick Love, and promoting the Happiness of others, whence should this Persuasion arise, "That the DEITY will make the Virtuous " happy?" Can we prove that it is for the Advantage of the DEITY to do so? This I fancy will be look'd upon as very absurd, by many who yet expect Mercy and Beneficence in the DEITY. And if there be such Dispositions in the DEITY, where is the Impossibility of some small Degree of this publick Love in his Creatures? And why must they be suppos'd incapable of acting but from Self-Love?*

IN short, without acknowledging some other Principle of Action in rational Agents than *Self-Love*, I see no Foundation to expect *Beneficence*, or *Rewards* from *God* or *Man*, farther than it is the *Interest* of the *Benefactor*; and all Expectation of Benefits from a *Being* whose Interests are independent on us, must be *perfectly ridiculous*. What should engage the DEITY to reward *Virtue*? *Virtue* is commonly suppos'd, upon *this Scheme*, to be only a consulting our

own Happiness in the most artful way, consist- Sect. 2.  
 ently with the Good of the Whole; and in   
 Vice the same thing is foolishly pursu'd, in  
 a manner which will not so probably suc-  
 ceed, and which is contrary to the Good of  
 the Whole. But how is the DEITY concern'd  
 in this Whole, if every Agent always acts from  
 Self-Love? And what Ground have we, from  
 the Idea of infinite Power and Art, to believe  
 the DEITY is good in the Christian Sense,  
 that is, studious of the Good of his Creatures?  
 Perhaps the Misery of his Creatures may  
 give him as much Pleasure, as their Happi-  
 ness: And who can find fault, or blame such  
 a Being to study their Misery? for what else  
 should we expect? A Manichean evil God,  
 is a Notion which Men would as readily  
 run into, as that of a good one, if there is  
 no Excellence in disinterested Love, and no  
 Being acts but for its own Advantage; un-  
 less we prov'd, that the Happiness of Crea-  
 tures was advantageous to the DEITY.

X. HAVING remov'd these false Springs The true  
 Spring of  
 Virtue.  
 of virtuous Actions, let us next establish the  
 true one, viz. some Determination of our Na-  
 ture to study the Good of others; or some In-  
 stinct, antecedent to all Reason from Interest,  
 which influences us to the Love of others; even  
 as the moral Sense, \* above explain'd, deter-  
 mines us to approve the Actions which flow

\* See Sect. i.

Sect. 2. from *this Love* in ourselves or others. This *disinterested Affection*, may appear strange to Men impress'd with Notions of *Self-Love*, as the *sole* Spring of Action, from the Pulpit, the Schools, the Systems, and Conversations regulated by them: but let us consider it in its strongest and simplest Kinds; and when we see the Possibility of it in these Instances, we may easily discover its *universal Extent*.

*Natural  
Affection.*

AN honest *Farmer* will tell you, that he studies the *Preservation* and *Happiness* of his Children, and loves them without any Design of Good to himself. But say some of our *Philosophers*, "The Happiness of their Children gives Parents Pleasure, and their Misery gives them Pain; and therefore to obtain the *former*, and avoid the *latter*, they study, from *Self-Love*, the Good of their Children." Suppose several Merchants join'd in Partnership of their whole Effects; one of them is employ'd abroad in managing the Stock of the Company; his Prosperity occasions Gain to all, and his Losses give them Pain for their Share in the Loss: Is this then the *same* Kind of Affection with *that* of Parents to their Children? Is there the same tender, personal Regard? I fancy no Parent will say so. In this Case of Merchants there is a plain Conjunction of Interest; but whence the Conjunction of Interest between the *Parent* and *Child*?



*Child?* Do the Child's *Sensations* give Pleasure or Pain to the Parent? Is the Parent hungry, thirsty, sick, when his Children are so? No; but his naturally implanted Desire of their Good, and Aversion to their Misery, makes him be affected with Joy or Sorrow from their Pleasures or Pains. This Desire then is antecedent to the Conjunction of Interest, and the Cause of it, not the Effect: it then must be *disinterested*. "No," says another *Sophist*, Children are *Parts* of ourselves, and in loving them we but "love *ourselves* in them." A very good Answer! Let us carry it as far as it will go. How are they *Parts* of ourselves? Not as a *Leg* or an *Arm*: We are not conscious of their Sensations. "But *their* Bodys were "form'd from *Parts* of *ours*." So is a *Fly*, or a *Maggot*, which may breed in any discharg'd Blood or Humour: Very dear Insects surely! there must be something else then which makes Children *Parts* of ourselves; and what is this but *that Affection*, which NATURE determines us to have toward them? *This Love* makes them *Parts* of ourselves, and therefore does not flow from their being so before. This is indeed a good Metaphor; and where-ever we find a Determination among several rational Agents to *mutual Love*, let *each Individual* be look'd upon as a *Part* of a great *Whole*, or *System*, and concern himself in the *publick Good* of it.

M

BUT

## Sect. 2.



BUT a later Author observes, \* “ That  
 “ *natural Affection* in Parents is *weak*, till  
 “ the Children begin to give Evidences of  
 “ *Knowledge and Affections.*” Mothers say  
 they feel it strong from the very first: and  
 yet I could wish, for the Destruction of his  
 Hypothesis, that what he alledges was true;  
 as I fancy it is in some measure, tho’ we may  
 find in some Parents an Affection toward  
 Idiots. The observing of *Understanding* and  
*Affections* in Children, which make them  
 appear *moral Agents*, can increase Love to-  
 ward them without Prospect of *Interest*;  
 for I hope, this Increase of Love is not from  
 Prospect of Advantage from the Knowledge  
 or Affections of Children, for whom Parents  
 are still toiling, and never intend to be re-  
 funded their Expences, or recompens’d for  
 their Labour, but in Cases of extreme Ne-  
 cessity. If then the observing a *Moral Capa-*  
*city* can be the occasion of increasing Love  
 without *Self-Interest*, even from the *Frame*  
 of our *Nature*; pray, may not *this* be a  
 Foundation of *weaker* degrees of Love, where  
 there is no preceding Tie of Parentage, and  
 extend it to *all Mankind*?

*Publick*  
*Affections,*  
*natural.*

XI. AND that this is so in Fact, will appear  
 by considering some more distant Attachments  
 If we observe any Neighbours, from whom

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\* See the Fable of the Bees, *Pag.* 68. *3d Ed.*

perhaps we have receiv'd no good Offices, Sect. 2.  
 form'd into *Friendships, Familys, Partner-*  
*ships,* and with *Honesty and Kindness* assist-  
 ing each other; pray ask any Mortal, if he  
 would not more desire their *Prosperity*, when  
 their *Interests* are no way inconsistent with  
 his own, than their *Misery and Ruin*?  
 and you shall find a *Bond of Benevolence* far-  
 ther extended than a *Family and Children*,  
 altho' the *Ties* are not so strong. Again,  
 suppose a Person, for *Trade*, had left his  
*native Country*, and with all his *Kindred* had  
 settled his *Fortunes* abroad, without any  
*View* of returning; and only imagine he  
 had receiv'd no *Injurys* from his *Country*:  
 ask such a Man, would he not rather desire  
 the *Prosperity* of his *Country*? Or could he,  
 now that his *Interests* are separated from  
 that of his *Nation*, as readily wish that it  
 was laid waste by *Tyranny*, or a *foreign*  
*Power*? I fancy his *Answer* would shew us  
 a *Benevolence* extended beyond *Neighbour-*  
*hoods* or *Acquaintances*. Let a Man of a  
*compos'd* Temper, out of the *Hurry* of his  
*private* Affairs, only read of the *Constitution*  
 of a *foreign* Country, even in the *most distant*  
*Parts* of the *Earth*, and observe *Art, Design,*  
 and a *Study* of *publick Good* in the *Laws* of  
 this Association; and he shall find his *Mind*  
*mov'd* in their *Favour*; he shall be *contriving*  
*Rectifications* and *Amendments* in their *Con-*  
*stitution*, and *regret* any *unlucky* Part of it,  
 which may be *pernicious* to their *Interest*;

Sect. 2. he shall *bewail* any Disaster which befalls them, and *accompany* all their Fortunes with the Affections of a Friend. Now this proves *Benevolence* to be in some degree extended to all Mankind, where there is no *interfering* Interest, which from *Self-Love* may obstruct it. And had we any Notions of *rational Agents*, capable of moral Affections, in the *most distant* Planets, our *good Wishes* would still attend them, and we should desire their Happiness. And that all these Affections, whether more or less extensive, are properly *disinterested*, not even founded on any Desire of that Happiness we may expect in seeing their prosperous Condition; may appear from this, that they would continue even at the Instant of our Death, or intire Destruction, as was already observed, *Art. IV.* of this Section.

*National  
Love.*

XII. H E R E we may transiently remark the Foundation of what we call *national Love*, or LOVE of one's *native Country*. Whatever Place we have liv'd in for any considerable time, there we have most distinctly remark'd the *various Affections* of *human Nature*; we have known many lovely *Characters*; we remember the *Associations*, *Friendships*, *Familys*, *natural Affections*, and other *human Sentiments*: our *moral Sense* determines us to approve these lovely *Dispositions*, where we have most distinctly observ'd them; and our *Benevolence* concerns

us in the Interests of those Persons possess'd Sect. 2. of them. When we come to observe the like as distinctly in *another* Country, we begin to acquire a *national Love* toward it also; nor has our *own* Country any other Preference in our Idea, unless it be by an *Association* of the pleasant Ideas of our Youth, with the *Buildings, Fields, and Woods* where we receiv'd them. This may let us see how *Tyranny, Faction, a Neglect of Justice, a Corruption of Manners, and anything* which occasions the Misery of the Subjects, destroys this *national Love*, and the *dear Idea* of a COUNTRY.

WE ought here to observe, That the only Reason of that *apparent Want* of natural Affection, among *collateral Relations*, is, that these *natural Inclinations*, in many Cases, are overpower'd by *Self-Love*, where there happens any *Opposition* of Interests; but where this does not happen, we shall find all Mankind under its Influence, tho' with different Degrees of Strength, according to the *nearer or more remote* Relations they stand in to each other; and according as the *natural Affection* of *Benevolence* is join'd with and strengthen'd by *Esteem, Gratitude, Compassion, or other kind Affections*; or on the contrary, weaken'd by *Displacence, Anger, or Envy*.

*The Reason why natural Affections do not always appear.*



## S E C T. III.

*The Sense of Virtue, and the various Opinions about it, reducible to one general Foundation. The Manner of computing the Morality of Actions.*

*All Virtue  
benevo-  
lent.*

I. IF we examine all the Actions which are counted *amiable* any-where, and inquire into the Grounds upon which they are  *approv'd*, we shall find that in the Opinion of the Person who approves them, they always appear as BENEVOLENT, or flowing from *Good-will to others*, and a Study of their Happiness, whether the *Approver* be one of the Persons below'd, or profited, or not; so that all those *kind Affections* which incline us to make others happy, and all Actions suppos'd to flow from *such Affections*, appear *morally good*, if, while they are *benevolent* towards some Persons, they be not *pernicious* to others. Nor shall we find any thing *amiable* in any Action whatsoever, where there is no *Benevolence* imagin'd; nor in any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not suppos'd applicable to, and design'd for, *benevolent Purposes*. Nay, as was before observ'd,

serv'd \*, the Actions which in Fact are ex-Sect. 3. ceedingly useful, shall appear void of *moral Beauty*, if we know they proceeded from no kind Intentions towards others; and yet an unsuccessful Attempt of Kindness, or of promoting *publick Good*, shall appear as amiable as the most successful, if it flow'd from *strong Benevolence*.

II. HENCE *those* Affections, which would <sup>Religion.</sup> lead us to do Good to our Benefactor, shall appear *amiable*, and the *contrary* Affections *odious*, even when our Actions cannot possibly be of any Advantage or Hurt to him. Thus a *sincere Love* and *Gratitude* toward our Benefactor, a *cheerful Readiness* to do whatever he shall require, how burdensom soever, a *hearty Inclination* to comply with his Intentions, and *Contentment* with the State he has plac'd us in, are the strongest Evidences of *Benevolence* we can shew to such a Person; and therefore they must appear exceedingly *amiable*. And under these is included all the *rational Devotion*, or *Religion* toward a DEITY apprehended as *good*, which we can possibly perform.

WE may here transiently observe one Circumstance in the *Frame* of our *Nature*; which is wonderfully adapted to promote *Benevolence*, *viz.* That as a Benefit conferr'd

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\* See Sect. ii. Art. 3. Par. 1. Art. 9. Par. 2.

Sect. 3. necessarily raises *Gratitude* in the Person who receives it, so the Expressions of this Gratitude, even from the meanest of Mankind, are *wonderfully delightful* to the Benefactor. Never were there any Mortals so poor, so inconsiderable, whose grateful Praise would not be some way delightful; and by whom we would not rather choose to be belov'd than hated, if their Love no way evidenc'd us to be Partners in their Vices, or concern'd in their Meanness. And thus the *most abject Person oblig'd* is capable, and inclin'd to make no small Addition to our Happiness by his *Love and Gratitude*, when he is utterly incapable of any other Return, and when we expect none from him: Thus,

————— *A grateful Mind*  
*By owing owes not, but still pays, at once*  
*Indebted and discharg'd* ————— \*

As to *external Performances* of Religion, they are no doubt very various in different Nations and Ages; and *Education* may give Men Opinions, that certain Actions are pleasing, and others displeasing to the DEITY: but then, where-ever any external Rite of Worship is approv'd, there also it is look'd upon to proceed from *Love* toward the DEITY, or some other Affection necessarily join'd with *Love*, as *Reverence, Repentance, or Sorrow*

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\* Par. Loft, B. iv. l. 55.



to have offended. So that the general Prin-  
 Sect. 3.  
 ciple of *Love* is the Foundation of all the  
 apparent moral *Excellence*, even in the most  
 fantastick Rites of *Worship* which were ever  
 approv'd. For as to Rites design'd only to  
 appease a *furiosus Being*, no Mortal, I fancy,  
 apprehends there is any *Virtue*, or *Excellence*  
 in them; but that they are chosen only as  
 the dishonourable Means of avoiding a  
 greater Evil. Now as there are various spe-  
 culative Opinions about what is acceptable to  
 the DEITY, it necessarily follows, " That,  
 " accordingly, *Practices*, and *Approbation*,  
 " must be *various*; tho' all the *moral Good-*  
 " *ness* of *Actions* is still presum'd to flow  
 " from *Love*."

III. AGAIN, that we may see how *Bene-* Social  
*volence* is the Foundation of all apprehended Virtues.  
*Excellence* in *social Virtues*, let us only ob-  
 serve, That amidst the Diversity of Senti-  
 ments on this Head among various Sects,  
 this is still allow'd to be the way of deciding  
 the Controversy about any disputed Practice,  
*viz.* to inquire whether this Conduct, or  
 the contrary, will most effectually promote  
 the *publick Good*. The *Morality* is imme-  
 diately adjusted, when the natural Tendency,  
 or Influence of the Action upon the *univer-*  
*sals natural Good* of *Mankind*, is agreed upon.  
 That which produces more *Good* than *Evil*  
 in the *Whole*, is acknowledg'd *good*; and  
 what does not, is counted *evil*. In this  
 Case,

Sect. 3. Case, we no other way regard the Good of the *Actor*, or that of those who are thus inquiring, than as they make a Part of the great *System*.

IN our late Debates about *Passive Obedience*, and the Right of *Resistance* in Defence of *Privileges*, the Point disputed among Men of Sense was, “ Whether *universal Submission* would probably be attended with greater *natural Evils*, than *temporary Insurrections*, when *Privileges* are invaded? and not, Whether what tended in the Whole to the *publick natural Good*, was also *morally good*?” And if a *divine Command* was alledg’d in Favour of the Doctrine of *Passive Obedience*, this would, no doubt, by its eternal Sanctions cast the Balance of *natural Good* to its own Side, and determine our Election from *Interest*; and yet *our Sense* of the *moral Good* in *Passive Obedience*, would still be founded upon some Species of *Benevolence*, such as *Gratitude* toward the DEITY, and *Submission* to his Will to whom we are so much oblig’d. But I fancy those, who believe the DEITY to be *good*, would not rashly alledge such a Command, unless they also asserted, that the thing commanded did tend more to the *universal Good*, than the contrary, either by preventing the external Evils of *Civil War*, or by enuring Men to *Patience*, or some *other Quality* which they apprehended necessary

to

to their everlasting Happiness. And were it Sect. 3.  
not so, *Passive Obedience* might be recom-  
mended as an *inglorious Method* of escaping  
a greater Mischief, but could never have any  
thing *morally amiable* in it.

BUT let us quit the Disputes of the *Learned*,  
on whom, it may be alledg'd, *Custom* and  
*Education* have a powerful Influence; and  
consider upon what Grounds, in common  
Life, Actions are *approv'd* or *condemn'd*,  
*vindicated* or *excus'd*. We are universally  
asham'd to say an Action is *just*, because it  
tends to my *Advantage*, or to the *Advantage*  
of the *Actor*: And we as seldom condemn a  
*beneficent kind Action*, because it is not *ad-*  
*vantageous* to us, or to the *Actor*. *Blame*  
and *Censure* are founded on a Tendency to  
*publick Evil*, or a Principle of *private Ma-*  
*lice* in the *Agent*, or *Neglect* at least of the  
*Good* of others; on *Inhumanity* of Temper,  
or at least such *strong Selfishness* as makes the  
*Agent* careless of the Sufferings of others:  
and thus we *blame* and *censure* when the  
Action no way affects ourselves. All the  
moving and persuasive Vindications of Ac-  
tions, which may, from some *partial* evil  
Tendency, appear *evil*, are taken from this,  
that they were necessary to some *greater*  
*Good*, which counterbalanc'd the *Evil*: “ *Se-*  
“ *verity* toward a few, is *Compassion* to-  
“ ward Multitudes.— *Transitory Punish-*  
“ *ments* are necessary for avoiding more  
“ *durable*

Se<sup>c</sup>t. 3. “ *durable Evils.*— Did not *some* suffer on  
 “ such Occasions, there would be *no living*  
 “ for honest Men”,—and such like. And  
 even when an Action cannot be intirely justifi-  
 fy’d, yet how greatly is the Guilt extenuated,  
 if we can alledge, “ That it was only the  
 “ Effect of *Inadvertence* without *Malice*, or  
 “ of *partial good Nature, Friendship, Com-*  
 “ *passion, natural Affection, or Love* of a  
 “ *Party?*” All these Considerations shew,  
 what is the *universal Foundation* of our Sense  
 of *moral Good, or Evil*, viz. *Benevolence* to-  
 ward others on the one hand, and *Malice*, or  
 even *Indolence, and Unconcernedness* about  
 the *apparent publick Evil* on the other. And  
 let it be here observ’d, that we are so far  
 from imagining all Men to act only from  
*Self-Love*, that we universally expect in others  
 a Regard for the *Publick*; and do not look  
 upon the Want of this, as barely the Absence  
 of *moral Good, or Virtue*, but even as *posi-*  
*tively evil and hateful.*

*Moral*  
*Evil not*  
*always*  
*Malice.*

IV. CONTRARYS may illustrate each  
 other; let us therefore observe the *general*  
*Foundation* of our Sense of *moral Evil* more  
 particularly. *Disinterested Malice*, or ulti-  
 mate Desire of the Misery of others, is the  
 highest Pitch of what we count *vicious*; and  
 every Action appears *evil*, which is imagin’d  
 to flow from any Degree of *this Affection*.  
 Perhaps a *violent Passion* may hurry Men in-  
 to it for a few Moments, and our *rash angry*  
*Senti-*

*Sentiments* of our Enemys, may represent Sect. 3. them as having such *odious Dispositions*; but it is very probable, from the Reasons offer'd above\*, that there is no such Degree of Wickedness in *human Nature*, as, in *cold Blood*, to desire the *Misery* of others, when it is conceiv'd no way useful to *our Interest*.

THE Story of NERO and PÆTUS may be alledg'd against this, but perhaps unjustly, even allowing the Fact to be true. NERO was conscious he was hated by those whom the World call'd *good Men*, and that they were dangerous to him; he fancy'd his best Security lay in being terrible, and appearing such on all Occasions, by making others miserable when he pleas'd, to let his Enemys see, that they should have no Security from that Compassion which a NERO would imagine argu'd Weakness. This *unfortunate Gentleman's* Happiness might by some *foolish Courtier* be so related, as to carry a Reproof of the *Tyrant's* unnatural Pursuits, whereby his Passion might be excited to cut off the Person admir'd, and prefer'd before him. Any of these Motives of *apparent Interest* seem more probably to have influenc'd him, than that we should in *him*, and a few others, suppose a Principle of *calm Malice* without *Interest*, of which the *rest* of *Mankind* seem intirely incapable.

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\* See Sect. ii. Art. 4.

Sect. 3.

Temper of  
a Tyrant.

THE Temper of a *Tyrant* seems probably to be a continu'd State of *Anger, Hatred,* and *Fear*. To form our Judgment then of his Motives of *Action*, and those of Men of like Tempers in lower Stations, let us reflect upon the Apprehensions we form of Mankind, when we are under any of those Passions which to the *Tyrant* are *habitual*. When we are under the fresh Impressions of an Injury, we plainly find, that our Minds are wholly fill'd with Apprehensions of the Person who injur'd us, as if he were *absolutely evil*, and *delighted* in doing Mischief: We overlook the Virtues, which, when calm, we could have observ'd in him: we forget that perhaps he acted from *Self-Love*, and not *Malice*, or, it may be, some *generous* or *kind Intention* toward others. These, probably, are the Opinions which a *Tyrant* constantly forms concerning *Mankind*; and having very much weaken'd all *kind Affections* in himself, however he may pretend to them, he judges of the Tempers of others by his own. And were Men really *such* as he apprehends them, his Treatment of them would not be very unreasonable. We shall generally find our Passions arising suitably to the Apprehensions we form of others: if these be rashly form'd upon some sudden slight Views, it is no Wonder if we find Dispositions following upon them, very little suited to the *real State of human Nature*.

THE

THE ordinary Spring of *Vice* then among Men, must be a *mistaken Self-Love*, made so violent, as to overcome *Benevolence*; or *Affections* arising from *false*, and *rashly form'd Opinions* of *Mankind*, which we run into thro' the Weakness of our *Benevolence*. When Men, who had good Opinions of each other, happen to have *contrary Interests*, they are apt to have their *good Opinions* of each other *abated*, by imagining a *design'd Opposition* from *Malice*; without this, they can scarcely *hate* one another. Thus two *Candidates* for the same Office wish each other *dead*, because that is an ordinary way by which Men make room for each other; but if there remains any Reflection on each other's *Virtue*, as there sometimes may in benevolent Tempers, then their *Opposition* may be without *Hatred*; and if another better Post, where there is no *Competition*, were bestow'd on one of them, the other shall rejoice at it.

