

PLAN
OF
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM,
IN THE FORM OF A
Catechism,
WITH
REASONS FOR EACH ARTICLE,
WITH AN
INTRODUCTION,
SHEWING
The Necessity of Radical,
AND
THE INADEQUACY OF MODERATE,
REFORM.

BY JEREMY BENTHAM, Esq.


LONDON:

PRINTED FOR R. HUNTER, SUCCESSOR TO MR. JOHNSON,
ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD.

1817.



John M'Creery, Printer,
Buck-Horse-Court, London.



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Parliamentary Reform Catechism.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. *History of the ensuing tract—alarming state of the country and the constitution.*

THE following little tract was written as long ago as in the year 1809. It was offered at the time to one of the time-serving daily prints, in which other papers on the same subject had already found admittance. No name was sent with it: and, the weathercock being at that time upon the turn, insertion was declined.

From that time to the present, despair of use kept this, together with so many other papers, upon the shelf. In a state of things, such as the present, if in any, they possess a chance of finding readers.—Sad condition of human nature! until the cup of calamity, mixt up by misrule, has been drunk to the very dregs, never has the man a chance of being heard, who would keep it from men's lips.

For a long time past had the necessity,—and not only the necessity, but supposing it attainable, the undangerousness,—of a Parliamentary Reform, and that

a radical one, presented itself to any mind, if not in a light as yet sufficiently clear for communication, at any rate in the strongest colours. Long had this sole possible remedy against the otherwise mortal disease of misrule, been regarded by me as the country's only hope. Long had I beheld, and not long after did I delineate the road to national ruin, in the economy of *Edmund Burke*, adopted and enforced under *William Pitt*, by the pen of his confidential adviser, *Mr. Rose*. The first of these sketches is already before the public;* the other will soon be so.

Drawn on, in the road to that gulph, from those times down to the present,—the country, if my eyes do not deceive me, is already at the very brink:—reform or convulsion, such is the alternative. How faint so ever the hope of its being attainable,—I for one, under the disease under which I see the country lingering, cannot discover any other than this one possible remedy. Of the composition of it—such as in my conception it must be, to be productive of any effect—some conception was and is now endeavoured to be given in the ensuing little tract. On the subject of the necessity, more than a few introductory pages cannot at this time, and in this place, be spared. To give any adequate conception of it would require a much larger work.

For the destruction of every thing by which the constitution of this country has ever been distinguished to its advantage, no additional measures need be em-

* In the Pamphleteer No. 17, for Jan. 1817.

ployed: let but the principles already avowed continue to be avowed—let but the course of action, dictated by those principles, be persevered in—the consummation is effected.

Gagging Bills—suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act—interdiction of all communication between man and man for any such purpose as that of complaint or remedy—all these have already become precedent—all these are in preparation—all these are regarded as things of course.

The pit is already dug: one after another, or all together, the securities called *English liberties* will be cast into it. With the sacred name of reform on their lips, and nothing better than riot or pillage in their hearts, let but a dozen or a score of obscure desperadoes concert mischief in a garret or an alehouse, fear will be pretended, prudence and wisdom mimicked—honest cowards will be made to acquiesce and to co-operate by feigned cowardice:—for the transgression of the dozen or the score, the million will be punished, and from the subjects of a disguised despotism will be made such under a despotism in form, to which disguise is no longer necessary:—such is the state of things, for which it is time for every man to prepare himself.

As for the *Habeas Corpus Act*, better the statute-book were rid of it. Standing or lying as it does, up one day, down another,—it serves but to swell the list of sham-securities, with which, to keep up the delusion, the pages of our law books are defiled. When no man has need of it, then it is that it stands: comes a time when it might be of use, and then it is suspended.

§ 2. *Most prominent present grievance, garrisoning France.*

The plains, or heights, or whatsoever they are, of *Waterloo*—will one day be pointed to by the historian as the grave—not only of French but of English liberties. Not of France alone, but of Britain with her, was the conquest consummated in the Netherlands. Whatsoever has been done and is doing in France, will soon be done in Britain. Reader, would you wish to know the lot designed for you? Look to France, there you may behold it.

In France, on the subject of their common interests, no longer can any information be received through the channel of any newspaper, other than those which are not only instruments, but avowed instruments, in the hands of the ruling despotism: no longer from any source any information that has not for its object deception—constant and universal deception: information in which, with a degree of anxiety proportionate to its importance, truth is suppressed, and by which pernicious error is circulated and inculcated. A newspaper, into which any expression can find its way, by which the "*feelings*" of "great characters" in their high situations can in any degree be "*hurt*"—(and is it possible they should not be hurt, as often as any misdeeds of their's are exposed?) any such source of instruction is in that country a no longer tolerable nuisance. The same causes will produce the same effects: the same "*great characters*" by which the monster of anarchy has so happily been

crushed in France—by these same exalted persons will the same monster be crushed in Britain.

There they are—our fifty thousand men, with the conqueror of French and English liberties—the protector of the Bourbons—the worthy vanquisher and successor to Bonaparte at the head of them: there they are—and, until every idea of good government—every idea of any thing better than the most absolute despotism—has been weeded out:—once more as thoroughly weeded out by the Bourbons, as ever it had been by Bonaparte. There it is that the whole of them, or whatsoever part may be deemed sufficient for the purpose, are destined to continue.

There they are, and for what is it that they were planted there?—For security? For the security of Britons? for the security of Frenchmen? for the security of Germans? for the security of Netherlanders? for the security of any other race of men under the sun?—impossible.

Had the security, of any thing but the universal despotism which produced it, been the object of that new Holy League, by which all France is put under a garrison,—the means of security were as obvious as the efficacy of them was certain,—and in comparison with the existing ones, the modes and forms lenient to the vanquished. Blow up all their fortifications without exception: carry off all their cannon: destroy all their arsenals and their founderies: destroy all their manufacturing factories of arms of every kind: leave them not a fowling piece: mark out for predicted vengeance every attempt to set up another foundery:—parcel out half the country among the allies: or, should any such parti-

tion be too dangerous to Christian charity among the crowned and newly-christianized Christians, divide the whole into any number of lots. Yes: though the whole country were parcelled out into lots,—still, if in each lot men were left to take their own measures for the preservation of what was left to them,—all these inflictions put together would have been mercy; in comparison of that of fastening upon their shoulders the old man of the woods, with his 150,000 foreign guards.

For the moment, in respect of *subjection* and absence of every thing that ever went under the name of *liberty*; France is but what she was. Exit the old weathercock, enter the *ultras*, and then Spain will be to France the model of good government. Then, under the protection of the Waterloo conqueror and his employers, the wardrobe of the Holy Virgin will be supplied with a new gown, and every prison in the country with a new set of torture-boots and thumb-screws.

Let him who thinks himself able, figure to himself a case in which there would not be a demand—an adequate demand—for the system of garrisoning France;—on the supposition that the existence of any such demand has place at present. The demand is composed of *possibilities*,—converted, it is alledged, into practical *certainties* by past facts. There *have been* Septembrians and anarchists;—*ergo*, no sooner does France cease to be garrisoned by us, than the reign of those miscreants will recommence. There *has been* one Napoleon Bonaparte: *ergo*, no sooner does France cease to be garrisoned by us; than in comes either the self-same; or exactly such another. Well;—these past events;

who is there that can cause them not to have had place? Nobody. Well then; never, never can it cease—the necessity of garrisoning France with English armies.

Once more.—For what then is it that France has been, is now, and by the blessing of God is destined to be for ever, garrisoned? Is it for security? Is it for the keeping out anarchy? Is it for the keeping out *bad* government? Alas, no: to any such object never, never has any real fear attached itself: the healing—the moderately monarchical—constitution, on which, at their entrance, the despots set their perfidious foot, would that have been bad government? No: it was not for keeping out *bad*, it was for keeping out *good* government. Under whatsoever form it might have been established—constitutional monarchy, or upon the model of the American United States, democracy—*there* was the real object of terror, to all the newly re-christianized crowned heads,—and to their loyal and correspondently pious,—coroneted, and not yet coroneted advisers.

There they are—but happily with the Atlantic between us and them—the never sufficiently accursed United States. There they are—living, and (oh horror!) flourishing—and so flourishing! flourishing under a government so essentially *illegitimate*! Oh, what a reproach to legitimacy! Oh what a reproach, a never to be expunged reproach, to our own matchless constitution—matchless in rotten boroughs and sinecures! Oh, had they but one neck—these miscreants! Ten times, twenty times, any number of times, the blood spilt at Waterloo, would be well spent in cutting it. There they are, with their prosperity the ef-

fect: there they are, with their good government—their matchless good government—the cause of it.

There they are—but happily, with two thousand leagues of sea between us and them—the ten millions of two-legged swine, with the illegitimacy and the unencumbered and undisturbed prosperity in which they wallow.

But now—suppose the same, or a similar accursed government, with the accursed prosperity, transplanted from that blessed distance—planted under our very noses: planted with no more than one-and-twenty miles of sea to dilute the stench of it. Without so much as a single *useless place, needless place, overpaid place, unmerited pension*—not to speak of *sinecures*—no not so much as a *peerage*, to settle a borough or buy off a country gentleman—suppose these *miscreants*—not one of them re-christianized—not one of them occupied in embroidering a robe for the Holy Virgin—debating, and resolving, and enacting—without so much as a single bayonet to secure good order to their deliberations:—resolving and enacting, and like their accursed preceptors and forerunners, paying off public debt faster than we are contracting it. Suppose all this state of things brought into existence: brought into existence, and not more than half-a-guinea or a crown, for a place in a passage-boat—not more than three hours row in a wherry—necessary to enable a man to see it.

In this case, by what possibility could the eye, the head, or the heart be shut against the spectacle of the united nuisances—*prosperity and good government?* To what use deny their existence? With as much effect might a man deny the existence of the dome of

St. Paul's, in the face of those who are viewing it from St. James's park.

Here then is *one* use, for the fifty thousand Britons, who, in France, with the hundred thousand men of other nations, are preying at one and the same time upon the vitals of France and Britain. Here is one use—behold now another.

The other use—need it here be mentioned? exists there that reader, who has not already told it to himself? Yes, it is to return to all plans of reform, to all petitions for reform—to all groans—to all complaints—to all cries for mercy—the proper, and properly, and already proposed answer, the bayonet.—The bayonet? yes: by the blessing of God, the bayonet. But is it altogether so sure, that should matters come to the push, the direction that will be prescribed by legitimacy, is exactly the direction in which the bayonets will move? The men by whom they will be to be pushed, of what class are they? Are they of the blood royal? Are they of the peerage? Are they not of the swinish multitude? Are they not as perfect swine as we are? Is it possible they should ever forget it? And when, in a direction that is not pleasing to him, the swine is driven, is he not apt to retrograde?

An army in France necessary for the security of Britain?—Yes! if an army in China is so too;—not otherwise.

Propose any thing good; the answer is at hand:—wild, theoretical, visionary, Utopian, impracticable, dangerous, destructive, ruinous, anarchical, subversive of all governments—there you have it.—Well, but in America there it is: and no such evil conse-

quences—nothing but what is good results from it.—Aha!—and so the United States government is your government?—is it?—You are a republican then, are you?—what you want is—to subvert this constitution of ours; the envy of nations! the pride of ages!—Matchless in rotten boroughs and sinecures?—Very well: begin and set up your republic: and, in the mean time, you, who are so ready to talk of *feelings*, think what *yours* will be, when after a few nights lodging in the tower, the knife of the hangman, after having rubbed off its rust upon the Spenceans, is doing its office in your bowels.

Propose any thing that would put any power into the hands of those of whose obedience all power is composed,—you propose *democracy*: and if any such epithet as *democratical* is applicable to it, there you have a reason, and that a conclusive one, for casting it out without further thought: casting it off as if it were a viper, and trampling upon it: and for this reason—for there needs no other—is eternity to be given to every thing that is corrupt and mischievous.

What, according to these men, is the use of the constitution? To make the *people* happy?—Make them happy? curse on the swinish multitude.—What then? Why to make the *one* man happy, the one object of legitimate idolatry,—with the small number of *others* to whom it accords with his high pleasure to impart any of the means of happiness.

Now by this bugbear word *democracy*, are the people of this country to be frightened out of their senses? frightened by Gwelfs any more than by Stewarts; into passive obedience and non-resistance?

§. 3. *Causes of the above and all other mischiefs:—particular interests, the monarchical and aristocratical, adverse to the universal—their ascendancy.*

Goaded to the task by the groans of all around me, of late,—with an attention, which the nature of the objects that were continually forcing themselves upon all eyes and upon all ears, rendered more and more painful to me,—I have been looking more closely than ever into the constitution;—I mean the present state of it;—and, in as few words as possible, of this most appalling of all examinations, what follows is the result.

As early as the year 1809, and I forget how much earlier, it had seemed to me, (it has been already hinted) that in the principle which, by those in whose hands the fate of the country rested, had not only been acted upon but avowed, the road to national ruin might be but too clearly traced. This principle was—that in the hands of the trustees of the people, the substance of the people was a fund, out of which, without breach of trust, and without just reproach in any shape—*fortunes*—as the phrase is—by those who, without exposing themselves to punishment, could contrive to lay their hands on the means, might be—*made*—and, it being matter of necessity, at any price, and to an amount absolutely unlimited, ought to be—*made*.

In this principle, I saw the two domineering inter-

ests—the monarchical and the aristocratical—which in our mixt constitution—(for such at least it was at one time) antagonizing with the every now and then struggling, but always vainly and feebly struggling, democratical: completely agreed,—and without concert, because without need of concert, co-operating with each other,—in the dissemination, and in the inculcation of it: the party out of power as well as the party in power inculcating it in theory; the party in power, by theory and practice.

That, on the part of both these interests, this principle, together with the practice that belonged to it, was but too natural—was abundantly evident: that, for its adoption it had any such plea as that of necessity, was a notion, which when once taken in hand, vanished at the slightest touch.

Power, money, factitious dignity—by an attractive force, the existence of which, and the omnipotence, is as indisputable as that by which the course of the heavenly bodies is determined—*each* of these elements of the *matter of good*—that precious matter, the whole mass of which, in so far as at the hands of the monarch, it is sought by a member of either of the two other branches of the efficient sovereignty, operates in the character of *matter of corruptive influence*—attracts and draws to it the *two others*: the greater the quantity a man has of any one of them, the greater the facility he finds, in his endeavours to obtain for himself the two others; each in a quantity proportioned to his desires:—those desires, which in human nature have no bounds.

The more he has of any one of them, the more

therefore it is his *wish* to have of *that* and all of them. But the more he has of any one of them, the more is it *right* also that he should have of them? All of them at the expense of the people,—the poor people, at whose expense whatsoever is enjoyed by their rulers is enjoyed? Oh gross, oh flagitious absurdity! The more? No: but on the contrary the less. Whatsoever be the quantity of the *matter of reward*, which, in any shape whatsoever, may be necessary to obtain at a man's hands the requisite service, the more he has of it in any *one* shape,—the less the need he has of it in any *other* shape.

In the case of the poorest individual,—in the character of a *guardian*, by any man has any such immoral notion ever been started, as that, in the substance of his *ward*, any proper source of enrichment to himself is to be found? Power, over a single individual and his little property, a sufficient payment for the labour: and power over twenty millions, and their property, together with all that mass of *patronage*,—lucrative of necessity, a great part of it,—shall it not be sufficient? Those who either have no property, or have it not in sufficient quantity for their maintenance,—such men must, indeed, either be paid or not employed:—but among men, who, not only have property, but have it in sufficiency, is it supposable that there can ever be a deficiency, in the number of those, in whom the *pleasure* of possessing such power will be sufficient compensation for all the *pain* attached to the exercise of it? Look at the country magistracy: see we not there—not only an example, but a host of examples? yes: and in those examples a host of proofs.

Unfortunately—in the breasts of all who have *power*, *merit* being, as they all agree and certify—to one another and to the people, infinite—so must be the *reward*.

Of the demand for the matter of reward—viz. money, power, and factitious dignity—(these are its principal shapes)—the infinity and absolute irresistibility being thus established,—then and thereupon comes the demand for the supply—and that supply a proportionable one. Here, however, to a first view, comes somewhat of a difficulty. From the body of the people—how habitually soever blind and passive—money, in *infinite* quantity cannot be demanded all at once: they would become desperate: they would rise: better, (they would say to themselves), better be shot or hanged at once, than starved.

A set of *drains* must therefore be established and set to work: drains, by and through which, by degrees—those degrees ever in the eyes of the devourers but too slow—under colour either of *use*, or what is so much better, of *necessity*—money may be drawn out of the pockets of the blinded, deluded, unsuspecting, uninquisitive, and ever too patient people. 1. Wars: 2. Distant and proportionably burthensome dependencies all over the habitable globe: (and note that, in prosecution of these views, every such dependency, without exception, has been made a source of net expense: net expense, the amount of which is destined to perpetual and unlimited increase:)—3. Penal colonies: 4. Claims of universal dominion over the universal water-way of nations, with a determination to destroy the shipping of all nations by whom those claims shall be contested. 5. Annexation of “*Hanover to Hamp-*

shire:" and that to the end that not a hostile gun may be fired any where on the continent, but that we may be in readiness to interfere, subsidizing one of the contending parties, and helping to oppress the other!* 6. Splendor of the crown; that effulgence, with the increase of which—and in exact proportion to that increase—will increase the respect, and with it the submission, and with it the happiness of the people. 7. Erection of *Hanover* into a kingdom for that purpose, and that the Hanoverians may the less grudge the increase of taxes that will be necessitated by the increase of *dignity*. Here, though not yet a complete one, is a list of these productive drains:—and are they not efficient ones?

As for *war*—never can a pretence for it be wanting—a pretence not yielding to any, in which, at any time in the course of the present reign it has ever been made:—no; never can a pretence be wanting, so long as that nation exists any where, against which war can be made.

The nation—the nation to be warred upon—is either formidably strong, or providentially weak:—if formidably strong, too long have we delayed the necessary task of obtaining, at the expense of it, indemnity for the past and security for the future:—if providentially weak, now is the favourable time for taking advantage of its weakness, and preventing it from becoming formidable:—now has the Lord of Hosts—

* Parl. Reg. xv. Anno 1784. Commons, Earl Nugent. "He (Lord Chatham) had often said, that Hanover was a mill-stone about the neck of England, that would weigh her down, and sink her."

as the Archbishop's prayer will not fail to inform us—delivered the enemy into our hands!—Thus, if there be nothing *past*, for which to obtain *indemnity*, *security* for the *future* will, at any rate, be an easy purchase.

The French people, for example—already have they had one set of *Septembrizers*,—and—so happy were they under them—by the first favourable opportunity they would give themselves another: and, no sooner had they septembrized France, than they would cross over, and, with the assistance of the travelling Orator and the *Spenceans*, septembrize us in the same way.—The French have already had one Bonaparte;—so happy were they under him—leave them to themselves—immediately they would give themselves another. In his scheme for invading and conquering this country, the first Bonaparte failed:—the second Bonaparte, by whom such another plan would immediately be formed, would succeed in *his*. From these two considerations put together, or indeed from either of them, follows the necessity of garrisoning France, and keeping possession of the country till the danger is at an end:—yes, till the danger is at an end; which it is impossible it ever should be.

Yes: wars would be invaluable, were it only for the *merit* of which they are the never-failing sources. When a battle is fought—unless it be a drawn one, which does not often happen—it must be gained by somebody. Gained on one side it must be, in what degree soever the generals on the respective sides are fit or unfit for their work. The greater the number that fight, the greater the number of those who are

capable of being killed. A battle is gained,—the number of the killed is great,—and half a million is scarce enough to reward the merit which, from one single bosom has been displayed in it.

In regard to all these drains of money, and all these sources of merit and reward,—the great misfortune is this.—For every shilling which, by means of any one of these drains, unless it be the last, the men of merit—and all placemen, without exception, are *ex officio*, men of merit,—for every shilling which the men of merit thus put into their pockets, some score, or some dozen at least, must come out of the pockets of the poor people.—A man who sets his neighbour's house on fire, that he may roast an egg for himself,—is the emblem by which a certain sort of man is pictured by Lord Bacon:—would you see a man of this sort, you need not look far, so you look high enough: for these five-and-twenty years, or thereabouts—to go no further back—has this poor nation been kept on fire, lest the emblematic eggs in sufficient quantity should be wanting to its rulers.

Money, is it wanting (and it always is wanting) for the support of the *splendor of the Crown*?—for the support of *royal dignity*? Money supplied by Parliament—supplied in a direct way, and without a burthen more than correspondent to the supply being deficient—and it always is deficient—Droits of Admiralty are sent by Almighty Providence to feed, though never to fill up—for nothing can ever fill up—the deficiency. The persons, for the reward of whose merit more and more of that object of universal desire is everlastingly wanted—these persons join

with one another, not only in commencing groundless war, but in commencing that groundless war in a piratical manner,—in a manner in which the Monarch and his instruments may add millions to the conjunct splendor,—not only the foreigners who thus and for this purpose have been converted into enemies, are plundered, but the men, by whose hands the plunder is got in, deprived of that which, had the war been commenced otherwise than in the way of piracy, would have been their due. Thus do these on whom it depends bribe one another to commit piracy!—piracy, which has been made legitimate, because, by their power and for their own benefit, it has been made unpunishable.

Money, power, factitious dignity—among the *modifications* of the *matter of good*—among the *good things* of this wicked world—these, as it is the *interest*, so has it ever been the study,—as it has been the study, so has it been the endeavour—of the Monarch—as it has been, so will it, and where the Monarch is a human being, so must it be every where—to draw to himself in the greatest quantity possible. And here we have one *partial*, one *separate*, one *sinister* interest, the *monarchical*—the interest of the ruling *one*—with which the *universal*, the *democratical* interest has to antagonize, and to which that all-comprehensive interest has all along been,—and, unless the only possible remedy—even parliamentary reform, and that a radical one, should be applied,—is destined to be for ever made a sacrifice:—a sacrifice?—yes: and, by the blessing of God, upon the legitimate and pious labours of his Vicegerent, and the express image of his person

here upon earth, a still unresisting sacrifice. Omnipresence, immortality, impeccability—equal as he is to God, as touching all these “*attributes*” (ask Blackstone else, i. 270, 250, 246, 249),—who is there that, without adding impiety to disloyalty, can repine at seeing any thing or every thing he might otherwise call his own, included in the sacrifice?

Meantime the money, which, in an endless and boundless stream, is thus to keep flowing into the monarchical coffers—this one thing needful cannot find its way into those sacred receptacles without instruments and conduit-pipes. Upon and out of the pockets of the people it cannot be raised, but through the forms of Parliament:—not but through the forms of Parliament, nor therefore without the concurrence of the richest men in the country, in their various situations:—in the situation of Peers, Great Landholding, and as yet uncoroneted Commoners, styled *Country Gentlemen*,—and others. In those men is the chief *property* of the country, and with it—(for in the language of the Aristocratic School, *property* and *virtue* are synonymous terms)—the *virtue* of the country. And here we have another partial, separate, and sinister interest—the *Aristocratical* interest—with which the *Democratical* interest has also to antagonize:—another overbearing, and essentially and immutably hostile, interest,—against which, and under which, the universal interest has to struggle, and as far as possible to defend itself.

Such is the state in which the country lies:—the universal interest crouching under the conjunct yoke of two partial and adverse interests, to which, to a

greater or less extent, it ever has been made,—and to the greatest extent possible, as far as depends upon them, cannot, in the nature of man and things, ever cease to be made, a continual sacrifice.

For the consummation of this sacrifice, adequate *inclination*—such is the nature of man—never could have been wanting:—but as to the *power*—the effective power—never at any former period could it have been seen swelled to a pitch approaching to that at which it stands at this moment.

Well—such being the swell of voracious power, what are the means—what the instrument—by which it has been effected? What but the precious matter already mentioned?—Yes, the *very matter of good*:—for such in *itself* it is, but, by reason of the two relative *situations*—the situation of the hands by which it is possessed, and that of the hands, which the very nature of man keeps ever open to receive it, operating—and by the whole amount of it—in the character of matter of *evil*—*matter of corruptive influence*. Ever upon the increase is the quantity of this essentially good, this accidentally, but alas! how extensively pernicious, matter:—ever upon the increase the pernicious effect of it. In an endless series of alternating and reciprocating operations, this matter is itself both effect and cause. Waste begets corruption; corruption, waste. Fed through the already enumerated drains—viz. useless places, needless places, over-pay of needful places, groundless pensions, and sinecures, some number of times more richly endowed than the most richly endowed efficient offices—these, together with Peerages, and Baronetages, and Ribbons—

for Peerage-hunters, Baronetage-hunters, and Ribbon-hunters—these, by their bare existence, and without need of their being either asked or offered,—always with the fullest effect, never with the personal danger, or so much as the imputation, attached to the word *bribery*,—operate in the character, and produce the effect, of *matter of corruptive influence*: that pestilential matter, against the infection of which not a household in the country can be said to be secure, from the Archiepiscopal palace down to the hovel by the road side.

What? not the Ducal mansion?—Oh no: *that* full as little as any other. The Duke, who, if there were no such thing as a ribbon, nor any such place as a Gaming-house, nor . . . but there is no end to the *et ceteras*—might of himself be independent, is dependent by his dependents: and the more enormous the mass of his property, the more numerous, as well as the higher, the list of his alliances,—the wider and the more craving is the circle of his dependents.*

* In the pension list are still to be seen the pensions enjoyed by divers Ladies, procured for them by a certain *Duke*, they being relations of his by marriage, then in a state of infancy; their father, a hero of the turf, living and dying in the bosom of affluence.

In one part of the present most religious reign, there existed an *Earl of Leinster*:—at that time, and under that title, *premier Peer of Ireland*. Being so high, and withal so rich, he was made a *Duke*, that with the exception of the blood-royal, no race might ever be so high as his. When for some time he had been a *Duke*, being so high as he was, it was found that he was not rich enough. On the pretence of his administering the sort of *Law* called *Equity*,—but having no more to do with either, or with *Justice* than the *Duke* of

Laud his virtue, party Orator, party Scribe:—laud that virtue, which is composed of rank and property, and consists of nothing else: laud him to-day, while he is yet your's:—come to-morrow, he has crossed over, and his place is on the other side. A Duke has a borough, and in it a brace of seats. Sincere or insincere, quoth the Duke to one of his Agents, whose attachment to the cause of the people was well known to him, cast your eyes around you, and find me out the two honestest and ablest men you can lay your hands on, to fill those seats. The Agent bestirs himself, and reports. But ere the report reaches its destination, the coroneted patriot has found money wanting, and the Borough, the seats, with the patriotism that would have filled them, are all sold.

Yes: in this country—under this Constitution—may be seen an official person, who by his station is, for ever, *ex officio* C———r* General: it is his situa-

Montrose has, who receives his 2,000*l.* a year for calling himself *Lord Justice General*,—he was accordingly made *Master of the Rolls*: assistant as such to and under the Lord Chancellor of Ireland,—receiving fees, and doing nothing whatever for any of those fees: helping thus to deny justice to the poor,—falsely pretending to render justice, and from richest and poorest without distinction exacting money on that false pretence: “obtaining money on that false “pretence;” and instead of the Hulks, having his station at the head of the House of Lords.

After those examples,—to which scores of such might be added,—let any one speak of the *matter of wealth*, in the character of a *preservation against corruption*: for this is among the pretences by which the waste made of it, by the cramming of official pockets with it, has been justified.

* Whatsoever blanks may eventually be observable in the remainder of this work, the prudence of the printer is the vir-

tion makes him so: it suffices for the purpose: *to produce the effect*, (and let this be well observed), *no overt act—no, nor so much as a thought—is on his part necessary*:—were it possible for him to have the *will*, scarcely in his *situation* would it be in his *power* to avoid being so.

Well: This attribute, which Blackstone has forgot to add to the other "*attributes*" of the God of his idolatry—this attribute of C——r-Generalship, which, after all, could not have place if there were not a Parliament to c——,—this inseparable attribute, disastrous as it is, does it, in this our country, form any peremptory objection to Monarchy? Not it indeed. But why not?—Even because in *democratic ascendancy*—such as it would be constituted by *radical reform*—the corruption would have its antidote—its constantly operating antidote—and that antidote an effectual one.

Extinguish Monarchy?—suppress, extirpate the Peerage?—Oh, not I indeed; nothing would I extinguish: nothing would I extirpate: *uti possidetis*—that which you have, continue to have—and God bless you with it—this, in all matters of reform—this, in so far as is not inconsistent with the very essence of the reform, is—and, so long as I have had any, has ever been—with me a ruling principle.—Leaving, with all my heart, the full benefit of it to Monarchy

tus to which the honour of them will be due. In the present instance, for filling up the *deficit* between the C and the r, the candour and sagacity of the Reader may employ the letters *onservato*, or any others, if any others there be, which in his view may be more apposite.

and Aristocracy—to the *ruling few*, my aim, my wishes confine themselves to the securing, if it be possible, a participation in that same benefit to *democracy*—to the *subject many*—to the poor suffering and starving people.

Monarchy a property! Not it indeed. Monarchy is a trust: is it not, Prince Regent?—have you not said it is?—Peerage a property! Not it indeed. Peerage is a trust: is it not, my Lord any body? If it is not, what business have you to be what you are, and where you are?

Ascendency! ascendency, that is what is sufficient: this, therefore, is all that should be asked for. In Ireland, we have Protestant ascendency. Well: and what is the effect? In Ireland, the Catholics—the great majority—are not yet, it is true, quite so well circumstanced as could be wished: still, however, they exist; still they are not extirpated.

For the seduction of his fellow traveller, what was the course taken by the ingenuity of *Ferdinand Count Fathom*? Ask his biographer—ask *Smollet*, he will inform you. He began with picking her pocket: her purse, and with it her virtue, was then at his command. By mere existence on the throne on which he is sitting, without need of stirring a finger, uttering a word, or giving a nod, in the character of that Ferdinand, and with the same disastrous success, may the Monarch of these realms act. Accomplices—the hero of *Smollet's* history had none: he needed none. The official s—— of Britannia's virtue—the C——r-General of this country—may have as many, as there are men, in whose breasts exists an *effective demand* for

any of the good things which he has at command: and, in regard to this *effective demand*—as Adam Smith would call it—the difficulty would be to find—not the bosom in which it *does*, but the bosom in which it *does not* display itself.

In this state of things, C——r-General being the proper style and title of the head-manager of the concern, taken by himself,—add the Aristocracy—the corrupted and corrupting Aristocracy—C——r-General and Co. is the proper firm of the partnership. As to the business of it, it consists but too plainly, like that of the Bank of England, in draining the contents of all pockets into its own; and the more intolerable the indigence thus produced, the more craving the demand for that corruptive supply, by the hope of which men are engaged to concur in the continually repeated measures, from which the indigence receives its continually repeated aggravation.

Now of this almost universal corruption, what is the effect?—A mere *moral spot*? a mere *ideal* imperfection?—Alas! no: but a somewhat more palpable and sensible one. What the real, the sensible mischief consists in is—the *sacrifice* made, as above, of the interest and comfort of the *subject many*, to the overgrown felicity of the *ruling few*: the effect of the corruption being—to engage all whom it has corrupted to bear their respective parts in the perpetual accomplishment of their perpetual sacrifice. Is not this sufficiently intelligible?—Well, if *that* expression be not, perhaps *this* may be: viz. that the *subject many* long have been, and, but for the only remedy, may

with but too much reason for ever expect to be, continually more and more grievously oppressed, that the *ruling few* may be more and more profusely pampered.

Now suppose an army of Frenchmen garrisoning England, as an army of Englishmen (oh! pretenceless and inhuman tyranny!) are garrisoning France. In that case, what would the description of our condition be? What, but that the dominion we were groaning under was the dominion of a set of men whose interest was opposite to our own, by whom that oppositeness was understood and felt, and by whom our interest was made a continual sacrifice to that separate and hostile interest.—Well: *that*, and but too indisputably is it not the description—the too just description—of the dominion under which we live?

Discarding the case of *public*—of *national*—subjection under a foreign yoke, take the case of *private*—of *domestic subjection*:—take the case of *Negro* slavery. The description of the case, is it not still the same?—The Slave-holder—it may be said—for it is continually said—has an interest in common with that of his slaves. True: and so has the Mail-Coach Contractor in common with that of his horses. While working them, and so long as they appear able to work, he accordingly allows them food. Yet, somehow or other, notwithstanding this community of interest, so it is that but too often Negro as well as horse are worked to the very death.—How happens this?—How?—but because in the same breast with the conjunct interest is lodged a separate and sinister interest, which is too strong for it. Even so is it in the case of C—General and Co., under whose

management the condition of the poor people is day by day approaching nearer and nearer to the condition of the Negro and the horse.

"I can have no interest but that of my people," says the Royal parrot—I can have no interest but that of my people: with these words in his mouth, he gives the touch of the sceptre to a Bill for establishing a nest of sinecures.*

* Behold the connexion between waste and corruption, in the view taken of it by divers statesmen at divers periods.

Proceedings of the Society of the *Friends of the People*, London, 1793, May 5th, *W. Baker*, *M. P.* Chairman, *Lord John Russell*, Deputy Chairman—p. 22.—"We positively affirm, that in fact, a case has lately occurred which, on the very principles of the objection, establishes the necessity of a Reform in the construction of the House of Commons. We mean the late *Armament* intended to act against *Russia*, which might have involved the nation in a most impolitic and ruinous war; and to which a large majority of the House of Commons gave their support, in direct contradiction to the real interests, and to the acknowledged sense of the people."

Page 31.—From the answer (to Major Cartwright's Society), proposed from the Committee for the adoption of the Society:—"The immense accumulation of debt,—the enormous taxation of seventeen millions of annual revenue,—demonstrate that the collective interests of the community have been neglected or betrayed."

Parl. Reg. A° 1793, p. 408? *Burke*, A° 1770? as quoted with applause by *Mr. Erskine*, now *Lord Erskine*. "When the House of Commons was thus made to consider itself as master of its constituents, there wanted but one thing to secure it (this was in 1770) against all possible future deviation towards popularity—an unlimited fund of money to be laid out according to the pleasure of the Court."

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 420. *Mr.* (now *Sir Philip*) *Francis*. Speaking of Parliamentary Reform, "this (says he) is the only measure, that can restore and preserve the Constitution,—that can prevent such ruinous wars in future."

Parl.

Under the constitution as it stands—under the administration as it is carried on—in what state, as to—

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 319. *Charles Fox and Edmund Burke.* “Since that time,” (1784, the year of Pitt the second’s accession,) “four-fifths of the elective franchises of Scotland” (in this work he had the aid of the first Lord Melville) “and Cornwall more particularly have passed into the hands of government; and the prediction, which an honourable gentleman (Mr. Burke) then made upon the occasion, has been literally fulfilled—no House of Commons has been since found *strong enough* to oppose the Ministers of the Crown.” Thus far Charles Fox:—add—nor *willing enough.*

Woodfall’s Debates, vol. iii. anno 1797. *Charles Fox and Pitt 2d.* Speaking of the American war, and observing that popular or not popular at the commencement, (anno 1780) in which year a dissolution of Parliament took place, the war was at any rate “extremely unpopular, as a proof that the Parliament did not even then (anno 1780) speak the voice of the people—and after asserting the opportunities of information possessed by him, and the care and accuracy with which he had endeavoured to avail himself of them:” he adds, “not more than three or four persons were (then) added to the number of those who had from the beginning opposed . . . that war.”

In the same page, *Pitt* being present, Fox, from words alledged to be those of Pitt, imputes to him a persuasion to that same effect. “You see” (says Pitt, as thereupon quoted by Fox,) “you see that so defective, so inadequate is the present *practice*, at least, of the elective franchise, that no impression of national calamity, no conviction of ministerial error, no abhorrence of disastrous war, are sufficient to stand against that corrupt influence which has mixed itself with election, and which drowns and stifles the popular voice.

Woodfall’s Debates, anno 1797, iii. 323. *Charles Fox.* There is a lumping consideration . . . which, now more than ever, ought to make “every man a convert to Parliamentary Reform: there is an annual revenue of *twenty-three millions* sterling collected by the executive government from the people.” Thus far Fox. Anno 1797, it was these twenty-three millions: now, year ending 5th Jan.

wards the one and the other, are the affections of the people?—Take the answer from Lord Castlereagh,

1817, 57,860,694*l.* Last year, year ending 5th Jan. 1816, it was 66,448,802*l.* Commons House. Abstract of net produce of revenue; year ending 5th Jan. 1816 and 1817. Date of order for printing, 3d Feb. 1817. The hope, of course excellent, with all speed, its deficiency will be supplied, and increase added. Well now: besides the other evils, is it not by the twenty-three millions that the sixty-six millions have been generated? In another twenty years will the sixty-six millions have been swelled to 132 millions? No:—but for what reason? Only because, before it can have arisen to that pitch, the people must, in such a proportion, have been either slaughtered or starved, that by no addition, either to the slaughtering or the starvation, could any increase be produced:

Woodfall's Debates, anno 1797, iii. 330. *Charles Fox*. (Speaking of and to Pitt 2d.) He "has bestowed no fewer than 115 titles, including new creations and elevations from one rank to another; how many of them are to be ascribed to national services, and how many to Parliamentary interest, I leave the House to inquire." So far Fox. This was no more than thirteen years, from 1784 to 1797: since that time twenty years have elapsed: to any person who would have the goodness to inform me, on produceable grounds, what the addition, that has since been made, may amount to, that I may give to the information such publicity as may be in my power, the gratitude of all honest reformists will be due.