V. THE Actions which flow solely from *Self-Love* and yet evidence no want of *Be-nevolence*, having no hurtful Effects upon others, seem *perfectly indifferent* in a *moral Sense*, and neither raise the *Love* or *Hatred* of the Observer. Our Reason can indeed discover certain Bounds, within which we may not only act from *Self-Love*, consistently with the *Good* of the *Whole*; but every Mortal's

Sect. 3. tal's acting thus within these Bounds for his own *Good*, is absolutely necessary for the *Good* of the *Whole*; and the Want of such *Self-Love* would be *universally pernicious*. Hence, he who pursues his own *private Good*, with an Intention also to concur with that Constitution which tends to the *Good* of the *Whole*; and much more he who promotes his *own Good*, with a direct View of making himself more capable of serving God, or doing Good to *Mankind*; acts not only *innocently*, but also *honourably*, and *virtuously*: for in both these Cases, *Benevolence* concurs with *Self-Love* to excite him to the Action. And thus a *Neglect* of our *own Good* may be *morally evil*, and argue a Want of *Benevolence* toward the *Whole*. But when *Self-Love* breaks over the Bounds above-mention'd, and leads us into Actions detrimental to *others*, and to the *whole*; or makes us insensible of the *generous kind Affections*; then it appears *vitious*, and is *disapprov'd*. So also, when upon any small Injuriys, or sudden Resentment, or any weak superstitious Suggestions, our *Benevolence* becomes so faint, as to let us entertain odious Conceptions of *Men*, or any Part of them, without just Ground, as if they were *wholly evil*, or *malicious*, or as if they were a worse Sort of Beings than they really are; these Conceptions must lead us into *malevolent Affections*, or at least weaken our *good ones*, and makes us *really vitious*.

VI. HERE



Sect. 3.

V I. H E R E we must also observe, that every *moral Agent* justly considers himself as a *Part* of this *rational System*, which may be useful to the *Whole*; so that he may be, in part, an *Object* of his own *Benevolence*. Nay, farther, as was hinted above, he may see, that the *Preservation* of the *System* requires every one to be *innocently solicitous* about himself. Hence he may conclude, that an *Action* which brings *greater Evil* to the *Agent*, than *Good* to others, however it may evidence *strong Benevolence*, or a *virtuous Disposition* in the *Agent*, yet it must be founded upon a mistaken *Opinion* of its *Tendency* to *publick Good*, when it has no such *Tendency*: so that a *Man* who reason'd justly, and consider'd the *Whole*, would not be led into it, were his *Benevolence* ever so strong; nor would he recommend it to the *Practice* of others; however he might acknowledge, that the *Detriment* arising to the *Agent*, from a *kind Action*, did evidence a strong *Disposition* to *Virtue*. Nay, farther, if any *Good* was propos'd to the *Pursuit* of an *Agent*, and he had a *Competitor*, in every respect *only equal* to himself; the *highest Benevolence* possible would not lead a wise *Man* to prefer another to himself, were there no *Ties* of *Gratitude*, or some other external *Circumstance* to move him to yield to his *Competitor*. A *Man* surely of the *strongest Benevolence*, may just treat himself as he would

Self-Love  
not exclu-  
ded by Be-  
nevolence.

Sect. 3. do a third Person, who was a Competitor of *equal Merit* with the other; and as his preferring one to another, in such a Case, would argue no Weakness of *Benevolence*; so, no more would he evidence it by preferring himself to a Man of only *equal Ability*s.

WHERE-EVER a Regard to *myself* tends as much to the Good of the *Whole*, as Regard to *another*; or where the *Evil* to myself, is equal to the *Good* obtain'd for another; tho' by acting, in such Cases, for the Good of *another*, I really shew a very amiable Disposition; yet by acting in the contrary manner, from Regard to *myself*, I evidence no evil Disposition, nor any want of the most extensive *Benevolence*; since the *Moment* of Good to the *Whole* is, in both Cases, exactly equal. And let it be here observ'd, that this does not supersede the Necessity of *Liberality*, or *gratuitous Gifts*, altho' in such Actions the Giver loses what the other receives; since the *Moment* of Good to any Person, in any given Case, is in a *compound Ratio* of the *Quantity* of the Good itself, and the *Indigence* of the Person. Hence it appears, that a Gift may make a much greater *Addition* to the Happiness of the *Receiver*, than the *Diminution* it occasions in the Happiness of the *Giver*: And that the most useful and important Gifts are those from the *Wealthy* to the *Indigent*. Gifts from *Equals* are not useless neither, since they often increase the  
Hap-

Happiness of both, as they are strong Evidences of *mutual Love*: but Gifts from the *Poor* to the *Wealthy* are really foolish, unless they be only little Expressions of *Gratitude*, which are also fruitful of Joy on both Sides: for these Expressions of Gratitude are really delightful and acceptable to the *Wealthy*, if they have any Humanity; and their Acceptance of them is matter of Joy to the poor *Giver*.

IN like manner, when an Action does more Harm to the *Agent*, than Good to the *Publick*; the doing it evidences an amiable and truly virtuous Disposition in the *Agent*, tho' 'tis plain he acts upon a mistaken View of his Duty. But if the private Evil to the *Agent* be so great, as to make him incapable, at another time, of promoting a *publick Good* of greater moment than what is attain'd by this Action; the Action may really be evil, so far as it evidences a prior Neglect of a greater attainable *publick Good* for a smaller one; tho' at present this Action also flows from a virtuous Disposition.

VII. THE *moral Beauty*, or *Deformity* of Actions, is not alter'd by the *moral* Benevolence, how affected by the Qualities of its Object. *Qualities* of the Objects any farther than the *Qualities* of the Objects increase or diminish the *Benevolence* of the Action, or the *publick Good* intended by it. Thus *Benevolence*

Sect. 3. *nevolence* toward the *worst* Characters, or the Study of their *Good*, may be as *amiable* as any whatsoever; yea, often more so than *that* toward the *Good*, since it argues such a strong Degree of *Benevolence* as can surmount the greatest Obstacle, the *moral Evil* in the Object. Hence the *Love* of *unjust Enemys*, is counted among the *highest Virtues*. Yet, when our *Benevolence* to the *Evil* encourages them in their bad Intentions, or makes them more capable of *Mischief*; this diminishes or destroys the *Beauty* of the Action, or even makes it *evil*, as it betrays a *Neglect* of the *Good* of *others* more valuable; *Benevolence* toward *whom*, would have tended more to the *publick Good*, than *that* toward our *Favourites*: But *Benevolence* toward *evil* Characters, which neither encourages nor enables them to do *Mischief*, nor diverts our *Benevolence* from Persons more useful, has as much *moral Beauty* as any whatsoever.

Qualities  
determin-  
ing our  
Election.

VIII. IN comparing the *moral Qualities* of Actions, in order to regulate our *Election* among various Actions propos'd, or to find which of them has the greatest *moral Excellency*, we are led by *our moral Sense* of *Virtue* to judge thus; that in *equal Degrees* of *Happiness*, expected to proceed from the Action, the *Virtue* is in proportion to the *Number* of Persons to whom the *Happiness* shall extend; (and here the *Dignity*,

or

or *moral Importance* of Persons, may compensate Numbers) and in equal Numbers, the *Virtue* is as the *Quantity* of the Happiness, or natural Good; or that the *Virtue* is in a *compound Ratio* of the *Quantity* of Good, and *Number* of Enjoyers. In the same manner, the *moral Evil*, or *Vice*, is as the *Degree* of Misery, and *Number* of Sufferers; so that *That Action* is best, which procures the *greatest Happiness* for the *greatest Numbers*; and *that worst*, which, in like manner, occasions *Misery*.

AGAIN, when the *Consequences* of Actions are of a *mix'd Nature*, partly *advantageous*, and partly *pernicious*; *that Action* is good, whose good Effects preponderate the evil by being useful to many, and pernicious to few; and *that evil*, which is otherwise. Here also the *moral Importance* of Characters, or *Dignity* of Persons may compensate Numbers; as may also the *Degrees* of Happiness or Misery: for to procure an *inconsiderable Good* to many, but an *immense Evil* to few, may be *evil*; and an *immense Good* to few, may preponderate a *small Evil* to many.

*Consequences how they affect the Morality of Actions.*

BUT the *Consequences* which affect the *Morality* of Actions, are not only the direct and natural Effects of the Actions themselves; but also all those *Events* which otherwise would not have happen'd. For many Actions which have no immediate or

Sect. 3. natural *evil Effects*, nay, which actually produce *good Effects*, may be *evil*; if a man foresees, that the evil *Consequences*, which will probably flow from the *Folly* of others, upon his doing of such *Actions*, are so great as to overbalance all the *Good* produc'd by those *Actions*, or all the *Evils* which would flow from the *Omission* of them: And in such *Cases* the *Probability* is to be computed on both sides. Thus, if an *Action* of mine will probably, thro' the *Mistake* or *Corruption* of others, be made a *Precedent* in unlike *Cases*, to very evil *Actions*; or when my *Action*, tho' good in itself, will probably provoke Men to very evil *Actions*, upon some *mistaken Notion* of their *Right*; any of these *Considerations* foreseen by me, may make such an *Action* of mine *evil*, whenever the *Evils* which will probably be occasion'd by the *Action*, are greater than the *Evils* occasion'd by the *Omission*.

AND this is the Reason, that many *Laws* prohibit *Actions* in general, even when some particular *Instances* of those *Actions* would be very useful; because an universal *Allowance* of them, considering the *Mistakes* Men would probably fall into, would be more pernicious than an universal *Prohibition*; nor could there be any more *special Boundarys* fix'd between the right and wrong *Cases*. In such *Cases*, it is the *Duty* of *Persons* to comply with the generally useful  
 Consti-

Constitution; or if in some very important Sect. 3. Instances, the Violation of the Law would be of less *evil Consequence*, than Obedience to it, they must patiently resolve to undergo those Penalties, which the State has, for valuable Ends to the Whole, appointed: and this Disobedience will have nothing criminal in it.

IX. 'T IS here to be observed, that tho' every *kind Affection* abstractly considered, is approved by our moral Sense, yet all sorts of Affections or Passions which pursue the Good of others are not equally approved, or do not seem in the same degree virtuous. Our *calm Affections*, either private or publick, are plainly distinct from our *particular Passions*; *calm Self-Love* quite distinct from *Hunger, Thirst, Ambition, Lust, or Anger*; so *calm Good-will* toward others is different from *Pity, passionate Love, the parental Affection*, or the Passion of *particular Friends*. Now every kind Passion, which is not pernicious to others, is indeed approved as virtuous and lovely: And yet a calm Good-will toward the same Persons appears more lovely. So calm Good-will toward a small System is lovely and preferable to more passionate Attachments; and yet a more extensive calm Benevolence is still more beautiful and virtuous; and the highest Perfection of Virtue is *an universal calm Good-will* toward all sensitive Natures. Hence it is, that we condemn particular Attachments, when inconsistent.

S. Ct. 3. with the Interest of great Societies, because they argue some Defect in that more noble Principle, which is the Perfection of Virtue \*.

*Partial  
Benevo-  
lence, how  
virtuous.*

X. FROM these Observations, we may see what Actions our *moral Sense* would most recommend to our Election, as the most *perfectly virtuous*: viz. such as appear to have the most universal unlimited Tendency to the *greatest* 2nd *most extensive Happiness* of all the *rational Agents*, to whom our Influence can reach. All *Benevolence*, even toward a *Part*, is amiable, when not inconsistent with the *Good* of the *Whole*: But this is a smaller Degree of *Virtue*, unless our Benevolence be restrain'd by want of Power, and not want of Love to the *Whole*. All strict Attachments to Partys, Sects, Factions, have but an imperfect Species of *Beauty*, even when the *Good* of the *Whole* requires a stricter Attachment to a *Part*, as in *natural Affection*, or *virtuous Friendships*; except when *some Parts* are so eminently useful to the *Whole*, that even *universal Benevolence* does determine us with special Care and Affection to study their Interests. Thus *universal Benevolence* would incline us to a more strong Concern for the Interests of *great* and *generous Characters* in a high Station, or

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\* See *Essay on Passions*, Sect. 2. Art. 3. And *Illustrations*, Sect. 6. Ars. 4.



make us more earnestly study the Interests of Sect. 3. any *generous Society*, whose whole Constitution was contriv'd to promote *universal Good*. Thus a good Fancy in *Architecture* would lead a Man, who was not able to bear the Expence of a completely regular Building, to choose such a Degree of Ornament as he could keep uniformly thro' the *Whole*, and not move him to make a vain unfinish'd Attempt in *one Part*, of what he foresaw he could not succeed in as to *the Whole*. And the most perfect Rules of *Architecture* condemn an excessive Profusion of Ornament on *one Part*, above the Proportion of *the Whole*, unless *that Part* be some eminent Place of the *Edifice*, such as the *chief Front*, or *publick Entrance*; the adorning of which, would beautify the *Whole*, more than an equal Expence of Ornament on any *other Part*.

THIS Constitution of our *Sense*, whereby the *moral Beauty* of Actions, or Dispositions, increases according to the *Number* of Persons to whom the good Effects of them extend; whence also Actions which flow from the *nearer Attachments* of Nature, such as *that* between the *Sexes*, and the *Love* of our *Offspring*, do not appear *so virtuous* as Actions of *equal Moment* of Good towards Persons less attach'd to us; has been chosen by the AUTHOR OF NATURE for this good Reason, "That the more *limited* Instincts tend to  
 " produce a smaller Moment of Good, be-  
 " cause

Sect. 3. “ cause confined to small Numbers; where-  
 as the more *extensive calm Instinct* of Good-  
 will, attended with Power, would have  
 no Bounds in its good Effects, and would  
 never lead into any Evil, as the particular  
 Passions may: and hence it is made more  
 lovely to our *Sense*, that we might be  
 induced to cultivate and strengthen it;  
 and make it check even *kind Passions*, when  
 they are opposite to a greater Good.”

*Moral Dis-  
 positions  
 and Abi-  
 litys.*

FROM this primary Idea of *moral Good* in Actions, arises the Idea of *Good* in those Dispositions, whether *natural* or *acquir'd*, which enable us to do Good to others; or which are presum'd to be design'd, and acquir'd or cultivated for that purpose. And hence those Abilitys, while nothing appears contrary to our Presumption, may increase our Approbation of the Possessor of them; but when they are imagin'd to be intended for *publick Mischief*, they make us hate him the more: Such are a *penetrating Judgment*, a *tenacious Memory*, a *quick Invention*; *Patience of Labour, Pain, Hunger, Watching*; a *Contempt of Wealth, Rumour, Death*. These may be rather call'd *natural Abilitys*, than *moral Qualitys*. Now, a Veneration for these Qualitys, any farther than they are employ'd for the *publick Good*, is foolish, and flows from our *moral Sense*, grounded upon a false Opinion; for, if we plainly see them

them *maliciously* employ'd, they make the Agent more detestable. Sect. 3.



XI. To find an *universal Canon* to compute the *Morality* of any Actions, with all their Circumstances, when we *judge* of the Actions done by ourselves, or by others, we must observe the following *Propositions*, or *Axioms*. How we compute the Morality of Actions in our Sense of them.

1. THE *moral Importance* of any Agent, or the *Quantity* of *publick Good* produc'd by him, is in a *compound Ratio* of his *Benevolence* and *Abilitys*: or (by substituting the initial Letters for the Words, as  $M =$  Moment of Good, and  $\mu =$  Moment of Evil)  $M = B \times A$ .

2. IN like manner, the *Moment* of *private Good*, or *Interest*, produc'd by any Person to himself, is in a *compound Ratio* of his *Self-Love* and *Abilitys*: or (substituting the initial Letters)  $I = S \times A$ .

3. WHEN, in comparing the *Virtue* of two Agents, the *Abilitys* are equal; the *Moment* of *publick Good* produc'd by them in like Circumstances, is as the *Benevolence*: or  $M = B \times I$ .

4. WHEN *Benevolence* in two Agents is equal, and other Circumstances alike; the *Moment* of *publick Good* is as the *Abilitys*; or  $M = B \times I$ .

5. THE

Sect. 3.

5. THE *Virtue* then of *Agents*, or their *Benevolence*, is always *directly* as the *Moment of Good* produc'd in like Circumstances, and *inversly* as their *Abilitys*: or  $B = \frac{M}{A}$ .

6. BUT, as the natural Consequences of our Actions are various, some *good* to ourselves, and *evil* to the Publick; and others *evil* to ourselves, and *good* to the Publick; or either *useful* both to ourselves and others, or *pernicious* to both; the intire Spring of good Actions is not always *Benevolence alone*; or of Evil, *Malice alone*; (nay, sedate Malice is rarely found) but in most Actions we must look upon *Self-Love* as another Force, sometimes conspiring with *Benevolence*, and assisting it, when we are excited by Views of *private Interest*, as well as *publick Good*; and sometimes opposing *Benevolence*, when the good Action is any way *difficult* or *painful* in the Performance, or *detrimental* in its Consequences to the *Agent*. In the former Case,  $M = \overline{B+S} \times A = BA + SA$ ; and therefore  $BA = M - SA = M - I$ , and  $B = \frac{M - I}{A}$ . In the latter Case,  $M = \overline{B-S} \times A = BA - SA$ ; therefore  $BA = M + SA = M + I$ , and  $B = \frac{M + I}{A}$ .

THESE

THESE *selfish Motives* shall be \* here-  
 after more fully explain'd; here we may in  
 general denote them by the *Word Interest*:  
 which when it concurs with *Benevolence*, in  
 any Action capable of Increase or Diminu-  
 tion, must produce a greater Quantity of  
*Good*, than *Benevolence* alone in the same  
*Abilitys*; and therefore, when the *Moment* of  
*Good*, in an Action partly intended for the  
*Good* of the *Agent*, is but equal to the *Mo-*  
*ment* of *Good* in the Action of *another Agent*,  
 influenc'd only by *Benevolence*, the former is  
 less *virtuous*; and in this Case the *Interest*  
 must be deducted to find the true Effect of  
 the *Benevolence*, or *Virtue*. In the same  
 manner, when *Interest* is opposite to *Bene-*  
*volence*, and yet is surmounted by it; this  
*Interest* must be added to the *Moment*, to in-  
 crease the *Virtue* of the Action, or the  
 Strength of the *Benevolence*: Or thus, in  
*advantageous Virtue*,  $B = \frac{M - I}{A}$ . And in *la-*  
*borious, painful, dangerous or expensive Vir-*  
*tue*,  $B = \frac{M + I}{A}$ . By *Interest*, in this last Case,  
 is understood all the *Advantage* which the  
*Agent* might have obtain'd by omitting the  
 Action, which is a *negative Motive* to it; and  
 this, when subtracted, becomes *positive*.

\* Vide Sect. v.

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*Intention  
and Fore-  
sight, affect  
Actions.*

BUT here we must observe, that no *Advantage*, not *intended*, altho' casually or naturally redounding to us from the *Action*, does at all affect its *Morality* to make it less *amiable*: nor does any *Difficulty* or *Evil* unforeseen, or not resolved upon, make a kind *Action* more *virtuous*; since in such Cases *Self-Love* neither assists nor opposes *Benevolence*. Nay, *Self-Interest* then only diminishes the *Benevolence*, when without this *View of Interest* the *Action* would not have been undertaken, or so much *Good* would not have been produc'd by the *Agent*; and it extenuates the *Vice* of an *evil Action*, only when without this *Interest* the *Action* would not have been done by the *Agent*, or so much *Evil* have been produc'd by him.

THE sixth Axiom only explains the external Marks by which Men must judge, who do not see into each others Hearts; for it may really happen in many Cases, that Men may have *Benevolence* sufficient to surmount any *Difficulty*, and yet they may meet with none at all: And in that Case, it is certain there is as much *Virtue* in the *Agent*, tho' he does not give such *Proof* of it to his *Fellow-Creatures*, as if he had surmounted *Difficultys* in his kind *Actions*. And this too must be the Case with the *DEITY*, to whom nothing is difficult.

SINCE

SINCE then *Benevolence*, or *Virtue* in any *Agent*, is as  $\frac{M}{A}$ , or as  $\frac{M+I}{A}$ , and no

*Perfect  
Virtue.*

*Being* can act above his *natural Ability*; that must be the *Perfection of Virtue*, where  $M=A$ , or when the *Being* acts to the utmost of his *Power* for the *publick Good*; and hence the *Perfection of Virtue* in this Case,

or  $\frac{M}{A}$ , is as *Unity*. And this may shew us

the only *Foundation* for the boasting of the *Stoicks*, "That a *Creature* suppos'd innocent, by pursuing *Virtue* with his utmost *Power*, may in *Virtue* equal the *Gods*." For in their Case, if [A] or the *Ability*, be *Infinite*, unless [M] or the *Good* to be produc'd in the *Whole*, be so too, the *Virtue* is not *absolutely perfect*; and the *Quotient* can never surmount *Unity*.

XII. THE same *Axioms* may be apply'd to compute the *moral Evil* in *Actions*; that is, calling the *Disposition* which leads us to *Evil*, *Hatred*, tho' it is oftner only *Self-Love*, with *Inadvertence* to its *Consequences*: then,

1<sup>st</sup>. THE *Moment* of *Evil* produc'd by any *Agent*, is as the *Product* of his *Hatred* into his *Ability*, or  $\mu = H \times A$ . And,

2<sup>dly</sup>. IN equal *Abilities*,  $\mu = H \times I$ .

3<sup>dly</sup>,

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3<sup>dly</sup>. WHEN *Hatred* is equal;  $\mu = A \times I$ ;  
And,

4<sup>thly</sup>, THE Degree of *moral Evil*, or *Vice*, which is equal to the *Hatred* or *Neglect* of *publick Good*, is thus exprefs'd,

$$H = \frac{\mu}{A}.$$

5<sup>thly</sup>. THE Motives of *Interest* may cooperate with *Hatred*, or oppose it the same way as with *Benevolence*; and then according as *Self-Interest* may partly excite to the Action, and so diminish the *Evil*; or dissuade from it, and so increase it, the *Malice* which surmounts it, or  $H = \frac{\mu + I}{A}$ , in like manner as in the Case of *moral Good*.

*Intention,  
Foreſight.*

BUT we must observe, that not only *Innocence* is expected from all Mortals, but they are presum'd from their *Nature*, in some measure, inclin'd to *publick Good*; so that a bare Absence of this Desire is enough to make an *Agent* be reputed *evil*: nor is a direct Intention of *publick Evil* necessary to make an Action *evil*; it is enough that it flows from *Self-Love*, with a plain Neglect of the *Good* of others, or an Insensibility of their Misery, which we either *actually* foresee, or have a probable *Presumption* of.

IT



It is true indeed, that *that publick Evil* which I neither certainly foresee, nor have actual Presumptions of, as the Consequence of my Action, does not make my *present Action* criminal or odious; even altho' I might have foreseen this Evil by a serious Examination of my own Actions; because such Actions do not, at present, evidence either *Malice*, or *Want of Benevolence*. But then it is also certain, that my *prior Negligence*, in not examining the Tendency of my Actions, is a plain Evidence of the Want of *that Degree* of good Affections which is necessary to a virtuous Character; and consequently the *Guilt* properly lies in this *Neglect*, rather than in an *Action* which really flows from a *good Intention*. *Human Laws* however, which cannot examine the *Intentions*, or secret Knowledge of the *Agent*, must judge in gross of the Action itself; presupposing all that Knowledge as actually attain'd which we are oblig'd to attain.

In like manner, no good Effect, which I did not actually foresee and intend, makes my Action *morally good*; however *human Laws* or *Governors*, who cannot search into *Mens Intentions*, or know their secret *Designs*, justly reward Actions which tend to the publick Good, altho' the Agent was engag'd to those Actions only by *selfish*

Sect. 3. *Views*; and consequently had no virtuous  
 ~~~~~ Disposition influencing him to them.

THE Difference in *Degree of Guilt* between *Crimes of Ignorance*, when the Ignorance is *vincible*, and *faulty*, as to the natural Tendency of the Action; and *crimes of Malice*, or direct evil Intention; consists in this, that the former, by a *prior Neglect*, argues a Want of the due Degree of *Benevolence*, or *right Affection*; the latter, evidences direct *evil Affections*, which are vastly more odious.

*Morality  
 distinct  
 from In-  
 terest.*

XIII. FROM Axiom the 5<sup>th</sup>, we may form almost a demonstrative Conclusion, “that we have a *Sense of Goodness* and *moral Beauty* in Actions, distinct from *Advantage*,” for had we no other Foundation of Approbation of Actions, but the *Advantage* which might arise to us from them, if they were done toward ourselves, we should make no Account of the *Abilitys* of the *Agent*, but would barely esteem them according to their *Moment*. The *Abilitys* come in only to shew the Degree of *Benevolence*, which supposes *Benevolence* necessarily *amiable*. Who was ever the better pleas’d with a *barren rocky Farm*, or an *inconvenient House*, by being told that the *poor Farm* gave as great Increase as it could; or that the *House* accommodated its Possessor

Possessor as well as it could? And yet in Sect. 3. our Sentiments of Actions, whose *Moment* is very inconsiderable, it shall wonderfully increase the *Beauty* to alledge, “ That it “ was all the *poor Agent* could do for the “ *Publick*, or his *Friend*.”

XIV. THE *moral Beauty* of *Characters* Morality of Characters. arises from their Actions, or sincere Intentions of the *publick Good*, according to their Power. We form our Judgment of them according to what appears to be their *fix'd Disposition*, and not according to any *particular Sallies* of *unkind Passions*; altho' these abate the *Beauty* of *good Characters*, as the *Motions* of the *kind Affections* diminish the *Deformity* of the *bad ones*. What then properly constitutes a *virtuous Character*, is not some few accidental *Motions* of *Compassion*, *natural Affection*, or *Gratitude*; but such a *fix'd Humanity*, or *Desire* of the *publick Good* of all, to whom our Influence can extend, as uniformly excites us to all Acts of *Beneficence*, according to our utmost Prudence and Knowledge of the Interests of others: and a *strong Benevolence* will not fail to make us careful of informing ourselves right, concerning the truest Methods of serving the Interests of Mankind. Every Motion indeed of the *kind Affections* appears in some Degree *amiable*; but we denominate the *Character* from the *prevailing Principle*.

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*Instinct  
may be the  
Spring of  
Virtue.*

XV. I KNOW not for what Reason some will not allow that to be *Virtue*, which flows from *Instincts*, or *Passions*; but how do they help themselves? They say, "*Virtue* arises from *Reason*." What is *Reason*, but that *Sagacity* we have in prosecuting any *End*? The *ultimate End* propos'd by the common *Moralists* is the *Happiness* of the *Agent* himself, and this certainly he is determin'd to pursue from *Instinct*. Now may not another *Instinct* toward the *Publick*, or the *Good* of others, be as proper a Principle of *Virtue*, as the *Instinct* toward *private Happiness*? And is there not the same Occasion for the Exercise of our *Reason* in pursuing the *former*, as the *latter*? This is certain, that whereas we behold the *selfish* Actions of others, with *Indifference* at best, we see something *amiable* in every Action which flows from *kind Affections* or *Passions* toward others; if they be conducted by *Prudence*, so as any way to attain their *End*. Our *passionate* Actions, as we shew'd \* above, are not always *Self-interested*; since our *Intention* is not to free ourselves from the *Uneasiness* of the *Passion*, but to alter the *State* of the *Object*.

IF it be said, "That Actions from *Instinct*, are not the Effect of *Prudence* and

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\* See Sect. ii. Art. 8.

"Choice:"

“*Choice* :” This Objection holds full as Sect. 3.  
 strongly against the Actions which flow from *Self-Love* ; since the Use of our Reason is as  
 requisite, to find the proper Means of promoting *publick Good*, as *private Good*. And  
 as it must be an *Instinct*, or a *Determination previous to Reason*, which makes us pursue  
*private Good*, as well as *publick Good*, as our *End* ; there is the same Occasion for *Prudence*  
 and *Choice*, in the Election of proper Means for promoting of either. I see no  
 Harm in supposing, “ that Men are *naturally*  
 “ *dispos’d to Virtue*, and not left *merely in-*  
 “ *different*, until some Prospect of Interest  
 “ allures them to it.” Surely, the Supposition of a *benevolent universal Instinct*, would  
 recommend *human Nature*, and its AUTHOR, more to the *Love* of a *good Man*, and leave  
 room enough for the Exercise of our *Reason*, in contriving and settling *Rights, Laws,*  
*Constitutions* ; in *inventing Arts*, and *practising* them so as to gratify, in the most ef-  
 fectual manner, that *generous Inclination*. And if we must bring in *Self-Love* to make  
*Virtue rational*, a little Reflection will discover, as shall appear hereafter, that this  
*Benevolence* is our *greatest Happiness* ; and thence we may resolve to cultivate, as much  
 as possible, this *sweet Disposition*, and to despise every *opposite Interest*. Not that we  
 can be *truly virtuous*, if we intend only to obtain the Pleasure which arises from *Bene-*  
 cence,

Sect. 3. *cence*, without the *Love* of *others*: Nay, this very Pleasure is founded on our being conscious of *disinterested Love* to *others*, as the *Spring* of our *Actions*. But *Self-Interest* may be our *Motive* in studying to raise these kind Affections, and to continue in this agreeable *State*; tho' it cannot be the *sole*, or *principal Motive* of any *Action*, which to our *moral Sense* appears *virtuous*.

Heroism,  
in all Sta-  
tions.

THE applying a *mathematical Calculation* to *moral Subjects*, will appear perhaps at first *extravagant* and *wild*; but some *Corollarys*, which are easily and certainly deduc'd below\*, may shew the *Conveniency* of this Attempt, if it could be farther pursu'd. At present, we shall only draw this one, which seems the most joyful imaginable, even to the lowest Rank of Mankind, *viz.* "That  
" no external Circumstances of Fortune, no  
" involuntary Disadvantages, can exclude  
" any Mortal from the *most heroick Virtue*." For how small soever the *Moment* of *publick Good* be, which any one can accomplish, yet if his *Abilities* are proportionably small, the *Quotient*, which expresses the Degree of *Virtue*, may be as great as any whatsoever. Thus, not only the *Prince*, the *Statesman*, the *General*, are capable of *true Heroism*, tho' these are the chief Characters, whose

\* See Sect. vii. Art. 8, 9.

Fame is diffus'd thro' various Nations and Sect. 3.  
Ages: but when we find in an *honest Trader*,  
the *kind Friend*, the *faithful prudent Ad-*  
*viser*, the *charitable and hospitable Neighbour*,  
the *tender Husband* and *affectionate Parent*,  
the *sedate, yet chearful Companion*, the *gene-*  
*rous Assistant of Merit*, the *cautious Allayer*  
of *Contention and Debate*, the *Promoter of*  
*Love and good Understanding* among Ac-  
quaintances; if we consider, that these were  
*all the good Offices* which his Station in the  
World gave him an Opportunity of per-  
forming to Mankind, we must judge *this*  
*Character* really as *amiable*, as those, whose  
external Splendor dazzles an injudicious  
World into an Opinion, "that they are the  
" *only Heroes in Virtue.*"

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## S E C T. IV.

*All Mankind agree in this general Foundation of their Approbation of moral Actions. The Grounds of the different Opinions about Morals.*

*This Moral Sense universal.*

I. **T**O shew how far Mankind agree in that which we have made the *universal Foundation* of this *moral Sense*, viz. **BENEVOLENCE**, we have observ'd already \*, that when we are ask'd the Reason of our Approbation of any Action, we perpetually alledge its *Usefulness* to the *Publick*, and not to the *Actor* himself. If we are vindicating a censur'd Action, and maintaining it lawful, we always make this one Article of our Defence, "That it injur'd nobody, " or did more *Good* than *Harm*:" On the other hand, when we blame any piece of Conduct, we shew it to be *prejudicial* to others, besides the *Actor*; or to evidence at least a *Neglect* of their Interest, when it was in our Power to serve them; or when *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*, or some other *disinterested Tye* should have rais'd in us a Study of

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\* See above, Sect. iii. Art. 3. Par. 3.



of their Interest. If we sometimes blame foolish Conduct in others, without any Reflection upon its Tendency to *publick Evil*, it is still occasion'd by our *Benevolence*, which makes us concern'd for the Evils befalling the *Agent*, whom we must always look upon as a Part of the *System*. We all know how great an Extenuation of Crimes it is, to alledge, "That the poor Man does Harm to no body but himself;" and how often this turns Hatred into Pity. And yet, if we examine the Matter well, we shall find that the greatest Part of the Actions which are *immediately prejudicial* to ourselves, and are often look'd upon as *innocent*, towards others, do really tend to the *publick Detriment*, by making us incapable of performing the good Offices we could otherwise have done, and perhaps would have been inclin'd to do. This is the Case of *Intemperance*, and *extravagant Luxury*.

II. AND farther, we may observe, that no Action of any other Person was ever approv'd by us, but upon some Apprehension, well or ill grounded, of some *really good moral Quality*. If we observe the Sentiments of Men concerning Actions, we shall find, that it is always some *really amiable and benevolent Appearance* which engages their Approbation. We may perhaps commit Mistakes, in judging that Actions tend to the publick Good, which do not; or be so stupidly inadvertent, that while our Attention is

fix'd

*Benevolence the sole Ground of Approbation.*

Sect. 4. fix'd on some *partial good Effects*, we may quite over look many *evil Consequences* which counter balance the *Good*. Our *Reason* may be very deficient in its Office, by giving us partial Representations of the Tendency of Actions; but 'tis still some *apparent Species of Benevolence* which commands our Approbation. And this *Sense*, like our other Senses, tho' counteracted from Motives of *external Advantage*, which are stronger than it, ceases not to operate, but has Strength enough to make us *uneasy* and *dissatisfy'd* with ourselves; even as the *Sense of Tasting* makes us loath, and dislike the nauseous Potion, which we may force ourselves from, Interest to swallow.

*False Approbations.*

IT is therefore to no purpose to alledge here, "That many Actions are really done and approv'd, which tend to the *universal Detriment*." For the same way, Actions are often perform'd, and in the mean time approv'd, which tend to the *Hurt* of the *Actor*. But as we do not from the *latter*, infer the *Actor* to be void of *Self-Love*, or a *Sense of Interest*; no more should we infer from the *former*, that such Men are void of a *Sense of Morals*, or a *Desire of publick Good*. The Matter is plainly this. Men are often mistaken in the Tendency of Actions either to *publick* or *private Good*: Nay, sometimes *violent Passions*, while they last, will make them approve very bad Actions in a *moral Sense*.

*Sense*, and conceive very *pernicious ones* to Sect. 4. the *Agent*, to be *advantageous*: But this proves only, “ That sometimes there may “ be some more *violent Motive* to Action, “ than a *Sense* of *moral Good* ; or that Men “ by *Passion* may become blind even to “ their own *Interest*.”

BUT to prove that Men are void of a *moral Sense*, we should find some Instances of *cruel, malicious Actions*, done without any *Motive* of *Interest*, *real* or *apparent* ; and approv'd without any *Opinion* of *Tendency* to *publick Good*, or *flowing* from *Good-will* : We must find a *Country* where *Murder* in cold *Blood*, *Tortures*, and *every thing malicious*, without any *Advantage*, is, if not *approv'd*, at least look'd upon with *Indifference*, and raises *no Aversion* toward the *Actors* in the unconcern'd *Spectators* : We must find Men with whom the *Treacherous, Ungrateful, Cruel*, are in the same account with the *Generous, Friendly, Faithful*, and *Humane* ; and who approve the *latter*, no more than the *former*, in all *Cases* where they are not affected by the *Influence* of these *Dispositions*, or when the *natural Good* or *Evil* befalls other *Persons*. And it may be question'd, whether the *Universe*, tho' large enough, and stor'd with no inconsiderable *Variety* of *Characters*, will yield us any Instance, not only of a *Nation*, but even of a *Club*, or a *single Person*, who will think all *Actions indifferent*, but those which regard his *own Concerns*. III.

Sect. 4.

*Diversity  
of Man-  
ners ac-  
counted  
for.*

III. FROM what has been said, we may easily account for the *vast Diversity* of *moral Principles*, in *various Nations* and *Ages*; and the *Grounds* of *this Diversity* are principally these:

*From va-  
rious No-  
tions of  
Happi-  
ness.*

Ist. DIFFERENT Opinions of *Happiness*, or *natural Good*, and of the most effectual Means to advance it. Thus in one Country, where there prevails a *courageous Disposition*, where *Liberty* is counted a *great Good*, and *War* an *inconsiderable Evil*, all Insurrections in Defence of Privileges will have the Appearance of *moral Good* to our *Sense*, because of their appearing *benevolent*; and yet the *same Sense* of *moral Good* in *Benevolence*, shall in another Country, where the Spirits of Men are more *abject* and *timorous*, where *Civil War* appears the *greatest natural Evil*, and *Liberty* no *great Purchase*, make the same Actions appear *odious*. So in SPARTA, where thro' Contempt of Wealth the Security of Possessions was not much regarded, but the Thing chiefly desir'd, as *naturally good to the State*, was to abound in a *hardy shifting Youth*; *Theft*, if dexterously perform'd, was so little odious, that it receiv'd the Countenance of a Law to give it Impunity.

BUT in these, and all other Instances of the like Nature, the Approbation is founded on *Benevolence*, because of some real, or ap-  
parent

parent Tendency to the *publick Good*. For Sect. 4. we are not to imagine, that this *Sense* should give us, without Observation, Ideas of complex Actions, or of their natural Tendencies to *Good* or *Evil*: it only determines us to approve *Benevolence*, whenever it appears in any Action, and to hate *the contrary*. So our *Sense* of *Beauty* does not, without Reflection, Instruction or Observation, give us Ideas of the *regular Solids, Temples, Cirques, and Theatres*; but determines us to approve and delight in *Uniformity amidst Variety*, where-ever we observe it. Let us read the *Preambles* of any Laws we count unjust, or the *Vindications* of any disputed Practice by the *Moralists*, and we shall find, no doubt, that Men are often mistaken in computing the Excess of the *natural good* or *evil Consequences* of certain Actions; but the Ground on which any Action is approv'd, is still some Tendency to the *greater natural Good* of others, apprehended by those who approve it.

THE same Reason may remove also the *Travellers* Objections against the *Universality* of this *Sense*, from some Storys of Travellers, concerning *strange Crueltys* practis'd toward the *Aged, or Children*, in certain Countrys. If such Actions be done in such angry Passions, they only prove, that other Motives, or Springs of Action, may overpower *Benevolence* in its *strongest Ties*: and if they really be universally allow'd, look'd upon as innocent,

Sect. 4. cent, and vindicated; it is certainly under some Appearance of *Benevolence*; such as to secure them from Insults of Enemies, to avoid the Infirmary's of Age, which perhaps appear greater Evils than Death, or to free the vigorous and useful Citizens from the Charge of maintaining them, or the Troubles of Attendance upon them. A Love of Pleasure and Ease, may in the immediate Agents be stronger in some Instances, than *Gratitude* toward Parents, or *natural Affection* to Children. But that such Nations are continu'd, notwithstanding all the Toil in educating their Young, is still a sufficient Proof of *natural Affection*: For I fancy we are not to imagine any nice Laws in such Places, compelling Parents to a proper Education of some certain Number of their Offspring. We know very well that an Appearance of *publick Good* was the Ground of Laws equally barbarous, enacted by LYCURGUS and SOLON, of killing the Deform'd, or Weak, to prevent a burdensome Croud of useles Citizens.

A LATE ingenious Author \* has justly observ'd the Absurdity of the *monstrous Taste*, which has possess'd both the *Readers* and *Writers* of *Travels*. They are sparing enough in Accounts of the *natural Affections*, the *Familys*, *Associations*, *Friendships*, *Clans*, of the *Indians*; and as transiently do they

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\* Ld. Shaftsbury, Vol. i. p. 346, 7, 8, 9, &c.

mention their Abhorrence of *Treachery* Sect. 4. among themselves; their *Proneness*, to mutual Aid, and to the Defence of their several *States*; their Contempt of Death in Defence of their Country, or upon Points of *Honour*. “ These are but *common Storys*.—No need “ to travel to the *Indies* for what we see in “ *Europe* every Day.” The Entertainment therefore in these ingenious Studys consists chiefly in exciting *Horror*, and making Men *stare*. The ordinary Employment of the Bulk of the *Indians* in Support of their Wives and Offspring, or Relations, has nothing of the *Prodigious*: But a *Human Sacrifice*, a Feast upon Enemies Carcases, can raise an Horror and Admiration of the wondrous Barbarity of *Indians*, in Nations no Strangers to the *Massacre at Paris*, the *Irish Rebellion*, or the Journals of the *Inquisition*. These they behold with religious Veneration; but the *Indian Sacrifices*, flowing from a like Perversion of *Humanity* by *Superstition*, raise the highest Abhorrence and Amazement. What is most surprizing in these Studys, is the wondrous *Credulity* of some Gentlemen of great Pretensions in other Matters to Caution of Assent, for these *marvellous Memoirs* of Monks, Friars, Sea-Captains, Pirates; and for the *Historys, Annals, Chronologys*, receiv’d by oral Tradition, or Hieroglyphicks.

MEN have *Reason* given them, to judge <sup>Use of</sup> of the Tendency of their Actions, that <sup>Reason in</sup> they <sup>Morals.</sup>

Sect. 4. they may not stupidly follow the first Appearance of *publick Good*; but it is still some Appearance of *Good* which they pursue. And it is strange, that *Reason* is universally allow'd to Men, notwithstanding all the stupid ridiculous Opinions receiv'd in many Places; and yet absurd Practices, founded upon those very *Opinions*, shall seem an Argument against any *moral Sense*, altho' the bad Conduct is not owing to any Irregularity in the *moral Sense*; but to a wrong Judgment or *Opinion*. If putting the *Aged* to *Death*, with all its Consequences, really tends to the *publick Good*, and the *lesser Misery* of the *Aged*, it is, no doubt, *justifiable*; nay, perhaps the *Aged* choose it, in Hopes of a *future State*. If a *deform'd* or *weak Race* could never, by Ingenuity and Art, make themselves useful to Mankind, but should grow an absolutely unsupportable Burden, so as to involve a whole State in Misery, it is *just* to put them to Death. This all allow to be *just*, in the Case of an over-loaded Boat in a Storm. And as for *killing* of their Children, when Parents are sufficiently stock'd, it is perhaps practis'd, and allow'd from *Self-Love*; but I can scarce think it passes for a good Action any-where. If *Wood* or *Stone*, or *Metal* be DEITIES, have *Government*, and *Power*, and have been the *Authors* of *Benefits* to us; it is *morally amiable* to praise and worship them. Or if the true DEITY be pleas'd with Worship before *Statues*, or any



any other Symbol of some more immediate Sect. 4<sup>r</sup>  
 Presence or Influence; Image-Worship is vir-  
 tuous. If he delights in Sacrifices, Penances,  
 Ceremonys, Cringings; they are all laudable.  
 Our Sense of Virtue generally leads us ex-  
 actly enough according to our Opinions; and  
 therefore the absurd Practices which prevail  
 in the World, are much better Arguments  
 that Men have no Reason, than that they  
 have no moral Sense of Beauty in Actions.

IV. THE next Ground of Diversity in <sup>Narrow</sup> Sentiments, is the Diversity of Systems, to <sup>Systems</sup> which Men, from foolish Opinions, confine <sup>pervert the</sup> their Benevolence. We intimated above \*, <sup>moral</sup> that it is regular and beautiful, to have stron- <sup>sense.</sup> ger Benevolence toward the morally good Parts of Mankind, who are useful to the Whole, than toward the useless or pernicious. Now, if Men receive a low or base Opinion of any Body, or Sect of Men; if they imagine them bent upon the Destruction of the more valuable Parts, or but useless Burdens of the Earth; Benevolence itself will lead them to neglect the Interests of such, and to suppress them. This is the Reason why, among Nations who have high Notions of Virtue, every Action toward an Enemy may pass for just; why ROMANS and GREEKS could approve of making those they call'd Barbarians, Slaves:

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\* See Sect. iii. Art. 10. Par. 1.

## Sect. 4.

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*Sects pernicious to Virtue.*

A L A T E ingenious Author \* justly observes, “ That the various *Seets, Partys, Factions, Cabals* of Mankind in larger Societys, are all influenc’d by a *publick Spirit*: That some generous Notions of *publick Good*, some strong friendly Dispositions, raise them at first, and excite Men of the same *Faction* or *Cabal* to the most disinterested mutual Succour and Aid: That all the Contentions of the different Factions, and even the fiercest Wars against each other, are influenc’d by a sociable *publick Spirit* in a limited System.” But certain it is, that Men are little oblig’d to those, who often artfully raise and foment this Party Spirit; or cantonize them into several *Seets* for the Defence of very trifling Causes. Associations for innocent *Commerce*, or *Manufactures*; Cabals for Defence of *Liberty*, against a *Tyrant*; or even lower Clubs for *Pleasantry*, or *Improvement* by Conversation, are very amiable and good. But when Mens Heads are filled with some trifling Opinions; when designing Men raise in their Minds some unaccountable Notion of *Sanctity* and *Religion*, in Tenets or Practices, which neither increase our Love to G O D, or our own *Species*; when the several Factions are taught to look upon each other as *odious, contemptible, profane*, because of

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\* Ld: Shaftesbury’s Essay on Wit and Humour, Part iii. Sect. II. Vol. I. p. 110.

their different Tenets or Opinions; even Sect. 4.  
 when these Tenets, whether true or false, are  
 perhaps perfectly uselessto the publick Good;  
 when the keenest Passions are rais'd about  
 such Trifles, and Men begin to hate each  
 other for what, of itself, has no Evil in it;  
 and to love the Zealots of their own Sect for  
 what is no way valuable; nay, even for  
 their Fury, Rage, and Malice against opposite  
 Sects; (which is what all Partys commonly call  
*Zeal*) 'tis then no Wonder, if our *moral Sense* be  
 much impair'd, and our *natural Notions* of  
*Good* and *Evil* almost lost, when our *Admi-  
 ration*, and *Love* or *Contempt*, and *Hatred*, are  
 thus perverted from their natural Objects.

IF any Mortals are so happy as never to  
 have heard of the *Party-Tenets* of most of  
 our Sects; or, if they have heard of them;  
 have either never espous'd any Sect, or all  
 equally; they bid fairest for a truly *natural*  
 and *good* Disposition, because their *Temper*s  
 have never been soured about vain Trifles;  
 nor have they contracted any *Sullenness* or  
*Rancour* against any Part of their own *Kind*.  
 If any *Opinions* deserve to be contended for;  
 they are those which give us lovely Ideas of  
 the DEITY, and of our *Fellow-Creatures*:  
 If any *Opinions* deserve Opposition, they are  
 such as raise Scruples in our Minds about the  
*Goodness* of PROVIDENCE; or represent  
 our *Fellow-Creatures* as *base* and *selfish*; by  
 instilling into us some ill-natur'd, cunning,

Seçt. 4. shrewd Insinuations, " That our most generous Actions proceed wholly from *selfish Views.*" This wise *Philosophy* of some *Moderns*, after *EPICURUS*, must be fruitful of nothing but *Discontent*, *Suspicion*, and *Jealousy*; a State infinitely worse than any little transitory *Injurys*, to which we might be expos'd by a good-natur'd *Credulity*. But Thanks be to the kind *AUTHOR* of our Nature, that in spite of such Opinions, our Nature itself leads us into *Friendship*, *Trust*, and *mutual Confidence*.

WERE we freely conversant with *Robbers*, who shew a *moral Sense* in the equal or proportionable *Division* of their Prey, and in *Faith* to each other, we should find they have their own sublime *moral Ideas* of their Party, as *generous*, *courageous*, *trusty*, nay *honest* too; and that those we call *honest* and *industrious*, are imagin'd by them to be *mean-spirited*, *selfish*, *churlish*, or *luxurious*; on whom that *Wealth* is ill bestow'd, which therefore they would apply to better *Uses*, to maintain gallanter Men, who have a *Right* to a *Living* as well as their Neighbours, who are their profess'd *Enemies*. Nay, if we observe the *Discourse* of our profess'd *Debauchees*, our most *dissolute Rakes*, we shall find their *Vices* cloath'd, in their *Imaginations*, with some amiable *Dress* of *Liberty*, *Generosity*, *just Resentment* against the *Contrivers* of artful *Rules* to enslave Men, and rob them of their *Pleasures*. PER-