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 383. "*Mr. Grey*" (now *Earl Grey*) "remarked that when *Mr. Pitt* moved for an addition of 100 Members to be added to the Counties, he could not carry his motion; and yet he had contrived (this was in nine years from 1784 to 1793) to procure the nomination of forty Members by indirect means; for he had added to the House of Peers thirty Members, who either nominated directly or by irresistible influence, that number of Members of the House of Commons as . . . the petitioners were ready to prove." See the Petition, *ib.* p. 518, in which it is asserted, that at this time (1793) 150 Members owe their elections entirely to Peers: and that forty Peers return eighty-one Members.

Parl.

(Morn. Chron. Feb. 8th, 1817). In the year just ended, 53,000 were the number of firelocks "indispensably necessary to aid the civil power in the discharge of its duty:"—in other words, to keep the people from the endeavour to substitute a better to the government as it stands. Now indeed, at this season of forced retrenchment, 5,000 is the number of men to be struck off from the desired complement of 53,000. Struck off! Why? Because they are regarded as superfluous? Oh no: for of those means of coercion which require no money, boundless is the supply which at this very moment is providing. Why then? Even because,—as under the most perfectly undisguised despotism, so under a disguised one,—in so far as supplies can not be had,—the revenue having, in the compass of a single year, fallen off for example, by any such amount as that of one-sixth,—retrenchment must be made. In this time not only of peace but of triumph—no Pretender in existence—France, instead of a cause of fear, an object of compassion—three-and-fifty thousand men necessary to be kept up to prevent a second revolution! In the same year of the last century, as this is of the present one, our great grandfathers—what would they have said to such a number? Our great grandfathers,—in whose days, a Pretender continually threatening from abroad, and at home, a strong party even after a defeat, were still

.. Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 388. *Mr. Grey, now Earl Grey.* "Were the evils of the American war nothing? These were in his mind; entirely owing to the unequal and corrupt representation in Parliament."

strong enough to keep on foot matter for another rebellion, which in twenty-eight years from that time, actually broke out! In the same year of the last, as this is of the present century, what was the whole number demanded and provided for this same service?—Answer: 16,000, and no more; not so much as *one third* of the number actually in demand, as above. Walpole, then in opposition, opposing even that number on the ground of alledged excess.*

* Upon a necessarily hasty search, made into such documents as happen to lie within my knowledge and my reach,—the following are the amounts of such part of the army, as appears to have been employed—employed for the same sort of service as that one above, for which the 53,000 have been employed. To match the present and last year, the years here exhibited, by the description of *years of ordinary demand*, have all of them been years of manifest and complete peace. Out of the hundred years in question, no more than 29 (it may be observed) are on this occasion brought to view. Of the comparative smallness of this number, there have been three causes. 1. About half the number of years have been years of actual war. 2. Of the remaining *fifty* or thereabouts, being *years of peace*, (*i. e.* years in no part of any of which was war actually carried on), *twenty-nine* was the only number, concerning which, in the sources of information in question, any information could be found. In consideration of their being so nearly in agreement with each other, and at the same time forming so considerable a majority, *twenty*, out of the twenty-nine are here inserted, under the above head of *years of ordinary demand*. In the case of the remaining nine years, ranked as will be seen, under the contrasted head of *years of extra-demand*,—the circumstances of the times not being, for any such purpose as the present, capable of being subjected to a particular examination,—the very circumstance of the superiority of the numbers, in so much smaller a number of instances, has been regarded as constituting an adequately conclusive proof, that in those years respectively there existed some special cause of alarm,—either from within or from without, or both,—of such a nature, as to cause

Well then:—by a standing army it is that we are governed: and a standing army—a standing army of

the condition of those years to make an approach more or less considerable to the condition of war years.

How (it may be asked)—how is it that, by preparation for war to be carried on abroad, increase should be given to the number of troops employed or provided for home service? Answer.—They are raised and kept at home in *readiness* to be employed in foreign service: and till they are thus employed, they are not distinguishable from those destined to no other than home service.

Note that, in the very nature of the case, to a very considerable amount, though it be impossible to say to what amount, the number cannot but have been—so from the very first, even Walpole, himself, declared it to be—superfluous and excessive: the excess having for its cause the principle of the inseparable union between waste and corruption, as already brought to view.

| Years of ordinary demand. | | | | Extra demand. | |
|---------------------------|---------------------|--------|---------------------|---------------|---------------------|
| Years. | Number of Soldiers. | Years. | Number of Soldiers. | Years. | Number of Soldiers. |
| 1717 | 16,000 | 1767 | 16,754 | 1728 | 22,955 |
| 1729 | 17,709 | 1768 | 17,265 | 1734 | 25,734 |
| 1736 | 17,704 | 1769 | 17,142 | 1740 | 28,852 |
| 1737 | 17,704 | 1775 | 17,547 | 1741 | 29,033 |
| 1738 | 17,704 | 1774 | 18,024 | 1742 | 35,554 |
| 1752 | 18,857 | 1786 | 14,380 | 1746 | 33,030 |
| 1753 | 18,857 | 1787 | 14,140 | 1770 | 23,000 |
| 1764 | 17,532 | 1788 | 14,380 | 1771 | 23,442 |
| 1765 | 17,421 | 1789 | 17,448 | 1784 | 21,505 |
| 1766 | 17,306 | 1790 | 17,448 | | |

* * * From Chandler's Debates, years, 1717, 1728, 1729, 1734, 1737, 1738, 1740, 1741, 1742. From Almon's Debates, 1752, 1753, 1764, 1765, 1766, 1767, 1768, 1770, 1789, 1790. From Annual Register, 1769, 1771, 1774, 1784, 1786, 1787, 1788. From Almon's Parliamentary Register, year 1775.

Shields and Monitions—by these two appellations two different sets

the magnitude which has been seen—this, this is the sort of instrument, without which, it is said,

of quotations, examples of which are hereinafter likely to be found, may be designated: *shields*, composed of quotations exhibiting opinions accordant with those here delivered; and having for their object the defending those opinions against the scorn or hostile terror of those, in whose eyes, by the single word *innovation*, be the proposition what it may, an objection, and *that* a conclusive one, is afforded; of these an exemplification has just been seen:—*monitions*, composed of quotations, from persons who,—being *absolutely* and, generally speaking, more or less well-informed as it may have happened,—have, by one means or other, commonly by that presumption, which is so natural an accompaniment of power, by what means soever obtained—been led into the misadventure of betraying, at any rate, *relative* ignorance,—by their eagerness to overwhelm with the reproach of ignorance men in inferior situations, whose interests and wishes have been regarded as not accordant with theirs.

As to the quotations employed as *shields*, an intimation given once for all, may in this place have its use. In the *Plan* itself, may be seen the train of reasoning, by which I was led to the several particular conclusions: in the formation of that train of reasoning, no opinions drawn from any external source bore any part: hence it is, that,—unless what regards the narrowness there given to the extent of the electoral franchise be regarded as an exception,—in no instance has it happened, that the opinions here employed as *shields* had served in the character of sources of judgment or invention: the formation of the opinion having, in every instance, preceded the discovery of the external support.

Not that I could ever suppose myself exempt from the yoke of that necessity,—by which, on many of the most important occasions of life, all human-kind are condemned to speak and to act, upon no firmer ground than that of *derivative* judgment:—not that any such continually disproved fancy could ever for a moment have had place in my thoughts,—but that, on any question or subject, those excepted on which a *self-formed* judgment had been formed by me, it has never happened to me to see, in my own instance, any use in the

we could not be governed; and by which,—so long as the constitution, in the form into which it has been moulded, lasts,—it is the intention of those that govern us that we shall be governed. And this is that Constitution—that matchless Constitution—in the praises of which, those whose opulence or power have been produced by, or are dependent on, the abuses of it, never tire. And in this Constitution we have a Parliament:—and in this Parliament a House of Commons:—and in this House of Commons a mask for a military government of its own erection:—and this mask so transparent an one! and,

endeavour to present any thing to the public eye. Ascribing to my own opinion, taken by itself, as little intrinsic weight as it is possible for any other person to ascribe to it,—never giving it as worth any thing, and by this only means making sure of never giving it for more than it was worth,—accordingly so it is, that, in the *reasons* subjoined to it by way of support, they having been the considerations from which the judgment expressed by it had been deduced,—in these reasons may be seen the only claim, which I could ever regard any opinions of mine as possessing to the public notice.

As to *innovation*,—in the instance of every man, by whom, under that name, any proposed measure is held up to view in the character of a just object of horror or terror,—let it be judged, whether, by the importance attached to that universally irrelevant argument, an acknowledgement is not made of a sort of incapacity of framing, in relation to the subject, any self-formed judgment:—a sort of incapacity of producing any arguments that are not irrelevant ones. Of the consciousness of any such sense of incapacity,—if not humility, at any rate toleration as towards dissentients, should be a natural, and would be a more becoming result: unhappily, pertinacity and intolerance are full as apt to have place in the *inverse* as in the *direct* ratio of the soundness of the judgment,—of the degree in which *appropriate intellectual aptitude* has place,—and of the quantity of appropriate information possessed.

under this military government, so long as the mask remains—under this military government are we to lie down, now and for ever, prostrate and contented?

Well—the *United States*—the seat of *representative democracy*, alias anarchy—what *plots*, real or pretended, have they, or have they ever had, in their bosom? What *standing army* is it that they have? On the subject of those concerns which are the concerns of every man, what laws have they to prevent each man from communicating with every other?—on pain of death, to prevent every man who is *not*, from speaking his mind to any one who *is*, a *soldier*?

Oh! but the fault, whatever it is, it is always the fault of the people:—behaving continually worse and worse, they must continually be treated with more and more just severity:—the sinners for their own sins—the non-sinners for the sins of the sinners—so long as any of them are left alive. . . *

* So long as, in any shape, offences, having for their object relief from the mischief of *mis-rule*, are committed,—the laws, whatever they are, that have been made for the punishment of them, are thereby proved insufficient; and thus it is, that, for the self-same offences, fresh and fresh laws, continually increasing in extent and severity, must be made.

Theory as well as practice, is not this become already a *maxim* of government? Is not this become the very character of the government? Lie as you are, you are more and more oppressed gradually:—seek relief—forcibly, or be it ever so peaceably—you are oppressed and crushed suddenly. When all *hands* are cut off, lest they should write treason—all *eyes* put out, lest they should read treason—all *tongues* cut out, lest they should speak treason—then it is that the climax of precautionary wisdom will be at an end.—Yes, then indeed! but how much earlier? Not at all: unless in some part of

No:—at this time—at any time, on the part of the people, any extensive discontent, that has ever manifested itself, never has it been the fault of the people. Discontent?—no: patience—too much patience, in *that* has been their fault—their only fault: a sad fault *that*—and, unhappily, under every government but an adequately representative government—under which alone the concerns which are those of every man, are left without restraint to the discourse of every man—an incurable one.—The people? what interest have they in being governed badly?—in having their universal interest sacrificed to any separate and adverse interest?—But the men by whom they have been governed—the interest which these men have had in governing badly—in governing as they have governed—this interest has here been made manifest, or nothing can be.

§ 4. *Sole remedy in principle—democratic ascendancy.*

Such being the disease, behold now the remedy—the only remedy: he for whose nerves it is too strong, let him, as soon as the irritation pains him,—take warning and shut his eyes against it: let him shut his eyes, and prepare his neck for a yoke, the pressure of which will continue on the increase, till either convulsion

this or a future century—as towards the close of the seventeenth—the people—soldiers and all—should become *effectually* tired of such theory and such practice.

breaks it, or existence sinks under it. This remedy—two words, viz. *democratical ascendancy* will, in principle, suffice for the expression of it. Taking this for the general description of the *end*,—*parliamentary reform* will next make its appearance in the character of a *means*: *parliamentary reform in general* as a proposed means: *radical parliamentary reform*, as the only means, by which either that immediate end, or the ultimate end—political salvation, can, in the nature of the case, be accomplished.

Without any outward and visible change in the forms of the Constitution,—by the means already indicated, by the mere instrumentality of the ever increasing mass of the matter of good operating in the hands of the crown in the character of matter of corruptive influence,—have the two separate, partial, and sinister interests,—viz. the *monarchical* and the *aristocratical*,—obtained over the *democratical* interest, (which is no other than the *universal* interest), not only an *ascendancy*—but an ascendancy so complete, that, under the outside show of a mixt and limited monarchy, a monarchy virtually and substantially absolute, is the result.

Without any outward and visible change in the forms of the Constitution—though waste already committed cannot be caused *not* to have been committed—though past misrule cannot be caused not to have reigned—yet may the plague be stayed.—To the democratical, to the universal interest, *give*—one might almost say, restore—that ascendancy which by the confederated, partial, and sinister interest has been so deplorably abused; and so long as it continues, will continue to be abused;—thus you have the remedy.—*This is what parliamentary reform will do, if it does*

any thing: *this* is what parliamentary reform means, if it means any thing.

This in the year 1780, and again in 1783, was the declared wish—the accomplishment of it the avowed, the official, the parliamentary endeavour of the late Duke of Richmond: a Duke—and with royal blood, though from a sinister channel, flowing in his veins: already even at the earliest of those two periods, a veteran: a veteran—not only in the army, but in parliament, in office, and of course in high office. His declared object was—the restoring to the people what by him were regarded as their *unalienable rights*: and what,—taking the word *right* in a certain altogether usual sense, though assuredly not in a legal sense, may with indisputable propriety be said to be so:—his *object*—giving to the people those rights: his declared and principal *means*—*universal suffrage* and an *annually renewed* House of Commons.—Now this peer—this duke—what object less good than *this* could have been his object?—what his expectation? Could it have been *anarchy*? Could it have been so much as *democracy*?—But read his plan—one of the few schemes of legislation, to which the authors have been at the same time able and willing to give the support of *reasons*. Read his plan, and with it read his reasons: they are contained in a letter dated August 15, 1783, and addressed to “Lieutenant-Colonel Sharman, commander of the Volunteers, Ireland.” Some *ipse-dixitism* in it about *rights* might, in point of reasoning, though perhaps not in point of power of persuasion, have been spared: but, setting aside the *ipse-dixitism*,—better, and sounder, and closer reasoning is not often to be found. Never yet has that man

been found who durst grapple with it. Men shut their eyes against it, and write and talk as if it had never been in existence.*

Now in this change—for unless the plague continues and spreads, a change there must be—in this change is there any *innovation*?—No: in substance, there is not so much as an *innovation*. The one thing needful is—that the *power of the purse* should be actually and effectively in the hands of the real representatives, the freely chosen deputies of the body of the people: the *power of the purse*, that being the power by the exercise of which for the defence of the people, against Steuart tyranny, all other needful powers were acquired. Now, at various periods in the history of this country, this all productive power was actually in the hands of the people: witness statute after statute: witness in one reign, viz. the splendid and unhappily conquering reign of Edward the third, and at thirty-two years interval, two statutes, by each

* Existence, however, it has, and—viz. at Hone's, 55, Fleet-street, and 67, Old Bailey; Hone being Editor of the Reformist's Register—that existence may even at this day be had for twopence. The title is—The right of the People to Universal Suffrage and Annual Parliaments, clearly demonstrated by the late Duke of Richmond.—In this letter of his, the Duke is against *secrecy of suffrage*. By a sort of sentimentality, with perhaps a little of self-regarding interest, perceived or unperceived, at the bottom of it, was his objection—for such as it is, there is but *one*—dictated. A little further on, it may be seen what a contrast the Duke's logic on this head makes with that which had dictated what he has said on the two others. As to his *Bill*—date of it Anno 1780, it is not to be found in the Parliamentary Register, but was published by itself, first (it is said) by *Ridgway*, and just now (Feb. 1817,) by *Hone*.

of which, the annual holding of a parliament—and in those days parliaments annually holden were annually changed—was declared to be the legitimate state and condition of the government.

Now if in those days—in those days in which the press was unknown—in which scarce any man but a priest could so much as read—and in which there was nothing worth the reading—no—not so much as the Bible—to be read;—if in those days in which standing armies were unknown, the people could, without danger to themselves or any body else, possess and exercise the power of the purse;—if in those days of ignorance and barbarism all this could be;—in these our days under the protection of such a forest of bayonets;—in these our days, in which every man either reads or hears his newspaper—and in which every thing that, in this part of the field at least, man can need for his instruction, may be to be found in newspapers;—in these days, shall blind cowardice, or tyranny in the skin of cowardice, find in pretended universal ignorance a pretext for scorning universal suffrage?—But of this more in an ensuing section.

But enough, and already too much, of the endlessly mischievous absurdity involved in the word *innovation*. What? is evil converted into good by being old?—good into evil by being new? What? is experience worth nothing? In toothless infancy is there more wisdom than in grey hairs? From self-contradictory nonsense, let us come to common sense: from long past and widely dissimilar, let us come to the present state of things.

In the ascendancy of the democratic interest,—to any

thing but the continuance of unconstitutionally usurped and most perniciously abused power, is there any, the slightest show of danger? In any determinate and assignable shape, any the smallest ground for apprehension?—What shall decide? Shall it be *experience*? Well: by experience, and that as well in its *negative* as its *positive* shape the decision is pronounced.

Look to positive experience: behold it in the American United States. There you have—not merely democratic ascendancy—democratic ascendancy in a mixt government: but democracy—pure democracy, and nothing else. There you have—not one democracy only, but a whole cluster of democracies: there, all is democracy; all is regularity, tranquillity, prosperity, security: continual security, and with it, continually increasing, though with practical equality divided, opulence. All, all is democracy: no aristocracy; no monarchy; all that dross evaporated. As for us, we need no such purity; we could not brook it: the dross has a glitter on it; our eyes are used to it,—*that* glitter: we cannot part with it. With us, so far as consists with national salvation, possession not only of *property* but of *power*, even though that power be but a *trust*, is a sacred thing: the *uti possidetis* principle, as in international law a well known and frequently applied, so in internal government, a sacred principle. Well, let us keep it then—the whole of it: not pure democracy do we want, nor any thing like it: what we want is, under the existing forms of subjection, the ascendancy—the virtual and effective ascendancy of the democratic interest: this is all we are ab-

olutely in need of: with this we should be content: with less than this it is in vain to speak of content: for less than this cannot save us.

Look to *negative* experience. While, in the language of legitimacy and tyranny, and of the venal slavery that crawls under them, *democracy* and *anarchy* are synonymous terms,—see whether, on the whole surface of the globe, there is, or ever has been any where so much as a single example, from which this abuse of words can receive countenance. Look once more at the United States, and see whether, on the habitable globe, there exists any where so *regular*, so *well-regulated* a government.

Look not to *Greece* or *Italy*: look not to ancient or to middle ages: look not to any *self-acting* democracy. Compared with the democracy here in question—compared with a *representative* democracy—a democracy in which the sole power exercised by the people is that of choosing their deputies, and in those deputies their rulers,—whatever else has been called *democracy*, has had nothing of democracy but the name.

Well then: forasmuch as in democracy, though it be American democracy, a *total* democracy,—forasmuch as in a democracy standing by itself without support from any thing but itself, there be no such thing as danger;—no diminution of security for person, property, reputation, condition in life, religious worship—in a word, for any thing on which man sets a value;—what ground can the nature of the case afford, for any apprehension of danger—in a *partial* democracy, with monarchy and aristocracy by the side; and at the head of it, for its support? for its support, and for keeping it in

order, a standing army—a conquering—an irresistible standing army—that grand instrument of order—all around it?

Well, then:—such being in general terms the instrument—and the only possible instrument—of political salvation, now as to the principles by which the *application* made of it requires to be guided.

At present, the cause of the *misrule* is this: viz. the *rule* is completely in the hands of those whose interest it is—their interest, and thence of necessity their desire—and as far as depends upon them, the determination—that the *misrule* should continue:—the thing required is—leaving the executive part of the government where it is, so to order matters, that the controuling part of the government shall be in the hands of those whose interest it is that good government shall take place of *misrule*: of *misrule* in every shape, and more particularly in the two most intimately connected and mutually fostering shapes—waste and corruption, corruption and waste. Now these are the whole body of the people, two classes alone excepted: viz. those by whom a loss in the shape of *money*, and those by whom a loss in the shape of *power* (not to speak of factitious dignity), would be sustained or apprehended from the change! As to what regards *money*, the *uti possidetis* principle being received and acted upon,—supposing delinquency out of the question, the only loss that could befall any body, would be, loss of the chance of increase. As to what regards *power*, in this shape it cannot be denied, that, of any change,—by which *misrule* could on the whole, or any considerable part, be made to cease,—loss of *power* actually in possession—and

that to no inconsiderable amount—would be an altogether inevitable consequence.—Loss of money? Yes! But of what money? of money at present expected to be received as the wages of corruption:—loss of power? Yes! But of what power?—of that power which at present, for the purchase of the wages of corruption in the shape of money, as well as other shapes, is perpetually on sale.

Before proceeding any farther, up comes (it must be confessed) a question, the title of which to an answer cannot admit of dispute. In the case of so vast a multitude of individuals, of the vast majority of whom it were too much to suppose that they had any tolerable acquaintance with the business of government—how is it that there can be any adequate probability of their concurring in the making a tolerably apt choice, in regard to the persons by whom it shall thus be carried on?

The short answer is—that, as the matter stands, the question is but a question of curiosity and theory. That, for the purpose in question, a choice sufficiently apt *can* be made—*is* habitually made—and, with entire confidence may be reasonably depended upon—is, by the American examples above referred to, put altogether out of doubt. The question is, then, reduced to *this*: viz. in what, among the circumstances belonging to the case, are we to look for the *cause* of a state of things, of the existence of which there cannot be a doubt,—but which, in a distant and abstract view of it, presents itself as thus improbable.

For giving immediate facility to the answer, a distinction no less familiar in itself than important in its

consequences—may here be brought to view. This is—the distinction between a *self-formed* and a *derivative* judgment. On the ground of any *self-formed* judgment, few indeed could, in a case such as that in question, be expected to act with any tolerable degree of wisdom or felicity:—true: but neither is it less so, that on the ground of *derivative* judgment, there exists not, (nor in this country is ever likely to exist), any such large and miscellaneous body of men, of whom the majority may not, even in such a case as this, be expected, and with reason, to act with a degree of felicity adequate to the purpose.—For, in respect of those concerns, which to each individual taken by himself, are of still superior importance—viz. *physic, law, and religion*, for example—every man who is not, in his own eyes, competent to make on the ground of his own self-formed judgment, the choice of an agent or assistant, does he not feel himself reduced to the necessity of acting on the ground of *derivative* judgment?—in a word, on the ground of *public opinion*? and, under the yoke of this, as well as so many other necessities, the business of life—of private, of domestic life—goes on in the way we see. Of *private* life? Well, and why not also of *public* life. Of the business of *each*? Well, and why not then the business of *all*?*—And note, that on this

* Reader, mark well the following parallel: when read, go back a few pages, apply it to pages vii. viii. ix. and x.

I. *Under mixt Monarchy—British Constitution.*

1. Falling off of the receipts of this last year, ending 5th January, 1817, as compared with those of the last preceding one, 9,083,108*l*.

2. Receipts

occasion, the probability of making any such choice as shall be not only foolish but mischievous—(and in so

2. Receipts of the same year, ending 5th of January, 1817, 57,360,698*l*.

3. Proportion of the amount of the *deficiency* to that of the *receipt*, about *one-sixth*.

II. Under Representative Democracy—American United States Constitution:

1. Receipts of the last year (ending five days earlier than the above, British)—dollars 47,000,000.

2. Deduct payments and appropriation that same year, 38,000,000.

3. *Surplus* remaining in the treasury, applicable in discharge of the public debt, 9,000,000.

Proportion of the *surplus* to the *expenditure*, about *one-fourth*.

4. Public debt at the end of the last year, dollars 110,000,000. Amount in pounds sterling, the dollar about 5*s*. about 27,500,000.

The British sums are taken from the Commons' House document, 3d February, 1817: the American from that which follows.

Morning Chronicle, Jan. 2, 1817: Extract from the *Message*, transmitted by the *President* of the United States of America, to both Houses of *Congress*, Dec. 3, 1816.

“ It has been estimated, that during the year 1816 † the actual receipts of revenue at the treasury, including the balance at the commencement of the year, and excluding the proceeds of loans and treasury notes, will amount to about the sum of 47 millions of *dollars*: that, during the same year, the actual payments at the treasury, including the payment of the arrearages of the war department, as well as the payment of a considerable excess beyond the annual appropriation, will amount to about the sum of 38 millions of *dollars*; and that consequently at the close of the year, there will be a surplus in the treasury of about the sum of 9 millions of *dollars* . . . The floating debt of treasury notes and temporary loans, will soon

† [*Estimated*.:] for to the whole of the year, *positive statement* could not be applied, near a month of it being at that time still to come.

far as it is not practically mischievous, no matter how foolish it is) is not only circumscribed, but circumscribed within very narrow limits, by the nature and number of the individuals who, on an occasion such as that in question, can offer themselves, with any the least prospect of finding acceptance, at the hands of the majority of so large a multitude as that in question: say at least, several thousands. True it is that, were the electors, for example, the parishioners of a small parish,—many might be the instances in which it might happen, that foolish and ignorant men might in considerable and those preponderant numbers, agree in the choice of some artful and profligate man of their own level and their own set,—by whom, to his own private and sinister purposes, their confidence would be abused. But when—whether it be in respect of territory as well as population, or in respect of population alone—the electoral circle is of any such large dimensions as those in question, all such individual and private causes of seduction and deception are altogether out of the question: no man can either propose himself, or be reasonably expected to be proposed, but upon the ground of some reputed qualification, of his possession of which, supposing him to possess it, the whole population of the electoral district will be in some sort in the possession of the means of judging.

But of all qualifications, real or imaginable, the

be entirely discharged. The aggregate of the funded debt, composed of debts incurred during the wars of 1776 and of 1812, has been estimated with reference to the 1st of January next, (1817) at a sum not exceeding one hundred and ten millions of dollars,

qualification, such as it is, which consists in the possession of property to such an amount as to draw attention, is at the same time the very qualification, concerning the possession of which men in general are best satisfied with their competence to form a right judgment,—and that on which, in proportion to its real virtue in the character of presumptive evidence of appropriate aptitude, the greatest reliance is,—by men in general, and in particular by the most uninformed classes,—wont to be placed.

The men who at present determine the course of election by the influence of *will on will*—these same men, in the event of the proposed change—these same men—and in a proportion much more likely to outstrip, than to fall short of their deserts,—would they not, by the influence of *understanding*, real or imputed, on *understanding*, exercise, for the most part, the same effective power—produce, for the most part—so far as concerns possession of the seats—the same effects as now?—Possession of the seats?—Yes: viz. in the case of those, in whose eyes, after the necessary change, on the only terms on which they would be to be had, these seats would be worth having. But, among those, by whom at present the office is at present possessed—possessed, and on each occasion, at each man's pleasure, the functions that belong to it, either exercised or neglected,—how many are there in whose eyes it would be worth possessing, if at all times the *functions* could not be left neglected, except when, under the spur of sinister interest, the *power* of it came of course to be abused?

Well—and suppose among 658 members—(for the

supposition, *that* number may do as well as another.)—among the 658 members, returned under a system of democratic ascendancy, *ten* knaves should be found plotting and confederating with one another (though what in that case could they be gainers by any such plotting?)—and fourscore and ten fools foolish enough to be led by them. In such a case what is the mischief they would be able to do?

Alas! how happy would not the state of things be in comparison of what it is, if there were not more than *thrice* ten knaves occupied without ceasing, not only in the plotting of mischief, but in the doing it and carrying it into effect!—More than *thrice* ten such knaves—(or, if it be but *once*, the *once* is but too sufficient)—and more than thrice fourscore and ten, —in whom, in a proportion altogether indeterminable,—the knavery of following, with eyes wide open, at the tail of the knaves,—and the folly of suffering themselves to be led, with winking, or half-closed, or carelessly, or purposely averted eyes,—are combined.*

* Woodfall's Debates, anno 1797, vol. iii. p. 316. Charles Fox.—“ I say that it is demonstrated, beyond the power of subterfuge to question, that genuine representation alone can give solid power, and that, in order to make the government strong, *the people must make the government*. I say, that you ought to act on *this grand maxim of political wisdom thus demonstrated*, and call on the people according to the original principles of your system to the strength of your government;—I say, that in doing this you will *not innovate*—you will *not imitate*”—(meaning the French Constitution, which he had been speaking of)—“ you will only recur to the true path of the Constitution of England. In making the *people* of England a

Ascendency? Yes: ascendency it must be: nothing less will serve.

“ constituent part of the Government of England, you do no more than restore the genuine edifice, designed and framed by our ancestors.”

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 377.—*Mr. Grey, now Earl Grey*.—“ In bringing forward this business, he was aware how ungracious it would be, for that House to shew that *they are not the real representatives of the people*.”

Ibid. p. 379.—*Mr. Grey, now Earl Grey*.—“ Why should innovations of the prerogative be watched with less jealousy, than innovations in favour of the popular part of the constitution?”

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 380.—*Mr. Grey, now Earl Grey*.—“ On looking into the Journals of the 24th of May, 1784, he found a motion made, that the King’s Speech should be read, wherein his Majesty says, that he would be always desirous to concur with his Parliament, in supporting and maintaining in their just balance the rights of every branch of the Legislature.”

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 387.—*Mr. Grey, now Earl Grey*.—“ Are all these innovations to be made, in order to increase the influence of the executive power,—and is nothing to be done in favour of the popular part of the constitution, to act as a counterpoise?”

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 407. Commons. “ A modern author of great eloquence,” [*E. Burke, anno 1770?*], says *Mr. Erskine, now Lord Erskine*, “ speaking of those changes in the English government, truly said, ‘The virtue, spirit, and essence, of a House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the nation. It was not instituted to be a control upon the people, as of late it has been taught by a doctrine of the most pernicious tendency, but as a control for the people.’”

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 417.—*Sir William Young*.—“ A delegation, of Members to that House, ought ever to be . . . of persons having one common interest with those who sent them there.” So much for principle: now for fact.—Who were the persons in the parenthesis here marked as omitted? Answer. “Gentlemen answering the description of those whom he then addressed.” Could this have been serious?—was it not irony?

Parl.

Talk of *mixture*—yes, this *may* serve, and *must* serve:—but then, the intrinsically noxious ingredients—the ingredients which must be kept in, though for no better reason than that we are used to them—and being so used to them, could not bear—(for who is there that could bear?)—to part with them—these ingredients—of which the greatest praise would be that they were inoperative—must not be in any such proportion of force, as to destroy, or materially to impair, the efficiency of the only essentially useful one.

Talk of *balance*, never will it do: leave that to Mother Goose and Mother Blackstone. Balance—balance—politicians upon roses—to whom, to save the toil of thinking—on questions most wide in extent, and most high in importance—an allusion—an emblem—an anything—so as it has been accepted by others, is accepted as conclusive evidence—what

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 465.—*Mr. Whitbread*.—"Sir, I maintain that there ought to, be a *community of interest* between the people and their representatives."

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 468.—*Mr. Whitbread*.—"We wish only to restore to the democracy that power which it ought to possess."

Works of *Sir William Jones*, by *Lord Teignmouth*, vol. viii. p. 506.—"Speech on the Reformation of Parliament," spoken anno 1782, May 28th, at the London Tavern, afterwards penned and published by himself.—"It is true" (says *Sir William Jones* in this speech) "that the *spirit* of the Constitution ought not to be changed:" [no, in so far as good: in so far as bad, why not?] "it is false, that the *form* ought not to be corrected: and I will now demonstrate that the spirit of our Constitution requires a representation of the people *nearly equal*, and *nearly universal*."

mean ye by this your *balance*? Know ye not, that in a machine of any kind, when forces *balance* each other, the machine is at a stand?—Well, and in the machine of government, immobility—the perpetual absence of all motion—is that the thing which is wanted? Know ye not that—since an emblem you must have—since you can neither talk, nor attempt to think, but in hieroglyphics—know you not that, as in the case of the body *natural*, so in the case of the body *politic*, when motion ceases, the body dies?

So much for the *balance*: now for the *mixture*:—the mixture to which, as such, such virtue is wont to be ascribed. Here is a form of government, in which the power is divided among three interests:—the interest of the great body of the people—of the *many*—and two separate interests—the interest of the *one* and the interest of the *few*—both of which are adverse to it:—two separate and narrow interests, neither of which is kept on foot—but at the expense, to the loss, and by the sacrifice, of the broader interest. This form of government (say you) has its advantages.—Its advantages?—compared with what?—Compared with those forms of government, in which the people have no power at all, or in which, if they have any, they have not so much?—Oh yes: with any such form of government for an object of comparison, its *excellence* is unquestionable. But, compare it with a form of government in which the interest of the people is the only interest that is looked to:—in which neither a single man, with a separate and adverse interest of his own, nor a knot of men with a separate and adverse interest of their own, are to be found;—where no in-

interest is kept up at the expense, to the loss, by the sacrifice, of the universal interest to it,—where is *then* the excellence?

Nay but (says somebody) in the form of government in question, what the *supreme*—the *universal* power is—is a compound—a mixture of the three *powers* corresponding to the three *interests*: what the *excellence* produced by it is in—not any one of the three ingredients taken by itself: no—it is the *mixture*. Take away any one of the three masses of power, the mixture is changed: the excellence is diminished:—take away any two of them, mixture has place no longer:—the excellence vanishes.

Good:—this notion about *mixture*:—O yes, good enough, so long as the respective natures of the several interests are kept out of sight. Look at them, and then see whether it be possible that, taking the power of the people for the *simple* substance,—by the adding to it either or both of the two other powers, and thus making a *mixture*,—any such quality as *excellence*, with reference to what belongs to the *simple* substance taken by itself, can be produced.

A form of government, in which the interest of the whole is the only interest provided for;—in which the only power is a power having for its object the support of that interest;—in this form of government behold the *simple* substance. To this simple substance add, separately or conjunctively, a power employed in the support of the interest of one *single* person, and a power employed in the support of the interest of a *comparatively small knot* of persons:—in either of these cases you have a *mixture*:—well; compared

then with the *simple* substance, when and where can be the advantages of this *mixture*.

What? what, could man ever find to say in behalf of *monarchy*, but that monarchy is *legitimacy*? or in behalf of *aristocracy*, but that *property* is *virtue*?

Fair questions these:—should any man feel disposed to answer them, let the answers be so too: and let them not—oh! let them not! be either imprisonment or death!

Go to the flour-mill: get a sack of *flour*, in which there is flour, and nothing else:—make bread of it,—there you have the simple substance. In making your bread, add now to the flour some powder of *chalk*, with or without some powder of *burnt bones*: in either case you have a *mixture*. Well, in either case, so long as you do not add to the flour too much of that which is *not* flour, your bread may afford nourishment—it may give to your constitution—to the constitution of your natural body—a support. But, from either of these two new ingredients, does this body of yours derive any nourishment? the constitution of it any support? your bread any thing that

mocracy—representative democracy is planted in America, with nothing but monarchy to hang over it:—comes the persecution of the G——, the monarchy is now cut up:—and now the salutiferous plant, established in its own roots, cleared of every weed that had choked it, shines in all its purity,—rears and spreads itself,—with matchless, and enviable, and envied, and hated, and dreaded vigour. By the mere passing from the one country to the other, oh, what a host of plagues and miseries in detail—major each in itself, minor compared with the two capital ones—did it not leave behind! Well worth taking and holding up to view would be the list of these abuses: but, for any such task the present is no place.

No:—*but* for the English Constitution, *democracy*, the only democracy worth the name, never could have been known. Oh rare English Constitution! there, there is thy greatest—there thy only lasting praise!

Balance? equality? no: I can not say *equality*, when what I mean is *ascendency*. Palsied would be this hand—motionless this pen—if, for the first time in a life, already of some length, it were to attempt deception. Ascendency—this I do mean, nothing less; more I do not mean—indeed I do not. The Monarch may for ought I know, plunge his hangman's knife in my bowels; but I am not for “cashiering kings.” The one thing needful and sufficient for the purpose—this I would have if I could: this I would have if I could, whatever were its name. More than this, not being in my view needful for the purpose, more I would not have if I could. For any more than for myself, for,

for any more than myself, no title have I to speak. In speaking thus for myself, I speak what I should expect to find the sense—so long as it were the quiet sense—of a vast majority of the people—in two at least of the three kingdoms—high and low—rich and poor together. But, should the only remedy be refused, oppression continue, and exasperation rise against it, then it is not quiet sense that will speak, but exasperation: and, as to what exasperation may say or do, who is there that can undertake to measure it?

§ 5. *Remedy in detail—Radical Parliamentary Reform—Elementary arrangements in this edition of it—their necessity.*

Immediate cause of the mischief—on the part of the men acting as representatives of the people, coupled with adequate *power a sinister interest*, productive of a constant sacrifice made of the interest of the people.

Causes of the above cause,—in the breasts of these same agents, *undue independence* coupled with *undue dependence*: independence as towards their principals; dependence as towards the C———r-General, by whose co———tive influence the above-mentioned sacrifice is produced.

Here, in the above elements—here, in a nutshell, may be seen the mischief and its causes:—against this mischief, revolution apart, behold in *Parliamentary Reform* the name of the only possible remedy. In these elements, when developed, may be seen—what

radical reform is—what the sort of reform termed *moderate* is—thence, what and where the difference.

The reform sketched out in the ensuing plan being of the *radical* kind,—the advantages, by the consideration of which the several elementary arrangements contained in it were suggested, will there be found. But, on the present occasion, what is required is—from all the several arrangements in question, to shew—this having been the result of the inquiry—that while, by *radical* reform, a remedy, and that an adequate one, would be applied,—by *moderate* reform no remedy would be applied, or next to none. In brief, the *undue independence* would remain, and with it the *undue dependence*.