PERHAPS never any Men pursu'd Vice long with Peace of Mind, without some such deluding Imagination of *moral Good* \*, while they may be still inadvertent to the *barbarous* and *inhuman Consequences* of their Actions. The Idea of an *ill-natur'd Villain* is too frightful ever to become familiar to any Mortal. Hence we shall find, that the *basest Actions* are dress'd in some *tolerable Mask*. What others call *Avarice*, appears to the Agent a *prudent Care* of a *Family*, or *Friends*; *Fraud*, *artful Conduct*; *Malice* and *Revenge*, a *just Sense* of *Honour*, and a *Vindication* of our *Right* in *Possessions*, or *Fame*; *Fire* and *Sword*, and *Desolation*, among *Enemies*, a *just* *thorow Defence* of our *Country*; *Persecution*, a *Zeal* for the *Truth*, and for the *eternal Happiness* of Men, which *Hereticks* oppose. In all these Instances, Men generally act from a *Sense* of *Virtue* upon *false Opinions*, and *mistaken Benevolence*; upon *wrong* or *partial Views* of *publick Good*, and the *Means* to promote it; or upon very *narrow Systems* form'd by like *foolish Opinions*. It is not a *Delight* in the *Misery* of others, or *Malice*, which occasions the horrid *Crimes* which fill our *Historys*; but generally an *injudicious*, *unreasonable Enthusiasm* for some kind of *limited Virtue*.

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\* See below, Sect. vi. Art. 2. Par. 1.

Sect. 4.



*Infani sapiens nomen ferat, æquus iniqui,  
Ultra, quam satis est, VIRTUTEM si petat  
ipsam †.*

False Opinions of  
the divine  
Laws.

V. THE last Ground of *Diversity* which occurs, are the *false Opinions* of the *Will* or *Laws* of the DEITY. To obey these we are determin'd from *Gratitude*, and a *Sense* of *Right* imagin'd in the DEITY, to dispose at *Pleasure* the *Fortunes* of his *Creatures*. This is so abundantly known to have produc'd *Follys*, *Superstitions*, *Murders*, *Devastations* of *Kingdoms*, from a *Sense* of *Virtue* and *Duty*, that it is needless to mention particular *Instances*. Only we may observe, "That all those *Follys*, or *Barbaritys*, rather confirm than destroy the *Opinion* of a *moral Sense*;" since the DEITY is believ'd to have a *Right* to dispose of his *Creatures*; and *Gratitude* to him, if he be conceiv'd *good*, must move us to *Obedience* to his *Will*: if he be not conceiv'd *good*, *Self-Love* may overcome our *moral Sense* of the *Action* which we undertake to avoid his *Fury*.

As for the *Vices* which commonly proceed from *Love* of *Pleasure*, or any *violent Passion*, since generally the *Agent* is soon sensible of their *Evil*, and that sometimes amidst the *Heat* of the *Action*, they only prove,

† Hor. Ep. 6. Lib. 1. ver. 15.

“ That

“ That this *moral Sense* and *Benevolence* Sect. 4.  
 “ may be overcome by the more importunate  
 “ Solicitations of *other Desires*.”

VI. BEFORE we leave this Subject, it is <sup>Objection</sup> necessary to remove one of the strongest Ob- <sup>from In-</sup> <sup>cest.</sup>  
 jections against what has been said so often, *viz.* “ That this *Sense* is *natural*, and inde-  
 “ pendent on *Custom* and *Education*.” The  
 Objection is this, “ That we shall find *some*  
 “ *Actions* always attended with the strongest  
 “ Abhorrence, even at first View, in some  
 “ whole Nations, in which there appears  
 “ nothing contrary to *Benevolence*; and that  
 “ the *same Actions* shall in another Nation  
 “ be counted *innocent*, or *honourable*. Thus  
 “ Incest, among *Christians*, is abhorr'd at  
 “ first Appearance as much as *Murder*; even  
 “ by those who do not know or reflect upon  
 “ any necessary Tendency of it to the Detri-  
 “ ment of Mankind. Now we generally  
 “ allow, that what is from *Nature* in one  
 “ Nation, would be so in all. This Ab-  
 “ horrence therefore cannot be from *Nature*,  
 “ since in GREECE, the marrying Half-  
 “ sisters was counted *honourable*; and among  
 “ the *Persian* MAGI, the marrying of Mo-  
 “ thers. Say they then, may not all our  
 “ *Approbation* or *Dislike* of *Actions* arise the  
 “ same way from *Custom* and *Education*?”

THE Answer to this may be easily found  
 from what is already said. Had we no *mo-*

Sec<sup>t</sup>. 4. *ral Sense natural* to us, we should only look upon *Incest* as hurtful to ourselves, and shun it, and never disapprove other *incestuous Persons*, more than we do a *broken Merchant*; so that still this Abhorrence supposes a *Sense of moral Good*. And farther, it is true, that many who abhor *Incest* do not know, or reflect upon the natural Tendency of some sorts of *Incest* to the *publick Detriment*: but where-ever it is hated, it is apprehended as offensive to the DEITY, and that it exposes the Person concern'd to his just Vengeance. Now it is universally acknowledg'd to be the grossest Ingratitude and Baseness, in any Creature, to counteract the Will of the DEITY, to whom it is under such Obligations. This then is plainly a *moral evil Quality* apprehended in *Incest*, and reducible to the general Foundation of *Malice*, or rather Want of *Benevolence*. Nay farther, where this Opinion, "That *Incest* is offensive to the DEITY," prevails, *Incest* must have another direct Contrariety to *Benevolence*; since we must apprehend the *Incestuous*, as exposing an Associate, who should be dear to him by the Ties of *Nature*, to the lowest State of *Misery* and *Baseness*, *Infamy* and *Punishment*. But in those Countrys where no such Opinion prevails of the DEITY's abhorring or prohibiting *Incest*; if no obvious *natural Evils* attend it, it may be look'd upon as *innocent*. And farther, as Men who have the *Sense of Tasting*, may, by *Company* and



and *Education*, have Prejudices against Meats Sect. 4. they never tasted, as *un savory*; so may Men who have a *moral Sense*, acquire an Opinion, by implicit Faith, of the *moral Evil* of Actions, altho' they do not themselves discern in them any Tendency to *natural Evil*; imagining that others do: or, by Education, they may have some Ideas associated, which raise an Abhorrence without Reason. But without a *moral Sense*, we could receive no Prejudice against Actions, under any other View than as *naturally disadvantageous* to ourselves.

VII. THE *Universality* of this *moral Moral Sense*, and that it is antecedent to *Instruction*, *Sense not from Education.* may appear from observing the Sentiments of *Children*, upon hearing the Storys with which they are commonly entertain'd as soon as they understand Language. They always passionately interest themselves on that Side where *Kindness* and *Humanity* are found; and detest the *Cruel*, the *Covetous*, the *Selfish*, or the *Treacherous*. How strongly do we see their Passions of *Joy*, *Sorrow*, *Love*, and *Indignation*, mov'd by these *moral Representations*, even tho' there has been no Pains taken to give them Ideas of a DEITY, of *Laws*, of a *future State*, or of the more intricate Tendency of the *universal Good* to that of each *Individual*!



## S E C T. V.

A farther Confirmation, that we have practical Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our Nature; with a farther Explication of our Instinct to Benevolence in its various Degrees; with the additional Motives of Interest, viz. Honour, Shame and Pity.

Degrees of  
Benevo-  
lence.


I. **W**E have already endeavour'd to prove, "That there is an *universal Determination to Benevolence in Mankind*, even toward the most distant Parts of the Species:" But we are not to imagine, that this *Benevolence* is equal, or in the same Degree toward *all*. There are nearer and stronger Degrees of *Benevolence*, when the Objects stand in some nearer Relations to ourselves, which have obtain'd distinct Names; such as *natural Affection*, and *Gratitude*; or when *Benevolence* is increas'd by greater *Esteem*.

Natural  
Affection.

ONE Species of *natural Affection*, viz. that in *Parents* towards their *Children*, has been consider'd already\*; we shall only

\* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 9. Par. 2, 3.

observe

observe farther, That there is the same kind Sect. 5.  
of *Affection* among *collateral Relations*, tho'   
in a weaker Degree; which is universally ob-  
servable, where no Opposition of *Interest* pro-  
duces contrary Actions, or counterbalances  
the Power of this *natural Affection*.

WE may also observe, that as to the *Affection* of *Parents*, it cannot be entirely Not found-  
ed on Me-  
rit, or Ac-  
quaint-  
ance.  
founded on *Merit* and *Acquaintance*; not  
only because it is antecedent to all Acquain-  
tance, which might occasion *Esteem*; but be-  
cause it operates where Acquaintance would  
produce *Hatred*, even toward *Children* appre-  
hended to be *vicious*. And this *Affection* is  
farther confirm'd to be from NATURE,  
because it is always observ'd to *descend*, and  
not *ascend* from *Children* to *Parents* mutu-  
ally. NATURE, who seems sometimes frugal  
in her Operations, has strongly deter-  
min'd *Parents* to the Care of their *Children*,  
because they universally stand in absolute  
need of Support from them; but has left it  
to *Reflection*, and a *Sense of Gratitude*, to  
produce Returns of *Love* in *Children*, toward  
such *tender kind Benefactors*, who very fel-  
dom stand in such absolute Need of Support  
from their Posterity, as their Children did  
from them. Now, did *Acquaintance* or  
*Merit* produce *natural Affection*, we surely  
should find it strongest in *Children*, on whom  
all the Obligations are laid by a thousand  
good

Sect. 5. good Offices; which yet is quite contrary to Observation. Nay, this Principle seems not confin'd to *Mankind*, but extends to other *Animals*, where yet we scarcely ever suppose any Ideas of Merit; and is observ'd to continue in them no longer than the Necessity of their Young require. Nor could it be of any Service to the Young that it should, since when they are grown up, they can receive little Benefit from the Love of their *Dams*. But as it is otherwise with *rational Agents*, so their *Affections* are of longer Continuance, even during their whole Lives.

*Gratitude.* II. BUT nothing will give us a juster Idea of the *wise Order* in which *human Nature* is form'd for *universal Love*, and *mutual good Offices*, than considering that *strong Attraction* of *Benevolence*, which we call *Gratitude*. Every one knows that *Benevolence* toward ourselves makes a much deeper Impression upon us, and raises *Gratitude*, or a *stronger Love* toward the *Benefactor*, than *equal Benevolence* toward a *third Person* \*. Now because of the great Numbers of *Mankind*, their distant Habitations, and the Incapacity of any one to be remarkably useful to great Multitudes; that our *Benevolence* might not be quite distracted with a Multiplicity of Objects, whose equal Virtues would equally recommend

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\* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6. Par. 3.

them to our Regard; or become useleſs, by Sect. 5.  
 being equally extended to Multitudes at vaſt  
 Diſtances, whoſe Interests we could not un-  
 derſtand, nor be capable of promoting, having  
 no Intercourſe of Offices with them; N A-  
 T U R E has ſo well ordered it, that as our At-  
 tention is more raiſed by thoſe good Offices  
 which are done to ourſelves or our Friends,  
 ſo they cauſe a ſtronger Senſe of Approbation  
 in us, and produce a ſtronger Benevolence  
 towards the Authors of them. This we call  
*Gratitude*. And thus a Foundation is laid  
 for *joyful Associations* in all kinds of *Business*,  
 and *virtuous Friendſhips*.

By *this Constitution* alſo the *Benefactor* is  
 more encourag'd in his *Beneſicence*, and bet-  
 ter ſecur'd of an *Increase* of Happineſs by  
*grateful Returns* \*, than if his *Virtue* were  
 only to be honour'd by the colder general  
 Sentiments of Perſons unconcern'd, who  
 could not know his Neceſſity, nor how to  
 be profitable to him; eſpecially, when they  
 would all be equally determin'd to love in-  
 numerable Multitudes, whoſe equal Virtues  
 would have the ſame Pretenſions to their  
 Love, were there not an *Increase* of Love,  
 according as the Object is more *nearly at-*  
*tack'd* to us, or our *Friends*, by good Offices  
 which affect *ourſelves* or *them*.

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\* See above, Sect. iii. Art. 2. Par. 2.

Sect. 5.

*THIS universal Benevolence* toward all Men, we may compare to that Principle of *Gravitation*, which perhaps extends to all Bodys in the *Universe*; but, like the *Love of Benevolence*, *increases* as the Distance is diminish'd, and is *strongest* when Bodys come to *touch* each other. Now this *Increase of Attraction* upon nearer Approach, is as necessary to the *Frame of the Universe*, as that there should be any *Attraction* at all. For a *general Attraction*, equal in all Distances, would, by the Contrariety of such Multitudes of equal Forces, put an End to all Regularity of Motion, and perhaps stop it altogether.

*THIS Increase of Love* toward the *Benevolent*, according to their *nearer Approaches to ourselves* by their *Benefits*, is observable in the high Degree of *Love*, which *Heroes* and *Lawgivers* universally obtain in their own Countrys, above what they find abroad, even among those who are not insensible of their *Virtues*; and in all the strong Ties of *Friendship*, *Acquaintance*, *Neighbourhood*, *Partnership*; which are exceedingly necessary to the Order and Happiness of Human Society.

Love of  
Honour.

III. FROM considering that strong Determination in our Nature to *Gratitude*, and *Love* toward our *Benefactors*, which was already

already shewn to be *disinterested*\*; we are Sect. 5.  
 easily led to consider *another Determination*  
 of our *Minds*, equally *natural* with the *former*, which is to desire and delight in the *good Opinion* and *Love of others*, even when we expect no other *Advantage* from them, except what flows from *this Constitution*, whereby H O N O U R is made an *immediate Good*. This Desire of *Honour* I would call A M B I T I O N, had not *Custom* join'd some evil Ideas to that Word, making it denote such a *violent Desire* of *Honour*, and of *Power* also, as will make us stop at no base Means to obtain them. On the other hand, we are by N A T U R E subjected to a *grievous Sensation* of *Misery*, from the unfavourable Opinions of others concerning us, even when we dread no other *Evil* from them. This we call S H A M E; which in the same manner is constituted an *immediate Evil*, as we said *Honour* was an *immediate Good*.

N O W, were there no *moral Sense*, or had we no other Idea of Actions but as *advantageous* or *hurtful*, I see no Reason why we should be *delighted* with *Honour*, or subjected to the *Uneasiness* of *Shame*; or how it could ever happen, that a Man, who is secure from Punishment for any Action, should ever be *uneasy* at its being known to *all the World*. The *World* may have an Opinion

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\* See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6.


Sect. 5. of him as pernicious to his Neighbours; but what subjects his Ease to this Opinion of the *World*? Why, perhaps, he shall not be so much trusted henceforward in Business, and so suffer Loss. If this be the only Reason of *Shame*, and it has no *immediate Evil* or *Pain* in it, distinct from Fear of Loss, then, where-ever we expose ourselves to Loss, we should be *asham'd*, and endeavour to conceal the Action: and yet it is quite otherwise.

A MERCHANT, for Instance, lest it should impair his Credit, conceals a *Shipwreck*, or a very bad *Market*, which he has sent his Goods to. But is this the same with the Passion of SHAME? Has he that *Anguish*, that *Dejection of Mind*, and *Self-condemnation*, which one shall have whose *Treachery* is detected? Nay, how will Men sometimes glory in their Losses, when in a Cause imagin'd *morally good*, tho' they really weaken their Credit in the Merchant's Sense; that is, the Opinion of their *Wealth*, or *Fitness* for Business? Was any Man ever *asham'd* of impoverishing himself to serve his *Country*, or his *Friend*?

The Foundation of  
Morals not  
the Opinions of our  
Country.

IV. THE *Opinions* of our Country are by some made the first Standard of *Virtue*. They alledge, "That by comparing Actions  
" to them, we first distinguish between *moral Good* and *Evil*: And then, say they,  
" AMBITION,



“AMBITION, or the *Love* of HONOUR, is Sect. 5.  
 “our *chief Motive*.” But what is *Honour*? 

It is not the being universally known, no matter how. A *covetous Man* is not *honour'd* by being universally known as *covetous*; nor a *weak, selfish, or luxurious Man*, when he is known to be so: Much less can a *treacherous, cruel or ungrateful Man*, be said to be *honour'd* for his being known as such. A *Posture-master, a Fire-eater, or Practiser of Leger-de-main*, is not *honour'd* for these publick Shews, unless we consider him as a Person capable of giving the Pleasures of *Admiration and Surprize* to Multitudes. *Honour* then is *the Opinion of others concerning our morally good Actions, or Abilitys presum'd to be apply'd that way*; for *Abilitys* constantly apply'd to other Purposes, procure the greatest Infamy. Now it is certain, that *Ambition, or Love of Honour*, is really *selfish*; but then this Determination to love *Honour*, presupposes a *Sense of moral Virtue*, both in the Persons who confer the Honour, and in him who pursues it:

AND let it be observ'd, that if we knew an *Agent* had no other Motive of Action than *Ambition*, we should apprehend no Virtue even in his most useful Actions, since they flow'd not from any *Love* to others, or *Desire* to their Happiness. When *Honour* is thus constituted by NATURE pleasant to us; it may be an *additional Motive to Virtue*,

Q

as,

Sect. 5. as, we said above \*, the Pleasure arising from *Reflection on our Benevolence* was: but the Person whom we imagine *perfectly virtuous*, acts immediately from the *Love* of others; however these refin'd Interests may be *joint Motives* to him to set about such a Course of Actions, or to cultivate every *kind Inclination*, and to despise every *contrary Interest*, as giving a smaller Happiness than *Reflection* on his own Virtue, and *Consciousness* of the Esteem of others.

SHAME is in the same manner constituted an *immediate Evil*, and influences us the same way to abstain from *moral Evil*: not that any Action or Omission would appear *virtuous*, where the *sole Motive* was Fear of *Shame*.

Opinions  
flow from  
the Moral  
sense.

V. BUT to inquire farther, how far the Opinions of our Company can raise a Sense of *moral Good or Evil*: If any Opinion be universal in any Country, Men of little Reflection will probably embrace it. If an Action be believ'd to be *advantageous* to the *Agent*, we may be led to believe so too, and then *Self-Love* may make us undertake it; or may, the same way, make us shun an Action reputed *pernicious* to the *Agent*. If an Action pass for *advantageous* to the *Publick*, we may believe so too; and what next?

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\* See Sect. iii. Art. 15. Par. 2.

If we have no *disinterested Benevolence*, what Sect. 5. shall move us to undertake it? “Why, we  
 “love *Honour*; and to obtain this Pleasure,  
 “we will undertake the Action from *Self-  
 “Interest.*” Now, is *Honour* only the Opin-  
 ion of our Country, that an Action is *ad-  
 vantageous* to the *Publick*? No: we see no  
 Honour paid to the *useful Treachery* of an  
 Enemy, whom we have brib’d to our Side,  
 to *casual undesign’d Services*, or to the most  
 useful Effects of *Compulsion* on Cowards; and  
 yet we see Honour paid to *unsuccessful At-  
 tempts* to serve the Publick from sincere Love  
 to it. *Honour* then presupposes a *Sense* of  
 something *amiable* besides *Advantage*, viz.  
 a *Sense* of *Excellence* in a *publick Spirit*; and  
 therefore the *first Sense* of *moral Good* must  
 be antecedent to *Honour*; for *Honour* is  
 founded upon it\*. The Company we keep  
 may lead us, without examining, to believe  
 that certain Actions tend to the *publick Good*;  
 but that our Company *honours* such Actions,  
 and loves the *Agent*, must flow from a *Sense*  
 of *some Excellence* in this Love of the *Pub-  
 lick*, and serving its Interests.

“WE therefore, say they again, pretend  
 “to love the *Publick*, altho’ we only desire  
 “the Pleasure of *Honour*; and we will ap-

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\* THIS should be considered by those who talk much of  
 Praise, high Opinion, or Value, Esteem, Glory, as Things  
 much desired; while yet they allow no moral Sense.

Sect. 5. “ plaud all who seem to act in that manner,  
 “ either that we may reap *Advantage* from  
 “ their Actions, or that others may believe  
 “ we *really love* the *Publick*.” But shall any  
 Man ever be heartily *approved* and *admired*,  
 when we know that *Self-Love* is the only  
 Spring of his Actions? No: that is impossi-  
 ble. Or, shall we ever really admire Men  
 who appear to *love* the *Publick*, without a  
*moral Sense*? No: we could form no Idea  
 of such a Temper; and as for these Preten-  
 ders to *publick Love*, we should hate them as  
 Hypocrites, and our Rivals in Fame. Now  
 this is all which could be effected by the  
 Opinions of our Country, even supposing  
 they had a *moral Sense*, provided we had  
 none ourselves: They never could make us  
 admire *Virtue*, or *virtuous Characters* in  
 others; but could only give us Opinions of  
*Advantage* or *Disadvantage* in Actions, ac-  
 cording as they tended to procure to us the  
 Pleasures of *Honour*, or the Pain of *Shame*.

BUT if we suppose that Men have, by  
 NATURE, a *moral Sense* of *Goodness* in Ac-  
 tions; and that they are capable of *disinterest-*  
*ed Love*; all is easy. The Opinions of our  
 Company may make us rashly conclude, that  
 certain Actions tend to the universal Detri-  
 ment, and are *morally evil*, when perhaps  
 they are not so; and then *our Sense* may de-  
 termine us to have an Aversion to them, and  
 their Authors; or we may, the same way,  
 be

be led into implicit Prejudices in favour of Sect. 5. Actions as *good*; and then our Desire of *Honour* may co-operate with *Benevolence*, to move us to such Actions. But, had we no *Sense* of *moral Quality*s in Actions, nor any Conceptions of them, except as *advantageous* or *hurtful*, we never could have *honour'd* or *lov'd* Agents for *publick Love*, or had any Regard to their Actions, farther than they affected ourselves in particular. We might have form'd the metaphysical Idea of *publick Good*, but we had never desir'd it, farther than it tended to our own *private Interest*, without a Principle of *Benevolence*; nor admir'd and lov'd those who are studious of it, without a *moral Sense*. So far is *Virtue* from being (in the Language of a late \* Author) *the Offspring of Flattery, begot upon Pride*; that *Pride*, in the bad Meaning of that Word, is *the spurious-Brood of Ignorance by our moral Sense, and Flattery only an Engine, which the Cunning may use to turn this moral Sense in others, to the Purposes of Self-Love in the Flatterer.*

VI. To explain what has been said of the Power of *Honour*: Suppose a STATE or PRINCE, observing the Money which is drawn out of *England* by *Italian Musicians*, should decree *Honours, Statues, Titles, for great Musicians*: This would certainly ex-

*Moral Sense, not from Love of Honour.*

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\* Author of the Fable of the Bees, Pag. 37. 3<sup>d</sup> Ed.

Seçt. 5. cite all who had Hopes of Success, to the Study of *Musick*; and all Men would look upon the good Performers as useful Subjects, as well as very entertaining. But would this give all Men a *good Ear*, or make them delight in *Harmony*? Or could it ever make us really love a *Musician*, who study'd nothing but his own Gain, in the same manner we do a *Patriot*, or a *generous Friend*? I doubt, not. And yet *Friendship*, without the Assistance of Statues, or Honours, can make Persons appear *exceedingly amiable*.

LET us take another Instance: Suppose *Statues* and *triumphal Arches* were decreed, as well as a *large Sum of Money*, to the Discoverer of the *Longitude*, or any other useful Invention in *Mathematicks*: This would raise an universal Desire of such Knowledge from *Self-Love*; but would Men therefore love a *Mathematician*, as they do a *virtuous Man*? Would a *Mathematician* love every Person who had attain'd Perfection in that Knowledge, where-ever he observ'd it, altho' he knew that it was not accompany'd with any *Love to Mankind*, or *Study of their Good*, but with *Ill-nature, Pride, Covetousness*? In short, let us honour other Qualitys by external Shew as much as we please; if we do not discern a *benevolent Intention* in the Application, or presume upon it, we may look upon these Qualitys as useful, enriching, or otherwise advantageous to any one who

who is possess'd of them; but they shall never meet with those endearing Sentiments of *Esteem* and *Love*, which our *Nature* determines us to appropriate to *Benevolence* or *Virtue*.

LOVE of *Honour*, and Aversion to *Shame*, may often move us to do Actions, for which others profess to honour us, even tho' we see no *Good* in them ourselves: And *Compliance* with the Inclinations of others, as it evidences Humanity, may procure some Love to the *Agent*, from Spectators who see no *moral Good* in the Action itself. But without some *Sense* of *Good* in the Actions, Men shall never be fond of such Actions in Solitude, nor ever love any one for Perfection in them, or for practising them in Solitude; and much less shall they be dissatisfy'd with themselves, when they act otherwise in Solitude. Now this is the Case with us, as to *Virtue*; and therefore we must have, by NATURE, a *moral Sense* of it antecedent to *Honour*.

THIS will shew us with what Judgment a late \* Author compares the Original of our Ideas of *Virtue*, and Approbation of it, to the manner of regulating the Behaviour of awkward Children by Commendation. It

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\* See the Fable of the Bees, Page 38. 3d Ed.

Sect. 5. shall appear hereafter\*, that our Approbation of some *Gestures*, and what we call *Decency* in Motion, depends upon some *moral Ideas* in People of advanc'd Years. But before Children come to observe this Relation, it is only *good Nature*, an *Inclination* to please, and *Love of Praise*, which makes them endeavour to behave as they are desir'd; and not any Perception of *Excellence* in this Behaviour. Hence they are not solicitous about *Gestures* when alone, unless with a View to please when they return to Company; nor do they ever love or approve others for any Perfection of this kind, but rather envy or hate them; till they either discern the Connexion between *Gestures* and *moral Qualities*; or reflect on the *good Nature*, which is evidenc'd by such a Complaisance with the Desire of the Company.

*False Honour.*

VII. T H E considering *Honour* in the manner above explain'd may shew us the Reason, why Men are often *asham'd* for things which are not *vitious*, and *honour'd* for what is not *virtuous*. For, if any Action only appears *vitious* to any Persons or Company, altho' it be not so, they will have a bad Idea of the *Agent*; and then he may be *asham'd*, or suffer Uneasiness, in being thought *morally evil*. The same way, those who look upon

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\* See Sect. vi. Art. 4.



an Action as *morally good*, will honour the Sect. 5.  
*Agent*; and he may be pleas'd with the Ho-  
*nour*, altho' he does not himself perceive any  
*moral Good* in what has procur'd it.

A G A I N, we shall be *asham'd* of every *Moral In-*  
 Evidence of *moral Incapacity*, or Want of *capacity,*  
*Ability*; and with good Ground, when this *matter of*  
 Want is occasion'd by our own Negligence. *Shame.*  
 Nay farther, if any Circumstance be look'd  
 upon as *indecent* in any Country, *offensive* to  
 others, or *deform'd*; we shall, out of our  
 Desire of the good Opinions of others, be  
*asham'd* to be found in such Circumstances,  
 even when we are sensible that this Inde-  
 cency or Offence is not founded on *Nature*,  
 but is merely the Effect of *Custom*. Thus  
 being observ'd in those Functions of Nature  
 which are counted *indecent* and *offensive*, will  
 make us *uneasy*, altho' we are sensible that  
 they really do not argue any *Vice* or *Weakness*.  
 But on the contrary, since *moral Abilities* of  
 any kind, upon the general Presumption of  
 a good Application, and of having been  
 acquired by Virtue, procure the Esteem of  
 others, we shall value ourselves upon them,  
 or grow proud of them, and be *asham'd* of  
 any Discovery of our Want of such *Abilities*.  
 This is the Reason that *Wealth* and *Power*,  
 the great *Engines* of *Virtue*, when presum'd  
 to be intended for *benevolent* Purposes, either  
 toward our Friends or our Country, procure  
*Honour* from others, and are apt to beget  
*Pride*

Sect. 5. *Pride* in the *Possessor*; which, as it is a general Passion, which may be either *good* or *evil*, according as it is grounded, we may describe to be *the Joy which arises from the real or imagin'd Possession of Honour, or Claim to it*. The same are the Effects of *Knowledge, Sagacity, Strength*; and hence it is that Men are apt to boast of them.

BUT, whenever it appears that Men have only their *private Advantage* in View, in the Application of these *Abilitys, or natural Advantages*, the *Honour* ceases, and we study to conceal them, or at least are not fond of displaying them; and much more, when there is any Suspicion of an *ill-natur'd* Application. Thus some *Misers* are ashamed of their *Wealth*, and study to conceal it; as the *Malicious* or *Selfish* do their *Power*: Nay, this is very often done, where there is no positive evil Intention; because the diminishing their *Abilitys*, increases the *moral Good* of any little kind Action, which they can find in their Hearts to perform.

*Selfishness  
shameful.*

IN short, we always see Actions which flow from *publick Love*, accompany'd with generous Boldness and Openness; and not only *malicious*, but even *selfish ones*, the matter of Shame and Confusion; and that Men study to conceal them. The Love of *private Pleasure* is the ordinary Occasion of *Vice*; and when Men have got any lively Notions of

*Vir-*

*Virtue*, they generally begin to be ashamed of every thing which betrays *Selfishness*, even in Instances where it is innocent. We are apt to imagine, that others observing us in such Pursuits, form mean Opinions of us, as too much set on private Pleasure; and hence we shall find such Enjoyments, in most polite Nations, conceal'd from those who do not partake with us. Such are *venereal Pleasures* between *Persons marry'd*, and even *eating and drinking* alone, any nicer sorts of Meats or Drinks: whereas a *hospitable Table* is rather matter of boasting; and so are all other kind generous Offices between *marry'd Persons*, where there is no Suspicion of *Self-Love* in the *Agent*; but he is imagin'd as acting from Love to his *Associate*. This, I fancy, first introduc'd Ideas of *Modesty* in polite Nations, and *Custom* has strengthen'd them wonderfully; so that we are now ashamed of many things, upon some confus'd implicit Opinions of *moral Evil*, tho' we know not upon what account.

HERE too we may see the Reason, why we are not ashamed of any of the Methods of *Grandeur*, or *High-Living*. There is such a Mixture of *moral Ideas*, of *Benevolence*, of *Abilitys* kindly employ'd; so many Dependants supported, so many Friends entertain'd, assisted, protected; such a *Capacity* imagin'd for great and amiable Actions, that we are never ashamed, but rather boast of such things.

*Honour and Shame often from some Associations of Ideas.*

Sect. 5. *things.* We never affect Obscurity or Concealment, but rather desire that our *State* and *Magnificence* should be known. Were it not for this Conjunction of *moral Ideas*, no Mortal could bear the Drudgery of *State*, or abstain from laughing at those who did. Could any Man be pleas'd with a Company of *Statues* surrounding his Table, so artfully contriv'd as to consume his various Courses, and inspir'd by some Servant, like so many Puppets, to give the usual trifling Returns in Praise of their Fare? Or with so many *Machines* to perform the Cringes and Whispers of a Levee?

THE *Shame* we suffer from the Meanness of *Dress, Table, Equipage*, is intirely owing to the same Reason. This Meanness is often imagin'd to argue *Avarice, Meanness of Spirit, Want of Capacity, or Conduct* in Life, of *Industry, or moral Ability*s of one kind or other. To confirm this, let us observe that Men will glory in the Meanness of their Fare, when it was occasion'd by a *good Action*. How many would be asham'd to be surpriz'd at a Dinner of *cold Meat*, who will boast of their having fed upon *Dogs and Horses* at the Siege of *Derry*? And they will all tell you, that they were not, nor are asham'd of it.

THIS ordinary Connexion in our Imagination, between *external Grandeur, Regularity*

*rit*y in *Dress*, *Equipage*, *Retinue*, *Badges* of Sect. 5.  
*Honour*, and some *moral Abilities* greater than ordinary, is perhaps of more Consequence in the World than some *recluse Philosophers* apprehend, who pique themselves upon despising these external Shews. This may possibly be a great, if not the only Cause of what some count *miraculous*, viz. That *civil Governors* of no greater Capacity than their Neighbours, by some inexpressible *Awe* and *Authority*, quell the Spirits of the *Vulgar*, and keep them in Subjection by such small Guards, as might easily be conquer'd by those Associations which might be rais'd among the *Disaffected*, or *Factionous* of any *State*; who are daring enough among their *Equals*, and shew a sufficient Contempt of Death for undertaking such an Enterprize.

HENCE also we may discover the Reason, why the gratifying our *superior Senses* of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, or the Enjoyment of the Pleasure of *Knowledge*, never occasions any Shame or Confusion, tho' our Enjoyment were known to all the *World*. The Objects which furnish this Pleasure, are of such a Nature, as to afford the same Delights to Multitudes; nor is there any thing in the Enjoyment of them by one, which excludes any Mortal from a like Enjoyment. So that, altho' we pursue these Enjoyments from *Self-Love*, yet, since our Enjoyment cannot be prejudicial to others, no Man is imagin'd any

Sect. 5. any way *inhumanly selfish*, from the fullest Enjoyment of them which is possible. The same *Regularity* or *Harmony* which delights me, may at the same time delight Multitudes; the same *Theorem* shall be equally fruitful of Pleasure, when it has entertain'd Thousands. Men therefore are not ashamed of such Pursuits, since they never; of themselves, seduce us into any thing *malicious, envious, or ill-natur'd*; nor does any one apprehend another *too selfish*, from his pursuing Objects of unexhausted universal Pleasure\*.

THIS View of *Honour* and *Shame* may also let us see the Reason, why most Men are uneasy at being prais'd, when they themselves are present. Every one is delighted with the Esteem of others, and must enjoy great Pleasure when he hears himself commended; but we are unwilling others should observe our Enjoyment of this Pleasure, which is really *selfish*; or that they should imagine us fond of it, or influenc'd by Hopes of it in our good Actions: and therefore we choose Secrecy for the Enjoyment of it, as we do with respect to other Pleasures, in which others do not share with us.

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\* See another Reason of this, perhaps more probably true, in the *Essay on the Passions*, p. 6.

VIII. LET us next consider another Determination of our *Mind*, which strongly proves *Benevolence* to be *natural* to us, and that is COMPASSION; by which we are dispos'd to study the *Interest* of others, without any Views of *private Advantage*. This needs little Illustration. Every Mortal is made uneasy by any grievous Misery he sees another involv'd in, unless the Person be imagin'd *evil* in a *moral Sense*: Nay, it is almost impossible for us to be unmoy'd, even in that Case. *Advantage* may make us do a cruel Action, or may overcome *Pity*; but it scarce ever extinguishes it. A sudden Passion of *Hatred* or *Anger* may represent a Person as *absolutely evil*, and so extinguish *Pity*; but when the Passion is over, it often returns. Another *disinterested* View may even in cold Blood overcome *Pity*; such as *Love* to our *Country*, or *Zeal* for *Religion*. *Persecution* is generally occasion'd by *Love* of *Virtue*, and a *Desire* of the *eternal Happiness* of *Mankind*, altho' our *Folly* makes us choose absurd Means to promote it; and is often accompany'd with *Pity* enough to make the *Persecutor* uneasy, in what, for prepollent Reasons, he chooses; unless his Opinion leads him to look upon the *Heretick* as *absolutely* and *intirely evil*.

WE may here observe, how wonderfully the Constitution of *human Nature* is adapted  
to

Seçt. 5. to move *Compassion*. Our *Misery* or *Distress* immediately appears in our *Countenance*; if we do not study to prevent it, and propagates some Pain to all Spectators; who, from Observation, universally understand the Meaning of those *dismal Airs*. We *mechanically* send forth *Shrieks* and *Groans* upon any surprizing Apprehension of *Evil*; so that no Regard to Decency can sometimes restrain them. This is the Voice of NATURE, understood by all Nations, by which all who are present are rous'd to our Assistance, and sometimes our *injurious* Enemy is made to relent.

WE observ'd above \*, that we are not immediately excited by *Compassion* to desire the *Removal* of our own Pain: we think it just to be so affected upon the Occasion, and dislike those who are not so. But we are excited directly to desire the *Relief* of the Miserable; without any Imagination, that this Relief is a *private Good* to ourselves: And if we see this impossible, we may by *Reflection* discern it to be vain for us to indulge our *Compassion* any farther; and then *Self-Love* prompts us to retire from the Object which occasions our Pain, and to endeavour to divert our Thoughts. But where there is no such *Reflection*, People are hurry'd by a natu-

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\* See Seçt. ii. Art. 8. Par. 2.



*ral kind Instinct*, to see Objects of *Compassion*, Sect. 5. and expose themselves to this Pain, when they can give no Reason for it; as in the Instance of *publick Executions*.

THIS same Principle leads Men to *Tragedies*; only we are to observe, that another strong Reason of this is the *moral Beauty* of the *Characters* and *Actions*, which we love to behold. For I doubt, whether any Audience would be pleas'd to see fictitious Scenes of Misery, if they were kept Strangers to the *moral Quality*s of the Sufferers, or their *Characters* and *Actions*. As in such a Case, there would be no *Beauty* to raise Desire of seeing such Representations, I fancy we would not expose ourselves to Pain alone, from Misery which we knew to be fictitious.

IT was the same Cause which croud'd the *Roman Theatres* to see *Gladiators*. There the People had frequent Instances of great *Courage*, and *Contempt* of Death, two great *moral Ability*s, if not *Virtues*. Hence CICE-RO looks upon them as great Instructions in *Fortitude*. The *Antagonist Gladiator* bore all the Blame of the Cruelty committed, among People of little Reflection; and the *courageous* and artful one, really obtain'd a Reputation of *Virtue*, and Favour among the Spectators, and was vindicated by the Necessity of *Self-defence*. In the mean time they were inadvertent to this, that their crouding

Se&t. 5. to such Sights, and favouring the Persons who presented them with such Spectacles of Courage, and with Opportunitys of following their *natural Instinct* to *Compassion*, was the true Occasion of all the real Distress, or Assaults which they were sorry for.


WHAT Sentiments can we imagine a *Candidate* would have rais'd of himself, had he presented his Countrymen only with Scenes of *Misery*; had he drain'd *Hospitals* and *Infirmaries* of all their pityable Inhabitants, or had he bound so many *Slaves*, and without any Resistance, butcher'd them with his own Hands? I should very much question the Success of his Election, (however *Compassion* might cause his Shews still to be frequented) if his *Antagonist* chose a Diversion apparently more *virtuous*, or with a *Mixture* of Scenes of *Virtue*.

*Compassion*  
*natural.*

How independent this Disposition to *Compassion* is on *Custom*, *Education*, or *Instruction*, will appear from the Prevalence of it in *Women* and *Children*, who are less influenc'd by these. That *Children* delight in some Actions which are *cruel* and *tormenting* to Animals which they have in their Power, flows not from *Malice*, or want of *Compassion*, but from their *Ignorance* of those Signs of Pain which many Creatures make; together with a *Curiosity* to see the various Contortions of their Bodys. For when they are more acquainted

quainted with these Creatures, or come by Sect. 5.  
any means to know their Sufferings, their  
*Compassion* often becomes too strong for their  
*Reason*; as it generally does in beholding *Ex-*  
*ecutions*, where as soon as they observe the  
Evidences of Distress, or Pain in the *Male-*  
*factor*, they are apt to condemn this necessa-  
ry Method of Self-defence in the *State*.

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## S E C T. VI.

Concerning the Importance of this moral Sense to the present Happiness of Mankind, and its Influence on human Affairs.

*Importance of the Moral Sense.*

I. **I**T may now probably appear, that notwithstanding the Corruption of Manners so justly complain'd of every-where, this *moral Sense* has a greater Influence on *Mankind* than is generally imagin'd, altho' it is often directed by very partial imperfect Views of *publick Good*, and often overcome by *Self-Love*. But we shall offer some farther Considerations to prove, "That it gives us more *Pleasure* and *Pain*, than all our *other Facultys*." And to prevent Repetitions, let us observe, "That where-ever any *morally good Quality* gives *Pleasure* from *Reflection*, or from *Honour*, the contrary *evil one* will give proportionable *Pain*, from *Remorse* and *Shame*." Now we shall consider the *moral Pleasures*, not only *separately*, but as they are the *most delightful Ingredient* in the ordinary *Pleasures of Life*.

ALL MEN seem perswaded of some *Excellency* in the Possession of *good moral Qualities*, which is superior to all other Enjoymen;

ments; and on the contrary, look upon a Sect. 6.  
 State of *moral Evil*, as worse and more wretched than any other whatsoever. We must not form our Judgment in this matter from the Actions of Men; for, however they may be influenc'd by *moral Sentiments*, yet it is certain, that *self-interested Passions* frequently overcome them, and *partial Views* of the Tendency of Actions, make us do what is really *morally evil*, apprehending it to be *good*. But let us examine the Sentiments which Men universally form of the State of others, when they are no way immediately concern'd; for in these Sentiments *human Nature* is *calm* and *undisturb'd*, and shews its *true Face*.

Now should we imagine a *rational Creature* in a sufficiently happy State, whose Mind was, without *Interruption*, wholly occupy'd with pleasant Sensations of *Smell, Taste, Touch, &c.* if at the same time all other Ideas were excluded? Should we not think the State *low, mean, and sordid*, if there were no *Society, no Love or Friendship, no good Offices*? What then must that State be, wherein there are no Pleasures but those of the *external Sensès*, with such long Intervals as *human Nature* at present must have? Do these short Fits of Pleasure make the *Luxurious* happy? How *insipid* and *joyless* are the Reflections on past Pleasure! And how poor a Recompence is the Return of the transient

R 3                      Sensation,

Seēt. 6. Sensation, for the *nauseous Satiety*, and *Languors* in the Intervals! This *Frame* of our *Nature*, so incapable of long Enjoyments of the *external Senses*, points out to us, “ That  
 “ there must be some other more *durable*  
 “ *Pleasure*, without such *tedious Interrup-*  
 “ *tions*, and *nauseous Reflections*.”

LET us even join with the Pleasures of the *external Senses*, the Perceptions of *Beauty*, *Order*, *Harmony*. These are, no doubt, more *noble Pleasures*, and seem to enlarge the *Mind*; and yet how *cold* and *joyless* are they, if there be no *moral Pleasures* of *Friendship*, *Love* and *Beneficence*! Now, if the bare Absence of *moral Good* makes, in our Judgment, the State of a rational Agent contemptible; the Presence of *contrary Dispositions* is always imagin'd by us to sink him into a degree of *Misery*, from which no other Pleasures can relieve him. Would we ever wish to be in the same Condition with a *wrathful*, *malicious*, *revengeful*, or *envious Being*, tho' we were at the same time to enjoy all the Pleasures of the *external* and *internal Senses*? The internal Pleasures of *Beauty* and *Harmony* contribute greatly indeed toward soothing the Mind into a Forgetfulness of *Wrath*, *Malice* or *Revenge*; and they must do so, before we can have any tolerable *Delight* or *Enjoyment*: for while *these Affections* possess the Mind, there is nothing but *Torment* and *Misery*.

WHAT

WHAT *Castle-builder*, who forms to himself imaginary Scenes of Life, in which he thinks he should be happy, ever made *Castle-builders* *prove it* *knowledg'd Treachery, Cruelty, or Ingratitude*, the Steps by which he mounted to his wish'd-for Elevation, or Parts of his Character, when he had attain'd it? We always conduct ourselves in such Resveries, according to the Dictates of *Honour, Faith, Generosity, Courage*; and the lowest we can sink, is hoping we may be enrich'd by some innocent Accident.

O *si urnam Argenti Fors qua mibi monstret* \* ! —

But *Labour, Hunger, Thirst, Poverty, Pain, Danger*, have nothing so detestable in them, that our *Self-Love* cannot allow us to be often expos'd to them. On the contrary, the Virtues which these give us Occasions of displaying, are so amiable and excellent, that scarce ever is any imaginary Hero, in *Romance* or *Epic*, brought to his highest Pitch of Happiness, without going thro' them *all*. Where there is no *Virtue*, there is nothing worth Desire or Contemplation; the *Romance* or *Epos* must end. Nay, the *Difficulty* †, or *natural Evil*, does so much increase the *Vir-*

\* Hor. Lib. 2. Sat. 6. ver. 10.

† Sect. iii. Art. 11. Axiom 6.

Sec̄t. 6. *tue* of the good Action which it accompanys, that we cannot easily sustain these Works after the Distress is over; and if we continue the Work, it must be by presenting a new Scene of *Benevolence*, in a prosperous Fortune. A Scene of *external Prosperity* or *natural Good*, without any thing *moral* or *virtuous*, cannot entertain a Person of the dullest Imagination, had he ever so much interested himself in the Fortunes of his Hero; for where *Virtue* ceases, there remains nothing worth wishing to our Favourite, or which we can be delighted to view his Possession of, when we are most studious of his Happiness.

*Virtue  
own'd su-  
perior to  
all Plea-  
sure.*

LET us take a particular Instance, to try how much we prefer the Possession of *Virtue* to all other Enjoyments, and how we look upon *Vice* as worse than any other Misery. Who could ever read the History of REGULUS, as related by CICERO, and some others, without concerning himself in the Fortunes of that gallant Man, sorrowing at his Sufferings, and wishing him a better Fate? But how better a Fate? Should he have comply'd with the Terms of the CARTHAGINIANS, and preserv'd himself from the intended Tortures, tho' to the Detriment of his Country? Or should he have violated his plighted Faith, and Promise of returning? Will any Man say, that either of these is the better Fate he wishes his Favourite? Had he acted thus, *that* *Virtue* would



would have been gone, which interests every Sect. 6. one in his Fortunes. — “ Let him take his Fate like other common Mortals.” —

What else do we wish then, but that the CARTHAGINIANS had relented of their Cruelty, or that PROVIDENCE, by some unexpected Event, had rescued him out of their Hands?

N O W may not this teach us, that we are indeed determin'd to judge *Virtue* with Peace and Safety, preferable to *Virtue* with Distress; but that at the same time we look upon the State of the *Virtuous*, the *Publick-spirited*, even in the utmost natural Distress, as preferable to all Affluence of other Enjoyments? For this is what we choose to have our Favourite Hero in, notwithstanding all its Pains, and natural Evils. We should never have imagin'd him happier, had he acted otherwise; or thought him in a more eligible State, with Liberty and Safety, at the Expence of his *Virtue*. We secretly judge the Purchase too dear; and therefore we never imagine he acted foolishly in securing his *Virtue*, his *Honour*, at the Expence of his *Ease*, his *Pleasure*, his *Life*. Nor can we think these *latter* Enjoyments worth the keeping, when the former are intirely lost.

II. LET us in the same manner examine our Sentiments of the Happiness of others in common Life. WEALTH and EXTER-

N A L

SECT. 6. NAL PLEASURES bear no small bulk in our Imaginations; but does there not always accompany this Opinion of Happiness in *Wealth*, some suppos'd *beneficent Intention* of doing good Offices to Persons dear to us, at least to our *Familys* or *Kinsmen*? And in our imagin'd Happiness from *external Pleasure*, are not some Ideas always included of some *moral Enjoyments* of *Society*, some *Communication* of Pleasure, something of *Love*, of *Friendship*, of *Esteem*, of *Gratitude*? Who ever pretended to a *Taste* of these Pleasures without *Society*? Or if any seem violent in Pursuit of them, how *base* and *contemptible* do they appear to all Persons, even to those who could have no Expectation of Advantage from their having a more generous Notion of Pleasure?

Now, were there no *moral Sense*, no Happiness in *Benevolence*, and did we act from no other Principle than *Self-Love*; sure there is no Pleasure of the external Senses, which we could not enjoy alone, with less Trouble and Expence than in *Society*. But a *Mixture* of the *moral Pleasures* is what gives the *alluring Relish*; 'tis some Appearance of *Friendship*, of *Love*, of *communicating Pleasure* to others, which preserves the Pleasures of the *Luxurious* from being *nauseous* and *insipid*. And this partial Imagination of some *good moral Qualitys*, some *Benevolence*, in Actions which have many *cruel, inhuman,* and

and *destructive* Consequences toward others, Sect. 6. is what has kept *Vice* more in Countenance than any other Consideration\*.

BUT to convince us farther wherein the Happiness of *Wealth*, and *external Pleasure* lies; let us but suppose *Malice*, *Wrath*, *Revenge*; or only *Solitude*, Absence of *Friendship*, of *Love*, of *Society*, of *Esteem*, join'd with the Possession of them; and all the Happiness vanishes like a Dream. And yet *Love*, *Friendship*, *Society*, *Humanity*, tho' accompany'd with *Poverty* and *Toil*, nay even with smaller degrees of *Pain*, such as do not wholly occupy the Mind, are not only the Object of Love from others, but even of a sort of Emulation: which plainly shews, "That *Virtue* is the chief *Happiness* in the Judgment of *all Mankind*."

III. THERE is a farther Consideration The Charm in Beauty. which must not be pass'd over, concerning the EXTERNAL BEAUTY of Persons, which all allow to have a great Power over human Minds. Now it is some apprehended *Morality*, some natural or imagin'd Indication of *concomitant Virtue*, which gives it this powerful Charm above all other kinds of *Beauty*. Let us consider the Characters of *Beauty*, which are commonly admir'd in Countenances, and we shall find them to be

\* See above, Sect. iv. Art. 4 Par. 4, 5.

Seçt. 6. *Sweetness, Mildness, Majesty, Dignity, Vivacity, Humility, Tenderness, Good-nature*; that is, that certain *Airs, Proportions, je ne scay quoy's*, are natural Indications of such Virtues, or of Abilitys or Dispositions toward them. As we observ'd above\* of *Misery* or *Distress* appearing in Countenances; so it is certain, almost all *habitual Dispositions* of *Mind* form the Countenance in such a manner, as to give some Indications of them to the Spectator. Our *violent Passions* are obvious at first View in the Countenance; so that sometimes no Art can conceal them: and smaller Degrees of them give some less obvious Turns to the Face, which an accurate Eye will observe. Now, when the *natural Air* of a Face approaches to that which any Passion would form it unto, we make a Conjecture from this concerning the *leading Disposition* of the Person's *Mind*.

As to those Fancys which prevail in certain Countrys toward *large Lips, little Noses, narrow Eyes*; unless we knew from themselves under what Idea such Features are admir'd, whether as *naturally beautiful* in Form, or Proportion to the rest of the Face; or as presum'd Indications of some *moral Quality*s; we may more probably conclude that it is the *latter*; since this is so much the Ground of Approbation or Aversion towards

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\* See *Seçt. v. Art. 8. Par. 2.*

Faces among ourselves. And as to those Sect. 6. Features which we count *naturally disagreeable* as to Form, we know the Aversion on this Account is so weak, that *moral Qualities* shall procure a Liking even to the Face, in Persons who are sensible of the *Irregularity*, or Want of that *Regularity* which is common in others. With us, certain Features are imagin'd to denote *Dullness*; as *hollow Eyes, large Lips*; a *Colour* of Hair, *Wantonness*: and may we not conclude the like *Association of Ideas*, perhaps in both Cases without Foundation in *Nature*, to be the Ground of those Approbations which appear unaccountable to us?

IN the same manner, when there is nothing *grossly* disproportion'd in any Face, what is it we dispraise? Is it *Pride, Haughtiness, Sourness, Ill-nature, Discontent, Folly, Levity, Wantonness*; which some Countenances discover in the manner above hinted at? And *these Airs*, when brought by Custom upon the most *regular Set* of Features, have often made them very disagreeable; as the *contrary Airs* have given the strongest Charms to Countenances, which were far from Perfection in *external Beauty*.

ONE cannot but observe the Judgment of HOMER, in his Character of HELEN. Had he ever so much rais'd our Idea of her *external Beauty*, it would have been ridiculous

Se<sup>ct.</sup> 6. lous to have engag'd his Countrymen in a  
 ~~~~~ War for such a H E L E N as V I R G I L has  
 drawn her. He therefore still retains some-  
 thing amiable in a *moral Sense*, amidst all her  
 Weakness, and often suggests to his Reader,