Thus far in generals: now for developement:—

First point to be considered—*situations*, in and to both which, to be effectual, the remedy must apply itself. These are:—

1. Situation of *Parliamentary Electors*.

2. Situation of *Parliamentary Representatives*.

1. First, as to the situation of *Parliamentary Electors*.

Take for the description of the *ultimate end*, *advancement of the universal interest*.

In the description of this end is included—*comprehension* of all distinguishable *particular interests*: viz. in such sort, that such of them, between which no repugnancy has place, may be provided for in conjunction, and *without defalcation*:—while, in regard to such of them, between which any such repugnancy has place, such defalcations, and such alone, shall be made, as, when taken all together, shall leave in the

state of a *maximum* whatsoever residuum of comfort and security may be the result:—with exceptions to as *small* an extent as possible, interests *all* to be *advanced*: without *any* exception, all to be *considered*.

In the character of a means, in this same description is moreover included—if it be not rather the same thing in other words—*virtual universality of suffrage*.

In this same description is moreover included—if it be not the same thing again in other words—*practical equality of representation or suffrage*.

Applied to the name of the quality *universality*, the use of the adjunct *virtual* is—by the limitation of which it gives intimation, to distinguish it from *unlimited* universality of suffrage; *unlimited* or *absolute*, being the *degree* of *universality*, which, but for the application of some limitative adjunct, would, according to the correct import of the word, be to be understood. Of absolute universality, if admitted, the effect would be—to admit to the exercise of the franchise in question persons of various descriptions, none of whom would be capable of exercising it to the advantage either of others or of themselves. *Idiots*, and *infants* in leading-strings, may serve for examples.

By *virtually* universal suffrage, what I mean is—that which will remain of absolutely universal suffrage, when from the number of individuals designated by the word *universal*, all such *defalcations* shall have been made, as, by specific considerations, shall have been shewn to be productive, each of them of a *benefit* in some special shape: that benefit being at the same time *preponderant* over every inconvenience, if

any such there be, resulting from the limitation thus applied:—a limitation, viz. to the operation of the principle, by which the comprehension of all interests, as far as practicable, is prescribed.

If, in the instance of any *one* individual of the whole body of the people, it *be right* that the faculty of contributing to the choice of a representative—to the choice of a person, by whom, in the Representative Assembly, his interest shall be advocated, be possessed and exercised,—how can it be otherwise than right, in the instance of any one *other* such person? In this question, viz. in the impossibility of finding an answer to it, unless it be in the case, and to the extent, of the several defalcations above alluded to,—will, it is believed, be found contained, the substance of the argument in support of *universality of suffrage*,

If, in the instance of any one individual, it *be right* that he should possess a *share*, of a certain degree of *magnitude*, in the choice of a person, to form one in the aggregate body of the representatives of the people,—how can it be right that, in the instance of any other individual, the share should be either *less* or *greater*? In this question is contained the substance of the argument in support of *practical equality of representation*.

That which *universality of suffrage* has for its limit—is—need of defalcation for divers special causes or reasons:—to give intimation of this limit is the use of the adjunct *virtual*. That which *equality of representation* has for its limit is—in the first place, the inconvenience, which in the shape of *delay*, *vexation*, and *expense*, could not fail to be the result of any en-

deavour, employed at any assignable point of time, to give existence to *absolute* equality; in the next place, the impossibility, resulting from the diversities, of which in respect of increase and decrease, the quantity of the population is every where susceptible: viz. the impossibility of keeping on foot—for any length of time, any such *absolute* equality,—supposing it to have, in the first instance, been established.

In the same description is, moreover, included *freedom of suffrage*: *freedom*, to which, in the present instance, may be considered as equivalent terms—*genuineness* and *non-spuriousness*.

To say that a suffrage ought to be *free*, what is it but to say—that the *will* expressed by it ought to be the very will of the person by whom it is so expressed?—The will of that person and of that person only: his *self-formed* will,—the product of his own *judgment*, *self-formed* or *derivative* as the case may be,—not produced by the knowledge or belief of the existence of any *will* or *wish*, considered as entertained by any other person, at whose hands the voter entertains an eventual expectation of receiving *good* or *evil*, in any shape: good or evil, according as, by him the said voter, the wishes of such other person, in relation to the matter in question, shall or shall not have been conformed to.

In so far as, in the instance of any voter, the vote which is given is, according to this explanation, and in this sense, not *free*, it is manifestly *not genuine*: it is *spurious*:—under the guise and disguise of the expression of the will of the *voter*, it is the will,—*not* of the voter, but of some *other* person. In so far as it is

given as and for the will of the voter, the giving it, is it any thing better than an act of *imposture* ?

5 or 4. Secrecy of suffrage. Short reason, its necessity to secure *freedom*:—i. e. to secure *genuineness*—to prevent *spuriousness*.

Extensive and important as is the result of the whole body of electoral suffrages, given in the aggregate number of the electoral districts;—yet, under any scheme of representation, in which any approach were made to *virtual universality* and *practical equality* of suffrage,—the *value*, even in his own eyes, of the *interest** which any one man can have, in the choice of any one candidate in contradistinction to any other, will, generally speaking—and, unless in so far as it may happen to it to be swelled by affections and passions, produced by accidental circumstances—be extremely minute: so minute, that, barring such accidental causes of augmentation, scarcely can there be that *private* and *separate* interest, so small as not to be capable of prevailing against it: of prevailing against it, in such sort, as to give to the vote a direction, *opposite* to that which would be the result of the regard, entertained by the voter, for such his share in the *universal* interest:—always supposed that in the case of such self-regarding interest, the advantage corresponding to it is regarded as *certain* of being received: which in the case of a bribe for example, it always is.

In the case of the vast majority of the number of

* Understand here the interest consisting in his individual share in the universal interest.

voters that would be produced by the principle of universal suffrage,—half-a-guinea, for example, or any interest equivalent to the interest corresponding to that sum, may under a certainty of its being received, be stated as abundantly sufficient for the purpose. But,—setting aside the case of an interest created by expectation of eventual good or evil,—expected, as in that case, at the hands of some other person or persons, according to the direction *known* to have been given to the vote—it is not in the nature of the case, that from a vote given by a single one out of any such large number of electors as is in question—say for example three or four thousand—any assurance or operative expectation whatsoever, of any effective advancement of self-regarding interest to any such amount—no, not so much as to any such amount as the value of a single shilling—should be entertained by any man. By *himself*, nothing could the *candidate* in question, supposing him chosen, do for the advancement of any such individual self-regarding interest on the part of the voting elector ; much less could the *elector himself*, by any disposition given by him to a vote, by which no effect whatsoever could be produced without the concurrence of a thousand or two of other votes.

Thus it appears, that by no *indigenous*—by no *inbred*—self-regarding interest, could any quantity of seductive or corruptive force, adequate to the purpose of effectual corruption, be created.

Not so in the case of such self-regarding interest, as in so many various circumstances is capable of being created by seductive or corruptive force, operating *from without*. In the present state of things,—four

thousand guineas for example, more or less,—is said to be the average price of a venal seat. On this supposition, four thousand, *minus* one, being supposed to be the number of voting electors, two thousand guineas would suffice to carry the election; and, on any other election, supposing four thousand guineas the price paid,—here would be a couple of guineas, which any man, and every man, would have it in his power to receive by the selling of his vote. Here then is a quantity of corruptive force amply sufficient. Half-a-guinea per vote, or some such matter, has been spoken of, as the price habitually paid—and by whom paid?—by a member eminent for probity as well in public as in private life; and this, in a Borough, in which—his probity lying—more within knowledge than elsewhere—cannot but be held in at least as high estimation as it can be any where else. But if, thus operating *ab extra*, an interest corresponding to the sure receipt of half-a-guinea, suffices to determine the conduct of each one of a two or three thousand of electors, much more will four times that sum.*

True it is that, in any such state of things as that which is here proposed,—at no such sum as four thousand guineas, or any thing approaching to it, could

* Setting aside the fear of personal shame, and of the evil example that would be set to the public,—many an election do I remember, in which not only a couple of guineas, but the half or the quarter of that sum, or even less, would, under any degree of affluence, have sufficed to determine the direction which I myself would have given to my vote. Imagine then whether, in my eyes, the sort and degree of moral guilt attached to the case of election bribe-taking on the part of the lower orders in general, can be very intense.

the value of a seat remain. But, no such seat could remain, without possessing some value: and, so long as the seat possessed a venal value, so long would each one of the number of the votes on which the possession of it depended.

Thus minute is the portion of corruptive force, which ought to be regarded as generally adequate to the production of the corruptive effect,—on the supposition that, as in the present state of things, the direction taken by the vote is in each instance *known* or *knowable*. On the other hand, let but this direction be to a certainty *unknown* to every individual but the voter himself,—the freedom—the complete freedom—of his suffrage, is the necessary result. In vain—at the instance, or for the satisfaction of any other person, at whose hands eventual good or evil is expected,—in vain would he disclose, though it be ever so truly, the direction taken by his vote. Apprised, as every voter would be,—that in such a case, not *veracity* but *falsehood* would be the course prescribed by a sense of moral obligation—under the uncertainty produced by the diffusion of a maxim to this effect, and by the universal *declaration* by which the observance of it might be enforced—by no elector could any adequate inducement be found, for putting in any such case any real restraint upon the *freedom* of his suffrage: by no other person in the character of *tempter*, would be seen any adequate prospect of advantage; advantage, even from simple solicitation, still less from pecuniary expense, employed in the endeavour to divest the suffrage of the freedom so essential to the utility of it.

True it is, that it is only on the supposition, that on

the part of the majority of the voters there exists, in the breast of each, either from self-formed or from derivative judgment, a practically adequate conception of the course dictated by his share in the universal interest,—true it is, that only in so far as this supposition is in conformity to fact, will the freedom in question, supposing it secured, be subservient to the great ends proposed: but, of the propriety of a supposition to this effect, proof sufficient for practice has already, it is presumed, been afforded. Nor as yet is the subject closed.

Freedom of suffrage being taken for the *end*,—it will soon (it is hoped) be generally seen and recognised, how essential, in every instance, to the accomplishment of this *end*, *secrecy of suffrage* is, in the character of a *means*.

In what different ways freedom of suffrage is *capable* of being taken away,—to what extent, and by the influence of what descriptions of persons it actually and constantly *is* taken away,—these are among the topics, under which the state of the case will presently be brought to view.

So much as to the situation of *elector*: now as to the situation of *representative*.

For the purpose of this part of the argument, the situation of *elector* must be supposed to have been properly marked out and established: and, for the marking out and establishment of it, the fulfilment of the above condition—the investing of the suffrage with the above-mentioned desirable qualities—viz. virtual universality, practical equality, freedom, and secrecy, must be regarded as effected.

1. *Due dependence*—i. e. *dependence as towards constituents*.—2. *Due independence*—i. e. *independence as towards every other person*—these, together with *universal constancy of attendance*, present themselves as occupying in relation to this situation—as occupying, and on the same line—the first rank, in the scale of *ends and means*.

1. *Dependence as towards constituents*.—Understand dependence to this effect, viz. that, in the event of a man's becoming, in the eyes of the acting majority of his constituents, to a certain degree deficient in respect of any of the elements of appropriate aptitude, (viz. appropriate probity, appropriate intellectual aptitude, or appropriate active talent),—it may,—before he has had time, by means of such deficiency, to produce in any considerable quantity, any irremediable mischief,—be in the power of his constituents, by means of a fresh election, to remove him from his seat.

2. *Independence*.—Understand as towards all other persons at large, but more particularly as towards *C——r-General and Co.* by whose influence alone, the nature of the case considered, *dependence*, as towards himself, can ever,—in the instance of any proportion approaching to a majority of the whole population of the House,—have place.

1. *As to due dependence*:—i. e. *dependence in relation to electors*.

According to another supposition, the truth of which has, it is presumed, been proved,—on the part of the electors,—at any rate, on the part of the great majority of them,—there *does* exist the disposition to contribute towards the advancement of the universal interest, whatsoever can be contributed by their votes:

by those votes, by the aggregate of which—that is, by the majority of that aggregate—will be determined the individuality, of the several persons, on whom in the character of their representatives, will be incumbent the duty of acting their parts respectively, towards the accomplishment of that same ultimate and comprehensive end.

Unfortunately, by the essential and unchangeable nature of the two situations,—viz. that of C——r-General and Co. with the immense mass of the *matter of good*—(not to speak of a less, but still very considerable, mass of the matter of *evil*.)—both *matters* not only capable of being made to operate, but, by reason of these same relative situations, at all times,—without need of any active and purposely directed operation on the part of any body to that end,—actually and with prodigious effect operating in the character of matter of corruption,—the representatives of the people are, one and all, exposed to the action, and that an altogether intense one, of this same baneful *matter*. In this state of things, that which in the very nature of the case is altogether impracticable, is—the keeping them in any such state, as that in which no such sinister interest would be capable of being, in any sensible degree, productive of any sinister effect. Towards preserving a man then in such a situation from being thus corrupted, all that the nature of the case admits of, is—so to order matters that in the event of his becoming obsequious to the influence of the matter of corruption, and thereupon manifesting a deficiency in the element of appropriate probity,

his power of doing mischief may receive a termination as speedy as the other exigencies bearing upon the case may admit.

2. As to *due independence*: *independence as towards C———r-General and Co.*

In regard to this endowment, what is manifest is—that by any direct means—by any means other than that which consists in the rendering the representative dependent by reason of his seat,—dependent therefore in a degree, which cannot be greater than that, whatsoever it be, which corresponds to whatsoever may, in his eyes, be the value of that seat,—nothing towards securing to him the possession of this endowment can be done. This being the case, this endowment resolves itself into the before-mentioned one—viz. *due dependence*; nor, in addition to the antiseptic power possessed by the *due dependence*, does it appear that by any circumstance referable to the head of independence—*due independence*—any ulterior security can be afforded.

That which, Monarch and Lords remaining, no reform in the Commons could prevent the Monarch from doing is—the giving to any member of the Commons House, or to any person in any way connected with him, a useful and needful place, a needless place, a useless place, an overpaid place, a ribbon or other badge of factitious dignity, a baronetcy, a peerage: and so in the case of any number of the members:—in this state stands the *mischief*. But that which a reform in the Commons, so it be a radical one, can do, is—so to order matters, as that

on the occasion of the next general election that has place, the electors, if in their eyes the appointment wears the character of a bribe, shall have it in their power to rid themselves of the supposed betrayer of his trust:—in this state stands *the remedy*. In the way of *punishment*, not to be inflicted but on *legal evidence*, true it is, that against the bestowing of the matter of corruption not on the Member *himself*, but only on a person connected with him, nothing does the nature of the case admit of in the way of remedy: but, so far as concerns the withdrawing their confidence for this purpose, no legal evidence is necessary.

Such being the *primary* or *principal* securities, follow now two *secondary* or *instrumental* ones.

3. *Impermanence* of the situation: viz. to the degree in which it is secured by *annuality* of *re-election*:—by the annual recurrence of the elective process.

In two distinguishable ways does this species of instrumental security contribute to the two principal ones. 1. In proportion to the *short-livedness* of the power, diminishes, both to purchasers, and thence to sellers, the *venal value* of it;—the profit capable of being reaped by C——r-*General and Co.* by corrupting the representative in question, and engaging him to betray his trust: 2. the profit to C——r, and thence, in the shape of money or money's worth, the price which he will be willing to pay, and thence the corruptible representative be able to receive. In the same proportion moreover, increases the power of the *antiseptic*—the corruption-opposing—remedy, placed in the hands of his constituents: the sooner the time

for re-election comes, the earlier will that remedy be applicable.*

To reduce to its minimum the quantity of time, during which it shall be in the power of the representative to continue in the supposed course of mischievous conduct, what would be requisite is—that *immediately*, on the supposed commission of any such breach of trust, it should be in the power of his *principals*, that is to say, of the majority of his constituents, to divest him at any time of such his trust.

But, to produce any such effect might require the keeping of the body of the electors in such a state of almost continual attention and activity, as would be incompatible with that degree of attention to their means of procuring and insuring to themselves in their respective productive occupations, those means of subsistence, without which the requisite quantity would, to a more or less considerable extent, fail; and thereby mischief be produced, in a degree far more extensive than

* Almon's Debates, anno 1744, Jan. 29.—On a motion for annual parliaments, in preference to triennial, made in 1744, by *Thomas Carew*, these arguments were urged with great force by him, and in reply to the ministerial advocate, Sir William Yonge, by *Sir John Phillipps*, whose son was created, in the present reign, *Lord Milford*. The negative was carried by no more than 145 to 113: majority no more than 32. The only other speaker reported is Humphrey Sydenham, much inferior, who spoke in support of the motion. Of Yonge's reasoning the weakness may to a curious degree be seen prominent.

Further on comes the occasion for observing the confidence with which the wish for annual parliaments has been regarded as confined to vulgar ignorance, or a wish to destroy the government.

could reasonably be expected to be produced, by the difference between a possession, capable of being revoked at any time, and upon the shortest notice, —and a possession, the termination of which could not be effected oftener than at the recurrence of some determinate and short period, such as that of a single year; in which last case the maximum of the average duration of the supposed disposition to pursue a mischievous course would, vacations considered, be reduced to considerably less than the *half* of the year.

On this occasion, two inconveniences present themselves as requiring to be guarded against, viz. general want of *preparedness*, and particular and incidental fraudulent *surprise*. When,—for a judgment to be passed by the several bodies of electors, on the conduct of their respective representatives, a determinate and universally fore-known day is appointed,—the time capable of being occupied in the consideration of that conduct will, in every instance, be the same:—in every instance allowing of more time and opportunity for appropriate and universal preparation, than could have place upon any other plan. Thus much as to general preparation: now as to particular surprise.—In this one word, *surprise*, may be seen a species of fraud, to which all public bodies stand exposed. By a particular knot of confederates, whose object is to carry some measure, which, in case of a full attendance, would not in their apprehension be approved,—a day is appointed;—the earlier, in general, the more favourable to the fraud:—two connected objects being of course aimed at—the one *respecting attendance*—to get in those from whom they expect support—the

other, to *keep out* those from whom they expect opposition—in both cases in as great numbers as possible: the other, respecting *preparation*—in such sort that *supporters* may be as *well* prepared,—*adversaries*, such as cannot be prevented from attending, as *ill-prepared*—as possible; these objects are accordingly, in each case, pursued:—pursued by such particular means as the particular nature of the case happens to afford, and admits of.

By the fixation of a determinate and universally fore-known day, both these inconveniences stand excluded: *but* for such fixation, the door to both lies open.

4. *Exclusion of Placemen* from the faculty of *voting* in the House.

The mischief, against which *impermanence* of the situation is calculated to operate as a security, is *contingent* receipt of the matter of corruption: he who to his *seat* in the House adds the possession of any other office, with benefit in a pecuniary or any other shape annex to it,—every such man is *actually* harbouring in his bosom a correspondent portion of that pestilential matter, and is actually under the dominion of its baneful influence.

In the *Plan* may be seen the *reasons*, by which the utility of the attendance of Placemen in the House, with faculty of *speech*, and even of *motion*, is brought to view: and in the same place is shewn, the inapplicability of those reasons to the faculty of *voting*,—and the sufficiency of this unnatural and baneful union to brand, with the just imputation of imbecillity, whatsoever confidence can be placed in any Assembly, in

which a so certainly efficient cause of habitual impropriety, breach of trust, and misrule, is harboured, and suffered to operate.

True it is, that to the case of the holders of places and pensions *at pleasure*,—to them and them alone does the demand for the exclusion in question present itself in its utmost force. But, to the case of the holders of places *during good behaviour*, as the phrase is—a tenure to the purpose in question not substantially different from tenure for life—the demand, though not in *equal*, presents itself as having place in *sufficient*, force.

A place or pension of this description may be, and, it should seem, ought to be, considered as a sort of *retaining fee*. *Gratitude*—private gratitude—as towards the patron—this motive, though, in comparison of self-regarding interest, a social and laudable motive, yet in comparison, especially when acting in opposition to *patriotism*—a motive equally social, and operating upon the more enlarged and important scale,—it operates in the character of an instrument of *corruption*. Gratitude, viz. even when it is *genuine*, and stands alone. But, to whom is it unknown, that, in whatever breast *fear* or *ambitious hope*, looking to the *future*, has place,—gratitude, looking, or pretending to look, solely to the *past*—*gratitude*, wherever the past presents a pretence, is a cloak—a cloak put on by the *self-regarding* motive—a cloak presented by *decency* and *prudence*.

5. *Universal constancy of attendance.*

Be the place what it will, in which, if at all, the function, be it what it may, must be performed,—that function cannot be performed by a man who is not.

there. A maxim to this effect seems not to be very open to dispute.

Beneficial effects of such universal constancy—mischiefs resulting from the want of it—these, together with the means of effectually securing such attendance, may be seen in the *Plan* itself.

The additional character, in which, on the present occasion, it seems necessary to bring it more particularly to view, is—that of an additional security against *undue dependence* in the only case in which it can be productive of practical mischief, viz. the case in which a *majority*, and that a *permanent* one, have been brought under the dominion of the corruptive influence. By absention, every man who, in the case of a *pernicious* measure, is in his real judgment against it; but who, by the sinister influence of C———r-General and Co. is prevented from acting in consequence, at the same time that, were it not for such influence, he would attend and vote in favour of it;—by mere absention, does every such man do exactly *one half* of the utmost quantity of the mischief that he could do by attending and voting in favour of the pernicious measure: and so, *vice versa*, in the case of a *beneficent* measure. On the other hand,—by supposition, the man being one who, on the occasion of the vote he gives, is, in the main, induced to be determined by consideration of public good,—then so it is, that, if the mischievousness of it be to a certain degree palpable, if he were in attendance, shame would suffice to prevent him from giving his vote on the sinister side. But, to the case of mere absention, the cause of it not being known, shame cannot attach itself: here then, in so

far as attendance and non-attendance are left optional, the half of every man's effective influence in the Assembly is left in the condition of a saleable commodity, capable of being sold to C——r-General and Co., without earthly restraint of any kind—not only without fear of *punishment*, under the name of punishment—but without fear of *reproach* or *shame*.

And thus it appears, that, after every thing which, for the securing of probity—appropriate probity—in the breasts of the individual members, each in his separate capacity, against the assaults of corruptive influence, can be done, has been done,—*universal constancy of attendance* remains, in the character of a supplement, necessary to the securing, on the part of the aggregate body, the same indispensable element of official aptitude.

Now then if, of an Assembly constituted by a system of deputation, in which suffrage was at once virtually universal, practically equal, and completely free,—and that Assembly composed of persons, each of whom was removable, at the earliest, in a week or two,—at the latest, in less than a year,—so it were that, by the means of corruptive influence always remaining in the hands of C——r-General and Co., even under a system of constantly universal attendance, a permanent majority could be bought,—then, on this supposition, the due and requisite dependence, viz. dependence on constituents, could not have place. But, that any such open corruption should really have place seems morally impossible. Even under the present system, spite of all its corruption, here and there a case has been seen, in

which the corrupt will of C——r-General and Co. has experienced effectual resistance. Yes: even under the present system: how then could it ever be otherwise under a pure one?

That, even in so much as a single instance, or so much as any one occasion, any such general corruption should, in such a state of things, have place, seems altogether out of the sphere of human probability. But, to produce any permanent and unremedied bad effect, it would require that such corrupt majority should be a permanent one:—for, suppose it ever to cease, the majority of a single day would suffice to unravel the web of corruption, and devote the corruptionists, if not to punishment under the forms of law, at any rate to universal indignation and abhorrence, with a certainty of never more being re-appointed to the trust which, by the supposition, they had thus abused.

Thus far as to the points of most prominent importance. Remain for consideration the arrangements necessary to the simplification of the mode of election, and thence to the exclusion of mischief in so many various shapes, such as *delay, vexation, expense, drunkenness* and *tumult at Elections*,—and *litigation* in consequence of, and even antecedently, and with a view to election:—mischiefs that have place, and, to a certain degree, are even fostered, under the existing mode. But, in regard to these, reference to the *Plan* itself may here suffice.

§. 6. *Differences between this and the original Editions of Radical Reform.*

So much for *absolute* views: now for a *comparative* one.

In the above explained list of principal arrangements—taking *ten* for the number—I find in the original editions of Radical Reform these following: viz. I. Applying to the situation of *Elector* these three, viz. 1. *Comprehension of all interests.* 2. *Virtual universality of suffrage.* 3. *Practical equality of suffrage*:—these three; unless the first and second should be regarded as the same object under two different names.

But, in these same original plans, neither *secrecy of suffrage*, nor therefore (as it seems to me) *freedom of suffrage*, are included.

II. Applying to the situation of *Representative*, these three, viz. 1. Operating in the character of an *instrumental* security, impermanence of the situation, viz. by means of annuality; and,—in so far as this suffices,—the two principal securities, viz. *due dependence*, and, to the extent of its operation, *due independence*. 2. Due dependence as towards Electors. 3. Due independence as towards C——r-General and Co.

But, referable to this last head, in this same original plan two other securities which I do not find,—but which, in the character of instrumental securities, with reference to those principal ones, have presented themselves to my view as indispensable,—are—1. Ex-

clusion of Placemen from the right of voting. 2. Universal constancy of attendance.

Here then are *four* additional securities: two of them applying to the one situation, two of them to the other,—four additional securities, in respect of which I hold myself more particularly responsible.

Taking the other edition, or, in case of difference, those other editions, of radical reform for the original edition or editions,—the edition composed of these same securities with the addition of the four others, which, in the character of instrumental, and indeed indispensable, securities, I have thus ventured to propose, may be distinguished by the name of my edition of Radical Parliamentary Reform, by any body that pleases.*

Arrangements, for the simplification of the process of Election,—and thereby for the diminution of delay, vexation, expense, drunkenness, and disturbance,—are to be found not only in the Radical Reform system, but moreover, in principle at least, in some of the Moderate Reform plans: in so far as they are in this case, they belong not to the present head.

Of the Radical Reform Plan—so far as concerns *annuality of election*,—the unknown member of the House of Commons,—at whose instance the rest of the House joined in that *petition*—(such in those days was the form)—to which Edward the Third *twice*, in the

* Since writing the above, I have become sufficiently assured, that long before the time when the ensuing *Plan* of mine was drawn up, the expedient of the ballot had, in more publications than one, been advocated by *Major Cartwright*: but none of these publications having been seen by me, more than this I am not enabled to say.

shape of a *law*, gave his sanction,—may be considered as the original inventor. In the late reign, viz. as above-mentioned, in 1744, it found in *Thomas Carew* a parliamentary reviver, and in him and *Sir John Phillipps* (not to mention others) two most powerful advocates: on which occasion, as hath been seen, it did not want much of being carried. Within the compass of the present reign, has this same arrangement found in the Lords an advocate in the person of the *late Duke of Richmond*;* and, since his death, viz. anno 1809, in the Commons,† in the person of *Sir Francis Burdett*: but, of the degree of extension insisted upon by the Duke of Richmond no inconsiderable part appears to have been given up by Sir Francis Burdett.

Finding *that* limitation already proposed, and from a quarter so respectable; finding it already proposed, and regarding it as promising—at any rate in a degree sufficient for a first proposal—to be effectually conducive to the purpose,—finding it already thus proposed,—and preferring, on every occasion in which a regard for the end in view will admit of such preference, union to dissension,—hence it was that, in the annex *Plan*, drawn up anno 1809—and word for word as it stands at present—I adopted this same limitation. With the arrangement in that same state, I should, after the closer consideration recently bestowed upon the subject be to a considerable degree satisfied. At the same time, after maturer consideration, on the one hand not seeing in it any source of danger, even though it were in a state of extension still more

* See Appendix, p. 4.

† Ibid. p. 14.

ample than that in which it was prescribed by the Duke of Richmond:—on the other hand, beholding in a limitation which I have ventured to propose a specific one—and *that* in my eyes a very important one, which will be brought to view under the appropriate head,—hence it is, that, to give a general intimation of the difference, the name which, in this my edition, is given to *universal suffrage*, is *virtually universal suffrage*.

§ 7. *Virtual Universality of Suffrage further considered.*

Now as to universal suffrage. Subject to defalcations, each for special reason,—in all eyes but those to which tyranny is the only endurable form of government,—what principle can be more impregnable?

1. Who is there that is not susceptible of discomfort and comfort—of pain and pleasure?

2. Of what is human *happiness, felicity, well-being, welfare*—call it what you please—composed, but comfort, and absence of discomfort—pleasure and exemption from pain.*

3. The happiness and unhappiness of any one member of the community—high or low, rich or poor—what greater or less part is it of the universal happiness and unhappiness than that of any other?

4. Who is there by whom unhappiness is not avoided—happiness pursued?

* See Table of Springs of Action, by the Author.

5. Who is there, by whom unhappiness ought not to be avoided—happiness ought not to be pursued?

6. Who is there that, in the avoidance of unhappiness, and pursuit of happiness, has not a course of conduct to maintain—which, in some way or other, he does maintain,—throughout life.

7. Who is there, whose conduct does not in its course take, on each occasion, its direction from a *judgment* of the one kind or the other:—from a *self-formed* or a *derivative one*?

8. Who is there, whose conduct is never, on any occasion, directed by any other than a *self-formed judgment*? Who is there that, in relation to the most momentous of the private concerns of his life, does not frequently find himself under the obligation of taking for his guidance a judgment of the *derivative kind*?—a judgment of no firmer texture?

9. How many are there, in whose instance the part taken by a man, in relation to his own private affairs considered all together, is not of greater importance to himself, (not to speak of the whole community) than any part could be, which in relation to the whole number of public affairs taken together, could, even under a system of universal suffrage, ever come under his cognizance?

20. In so far as between the interests of the *subject many*, and those of the *ruling few*, any such relation as that of *incompatibility* has place,—suppose, on the part of the *ruling few*, the *prevalent*—or though it were the *exclusive*—possession of *appropriate intellectual aptitude*, suited to the nature of the case,—in what way or degree would the *interest*—would the *welfare*—of the *subject-many* be benefited, so long as in those

ruling bosoms, instead of *appropriate probity*, the opposite, *improbity*, had place ?*

* In respect of general utility and propriety, behold what were the sentiments of *Sir William Jones*, on the subject of virtual universality of suffrage : from the authorities to which he refers, judge whether, in the best of those old times, such was not the ancient usage : behold moreover how frivolous were the pretences on which were grounded the still existing defalcations made in the time of Henry VI.

Works of *Sir William Jones*, by Lord Teignmouth, vol. viii. p. 507.—“ Speech on the Reformation of Parliament, anno 1782, “ May 28th.”—Speaking of the feudal system, “ Narrow and base,” (he says), “ as it was, and confined exclusively to landed property,* “ it admitted the *lowest freeholders* to the due enjoyment of that “ inestimable right, without which it is a banter to call a man *free*, “ the right of voting in the choice of deputies to assist in making “ those laws, which may affect not his property only, but his life, “ and, what is dearer, his liberty; and *which are not laws, but tyrannous ordinances, if imposed on him without his suffrage, given to “ person or by deputation. This I conceive to have been the right of “ every freeholder, even by the feudal polity, from the earliest time; “ and the statute of Henry IV. I believe to have been merely declaratory: an act which passed in the seventh year of that “ prince, near four hundred years ago, ordains that, ‘ all they who “ are present at the county court, as well suitors *duly summoned* for “ the same cause, as *others*, shall proceed to the election of their “ knights for the parliament.’ All suitors, you see, had the right, “ and all freeholders were suitors in the court, however low the value “ of their freeholds.—Observe all along that *one pound* in those “ days was equal to *ten* at least in the present time.† Here then is “ a plain declaration, that minuteness of *real* property created no “ harsh suspicion of a dependant mind, for a harsh suspicion it is, “ and, by proving too much, proves nothing.” Thus far *Sir William Jones*. Behold now the words of the statute, 7 H. IV. c. 15. After reciting the grievous complaint of the Commons (in the French*

* Reasons for doubting of this limitation will be seen below.

† If so, then to *twenty* at this present time, anno 1817.

Security—general security—against misrule—in this are we to behold the *only use* and *advantage* resulting

original *Communalité*) of the undue Election of the Knights of Counties . . . sometime made of affection of the Sheriffs, and otherwise against the form of the Writs, to the great slander of the Counties, and hindrance [retardation] of the business of the Commonalty in [of] the said county,—it enacts that, at the County Court, after proclamation, “*all they that be there present*, as well “*suitors duly summoned as others*, shall attend to the Election of “*the Knights for the Parliament, and then in the full County*” [Court] “*they shall proceed to the Election, freely and indifferently, “notwithstanding any request or commandment to the contrary.*”

And, a little after, it adds:—And in the Writs of the Parliament to be made hereafter, this clause shall be put:—“*Et Electionem tuam “in pleno comitatu tuo factam distincte et aperte sub sigillo tuo et “sigillis eorum qui electioni illi interfuerint nobis in Cancellaria nos- “tra ad diem et locum in brevi content, certifies indilate.*” Note, that, without any distinction made, what is here required is—that the seals to be affixed shall be the seals of those—i. e. of *all those—who shall have taken part* in the Election. *Villeins*,—composing still no inconsiderable part of the population, though it is impossible to say exactly what part, being (it may be supposed) plainly out of the question,—who were the persons thus admitted to the exercise of this franchise? Who but all who were not *Villeins*. With the exception of a class of persons happily no longer in existence, if this be not virtually universal suffrage—suffrage more extensive than in the case of the “*householders*,”—by *Charles Fox* and *Mr. Grey* (as will soon be seen) proposed to be admitted—by the said *Mr. Grey*, now *Earl Grey*, proposed not to be admitted—if *this* be not, what else can be?

Even as to *Villeins*,—were they, after all, really excluded? Look to the *words*, clearly not: who were the persons by whom the Elections were to be made?—Suitors summoned as such, and they alone?—No: but “*all they that be there present.*” Well but (says somebody) in the state of villenage, no will of his own could any person be said to have. So much for *surmise*; and, but for particular inquiry, not an unnatural one. Well now as to the *fact*.

to the community from the utmost amplitude of extent, which, subject to the necessary defalcations, can

Eight-and-twenty years before the time in question, viz. anno 1377, was passed the statute, 1 R. II. of which c. 6.—a chapter of considerable length—is in the old French—and, in the *vulgate* edition, not translated. From this statute it appears, that already, even at that time, villenage was a condition very different from slavery.—*Rent* did they pay: and though, instead of money, it was in the shape of *services*, yet these services were certain. In this statute what is assumed as a general fact, is—that they were able to pay *a fine* to the King, besides making *satisfaction* to their Lords. The main offence imputed to them is—obtaining liberation from those services by forged deeds.

The existing *Copyholders* are the posterity of the ancient Villeins. *Tenants*—the Villeins were—the *Copyholders* are—so were they and are they styled—by *Copy of Court Roll*. Deriving from the Records of the Court the title to the lands they occupied, what can be more natural, than that to *that* same Court they should lie under an *obligation*,—under which it included the *liberty*,—of access and resort to it. But, supposing any of them *present* at any such Court, how is it possible that they should not have been included, in the assemblage designated as above by the word “*others*?”

Presently, in the “*excessive*” multitude of the persons resorting to those Courts, we shall see a *fact*, and the *only fact*, employed in another reign, twenty-five years afterwards, as a pretence for limiting in those same Courts the right of voting to those who possessed, in *freehold*, an estate equal in value to 40*l.* a year, money of present time. But, unless *Copyholders* be supposed to have, even at *that* time, made a part of it, where shall we find matter enough out of which to compose any such *excessive* multitude?

True it is, Blackstone (see his “*Considerations on the Question concerning Copyholders*,” &c. London, 1758, p. 7) applies a limitation to the import of the word *other*; (it should be—the French is—*autres, others*;) confining it to suitors. For this surmise however, no ground does he give: nor of any such or other limitation can I find any intimation given, in or by any word or words of the Statute.—“*Communalte du dit Countee*,” says the old French.

be given to the right of suffrage? *Answer.* The main use and advantage? yes, but assuredly not the only one.

“*Omnes illi qui electioni illi interfuerint,*” says the Latin inclosed in it.

So much for the strong and prosperous reign of Henry the Fourth, in which virtually universal suffrage was then established. Comes now the weak and disastrous reign of his idiot grandson, under which, under the sort of pretences that will be seen, it was curtailed.

Statute 8 H. VI. c. 7.—“What sort of men shall be chosen, and “who shall be chosen Knights of the Parliament.” Follows the *vulgate* translation: the original, which is in the old French, would fill up too much room here. Of the translation, except as here corrected, I have by examination assured myself of the correctness.