— Ἐλένης ὀργήμαλά τε σοναχάς τε\*,

as the Spring of his Countrymens Indigna-  
 tion and Revenge.

*The Cause  
 of different  
 Fancies of  
 Beauty.*

T H I S Consideration may shew us one  
 Reason, among many others, for Mens *dif-*  
*ferent Fancies*, or *Relishes of Beauty*. The  
 Mind of Man, however generally dispos'd  
 to esteem *Benevolence* and *Virtue*, yet by more  
 particular Attention to some kinds of it than  
 others, may gain a stronger Admiration of  
 some *moral Dispositions* than others. *Mili-*  
*tary Men* may admire *Courage* more than  
 other Virtues; Persons of *smaller Courage*,  
 may admire *Sweetness of Temper*; Men of  
*Thought and Reflection*, who have more ex-  
 tensive Views, will admire the *like Qualities*  
 in others; Men of *keen Passions* expect equal  
 Returns of all the kind Affections, and are  
 wonderfully charm'd by *Compliance*: the  
*Proud* may like those of *higher Spirit*, as  
 more suitable to their Dignity; tho' *Pride*,  
 join'd with *Reflection*, and *good Sense*, will re-  
 commend to them *Humility*, in the Person be-  
 lov'd. Now as the *various Tempers* of Men

\* See Homer, *Iliad* 2. ver. 356, 590.

make *various* Tempers of others agreeable to Sect. 6. them, so they must differ in their *Relishes* of *Beauty*, according as it denotes the several Qualitys most agreeable to themselves.

THIS may also shew us, how, in *virtuous Love*, there may be the greatest Beauty, without the least Charm to engage a Rival. *Love* itself gives a Beauty to the *Lover*, in the Eyes of the Person *belov'd*, which no other Mortal is much affected with. And this perhaps is the *strongest Charm* possible, and that which will have the greatest Power, where there is not some very great Counterbalance from *worldly Interest*, *Vice*, or *gross Deformity*.

IV. THIS same Consideration may be extended to the whole AIR and MOTION of any Person. Every thing we count agreeable, some way denotes *Chearfulness*, *Ease*, a *Condescension*, and *Readiness* to oblige, a *Love* of *Company*, with a *Freedom* and *Boldness* which always accompanys an *honest*, *undesigned* *Heart*. On the contrary, what is shocking in *Air* or *Motion*, is *Roughness*, *Ill-nature*, a *Disregard* to others, or a *foolish Shame-facedness*, which evidences a Person to be un-experienc'd in Society, or Offices of Humanity.

WITH relation to these *Airs*, *Motions*, *Gestures*, we may observe, that considering the

Seçt. 6. the different *Ceremonys* and *Modes* of shewing Respect, which are practis'd in different Nations, we may indeed probably conclude, that there is no *natural* Connection between any of these *Gestures* or *Motions*, and the *Affections* of *Mind* which they are by *Custom* made to express. But when *Custom* has made any of them pass for Expressions of *such Affections*, by a constant *Association* of Ideas, some shall become *agreeable* and *lovely*, and others *extremely offensive*, altho' they were both, in their own Nature, *perfectly indifferent*.

*The Spring  
of Love be-  
tween the  
Sexes.*

V. HERE we may remark the Manner in which NATURE leads *Mankind* to the Continuance of their Race, and by its strongest Power engages them to what occasions the greatest Toil and Anxiety of Life; and yet supports them under it with an inexpressible Delight. We might have been excited to the Propagation of our Species, by such an uneasy Sensation as would have effectually determin'd us to it, without any great Prospect of Happiness; as we see *Hunger* and *Thirst* determine us to preserve our Bodies, tho' few look upon eating and drinking as any considerable Happiness. The *Sexes* might have been engag'd to Concurrence, as we imagine the *Brutes* are, by *Desire* only, or by a *Love* of *sensual Pleasure*. But how dull and insipid had Life been, were there no more in MARRIAGE! Who would have had Resolution enough to  
bear



bear all the Cares of a *Family*, and Education of *Children*? Or who, from the general Motive of *Benevolence* alone, would have chosen to subject himself to *natural Affection* toward an *Offspring*, when he could so easily foresee what Troubles it might occasion? Sect. 6.

THIS Inclination therefore of the *Sexes*, is founded on something stronger, and more efficacious and joyful, than the Solicitations of *Uneasiness*, or the bare *Desire* of *sensible Pleasure*. BEAUTY gives a favourable *Presumption* of *good Moral Dispositions*, and *Acquaintance* confirms this into a real *Love* of *Esteem*, or begets it, where there is little *Beauty*. This raises an *Expectation* of the greatest *moral Pleasures* along with the *sensible*, and a thousand tender *Sentiments* of *Humanity* and *Generosity*; and makes us impatient for a *Society* which we imagine big with unspeakable *moral Pleasures*: where nothing is indifferent, and every trifling *Service*, being an *Evidence* of *this strong Love* and *Esteem*, is mutually receiv'd with the *Rapture* and *Gratitude* of the greatest *Benefit*, and of the most substantial *Obligation*; and where *Prudence* and *Good-nature* influence both *Sides*, this *Society* may answer all their *Expectations*.

NAY, let us examine those of looser Conduct with relation to the *fair Sex*, and we shall find, that *Love* of *sensible Pleasure* is not

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the

Sect. 6. the chief Motive of *Debauchery*, or *false Gallantry*. Were it so, the *meanest Prostitutes* would please as much as any. But we know sufficiently, that Men are fond of *Good-nature, Faith, Pleasantry of Temper, Wit*, and many other *moral Qualities*, even in a *Mistress*. And this may furnish us with a Reason for what appears pretty unaccountable, *viz.* “ That *Chastity* itself has a powerful Charm “ in the Eyes of the *Dissolute*, even when “ they are attempting to destroy it.”

THIS powerful Determination even to a *limited Benevolence*, and other *moral Sentiments*, is observ'd to give a strong Bias to our Minds towards a *universal Goodness, Tenderness, Humanity, Generosity*, and *Contempt of private Good* in our whole Conduct; besides the obvious Improvement it occasions in our *external Deportment*, and in our Relish of *Beauty, Order, and Harmony*. As soon as a Heart, before *hard and obdurate*, is soften'd in this Flame, we shall observe, arising along with it, a Love of *Poetry, Music*, the *Beauty of Nature* in rural Scenes, a *Contempt of other selfish Pleasures of the external Senses*, a *neat Dress, a humane Deportment, a Delight in, and Emulation of*, every thing which is *gallant, generous, and friendly*.

Society,  
Friend-  
ships, from  
our Moral  
Sense.

IN the same manner we are determin'd to common Friendships and Acquaintances, not by the sullen Apprehensions of our *Necessities*,

or

or Prospects of *Interest*; but by an incredible Sect. 6° Variety of little, agreeable, engaging Evidences of *Love, Good-nature,* and other *morally, amiable Qualitys* in those we converse with. Among the rest, none of the least considerable is an Inclination to *Cbearfulness,* a *Delight* to raise *Mirth* in others, which procures a secret Approbation and Gratitude toward the Person who puts us in such an agreeable, innocent, good-natur'd, and easy State of Mind, as we are conscious of, while we enjoy pleasant Conversation, enliven'd by moderate *Laughter.*

VI. UPON this *moral* Sense is founded all The Power of Oratory founded on the Power of the ORATOR. The various it. Figures of Speech are the several Manners, which a lively Genious, warm'd with Passions suitable to the Occasion, naturally runs into, only a little diversify'd by *Custom*: and they only move the *Hearers*, by giving a lively Representation of the Passions of the *Speaker*; which are communicated to the *Hearers*, as we \* observ'd above of one Passion, viz. *Pity.*


Now the Passions which the *Orator* attempts to raise, are all founded on *moral Qualitys*. All the bold *Metaphors,* or *Descriptions,* all the artificial Manners of *Expostulation,* *Arguing,* and *Addressing* the *Audience,* all the

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\* See Sect. v. Art. 8. Par. 2.

Se&t. 6. *Appeals to Mankind*, are but more lively Methods of giving the *Audience* a stronger Impression of the *moral Qualities* of the Person *accus'd* or *defended*; of the *Action advis'd*, or *dissuaded*: And all the *Antitheses*, or *Witticisms*; all the *Cadences* of sonorous Periods, whatever inferior kind of Beauty they may have separately, are of no Consequence to persuade, if we neglect moving the Passions by some Species of *Morality*. They may perhaps raise a little *Admiration* of the *Speaker*, among those who already favour his Party, but they oftener raise *Contempt* in his *Adversarys*. But when you display the *Beneficence* of any *Action*, the *good Effect* it shall have on the *Public* in promoting the *Welfare* of the *Innocent*, and relieving the *unjustly Distressed*; if you prove your *Allegations*, you make every *Mortal* approve the undertaking it. When any Person is to be *recommended*, display his *Humanity*, *Generosity*, *Study* of the *publick Good*, and *Capacity* to promote it, his *Contempt* of *Dangers*, and private *Pleasures*; and you are sure to procure him *Love* and *Esteem*. If at the same time you shew his *Distress*, or the *Injury*s he has suffer'd, you raise *Pity*, and every *tender Affection*.

ON the contrary, represent the *Barbarity*, or *Cruelty* of any *Action*, the *Misery* it shall procure to the *Kind*, the *Faithful*, the *Generous*, or only to the *Innocent*; and you raise an *Abhorrence* of it in the *Breasts* of the *Audience*,

dience, tho' they were not the Persons who Sect. 6.  
 would have suffer'd by it. The same way,   
 would you make a Person *infamous*, and *de-*  
*spis'd* and *bated*, represent him as *cruel*, *inhu-*  
*man*, or *treacherous* toward the most distant  
 rational Agents; or shew him only to be  
*selfish*, and given to *solitary Luxury*, without  
 regard to any *Friend*, or the *Interest* of  
 others; and you have gain'd your Point, as  
 soon as you prove what you alledge. Nay,  
 how does it stop our Admiration of any *cele-*  
*brated* Action, to suggest, "That the *Author*  
 " of it was no Fool; he knew it would  
 " turn to his own *Advantage!*"

N o w, are the *Learned* and *Polite* the only  
 Persons who are mov'd by such Speeches?  
 Must Men know the Schemes of the *Mora-*  
*lists* and *Politicians*, or the *Art* of *Rhetoric*,  
 to be capable of being persuaded? Must they  
 be nicely conversant in all the Methods of  
 promoting *Self-Interest*? Nay, do we not see  
 on the contrary, the *rude undisciplin'd Mul-*  
*titude* most affected? Where had *Oratory*  
 so much Power as in *popular States*, and that  
 too before the Perfection of the Sciences?  
*Reflection* and *Study* may raise in Men a  
 Suspicion of Design, and Caution of Assent,  
 when they have some Knowledge of the va-  
 rious Topicks of Argument, and find them  
 employ'd upon themselves: but *rude Nature*  
 is still open to every *moral* Impression, and  
 carry'd furiously along without Caution, or

Sect. 6. Suspense. It was not the *Groves* of the *Academy*, or the *polish'd Stones* of the *Portico*, or the *manag'd Horses* of G R E E C E, which listen'd to the Harp of an A M P H I O N, or an O R P H E U S; but the *Trees*, and *Rocks*, and *Tygers* of the *Forest*: which may shew us,  
 “ That there is some *Sense* of *Morality* ante-  
 “ cedent to Instruction, or metaphysical Ar-  
 “ guments proving the *private Interest* of the  
 “ Person who is persuaded, to be connected  
 “ with the *publick Good*.”

Poetry  
 pleases  
 from this  
 Moral  
 Sense.

VII. WE shall find this *Sense* to be the Foundation also of the chief Pleasures of P O E T R Y. We hinted, in the former Treatise, at the Foundation of Delight in the *Numbers*, *Measures*, *Metaphors*, *Similitudes*\*. But as the Contemplation of *moral Objects*, either of *Vice* or *Virtue*, affects us more strongly, and moves our Passions in a quite different and a more powerful manner, than *natural Beauty*, or (what we commonly call) *Deformity*; so the most moving Beautys bear a Relation to our *moral Sense*, and affect us more vehemently, than the Representations of *natural Objects* in the liveliest Descriptions. *Dramatic* and *Epic* Poetry are intirely address'd to this *Sense*, and raise our Passions by the Fortunes of *Characters*, distinctly represented as *morally good* or *evil*; as might be

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\* See Treatise I. Sect. ii. Art. 13. Sect. iv. Art. 3.

seen more fully, were we to consider the Sect. 6.  
 Passions separately.

WHERE we are studying to raise any *Desire*, or *Admiration* of an Object really beautiful, we are not content with a bare *Narration*, but endeavour, if we can, to present the Object itself, or the most *lively Image* of it. And hence the *Epic Poem*, or *Tragedy*, gives a far greater Pleasure than the Writings of *Philosophers*, tho' both aim at recommending *Virtue*. The representing the Actions themselves, if the Representation be *judicious*, *natural*, and *lively*, will make us admire the *Good*, and detest the *Vitious*, the *Inhuman*, the *Treacherous* and *Cruel*, by means of our *moral Sense*, without any Reflections of the *Poet* to guide our Sentiments. It is for this Reason that HORACE has justly made Knowledge in *Morals* so necessary to a good *Poet*:

*Scribendi recte SAPIERE est & principium  
 & fons\*.*

And again:

*Qui didicit Patriæ quid debeat, & quid  
 Amicis,  
 Quo sit amore Parens, quo Frater amandus,  
 & Hospes,*

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\* Hor. de Arte Poet. ver. 309.

Sect. 6. *Quod sit Conscripti, quod Judicis officium, quæ  
Partes in bellum missi Ducis; ille profecto  
Reddere Personæ scit convenientia cuique*\*

*Imagery  
in Poetry  
founded on  
the Moral  
Sense.*

UPON this same Sense is founded the Power of that great Beauty in Poetry, the PROSOPOPOEIA, by which every Affection is made a Person; every natural Event, Cause, Object, is animated by moral Epithets. For we join the Contemplation of moral Circumstances and Qualitys, along with natural Objects, to increase their Beauty or Deformity; and we affect the Hearer in a more lively manner with the Affections describ'd, by representing them as Persons. Thus a shady Wood must have its solemn venerable Genius, and proper rural Gods; every clear Fountain, its sacred chaste Nymph; and River, its bountiful God, with his Urn, and perhaps a Cornucopiæ diffusing Plenty and Fruitfulness along its Banks. The Day-light is holy, beneign, and powerful to banish the pernicious Spirits of the Night. The Morning is a kind officious Goddess, tripping over the dewy Mountains, and ushering in Light to Gods and Men. War is an impetuous, cruel, undistinguishing Monster, whom no Virtue, no Circumstance of Compassion, can move from his bloody Purposes. The Steel is unrelenting; the Arrow and Spear are impatient to

\* Hor. de Arte Poet. ver. 312, &c.



destroy, and carry *Death* on their Points. Sect. 6. Our modern Engines of War are also *frightful Personages*, counterfeiting with their rude Throats the Thunder of J O V E. The *moral Imagery* of *Death* is every-where known, viz. his *Insensibility* to *Pity*, his *Inflexibility*, and *universal impartial Empire*. FORTUNE is inimitably drawn by HORACE\*, with all her *Retinue* and *Votarys*, and with her *rigid severe Minister*, *Necessity*. The *Qualitys* of *Mind* too become *Persons*. *Love* becomes a VENUS, or a CUPID; *Courage*, or *Conduct*, a MARS, or a PALLAS, *protecting* and *assisting* the Hero; before them march *Terror* and *Dread*, *Flight* and *Pursuit*, *Shouts* and *Amazement*. Nay, the *most sacred Poets* are often led into this *Imagery*, and represent *Justice* and *Judgment*, as *supporting* the ALMIGHTY'S Throne, and *Mercy* and *Truth* going before his Face: They shew us *Peace* as *springing* up from the Earth, and *Mercy* looking down from Heaven.

EVERY one perceives a greater Beauty in this manner of Representation, this Imagery, this Conjunction of *moral Ideas*, than in the fullest Narration, or the most lively natural Description. When one reads the fourth Book of HOMER, and is prepar'd, from the Council of the *Gods*, to imagine the bloody Sequel, and amidst the most beau-

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\* See *Lib. i. Od. 35*,

Sect. 6. tiful Description which ever was imagin'd of  
 shooting an Arrow, meets with its *moral Epithet*,

————— μελαινάων ἐξ μ' ὀδυνάων\*,  
 ————— *The Source of blackest Woes;*

he will find himself more mov'd by this Circumstance, than by all the Profusion of natural Description which Man could imagine.

*History.*

VIII. HISTORY derives its chief Excellence from the representing the *Manners* and *Charaēters*; the Contemplation of which in *Nature* being very affecting, they must necessarily give Pleasure, when well related.

*Painting.*

IX. IT is well known too, that a Collection of the best Pieces of *Face-painting* is but a poor Entertainment, when compar'd with those Pieces which represent *moral Aētions*, *Passions*, and *Charaēters*.

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\* See Homer, *Iliad* iv. ver. 117.



## S E C T. VII.

*A Deduction of some Complex moral Ideas; viz. of Obligation, and Right, Perfect, Imperfect, and External, Alienable, and Unalienable, from this moral Sense.*

I. **T**O conclude this Subject, we may, from what has been said, see the *true Original of moral Ideas, viz. This moral Sense of Excellence in every Appearance, or Evidence of Benevolence.* It remains to be explain'd, how we acquire more particular Ideas of *Virtue* and *Vice*, abstracting from any *Law, Human, or Divine.*

IF any one ask, Can we have any Sense of *Obligation*: OBLIGATION, abstracting from the *Laws of a Superior*? We must answer according to the various Senses of the Word *Obligation*. If by *Obligation* we understand a *Determination, without regard to our own Interest, to approve Actions, and to perform them; which Determination shall also make us displeas'd with ourselves, and uneasy upon having acted contrary to it:* in this Meaning of the word *Obligation*, there is naturally an *Obligation* upon all Men to *Benevolence*; and they are still under

Sect. 7. under its Influence, even when by false, or partial Opinions of the natural Tendency of their Actions, this *moral Sense* leads them to *Evil*; unless by long inveterate Habits it be exceedingly weaken'd; for it scarce seems possible wholly to extinguish it. Or, which is to the same Purpose, this *internal Sense*, and *Instinct* of *Benevolence*, will either influence our Actions, or make us very uneasy and dissatisfy'd; and we shall be conscious, that we are in a base unhappy State, even without considering any *Law* whatsoever, or any external Advantages lost, or Disadvantages impending from its Sanctions. And farther, there are still such Indications given us of what is in the whole *beneficent*, and what not, as may probably discover to us the true Tendency of every Action; and let us see, some time or other, the evil Tendency of what upon a partial View appear'd *good*: or if we have no Friends so faithful as to admonish us, the Persons injur'd will not fail to upbraid us. So that no Mortal can secure to himself a perpetual Serenity, Satisfaction, and Self-approbation, but by a *serious Inquiry* into the Tendency of his Actions, and a *perpetual Study* of *universal Good*, according to the justest Notions of it.