“Item, Whereas, the Elections of Knights of Shires to come to “the Parliaments of our Lord the King, in many Counties of the “realm of England, have now of late been made by *very great, outrageous, and excessive number of people dwelling within the same “Counties* of the realm of England, of the which, most part was “of People of *small Substance*, and” [or] “of no value, [i. e. worth] “whereof every one [of them] pretended a voice *equivalent*, as to “such Elections to be made, *with the most worthy Knights and “Esquires* dwelling within the same Counties, whereby Man- “slaughters, Riots, Batteries, and Divisions among the gentlemen “and other people of the same Counties, shall *very likely* rise and “be, unless convenient and due Remedy be provided in this “Behalf. (2.) Our Lord the King, considering the Premises, hath “provided, ordained, and stablished, by authority of this present “Parliament, That the Knights of the Shires, to be chosen within “the said realm of England, to come to the Parliaments of our “Lord the King, hereafter to be holden, shall be chosen in every “County of the realm of England, by *people dwelling* and resident “in the same Counties, whereof every one of them shall have *free “Land or Tenement* to the value of Forty Shillings by the Year at “the least, above all Charges;”

As to the *grounds*.—First, as to any supposed deficiency in respect of *appropriate intellectual aptitude*. Among those who, in the

Another is—(for is it not?)—the extent given to the pleasure—the *pleasure* of power*—derivable from

shape, of landed property, had *not* so much as 40s. a year of that day—going as far—say as 40l. money of the present day, small indeed probably was the number of those who were able to *read*: how much larger among those who *had* their 40s. and more? Probably enough, very little. As for the “Knights and Esquires,” some few of them not improbably were in those days able to *read*: but by not one of them, most certainly, was any book to be found, from which any information, tending to the increase of *appropriate intellectual aptitude*, could be extracted.

So much for *intellectual aptitude*: now as to *freedom of suffrage*. “Manslaughters,” &c. &c. . . . What? at that time, in any one instance, had any of these mischiefs really taken place?—No: no such thing is so much as pretended. What then?—Oh, they *will very likely* take place, unless due remedy be provided. Aristocracy this—all over. But was ever pretence more plainly groundless?—By the alteration of the value of money, the efficiency of the aristocratical principle has, in *this* part of the field of Election, though no thanks to Parliament, been somewhat diminished—extent of the right of suffrage somewhat increased. But—such, as will be seen, has been the influence of other causes,—that from this extension no real advantage has resulted. See what in a following section will be said on the subject of *vote-compelling* and *competition-excluding terrorism*.

On the ground of general utility and propriety,—behold, moreover, the sentiments of *Charles Fox*.—Woodfall’s Debates, A° 1797, p. 331. “There is one position in which we shall all agree, that
“ man has a right to be well governed. Now it is obvious, that no
“ people can be satisfied with a government from the constituent
“ parts of which they are excluded.”

In regard to *universal suffrage*, even under that unlimited name,

we

* For the place of *this* pleasure in the list of *pleasures*, see *Spring of Action Table*, published at the same time with the present tract.

the exercise of it. By the first English Monarch of Stuart race, the pleasure of scratching where it itches

we shall find him acceding to it and advocating it upon principle: refuting it no otherwise than upon the ground of a supposed matter of fact, in relation to which it has been seen, and will further be seen, the truth is exactly opposite. Not adverting to the effect of *secrecy of suffrage*, the notion on which he here grounds himself is—that in the case of *non-housekeepers* in general, freedom of suffrage is not to be looked for.

Antecedently to the above passage, behold what he says in p. 327. “ My opinion is, that the best plan of representation is that which shall bring into activity the greatest number of independent voters:” thereupon it is that immediately he goes on and says,— “ and that that is defective which would bring forth those whose situation and condition takes from them the power of deliberation.” In this I heartily concur with him: but in the next section it will be seen to what this observation leads: an observation by which it may be seen (ib. p. 326.) he was led to the disapprobation of giving any *extension* to the system of *County Representation*.

A little earlier in the same page, “ I have always,” (says he), “ deprecated universal suffrage, not so much on account of the *confusion* to which it would lead, but because I think that we should in reality lose the very object we desire to obtain:—it would in its nature embarrass and prevent the deliberative voice of the country from being heard.” Thus far Charles Fox: meaning by reason of the supposed want of freedom, as above. As to *confusion*,—upon any thing like the Plan here proposed, all danger of this sort will be seen to be most completely excluded. Charles Fox sat for Westminster. In the Westminster Election what confusion do we see? Yet, in the Westminster Election, there remain in abundance natural causes of confusion, all which would, on the plan in question, be completely excluded.

So much as to what might be and would be. But now, look at what actually has been. A° 1807 Sir Francis Burdett was, for the first time, elected successor to Charles Fox. Since then, near ten years have elapsed, and in all that time no more *confusion* than if

was pronounced too great a pleasure for a subject. On the same principle, in the eyes of many an aristocrat of the present day, so will the pleasure, attached to the exercise of a power, so furiously and indignantly grasped by the monopolizing hand.— Yes: in the eyes of the aristocrat. But so will it be

Westminster had been a pocket borough. See the History of the Westminster Representation from that time in Hone's Reformist's Register, No. 3: a most interesting picture, of the state of purity and good order, into which Election proceedings not only *may be* brought, but *have been* brought, and in it have already for ten years been continued, under a degree of extension so little short of that of universal suffrage.

In the same sentiments,—both as to the general principle and the ill-grounded reason for putting it aside,—already had he spoken, and even still more explicitly, in the year 1793.

Almon's Parl. Register, Anno 1793, p. 497. "His" (Fox's) "objection to universal suffrage, was not distrust of the decision of the majority, but because there was no practical mode of collecting such suffrage; and that by attempting it, what from the operation of hope on some, fear on others, and all the sinister means of influence, that would so certainly be exerted, fewer individual opinions would be collected than by an appeal to a limited number. Therefore, holding fast to the right of the majority to decide, and to the natural rights of man, as taught by the French, but much abused by their practice, he would resist universal suffrage."

At that same time, *Mr. Grey*, now *Earl Grey*, though he did not approve of universal suffrage *absolutely*, approved of it,—yea, and moreover of annual Parliaments,—*comparatively*, viz. in comparison of the existing system.

Woodfall's Debates, Anno 1793, p. 383.—"He" (*Mr. Grey*): "did not approve of the Duke of Richmond's plan of reform, though he thought it better than the present system."—The Duke of Richmond's plan?—Well, what was it?—Suffrage universal, Parliaments annual: this, but without *secrecy*, and thence without *liberty*, of suffrage.

in the eyes of a lover of his country, or of a lover of mankind?

So much for the *comfort* of the *Elector*. Come now the *social virtues*—*probity*—*benevolence*—*benevolence*—considered as not being wholly without hope of finding place one day in the breast of the *Representative*: in this breast, *virtue*; thence in both breasts, *comfort*, for its fruit.

A third use and advantage attendant on the maximization of the extent given to this right, will it not accordingly be to be found in the proportionable extent which will so naturally be given to the *demand*, and thence to the *supply*, of those precious virtues,—considered as exercisable by men of *high*, on the occasion of their intercourse with men of *low* degree? (See on this head the Plan itself, pp. 50, 51.)

The art and habit of affording, in the shape suited to each occasion, in the general intercourse of life, *pleasure*,—in which is necessarily included the *negative* art and habit of avoiding to produce *displeasure*—*curtesy*. in a word—the *word* as well as the *thing* derived from *Court*—in common account, the diffusion of virtue in this shape, has it not been regarded as a use and advantage attached to *Monarchy*?—Yes:—nor surely without reason. But, when for its head-quarters it has the *palace*, in what way does it propagate itself?—To the level of the lowest ranks it descends not, but as it were by accident, by slow degrees, and through an indefinite number and variety of channels. But, in the case here in question, reaching the lowest level at one step, it fills the whole atmosphere of society with its balmy influence.

3. Third collateral use—security afforded *against Vice* in all its shapes, and *for Virtue* in all its shapes.

4. By the same *tie* by which in this case the Candidate is restrained from giving the reins to misconduct in the particular shape above-mentioned, viz. insolence towards individuals in the particular situation in question,—by this same tie, with more or less good effect, is he restrained from misconduct in all other shapes in general—public as well as private: by the same *spur* by which he is urged to the making of the comparatively small sacrifices, necessary to the attainment of the reputation of *urbanity* within the limited circle in question, by this same *spur* is he continually urged to the making of those greater sacrifices—those continually recurring and perseveringly reiterated sacrifices, by which, throughout the whole field of a man's influence, in public as in private life, pre-eminence in virtue is attained:—sacrifices of smaller *present* to greater *future* interest; sacrifices of *self-regarding* to *social* interest; sacrifices of social interest on a *less* extensive to social interest on a *more* extensive scale.

III. Now as to *defalcations*.—So far as concerns *extension*, the main object being *comprehension of all interests*,—suppose the defalcation in question capable of having place without prejudice to that object, slight may be the advantage that will suffice to warrant it.

First comes the principle, by which (saving always the rightful supremacy of the *universal-interest-comprehension* principle), intimation is given of the propriety of *defalcation*, considered as applied to the extent capable of being given to the right of suffrage.

—Call this, for shortness, *the legitimate-defalcation principle*.

Next come an *exception* or *exceptions*, that may be found to present themselves as proper to be made to the application of this principle.

This principle is—that if, in the instance of any class of persons, it be sufficiently clear, that they neither are, nor can be, in such a state of mind as to be, in a sufficient degree, endowed with the appropriate intellectual aptitude,—then so it is that, in the instance of such particular class of persons, a defalcation may be made: made, viz. without prejudice to any thing that is useful in the *interest-comprehension principle*.

The consideration, by which the principle is itself suggested, and the application of it directed, is the regard due to the quality of *appropriate intellectual aptitude*. In the case of this or that class of persons, suppose it clear, that no such aptitude can, in any degree sufficient for practice, be reasonably expected to be found,—what follows is—that, from the extent given to the right in question, a *defalcation* may be made, correspondent to the extent occupied in the field of population by this class: and thus, without prejudice to the extent given to the *universal-interest-comprehension principle*.

Take now a few examples.

I. *Minors*. By the word *minors* is immediately brought to view one vast class of persons, to which, without prejudice to the *interest-comprehension principle*, the *legitimate-defalcation principle* promises to be found applicable.

On this occasion, for forming a limit to the extent to be given to this class, what is evident is—that with full assurance, an *age* may be taken, such, as that from the extent belonging to the dominion of the *universal-interest-comprehension* principle, no defalcation shall be made by the application of the *legitimate-defalcation* principle: and, even let the age fixed upon for this purpose be supposed to be too early an age, still one great advantage remains untouched;—which is—that, in its application to individuals, the defalcation is not *permanent*; not permanent, but *temporary* only, and the *utmost duration* of it limited. As to the *age* most proper to be fixed upon for this purpose,—in this may be seen a topic neither unsusceptible nor undeserving of a separate consideration: but, for any thing like a full consideration of it, neither *time* nor *space* can be allowed here. Under British law, in relation to private concerns at large, viz. in respect of the sole and separate management of those concerns taken in the aggregate, *one-and-twenty* is the age at which the right commences. But, at a much earlier age does this and that particular right commence: such as the right of making a *last will*; and, what is more to the purpose, the right of *choosing a guardian*. And note, that though the concerns here in question are, in respect of *extent*, the public and universal concerns, and the importance of them proportioned to that extent, yet, on the other hand—instead of being, as in the present case, *integral*,—the right here in question is but a minute fraction of the *integral* or *entire right* of choosing the fraction of a *guardian*, for the management of those great common concerns.

For what remains, see the next head.

II. Females. As to persons of this sex, the sex in which the half, more or less, of the whole species is contained—usually, if not constantly, have they on this occasion been passed over without notice: an omission which, under a Mahometan government, might have place with rather less prejudice to consistency than under a Christian one.

The great leading considerations above brought to view—viz. the *universal-interest-comprehension* principle, the quality of *appropriate probity* and *appropriate intellectual aptitude*—these guides to decision, if they apply not with propriety to both sexes, it seems not easy to say with what propriety they can be applicable to either.

As to the *interest-comprehension* principle,—a task which, to the purpose of making application of it on competent grounds, presents itself as indispensable, is—the taking a survey of the state of the *laws*, by which at present the shape between the two sexes is determined.

Thereupon, a sort of preliminary question presents itself as likely enough to be put:—Suppose—for argument sake suppose—the result to be, that on this part of the field of law, due justice has not hitherto been done to the weaker sex: on this supposition, can any such expectation exist, as that in the formation of a plan in relation to suffrage, any better justice will be done?—The answer is—that, barring the intervention of this or that special obstacle, there seems no sufficient reason why any such justice should be despaired of. For, upon a spurt, upon the spurt of

the occasion, even against the general bent of permanent interest,—are now and then seen to be made, such sacrifices as, under the permanent, and habitual, and tranquil operation of particular interest are never seen to be made.

As to *appropriate intellectual aptitude*—in the case of *Monarchy*—in the case of integral possession of supreme and all-comprehensive power—by no man, perhaps unless it be by *John Knox*, has physical weakness been brought forward in the character of an objection to the practice of vesting political power in the softer sex: by no man, even in the case of the *Electoral* function, where, as in the instance of the *East India Direction*, the *active* or *self-acting*, including the *imperative* power, is in the hands of an *Aristocracy*: an *Aristocracy*, itself in England subject to the mixt *Monarchy*, but exercising the *Electoral* function, in relation to the sort of local *Monarchy*, by which, under the guise of a *Council*, under the *Presidence* of a *Governor*, in *British India* so many millions are ruled.*

Although, in all these several instances, the propriety of the arrangement were confessedly established,—yet in the case of the *democratic* species of Election in question, the propriety of it could not be stated as presenting itself in any such character as that of a necessary consequence. As to any thing approaching to a decided opinion,—any thing of that sort—any

* In the County of York, if my information be correct, may be found a Borough, to which belong two seats, in relation to which the *Electoral* function is virtually performed by a single person of the female sex.

attempt towards it—would in this place be altogether premature. Of the few observations here hazarded, what then, it may be asked, is the use? The use (I answer)—the design at least is—to shew, in what way, and with a degree of attention suited to its importance, the subject is capable of being treated, in respect to *principle*: of two modes of treatment, which may be the more proper one—on the one hand the mode here exemplified, or on the other, this or a *horse-laugh*, a sneer, an expression of scorn, or a common-place witicism, the reader will determine.*

* Woodfall's Reports, Anno 1797, p. 327.—*Charles Fox*.—"I hope gentlemen will not smile if I endeavour"—After saying as above, he adds, "My opinion is, that the best plan of representation is that which shall bring into activity the greatest number of independent voters, and that that is defective which would bring forth those whose situation and condition takes from them power of deliberation. I can have no conception of that being a good plan of Election, which should enable individuals to bring regiments to the poll. I hope gentlemen will not smile if I endeavour to illustrate my position by referring to the example of the other sex. In all the theories and projects of the most absurd speculation, it has never been suggested that it would be advisable to extend the elective suffrage to the female sex; and yet, justly respecting, as we must do, the mental powers, the acquirements, the discrimination, and the talents of the women of England, in the present improved state of society; knowing the opportunities which they have for acquiring knowledge; that they have interests as dear and as important as our own; it must be the genuine feeling of every gentleman who hears me, that all the superior classes of the female sex of England must be more capable of exercising the elective suffrage with deliberation and propriety, than the uninformed individuals of the lowest class of men, to whom the advocates of universal suffrage would extend it; and yet, why has it never been imagined that the right of election should be

III. *Soldiers and Sailors.* If of these classes mention must here be made, scarcely can it be for any other purpose than to shew that they have not been out of mind. From participating in the exercise of this franchise, all those who are out on foreign service, stand excluded by physical, by absolutely unsurmountable obstacles: this being constantly and unavoidably the case with many, and incidentally with all,—those, in whose instance the bar is not applied by physical obstacles, need the less repine, should the necessity arise of excluding them by legal ones. *Individually* considered, no tenable objection could surely be opposed to the suffrage of any individual of this so extensive and eminently meritorious a class of public servants. But, collected in a mass, under the command of C——r-General and Co.—they might, in any part of the country, or in many parts of the country at once, be set a rolling like an *avalanche*,

“ extended to women? Why, but because of the *law of Nations*,*
 “ and *perhaps*† also by the *law of nature*,‡ that sex is dependant on
 “ ours; and because, therefore, their voices would be governed by
 “ the relation in which they stand in society. Therefore it is, Sir,
 “ that with the exception of companies, in which the right of
 “ voting merely affects property, it has never been in the contem-
 “ plation of the most absurd theorists to extend the elective fran-
 “ chise to the sex.”

* A law which has no existence.

† *Perhaps.* A peremptory exclusion, by which one half of the species is excluded from that security for a regard to their interests, which in the case of the other half is pronounced indisputable. Ground of this exclusion—or at least a principal part of that ground, a *perhaps!*

‡ *Law of Nature*—another non-entity. A too common phrase: in the present instance, *quere* what is at the bottom of it?

overwhelming as they rolled the settled population of (who can say how many?) Electoral districts. Here is a mischief; but a mischief, to which, by a few regulations, no less obvious than the mischief, there could be no difficulty in opposing an effectual bar.

To the above perfectly obvious grounds of defalcation, add, for consideration, this one more, which will perhaps be found not quite so obvious.

IV. *Non-readers*—for shortness, let this be the name of the class: also, for shortness, take the following compressed intimation of the ground of the thus proposed defalcation, with the political and moral institution attached to it, and of the mode proposed for fixing the termination of it. *Principle*, not at variance with the *universal-interest-comprehension* principle: *duration* of the exclusion—not only temporary,—but, to an indefinite degree, capable of being shortened by the exertions of the individual excluded.

Proof, of the cessation of the cause of exclusion, public: *matter*, taken for the subject of the proof,—in the first place the *law* by which the Elections in question shall, in the here supposed state of things, have been regulated; to which might be added (regard being had to matter and applicable space) this or that portion of *other* appropriate matter:—but for any such details the present is no place.

For the *collateral effects*, moral and intellectual—of such an institution, inquire of the *National Society*:—inquire of any body—those excepted whose wish—(for alas!—some such are there not?) whose undissembled wish has been, to keep us of the swinish

multitude—to keep us for ever in our state of swine.

Defeasible as it is at all times at the pleasure of the excluded party,—if by this exclusion the exercise of the right may, in the instance of some person of full age be suspended,—in the instance of *minors*, might not, on proof given as above of possession obtained of appropriate intellectual aptitude—might not the acquisition of it be accelerated?

So much for *defalcation*, considered as applicable to the extent to be given to this franchise. Behold now a principle of *exception*, operating as a bar to a little swarm of other defalcations,—such as, but for this consideration, would, on grounds more or less cogent, be apt to present a call—some of them a *peremptory* call—for acceptance.

This principle is the *simplification principle*. On the ground of deficiency, in one or other, or both, of the elements of the appropriate aptitude in question—viz. *appropriate probity* and *appropriate intellectual aptitude*,—various are the classes that might be proposed for exclusion: *foreigners* in amity, foreigners in *enmity* but at large, *outlaws*, *convicts*, *vagrants*, *insolvents*, *bankrupts*, *lunatics*—these may serve as examples.

O rare *Simplicity!*—Hand-maid of beauty, wisdom, virtue,—of every thing that is excellent—*Simplicity!*—applied to every subject, to which, without preponderant inconvenience, it can be applied—simplicity, though but a sort of *negative* good, is not the less a good. To the exclusion of *sensible* (which are the only *real*) evils, may it without scruple be applied,

where the only evils that can result from the application, are but as it were *nascent* and *insensible*: evils, for example, which,—though if they existed in a certain quantity, they *might* or even *would*, be felt,—yet, in the greatest quantity in question, *cannot* be felt;—evils, in a word, which,—though but for the operation of counter causes, they would or might be productive of actual sensible sufferance or loss of comfort,—yet, by the operation of such counter causes, will be prevented from carrying that capacity into act.

So much for principle; now for application. Even at the place of Election, much more in a judicatory of *appeal* constituted for the purpose,—among the accompaniments of every such investigation are the intimately connected mischiefs, with which all judicature is so liable to be infested, *viz. delay, vexation, and expense*. In all these may be seen real and sensible—acutely sensible evils. But, in the case of a *right*, which, how important soever, when taken in its *integrality*, is to all really effective purposes, such as the establishment of laws, and the execution of measures of administration, itself but the *fraction of a fraction*,—suppose that by the exceptionable classes, all of them taken together—that is, by the admission given to them, be they ever so exceptionable, no sensible change for the worse can ever, in all human probability, be made in the conduct of public affairs;—the consequence is—that the supposed inconvenience is ideal and theoretical merely, not actual and practical.

The *simplification* principle, thus explained,—apply it to the question as between the extent indicated by

the word *householders*, and the extent here marked out as designated by the words *virtually universal suffrage*. In the *Plan* itself, on the occasion of which the attention was confined to householders, an expedient may be seen proposed, having for its object the *maximization* of simplicity;—the *minimization* of the triple yoke of inconvenience—the *trinoda necessitas*—composed of delay, vexation, and expense, which, by *Nature* in a certain proportion, by sinister *Art* commonly in a much greater proportion, has been made to press upon the neck of so many sorts of *public*, but most intolerably of all upon the neck of almost all *judicial*, proceedings.

Look at what is said in *Mr. Cobbett's Letter* on this subject to *Earl Grosvenor* (*Cobbett's Register*, Feb. 22, 1817), and, in respect of simplicity, and its consequences as above explained, judge whether, compared with the *householder* plan, even with the benefit of the above proposed instrument of simplification, the *virtually universal plan* has not the advantage.

In this same view, note a principle of precaution, having regard to relative *time*. The evidence, on the ground of which a claimant's title to the franchise is provisionally to be allowed,—let it be—not of the *oral*, but, as proposed in the *Plan*, of the *written* kind—a *document*, suppose a *card*—suppose a *ticket*—penned, and authenticated, and allowed, at a time *anterior* to that of the Election. By this means all discussion is excluded from that *time*: in the instance of each voter, the operation of voting may, as in the case of *holding up of hands*, be instantaneous. *Forgery* and fraudulent *personation* are the only causes of deceit left pos-

sible: and, forasmuch as by small numbers no promise of effect would be afforded, while among large numbers, the larger the number the fuller the assurance of detection,—no probability can this possibility have for its accompaniment.

§ 8. *Virtual Universality of Suffrage—its Undangerousness.*

On the topic of supposed or imputed dangerousness, after what has been seen already, accept the following observations, compressed to that degree of compression which *time* and *place* necessitates.

Objection.—Universal suffrage, universal hostility and anarchy.—Answer. No, not the smallest approach to any such evils.

Hostility? under what provocation, and against what object? Provocation now, alas! but too abundant: in that case, absolutely none. Provocation, say you?—say, instead of it, its exact opposite. Yes: in place of provocation, and that inveterate,—fresh and never before experienced beneficence. Provocation—where should it find its object? In a branch of government, now for the first time, at the instance of the people themselves, repaired and improved for their benefit, and then placed in their own hands?

Suppose mischievous activity, on what occasion or in what shape should it exert itself? The sort of power which they would be called upon to exercise, what is it? Is it,—as in *legislation*, and *command*, as well *civil* as *military*,—directly, immediately, imperatively,

impressively, and coercively acting *power*?—No, but a mere exercise of the unimperative faculty of deputation—an exercise performed under the veil of the most tranquil and silent, and absolutely impenetrable and imperturbable secrecy,—performed by a mere turn of the hand,—and, in the instance of each individual, in the same moment begun and ended:—a power which, if such it must be called, is but the fraction of a fraction: the power of making one of a vast multitude, the majority of which must join, ere they can seat so much as one man in an Assembly,—one man, with whom another large majority must join, and with that large majority, the majority of another Assembly, ere he can give effect to any power by which *command* is issued, and *obedience* produced.

Be the mischief what it may,—suppose the people; in any considerable number, inclined to effect it. In their eyes, or in any eyes, what sort of prospect of accomplishing the supposed obnoxious purpose could the nature of the case afford? How deep, as well as at the same time how hollow, must not the scheme of speculation be supposed to be, that is thus supposed to be entertained by the supposed precipitate and unthinking multitude? Of himself not one of them could, so much as in expectation, have any the least part in it: if accomplished, the persons by whom it is accomplished must be the majority of a set of persons, all different from these voters; yet this majority, composed of individuals, all of them without exception bent upon the execution of this same pernicious scheme:—and what could they hope to get by it? When, by the passions of a populace, mischief has

been perpetrated or aimed at, is it by any such telescopic and deep-laid schemes that it has ever been aimed at?

No: it is not in the dangerousness and mischievousness—it is in the undangerousness and beneficialness of this and the other elements of reform, that in the minds of the *ruling and influential few* the opposition made to it has its real ground. Not in the want of light—pure and instructive light—in the political hemisphere—not in the *want* of it, but in the abundance of it, look for the true object of their fears. The *increase* of light—were that any part of their object, how to compass that object is no secret to them. Confined to the quarter in which when it is of use to them—applied to the accomplishment of the grand object—the openly avowed object—the “*prostration of understanding and will*” at the feet of a Priesthood, itself by original institution prostrate—and so lately so much more profoundly prostrated*—at the feet of a Prelacy, itself in a state of everlasting prostration at the foot of the throne—applied to this object never can there be any want of anxiously directed activity.—In regard to *appropriate intellectual aptitude*, what is the real, the everlasting fear?—lest it be deficient?—No: but lest it be abundant. Yes: on the hemisphere of *religion*, to delude them with false and *political* lights—on the political hemisphere, to keep them plunged in the thickest darkness—such in their “*high situation*” is the policy of “*great characters* :” such

* See the Reverend Mr. Belsham's Observations on the Bishop of London's Charge, Anno 1814.

in the very nature of things, it is ever destined to be, when vouchsafing to determine the lot of the *swinish multitude*.

Of this supposed dangerous and mischievous right, by what mode and form of instruction would the exercise be prefaced and prepared? On the one part, would it be, as *now*, by *haranguing*—(by *haranguing—loud*, and, till the present state of things be replaced by a better, how can it be other than *impassioned*?)—on the other part by *thronging*: by *thronging*, if not actually tumultuous, continually, by the naturally and incessantly increasing tyranny expected, or pretended to be expected to be found,—and for the sake of the thus manufactured pretext, always wished to be found, tumultuous? Oh no:—on the one part by a course of *writing*, on the other part by a correspondent course of *reading*. Oh yes:—*the pen in hand*—behold in this the true organ for administering sound, dispassionate, and undelusive information:—in *the eye*—in the *stillness* and *leisure* of the closet, applied to the *silent paper*, behold in this the true organ for the reception of the matchless blessing.—*Lips* on the one part, *ears* on the other part—behold in these the so imperfectly adapted—the only originally employable organs;—in the fugitive, the ever questionable, the ever delusive information—the only information capable of being communicated and received by such organs,—the sole and sadly imperfect resource, of immature, unlettered, and unenlightened times.*

* By *Mr. Cobbett*, this topic I observe just now mentioned by himself as having been frequently worked:—and if so, doubtless

As to speechifying and writing—and the comparative beneficialness and innoxiousness of the sort of information to be respectively looked for to the two sources—by speeches, many an assembly has been driven into precipitate and mischievous resolves; by writings, much fewer, not to say none. By speeches, followed on the spot by resolutions taken on the spot, falsehoods are asserted—means of detection excluded: in writings, scarce can falsehood be brought forward on one side, but time for detecting and refuting it has place on the other:—by speeches, imagination is fascinated,—passion in excess excited,—time for comprehensive conception and cool judgment denied:—substitute *writing*, no advantage can in any of these shapes be gained by any side to the injury of any other. When tongues and ears are the organs of converse;—in an assembly, congregated under the notion of *hearing speeches*,—by its own clamours, (and with what unhappy frequency is not this mischief exemplified!) by its own clamours—that is, by the clamours of a few impatient tongues,—on both sides of the question—or, what is so much worse, on one side only,—may not only all *documents*, but all *argument* be excluded? whereas, in so far as *pens* and *eyes* are the organs,—by no power but that of a tyrant—of a tyrant about the throne, or on a bench—can any

with that force and acuteness, which might be expected at his hands, as well as with that copiousness and diffuseness, which is so well adapted to the situation of the bulk of those among whom he has to look for readers.

minds be deprived of the knowledge of whatsoever *has* been said, or *can* be said, on both sides.

Thus, not only in the first instance, but so long as the subject continued to be viewed no otherwise than at a distance,—that, in this state of mind, by the vastness and indeterminateness of the compound idea, produced by the combination of *annuality of election* with *universality of suffrage*,—conception should be at first bewildered, and the passion of *fear* kept in a state of excitation,—in *this* there is nothing strange: the strange thing would rather be, if the case were otherwise.*

* Such, at any rate in my own view, it cannot fail to be: for in this state, for a long course of years, was my own mind:—the object a dark, and thence a hideous phantom, until, elicited by severe and external pressure, the light of *reason*—or, if this word be too assuming, the light of *ratiocination*—was brought to bear upon it. In the *Plan* itself may be seen at what period (*viz.* anno 1809), fearful of going further—embracing the occasion of finding, in *derivative* judgment, an exterior support—I was not only content, but glad, to stop at the degree of extension indicated by the word *householders*;—taking at the same time for conclusive evidence of *householdership*, the fact of having paid *direct taxes*. But, the more frequently my mind has returned itself upon the subject—the more close the application made to it—the more minute the anxiety with which every niche and cranny has been pryed into—the stronger has been the persuasion produced,—that, even from an extent as unbounded as that which would have been given to the principle by the vigorous, and laborious, and experienced mind of the *Duke of Richmond* (always with the proviso, that, by that secrecy,—which, somehow or other he could not bear to look in the face,—freedom should be secured) no mischief, no danger, in any such shape as that which is denoted by the words *anarchy* or *equalization*, i. e. *destruction* of property, would ensue: in a word, not

Note here a little operation :—an operation which may be performed by any body who has leisure.

any the smallest defalcation from any rights, but those which are universally acknowledged to be mere *trust-rights*—rights, the exercise of which ought to be directed to the advancement—not of the separate interests of him to whom they are intrusted, but of the joint and universal interest.

Tranquillized, on the other hand, by the persuasion—that, although, by defalcation after defalcation, very considerable reduction were made in respect of *extent*, still no very determinate and distinguishable defalcation might be made from the beneficent influence of the *universal-interest-comprehension principle*,—and that, by every extension obtained, the way could be smoothed to any such ulterior extension,* the demand for which should, in the continued application of that principle, guided by the experience of security, under the experienced degree of extension, have found its due support,—with little regret, considering the subject in a theoretical point of view, and altogether without regret, considering it with a view to *conciliation*, and in that sense in a practical point of view,—thus it was that without difficulty I found I could accede to the extent indicated by the words *householders*, or *direct-tax-paying householders*: due regard being at the same time paid to the arrangements prescribed by the *simplification principle*, as above.

Representation co-extensive with taxation?—with taxation in every shape?—Oh yes, with all my heart: no danger to *property* any more than to *person* should I apprehend from it: for, under another description, what would this be but the *Duke of Richmond's universal suffrage*? But the *principle*—in the *principle* behold the defect:—a principle which is but the product of imagination—of imagination with nothing but itself for its support:—a principle, not looking to *universal interest*—not looking to interest in any shape or to any extent—to human feelings in any shape or to any extent—to general utility—to utility in any shape or to any extent:—a principle deaf, unyielding, and inflexible:—a principle which

* Supposing this a speech spoken,—*hear him! hear him!* would it not at this place be the cry from the opposite benches?—profound the discovery of the supposed confession—proportionably triumphant the exultation!

Turn to the *History of Boroughs*: pick out the most *open* ones: those in which the right has the extension

will hear of no *modification*—will look at no *calculation*:—a principle, which, like that of the *rights of man*, is in its *temper* a principle of *despotism*, howsoever, in its *application*, applied to purposes so diametrically and beneficently opposite.

Co-extensive with taxation?—Why this reference, this adjustment?—If, instead of *imagination*, *reason* be consulted, the answer is—that by extent coinciding with that of taxation, so it happens that in this country all *interests* are comprehended:—deference is paid to, practice would accordingly be guided by, the principle by which the comprehension of all interests is prescribed. Good: but if, in the principle which prescribes the giving admission at once to all interests, you were to have a principle which nobody but yourself would listen to, what would you be the better for it? and if, with a principle which, in numbers sufficient to carry the question, men would listen to and be governed by, you were to get a constitution, under and by virtue of which, for want either of *appropriate probity* or *appropriate intellectual aptitude*, or both, property and liberty would be destroyed,—what in *this* case would you be the better for your principle?—would not your condition be still worse—yea, much worse—than even at present?

Behold here—(for it is well worth beholding)—the relation—the instructive relation—between *theory* and *practice*:—of the goodness of *theory*, the test is—in every instance—its applicability to practice:—*good in theory, bad in practice*:—behold in this fallacy—this vulgar fallacy—a contradiction in terms.

But, if theory be recurred to, it suffices not that a proposed measure be good in itself;—the theory employed in support of it should also be a good one: a theory capable of being—and without practical mischief—applied to practice. But capable of being, without mischief, applied to practice, it cannot be,—if no reference being made by it—no regard paid by it—to *human interests* or to *human feelings*—to feelings of *pain*—to feelings of *pleasure*,—it admits of no modification—no yielding of interest to interest—and thereby of no means of *conciliation*:—of no means of *conversion*, but overbearing despotism.

The

indicated by the word *householders*, or by the word *pot-wobblers*,—go back as far as recollection—recollec-

The horror and terror with which, by the words *universal suffrage* and *annual elections*, so many uncorrupted breasts are filled, (for I speak not here of the case of those in whose instance language and deportment are necessarily prescribed and fashioned by the predominance of sinister interest)—these self-disturbing and dissocial passions—to which object shall we look for the cause of the application thus made of them? Shall it not be to the weakness—alas! the too natural, and, in a greater or less degree, the universal weakness—of yielding too readily to first impressions?—of giving the reins to *imagination*, and at the same time to that *love of ease*, which spares itself the labour necessary to close inspection, and carefully comprehensive analysis? Oh yes: in the combination of all these co-operating causes may be found *power* but too sufficient for the production of these and so many other undesirable effects.

In my own instance, well do I remember the time when the principle of *universal suffrage*, howsoever modified, presented itself to me as being in a general view inadmissible. Yes: but *what time?* any time subsequent to that attentive consideration and scrutiny, which the importance of the question now so imperiously calls for?—Oh no: it was a time, at which, as yet, no *purposed* attention had on my part ever directed itself to the subject. No: the closer the attention bestowed, the firmer has all along been my conviction—on the one hand of the undangerousness of the principle, taken in the utmost extent to which the application of it can ever reach,—on the other hand, of the facility and consistency, with which, for the sake of *union* and *concord*, defalcation after defalcation might,—provisionally at any rate, and for the sake of experience—quiet and gradual experience,—be applied to it.

As to what concerns the influence of understanding as understanding—in the case here in question the only beneficent—the only enduring influence,—my own persuasion is—that under the most unbounded universality of suffrage,—instead of being annihilated, the influence of *aristocracy* would still be but too great: too great, I mean, with relation to appropriate *intellectual aptitude*: too great

tion about individual character—can carry you:—say, to the commencement of the present reign. Under

not to give admission to many an idle and comparatively unfurnished, to the exclusion of a laborious and better furnished, mind.

As far as I have been able to collect it—and I have not been unsolicitous in my endeavours to collect it—the whole stream of experience runs that way.

In proof, or at any rate in illustration of this position—one particular incident, which has place in my own remembrance, has just been confirmed by cotemporary recollections. In the days of *Wilkes and Liberty!* among Wilkes's supporters—and, indeed, for activity and extent of influence, at the head of them—was *Churchill, the Apothecary*, brother to *Poet Churchill*. Election time approaching, Wilkes himself being, for the moment, by some incident or other, put out of the question,—Apothecary Churchill was proposed. *An Apothecary Member for Westminster!* by a loud and general clamour to this effect was the proposition immediately crushed:—yet, besides that extraordinary personal popularity, by which he had been enabled to render such commanding service to the fine Gentleman, his protégé, was this Apothecary of the number of those who kept their coaches.

As to *Apothecaryship* and *Gentlemanship*, for my own part, if, of two Candidates, knowing nothing of either, but that one was an *Apothecary*, the other a *Gentleman* of 10,000*l.* a year, the question were to be asked of me, *for which will you give your vote?* my answer would be at once—the *Apothecary*—the *Apothecary for me!*—Why? even because in the mind of the Apothecary—the Apothecary being to a certain degree known as such—I should be assured of finding *intellectual aptitude*:—*intellectual aptitude* in the shape and degree corresponding to the exigencies of that eminently useful and respectable profession, including the branches of art and science that belong to it:—in the first place, *intellectual aptitude at large*: and scarcely can it happen, but that, so it be considerable in degree, *intellectual aptitude appropriate*,—appropriate, if not with reference to *any* subject without exception, at any rate with reference to the subject *here* in question,—may with more or less facility be acquir-

the head of each such Borough, look over the list of the *Representatives*, who from that time to this have sat for it:—this done, then it is that you may be in a condition to pronounce—whether, when compared with the seats, filled in the most generally approved and lauded mode, viz. the *County Seats*, (of which in the next section), any distinctly-marked deficiency, in respect of any one of the three *elements of appropriate aptitude*—be to be found: *appropriate aptitude*, as divided into its never to be forgotten three branches, viz. *appropriate probity*, *appropriate intellectual aptitude*, and *appropriate active talent*.

Aptitude? Elements? (cries a voice from Bond Street) *d—— you and your three elements!* No, no; *Property! Property! that's our sort! that's the only element we know of—worth all your's, and a hundred such put together.*

Ok no, d——e! (cries another from a *four-in-hand*, interrupting himself while in the *establishment of a*

ed: the already acquired *stock or capital*, being, with more or less advantage, capable of being transferred and applied to the newly adopted branch of industry.

Thus much for the *Apothecary*. Now as to the Gentleman. This Gentleman, with his ten thousand a year—he having been bred up in the expectation of it—on what assignable or maintainable ground could I build any equal or nearly equal expectation, of his possessing the requisite intellectual aptitude, in any tolerably competent degree, in any shape? at any rate in any shape in which it would, any part of it, possess a tolerable chance of being *transferred* to this purpose? Intellectual aptitude—to whatever subject applied—is it not the fruit of *labour*?—is it to be had *without labour*? How then should he have come by it?—by the force of what *motives* shall that of the pain attached to the labour have been overcome?

raw)—*Oh no, you've forgot one : and that's blood, d—e : look there, (pointing to the horse's shoulder) look there—there you have it, d—e. To be sure, to sit comfortably, a man should have both :—no doubt of that ; but where one fails, t'other must serve instead of it. After all, blood's our surest card : vingt-un runs off with property now and then—blood it can't run off with : that sticks by us. Come, if you must have three elements, here's an amendment for you,—Blood, Property, Connexion : these are our three elements : Blood and Property in ourselves ; Connexion in the good fellow we put in to think and speak for us.—There now, you old fellow ! off with your three elements—off with them to UTOPIA, 'twas there you got 'em from, d—e !*

Well, good gentlemen, look over the list I am speaking about :—look it well over—look at the *seats*—look at the *sitting-parts* they have been filled by—look at them well—and as little will you find any deficiency in the stock of your own legitimate elements—man and horse elements together—as of my swinish ones.

Look to the most populous of all populous Boroughs ! look to Westminster !—Number of Electors, even many years back, not fewer than 17,000 : swine not all of them indeed—the Dean and Chapter being of the number—not to speak of Right Honourables and Honourables ;—swine's flesh, however, predominant—abundantly predominant : swinish the character, of the vast majority of that vast multitude.

Well then, look to Westminster—look first to time present—see now what you have there. See you not Lord Cochrane ? What do you see there ? See you

not blood and property in one?—blood from ancestors—property from the source most prized—the source from whence all your oldest property sprung—enemies' blood, with plunder for the fruit of it?—See you not Sir Francis Burdett?—have not you there blood enough and property enough? Look now a little back:—before you had either Cochrane or Burdett, had not you Charles Fox? had you him not as long as the country had him?

Even within this twelvemonth, when a vacancy was apprehended, what sort of man was it that was looked to for the filling of it? Was it a man *of* and *from* the people? Was it the *Cobbett* with his penmanship? his 60,000 purchasers, and his ten times 60,000 readers? Was it the *Henry Hunt* with his oratory? Was it not *Cartwright*, of the *Cartwrights* of *Northamptonshire*? Was it not *Brougham*, of *Brougham*?—and howsoever by these men the plea of *Ulysses* might be put in—“*Neve mihi noceat quod vobis semper Achivi profuit ingenium,*”^{*} not the less were there

* Thus miserably dilated by Dryden and Co. (*Chalmers's English Poets*, vol. xx. p. 532):—

————— Nor I may lose the prize,
By having sense which heaven to him denies;
Since great or small the talent I enjoy'd,
Was ever in the common cause employ'd;
Nor let my wit and wonted eloquence,
Which often has been used in your defence,
And in my own, this only time be brought
To bear against myself, and deem'd a fault.

the *genus et proavi*,*—and whether sitting for Westminster, or looked to for Westminster, the case of a man who had neither the *blood* element nor the *property* element, remains still without example.

Look at Bristol, the next most populous city:—when a man was looked for, who should, if possible, stem the tide of corruption—that tide which so naturally flows so strong in maritime and commercial cities—who is it that was looked for? Was it the Spa Fields Orator?—did he not try and fail there? Was it not Sir Samuel Romilly?—and though,—(from an irregularity, for which, by some country gentlemen or, other, whose *aptitude* was in his *acres*,—a Mr. *Eyre*, or a Mr. *Frankland*, which was it?—he was so consistently called to order,—the blood he had, came from, the wrong side of the channel, and with a something in it too nearly allied to *Puritanism* to be relished by *legitimacy*),—yet (not to speak of the *swinish* elements, which are of no value but in *Utopia*)—blood, such as it was, there was in him—*blood*?—yes; and *property* too,—though, whether then as now *savouring of the realty*, let others, who know, say,—to sanction it.

Look to the most populous among Boroughs: look to *Liverpool*. When the same pestilential tide was hoped to be stemmed at Liverpool, who is it that great commercial port and borough called in to stem

* The deeds of long-descended ancestors
Are but by grace of imputation ours,—
Theirs in effect.

it? Was it the *Cobbett*?—Was it the *Spa Fields' Orator*? Here too, was it not *Brougham*, of *Brougham*?

Propensity to look wide of the true mark—to look to and to accept, in lieu of the only true and direct elements of appropriate aptitude, those supposed circumstantially but deceptiously evidentiary ones—*blood—property*—add, if you please, *connexion*—this is not peculiar to *English*, it is common to *human nature*: yes, to human nature; and, till that nature be transformed, never will the propensity—be it useful, be it mischievous—be rooted out of it.

Look to *ancient*, look to *Republican Rome*. To protect them against the Aristocracy, the people obtained a *Representative*—a *single Representative*—a *Representative* whose style and title was, *Tribune of the People*: in the breast of this one individual was contained *their Commons House*. Well—this man—who to them was a *host*, and their *only* host—from what men, from what *cast* of men did they take him? From among themselves?—Not they indeed. From whence then?—Even from their oppressors—their very oppressors themselves—from the *Patricians*. Such (it has been observed by somebody, was it not *Montesquieu*?) such was their choice, for hundreds of years together.

Well:—in thus advocating *virtually universal suffrage*—and, as to *absolutely universal suffrage*, though, preferably to the other, I do not, nor ever should advocate it—I should nevertheless, as *Earl Grey* did once, “prefer it to the present system.” In thus advocating *virtually*, or though it were *absolutely*, *universal suffrage*,—what is given as above, is it all mere

theory?—is it not *practice* to boot?—*practice*, or somewhat not very easily distinguishable from it?—Is it not *experience*?

Oh but (says somebody) *this which you call practice—this, in support of which you are calling in experience—this is not any universal-suffrage plan—this is not even your own virtually-universal-suffrage plan:—this is but the householder plan.*

Yes, to be sure, in *name* it is but the *householder* plan; though where a *pot* constitutes a *house*, how much narrower soever the *ground* of the right is, the right itself must be admitted to be a little more extensive. But, be that as it may, if so it be that what you insist on is, that, in the field of political arrangement, nothing should ever be tried, but what in the self-same shape has been tried already, then so it is that, on this part of the question, my pen is stopped. But, upon this principle, here or any where—at this time or at any other time—well or ill—can or could government ever be carried on?

On your side, for the future (not to speak of the past), for the future, will you take it up and steadily, and to the last, adhere to it?—Vast as it is, and poisonous as it is vast, will you so much as pledge yourselves to be content with your existing stock of *panaceas*?—with your universal-personal-security-destroying Acts?—with your universal gagging Acts?—with your *liberty-of-the-press-destroying* Statutes, and judge-made-*ex-post-facto* laws?—with your *universal-popular-communication-destroying* Acts?—with your Acts for stopping up the ears of *soldiers*, and for engaging them in the character of informers, to embrae

their hands in the blood of their brothers, their sisters, their fathers, and their mothers?—with your *petition-rejecting* and *hope-extinguishing* Decisions and Orders and Resolutions?—with your Resolves for *rejecting petitions unheard*, because, *in aid of the pen, the press* had been employed in giving the circulation to the matter of them?—with your *sham precedents*, brought forward for a colour to such liberticide Resolves?

Well: if you shrink at this, remains still a possibility of your forbearing to insist here upon *individual* identity—of your listening to identity in *principle* and *specie*.

But, if identity of *principle* will satisfy you, how, so long as you admit the *householder* plan, how can you be at a loss for *principle* in support of virtually universal suffrage? Take in hand the fellowship of *householders*: take in hand the fellowship of *universal-suffrage men*: apply to each of the two fellowships the two tests of appropriate aptitude:—the tests of appropriate aptitude, in those two of its three branches which apply to the case in question—the case of *electors*. Apply to them the *appropriate probity* test; say, have you a sufficiency of it in your *householders*? Well then, on what grounds can you look for any want of such sufficiency in *my universal-suffrage men*?—of universal-suffrage men, although, instead of being, as here proposed, *virtual*, the universality were *absolute*. Your *householders*—is it their interest to possess, to retain, and upon occasion acquire property?—to acquire it (which to do would not, unless they could retain it, be of any great use to them). Well then—among my *universal-*

suffrage men, how many will you find, who would fail in any respect of being partakers in that same interest?—Apply to them next the appropriate *intellectual-aptitude* test. Your *householders*—the interest, which they possess in regard to property—the interest they have in possessing, acquiring, and retaining, of it:—that source—that sole and indispensable source—of subsistence, and continuation of existence, are they in a sufficient degree sensible of its existence?—then in what less degree think you would my *universal-suffrage men* be sensible to a matter of fact, to which (infants in arms and persons insane excepted), no human being sensible to any thing ever failed of being sensible?

In *your eyes*, and with reference to your habits and your means, the *all* of the sort of men to which the great majority of them belong is as nothing. Think you that, therefore, in their eyes it is no more? The *all* of A, how much less is it in the eye of A, than the *all* of B in the eye of B? When you have solved this problem,—then, and not before, say that universal confusion and universal destruction of property would be the results of universal suffrage.

For its success, true it is, that this reasoning supposes, with reference to the formation of a judgment on the subject of it, the existence of a competent qualification in the shape of appropriate intellectual aptitude. Unfortunately, just at this moment—such of you as are honest—you have no such aptitude. Spectres have stalked in and planted terror and confusion in your minds. *Cobbett*, in the character of *Apollyon*, the Destroyer:—Cobbett, with a *universal levelling ma-*

chine in his hand:—Cobbett, with the Spa-Fields Orator at his heels:—these are your bugbears. From the contemplation of these hobgoblins comes the spirit of wisdom with which you are inspired.

Well then, take them up—to give your theory its finish, take them up, and plant them in the House of Commons. Chosen by the swinish multitude, behold them seated on the Treasury Bench:—in that situation in which any thing may be done, there is nothing they would not be ready to do, so long as in any shape they saw any thing they could get by it. Yes: of course they would. Yes: but, according to this theory of yours, they are to level all property, and, of course, by levelling it, destroy it. Now, by so doing, what is it they could get, either of them? Some property they have, each of them: that one of them that has least, some number of times the amount of the utmost that could be expected to be put into his pocket by the operation of the universal levelling machine.

Oh, but these men, even these, are not the worst. The worst, to be sure, they are that we as yet know of. But what you perhaps don't see, and we do see is—the mob which is still behind them. This mob, which would begin with pushing them on, do you think it would end there? Oh no. No sooner were they seated, than after them it would be continually pouring in others that would be worse and worse. For, with the exception of us and ours, this is the way with all men. Their object—their constant object is—to do, in every imaginable shape, as much mischief as they can continually contrive to do:—Such is their end: and for their means and their instruments, how can they do otherwise than take up and

employ, and be perpetually upon the look-out for, the most mischievous agents that are to be found. Such being their constant study and endeavour—the constant study and endeavour of this mob of yours—this mob, that you and all that think with you want to set upon us and destroy us—what will be the consequence? The men, they will be finding out and pouring into the House, will be—each of them worse than every other: men, the least mischievous of whom will be mischievous enough to out-Hunt Hunt, and to out-Cobbett Cobbett.

The universal-suffrage plan being considered in the character of a *cause*—for the *effect*, on the monarchico-aristocratical theory, behold, in the above scheme of universal mischief and its consequence, universal destruction given—given, not merely as a *probable effect*, but as one that, in a practical sense, ought to be regarded as *certain*. And, for the *accomplishment*—not to speak of the *commencement*—of this same scheme, what are the sort of beings that are to have existence?—Human beings? Oh no: so far from it, a set of creatures, such as no man ever saw: a set of beings, in respect of the features essentially requisite for so much as the commencement of any such scheme, as opposite to all known human beings as can be conceived. Without one of the motives that is known of, and against the bent of all the motives that is known of—such is to be their course of action. Of no such motive as *social interest* are they to have any the smallest spark. As little are they to have of that sort of motive, *self-regarding interest*, on which the human species is in a more especial and necessary manner dependant for its existence. On this career of theirs are

they to set out, bent upon destruction—upon destruction of all property,—and with it, or before it, of all that derive support from it, ending or beginning with themselves.

In the words *wild* and *wildness* seems to be condensed the substance of all the *talk* (to call it *reason* or *argument* would be misrepresentation), say then the *talk*—by which universal suffrage has been opposed. Wildness? O yes: and but too much of it. But in what place is it that it will be found?—In the *universal-suffrage* plan, with the practice and experience on which it is *grounded*, or in the *theory* with which, against all practice and experience, it has been *opposed*?

True it is—but too true—as matters stand at present, they have not, *all of them*, means so sufficient as could be wished, to inform and qualify themselves. They have not—so much as the *majority* of them—any such sufficient means to inform and qualify themselves: they have not—the majority of them—*means* so sufficient as could be wished to inform themselves aright as to what good government is, or what the value of it: they have not—the majority of them—*sufficient means* of access to the *documents* on which the acquisition of this necessary knowledge depends: they have not any such sufficient means in any regular way to *read the newspapers*: they have not—many of them—nay even the majority of them—they have not as yet so much as the requisite skill in the elementary art of *reading*.

True. But these their deficiencies—whatsoever they may be—is it in these deficiencies that we are to look for the consideration—the sole, the chiefly preva-

lent consideration, or so much as any part of the consideration,—by which your anxiety, and your determination, to exclude them from the right of suffrage is produced?—Alas! alas! no.—These deficiencies—there is not any one of them, that it would not be little less difficult to you actually to supply, than to will or wish to do so: there is not any one of them, which they could not supply without any assistance of yours; which they would not supply to themselves, of themselves, if left to themselves: which they could not to themselves supply,—if, instead of aiding them in, your wishes and endeavours were not employed in the preventing them from, the receiving of such supplies:—of these same supplies, there is not one of them that, in the American states, is not actually and abundantly received. Received? Yes:—and of the supply thus received, what is the fruit? What? is it anarchy? No: but instead of it, the best government that is or ever has been:—that, with which yours forms so strong, not to say so complete a contrast.

Look on this occasion—if by any means you can endure to look that way—look once more to the American United States. Behold there democracy:—behold there pure representative democracy.—In the shape in question, any more than in any other shape, what mischief do you see there: In the American United States is there no property? Has it ever been destroyed since the establishment of independence? Has it ever been destroyed there, as it was here, in 1780, by your *Anti-Popery* mob; and—(not to speak of *Luddites*, and so many other non-religious)—in 1793, by your Church-of-England *Anti-sectarian* mobs

with orthodox and loyal Justices of the Peace (see Hutton's Life) to encourage them? In any one of these commonwealths has any, so much as the slightest, shock been ever given to it? All this while, since that auspicious day—these supposed destroyers of all property and all government—the great body of the people, has there ever been any where that day, in which they have not had full swing? Has there ever been that day, on which, for the keeping of them quiet, any one of your *panaceas* has been applied;—applied, or so much as thought of?—Yet has there at any time been that day, in which the door of that immense country has not stood wide open to the *scum of the earth*, as you would call it? and amongst others to your own wild Irish—to those wild Irish, who by your misrule, and by the fear of your *torture-mongers*, have been driven into banishment?

Oh, but (says somebody), what they have in America is—not the universal-suffrage plan: it is more like the householder plan; only still less popular:—it is actually the property plan.

True: in *individuality*, as above, it is not the *universal-suffrage* plan: but, in *principle*, look once more, and say once more—where and in what, if in any thing, consists the difference? The *property*—the income there required from landed property—there, even as here—consider, even where largest, how small it is, compared with the least amount of what is necessary for, and actually expended on, the means of sustenance.

Well but—will you then give us the *householder* plan?—will you give us the *American* plan?—with

either of those plans, we for our parts—I, for one—I, for my part at least, should be contented. Oh no: for *opposition* indeed—for *refusal*—this or any thing may serve: but for *agreement*—for *consent*—that's quite a different affair:—No: in the way of *concession*, nothing.

After all, what need can there be for looking to any such distance?—Intellectual aptitude? Sufficiency of appropriate intellectual aptitude?—is that the question? Look at home. Once more look at home. Turn your eyes to Westminster. By the hand of Virtue, in that great metropolis of Reform, behold Democracy—already for these ten years past—though with the mass of Corruption, as it were a mill-stone, still overhanging and threatening, yet still seated on her throne:—Westminster, a field of contention, on which, till that auspicious moment, Monarchy and Aristocracy—the everlastingly leagued, yet everlastingly bickering, adversaries of good government—had, from the commencement of the dynasty, been tearing one another and the country to pieces:—impoverishing one another; poisoning the morals of the people. Instead of this system of abuse, behold freedom of Election—perfect and unexampled freedom:—yes, freedom: and with it sobriety, temperance, tranquillity, security. And this under what system of representation? even under the Householder Plan—the same which *Mr. Grey* proposed—which *Earl Grey* is so much afraid of:—the Householder plan—the almost equivalent of virtually universal suffrage.*

* For the passages quoted, see Hone's Reformist's Register, Feb 15, 1817, No. 3. On reading them, a suspicion may possibly arise

No exaggeration here: nothing but simple truth. In proof, take, in the most compressed state possible, the following facts:—within a certain circle—were that a very small one—all of them notorious—all of them every where uncontrovertible.*

of their having been penned by the author of this tract.—In respect of personal knowledge, the facts are all unknown to him:—the picture here given of them was equally so, till several days after it was in print.

* I.—COMMENCEMENT.

Origin of the System of uncorruption and free Election established in Westminster.

I. OBJECT proposed. INDUCEMENTS—" To return Sir Francis Burdett free from expense, or personal trouble, and without even making him a *Candidate*: Sir Francis Burdett the only man who had the sense and the courage to fight the people's battle. He had proved himself a friend to very extended suffrage, and to ANNUAL PARLIAMENTS."

II. MANAGERS, *who*. " Few in number, of no political importance whatever—without influence*—even their names unknown to the Electors. The Electors, from the long disuse of the elective franchise, in the way in which alone it should ever be used, had no confidence in each other. Each man was indeed ready to do his duty, yet few reckoned upon the same disposition in their neighbours..."

III. MANAGERS—*their mode of canvassing*. Managers to the people—" We have undertaken your cause; the way is open—it is before you; do your duty. Electors may receive letters of thanks from the Candidates who are acting for THEMSELVES, but you will

* By *influence* must surely have here been meant—not influence of *understanding on understanding*—the influence exercised by acknowledged wisdom on unexperienced probity—but the vile instrument commonly called and understood by this name—viz. the influence of *will on will*—the influence exercised by the double-headed beast, whose name is *Terrorism and Bribery*.

The Americans—they impose no tax upon the means of political information; you impose an al-

“ not expect to receive them from the Committee who are acting
“ for you, and by your means.”

IV. RESULT *as to* SUCCESS. “ For Sir Francis Burdett, the ob-
“ ject of their choice, (himself not soliciting any man), single votes
“ as many within seven as all the Candidates, four in number, had
“ received among them; and nearly two-thirds of the whole num-
“ ber of Electors polled voted for him.”

V. RESULT *as to* EXPENSE.—“ From the commencement of
“ the Election to the close,” sum total 780*l.* 14*s.* 4*d.* :—to the person
thus chosen for *representative*—himself not so much as a *candidate*—
not a farthing.

VI. RESULT *as to* MORALS.—“ No drunkenness—no rioting—
“ no murders—no bludgeon-men—no sailors—no Irish chairmen—
“ no obstruction at the place of polling—no hired voters—no false
“ swearing—no puffing and lying in the newspapers—no assassin-
“ like attempt to destroy reputation—no attempt to mislead :—to
“ the people was the business left : nobly and effectually did they
“ perform it.”

VII. OPPOSITION *vanquished* : MEANS in vain employed by it :
Terrorism, Bribery, Falsehood—the *Holy Triple Alliance*—*impotent*.
—“ Threats, promises, persuasions, calumny, misrepresentation;
“ frauds of all kinds; letters written for those who could not refuse
“ their signatures, to induce others to procure votes; licences
“ threatened; tradesmen to have their customers taken away.”
—N. B. From what I know of the source from whence the infor-
mation came,—I should, upon occasion, stand assured of finding
these general assertions made good by proof of individual facts.

II.—CONTINUANCE.

VIII. On the part of the Managers, PERSEVERANCE : on the part
of the system of uncorruption, PERMANENCE.

“ It is now nearly ten years ago; and from that time to this the
“ Electors of Westminster have kept their steady course, while

most prohibitory one. Why impose so enormous an one? Is it for the sake of the money? In some de-

“Corruption has been obliged to hide its head, and to draw in its claws.”

“The Electors of Westminster have, since that time, *re-elected* Sir Francis Burdett *once*, and Lord Cochrane *twice*, on the same excellent plan. They have had to contend *three times* in Courts of Law; they have held upwards of *thirty* public meetings, all at their own expense, all too at an expense scarcely exceeding 4,000*l.*”

In ten years, four thousand pounds—scarcely more—even with the drain from the *Great Hall!* But for the cramming of *Giants*, ever *refreshed*, still insatiate—to how much more moderate a sum would not that so astonishingly moderate sum have been reduced?

IX. PRINCIPALITIES and POWERS contended with and vanquished.—

“In Westminster are the Courts of Law—the Houses of Parliament—the Palaces—the Admiralty—the Pay Office—the War and Ordnance Offices—the Treasury—the India Board—the great Army Agents—the Barrack Office—the Navy Office—the Victualling Office—the Tax Office—the Theatres—the Opera House and many other offices and public establishments, *All* of them, from their very nature, *opposed to free election*; yet in this place—abounding beyond all others in the means and the love of corruption—in this place power was impotent against the people.”

X. SOPHISTRY *thus confuted by fact*. “Westminster has replied, by its acts, to the calumny of the enemies of reform, that the House of Commons was corrupt, because THE PEOPLE were corrupt.”

The people corrupt forsooth? This was the plea of the Alarmist, muddle-headed, joke-spinner, metaphor-hunter, and laborious would-be deceiver, now no more: in whose head no one idea was ever clear, nor any two ideas consistent. *The people corrupt* forsooth? Corruption, why thus charge it upon the people? Even because, among the men he was addressing, he saw—and upon each occasion felt—an eagerness to catch at every pretence for shrouding, under a covering of contempt cast on the *subject many*, the system of depredation and oppression, continually carried on at their ex-

gree of course, yes: for where money is to be had, in what place and at what price is it not raked for? It is

pense, by the ruling few. Even because, supposing the pretended *corruption* to be regarded as having its source in that quarter, it could not but be regarded as being below the reach of remedy—and *reform*, in every shape and every situation, hopeless.—The aim of this man was to extinguish hope.

XI. CONTRAST *between this genuine reform and Government sham-reform.*—“Talk of *reformation* and *economy* indeed! Here are examples of both, worthy the contemplation of every man. Here is no petty retrenchment from unlimited extravagance; here is a radical reform in management and in morals, at once demonstrating that the people, and the people alone, are willing and able to do their own business in the best and the least expensive manner.”

XII. EXAMPLE *set*, LESSON *given*, PRACTICABILITY *proved*; ASSURANCE *of like success every where.*—“Westminster, at this moment, exhibits a fair sample of what the whole people would be if the plan of reform proposed by Sir Francis Burdett were adopted. Corruption and profligacy would speedily disappear from among them; and the profligate and the corrupt would no longer dare to offer themselves as Candidates to misrepresent and abuse them. Then must a man have a character for wisdom and integrity, who aspired to the high honour of representing a virtuous, a free, an intelligent, and brave people; and then would the wise and the virtuous, whose more correct notions of honour keep them out of sight, come forward, proud to receive real honours from their countrymen. And what is there, after all, in the conduct of Westminster, which would not instantly be put in practice by the whole people, if they possessed even the right of voting enjoyed by the people of Westminster?”

N. B. Freedom of suffrage here—freedom, to an extent sufficient, for the purpose—and yet, (it may be observed), without the protection of *secrecy*. True:—but though, in every other particular, a fit example for the whole kingdom, in this one it could not be.—Why? because in the circumstances in which the population is placed, freedom, even without the aid of *secrecy*, finds a protection, such

raked for in the Courts that should be Courts of Justice, to the destruction of justice. It is raked for in the stores of medicine, to the destruction of health and life. Yes, surely, in some degree for the money, but in a still greater degree for the sake of the *darkness*: the same transparent cunning which, in the teeth of all argument, and without the shadow of a pretence, has so recently, yet repeatedly engaged you to deprive them of the use of the press for giving expression to their desires, engages you, in relation to all these affairs, which while they are yours, are at the same time so much their own, to keep them in the state of the profoundest ignorance possible, that in the existence of that ignorance you may have a plea for the perpetuation of it.

Oh, but the information they get, it is, all of it, from

as, unless it be in the adjoining metropolis, it would in vain look for any where else. Though by the particularly independent condition of the majority of the inhabitants, Terrorism was vanquished, it was not till it had struggled and done its utmost. Terrorism, notwithstanding, the majority being so great, how much greater might it not have been, had Terrorism been disarmed by secrecy?

Of Democracy it is among the peculiar excellencies, that to good government in this form nothing of *virtue*, in so far as *self-denial* is an ingredient in virtue, is necessary. Such is the case, where the precious plant stands alone: no *Upas* tree, no clump of *Manchineel* trees to overhang it. But, in the spot in question, still live and flourish in conjunction both these emblems of misrule. Here then was, and still is, and will continue to be, a real demand for *virtue*: and here has the demand proved, as Adam Smith would say, an *effectual* one.

Shade of *Hampden*! look down, and in a host of Tradesmen and Shopkeepers, behold thy yet living and altogether worthy successors!

Cobbett:—misinformation, all of it ;—mischievous information :—a great deal worse than none.

Well: be it so: what of that? The information you could give—yes, and would give too, if you gave any—*that* is good information, is it not? Well then, what is it that hinders you from giving it? Have you not money enough?—enough at any rate for such a purpose? Know you not of writers enough, who—all of them, as touching righteousness and piety, inferior to nobody but yourselves, would—though none of them, any more than yourselves, for the sake of the money, have any objection to the taking of it? Have you not your champions, with and without names, and with names worse than none?—names with which paper such as this ought not to be defiled? The same hands which circulate your substitutes to the Bible, would they not serve, yea and suffice, to circulate whatsoever writings it might seem good to you to circulate, for the purpose of serving as *antidotes*, and by divine blessing as *substitutes*, to all such others, by the influence of which good government might, in the fulness of time, be substituted to misrule.

Oh, but to contend with Jacobins and Atheists!—with Jacobins who would substitute the Habeas Corpus Act to the abolition of it—Atheists, who would substitute the Bible to Creeds and Catechisms! to think of contending with such wretches on any thing like equal terms!—to think of arguing with miscreants, for whom annihilation would be too mild a destiny!

Aye—there's the rub!—Ever under a Monarchy.—whether pure and absolute, or mixt and corrupt—

ever under a Monarchy—every where but in that seat of licentiousness, a Representative Democracy, does *excess* in force employ itself in the filling up of all *deficiencies*, in the articles of *reason* and *argument* : and; the more palpable the deficiency, the more excessive, the more grinding, the more prostrative, the more irresistible the force.

So much for us of the swinish multitude : so much for us and our ignorance. But you—Honourables and Right Honourables—how is it with you?

You tolerate publication of debates. But is it for the sake of general information and the diffusion of it? Oh no, it is for individual vanity, and the gratification of it. He who is at the head of you—the ablest head you ever had—after he had fired off his speech against corruption—his furious speech, with the double-headed shot in it from top to bottom—his speech, in which all that is least mischievous in corrupt influence is fired upon with red hot shot, while all that is most mischievous in it is spared, did he not send it himself to Cobbett, to the Cobbett whom you would all crush?

What they are in want of is not so much the *time* as the *liberty* to inform *themselves*. What you are in want of—you who have time as much as you choose to have—you who, so many of you, have time, so much more of it than you know what to do with—what you want, what you want, is *inclination*—the *inclination* to inform *yourselves*.

Thus deficiency—the evil of it, be it what it may, is a removable one: from you it came, by you it is kept up: at your pleasure it lies to remove it. Leave

them but the liberty: by their knowledge will your ignorance be put to shame.

Your deficiency—the evil of *your* deficiency—is that evil à removable one?—Yes: establish reform, and that a radical one, you will then—and I will presently shew you how—have removed it. But upon any other terms it is absolutely without remedy. It is fixt to your freehold: it sticks to *property*: to *your* only element of aptitude: the only element you either possess or acknowledge. From property—from that plethora of the good things of this world in all their shapes, under which the man who is gorged with property is condemned to suffer—from that surfeit comes *love of ease*: love of *ease*—that appetite which, existing in excess—in that degree of excess, in which in your situation it does so generally and so necessarily exist—is *indolence*. But be the field of action what it may, indolence and information are exclusive of each other. Labour of the body—labour of the mind—in his spare time will the man, who being used to labour, loves labour—in his *spare* time—be it ever so small—will he do more, than will the man, who, being unused to labour, hates labour, do in his *whole* time.

Opulence, indolence, intellectual weakness, cowardice, tyranny—oh yes, these five are naturally in one. From opulence proceeds indolence—from indolence, intellectual weakness—from intellectual weakness, cowardice—from cowardice, tyranny. A phantom of danger presents itself: could he but fix his attention upon it, and look steadily at it, the phantom would vanish; but, being unexercised, *his* mind is weak: he has no such

command over it. The phantom haunts him: it continues terrifying him: it plants an ague in his mind: in his delirium he catches at every straw that presents to his eyes the image of a chance for stopping his fall into the gulf which he sees yawning for him: his bowels, if amidst his entrails he ever had any, wither: to his sick mind no feelings, but his own, present any tokens of existence: no barbarity, no wickedness—so it but afford the glimmering of an addition to the stock of accumulated securities with which he has overlaid himself, comes amiss to him. Frantic at the thoughts of the danger to himself, with or without thinking of any exterior objects, he gives his *fiat* to the cluster of tyrannies by which the security of the whole people—his own along with it—is destroyed. Trembling with terror, and terror-sprung rage, he lends his hand to the opening of the Pandora's box, and pours forth the contents of it upon the heads of the whole people. And thus it is, and by this course—and even without the aid of sinister interest in any other shape—thus it is that, by the very fear—the groundless fear—of its destruction, security may be destroyed. May be? Yes: and, by that, and sinister interest in all its shapes together, if it be not already, is, while this pen is moving, on the very point of being destroyed.

Yes:—you pillage them: you oppress them: you leave them nothing that you can help leaving them: you grant them nothing, not even the semblance of sympathy: you scorn them: you insult them: for the transgression of scores, or dozens, or units, you punish them by millions; you trample on them, you defame

them, you libel them: having, by all you can do or say, wound up to its highest pitch of tension the springs of provocation and irritation, you make out of that imputed,—and, where in any degree real, always exaggerated—irritation, a ground, and the only ground you can make, for the assumption, that, supposing them treated with kindness—all their grievances redressed—relief substituted to oppression, they would find in the very relief so experienced, an incitement—an incitement to insurrection, to outrage, to anarchy, to the destruction of the supposed new and never yet experienced blessing, together with every other which they ever possessed or fancied.

Levelling? destruction of all property? Whence is it they are to learn it? What is there they can get by it? Who is there that ever taught it them? whose interest is it, whose ever can it be, to teach it them? How many of them are there, who would, each of them, be so eager to lose his all? The all of a peasant—to the proprietor how much less is it; than the all of a prince—the all, of him whose means of livelihood are in his labour, than the all of him whose means of livelihood are in his land? Who again is it, that, in your notion at least, they are at this moment so abundantly looking to for instruction? Is it not Cobbett? With all his eccentricities, his variations, and his inconsistencies, did he ever attempt to teach them any such lesson as that of equal division of property—in other words, annihilation of it? In the whole mass of the now existing and suffering multitude, think ye that one in a score, or in a hundred, not to say a thousand, could be found, so stupid, so foolish, as either

of himself or from others, to fancy that, if without other means of living, he had his equal share in the whole of the land to-day, he would not, twenty to one, be starved upon it before the month were out? Oh! if the men, in whom—truly or erroneously—they behold their friends, were not better instructors as well as better friends to them than you are, or than it is in your nature to be, long ere this would the imputation you are thus so eager to cast on them, have been as substantially grounded as it now is frivolous.

No, no:—it is not *anarchy* ye are afraid of: what ye are afraid of is *good government*. More and more uncontrovertibly shall this fear be proved upon you;—proved upon you, from the sequel of these pages, even to the very end.

§ 9. *Freedom of suffrage further explained—Seductive influence—its forms, instruments, &c.*

Sub-topics proposed to be brought to view under this head. Opposite of freedom of suffrage, *spuriousness*:—*efficient cause*, by which—*motives*, by which—*influential persons*, by whom—*modes*, in which—*situations*, in and by which—*instruments* by or with which—it is produced;—in respect of *mischievousness*, differences as between instrument and instrument;—*Seat-traffick* as between proprietor and purchaser, how far mischievous; *penal laws* for prevention of spuriousness, how far *useful*.

For the more effectual explanation of these several particulars,—distinctions, and points of agreement, not

all of them (it is believed) as yet sufficiently noticed,—and for giving expression to these distinctions, here and there a word or phrase not as yet in general use,—must unavoidably be brought to view.

I. *Efficient cause.* As in the case of election at large, so in the case of parliamentary election in particular,—the efficient cause, by the operation of which *freedom* of suffrage is or may be *excluded—spuriousness* to that same extent *substituted*,—may, with reference to the person operated upon, be termed, *seductive influence*:—it being understood that the sort of influence here in question is—according to a distinction already noted, the influence—not of understanding on understanding, but of will on will.

II. *Motives.*—As to the sort of motive, through which seductive influence operates, it may be either of the nature of *hope*, or of the nature of *fear*:—in the first case it may be termed *pleasurably-operating*; or, in one word, *pleasurable* or *alluring*:—in the other, *painfully-operating*, *painful*, *terrific*; or, in so far as it operates with effect, *coercive*.

In general, when *seduction* is the word employed, the *pleasurable* is the sort most apt to be brought to view by it: but, of the two, as every body feels, the *painful*—the *terrific*—is, in its general nature, the sort by much the more powerful in its operation; and, in the particular case here in question, it is by *that* that by far the greatest part of the mischief (it will be seen) is produced.*

* *Gratitude* may perhaps here present itself, as a *motive*,—which, though not of the nature of either terror or bribery, may not un-

III. *Modes*.—By seductive influence,—in whichever of the above two shapes it operates,—freedom

frequently be capable of being productive of the same effect: and, in so far as this case is considered as exemplified, *sentimental* may be the adjunct employed for the purpose of giving expression to it: say, *sentimental seduction*, or *sentimental seductive influence*.

But, in the instances in which, at bottom, no motive but of the *self-regarding* kind, and *that* looking to the *future*, viz. either hope or fear, or a mixture of both has place,—*gratitude*, the *social* motive, is a *cloak*, which, in so far as any tolerably plausible pretence can be found—(and whensoever a favour has been received, or supposed to be received, it always may be found)—is sure to be employed as a covering for the *self-regarding* motive: and, even when favours to any amount have been received, a *self-regarding* fear—fear of the *reproach of ingratitude*—is frequently the cause, by which, if not the whole, a part more or less considerable of the effect is produced.

On the occasion of *election bribery*, such as in this last case is the mode, in which the *seductive influence* is commonly applied and operates: in this way, if at all, must it operate, when the bribe is given *before hand*: and in this case, to the reproach of *ingratitude*, will, in common apprehension, be added the stronger reproach of *improbability*, viz. in the shape of *perfidy*. See *Spring-of-action* table, as above.

From the situation of *Elector*, turn now to that of *Representative*.

In the motive of *hope*, with or without *fear*, and with a covering of *gratitude* more or less sincere, may be seen the *seductive influence*, by which in this case, under the dominion of C——r-General, the conduct of members of parliament, both houses included, is, to so vast an extent, determined. To this case may be referred, in a more especial manner, the *gratitude* which has place under the sort of robe, the sleeves of which are of *law*. “*When I forsake my King* “*may my God forsake me!*” was the once famed speech of a high-seated and notorious profligate, to whom for once it seemed good to play the hypocrite. But in this case *law* was not the material of the sleeves.

Hope, fear, gratitude,—in such situations, generally speaking,

of election may be excluded—spuriousness of suffrage in that same proportion produced and introduced:—

who but the Searcher of Hearts can distinguish the proportions in which those affections contribute to the production of the effect? still greater is the difficulty, as between gratitude and fear of the reproach of ingratitude. When in such a situation the profession of gratitude has any thing of sincerity at the bottom of it, the stronger the sincerity the more mischievous the gratitude is apt to be.—Why? even because the stronger it is, the more strenuous the exertions with which it will operate towards the support of the separate and sinister interest.

As between *individual* and *individual*,—if in so far as it exercises itself to the *benefit* of one individual who is the object of it, gratitude is a virtue,—yet, in so far as, when exercising itself to the benefit of the one, it exercises itself to the *injury* of any other, in so far instead of being a virtue, can it be any thing better than a vice? much more, if, as between an individual and the whole community, exercised to the still greater injury of the universal interest. Gratitude, by which, at the expense of the universal interest, the private interest of the C——r-General is served—is this a virtue? Yes: if stealing money out of the Exchequer or the Bank, to slip it into the Privy Purse would be a virtue;—not otherwise.