BUT if, by *Obligation*, we understand a *Motive from Self-Interest*, sufficient to determine all those who duly consider it, and pursue their own Advantage wisely, to a certain Course

*Course of Actions*; we may have a Sense of Sect. 7. such an *Obligation*, by reflecting on this *Determination* of our *Nature* to approve *Virtue*, to be pleas'd and happy when we reflect upon our having done *virtuous Actions*, and to be uneasy when we are conscious of having acted otherwise; and also by considering how much superior we esteem the Happiness of *Virtue* to any other Enjoyment \*. We may likewise have a Sense of this sort of *Obligation*, by considering those Reasons which prove a constant Course of *benevolent* and *social Actions*, to be the most probable Means of promoting the *natural Good* of every *Individual*; as CUMBERLAND and PUFENDORF have prov'd: And all this without Relation to a *Law*.

BUT farther, if our *moral Sense* be suppos'd exceedingly weakened, and the *selfish Passions* grown strong, either thro' some general Corruption of Nature, or inveterate Habits; if our *Understanding* be weak, and we be often in danger of being hurry'd by our *Passions* into precipitate and rash Judgments, that *malicious Actions* shall promote our Advantage more than *Beneficence*; in such a Case, if it be inquir'd what is necessary to engage Men to *beneficent Actions*, or induce a steady Sense of an *Obligation* to act for the *public Good*; then, no doubt, " A *Law* with Sanctions,

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\* See above, Sect. vi. Art. 1, 2.

Se<sup>c</sup>t. 7. “ given by a *superior Being*, of sufficient  
 “ Power to make us happy or miserable,  
 “ must be necessary to counterbalance those  
 “ apparent Motives of *Interest*, to calm our  
 “ *Passions*, and give room for the Recovery  
 “ of our *moral Sense*, or at least for a just  
 “ View of our *Interest*.”

How far  
 Virtue can  
 be taught.

II. Now the principal Business of the *mo-  
 ral Philosopher* is to shew, from solid Reasons,  
 “ That *universal Benevolence* tends to the  
 “ Happiness of the *Benevolent*, either from  
 “ the Pleasures of *Reflection, Honour, natural*  
 “ *Tendency* to engage the good Offices of  
 “ Men, upon whose Aid we must depend for  
 “ our Happiness in this World; or from the  
 “ Sanctions of *divine Laws* discover'd to us  
 “ by the Constitution of the *Universe* ;” that  
 so no apparent Views of *Interest* may counter-  
 act this *natural Inclination*: but not to at-  
 tempt proving, “ That Prospects of our *own*  
 “ *Advantage* of any kind can raise in us the  
 “ *virtuous Benevolence* toward others.” Let  
 the Obstacles from *Self-Love* be only remov'd,  
 and NATURE itself will incline us to *Be-  
 nevolence*. Let the Misery of *excessive Self-  
 ishness*, and all its *Passions*, be but once  
 explain'd, that so *Self-Love* may cease to  
 counteract our *natural Propensity* to *Be-  
 nevolence*; and when this *noble Disposition* gets  
 loose from these Bonds of *Ignorance*, and false  
 Views of *Interest*, it shall be assisted even by  
*Self-Love*, and grow strong enough to make

a noble virtuous Character. Then he is to Sect. 7. inquire, by *Reflection* upon human Affairs, what Course of Action does most effectually promote the *universal Good*, what universal Rules or Maxims are to be observ'd, and in what Circumstances the Reason of them alters, so as to admit Exceptions; that so our good Inclinations may be directed by Reason, and a just Knowledge of the *Interests* of Mankind. But *Virtue* itself, or good *Dispositions* of Mind, are not directly taught, or produc'd by *Instruction*; they must be originally implanted in our Nature by its great AUTHOR, and afterwards strengthen'd and confirm'd by our own Cultivation.


III. WE are often told, "That there is *Objection.*  
 " no Need of supposing such a *Sense* of Mo-  
 " rality given to Men, since *Reflection* and  
 " *Instruction* would recommend the same  
 " Actions from Arguments of *Self-Interest*,  
 " and engage us, from the acknowledg'd  
 " Principle of *Self-Love*, to the Practice of  
 " them, without this *unintelligible Determi-*  
 " *nation* to *Benevolence*, or the *occult Qua-*  
 " *lity* of a *moral Sense*."

IT is perhaps true, that *Reflection*, and *Moral*  
*Reason* might lead us to approve the same *Sense, not*  
 Actions as *advantageous*. But would not the *from Re-*  
 same *Reflection* and *Reason* likewise general-  
 ly recommend the same *Meats* to us, which  
 our

Se&t. 7. our *Taste* represents as pleasant? And shall we thence conclude, that we have no *Sense* of *Tasting*, or that such a *Sense* is *useless*? No: The Use is plain in both Cases. Notwithstanding the mighty *Reason* we boast of above other Animals, its Processes are too slow, too full of Doubt and Hesitation, to serve us in every Exigency, either for our own Preservation, without the *external Senses*, or to influence our Actions for the *Good* of the *Whole*, without this *moral Sense*. Nor could we be so strongly determin'd at all times to what is most conducive to either of these Ends, without these *expeditious Monitors*, and *importunate Solicitors*; nor so nobly rewarded, when we act vigorously in Pursuit of these Ends, by the calm dull Reflections of *Self-Interest*, as by those delightful Sensations.

THIS *natural Determination* to approve and admire, or hate and dislike Actions, is, no doubt, an *occult Quality*. But is it any way more mysterious, that the Idea of an Action should raise *Esteem* or *Contempt*, than that the Motion or tearing of *Flesh* should give *Pleasure* or *Pain*; or the Act of Volition should move *Flesh* and *Bones*? In the latter Case, we have got the Brain, and elastic Fibres, and animal Spirits, and elastic Fluids, like the *Indian's* Elephant,



Elephant, and Tortoise, to bear the Burden Sect. 7.  
of the Difficulty: but go one Step farther,   
and you find the whole as difficult as at first,  
and equally a Mystery with *this Determination*  
to love and approve, or condemn and  
despise *Actions* and *Agents*, without any  
Views of *Interest*, as they appear *benevolent*,  
or the contrary.


WHEN they offer it as a Presumption  
that there can be no such *Sense*, antecedent  
to all Prospect of *Interest*, "That these Ac-  
" tions for the most part are really *advan-*  
" *tageous*, one way or other, to the *Actor*,  
" the *Approver*, or *Mankind* in general, by  
" whose Happiness our own State may be  
" some way made better;" may we not ask,  
supposing the DEITY intended to impress  
such a *Sense* of something *amiable* in Acti-  
ons, (which is no impossible Supposition)  
What sort of Actions would a good GOD de-  
termine to *approve*? Must we deny the Pos-  
sibility of such a Determination, if it did  
not lead us to admire Actions of no *Advant-*  
*age* to *Mankind*, or to love *Agents* for their  
being *eminent Triflers*? If then the Actions  
which a *wise* and good GOD must determine  
us to approve, if he give us any such *Sense*  
at all, must be Actions *useful* to the *Publick*,  
this *Advantage* can never be a Reason against  
the *Sense* itself. After the same manner,  
we should deny all *Revelation*, which taught  
us good *Sense*, *Humanity*, *Justice*, and a *ra-*  
T tional

Sect. 7. *tional Worship*, because *Reason* and *Interest* confirm and recommend such *Principles* and *Services*; and should greedily embrace every *Contradiction*, *Foppery*, and *Pageantry*, as a *truly divine Institution*, without any thing *humane*, or *useful* to *Mankind*.

*Moral  
Sense  
judges of  
Laws.*

IV. THE Writers upon opposite Schemes, who deduce all Ideas of *Good* and *Evil* from the *private Advantage* of the *Actor*, or from Relation to a *Law*, and its *Sanctions*, either known from *Reason* or *Revelation*, are perpetually recurring to this *moral Sense* which they deny; not only in calling the *Laws* of the DEITY *just* and *good*, and alledging *Justice* and *Right* in the DEITY to govern us; but by using a Set of Words which import something different from what they will allow to be their only Meaning. *Obligation*, with them, is only such a *Constitution*, either of *Nature*, or *some governing Power*, as makes it *advantageous* for the *Agent* to act in a *certain manner*. Let this Definition be substituted, where-ever we meet with the Words, *ought*, *should*, *must*, in a moral Sense, and many of their Sentences would seem very strange; as that the DEITY *must* act rationally, *must* not, or *ought* not to punish the Innocent, *must* make the State of the *Virtuous* better than that of the *Wicked*, *must* observe Promises; substituting the Definition of the Words, *must*, *ought*, *should*, would make these

Sen-

Sentences either ridiculous, or very disputa- Sect. 7.  
ble. 

V. B U T that our first Ideas of *moral Good* depend not on *Laws*, may plainly appear from our constant Inquirys into the *Justice of Laws themselves*; and that not only of *human Laws*, but of the *divine*. What else can be the Meaning of that universal Opinion, “ That the *Laws of GOD* are *just*, “ and *holy*, and *good* ?” *Human Laws* may be call’d *good*, because of their Conformity to the *Divine*. But to call the *Laws of the supreme DEITY good*, or *holy*, or *just*, if all *Goodness*, *Holiness*, and *Justice* be constituted by *Laws*, or the *Will* of a *Superior* any way reveal’d, must be an insignificant Tautology, amounting to no more than this, “ That *GOD wills* what he *wills*.”

I T must then first be suppos’d, that there is something in Actions which is apprehended *absolutely good*; and this is *Benevolence*, or Desire of the *publick natural Happiness* of *rational Agents*; and that our *moral Sense* perceives this *Excellence*: and then we call the *Laws of the DEITY good*, when we imagine that they are contriv’d to promote the *publick Good* in the most effectual and impartial manner. And the *DEITY* is call’d *good*, in a *moral Sense*, when we apprehend that his *whole Providence* tends to the universal Happiness of his *Creatures*; whence we con-