Behold a man eight-and-thirty years in Parliament, three-and-thirty of those years in office: in all those three-and-thirty years, not to speak of the other five, though the measures of the monarch were ever so mischievous, never in any instance failing to give his vote (not to speak of his speeches) in support of them: and, in a life of him, written in lawn sleeves, by a brother of the Right Honourable person in question, this habit, as will be seen, placed to the account of *virtue*! In respect of extent, as well as malignity, see the character of this mischief admirably displayed in an Edinburgh Review of the last year, or last but one. But in this place the matter is too apposite, as well as too impressive, to be sufficiently put to use by a mere reference. *Lord Viscount Barrington's Life*, by his brother, the Bishop of Durham, p. 169 to 192. *Time*, that of the American war. In October, 1775, Letter to the

introduced, viz. in either of two *modes*; the one *direct*, the other *indirect*:—*direct*, in so far as the situation, of

King, desiring leave to resign: no notice taken. June 7th, 1776, for the first time, conversation on the subject with the King in his closet. Year of Lord Barrington's age, the sixtieth:—of his official service, the thirty-first. Hear Lord Barrington: this from his own manuscript:—"Many difficulties," (I answered) (p. 174) "in respect to the House of Commons, were of the most serious kind, as *they affected my conscience* and my character. I have, said I, my own opinions in respect to the disputes with America: I give them, such as they are, to Ministers in conversation as in writing. I am summoned to meetings, where *I sometimes think it my duty to declare them openly, before perhaps twenty or thirty persons*; and the next day *I am forced either to vote contrary to them, or to vote with an Opposition which I abhor*:" viz. not that particular Opposition alone, but every Opposition whatsoever, in whatsoever case, and on whatsoever ground acting.

Judge whether this be not true: view him in the year of his age the twenty-ninth; of his parliamentary service, the fifth or sixth, (p. 13, anno 1745.) Then it is that, to his perfect astonishment, he discovers, that, in that one instance, opposition in Parliament had given a certain degree of encouragement to rebellion: as if it were possible, that, where rebellion is in contemplation, opposition could in that place by any possibility be made, without contributing more or less to that effect. Thus made, the discovery, profound as we see it, suffices of itself to produce, on his part, a determination never to be in opposition in any case whatsoever: and, to this determination, for such a number of years together—the whole time against his most decided judgment—to the support of one of the most tyrannical and disastrous measures—(disastrous?—to the would-be-enslaving country, yes: but to the country intended to be enslaved, how felicitous!)—ever contemplated, he most heroically adheres. Speaking of the rebellion in 1745, "he had seen," (says his Right Reverend biographer and panegyrist), "he had seen, with some degree of remorse, how much the conduct

the persons to whom the force applies itself in the first instance, is that of the *electors* themselves; in-

" of Opposition had encouraged that enterprise. He perceived" (continues he) " that appeals to the people against the Parliament " and the Government contribute towards anarchy; and that Ministers are more frequently deterred from right than from wrong " measures, by the apprehension of opposition. Possibly" (continues he) " some may think, that his having an employment in " administration might have contributed to his adopting these sentiments: being once, however, offered to his mind, the force and " *truth* of them became irresistible." Yes—" *the truth of them,*" says the good Lord Bishop.

Behold then the scrupulous Viscount, with his tender conscience. Thus, according to his own shewing, was this man, and for so many years together, in the unvaried habit of voting against his own conscience, contributing in one of the most influential situations to the commission of legally dismurdered murders (to speak according to his opinion) committed in the wholesale way: and why?—only because, had his votes been given according to his conscience, and against these murders, he would have seen other votes operating in aid of *his*, and contributing to the efficiency of *his*, by being given in favour of the only system his conscience could approve of. After this comes the determination expressed to the King, over and over, and over again, the determination thus to continue voting, and at the head of the War Department as well as in Parliament, acting to this effect against his conscience: and this to the end of his days, unless and until it should please his Majesty to consent to his ceasing so to do. P. 179, June 1st, 1777. " Your Majesty knows the very bottom of my mind: *if, after that, you order me to remain as I am, I will obey you. I find I cannot force myself from you; and, whenever I go, your Majesty must voluntarily tell me that I may leave you.*" After, as well as before this, from p. 167 to 169, see passages, reporting conversations or letters out of number, all to this effect. " *The King thanked me warmly,*" (viz. for continuing to operate towards the perpetration of the dismurdered murders, against the declared dictates of his conscience),

direct, in so far as the situation thus applied to is that of persons at large, considered in the capacity of *Candidates*:—Candidates *actual* or *proposable*.

“and said” (continues his Lordship) “*it was impossible to act a more handsome part than I had done throughout.*” Thus it went on, the King still refusing dismissal—permission to act according to conscience; the War Secretary still obsequious; till almost three years after the date of the letter, by which, for the cause in question, the desire to resign was made known: the 16th December, 1778, on which day, with this lesson before his eyes, *Mr. Jenkinson*, father to the *present Earl of Liverpool*, to whom his paternal care could not but have transmitted it, kissed hands as successor to the present Earl, who, on the 15th June, 1809, (*Cobbett’s Debates*, p. 1033*), “from long, deliberate, and mature consideration,” said, “I am convinced, that the disfranchisement of the smallest borough . . . would eventually destroy the constitution.”—N. B. On this same 1st June, 1776 (p. 179), King to Lord Barrington:—“I will give you a mark of my favour at parting: but I wish much to keep you at present,” &c.: and, during all this conflict betwixt gratitude and loyalty on the one side, and conscience on the other, the quantum of this mark of favour remained to be determined; it was settled at 2,000*l.* a year pension, (King’s Letter to Lord Barrington, *in terminis*, p. 191), “until” (says the letter) “he shall be appointed to some other employment.”

Thus much for King and Ministers. Now for Bishop:—“Perhaps,” (says he, p. 169) “the reader may be disposed to interrupt my narrative, by observing, that, if Lord Barrington objected to the general system, which administration had adopted, and which they continued to act upon, notwithstanding his remonstrances, it was his duty to have resigned his appointment, and not to have taken any further part in measures which he disapproved. *The answer is in itself complete.* As soon as Lord Barrington found these measures would be persevered in, he tendered his resignation: but he did it *in that candid and consistent manner which became Lord Barrington.* He did not make his dif-

Proprietor, *proprietary seat*, proprietorship; *sole proprietor*, *co-proprietor*; *land-holding proprietor*,

“ference of sentiment the subject of appeal to the public* favour, “or the means of thwarting national efforts, and embarrassing the “King and his Ministers: but he submitted it in a private letter to “his Majesty, as early as *with propriety* he could, in the beginning “of October, 1775; and he renewed his instances, until his retirement from public life could be permitted, without inconvenience “to his Majesty or to the interest of the public.”

Behold in this one frame three portraits—the *King's*, the *Minister's* and the *Bishop's*—drawn by the pious hand of the original of one of them. In these three behold, moreover, a family picture of matchless Constitution:—Monarchy and Aristocracy above: sham Democracy beneath—a slave crouching under both. But the sample afforded by this triad is a favourable sample: the King, a bettermost kind of King; the Peer and War-Minister, a bettermost kind of Peer and Minister; the Bishop, a bettermost kind of Bishop: all agreeing in this, viz. that when a King is pleased to express a wish, be it even ever so faint a one, no part but obedience can be left to conscience.—Note well, this from among the *bettermost* sort: what would be to be expected from the *ordinary* sort?—*Answer*. Exactly what we are now experiencing.—These portraits from a *partial* pencil,—what if from an impartial one?

Walk in and see Church and King!—Walk in and see Church and State!—After this, what need can there be of libels?—This, if it were not the work of a Bishop, would it not in itself be the quintessence of all libels?—a libel on every thing that is most *excellent*?—a libel accompanied with the most flagitious of all aggravations—the matters of fact unquestionably true?

Behold legitimacy *in puris naturalibus*. Behold not only passive

* Learn hence, that, in the opinion of both brothers, *public opinion*—the whole force of seductive influence notwithstanding—was really against the American war. N. B. *Public favour* would not have given him the 2,000*l.* a year, or any part of it.

office-bearing proprietor.*—*Terrorist*, terrorism; *vote-compelling*,† *terrorist*; *competition-repelling*, *competition-quelling* or *subduing*, *competition-excluding terrorist*; *land-bestridding*, *purse-brandishing terrorist*:—*Bribe-offering*, *bribe-giving*, *seducer* or *seductionist*, *corruptor* or *corruptionist*;—*bribe*, in the *pecuniary* or *money* shape; *bribe*, in the *quasi-pecuniary* shape; ordinary *bribe*, *bribe-royal*:‡—reference being had to the

obedience and non-resistance, but active obedience—active obedience to the monarch, whatsoever be his measures—professed and preached without reserve. If,—by any form given to language, thus speaking in generals,—it be possible, that any more profligate servility should be inculcated, any more profligate despotism invited, one should be curious to see it. And, while the pen is writing this, comes from Durham the intelligence, by which a practical comment on this theory is brought to view.

Turn back now to Section 8,—one more glance at *Westminster Election* management. Behold there Democracy—representative Democracy—in its lowest stage, not, as in America, erect and independent; but as in Britain, ever threatened and ready to be crushed. Say now whether *property* is *probity*: say whether *Kingship* is *probity*: say whether *Peership* is *probity*: say whether *Bishopship* is *probity*: say whether,—if every one of these is *probity*,—*Tradesmanship* *probity*, as exemplified for these ten years past in Westminster, is not worth all such other *probities* put together.

* Office-bearer—the term in common use in Scotland for the possessor of an office.

† In Pope's Homer, the God Jupiter is *cloud-compelling Jove*.

‡ *Penny-royal*, as well as other *royals*, is already in the language. *Bribe-royal*, a term that may be employed to signify all and singular the good things, applicable at the pleasure of C——r General, in reward for *parliamentary service*, certain or contingent, past or future: good things, some *transferable*, as offices and contracts: some

operating *motive*, viz. *fear* or *hope*, and to the *situation* operated upon,—of the objects meant to be respectively presented to view by these terms—of these objects, together with their mental relations—a general conception will, it is believed, present itself at the first mention; and, by the occasions on which they will come to be employed, whatsoever may be wanting to clearness or correctness will presently, it is hoped, be supplied.

IV. *Instruments*.—*Free suffrage*, *proprietorship*, *terrorism*, *bribery*,—behold in these the instruments by one or other of which every vote given by an Elector is produced: by which, taken all together, the 658 seats in the House, taken altogether, are filled.

As to the *votes*,—the number of those which, on the occasion of each election, are really *free*, is the *residuum* of the number of those which, by any one or other of the above three instruments or modifications of the efficient cause of spuriousness, have been rendered *spurious*. Small indeed will probably appear to be the proportion, of those in the filling of which *free suffrage* performs commonly the greater part; scarce one perhaps in which it constantly performs the whole.

As to *free suffrage*, of this instrument the nature is sufficiently explained, by its being said to be the result of the absence or non-operation of the several other instruments.

In regard to *votes* and the *seats* filled by them, the

nontransferable, as knighthood, ribbons, baronetcies, peerages: the two last *descendible*.

proprietor is already in possession of that which, antecedently to success, the terrorist and the corruptionist does but aim at. Proprietorship has for its effect the effect of terrorism or corruption consummated and perpetuated: freedom of suffrage excluded in perpetuity.

In relation to any seat or pair of seats, suppose amongst co-proprietors a disagreement as to the choice. In this case a *competition* may have place: and room is made for employment to be given to the two remaining instruments, either or both of them, viz. *terrorism* and *bribery*.

So much as to the instruments themselves: now as to the *field*, and the different *parts* of the field, in which they respectively operate.

As to *proprietorship*, the field of its operation is composed of and confined to the *proprietary seats*: that being said, all is said.

As to *terrorism*, the *County seats* present themselves as constituting that part of the field, in which its operation is at the same time most conspicuous and most extensive: subjects of the oppression exercised by it, in the *direct* mode, *Electors* alone; in the indirect mode as above, *Candidates*, actual and proposable:—Candidates,—and through them *Electors* again, viz. by the exclusion put upon the countless multitude of those persons, the worthiest of whom might otherwise have been taken for the objects of their choice. The shape in which in this case it operates in preference, is that of the *land-bestridding* terrorism. In this shape and this alone it operates, where there is no competition: *Electors* being driven to the Polling Booth by the vote-

compelling influence of the oppressive instrument, Rival Candidates driven *from* it by its competition-excluding influence. Comes a competition,—then it is that, in aid of *land-bestridding* terrorism, bribery and *purse-brandishing* terrorism are called in: the self-same money, while operating on Electors in the shape of *bribery*, operates upon rival Candidates in the shape of *terrorism*.

Thus stands the matter, in the case where the vote-compelling power of the instrument is, or is deemed to be, strong enough to operate upon the situation of Candidate with such a degree of efficiency, as gives it the character, not merely of a competition-repelling, but of a competition-excluding instrument. By the opposite case, a demand is presented for a supplemental one in the *bribery* shape: in this case, while it is in the *alluring* shape that the influence operates on the situation of Elector, it is in the *terrific* shape that it operates on the situation of Candidate. In truth, it is only by the prospect of the quantity of force likely to be exerted by the instrument in its *alluring* shape upon the situation of *Elector* in the event of a competition, that it can operate upon the situation of *Candidate* with any such force as that which is indicated by the appellation of *competition-excluding terrorism*.

In the case of these *County Seats*, if we look for the persons, on whom, in the character of *Electors*, it is in the shape of *terrorism* that the seductive influence operates, we shall find them—in the first place, *Tenants*; in the next place, *Tradesmen, Shop-keepers, Artificers*, and other persons of all sorts, in whose instance, by

hope of custom for goods or labour, or by *hope* from any other source, or by a motive of a more irresistible nature from the same sources, viz. *fear of loss*—(fear, having for its object loss of any such profit or benefit; as in those or any other shapes had already been in use to be derived from the rich man's expenditure—not to speak of any interest which he may have, or be supposed to have, with the superior givers of good gifts,—) consider themselves as more or less dependant on his *good will*, and those *good offices* which may be among the expected fruits of it.

In this case, the instrument of force by which the voter is compelled and the vote extorted, is, on the part of the dependant Elector, the fear of giving offence to, and thereby losing the *good offices*, and perhaps suffering under the *ill offices*, of the terror-inspiring Candidate. In so far as,—consideration had of the amount of the apprehended loss, and of the Elector's ability, in respect of his pecuniary circumstances, to preserve himself from it,—the force is sufficient to engage the Elector to take upon himself the expense of journeys to and from, and demurrage at, the Election town,—in so far, *terror*—as being a force, which in this case costs nothing to the person by whom it is applied—is the seductive force called into action: in so far as, in respect of its quantity, the force which in this shape is at the disposal of the Candidate, is regarded by him as not sufficient,—seductive influence in the opposite shape, viz. *bribery*—seductive influence in this acceptable and *alluring* shape—is called in and employed, in aid of that which operates in the *terrific* shape:—*indemnification*, viz. against the expense of

journeys and *demurrage*, is the cloak in which in this case the bribery is enveloped.

Thus much as to the situation of *Elector*. Look upwards—look to the situation of *Candidate*, and the instrument which you have just been seeing operate upon *Electors*, in the shape of an instrument of *alluring* seductive influence—viz. the money spent in *bribery*—this same instrument you may *now* see in the shape of an instrument of *terror*, operating—and this too of itself and without need of any hand to work it—operating upon the situation of *Candidate*: operating, according to the degree of its efficiency, with the effect of a *competition-encounter-repelling*, a *competition-quelling*, or a *competition-excluding* instrument.

In the Election *Town* itself,—and within that circle, within which, by reason of *vicinity* to the Town, all demand for expense of journey and demurrage, and consequently all cause and pretence for indemnification on that score, stands excluded,—the Terrorism, in the above, viz. the *purse-brandishing* shape, finds not any place in which it can operate: and, as to Rival Candidates, actual and proposable,—the greater the distances between this central spot and the abodes of the respective voters thus purchasable, the more strongly coercive will be the force of the rival and terror-inspiring purse.*

* By various persons—and even by persons by no means partial in their affections to the Gentleman in question, it has happened to me, more than once, to hear spoken of as a matter of fact, not regarded as open to dispute, that in the instance of *Mr. Wilberforce*, in the character of a veteran Member of Parliament, might be seen a person, from whose declared judgment—self-formed or derivative—

Of *terrorism*, considered in respect of both the situa-

derivative judgments, in greater numbers than from any other, had, as it seemed to them, been for a long time in use to be derived.—Well: not many years ago, by the mere force of terrorism—competition-excluding terrorism—in the hands of an as yet untried competitor, was this man driven from the seat: that seat which, with the effect just mentioned, he had so long filled. And this seat, what was it?—It was one of the two seats filled by the County of Yorkshire: a County, by the exorbitant amplitude of which, the joint power of *land-holding* and *purse-brandishing* terrorism are swelled to a maximum:—120,000*l.* I have heard mentioned as the sum, which on the occasion of one Election was expended, by one only of the two victorious competitors for the two seats: but the victory had conquest—complete conquest—for its fruit. The condition of a *proprietary* Borough—a proprietary Borough held in *joint-tenancy*—such is the condition to which that vast County, inclosing in its bosom *three* large Counties called *Ridings*, is reduced.

This is not all. For, by the same instrument by which the disease is produced and fixt, is all remedy barred out. Petition—if it aim at any thing better than the continuance of the disease; by this same instrument is Petition nipped in the bud. And thus it is that so long as, between the two high allies, peace and union shall continue to flourish, the peace of the County, (for such is the appropriate phrase), remains secure: the peace of Yorkshire secured, and by the same instrument, which, under the auspices of the new-invented Christianity, is with such irresistible effect occupying itself in the giving security to the peace of Europe.

In the *Debates*, moreover, traces are not altogether wanting, of the impression made by the experience of *terrorism*: and that in its several shapes of *vote-compelling* influence, *competition-repelling-and-excluding* influence, in the hands of Peers; and *competition-repelling-and-excluding* influence in the hands of the *Crown*: with which are mixed, indications of the existence and degree of the *undue dependance*, in which *nominees* are held by proprietary and other possessors of seats under the name of *patrons*, more particularly Peers, contrasted with the *absence of due dependance* as towards Electors, in the

tions on which, and thence in respect of both the modes

small number of instances, in which, in the whole assemblage of those by whose suffrages a seat or a pair of seats are filled, suffrages completely free are in any proportion to be found.

Behold accordingly in this note the following instructive particulars: 1. By *Earl Grey*, at that time *Mr. Grey*, a peerage not as yet in any near prospect, the existence of *terrorism* recognized, and, in so far as exercised by *Peers*, not approved of:—2. By *Charles Fox*, the part borne by *terrorism* in the filling of the *County Seats* recognized, and therefore the extension of the number of those seats not approved of:—3. By *Charles Fox*, the effect of *terrorism*, in the formation of a squadron composed of *coroneted terrorists* and their *nominees*, listed under the banners and the orders of C——r General, indicated,—and their numbers, as they stood at that time, mustered.

Parl. Reg. anno 1793, p. 393. *Mr. Grey*, now *Earl Grey*. 1. “*Mr. Grey* remarked, that when *Mr. Pitt* moved for an addition of 100 Members to be added to the Counties, he could not carry his motion: and yet he had contrived to procure the nomination of 40 Members by indirect means; for he had added to the House of Peers 30 Members, who either nominated *directly** or by *irresistible influence*,† that number of Members of the House of Commons, as appeared from the petitions then on the table, and which the petitioners were ready to prove.”

Woodfall's Debates, anno 1797, p. 323. *Charles Fox*. 2. “I submit, however, to the good sense and to the personal experience of gentlemen who hear me, if it be not a manifest truth, that *influence* depends almost as much upon what they have to receive, as upon what they have to pay; whether it does not proceed as much from the *submission* of the *dependant* who has a debt to pay, as on the *gratitude* of the person whose attachment they reward? And if this be true, in the *influence* which individuals derive from the rentals of their estates, and from the expenditure of that rental, how much more so it is true of Government, who, both in the receipt and expenditure of this enormous revenue, are actuated by one

* i. e. by means of proprietorship of so many proprietary seats.

† i. e. by *terrorism*; with or without an admixture of bribery.

and directions in which it operates,—but more parti-

“ invariable principle, that of extending or withholding favour in
 “ exact proportion to the submission or resistance to their measures
 “ which the individuals make ?”

Woodfall’s Debates, anno 1797, p. 326.—*Charles Fox*. 3. “ A
 “ noble Lord says that the County representation must be good, *that*
 “ must be approved of; be it so; this proposes to leave the County
 “ representation where it is: I wish so to leave it, I think, that re-
 “ presentation ought to be of a *compound* nature; the *counties may*
 “ *be considered as territorial representation, as contra-distinguished*
 “ *from popular; but in order to embrace all that I think necessary, I*
 “ *certainly would not approve of any further extension of this branch of*
 “ *the representation.*”

3. Woodfall’s Debates, anno 1797, p. 329.—*Charles Fox*. “ There
 “ is one class of constituents, whose instructions it is considered as
 “ the implicit duty of members to obey. When gentlemen represent
 “ *popular towns and cities*, than it is *disputable whether they ought to*
 “ *obey their voice*, or follow the dictate of their own conscience; but
 “ if they happen to represent a *noble Lord* or a noble Duke, then it
 “ becomes no longer a question of doubt; *he is not considered as a man*
 “ *of honour who does not implicitly obey the orders of his single constituent.*
 “ He is to have no conscience, no liberty, no discretion of his own;
 “ he is sent here by my Lord this, or the Duke of that, and if he
 “ does not obey the instructions that he receives, he is not to be
 “ considered as a man of honour and a gentleman; *such is the mode*
 “ *of reasoning that prevails in this house.* Is this fair? Is there any
 “ reciprocity in this conduct? Is a gentleman to be permitted,
 “ without dishonour, to act in opposition to the sentiments of the
 “ city of London, of the city of Westminster, or of Bristol; but if
 “ he dares to disagree with the Duke, or Lord, or Baronet, whose
 “ representative he is, then he must be considered as unfit for the
 “ society of men of honour? This, Sir, is the *chicane and tyranny of*
 “ *corruption*, and *this*, at the same time, is called *representation*. In a
 “ very great degree the County members are held in the same sort of
 “ *thralldom*; a number of peers possess an over-weening interest in
 “ the country, and a gentleman is no longer permitted to hold his

cularly in respect of the *competition-excluding mode*, the effect seems as yet, in comparison of its mischievous-

“ situation, than as he acts agreeably to the dictates of those powerful families. Let us see how *the whole of this stream of corruption has been diverted from the side of the people to that of the crown, with what a constant persevering art, every man who is possessed of influence in counties, corporations, or boroughs, that will yield to the solicitations of the court, is drawn over to that phalanx, which is opposed to the small remnant of popular election.* I have looked, Sir, to the machinations of the present minister in that way, and I find, that including the number of additional titles, *the right honourable gentleman has made no fewer than one hundred and fifteen peers, in the course of his administration; that is to say, he has bestowed no fewer than one hundred and fifteen titles, including new creations and elevations from one rank to another; * how many of these are to be ascribed to national services, and how many to parliamentary interests, I leave the house to enquire. The country is not blind to the arts of influence, and it is impossible that we can expect men to continue to endure them.*”

In the Statesman, for February 21, 1817, authenticated by the signature of Major Cartwright, may be seen a statement in these words:—“ The writer has seen a very numerous troop of tenants, holding under a placeman and sinecurist, conducted to a county election as swine are conducted to market, one steward in the front, and another in the rear, as one hog-driver goes before the herd, and another follows after, to regulate the drift, and prevent straggling.”

Thus far the worthy father of radical reform. From the nature of the two corresponding situations, coupled with the circumstance of the two stewards, one behind as well as another before, let any one judge whether the surmise is likely to have been unfounded, or the parallel inapposite.

* Viz. In the compass of about thirteen years, from 1784 to 1797: in the subsequent twenty years down to this time, what may have been the addition? Enquire and report,—ye good men and true—who have leisure.

ness, to have attracted but little notice.* In brief, so far as regards the *competition-excluding* mode, it may be thus expressed:—the reducing the quantity of appropriate official aptitude in the Honourable House, from that *maximum* to which a regard for the welfare of the community would seek to raise it, to that slender (alas, how slender!) scantling, which experience has brought to view:—a proprietorship in land, or a mass of property sufficient to operate with effect either in the way of *terrorism* or in the way of *bribery*;—in the latter case, a surplus of ready money, to the amount of from 4000*l.* to 5000*l.* over and above what is necessary for habitual expenditure, and ready to be employed in the purchase of power in this shape;—an appropriate connexion with some person, who is himself in possession of an appropriate qualification, in one or other

* The only instance within my knowledge, in which in any published work, any indication has been given of this circumstance, in the character of an imperfection attached to the constitution in its present state, is that which is afforded by a passage in *Mr. Wakefield's Account of Ireland*, vol. ii. p. 321. In it, after mention made of two names, think (says he) what must be the character and complexion of the constitution of this country, in so far as concerns the Commons House of Parliament, when for such a length of time as they have been in existence, neither of those names has ever been found in the list of the members of this House. Of those persons, one was *Mr. Arthur Young*; the other was a person with whom, otherwise than by reputation, *Mr. Wakefield* had not any acquaintance: and of whom it is sufficient to say, that from early youth, throughout the whole course of his life (even at that time (anno 1812), not a short one) his time had been almost exclusively devoted to the endeavour to meliorate the condition of his fellow-creatures in all countries, but more particularly his own, by labour as unremitting as it could not but be thankless, applied to the field of legislation.

of those shapes;—in these behold the *conditions*, one or other of which is indispensably necessary, and at the same time altogether sufficient, to the purpose of a man's being chosen to fill this most important of all offices.—So as the *purse* be but *full* enough, no matter how *empty* the *head*.

Note well the *persons*, to whom in this instance the exclusionary force is in an immediate way applied: note well, that they are not the *electors* themselves, but persons at large, considered in the character of *proposable candidates*: note well the hand by which that same force is applied: note well, that it is not the hand of any individual *human being*, but the hand of the invisible *nature of things*:—the offspring of the election system taken in its whole *compages*. Now then, all these circumstances considered, pregnant as is this state of things with a mass of mischief so immense, but at the same time so incalculable and inscrutable, great need not be the wonder at its having in so great a degree escaped notice.

The case of the *county* seats being thus explained, no further details can (it is supposed) be necessary for conveying a correspondent conception of the case of the *borough* seats. In so far as, by *terrorism* applied to the electors, the effect can be produced,—in this shape of course, as being free of expense to the seductionist—in this shape it is that the seductive influence is applied. At the same time,—in so far as the number of those, to whom in this unexpensive shape seduction can be applied with effect, being regarded as insufficient to carry the election, the assistance of bribery is regarded as necessary,—bribery

is the shape in which it is accordingly applied: and here too, in so far as *bribery* is the force applied to the situation of *elector*,—*purse-brandishing* and *competition-excluding terror* is the instrument which, as above, applies itself to the situation of *rival candidate*, actual and proposable.

§ 10. *Bribery and Terrorism compared.*

Bribery and terrorism,—mischiefs compared. In both instances, what is it that forms the character of the case? Is it not the *spuriousness* of the *will* to which the effect is given? In both cases is it not that the will, to which the effect is given, is the will—not of the person whose will it appears to be, and in pretence is intended to be, and in reality said to be,—but that of some *other* person, whose will it does not appear to be, and in pretence is intended not to be, and accordingly is not said to be?

Well: so much for the general nature and character of the effect produced, supposing it produced. Now as to the degree of *probability* as a mathematician would say,—is the degree of *certainty*, as other men say,—that belongs to this important and mischievous effect.

The *quantity of interest* at stake—for conception sake—be it money or money's worth, for it comes to the same thing—say the *sum* at stake this sum—being in the two cases the same;—say for example, *5l.*;—for *one* instance in which you would find it producing this effect in the way of *bribery*, in *ten* instances perhaps you would find it producing that same effect in the way of *terrorism*.

Situations in which the effect depends, two: that of the Elector to be operated upon, and that of the proposed Representative, by whom or to whose use the other is to be operated upon. Look, in the first place, to the first: for, unless it be with a prospect of accomplishment, an object is not aimed at. Here, if *bribery* is to be the instrument employed, behold the obstacles—the opposing motives—which the seductionist—the proposed Representative or his supporters—have to overcome: fear of punishment at the hand of the law—fear of reproach from *without*—and, in so far as *conscience* may be regarded as concerned in the matter, fear of reproach from *within*. In this same case, if *terrorism* is the instrument—and the only sinister instrument in the way to operate—by no one of the above obstacles does the power of the instrument find itself opposed. In the case of *bribery*, the operation has an external tangible instrument, viz. the money, or money's worth; and the application of the instrument is rendered determinate by the circumstances of place and time, and by the necessary acts of intercourse betwixt man and man for the purpose. To the case of *terrorism* belongs not any one of all these exterior and determinate accompaniments:—no such tangible instrument does it admit of: of no such intercourse is there any need in it:—no external and determinate object does it present, to which any such inward sentiment as *fear of reproach* can attach. In this state of things, the two first of the three restraining motives cannot, and the other (generally speaking) will not, operate.

Look now to the situation of the person—the pro-

posed Representative—by whom, or to whose use, the effect is to be produced. To the production of it by *bribery*, special application is on every occasion necessary: special application, and *that* attended with hazard in various shapes to him by whom, or to whose use, it is made:—hazard of scorn and reproach, instead of acceptance, at the time; in case of engagement, hazard of non-fulfilment; in either case, hazard of disclosure, followed or not followed by prosecution.—To the production of the effect by *terrorism*, no special application is, with any such constancy, necessary: in many instances, it assuredly has place: perhaps in most: but there is no saying to what extent it may be produced, by the mere notoriety of the wishes of the person, in whose power is the source of terror:—by this general indication, with or without the assistance of any of those particular indications, of which, in infinite variety, the case is susceptible.

To the application and operation of the *matter of seduction* in the shape of *bribery*, the *matter of wealth* in the shape of ready money is necessary: and, in proportion as the desired effect is produced,—or rather as the endeavour, successful or unsuccessful, to produce the effect is exerted,—loss equal in amount to the expenditure is sustained. In the case where it is in the shape of *terrorism* that this same naturally useful, but accidentally misapplied and pernicious, matter operates,—though in this case, as in the other, the quantity of matter capable of operating towards the effect has its limits,—still, without *loss* in any shape to him by whom the profit is reaped, does it perform its seductive office.

In a word, so far as bribery is the instrument, loss is certain, profit precarious: so far as terrorism is the instrument, loss none; effect, if any, profit without loss.

In the case of *bribery*, the danger of punishment at the hands of law,—together with the less uncertain, though less intense, suffering at the hands of general disrepute,—these together may be seen composing no slight obstacle to the procurement of *agents*, such as to the requisite *disposition* shall add the ability, necessary to the production of the effect desired. On the other hand, in the case of *terrorism*, operating in the way in question,—while, as above, what may very well happen is—that no application of any kind, whether made on the part of the terrorist *himself*, or on the part of any person in the character of an *agent*, shall be necessary,—yet in that same character scarcely will there exist that well-wisher to his cause, in whose instance any aversion to the task of conveying the appropriate intimation will have place.

Thus much as between *bribery* and *terrorism*:—now, as to the two contrasted cases, in both which the force is supposed to be applied in the shape of terrorism,—in the one case *by* the power of the law; in the other case *without* the power of the law. Suppose an *Act* passed—(many a worse law has been passed, is passing, and will be passed)—suppose an Act passed, imposing a penalty of *5l.* on every man, who, being tenant of the Duke, Marquis, or Earl of Mickleland, viz. to his estate at Fearham, in the county therein-mentioned,—and having moreover a right of voting at all elections in and for the said county,—shall, at any

election of a Knight to serve in Parliament in and for the said county,—refuse or omit to give such his vote in favour of any such person whom for that purpose it shall please such his Grace, or such his Lordship, to nominate. Suppose for this purpose a Bill moved for:—here would be an occasion for Whig eloquence!—here would be fretting, and fuming, and vociferation! Even now, supposing any such Bill moved for—(not that—considering the more convenient shape in which the same effect is produced for the benefit of both parties—not that in either there exists any the smallest interest exciting any one to move it)—highly questionable it might be;—nay even now, while every thing that is most atrocious, and most fatally destructive of what little remains good in the constitution is passing every day—questionable it might be, whether a Bill to any such effect would make its way through the two Houses.

Well:—but, in a law to such an effect, in point of efficiency and thence of mischievousness, would there be any thing comparable to what has place in this behalf, in the existing and everlastingly lauded state of things? Sums the same, of the thus *legitimated* influence of *property*, would the force be equal to the already "*legitimate influence*" possessed by that same representative of, and substitute to, probity and intellectual aptitude, in the present state of things? No: a dead letter, or not much stronger, would be the five pound penalty. By the profit of it, even if levied and received, would be covered but a small part of the expense. Instead of the lordly and angry hand,—by this or that friendly and commissioned hand (such are

the powers of appropriate legal arrangements) might the profit be received : by an appropriate microscope, a flaw—such as all law proceedings are *kept* exposed to—might peradventure be discovered : but, before this, by the very attempt, as indicated by the purchase of the first piece of parchment by which the proceedings were commenced, might such a storm of odium be raised, as the nerves of his Grace, or his Lordship—though he had been a *Sir James Lowther*—would not be able to stand.

So much for the case, in which,—neither by him whose endeavour it is to impose it, nor by him whose endeavour it is to avoid it,—the loss is any otherwise to be looked for, than through the ever-wavering and perpetually-delusive hand of the man of law. Contrast it now with the case, in which the source from which it is looked for, is a force, which without need of any such treacherous and inadequate instrument may be applied at pleasure. In the former case, odium maximized ; vexation and expense, certain ; execution distant and uncertain :—in this case, execution at pleasure ; odium covered up ; no vexation, no expense.

In the instance of *vote-compelling* terrorism, the establishing it by law is, as above, as yet but a supposition. In the instance of *competition-excluding* terrorism, it has, as every body knows, now, for above this century past, been matter of fact : (year, 1710 : Act, 9 Ann. c. 5. § i.) 300*l.* landed property—and that too in a particular shape—the *minimum* : 300*l.* a year, going as far as a thousand a year at least, money of the present time. At that time the moneyed interest being particularly strong among the Whigs, the landed

interest among the Tories,—Tories strong in the House of Commons,—so it was, that, on the occasion of the exclusion thus endeavoured to be put upon the genuine elements of appropriate aptitude in favour of the spurious ones, Monarchy and Aristocracy acted with conjunct force. In both creeds, *property is probity*, was then a fundamental article. Well:—after all, triumphing over sinister theory, experience forced upon men the conviction, that, with the Birmingham article, employed to the exclusion of the genuine one, business could not go on. So completely had the absurdity of the idea been demonstrated,—anno 1784 and thenceforward, of the two great leaders of the opposite parties, Pitt the second and Charles Fox—each in his day a minister—a situation in which, if any, the demand for appropriate probity should have been at the highest pitch—the one had from the first no more than a *minimum*;—and that to the last drowned in debt: the other, not even that *minimum*. Well: neither of them having on principle,—one of them not having even by law,—a right so much as to sit in the House, how come they to be there? *Answer*, Oh!—by the usual instruments—*House-of-Commons' craft* and *lawyer-craft*—the difficulty had been removed. Lawyers had been to work, and set up a manufactory of sham qualification. Lawyers got their fees; disqualified men, their seats;—the work, which should have been performed by *sincerity*, was bungled out by the more acceptable hand of *fraud*:—and thus, in the *Blackstone* phrase, *every thing was as it should be*.

Thus much for the comparison, between the case of the seductionist whose instrument is *bribery*, and that

of him whose instrument is *terror*: the situation in both cases being that of an individual. The same representative of the source of the power being in this case, as in the two former, still the same.

Compare now the situation, of the individual operating in the character of *terrorist*, with that of the *universal seductionist*: the seductionist, by whose hand, though by no means unpractised in the use of terror, the instrument of seduction most extensively and conspicuously employed, is—the instrument mostly known by the name of *bribery*, or *corruption*:—the instrument of *alluring* influence.

By both seductionists—the individual terrorist and the universal seductionist—in which soever of his two shapes the latter may, on the occasion in question, be found operating—the same mighty mass of advantage is possessed:—in the one case, as in the other, without personal application—without application so much as by agents—yet, with the sure assistance of agents, and these unpaid—in abundance—may the desired effect be purchased. No expense—not so much as of thought: no exposure to rebuff and scorn:—no exposure to that sort of disappointment, which, in case of engagement, is produced by the breach of it on the other side:—no exposure to legal punishment—to public reproach—nor so much as to reproach of conscience:—all these so many mill-stones hanging over the head of the venal, and, comparatively at least, innoxious sinner, whose sin has taken upon itself the nature of bribery.

But in all these cases the less efficient the restraint, in these and all other imaginable shapes, opposed to

the pernicious effect,—the greater, in each instance, the probability of its taking place: the greater, in *each* instance, the *probability* of its taking place, the greater the *extent* to which upon the whole it will take place, and thence, upon the whole, the greater the *mischievousness* of it: in each instance, in which it is efficient,—the result being, in both cases, of one and the same nature, viz. the giving effect to the will of some other man, instead of that of the voter, by whom the vote is given as the expression of his own free will,—the comparative aggregate mischievousness of the two practices is great in proportion to the *extent* in which they respectively have place.

Yes: compared with the system of *terrorism*, the system of *bribery* is virtue. Under the system of *bribery* both parties are pleased: the *giver* of the bribe gets what *he* most desires; the *receiver* of it what *he* most desires: both parties are gratified; both parties are contented; in both situations you see smiling faces, indexes of contented hearts. Under the system of *terrorism*, whatsoever feeling of satisfaction can have place, look for it on one side only: and even on that side scarcely can it have place, without having for its alloy the apprehension of odium, and that odium just:—frowns above; gloom below:—sympathy, satisfaction, no where.