Sect. 7. clude his *Benevolence*, and *Desire* in their  
 ~~~~~ Happiness.

SOME tell us, "That the *Goodness* of  
 " the *divine Laws* consists in their Confor-  
 " mity to some *essential Rectitude* of his  
 " *Nature.*" But they must excuse us from  
 assenting to this, till they make us under-  
 stand the Meaning of this Metaphor, *essen-*  
*tial Rectitude*; and till we discern whether  
 any thing more is meant by it than a *per-*  
*fectly wise, uniform, impartial Benevolence.*

*Difference  
 between  
 Constraint  
 and Obli-  
 gation.*

HENCE we may see the Difference be-  
 tween *Constraint* and *Obligation*. There is  
 indeed no Difference between *Constraint*, and  
 the second Sense of the Word *Obligation*, viz.  
*a Constitution which makes an Action eligible  
 from Self-Interest*, if we only mean *exter-*  
*nal Interest*, distinct from the delightful Con-  
 sciousness which arises from the *moral Sense*.  
 The Reader need scarcely be told, that by  
*Constraint*, we do not understand an *external  
 Force* moving our Limbs without our Con-  
 sent; for in that Case we are not *Agents* at  
 all; but that *Constraint* which arises from  
 the threatening and presenting some *Evil*, in  
 order to make us act in a certain manner.  
 And yet there seems an universally acknow-  
 ledg'd Difference between even this sort of  
*Constraint* and *Obligation*. We never say,  
 we are *oblig'd* to do an Action which we  
 count base, but we may be *constrain'd* to it;  
 we

we never say, that the *divine Laws*, by their Sect. 7. Sanctions, *constrain* us, but *oblige* us; nor do we call Obedience to the DELTY *Constraint*, unless by a Metaphor, tho' many own they are influenc'd by Fear of Punishments. And yet supposing an *almighty evil Being* should require, under grievous Penaltys, *Treachery, Cruelty, Ingratitude*, we would call this *Constraint*. The Difference is plainly this: When any Sanctions co-operate with our *moral Sense*, in exciting us to Actions which we count *morally good*, we say we are *oblig'd*; but when Sanctions of Rewards or Punishments oppose our *moral Sense*, then we say we are *brib'd* or *constrain'd*. In the former Case we call the *Lawgiver good*, as designing the *publick Happiness*; in the latter we call him *evil*, or *unjust*, for the suppos'd *contrary Intention*. . . But were all our Ideas of *moral Good* or *Evil* deriv'd solely from Opinions of *private Advantage* or *Loss* in Actions, I see no possible Difference which could be made in the Meaning of these Words.

VI. FROM this Sense too we derive our *Rights*. Ideas of RIGHTS. Whenever it appears to us, that a *Faculty of doing, demanding, or possessing any thing, universally allow'd in certain Circumstances, would in the Whole tend to the general Good*, we say, that one in such Circumstances has a *Right to do, possess, or demand that Thing*. And according as

Sect. 7. this Tendency to the *publick Good* is greater or less, the *Right* is greater or less.

*Perfect Rights.*

THE *Rights* call'd *perfect*, are of such *Necessity* to the *publick Good*, that the *universal Violation* of them would make *human Life intolerable*; and it actually makes those *miserable*, whose *Rights* are thus *violated*. On the contrary, to fulfil these *Rights* in every Instance, tends to the *publick Good*, either *directly*, or by promoting the *innocent Advantage* of a *Part*. Hence it plainly follows, "That to allow a violent *Defence*, or *Prosecution* of such *Rights*, before *Civil Government* be constituted, cannot in any particular *Case* be more *detrimental* to the *Publick*, than the *Violation* of them with *Impunity*." And as to the general *Consequences*, the *universal Use* of *Force* in a *State of Nature*, in pursuance of *perfect Rights*, seems exceedingly *advantageous* to the *Whole*, by making every one dread any *Attempts* against the *perfect Rights* of others.

*Right of War, and Punishment.*

THIS is the *moral Effect* which attends *proper Injury*, or a *Violation* of the *perfect Rights* of others, *viz.* A *Right* to *War*, and all *Violence* which is necessary to oblige the *Injurious* to repair the *Damage*, and give *Security* against such *Offences* for the future. This is the sole *Foundation* of the *Rights* of *punishing Criminals*, and of *violent Prosecutions* of our *Rights*, in a *State of Nature*.  
And

And these Rights, naturally residing in the *Sect. 7.*  
 Persons injur'd, or their *voluntary*, or *invited* ~~~~~  
 Assistants, to use Force according to the Judgment of indifferent Arbitrators, being by the Consent of the *Persons injur'd*, transferr'd to the *Magistrate* in a *Civil State*, are the true Foundation of his Right of Punishment. Instances of *perfect Rights* are those to our *Lives*; to the *Fruits* of our Labours; to demand Performance of *Contracts* upon valuable Considerations, from Men capable of performing them; to *direct* our own Actions either for *publick*, or *innocent private Good*, before we have submitted them to the Direction of others in any measure: and many others of like Nature.

IMPERFECT *Rights* are such as, when *Imperfect*  
*universally violated*, would not necessarily make *Rights.*  
*Men miserable*. These *Rights* tend to the Improvement and Increase of *positive Good* in any Society, but are not *absolutely* necessary to prevent universal Misery. The Violation of them only disappoints Men of the Happiness expected from the Humanity or Gratitude of others; but does not deprive Men of any *Good* which they had before. From this Description it appears, "That a violent  
 " Prosecution of such *Rights* would generally occasion greater *Evil* than the Violation of them." Besides, the allowing of Force in such Cases would deprive Men of the greatest Pleasure in Actions of *Kindness*,

Sect. 7. *Humanity, Gratitude*; which would cease to appear amiable, when Men could be constrain'd to perform them. Instances of *imperfect Rights* are those which the *Poor* have to the Charity of the Wealthy; which *all Men* have to Offices of no Trouble or Expence to the Performer; which *Benefactors* have to Returns of Gratitude, and such-like.

THE Violation of *imperfect Rights* only argues a Man to have such weak *Benevolence*, as not to study advancing the *positive Good* of others, when in the least opposite to his own: but the Violation of *perfect Rights* argues the *injurious Person* to be *positively evil* or *cruel*; or at least so *immoderately selfish*, as to be indifferent about the *positive Misery* and *Ruin* of others, when he imagines he can find his *Interest* in it. In violating the *former*, we shew a weak Desire of *publick Happiness*, which every small View of *private Interest* overbalances; but in violating the *latter*, we shew ourselves so intirely negligent of the *Misery* of others, that Views of increasing our own *Good* overcome all our *Compassion* toward their Sufferings. Now as the Absence of *Good* is more easily borne than the Presence of *Misery*; so our *good Wishes* toward the *positive Good* of others, are weaker than our *Compassion* toward their *Misery*. He then who violates *imperfect Rights*, shews that his *Self-Love* overcomes only the Desire of *positive Good* to others; but



but he who violates *perfect Rights*, betrays Sect. 7. such a *selfish* Desire of advancing his own *positive Good*, as overcomes all *Compassion* toward the *Misery* of others.

BESIDE these two sorts of *Rights*, there <sup>External Rights.</sup> is a third call'd *External*; as when *the doing, possessing, or demanding of any Thing, is really detrimental to the Publick in any particular Instance, as being contrary to the imperfect Right of another*; but yet *the universally denying Men this Faculty of doing, possessing, or demanding that Thing, or of using Force in Pursuance of it, would do more Mischief than all the Evils to be fear'd from the Use of this Faculty.* And hence it appears, "That  
 " there can be no Right to use Force in Op-  
 " position even to *external Rights*, since it  
 " tends to the *universal Good* to allow Force  
 " in Pursuance of them."

CIVIL Societys substitute *Actions in Law*, instead of the Force allow'd in *the State of Nature*.

INSTANCES of *external Rights* are these; that of a *wealthy Miser* to recal his Loan from the most industrious poor Tradesman at any time; that of demanding the Performance of a *Covenant* too burdensome on one Side; the Right of a *wealthy Heir* to refuse Payment of any Debts which were contracted by him under Age, without Fraud in the Lender;

Seçt. 7. der; the Right of taking Advantage of a *positive Law*, contrary to what was *Equity* antecedent to that Law; as when a *register'd Deed* takes Place of one not register'd, altho' prior to it, and known to be so before the second Contract.

*What Rights can be opposite.*


Now, whereas no *Action, Demand, or Possession*, can at once be either necessary to the *publick Good*, or conducive to it, and at the same time its *contrary* be either necessary or conducive to the same End; it follows, "That there can be no Opposition of *perfect Rights* among themselves, of *imperfect* among themselves, or between *perfect* and *imperfect Rights*." But it may often tend to the *publick Good*, to allow a *Right of doing, possessing, or demanding*, and of using *Force* in Pursuance of it, while perhaps it would have been more *humane* and *kind* in any Person to have acted otherwise, and not have claim'd his *Right*. But yet a violent Opposition to *these Rights* would have been vastly more *pernicious* than all the *Inhumanity* in the Use of them. And therefore, tho' *external Rights* cannot be opposite among themselves; yet they may be opposite to *imperfect Rights*; but *imperfect Rights*, tho' violated, give no *Right to Force*. Hence it appears, "That there can never be a *Right to Force* on both Sides, or a *just War* on both Sides at the same time."

VII. THERE is another important Difference of *Rights*, according as they are *Alienable*, or *Unalienable*. To determine what *Rights* are *alienable*, and what not, we must take these two Marks:

1<sup>st</sup>. IF the Alienation be within our natural Power, so that it be possible for us in Fact to transfer our *Right*; and if it be so, then,

2<sup>dly</sup>. IT must appear, that to transfer such *Rights* may serve some valuable Purpose.

BY the *first* Mark it appears, “ That the *Right of private Judgment*, or of our *inward Sentiments*, is *unalienable* ;” since we cannot command ourselves to think what either we ourselves, or any other Person pleases. So are also our *Internal Affections*, which necessarily arise according to our Opinions of their Objects. By the *second* Mark it appears, “ That our *Right of serving* *GOD*, in the manner which we think acceptable, is not *alienable* ;” because it can never serve any valuable Purpose, to make Men worship him in a way which seems to them displeasing to him. The same way, a *direct Right* over our *Lives* or *Limbs* is not *alienable* to any Person; so that he might at Pleasure put us to Death, or maim us. We have indeed

Sect. 7.  deed a *Right* to hazard our Lives in any good Action which is of Importance to the *Publick*; and it may often serve a most valuable End, to subject the Direction of such perilous Actions to the Prudence of others in pursuing a *publick Good*; as *Soldiers* do to their *General*, or to a *Council of War*: and so far this *Right* is *alienable*. These may serve as Instances to shew the Use of the two Marks of *alienable Rights*, which must both concur to make them so, and will explain the manner of applying them in other Cases.

*The Foundation of Property.*

VIII. THAT we may see the Foundation of some of the more *important Rights* of *Mankind*, let us observe, that probably nine Tenths, at least, of the things which are useful to Mankind, are owing to their *Labour* and *Industry*; and consequently, when once Men become so numerous, that the *natural Product* of the Earth is not sufficient for their Support, or Ease, or innocent Pleasure; a Necessity arises, for the Support of the increasing *System*, that such a *Tenour* of Conduct be observ'd, as shall most effectually promote *Industry*; and that Men abstain from all Actions which would have the contrary Effect. It is well known, that *general Benevolence* alone, is not a Motive strong enough to *Industry*, to bear *Labour* and *Toil*, and many other Difficultys which we are averse to from *Self-Love*. For the strengthening therefore our Motives to *Industry*, we have

have the strongest Attractions of *Blood*, of Sect. 6. *Friendship*, of *Gratitude*, and the additional Motives of *Honour*, and even of *external Interest*. *Self-Love* is really as necessary to the Good of the *Whole*, as *Benevolence*; as that *Attraction* which causes the Cohesion of the Parts, is as necessary to the *regular State* of the *Whole*, as *Gravitation*. Without these additional Motives, *Self-Love* would generally oppose the Motions of *Benevolence*, and concur with *Malice*, or influence us to the same Actions which *Malice* would. “ That Te-  
 “ nour of Action then, which would take  
 “ away the stronger Ties of *Benevolence*, or  
 “ the additional Motives of *Honour* and *Ad-  
 “ vantage*, from our *Minds*, and so hinder  
 “ us from pursuing *industriously* that Course  
 “ which really increases the *Good* of the  
 “ *Whole*, is *evil*; and we are oblig’d to shun  
 “ it.”

FIRST then, the depriving any Person of the Fruits of his own innocent Labour, takes away all Motives to *Industry* from *Self-Love*, or the nearer *Ties*; and leaves us no other Motive than *general Benevolence*: nay, it exposes the *Industrious* as a constant Prey to the *Slothful*, and sets *Self-Love* against *Industry*. This is the Ground of our *Right of Dominion* and *Property* in the Fruits of our *Labours*; without which *Right*, we could scarce hope for any *Industry*, or any thing beyond the Product of uncultivated Nature.

*Industry*

Sect. 7. *Industry* will be confin'd to our present Necessitys, and cease when they are provided for; at least it will only continue from the weak Motive of *general Benevolence*, if we are not allow'd to store up beyond present Necessity, and to dispose of what is above our Necessitys, either in Barter for other kinds of Necessarys, or for the Service of our Friends or Familys. And hence appears the *Right* which Men have to lay up for the *future*, the Goods which will not be spoil'd by it; of alienating them in *Trade*; of Donation to *Friends, Children, Relations*: otherwise we deprive *Industry* of all the Motives of *Self-Love, Friendship, Gratitude, and natural Affection*. The same Foundation there is for the *Right* of Disposition by *Testament*. The *Presumption* of Disposition is the Ground of the *Right* of Succession to the *Intestate*.

THE *external Right* of the *Miser* to his useless Hoards is founded also on this, That allowing Persons by Violence, or without Consent of the Acquirer, to take the Use of his Acquisitions, would discourage *Industry*, and take away all the Pleasures of *Generosity, Honour, Charity*, which cease when Men can be forc'd to these Actions. Besides, there is no determining in many Cases, who is a *Miser*, and who is not.

Sect. 7.

MARRIAGE must be so constituted as to ascertain the Offspring; otherwise we take away from the *Males* one of the strongest Motives to *publick Good*, viz. *natural Affection*; and discourage *Industry*, as has been shewn above.

Right of  
Marriage.

THE *Labour* of each Man cannot furnish him with all Necessaries, tho' it may furnish him with a needless Plenty of one sort: Hence the *Right of Commerce*, and *alienating* our Goods; and also the *Rights* from *Contracts* and *Promises*, either to the *Goods* acquir'd by others, or to their *Labours*.

Commerce.

THE great Advantages which accrue to Mankind from unprejudic'd *Arbitrators*, empower'd to decide the *Controversys* which ordinarily arise, thro' the *Partiality of Self-Love*, among Neighbours; as also from prudent *Directors*, who should not only instruct the Multitude in the best Methods of promoting the *publick Good*, and of defending themselves against mutual or foreign *Injurys*; but also be arm'd with Force sufficient to make their *Decrees* or *Orders* effectual at home, and the Society formidable abroad: These Advantages, I say, sufficiently shew the *Right Men* have to constitute *Civil Government*, and to subject their *alienable Rights* to the Disposal of their *Governors*, under such *Limitations* as their *Prudence* suggests. And

Right of  
Civil Go-  
vernment.

Sect. 7. as far as the People have subjected their *Rights*, so far their Governors have an *external Right* at least, to dispose of them, as their Prudence shall direct, for attaining the Ends of their Institution; and no farther.

Corollarys  
for compar-  
ing the  
Degrees of  
Virtue and  
Vice in Ac-  
tions.

IX. THESE Instances may shew how our *moral Sense*, by a little Reflection upon the Tendency of Actions, may adjust the *Rights* of Mankind. Let us now apply the general Canon laid down above\*, for comparing the Degrees of *Virtue* and *Vice* in Actions, in a few Corollarys besides that one already deduc'd †.

From A-  
bility.

I. THE Disappointment, in Whole or in part, of any Attempt, *good* or *evil*, if it be occasion'd only by external Force, or any unforeseen Accident, does not vary the *moral Good* or *Evil*; for as in *good* Attempts, the *Moment of Good*, or [M] is diminish'd, or vanishes in such a Case, so does the *Ability*, or [A] likewise: The *Quotient* then may still be the same. This holds equally in *evil* Attempts. So that Actions are not to be judg'd *good* or *evil* by the Events, any farther than they might have been foreseen by the *Agent* in *evil* Attempts; or were actually intended, if they were *good*, in *good* Actions; for then

\* See Sect. iii. Art. 11, 12.

† See Sect. iii. Art. 15. Par. 3.



only they argue either *Love* or *Hatred* in the *Agent*. Sect. 7.

~  
Interest.

2. SECULAR *Rewards* annex'd to *Virtue*, and actually influencing the *Agent* farther than his *Benevolence* would, diminish the *moral Good* as far as they were necessary to move the *Agent* to the *Action*, or to make him do more *Good* than otherwise he would have done; for by increasing the *Interest*, or [I] *positive*, to be subtracted, they diminish the *Benevolence*. But *additional Interests* which were not necessary to have mov'd the *Agent*, such as the *Rewards* of a *good Being* for *Actions* which he would have undertaken without a *Reward*, do not diminish the *Virtue*. In this however no *Mortal* is capable of judging another. Nor do the *Prospects* of *grateful Returns* for *Benefits* which we would have conferr'd gratuitously, diminish the *Generosity*. This *Corollary* may be apply'd to the *Rewards* of a *future State*, if any *Person* conceives them distinct from the *Pleasures* of *Virtue* itself: If they be not conceiv'd as something distinct from those *Pleasures*, then the very *Desire* of them is a strong *Evidence* of a *virtuous Disposition*.

3. EXTERNAL *Advantage* exciting us to *Actions* of *evil Tendency* to others, if without this *Prospect* of *Advantage* we would not have undertaken them, diminishes the *Evil*

U

of

Sect. 7. of the Action; such as the Prospects of *great Rewards*, of avoiding *Tortures*, or even the *uneasy Solicitations* of violent *selfish Passions*, This is commonly called the *Greatness of Temptation*. The Reason of this is the same with that in the former Case, since

$$H = \frac{\mu - I}{A}$$

We may here also remember

again, that we are more uneasy upon the Presence of *Pain*, then upon the Absence of *Good*; and hence *Torture* is a more extenuating Circumstance than *Bribes*, engaging us to *Evil*, because [I] is greater.


*Detriment.* 4. THE surmounting the uneasy Solicitations of the *selfish Passions*, increases the *Virtue* of a *benevolent Action*, and much more worldly Losses, Toil, &c. for now the *Interest* becomes *negative*; the Subtraction of which increases the *Quantity*.

5. A MALICIOUS Action is made the more odious by all its foreseen *Disadvantages* to the *Agent*, for the same Reason: particularly,

*Knowledge of Laws, how it affects Actions.*

6. THE Knowledge of a *Law* prohibiting an *evil Action*, increases the *Evil* by increasing the *negative Interest* to be subtracted; for then the *ill-natur'd Inclination* must be so strong as to surmount all the Motives of *Self-Love*, to avoid the Penalties, and all the Motives of *Gratitude* toward the *Law-giver*.

This

This is commonly call'd *sinning against Con-* Sect. 7.  
*science.* 

7. OFFICES of no *Toil* or *Expence* have little *Virtue* generally, because the *Ability* is very great, and there is no *contrary Interest* surmounted.

8. BUT the refusing of them may be very *vitious*, as it argues an Absence of good *Affection*, and often produces a great enough Moment of *natural Evil*. And,

9. IN general, the fulfilling the *perfect* <sup>Degree of</sup> *Rights* of others has little *Virtue* in it: for <sup>Right.</sup> thereby no *Moment of Good* is produc'd more than there was before; and the *Interest* engaging to the Action is very great, even the avoiding all the Evils of *War* in a *State of Nature*.

10. BUT the *violating perfect*, or even *external Rights*, is always *exceedingly evil*, either in the immediate, or more remote Consequences of the Action; and the *selfish* Motives surmounted by this *vitious* Inclination, are the same with those in the former Case.

11. The truest Mater of Praise are those Actions or Offices which others claim from us by an *imperfect Right*; and generally, the stronger their *Right* is, there is the less

Se<sup>ct.</sup> 7. *Virtue* in fulfilling it, but the greater *Vice* in violating it.

*Strength  
of Ties.*


LEMMA. The stronger Ties of *Benevolence*, in equal *Abilitys*, must produce a greater *Moment of Good*, in equally good *Characters*, than the weaker Ties. Thus, *natural Affection*, *Gratitude*, *Friendship*, have greater Effects than *general Benevolence*. Hence,

12. IN equal Moments of Good produc'd by two *Agents*, when one acts from *general Benevolence*, and the other from a *nearer Tie*; there is greater *Virtue* in the *Agent*, who produces equal Good from the weaker Attachment; and less *Virtue*, where there is the stronger Attachment, which yet produces no more. The general *Benevolence* also appears of itself a more amiable Principle, according to the Constitution of our moral Sense\*.

13. BUT the Omission of the good Offices of the stronger Ties, or Actions contrary to them, have greater *Vice* in them, than the like Omissions or Actions contrary to the weaker Ties; since our *Selfishness* or *Malice* must appear the greater, by the Strength of the contrary Attachment which it surmounts. Thus, in cooperating with *Gratitude*, *natural Affection*, or *Friendship*, we evidence

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\* See Sect. 3. Art. ix. & Art. x. §. 2.

less *Virtue* in any given Moment of Good pro- Sect. 7.  
 duc'd, than in equally important Actions of   
*general Benevolence*: But *Ingratitude* to a  
*Benefactor*, *Negligence* of the *Interests* of a  
*Friend* or *Relation*, or *Returns* of *evil Offices*,  
 are vastly more *odious*, than *equal Negligence*,  
 or *evil Offices* toward *Strangers*.

14. WHEN we cannot at once follow What of-  
 two different Inclinations of *Benevolence*, we ices to be  
 are to prefer gratifying the stronger Inclina- prefer'd,  
 tion; according to the wise Order of NA- when there  
 TURE, which has constituted these Attach- appears  
 ments. Thus, we are rather to be *grateful* any Oppo-  
 than *liberal*; rather serve a *Friend*, or *Kins-* sition.  
*man*, than a *Stranger* of only *equal Virtue*,  
 when we cannot do both.

15. OR, more generally, since there can  
 be no *Right*, *Claim*, or *Obligation* to *Impossi-*  
*bilitys*; when two *Actions* to be done by any  
 Agent, would both tend to the Good of Man-  
 kind, but they cannot be perform'd both at  
 once; that which occasions most *Good* is to  
 be done, if the Omission of the other occasi-  
 ons no prepollent *Evil*. If the Omission of  
 either will occasion some *new natural Evil*,  
*that* is to be omitted, whose Omission will  
 occasion the least *Evil*. Thus if two Per-  
 sons of unequal Dignity be in Danger, we  
 are to relieve the more *valuable*, when we  
 cannot relieve both. *Ingratitude*, as it evi-  
 dences a worse Temper than Neglect of Be-  
 neficence;

Sect. 7. *negligence*; so it raises worse Sentiments in the Benefactor, and greater Diffidence, and Suspicion of his Fellow-Creatures, than an Omission of an Act of Beneficence: we ought therefore to be *grateful*, rather than *beneficent*, when we cannot (in any particular Case) evidence both Dispositions. If omitting of one Action will occasion *new positive Evil*, or Continuance in a State of *Pain*, whereas the Omission of another would only prevent some *new positive Good*; since a State of *Pain* is a greater Evil, than the Absence of Good, we are to follow *Compassion*, rather than *Kindness*; and relieve the *Distressed*, rather than increase the Pleasures of the *Easy*; when we cannot do both at once, and other Circumstances of the Objects are equal. In such Cases, we should not suppose *contrary Obligations*, or *Dutys*; the more important Office is our *present Duty*, and the Omission of the less important inconsistent Office at present, is no *moral Evil*.

The Original of Government.

X. FROM *Art. vii.* it follows, "That all human *Power*, or *Authority*, must consist in a *Right transferr'd to any Person or Council, to dispose of the alienable Rights of others*; and that consequently, there can be no Government so absolute, as to have even an *external Right* to do or command every thing." For where-ever any Invasion is made upon *unalienable Rights*, there must arise either a *perfect*, or *external Right* to *Resistance*.

*Resistance.* The only Restraints of a moral Sect. 7.  
 Kind upon Subjects in such Cases, are, when they foresee that, thro' their want of Force, they shall probably by Resistance occasion greater Evils to the Publick, than those they attempt to remove; or when they find that *Governors*, in the main very useful to the Publick, have by some unadvised Passion, done an Injury too small to overbalance the Advantages of their Administration, or the Evils which Resistance would in all likelihood occasion; especially when the Injury is of a private Nature, and not likely to be made a Precedent to the Ruin of others. *Unalienable Rights* are *essential Limitations* in all Governments.

BUT by *absolute Government*, either in *Prince* or *Council*, or in *both jointly*, we understand a *Right to dispose of the natural Force, and Goods of a whole People, as far as they are naturally alienable, according to the Prudence of the Prince, Council, or of both jointly, for the publick Good of the State, or whole People; without any Reservation as to the Quantity of the Goods, Manner of Levying, or the Proportion of the Labours of the Subject, which they shall demand.* But in all States this *tacit Trust* is presuppos'd, "That the Power conferr'd shall be employ'd according to the best Judgment of the Rulers for the publick Good." So that, whenever the *Governors* openly profess

Se<sup>c</sup>t. 7. a Design of destroying the State, or act in such a manner as will necessarily do it; the *essential Trust*, suppos'd in all Conveyance of *Civil Power*, is violated, and the *Grant* thereby made void.

Limited  
Govern-  
ment.

A PRINCE, or Council, or both jointly, may be variously limited; *either when the Consent of the one may be necessary to the Validity of the Acts of the other; or when, in the very Constitution of this supreme Power, certain Affairs are expressly exempted from the Jurisdiction of the Prince, or Council, or both jointly*: as when several independent States uniting, form a general Council, from whose Cognizance they expressly reserve certain Privileges, in the very Formation of this Council; or when, in the very Constitution of any State, a certain Method of *Election* of the Person of the Prince, or of the Members of the supreme Council, is determin'd, and the *Intention* of their Assembling declar'd. In all such Cases, it is not in the Power of such Prince, Council, or both jointly, to alter the very *Form of Government*, or to take away that Right which the People have to be govern'd in such a manner, by a Prince or Council thus elected, without the universal Consent of the very People who have subjected themselves to this Form of Government. So that there may be a very *regular State*, where there is no universal absolute Power, lodg'd either in one Person, or Council,



cil, or in any other Assembly beside that of Sect. 7  
 the whole People associated into that State. To say, that upon a Change attempted in the very *Form of the Government*, by the *supreme Power*, the People have no Remedy according to the Constitution itself, will not prove that the *supreme Power* has such a *Right*; unless we confound all Ideas of *Right* with those of *external Force*. The only Remedy indeed in that Case, is an universal Insurrection against such *perfidious Trustees*.

DESPOTICK Power, is that which Persons injur'd may acquire over those Criminals, whose Lives, consistently with the publick Safety, they may prolong, that by their Labours they may repair the Damages they have done; or over those who stand oblig'd to a greater Value, than all their Goods and Labours can possibly amount to. This Power itself is limited to the Goods and Labours only of the Criminals or Debtors; and includes no Right to Tortures, Prostitution, or any Rights of the Governed which are naturally unalienable; or to any thing which is not of some Moment toward Repair of Damage, Payment of Debt, or Security against future Offences. The Characteristick of Despotick Power, is this, "That it is solely intended for the Good of the Governors, without any tacit Trust of consulting the Good of the Governed." Despotick Government,

in

Sect. 7. in this Sense, is directly inconsistent with the  
 ~~~~~ Notion of Civil Government.

FROM the Idea of *Right*, as above explain'd, we must necessarily conclude, "That  
 " there can be no *Right*, or *Limitation of*  
 " *Right*, inconsistent with, or opposite to the  
 " greatest publick Good." And therefore  
 in Cases of *extreme Necessity*, when the State  
 cannot otherwise be preserv'd from Ruin, it  
 must certainly be *just* and *good* in limited  
 Governors, or in any other Persons who  
 can do it, to use the Force of the State for  
 its own Preservation, beyond the Limits fix'd  
 by the *Constitution*, in some *transitory Acts*,  
 which are not to be made *Precedents*. And  
 on the other hand, when an *equal Necessity*  
 to avoid Ruin requires it, the Subjects may  
 justly resume the Powers ordinarily lodg'd in  
 their Governors, or may counteract them.  
 This Privilege of *flagrant Necessity* we  
 all allow in Defense of the most perfect *private Rights*: And if *publick Rights* are of  
 more extensive Importance, so are also *publick Necessitys*. These Necessitys must be  
 very grievous and flagrant, otherwise they  
 can never overbalance the *Evils* of violat-  
 ing a tolerable Constitution, by an *arbitrary*  
*Act of Power*, on the one hand; or by an  
 Insurrection, or Civil War, on the other.  
 No Person, or State can be happy, where  
 they do not think their *important Rights*  
 are secure from the *Cruelty, Avarice, Am-*  
*bitious,*

*bition*, or *Caprice* of their Governors. Nor Sect. 7.  
 can any *Magistracy* be safe, or effectual for  
 the Ends of its Institution, where there are  
 frequent Terrors of *Insurrections*. What-  
 ever *temporary Acts* therefore may be allow'd  
 in extraordinary Cases; whatever may be  
 lawful in the *transitory Act* of a bold Legis-  
 lator, who without previous Consent should  
 rescue a slavish Nation, and place their Af-  
 fairs so in the Hands of a *Person* or *Council*,  
*electd* or *limited* by themselves, that they  
 should soon have Confidence in their own  
 Safety, and in the Wisdom of the Admini-  
 stration; yet, as to the fixed State which  
 should ordinarily obtain in all Communitys,  
 since no *Assumer* of Government can so  
 demonstrate his superior Wisdom or Good-  
 ness to the Satisfaction and Security of the  
 Governed, as is necessary to their Happiness;  
 this must follow, " That except when Men,  
 " for their *own Interest*, or out of *publick*  
 " *Love*, have by *Consent* subjected their  
 " Actions, or their Goods, within certain Li-  
 " mits to the Disposal of others; no Mor-  
 " tal can have a *Right* from his *superior Wis-*  
 " *dom*, or *Goodness*, or any other *Quality*, to  
 " give Laws to others without their *Consent*,  
 " *express* or *tacit*; or to dispose of the *Fruits*  
 " of their Labours, or of any other *Right*  
 " whatsoever." And therefore *superior Wis-*  
*dom*, or *Goodness*, gives no *Right* to Men to  
 govern others;

BUT

Sect. 7.

Divine Government  
founded on  
Wisdom  
and Goodness.

BUT then with relation to the DEITY, suppos'd *omniscient* and *benevolent*, and secure from *Indigence*, the ordinary Cause of Injuries toward others; it must be *amiable* in such a *Being*, to assume the Government of *weak, inconstant Creatures*, often misled by *Selfishness*; and to give them Laws. To these Laws every Mortal should submit from *publick Love*, as being contriv'd for the *Good of the Whole*, and for the *greatest private Good* consistent with it; and every one may be sure, that he shall be better directed how to attain these Ends by the *Divine Laws*, than by his own greatest Prudence and Circumspection. Hence we imagine, "That a  
" *good and wise GOD* must have a *perfect*  
" *Right* to govern the *Universe*; and that all  
" Mortals are oblig'd to *universal Obedience*."

Divine Justice  
what.

The *Justice* of the DEITY is only a Conception of his *universal impartial Benevolence*, as it shall influence him, if he gives any Laws, to attemper them to the *universal Good*, and enforce them with the most effectual Sanctions of *Rewards* and *Punishments*.

Creation  
not the  
Ground of  
God's Do-  
minion.

XI. SOME imagine that the *Property* the *Creator* has in all his Works, must be the *true Foundation* of his *Right* to govern. Among Men indeed, we find it necessary for the *publick Good*, that none should arbitrarily dispose

dispose of the Goods acquir'd by the Labour Sect. 7. of another, which we call his *Property*; and hence we imagine that *Creation* is the *only* Foundation of G O D's *Dominion*. But if the Reason \* of establishing the *Rights* of *Property* does not hold against a *perfectly wise* and *benevolent Being*, I see no Reason why *Property* should be necessary to his *Dominion*. Now the Reason does not hold: For an *infinitely wise* and *good Being* could never employ his assumed Authority to counteract the *universal Good*. The Tie of *Gratitude* is stronger indeed than bare *Benevolence*; and therefore supposing two *equally wise* and *good Beings*, the one our *Creator*, and the other not, we should think ourselves more oblig'd to obey our *Creator*. But supposing our *Creator malicious*, and a *good Being* condescending to rescue us, or govern us better, with sufficient Power to accomplish his kind Intentions; his *Right* to govern would be perfectly good. But this is rather Matter of curious Speculation than Use; since both Titles of *Benevolence* and *Property* concur in the *one only true D E I T Y*, as far as we can know, join'd with *infinite Wisdom* and *Power*.

XII. IF it be here inquir'd, " Could not Our Moral Sense the Effect of the Divine Goodness. the D E I T Y have given us a *different* or *contrary Determination* of Mind, viz. to *approve* Actions upon another Foundation


\* See Art. 10. Par. 6. of this Section.

" than

Sec̄t. 7. “ than *Benevolence*?” There seems nothing in this surpassing the natural Power of the DEITY. But, as in the first Treatise \*, we resolv’d the Constitution of our present *Sense of Beauty* into the *divine Goodness*, so with much more obvious Reason may we ascribe the present Constitution of our *moral Sense* to his *Goodness*. For if the DEITY be really *benevolent*, and desires the Happiness of others, he could not *rationaly* act otherwise, or give us a *moral Sense* upon another Foundation, without counteracting his own *benevolent Intentions*. For even upon the Supposition of a *contrary Sense*, every *rational Being* must still have been solicitous in some degree about his own external Happiness: Reflection on the Circumstances of Mankind in this World would have suggested, that *universal Benevolence*, and a *social Temper*, or a *certain Course* of external Actions, would most effectually promote the *external Good* of every one, according to the Reasonings of CUMBERLAND and PUFFENDORF; while at the same time this *perverted Sense of Morality* would have made us uneasy in such a Course, and inclin’d us to the quite contrary, *viz. Barbarity, Cruelty, and Fraud*; and *universal War*, according to Mr. HOBBS, would really have been our *natural State*; so that in every Action we must have been distracted by two

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\* Sec̄t. viii. Art 2. Prop. 5<sup>o</sup>

contrary Principles, and perpetually miser- Sect. 7.  
 able, and dissatisfy'd, when we follow'd the   
 Directions of either.

XIII. IT has often been taken for granted <sup>Whence</sup>  
 in *these Papers*, “ That the DEITY is *mo-* <sup>this uni-</sup>  
 “ *rally good;*” tho’ the Reasoning is not at all <sup>versal Opini-</sup>  
 built upon this Supposition. If we inquire <sup>nion of the</sup>  
 into the Reason of the great Agreement of <sup>Divine</sup>  
 Mankind in this Opinion, we shall perhaps <sup>Goodness.</sup>  
 find no demonstrative Arguments *à priori*,  
 from the Idea of an *Independent Being*, to  
 prove his *Goodness*. But there is abundant  
 Probability, deduc’d from the whole *Frame*  
 of *Nature*, which seems, as far as we know,  
 plainly contriv’d for the *Good* of the *Whole*;  
 and the casual Evils seem the necessary Con-  
 comitants of some Mechanism design’d for  
 prepollent *Good*. Nay, this very *moral Sense*,  
 implanted in *rational Agents*, to approve and  
 admire whatever Actions flow from a Study  
 of the *Good* of *others*, is one of the strongest  
 Evidences of *Goodness* in the AUTHOR of  
*Nature*.

BUT these Reflections are not so universal  
 as the Opinion, nor are they often inculca-  
 ted. What then more probably leads *Man-*  
*kind* into that Opinion, is this: The obvious  
*Frame* of the *World* gives us Ideas of bound-  
 less *Wisdom* and *Power* in its AUTHOR.  
 Such a *Being* we cannot conceive *indigent*, and  
 must conclude *happy*, and in the *best State*  
 possible,

possible, since he can still gratify himself. The *best State of rational Agents*, and their *greatest* and most *worthy Happiness*, we are necessarily led to imagine must consist in *universal efficacious Benevolence*: and hence we conclude the DEITY *benevolent* in the most *universal impartial manner*. Nor can we well imagine what else deserves the Name of *Perfection* more than *Benevolence*, and those *Capacitys* or *Abilitys* which are necessary to make it *effectual*; such as *Wisdom* and *Power*: at least we can have no more lovely Conception of it.

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F I N I S.