Turn back now to what is said on the *extent of the right of suffrage*: note once more the *collateral* uses, attached to the amplitude of that extent: apply these considerations to the present case. In comparison of what has place under *terrorism*,—*urbanity*, though under the system of *bribery* not so much cherished as

under the system of *freedom*, finds a door naturally open to receive it : not so, under *terrorism*. Whence the difference?—the answer has been already given : of the benefit that may be acquired by the *receipt* of a *bribe*, a man has no need, equal to what he has of *that*, of which—he having already the habitual possession, or fixed expectation of it,—terrorism threatens him with the *loss*. Whatsoever be the magnitude of his bribes, yet, suppose him to a certain degree obnoxious, whether it be in public or in private life—and in particular if it be, for instance, the man whose sole trust is in those means of sinister influence, may, to an extent more or less considerable, experience the mortification of seeing them refused. Repression of insolence is therefore in his situation prescribed by considerations, and urged by motives, which, in the case of the secure *terrorist*, or the possessor of a *proprietary seat*, have no place.

Thus it is that—each being considered separately—bribery, if not *absolutely*, compared with *terrorism* at least, is a useful practice. Terrorism having place on *one* side, place bribery on the other,—the lesser evil, if *evil* it be now to be called, becomes positively *useful*, by the check it is capable of giving to the greater evil. By the terrors inspired by a full purse brandished on the other side, the vote-compelling terrorist may himself be either driven out of his seat, or so wrought upon as, in respect of it, to bear his faculties more meekly than he would otherwise. Himself *incapacitated*—by *peerage* for example—or *disinclined*,—the *nominee*, to whom, under the influence of this check, he has recourse, may (it may thus happen) be a person

less unpopular—in any, or every respect, less unapt—than the person who, but for this salutary restraint, would have been the object of his choice.

Of one mischief, with which *terrorism* is pregnant, while *bribery* is altogether pure from it, no more than a slight hint can in this place be afforded. Producing with so much more disastrous an efficiency the same common *disease*, viz. *spuriousness of suffrage*,—the force of terrorism operates at the same time towards the suppression of the only remedy. By the same tyranny, by which the demand for *reform* is created, the *petition system*, in which alone it can originate, is endeavoured to be crushed. *Desperateness* is thus another symptom added to the malignity of the disease: and to this symptom the influence of bribery is happily inapplicable. By mere situation,—no expense in any shape, not so much as in the shape of thought,—does the bare image of the frowning terrorist repel from the paper,—repel in countless numbers—the hands by which, if free, it would have been signed: while, strong as is the interest, by which, in so many places, the disbursement of the money necessary to the purchase of *votes* is produced,—on no occasion is any interest strong enough to produce any such disbursement in the quantity necessary to the purchase of *signatures to petitions*, to be found.

Interested alike in the preservation and increase of abuse and misrule in all its forms,—Monarchy, and the Aristocracy that crouches under its feet, operate—with united force operate—as in case of *votes*—even without exertion, still more powerfully of course if with exertion—towards the keeping the door as closely shut

as possible against the only remedy. The situation in this case *operated upon* is that of the aggrieved subject, who—but for the frown of inexorable tyranny—would have become a petitioner, but who, by the spectacle of the united thunderbolts suspended over his head, finds his hand arrested, and the complaining paper prevented from receiving his signature.

Not satisfied with operating in the quiet and *negative* form of *restraint*,—coercion is at this moment busy;—ing itself in the positive and more galling form of *constraint*,—under the guise of *declarations of loyalty*, circulating or stationing *declarations of abhorrence* as towards the only remedy:—under the G——s as under the Stuarts, woe be to *petitioners*; grace and favour to *abhorrrers*,

§ 11. *Purchase of seats—in what cases mischievous—in what beneficial.*

In comparison of purely *gratuitous*,—nomination for what in law language is called *valuable consideration*—is it upon the whole a pernicious, a beneficial practice, or a matter of indifference?

Answer.—In each instance, which of the three qualities belongs to it will, in this, as in all other cases, depend upon the manner in which the *universal interest* is affected by it.

In comparison of the person, who but for the *sale* would have been seated in the way of *gratuitous* nomination,—the course taken by the possessor by *purchase*, will it be *more* beneficial, *less* beneficial, or neither

more nor less beneficial, to the public interest?—In this question may be seen the answer to the last preceding one.

For this last question, from no other source can any answer be deduced than from the consideration of the *quality* and *quantity* of the effective influence exercised by the individual in question, in all shapes taken together, during his continuance in the seat.

Individuals being unknown, as to the *quantity* nothing can here be said. Quantity being supposed the same, as to the *quality*, which depends on the *direction* taken by it, thus much, and thus much only can be said,—viz. that for ascertaining it, in so far as it is capable of being ascertained, the only *criterion* which the nature of the case affords is—the consideration of the situation occupied by him with reference to *party*. *Tories, Whigs, People's men, neutrals*—taking him during the whole of his career together, with which of all the several classes thus denominated has he acted?

In the course of this inquiry, the persuasion which the author has all along found pressing upon his mind with irresistible force, is—that, to the *disposition*, the *Tories* or *King's men* add already not only the *power*, but the *practice*, of driving the country down headlong in the descent that terminates in the gulf of pure despotism:—that—such is the state of interests—the *Whigs*, whether in or out of office, are driving, and would continue to drive on in that same course; though in both situations with a degree of force and velocity more or less inferior, to that which belongs to the nature of their naturally and almost constantly successful

rivals: that, if it be among the decrees of destiny, that in its way to that abyss the country shall at any point be stopped,—it can only be by the energy of the people; headed and led by the few *People's men* by whom any place shall have been found in the House, re-inforced by such of the Whigs, if any, in whose view, as the prospect of perdition comes nearer and nearer, the shares they respectively possess in the *universal* interest, may come to present itself as exceeding in value their respective shares in the *particular* and separate interests, possessed by them in virtue of their connexion with the party to which they belong.

In this view of the matter—barring the application of the only remedy as above—the arrival of unmitigated despotism being, sooner or later, a result altogether certain,—the only effect, of which, in this respect, the practice in question, or any other, can be productive, is that which respects the predicament of *time*: the causing it to take place a little *sooner* or a little *later* than it would otherwise.

Of the practice of *venal*, contrasted with that of *gratuitous* nominations, is the *acceleration* or the *retardation* of this catastrophe most likely to be the effect? I answer—the *acceleration*: and for these reasons.

It being the property of *money* and *money's worth*, when applied to the accomplishment of any object; to apply to the minds on which that accomplishment depends, a quantity of influencing force, over and above whatsoever would otherwise be acting on those same subjects in that same direction,—the effect of the *venality*, i. e. of the *purchases* made by means of it,

will in this case be—to give to the party, whichever it be, by whom they are made, an accession of strength beyond what it would possess otherwise.

The accession of strength, whatever it be, which may be derivable from this source,—by which of the several denominations is it likely to be derived in the greatest quantity?—Answer—by the Tories:—by that party, headed as they are and supported by C——r-General, and their interest and their affections identified with his.

As it is, the number of *Members* belonging to this denomination—not to speak of persons without-doors—*corruption-eaters*, and *corruption-hunters*, and *blind-custom-led* men, and *indifferentists* taken together,—seems at present to be far greater than that of all the other denominations put together: and, as despotism advances,—and while this sentence is writing, it is advancing in seven-leagued boots,—the number will be receiving continual increase. Proportioned to their number will be the aggregate amount of the quantity of ready money in their hands, applicable to this convenient purpose: and, quantity of money in hand the same, of him whose prospect of appropriate return is nearest, the biddings will naturally be higher than of him whose prospect is more distant.

Thus much as to the *general* tendency of the practice. But, from this general tendency, supposing it admitted, does any such proposition follow, as that to the character of a true *People's man* it belongs to lay down to himself any such rule, as that of *abstaining* from it? No, surely: but exactly the reverse. The greater the velocity of the disastrous descent, the

more strenuous are the exertions by which it should be endeavoured to be retarded.

For my own part, had I some ten or twenty millions of money at my disposal,—I would, though to an opposite purpose, effect the very monopoly, the mischievousness of which, reference being made to the at present established practice, has just been represented as being in the direct ratio of the *extent* of it. Instead of buying land with the money for my own kindred, I would buy liberty with it for the people. With that money, not only should I buy up all the existing venal *Borough seats* and *County seats*, as they came to market, but I should raise to the rank of venal ones many others which now are not so. With that money in hand, I could and would open Honourable eyes, in sufficient abundance: I would enable them even to see—(oh the astonishing sight!)—that liberty is better than slavery, sincerity than imposture, good government than misrule, the absence of waste and corruption than the presence, dependance on the people than dependance on an essentially insatiable shark with his sub-sharks—the love and respect of the people, than their merited abhorrence.*

* The pace at which, in virtue of such a series of antecedent impulses, they saw the chariot of the State descending towards the gulph, was not yet rapid enough to satisfy the impatience of the *Phaëtons*, from whom it receives its guidance. Behold one instance in which, on the spur of the occasion, to give redoubled energy to the indefatigable arm, the *surtout* of common decency was cast off, as being a needless incumbrance.

A Bill for the more effectually preventing the sale of seats for money, and for promoting the monopoly thereof to the Treasury, by the means of Patronage—such was the title moved for by Lord Folkestone for

§ 12. *Secrecy of suffrage—its importance further developed.*

In the situation of Election voters,—in the character of a security for freedom of suffrage and against

the Act 49 G. III. c. 118. Out of 161, 28 voted for this amendment. (Cobbett's Debates, June 13, 1809.)—To *denounce* to the people, and in language so expressive, the true character of this measure, required the generous boldness of a Lord Folkestone. To read this character in it belongs to any man, to whom the words of it are not unreadable.

Would you form an adequate conception of the anxiety by which on this occasion that Honourable House was agitated? Read it in the anxiety expressed—not to say betrayed—by the Right Honourable Gentleman who is the head of it. Bursting the bond of those delicacies, which, but six days before, (June 1st), had produced the well-considered and elaborate declaration, of the reluctance by which, down to that time, he had been restrained from “mixing in the debates,”—twice in one day—viz. on the 7th of that same month—did he stand up and insist, that the word *express*—(that being the word employed for the grant of the licence included in the monopoly), should be inserted.—Inserted? and upon what grounds?—On grounds to which the absence of all grounds would surely have been in no small degree an advantageous substitute.

In the determination of Honourable House to *establish* the monopoly at that time—in that determination which he was thus labouring to produce—he saw an earnest of their determination to *abolish* it as soon as the occasion should require: and, in an imagined rule of *Common Law* already punishing the practice with an adequate punishment in *both* cases, he saw a sufficient reason for *adding* a regulation of *Statute Law* for punishing it in the *one*, and for *refusing* to add it in the other, of those same cases.*

* Cobbett's Debates, June 7, 1809, xiv. 926.—“The Speaker stated his wish on the first view to extend the provisions of this Bill to the purchase of seats in Parliament, as well by office as by money. The great rule was—to strike at the prominent and most flagrant points of offence. Amongst those, most certainly, was the proof of an *express* contract. These, he would state, always

spuriousness of suffrage, not only the *utility* but to a great extent the *necessity* of secrecy,—in the character of a security against all seductive influence operating *from without*, whether in the shape of terrorism or in the shape of bribery (that is, in every shape whatever, *gratitude* of the purely social kind excepted) its *necessity*—in a preceding section (§ 5), and in the Plan itself, all these tutelary properties have been brought to view.

Turn back to section 10—behold once more the troop of dependants driven to the Poll-booth, with Stewards in front and rear, to prevent desertion. By the protecting veil of *secrecy*, suppose now the direction given to the voter completely hidden—hidden from all tyrant eyes—say, would any such trouble ever be given to Stewards?—By terror may a man be driven to the place of Election,—true:—but, under the shield of secrecy, it is not by terror that, when he is there, the *direction* given to his *vote* can be determined.

But, in this same case, secrecy, as it excludes ter-

impressed him with the conviction, that this species of traffic, whether carried on by *implied* or *express* covenants, was an offence against the law of Parliament, and, in his opinion, *punishable* as a misdemeanour *at common law*. It was fully within the power of the House to provide any *future enactments* against *any future offences*, which in the course of the operation of this measure might subsequently arise."

"Mr. Ponsonby, with considerable diffidence in his own opinion, when opposed to the very high authority of the Speaker, still contended that the insertion of the term "*express*," in a declaratory Act of Parliament, conveyed the interpretation, that the penalty attached to *express* agreements, and that all of an *indirect* nature came not within its operation."

"The Speaker considered, that the Resolutions of that House in 1779 bore fully upon a traffic carried on by an *implied* contract, and therefore he saw no reason to oppose the proposed clause, as now worded."

rorism, so does it exclude bribery: for, though by *gratitude* and *sympathy* alone what *may* happen is—that a bribe shall in this case be productive of the desired effect,—yet such is the feebleness of the chance, as to exclude (it should seem) all probability;—all practical probability, and thence all adequate expectation, of effecting by this means the desired purpose. Where the engagement is of such a nature, that the act of contracting it is a transgression against the laws of morality and political probity, who is there that can fail to acknowledge that the fulfilling of that same engagement is—not an *atonement* for that first sin, but a *repetition* of it? If this doctrine be just and true,—nay, whether it be so or not,—in a case such as that in question, endeavours to instil this antidote, into the mind to which in the way in question the matter of corruption has been applied, seem little in danger of being either deficient or ineffectual.

Now, suppose *universal suffrage* established, or suffrage to such an extent as not to exclude *paupers*. Let but the direction given to the vote be completely unknown to all but him who gives it,—a pauper—having no prospect of gain in the event of his giving it in favour of the less fit candidate—nor of loss in the event of his giving it in favour of the more fit candidate,—would, if the delivery of his vote seemed to him worth the trouble—would naturally, if in his own conception unable to form a judgment of his own—would, of course, among such persons as he beheld within his reach—look out for those, whose reputation in respect of the joint qualities of appropriate probity and appropriate intellectual aptitude, stood highest,—

from *them* endeavour to learn which of all the proposed candidates was, in their opinion, the fittest—and give his vote accordingly. Such would be the case under the system of secrecy. How would it be under the system of publicity? His subsistence—his very existence—depends upon the pleasure of the local magistracy: his vote would be as absolutely at their command as the voting ticket at the command of the hand by which it is dropped into the box. Think of the proportion borne by those who already are in a state of pauperism, to those who are not yet fallen into that disastrous state. This vast part of the democracy would be completely in the hands of the removable nominees of the Crown. Yes:—in the hands of titled Country Terrorists, and corruption-eating and corruption-hunting Court Divines, ready to join hand in hand with hubble-bubble City Corruptionists, for the protection of a commissioned associate, in the habit of exercising to his own use, on condition of exercising other arts to the use of Court and Treasury, the “*useful*” art of “*poisoning*,” so long as it were upon such and such alone of his Majesty’s subjects, as it should please them to consign to contempt and torment by the appellation of “*ale-drinkers*.”

And thus by the new instrumentality of universality of suffrage, if unprotected by the necessary shield of secrecy—thus, without commotion or drop of blood shed, the constitution would be changed; changed from its present state, of an impure but not yet to a certainty altogether unpurifiable mixture, into a pure and ever unamendable despotism.

In correspondent obedience to one of those solemn

ordinances, which have been so often passed for shew;—with the exception of the metropolis, at which it is kept collected in greatest quantity, all military force is, at all Parliamentary Election times, ordered at a distance from the place: as if for a troop of dragoons, by whose sabres the mask would be so effectually cut off, and by any the smallest movement of which, in this line of parliamentary service, the whole country, if by any thing it could be, would be thrown into a flame,—as if for any such instruments of terror there could be any the slightest demand, when, without the stirring so much as of a finger or a tongue, the object can be and is so effectually accomplished by the invisible and motionless spectre of *terrorism*. Thus are *gnats* strained out, that *camels* may be swallowed.

Such being the state of things, by what strange accident—by what strange delusion—can it be that, in the situation, in which so vast a proportion of the whole body of the people are held down by the indissoluble bonds of civilized society,—the necessity of secrecy in the character of a shield to *freedom*, in the character of a security against *spuriousness* of suffrage—at any rate under the joint yoke of *Monarchy* and *Aristocracy*,—can have been made to conceal itself from any eye?—In such a case, how is it that a man can avoid seeing, that by *publicity* terror is armed, by *secrecy* disarmed?

A man *ought*—every man *ought*—to sacrifice in every case—to sacrifice in this case in particular—his own personal interest to the universal interest.—Good:—there we have an antecedent. Ergo, so he *will*: there we have the *consequent*. Well: if in the consequent there be any truth, here are we already in

Utopia : no need of *penal laws* ; no, nor so much as of *sermons*.

Call a man names—hard to any degree of hardness—*slave*, *coward*, or if there be any thing harder,—by any such insult will he in any degree be disposed to practise the self-denying lesson, thus preached to him by a censor, who himself is all the while sitting upon velvet ?

On this occasion, as on any other,—if, in any imaginable way, without determinate and preponderant mischief, means can be found for reconciling private with public interest, and thus saving both from sacrifice,—can any valid reason be given why such means should not be employed ?

Suppose that, by any such expression of scorn, ninety-nine men out of a hundred, or though it were but one out of the hundred, could thus be engaged to devote themselves to ruin,—to ruin, or though it were but any the slightest inconvenience,—how is it that, while the useful and desired effect might as completely and surely be produced without inconvenience in any shape,—how is it that by any such discipline the sum of happiness would be increased ?

This shield, without which all pretence to freedom is imposture,—in what sort of situation could any objection to the use of it have found either origin or acceptance ? Only in one or other of these two : the *one* is—that of a man who—his whole dependance being in terrorism, in bribery, or in a mixture of both—beheld in the freedom secured by secrecy a bar to his designs ; the *other*, that of a man to whom—that same situation exempting him from all such sensation as that of fear on any such score—no idea of any such sensation had

ever presented itself as likely to have place, among the multitude whom he saw at his feet; or, if it had, had never otherwise presented itself than as a matter of indifference.

In conversation even, and that a confidential one, with a man now no more, ballot being mentioned by me as a *causa sine qua non* of freedom, he made wry faces, muttered out the word *nasty*, and turned off the discourse. He was a patron of seats; his votes wavering; he was a great landholder; and not the most popular among landholders.

Cowardly dogs! said an expert swimmer, who having crossed a deep river at his ease, looked back and beheld his companions, some of whom could swim, lingering on the other side;—*cowardly dogs!* are not ye ashamed of yourselves?

As to any supposed difficulty with regard to the accomplishment of the purpose, altogether groundless would be any objection on that score. With notorious and undisputed constancy is the effect accomplished, for example, at the *India House*.* In the sort of situation here in question, should any inconvenience be found to attend the mode there employed, others might and would be devised in plenty, every one of them exempt from inconvenience.

No: not in the invention of a mode by which the

* Yet, by *Charles Fox*, as hath been seen, could the supposed impracticability of uniting freedom with universality of suffrage, be urged in the character of an objection—and that, though the only one, a conclusive one—against the giving any such extent to the right of suffrage!

purpose shall be *accomplished*,—but in the devising of a mode, by which—to remotely situated as well as to con-ning eyes, the purpose shall be made to *appear* to be intended and accomplished, while in effect as well as design the *opposite* purpose is accomplished,—in *this* lay the only difficulty. Turn now to *Honourable House*, and in that seat of self-proclaimed honour, behold this difficulty, after having, during a course of *ages*, been constantly surmounted, at last by miracle rendered for ever unsurmountable. Turn to *Morning Chronicle Debates*, and therein you may see that, on the 6th of February, 1817,—the time of *Honourable House* having already for a whole hour been occupied in the organization of a *ballot* for a *Committee of Secrecy*,—up, from the opposite side of the house, starts *Mr. Brougham*, and with the exception of one out of one and twenty, reads the names of the members, the choice of whom was to be the result of all this *secrecy*.

Comes the next day, (7th February, 1817,) and, in speaking of the *ballot*, the noble Lord at whose motion this time-consuming process has been carrying on, admits it to be *open to the insinuations* “*that had been conveyed;*” still however, (says the report) “he did not think that the *House* would “join in reprobating a practice established “by *the usage of ages.*” No imposture which, for the delusion of the public, *Honourable House* had been in use to practise—of no such imposture would even the most public detection afford to *Honourable House* any inducement, strong enough to engage honourable Gentlemen to cease practising it. *In*

and to Honourable House itself, such is the portraiture given of the said Honourable House by a noble Lord, who, at that same moment, is seen occupied in the giving direction to it, and the intimacy of whose acquaintance with its true character could not without injustice and folly be contested.

Not the less pertinaciously maintaining by argument the excellence of this "*usage of ages*,"—even the principle of *universal suffrage*, " (it had been contended," he observed, " by many) would not be productive of a fair representation of the people " without it." True: but between the *many* and the *one* there was one difference: the ballot thus advocated by the *many* was a *real* one: the ballot advocated by the *one* was a *sham* one. "*High*," in the tone of scorn and sarcasm, was the epithet thereupon given to the "*authority*," by which the use of the instrument of freedom is thereupon stated as recommended: "*high*," as who should say *contemptible*. Now if *contempt* there must be, where will be the fittest object for it to be found? In the titled would-be impostor, who knowing a practice to be a *sham*, attempts to pass it off as *genuine*,—or the untitled good man and true, who holds up to view as *sham* that which he sees to be *sham*, and as *genuine* that which he sees to be *genuine*?

For illustration,—the effect of ballot, as applied to other situations, presents some claim to notice. Whatsoever be the situation, and the *ultimate* effect,—the effect which secrecy has for its *proximate* result is—the enabling the voter to give effect to *his own will*, to the exclusion of every *other*. This being true in

every case,—in the situation of a public trustee, consider it in the character of a security for appropriate probity:—a security for the faithful execution of his trust. In this situation, whatsoever be the nature of this public *trust*, and of the public *interest*, for the support of which the trust has been instituted,—in so far as, in his own view of it, his own individual interest *coincides* with such public interest, secrecy is the mode and the only mode, that affords an adequate assurance of the fulfilment of the intended purpose. On the other hand, when (the situation in which he is acting being here likewise that of the holder of a public trust,) the danger is—that, in his own view of it, the tendency of his individual interest is, on the point in question, *opposite* to the public interest—to that public interest for which he is in trust—, in so much that he thereby stands exposed to the temptation of sacrificing such public to his own private interest,—in any such situation, the greater the publicity is that is given to his proceedings, the stronger is the check, such as it is, the tendency of which is to restrain him from joining in such sacrifice: consequently, on the other hand, the more entire and assured the secrecy,—the stronger the temptation, and the greater the facility afforded to such sacrifice.*

* In this case, what may perhaps be observed is—that, under the check thus applied, the *will* to which he gives effect is *not his own* will, any more than under the check applied by individual terrorism. True: but *here* though it is not his *own* will, it is the only *proper* will; which is still better. To give effect to that will, the effectuation of which is in the highest degree subservient to the *public* interest in question—this is the only *ultimate* end: in relation to this *ultimate* end, the giving effect to his own *private* and individual will, as govern-

Now transfer in idea the ballot to Honourable House;—adjourned suppose to *Utopia*, for the purpose of so ordering matters that on this one occasion the practice of Honourable House shall not be tainted with imposture. Suppose at the same time a member, in whose instance dependance and independence preserve both of them the customary relations: independent as towards the swine who dare to style themselves his constituents, he is dependant—constitutionally dependant—as towards the *Emanuel* of Judge Blackstone. First, let the case be one, in which,—whether in his *individual* capacity merely, or as his capacity of partner in the *universal interest*, or in both capacities together,—he would, in his own view of the matter, be a sufferer by the proposed measure if carried; say a bad or needless *tax*:—at the same time, were he to oppose it, he would, from the resentment of the said *Emanuel*, in his own view of the matter be in danger of becoming a sufferer to a *greater* amount: in this case, secrecy will in his instance operate—and that with indisputable effect—as a shield to appropriate *probity*. Now, let the case be one, in which, in the same capacities, and in the same eyes as before, he would be a gainer: say that of any one of the swarm of bills for the extirpation of English liberties: any bill, in a word, for the fastening, in a manner still

ed by his own private and individual *interest*, or supposed interest, is but a *means*. Be the means what it may, that which the public *service*, in respect of the public *interest* in question requires, is—that when the means in question, i. e. that which is proposed in the character of a means, is really subservient to the end, *then* it should be employed—when it is *not* thus subservient, then it should *not* be employed.

more excruciating if possible, the joint yoke of Monarchy and Aristocracy upon the neck of the swinish multitude;—in this case, instead of being a shield to appropriate *probity*, secrecy would be a shield to the opposite *improbity*.

§ 13. *Exclusion of Placemen, &c. from the right of voting—Mischievousness and profligacy of the opposite arrangement.*

On the topic here brought to view, something has been said already, in a preceding Section (§ 5.); something also in the *Plan* itself: in each of these places something: and surely in either of them enough to satisfy any reasonable and unprejudiced mind: in a word any mind whatever, that were not led blindfold, either by *sinister interest* or *interest-begotten prejudice*, or by an indiscriminating regard to *custom: custom*, that blind guide, to the guidance of which, if to the rejection of *reason*, none but the blind submit themselves.

Placemen seated by the King, with right of speech, and even right of motion.—Placemen from all the departments of government, from which a demand for information can present itself—each of them *with* right of *speech* and *motion*—but in every case *without vote*:—this is what is there proposed.*

* Say, in a number equal to the average of the number of those, who since the *Irish Union* have had seats in the House,—*Army* and *Navy* Officers, nominated of course by the Monarch: Officers—

Decompose thus in idea the existing practice; though as yet it never has been decomposed in practice. Perform this operation, for yourself, gentle reader, if so it be that your habits and faculties are suited to the task:—suited to the performance of the operation; or, at any rate to the conception and remembrance of the result of it:—if not, turn at any rate from this section; else, nothing that you will see in it can be otherwise than misconceived.

Let there be no mistake. By nothing that has here been said, or will be said, is any such foolish insinuation meant to be conveyed,—as that to the possession of an office under the crown—accompanied with any such mass of profit as shall be found adapted to the

not, as now, engaged in active service, thence in a line of duty, with the fulfilment of which, the fulfilment of that of a Member of the Commons House, would, if constancy of attendance, as hereinafter proposed were effectually enforced, be incompatible,—but *veterans*, who, their service in their respective lines being at an end, would,—to a body of professional experience superior to that which, at present, under the dispensations of blind chance, is afforded by the average of all characters and all ages,—add a degree of leisure, such as would not present a demand for any abatement from the most perfect constancy of attendance.

These, attending of course in their respective uniforms:—other official persons, in official uniforms, expressive of their respective official situations, and thus at one view presenting the sort of information which they were respectively regarded as being in a peculiar degree qualified to afford. Choice of these uniforms—behold here an exercise—nor *that* it is humbly supposed, altogether an unacceptable one—for the taste and talents of the *Prince Regent*. In the situation here proposed, the use of an appropriate uniform seems rather more obvious, than in those situations of a non-military nature, in which uniforms, it is said, are already in use.

nature of it,—to the possession of any such situation, when considered by itself, any mark of reprobation ought to be annexed. To the case in which it operates with the effect of a bribe—a regularly repeated bribe—to this case, and to this alone, is every thing which has been, or will be, said of *offices* in the character of masses of the matter of *corruption*, meant from first to last to be applied: No:—considered in its own nature:—considered even in any connexion, other than that of the sort here in question,—*office* is no more a bad thing than *money* is a bad thing. Censure passed on office thus connected, is no more a censure passed on office at large, than censure passed on a murder committed for the sake of money with a knife, would be a censure on the use of money or on the use of knives. Considered in this point of view,—and independently of the particular connexion here pleaded against,—as it is with any one office, so is it with every other:—to no part of the official establishment—whether among those parts in which the office is in the gift of the Monarch, or among those of which the patronage is in any other hands;—neither to any such part, nor to the whole taken in the aggregate;—has any thing which is here said been ever meant to have any application.

If the sitting in perpetual judgment over the conduct of the several functionaries, possessors of offices in all the several departments of government—if this be not of the number of the functions properly belonging to, and, in shew at least, exercised by the Commons House,—what other functions are there that can be said to belong to that same House? if, in so far as exercised with propriety and effect, this function of

the House, has not its use,—to what good use, with what good effect, can its other functions—all or any of them—be exercised?

In the situation of those functionaries, who, under the official name of *Judges*, are Judges and nothing more,—an incident which of necessity has sometimes happened, is—that, of a suit, in which one of these Judges has been a party, instituted and carried on, in a judicatory in which his seat on the bench was situated. Of course, when the cause has come to be heard, he has been any where but upon that bench. What would his brethren,—what would the bar,—what would the audience,—what would the public—have thought and said, had he staid and voted there? If, in a word, the *judica-teipsum* principle—the principle brought to view by Blackstone, for the purpose of condemnation—and illustrated by the story of the sinning and repentant Pope, who, in virtue of a sentence, passed by himself upon himself, was burnt alive,—were on any of those seats, which are called *benches*, realized?

In the situation of any one of the *twelve*, say rather of the *fifteen* superior Judges,—on the occasion, though it were of but one single cause, and *that* between individual and individual, suppose a man convicted of having received a *bribe*:—by bench, bar, audience, public—what would be thought and said of him, as above? By the very height of its improbability (for assuredly few political suppositions can be more improbable) the case serves but the better in the character of a case put in the way of supposition, for the purpose of argument.

Well—here, in the Commons House—in the instance of every member by whom a political situation

of any other kind, under the patronage of the Crown, is at the same time holden, this *judica-teipsum* principle, as above explained, is it not exemplified and realized?

In any such instance—on any occasion, in which, by any such member, in case of a division, a vote is given—the other situation having either money or money's worth attached to it—the taint of *bribery*, is it in any degree *less* strong upon the case of such member, than if a bank note—say of a hundred pound—had but just before been received by him? received, under an engagement “*implied*,” or (if Mr. Speaker pleases) “*express*”,—that such or such should be the direction given to his vote? Oh no—it is abundantly *more* strong: for, in the Section in which the comparison has been made between *bribery* and *terrorism*, this has been shewn already. At any time, at which a quarter's salary is put into his hand,—the effect of it in the way of seductive influence, is it in any degree *less* than that which would be produced by money to the same amount put into his hand, (suppose him not in *that* or any other office) under a stipulation—*implied* or *express* as before—that during the next ensuing quarter, on every occasion on which a vote that should come to be given by the Cabinet Ministers, such of them as were in the House, his vote should be on the same side with theirs?—*Less*, did I say? not it indeed; but much greater. Why?—*Answer*. Because, in the case of a *bribe* so called,—the amount of it, being on each occasion *fixt*, is on each occasion *limited*: whereas in the case of the *bribe* *not* so called—of the *bribe* received under the name of *salary* attached to an *office*,—though that *one* office and no other is in the man's *possession*, yet in *prospect*,—by the side of it,

beneath it, and above it,—each with its emoluments, is a cluster of other offices—a cluster boundless in number and value—for self and friends.

In the highest—in the most comprehensive—in the in every way the most important seat of judicature in existence,—in the judicatory in which the lives and fortunes—the every thing—not of A and B only, but of all the inhabitants of the whole empire—not to speak of those of almost all other countries on this globe—are, day by day, if not actually at stake, liable to be at stake, in the exercise given to its powers,—do the men in question,—in a number, on almost every occasion, capable of deciding the part taken by the whole House, and thence by the whole government,—as often as the conduct of the partnership to which they belong is called in question, sit and act, each man as judge in his own cause: each of them, in respect of every vote he gives, (I speak of those who to their seats add offices of emolument, from which they are removable at the pleasure of the Crown), each of them tainted with the matter of *corruption*; and *that*, as hath been shewn, in a form, in comparison of which *bribery* is purity.

Suppose this told of a foreign country:—with what horror would not the state of government in that country be regarded! with what commiseration that of the wretched people!

Think then of the American United States! think of the sentiments, with which, on so many accounts—and on none more particularly than on this account—the condition, to which *we* are doomed, cannot but be regarded, by a Citizen of those happy States!

Storm of indignation in the breast of Honourable Gentleman:—at this page, should his patience have lasted him thus long,—down, not improbably, goes the page on the floor, and then the foot upon it. Never but of one complexion—and that the purest—are his *conduct*, his *intentions*, or his *motives*. *Self-regarding* interest—the *motive* corresponding to that interest—the sort of motive, on the general predominance of which over every other the whole species is continually dependant for its very existence,—never for any such sordid motive can any place be ever found in so Honourable a breast.

A hundred to one,—for want of the habit of examination, no tolerably clear conception has he, on any occasion, of the *springs of action* by which his own conduct is determined: no tolerably clear conception of any thing that is passing in his own mind.

On the present occasion,—supposing him able to endure any such task, as that of forming a comparative estimate of the degrees of mischievous efficiency, as between *corruption* in the shape of *bribery* commonly so called on the one part, and *corruption* in the shape of *place-holding* and *place-hunting* on the other,—in the following queries he may perhaps find some assistance, while occupied in that more instructive than pleasant process.

1. Whether, if on any occasion, in effect or in intention, the measure brought upon the carpet by the Minister be *mischievous*, or the measure opposed by him *beneficial*,—in which case his opposition in so far as effectual is mischievous,—whether, in any such case,—for securing, as far as depends upon votes in that

House, the production of the mischief,—any means more effectual than the sort of arrangement in question could be devised?

2. Whether, in the case of punishable bribery,—the bribe being either in possession or in prospect,—the *connexion*, between the desired *end* and the criminal and punishable *means*, can, in any degree, be *closer* than—or even so *close* as—in the present case?

3. Whether, by the *impunity*, which in the bribery case has *not* place, and in this case *has* place, the *strength* of the temptation, or the *probability* of its being yielded to, is diminished?

4. The like questions, with regard to the *ignominy* and *reproach*, which, in the case of the *bribery* have place,—and which in the present case find their place occupied by *honour* and *respect*;—at any rate in the breasts of the custom-led and unreflecting multitude?

5. Whether, in the case of the *bribery*, the quantity of the *matter of good*,—operating, whether in the shape of money, money's worth, or any other shape, in the character of matter of corruption,—is not *fixt*, and by being *fixt*, *limited*? and whether,—to the quantity of that same precious matter, in the shape of *offices*, and so forth, capable of being held by himself, or by connexions of his of all sorts and sizes—relations, friends, dependants—in countless multitudes—held by the side of him, underneath him, and above him—his own situation being, at the same time, compared with the moment at which a bribe in the ordinary form is received, a *permanent* one,—and, unless it should please him whose place is above all a *perpetual* one—whether, to the quantity of this same seduc-

tive matter there be any determinate limits? whether, compared with that of a mass of the matter of corruption, applied and received in the shape of a *bribe* commonly so called, the seductive power of a mass of that same matter, in the shape here in question,—in the eye of imagination, inflamed as it is by desire,—be not as infinity to one?

6. Whether, in the connexion, which thus by positive institution has been established, between the *public mischief* and the *private benefit*, there be any the smallest public use?—the smallest public use,—or, except the creation, preservation, or increase of the public mischief, any other assignable, intended use or effect than the production of the private benefit?

7. Whether if, in any of the imputations here attached to the monstrous conjunction in question—the conjunction of the perpetually accountable situation with the situation to which account is perpetually rendered—whether if, in any of these imputations, there be any thing really grievous to the feelings of any one to whom they apply, there has ever been a time, at which it has not been in his power to rid himself of it? and whether there has ever been a time, at which it has not been in the power of the majority of those who find their profit in the monstrosity, to rid the country of it?

8. Whether when, in a case of imputed delinquency, all other evidence, and that sufficient, is against a man,—any other resource be left to him than the vehemence of the protestations by which he makes assertion of his own innocence? and whether, from any such vehemence, the probative force of

such his evidence receives in the eye of reason any increase?*

Suppose a prize offered, for him, by the fertility

* Like queries, in the case of a *Chancellor*, supreme Judge in a judicatory, in which, immediately or through the channel of patronage, he pays himself by *fees*, the aggregate amount increasing with the aggregate of *individual bankruptcy* and public misery produced or increased by *war*—in the case of the Judge of a *Prize Court* paying himself and Co. in like manner—the aggregate amount of the fees depending altogether upon *war*—Chancellor and Judge strenuous from first to last in the support given to war, by vote, eloquence, and influence. Think of this, and then say—whether under a government so formed, in looking for the causes of war—commencement and continuance—the eye need to convey itself to any unmeasurable distance.

Like queries in the case of a *Judge*, sitting in a superior situation, to judge of the propriety, in each individual case and in the aggregate, of fees received to his own use in a subordinate situation;—and in another place, with transparent yet ever prevailing fallacies on his lips, and flame and fury in his eyes, slapping the door in the face of every measure, in which the vast majority of the people behold the only possibility left to them, of obtaining so much as a chance for justice!—See *Scotch Reform: and Protest against Law Taxes*.

Think as often as war—and the causes and the profit and loss by it come in question—think whether in any company,—private, or even mixt—it be a frequent occurrence, to meet with an officer, in any branch of the *military* service, who makes any scruple of declaring his wishes to see war commence, or if already in existence, continued:—and, unless it be in the article of frankness, whether there be any reason, for supposing human nature to be in this respect different in the one of those situations, from what it is in the other.

If, on any such occasion, from general rules the inquiry should descend to individual cases, then would naturally come the question, whether in the individual instance or instances in question, there be any such known contempt of money, as, in such instances respectively, to take the individual case out of the general rule.

of whose imagination, that political arrangement should be proposed, which, with a view to justice and public utility, should be most flagrantly flagitious;—to any purpose but that of corruption and misrule the most grossly and palpably absurd;—could any *other* be found capable of making a match for *this*? Oh no:—not although every man who ever gave himself to politics were to employ his whole life in the research. Suppose such a prize offered: would all the poetry, added to all the oratory of the Right Honourable the President of the Board of Controul, suffice him to win it?—No, not even though the Quarterly Review and British India were left to themselves, and the whole mass of his powers concentrated upon this one object.

A constitution, with this poison—slow, but not the less sure—in the bowels of it!—Rotten, even from the time that this poison was injected into it, must have been the matchless constitution,—rotten at the core—and, of such rottenness, what we are now suffering is among the fruits.

As a match for *Utopia*, suppose a *Cacotopia* discovered and described,—would not filth in this shape be a “*fundamental feature*” in it?

For fear of the influence of the Crown in a relatively subordinate sphere,—Judges forsooth in certain Courts ~~—~~though in certain Courts only—Judges, in Courts where *four* of them sit together, though not in the Court in which the powers of all four are condensed into one breast—Judges, in these relatively subordinate situations, fixed firmly on their benches,—while on the benches on which the fate of those men and all

others depends,—the Judges, on whom the whole of the business depends, are thus kept—kept for ever—in a state—not only of dependency, but corruptedness! Behold here another gnat strained out, while Camels and Camelopards are swallowed.

Search the whole fabric through, where will an end be found to this tissue of hypocrisy:—to this mixture of sham securities and real mischiefs—of sham securities provided, and real mischiefs fostered?—*efficiency* to bad purposes, coupled with *inefficiency* to good ones?

Hypocrisy?—Yes: over and over. Can any hypocrisy be more shameless—more transparent—than that which is manifested in marking *Bribe-taking* with *punishment*, and, as far as may be, with *infamy*, while in the person of a so styled representative of the people, *Place-holding* under the Crown is held in honour? The *Place-holding* held in honour?—Why?—Even because the corruptors and the corrupted—the bestowers and the receivers of the matter of corruption—have need that so it should be. *Bribe-taking* marked with punishment and with infamy?—Why?—Even because the corruptionists,—by whom the matter of corruption, together with the impunity and the honour, is given and received in that other—in that wholesale and so much more profitable shape,—have no need of it in any such petty and retail shape. By vituperating it in the shape in which it is of no use to them, men think to earn—and, if they do earn, it is without expense—the praise of virtue: of that virtue, the vice opposite to which has taken such full and

never-disturbed possession of their practice and their hearts.

Limit the number of those pretended representatives of the people? of these real representatives of the Monarch? Limit the number of those public trustees into whose hands, as sure as quarter-day comes, the bribe by which they are hired shall be paid? Limit the number of those men who, on the bench of Justice, as often as they become malefactors, shall sit in judgment on their own conduct and that of their accomplices? Well: when, for the purpose of this limitation, a Bill is ready for passing, tack on then to it a *rider*, limiting the number of street-prostitutes, that shall be employed as Teachers in any Boarding-School for Young Ladies.

Once upon a time, and once only,—into one of the plans of *moderate* reform, peeped (it will be seen)—and with congenial modesty—a proposition for a limitation to this effect. Once and once only: nor does it appear, that on that one occasion, a proposition so daring—so innovational—so Utopian—so near to Jacobinical—found any one to second it.*

Oh, blessed Constitution! that in which (for of this you will find men ready to assure you) *business could not go on*, unless, in this way, delinquents—and those upon the largest scale—were judges in their own cause! And thus it is that, in the mind of every man who thinks, *Impeachment*—the sole legal remedy against misrule—has been blotted out of the list of remedies.

* See section 16. Moderate Reform, &c.

Give me a place—give me a peerage—give me Court favour—I will pocket 10,000*l.* of the public money—I will confess I have done so—and with honour on their lips—proclaiming each man his own honour—Noble Lords shall declare me innocent.

Oh, matchless Constitution!—And so, in this matchless constitution—such is the nature and virtue of it—business could not go on,—unless, besides being judges, each one of them in his own cause, those by whom every thing is done, were not,—every one of them,—throughout the whole course of his service—corrupted: corrupted in a mode of corruption, beyond comparison more effectual and more mischievous than that of bribery!

Look now to the United States! Look to the General Congress! see whether in that head seat of democratic government, corruption in any such shape is in any instance to be found. What? does not business then go on in Congress?—In Congress, where, in the very last year that was, there was a *surplus* to the amount of a *fourth* of the year's income, instead of a *deficit*, as *here*, to the amount of a *sixth*?*

Take the heir apparent of a *Duke* (alas! poor Duke!)—take him, and, having seated him in the House of Commons, put him into a coloured sinecure, to serve as a substitute to an automaton for signing papers: his hand to the papers, the *will* by which it is directed, together with the *judgment*, such as it is, that belongs to that will, safe lodged all the while in another place. In this one picture behold the

* See above, section 4, p. xlv.

Anti-jacobin Triad—*Waste, Corruption, and Oppression*: *Waste* made of the *salary*; *Corruption*, the purpose it is applied to:—*Oppression*, the channel through which for such purposes it is extracted. Behold the lauded *preparatory seminary* for the training of young nobility to business. Behold a training school for young nobility, in the true *Anti-jacobin* style. Behold in the *triad* the true and everlasting object of *Anti-jacobin worship*.—Behold now the *Regius Professor of Piety* in the Honourable House—behold him—should any such blasphemy as this assault his eyes—behold him rending his heart—not at the sight of the *waste*—not at the sight of the *corruption*—not at the sight of the *oppression*—but at the allusion which, with the help of Mr. Attorney-general, he will have descried: the allusion made to a something more sacred than the Bible:—to a substitute, which, with all-embracing; and blessedly efficient, orthodoxy, is put into the place of that old fashioned miscellany:—a substitute which, in the Established Church of *Scotland*, a man would no more rend his heart about, than in the Established Church of *Morocco*.

Reader, is the language here too warm for you? Turn to the *Plan* itself, pages 14 and 15, there may you find the substance of it in as cool a state as the coldest heart can desire.

In any language, warm or cold, let him who thinks he can, produce an answer to it.

Look once more to the United States; see whether in that seat of democracy—of representative democracy—where swinish rulers are chosen by swinish multitudes—see whether, in that seat of illegitimate

incorruption and good government—any such monster is to be found, as a man constituted judge—perpetual judge—in his own cause?

O blessed constitution! a constitution in which it is become a fundamental principle—*become* I say—for for centuries it was otherwise*—that, among those who rule, there shall not be a man who is not judge in his own cause! Can it be matter of wonder, that among men thus self-qualified for the function of rendering justice—men,—in whose instance the sacrifice of *universal* interest to *particular*, of *social* interest upon the *largest* scale to *self-regarding* interest upon its own narrow scale—of *duty*, in a word, to *interest*, is matter of constant and universal practice,—should not be to be numbered among those who are given to change?

And in this state is the constitution, which, in this very state, on pain that shall follow, we are called upon and forced to love!

Say, Mr. Wilberforce, how long shall a state of things like this be looked upon with no other than a smiling and admiring countenance? How long shall *reform*, and not *abuse*, be the object of all fears? When immorality is thus operating—operating upon the largest scale—say what in this world is *religion* good for, if, instead of a *check*, *immorality* finds in it a support? if, instead of a support, *morality* finds in it a *substitute*.

The man who, with open eyes, lauds the constitu-

* See Section 15.—Representatives—Impermanence, &c.

tion with these sins in it—sins circulating in every vein, and tainting every fibre—the man who, with open eyes, (and your eyes, have they not had time to open themselves?)—lauds and cherishes all these sins, say where is the sin among them all, of which the guilt does not lie upon his head?

Sad—O sad condition of human nature! Conceive, if you can, the enormity so atrocious, that, so as this one circumstance be but superadded to it, viz. that of its having been habitually practised—practised with impunity by men in power, and under the protection of the law—will not, if, by any strange accident, exposed and complained of, find in that quarter a host of inexorable and indignant supporters and defenders—in that of the suffering multitude, alas! with how few exceptions!—so many indifferent and incurious observers, if not prostrate venerators!—Presented at first in its true colours, and by its proper phrase, it would not perhaps have gained acceptance: presented in an improper phrase—dressed up in false colours—it passes without objection,—and, for ages after ages; the country is tormented by it.

Ah! when will the yoke of *Custom*—Custom, the blind tyrant, of which all other tyrants make their slave—ah! when will that misery-perpetuating yoke be shaken off?—When, when will *Reason* be seated on her throne?

§ 14. *Universal Constancy of Attendance—its Importance.*

I. *Plan of this Section.*

Actual state of things in respect of attendance—**Mischiefs** from non-attendance, viz. 1. In respect of moral aptitude: 2. In respect of intellectual aptitude: 3. **Mischief** by securing greater attendance on the corrupt side.—Interests, by the play of which, the numbers in attendance are determined.—Inconsistency as between the licentiousness as to this point in this situation, and the comparative strictness in other public situations.—Remedy from any exertions of individuals impossible—but by reform the disorder incurable; the constitution already subverted by it.—Abdication, whether not more truly predicable of Honourable House than of James the Second.—The incurableness of the disorder, and the consequently incurable corruptness of Honourable House, declared by *Hatsel*, Chief Clerk of the House.

Such are the sub-topics, under which the matter of this section will be found.

Mischiefs individually seated—*mischiefs collectively seated*.—To one or either of the two heads thus distinguished will be found referable whatsoever mischiefs can be seen flowing from this source:—*mischiefs individually seated*, those of which the seat of them being in the character of the individual individually considered, the nature may be understood from

and exemplified in the effect produced by them, in the case of any one such individual:—mischiefs *collectively seated*, those of which the *seat* cannot be found in the state and condition of any individual, individually considered; but of which the *source*, as well as the *seat*, will be found in the state and condition, into which the whole House, taken in the aggregate, will be seen to be put:—put by the use made of the habit of individual delinquency in this shape, in the character of an instrument of public mischief in a variety of shapes:—an instrument of *packing*, employed in the art and mystery of political *packing*, as applied—to the securing, on each particular occasion, out of the mixt mass, a predominant proportion of corrupt matter in the composition of the assembly—and to the use made of corrupt measures—not only of each of them, individually taken, considered as applied to its own particular corrupt purpose,—but of all of them, collectively or separately, considered as employed in serving as instruments of *extension*, for the keeping out of uncorrupt ones.

Confined to the individually seated part of the aggregate mass of mischief flowing from this source, may be seen to be the slight view of it given in the *Plan* itself, as well as in the general sketch given of the system of Radical Reform in Section 5. In the present Section, that more complex part, here styled the *collectively-seated part*, will, according to the intimation above given, be taken up and laid open to view.

II. *Actual State of Things in respect of Attendance.*

Instead of being what it is pretended to be—a check upon the power of the Monarch—the power of the *Commons House* an instrument of misrule in his hands—an instrument by which he has been enabled to sacrifice, and accordingly has sacrificed, the universal interest to a cluster of particular interests, of which his own personal interest is at the head. Behold, in this state of things, the mass of abuse to which it is the object of parliamentary reform to devise and to apply a remedy:—an appropriate and adequate remedy. Among the requisites for the accomplishment of this object, is the detecting and holding up to view in its true colours, every particular abuse which shall have been found to enter into the composition of the aggregate mass:—every *arrangement*, every *custom*, which, in the character of a co-operating cause, may be found contributing to the production of the disastrous effect. In the instance of such of the component abuses as have as yet been brought to view, notorious in general has been not only the existence and the nature of the abuse, but, to a considerable degree, the *extent* in which it has place. In the instance here in question, the *existence*, *yes*; and in some measure the *nature* of it. Not, however, even *this* entirely:—not, assuredly, in all their magnitude and variety, the *evil consequences*: and, as to the *extent* to which it has place, information on this head—information in any tolerable degree adequate—is a treasure that remains yet to be dived for, in the ocean in which it lies drowned.

For the taking and presenting of a clear, a correct,

and complete view of the state of the House in this respect, during a given period—say from the commencement of the present reign—the following present themselves as the heads under which matter should be collected. Sources of information, the *Journals* of the House, the *Votes of the House*, and such accounts as are extant of the *Debates*: accounts, of the *incorrectness* of which, supposing them in this or that instance incorrect,—any more than of their *incompleteness*, supposing them incomplete, as, unless by accident, they always are—no Member can have any moral right to make complaint, until he has done whatsoever may be in his power towards the removing, in the one only way, the inconvenience in those its two distinguishable shapes.

1. Number of *days*, on which, in the course of each *year*, the House was sitting, and, in it and by it, *business*, in some shape or other, accordingly *done*.

2. Number of *days*, in which the *Speaker took the Chair*; but, for want of the requisite number of members, (*viz.* forty) business could not be begun upon:—whereupon, the hour being arrived, adjournment took place of course.

3. Number of *days*, in which business having been begun upon—the requisite number of members present therefore complete—so it was, that by the departure of Members, a deficiency in the number present, as compared with the number that should be present, having been produced, and notice publicly taken of it,—the business was stopped, and an adjournment thereupon took place of course.

4. Number of *days*, in which, a deficiency having

as above taken place, the business went on notwithstanding; the Speaker sitting all the while and beholding the deficiency, but no other Member standing up to notice it.

5. Numbers of the *Members* on both sides, on the occasion of the several *divisions*, which on the several *days* took place. The list of these divisions, with the numbers, being rendered as complete as may be,—then will come to be made a selection of *two* contrasted classes of cases:—*one*, in which, the *importance* of the question being in a remarkable degree *high*, the *numbers* were in a remarkable degree *low*; the other, in which, the importance of the question being in a remarkable degree *low*, the *numbers* were in a remarkable degree *high*.

6. *Calls of the House*—numbers of them in each year: with the numbers in the respective *divisions*, if any, which took place on the days respectively appointed.*

* Of this body of evidence taken in the aggregate, the importance will, it is believed, be seen in a light continually clearer and stronger, in proportion as this inquiry advances. To complete any such task as that of collecting it, would require abundantly more time, not only than at the present conjuncture, but moreover than at any future time, out of the small expectable remnant of my life it would be possible for me to spare. If, to any person who has sufficient leisure, it should appear, that, in regard to the whole, or any part of this mass of information, the search would afford a sufficient promise of being productive of adequate use,—the consciousness of rendering to the public that service will be his reward: and if, for the purpose of enabling me to give to the stock so collected, such useful application as may be in my power, he will have the goodness to communicate it to me by letter,—he will be the object of an inward sentiment of esteem and gratitude, in the breast of a man, from

Remain two other topics, in relation to which, any information, supposing it attainable, could not fail to afford additional instruction; but of which, so far at least as regards *time past*, the attainment presents itself as hopeless, unless possibly in a very small number of instances.

7. On the occasion of each division, numbers absolute and comparative of *place-holders* and non-*place-holders*. From a document of this sort, what would be shewn with certainty is—the number of the individuals belonging to one species of the genus *corrup-*

whom no exterior demonstrations of it can, in the vulgar signification of the word, be *of use* to any one.

Under such heads as the above, with the addition of any such others, as may suggest themselves as promising to be conducive to the desired purpose,—the matter, though it were but of a *single Session*, might, in the way of *sample*, be of no small use. Suppose it were the last Session: and from thence the research might be pursued, according to opportunity, from year to year. Supposing the research carried through more years than one, in this case, for exhibiting such differences as, in respect of members present and other particulars, cannot but have been made by the Irish Union, it is manifest how much the utility of such a process cannot but be increased, by taking for one of them a year anterior, and for another a year posterior to that event.

So long as it may be my fortune to escape the doom with which, in proportion to his activity in the service of his country in this laborious and melancholy line, every man who dares to manifest his love for it, and for what remains undestroyed of the useful parts of its constitution, is at this time threatened—so long, in a word, as it shall be my lot to remain alive, unkilld, and unbastilled—so long will every such contribution find, in the quarter to which it is consigned, the sincere endeavour to make the most and the best of it in the way of use.

tionist, viz. corruption-eaters : but, under the species *corruption-hunters*, no precise number of individuals could ever be distinguished: under the influence of the ever attracting, and scarcely resistible, *cocagne* above spoken of,—the difficulty would be, among the whole remainder of the numbers voting on this side, to find so much as the single individual, who did not appertain to this latter species, and thence to the genus in which it is included.

8. Number of members present at the time of the *division*, compared with the numbers present at different portions of the length of time employed in the debate. In ordinary tribunals, the two operations—*oyer* and *terminer*—being expressly included in the same commission,—and *oyer* being regarded as forming a useful, not to say a necessary, preparative to *terminer*,—he who performs either of them performs both: in this extraordinary tribunal, not inconsiderable (as every body knows) is the proportion of those distinguishing more than distinguished Honourables, who, regarding *oyer* as a useless formality, come to the *terminer* at once: by which principle of dispatch, a proportionable saving of *time* is effected. *Quere*, on the occasion of each division, the number of these economists, and the quantity of the saving effected by each?

III. *Mischiefs from Non-attendance* :—*Mischief 1.* *Mischief in respect of Moral Aptitude.*

Only by regard for regularity is produced the mention made of this topic in this place. In the Plan itself, pp. 21, 22, may be seen how, in the license given to dereliction of duty in this shape, is contained

a *sub-license*,—by which, without danger of shame or reproach in any shape, every man is empowered, within any given space of time, to produce exactly half the effect, which, within that same space of time, could have been produced by an uninterrupted series of votes, given by him in support of a series of measures, not only corrupt but scandalous:—so scandalous, and *that* to such a degree as that,—whatsoever had been his wishes,—had he been present, he could not have prevailed with himself to abstain from voting in opposition to them in every instance.

IV. *Mischief 2.—Intellectual Mischief—Deficiency in respect of appropriate Intellectual Aptitude, and appropriate Active Talent.*

Probity being supposed not deficient, principally upon appropriate *intellectual aptitude* depends the propriety of the direction, given on the several occasions, to a man's *vote*: in the case, where it is not with himself that the measure has originated, principally upon appropriate *active talent* the aptness of the matter of which his *speeches* are composed: in this case certain it is with himself that, singly or in conjunction with others, the measure has originated, on *intellectual aptitude*, as evidenced by the choice made of that same measure, and of the more particular measures, if any, including the occasional penning of written instruments—for example, *Motions, Resolutions, and Reports of Committees*—which, as being subservient to it, are included in it: but upon *appropriate active talent*, in another shape, depends the matter of those several instruments.

That, in respect of these two so intimately connected elements of aptitude, a general and predominant state of *inaptitude* is among the natural and naturally unavoidable effects of the whole system taken together, is a matter which, in some sort, has already been brought to view. On the one hand, necessity of *hard labour* in both these elementary shapes to *aptitude* in the aggregate shape in question; on the other hand, *exclusion* put upon the *hard labour*, and thence upon the *aptitude*, viz. by *rank* and *opulence*:—of rank and opulence together, the effect being to put a man already, and even to a greater amount, in possession of that sort of consideration, which, but for these unmerited advantages, might, in the character of an adequate reward, have suffered to extract from him the exertions necessary to furnish his mind, and in sufficient quantity, with those same endowments. By rank, opulence, or connexion, is a man put in possession of this office: by the pride joined to the indolence derived from the same sources,—is he, in respect of the endowments here in question, more or less disqualified from the exercising, with any benefit to the universal interest, the power attached to this most important of all offices.

Of these three modes of entrance into a seat, *connexion* is that by which the greatest chance for any tolerable stock of these endowments is left. Why? Because, in the instance of a *patron*, rendered such by proprietorship, or by terrorism,—what here and there will happen is—that, on failure of all persons connected with him by natural relationship, some person or other shall, by the possession, or reputed possession, of the endowments in question, in a degree

more or less distinguished, have been recommended to his choice.

In this state of things,—to men seated by *connexion*, with the addition of men seated by *profession*, but in a more particular degree to the latter,—of these two intellectual endowments will such stock as is to be found in Honourable House be, generally speaking, almost confined: at any rate, small indeed, in proportion to the whole number (658), will be the number of those, in whose instance, otherwise than in company with the one or the other of these two marks of distinction, any tolerable stock of these endowments is found discernible. In that House, the term *Country-gentleman* is it not a sort of by-word?—is it not commonly regarded as presenting, in one word, a sort of character, the idea of, compounded of mental indolence, mental vacuity, and mental weakness?

In those two quarters then—*connexion* and *profession*—in these two quarters are the two intellectual endowments in question almost exclusively looked for.

Well; and in those same quarters suppose them found:—what is the consequence? The universal interest, is it by this means benefited? On the contrary, much more probably is it injured. Only in so far as these two *intellectual* endowments are in the same breast united to the one moral one—only in so far as they are united to *appropriate probity*—will the *universal interest* receive from them any net benefit:—only on the terms of this auspicious union, will it so much as escape the being sacrificed. But, the higher the degree, in which by the individual in question they are possessed, the higher will be the price which, at the

constantly *overt market*, of which C——r-General is *Clark*, they will fetch: the higher the price, the higher the temptation, and the less the probability of resistance.

In this state of things—the promiscuous multitude being by intellectual weakness prepared for the reception of mental poison—the select few, by sinistrously derived strength, for the injecting of it—observe what will be the effect of the cluster of arguments, comprehensible under the common appellation of the *argumentum à superficie ad superficiem*—arguments from *surface* to *surface*—appositely employed. Gorged with public money, obtained on false pretences out of the taxes—behold a man, whose whole political life has been employed in helping to give increase to waste, corruption, and the consequent oppressions,—summoning up, when the time comes, all his powers, to the duty of guarding this complication of disorders against the only remedy: and the history of any one such individual is the history of a class. *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*—says a maxim of the Old-School Logic:—a maxim in which more instruction is contained than can often be obtained from any such musty source. Of whatsoever is received, correspondent to the constitution of that by which, or him by whom it is received, will be the effect. On a mind prepared by sound and manly instruction for the resisting of it, poison such as that would have no effect: but those with which it has to deal, are minds that, by want of instruction, or by such instruction as is worse than none, have been pre-

pared for yielding to it: instruction, by which the whole duty of man is summed up in the "prostration of understanding and will" at the feet of a set of men, tied by every bond that corruption can devise, to those habits of self-blinded partiality, with which all prudence and all justice are equally and utterly incompatible.

The more attentively the stock of evidence, which the nature of the case, and the existing state of things affords, is looked into,—the more clearly will the operation of the above causes of inaptitude be seen exemplified, and their efficiency demonstrated.

Look at the Debates: yes, and if to such a degree your patience will suffer you to draw upon it, look *into* these same Debates.

To so prodigious an extent, not only no mark of active talent, no mark of intellectual aptitude—but, on the contrary, proofs, and, how deplorably abundant!—and that on the most important occasions—that of no such part of man's frame as the *intellectual*, has any use been so much as attempted or endeavoured to be made. In the *volitional*, with the passions and affections by which it is put in motion, in the volitional and sensitive parts alone, are any marks of exercise discernible. Vituperation—in the strongest as well as most unqualified terms that passion can supply,—vituperation, altogether unaccompanied by indication made of any specific grounds, for the opinion, or pretended opinion thus involved in, and indirectly expressed by it—such, with the addition of more or less of the matter of trivial *fallacy*, in its several shapes,

of which a list might be made out,*—is the matter, of which in general—and in a more particular degree on

* By an ingenious cultivator of the physical branch of art and science, *the clouds* have been endeavoured to be brought under the dominion of the tactical branch of logic. With somewhat better profit, it is supposed, in the shape of practical use, might the like useful operation be applied to the congeries of political *fallacies*—those clouds of the mental atmosphere.—Take for an example of the *genera*, or some of them, suppose the following:—*argumentum ad verecundiam*—*ad quietem*—*ad socordiam, sive ignaviam*—*ad superstitionem*—*ad superbiam*—*ad motum, sive timorem*—*ad odium*—*ad amicitiam*—*ad invidentiam*: Of the *Classes*, under which these *genera* might be arranged—*argumenta ad affectus*—to the affections and passions as above—*ad imaginationem*, to the imagination—*ad iudicium*, to the judicial faculty. Example of a set of species under the genus *ad odium*: 1. *Bad-design-imputer's* argument.—2. *Bad-motive-imputer's* ditto.—*Bad-character-imputer's* ditto.—*Varieties* under the *Bad-character-imputer's* argument.—Imputation *a seipso*—*a socio*—*a consentaneis*—*a cognominibus*.

A characteristic, which would be found common to by far the greater number of the articles in the system, is *irrelevancy*: irrelevancy with reference to the subject in debate. This character will, at a first glance, be seen to belong to the class, or order, or *division*, commonly denominated *personalities*; to which belong two genera—the *argumentum ad odium*, as above particularized, and the *argumentum ad amicitiam*.

One day—by the sun of Reason, will all these clouds of the mind be dissipated.

Conceive in vision *Honourable House*, or any other place of debate, if any such there be, in which debates are free—conceive therein a complete list of these clouds of the mind, made out and digested in the form of a Table:—conceive the Chairman, his hand provided with a wand, to be occasionally employed, like that of *Don Pedro Resio*, in the service of ridding the science, in the most expeditious manner, of all intruding superfluities. By a touch of this wand, applied to this or that article in the Table, might any Orator, whose speech being, as at present, from beginning to end,

the occasion of the great topic here in question—speeches, Honourable and Right Honourable, may be seen to be composed. With a degree of energy, proportioned to the dangerousness of the disease, and the salutary efficiency of the proposed remedy, *wild, visionary, impracticable, mischievous*, and so forth, are the imputations cast upon it,—gross ignorance, conjoined with mischievous madness, the attributes ascribed to the authors and supporters of it.

By the barking of a dog—by the screaming of a parrot—might as much light be seen thrown upon the question, as by this or that speech (and by how

so many speeches are, composed of elements no other than such in those—speeches, by the whole amount of them so much worse than nothing—by one such silent motion—and without need of any such cry as *Order! Order!*—be put to silence. Continuing the vision, conceive in Honourable House, a Table of this sort, and in the hand of Mr. Speaker a *wand*, the usefulness of which would be rather more obvious than that of any of the *wands* and *gold-sticks* which are seen in other places,—of such an instrument, aptly and steadily applied, what might be the effect?—A *Meeting*, of which, with the exception of the quantity of sound employed in the giving utterance to *Motions*, and other instruments meant to be consigned to *Votes* and *Journals*,—a *Quakers' Meeting* of the silent sort might serve as a prototype.

Awakening from these visions,—of the set of fallacies above exemplified conceive the list completed and systematized,—how useful, as well as how abundant, might not the instruction be,—which, in the published Collections of *Debates*, might be afforded, by a few words in the margin, indicative of the *genera* and *species*, to which the several *fallacies*, employed in the course of the several speeches, were found to belong? In the shape of logical instruction, what a value might not thus be given to matter in itself so much worse than valueless!

sad a proportion of the whole number of speeches!) reported—and for the most part to no small advantage—as having issued from the lips of Honourable Gentlemen, Right Honourable Gentlemen, Noble Lords—not to speak of Noble and Learned ones. By the votes of those and other inferior animals, is indication given of the state of *the will* and *the affections*: by the speeches of so many unfeathered bipeds, by whom such large draughts are drawn upon us for our respect, and so much sufferance brandished over our heads in the character of punishment, for the purpose of extorting from us that sentiment, or at any rate the outward show of it by these speeches, is—the state of that same faculty, and of those same affections, expressed and indicated: affections as pure from all admixture of reason, in this case as in those others.

Let not what is thus said be misconceived. Not to any such effect as that of weakness in argument does the indication here afforded mean to point. No: it is merely to the utter absence of all argument:—of every thing which, on the individual by whom it is uttered, could have passed for argument. Opinion, ungrounded opinion—this is what we have from them: nor even *that* in its own shape, but disguised in the garb of a mere expression of *will*, mixt with that of the passion which produced it. And this passion—with what sort of expectation is it manifested? Even with this, and this only—such is the height and weight of the authority of the orator, that by the mere perception of his supposed *self-formed* judgment, will the desired direction be given to the *derivative* judg-

ments, of all those by whom that perception has been obtained.

From what cause then this expectation?—Oh, from this cause: not only *probity* but *wisdom* are among the appendages of *rank* and *opulence*:—to him are known to belong these primary and only essential requisites, therefore so of course do those derivative appendages: from the very causes of his inaptitude does he derive the assurance of his aptitude. Idiosyncracies apart, a man of *twenty thousand* a year will accordingly speak with twice the persuasive force of a man of but *ten thousand* a year: a man who is everlastingly Noble, with some number of times the force of one who is but Honourable. Such is the expectation of the man himself: and unhappily—such is the force of inveterate prejudice—neither is that expectation by any means so groundless as it is to be wished it were.

V. *Mischief 3.—Mischief by securing greater Attendance on the corrupt side.*

A matter, which henceforward should be never out of mind, is—it is only on the supposition of the existence of a number of Members, in whom,—in a degree adequate to the placing of their votes on the several occasions on the proper side,—the several elements of appropriate aptitude are combined,—and these on each occasion in a number sufficient to the outnumbering of such of the Members as, by sinister interest, by interest-begotten prejudice, by indigenious weakness, or by adoptive prejudice, are stationed

under the dominion of C——r-General and Co. —only on this supposition can any such copious attendance be any thing better than an object of comparative indifference.

On this supposition, here once for all brought to view—on this supposition, as in the character of a necessary basis, must be considered as grounded every thing which in the course of the present section remains to be said.

In the present state of things—and, in a word, under any other than what is looked for from the proposed radical reform—the existence of any such majority on the side of uncorruption, (unless it be on this or that extraordinary occasion, on which,—in the minds of the several corruptionists, in sufficient numbers—whether *corruption-eaters*, or but *corruption-hunters*,—it happens either to some particular interests of their own, or to their share in the universal interest, to operate with such a force as for the moment to overbalance the force of their partnership share in the corruption concern)—any such superiority of numbers on the side of uncorruption, presents itself as being, —even on the supposition of the most perfect and universal constancy of attendance,—altogether hopeless. Thence, the demand for the *other* proposed articles in the system of reform: for, supposing this single one adequate to the purpose of securing the effect desired, the advantages expectable from reform would, in so far as concerns *virtual universality of suffrage*, be reduced to those above distinguished by the appellation of *collateral*: and these and all the others put together might, upon a fair account taken, be

found scarcely sufficient to compensate for the evils of change.

But, when the state of interests comes to have been fully seen into, what amongst other things will be seen is—that scarcely would the repugnance produced by all the other articles put together exceed that which this single one would of itself be sufficient to produce: and that by no instrument of less cogency than that composed of the system of radical reform taken in *all* its parts, could abuse in the *one* shape here in question be excluded.

Another memento which in this place it may be of use to give, is—that the state of things, the existence of which is, on the occasion, and in the course of the ensuing observations all along assumed, is—that the course of action, to which, on the part of the servants of the Crown, the particular mischief here in question—the established course of transgression—is rendered subservient, is more or less mischievous. Why? Because the effect of it is—to secure to their measures, be they what they may, an undue advantage: an advantage, the property of which, on each occasion, is to be of no use but to the wrong side as such; and not to be capable of being reaped, but through the instrumentality of that mass of seductive influence, which has been shewn to be in their hands.

Follows now an indication of the *collectively-seated* portion, of the mischief produced by the habit of non-attendance in its present shape; and an indication of the sinister interest, by which that habit is put to use and fostered.

Too manifest to need explanation or comment is

the sinister interest which the Ministerial leaders have, in the absence of Members, whose votes,—together with their speeches, if any,—would have operated on the opposite side.

Sinister interest *of the day*—sinister interest of the *Session*—in the sinister interest here in question, these two branches may be distinguished.

The sinister interest of the *day* is that which regards the business of the day: the fewer the adversaries present, not only is the victory the more assured before hand, and the more signal afterwards, but the time consumed in making, hearing, and answering speeches, and the labour in making and prompting speeches, is by so much the less.

In respect of neither of these sinister interests would the habit of absention be of use to C——r-General and Co. if the number of absentees were as great in proportion on his side as on the opposite side. But of this there is never any fear: the means, viz. the sinister influence which they have in their hands, being adequate—not only to the purpose of securing conformity in case of attendance,—but, for the purpose of such conformity, adequate moreover to the more difficult purpose of securing attendance.

True it is that, in this instance as in most others, whatsoever the Ministerial side for the time being has in *possession*, the *Opposition* side has in *prospect*. But, in this case, between *possession* and *prospect* so mighty is the difference,—that, compared with so substantial an instrument of compulsion as that which the Ministry have in their hands, that which the op-

position leaders have in theirs is but little better than a phantasmagoric image of it.

In the sinister interest of *the Session*, note moreover two distinguishable branches: the *efficient* or *effective*; and the *preventive* or *defensive*.

First, as to the *efficient* or *effective* sinister interest: it consists in the increased *facility* as well as *certainty*, given to the adoption of all such measures as it may be the wish of the Administration to see carried into effect.—As the *Session*, and along with it the season advances, the attractions of the Town diminish, those of the Country increase. The *motives* or *inducements*, by the force of which *absentation* is produced, gain in strength; and the number of the individuals, in whose instance they are preponderant, receives continual increase.

If the diminution of numerical strength produced by the operation of this cause were the same on both sides, no such sinister interest as that in question, would have place on the Ministerial, any more than on the Opposition side. But, for a counterpoise to the force of this cause of absentation, the Ministerial side has a power, of which their adversaries are destitute. With the highest degree of efficiency, as above shewn, the Cabinet Ministers command the attendance of the removable *corruption-eaters* of the inferior classes, as also the *corruption-hunters*; and this with a degree of efficiency, proportioned to the estimated value of their respective possessions and prospects.

Of the nature of the *defensive* or *preventive* interest, some intimation is already given by the name thus em-

ployed for the designation of it. By the same cause by which certainty and facility are given to their own enterprizes, certainty is given to the defeat of all adverse measures on the other side. *Of all adverse measures?—* *Good:* (says somebody,) *but what are they, these measures, which, with reference to the side in question, come under the denomination of adverse measures? Answer:—*All measures whatsoever: measures *directly, or specially* adverse—measures *indirectly, in a general way* adverse;—by these two adjuncts stands expressed the only difference. By every measure carried into effect by the adversary,—by every such measure,—be it what it may, if popular, *reputation* is gained; and whether popular or not, *power* displayed. “*There must not be two Chancellors of the Exchequer,*”—is one of the few sayings remembered of *Pitt the second*.

But, whatsoever assurance of ultimate frustration may, in this way, be afforded,—the same periodical cause of flight adds a further assurance from a still more advantageous source, viz. *preventive anticipation, or pre-occupation* of the House. Partly in virtue of the established rules of proceeding, partly in virtue of the majorities, on the habitual existence of which their continuance in their situation depends,—the members of the Cabinet possessing at all times an all-comprehensive command of the aggregate mass of the business of the House;—a command, by which are determined—not only the *choice* of the elementary parts to be admitted into that mass, but the *order* in which they shall respectively be admitted,—admittance for the whole mass of *their own measures* is at all times of course secured: admittance to the *measures*, and there-

fore command of the quantity of *time* necessary for that purpose. This portion being thus sure to them, whatever portion might otherwise be occupied by business not originating in themselves, it is therefore their interest to minimize.

For this purpose *three* expedients present themselves to their hands: 1. One (which belongs not to this head) is the *deferring the commencement* of the session to as late a point of time as possible, in which way moreover the interest of the *pillow* is served at the same time with the general interest of corruption: say, *staving off sessions*: 2. Another is—the inserting into the whole length of the allotted period, on as many pretences as can be found, times of *recess* as many, and each of them as long as possible: say, *maximizing recess*: a *third* is—the rendering as large as possible the number of the days, in which, by the original or incidental failure of the numbers made requisite to give validity to the proceedings, the carrying on of the business is prevented: say, *maximizing barren days*.

Now then, on every day, on which it suits their purpose, that the number of members necessary to give validity should be present,—by means of their official *Whippers-in*, it is evidently in the power of the Treasury to secure, and by circular letters and word of mouth applications they accordingly do secure, the presence of that necessary number: this object thus secured, in the same hands being likewise the legal powers of giving to the whole Session whatsoever length it may happen to their purposes to require,—on every other day it is therefore their interest, as above, that this condition to validity should remain

unfulfilled, in such sort that nothing should be done. From no barren day, nor from any number of barren days, can the sinister interest of C——r-General be subjected to any loss: because for any day or number of days thus lost at an *anterior* part of the session, it is in his power to add at the *posterior* part as many as he pleases:—at this *posterior* part; that is at the part, at which the ratio of the number on the opposite side to the number on his own side will be less and less.

By a conspiracy, on the part of the opposition members, to flock into the scene of action, in numbers greater than usual, on this or that particular day, what might now and then happen is—the Cabinet Junto's being taken by surprise: and, in this way it is, that this or that thing might happen to be done, which could not by any succeeding majority be undone: *evidence* for example procured, and admission thus given to lights, which could not afterwards be extinguished. To obviate any such inconvenience, a sort of *rule of courtesy* has, with the concurrence of both parties, been established: viz. that no motion of considerable importance shall be made without previous notice. In this rule however it does not appear that motions having for their object the procurement of *official evidence* have in general been considered as included: hence an accident which is said to have now and then happened, is—that evidence, which, in case of an attendance sufficiently full, would with the most inexorable effrontery have been refused, has by surprise been extorted. One mode of denying justice, and by far

the most effectual, is the denial of the evidence necessary to the obtaining of it: the most effectual,—because by the mere production of the evidence, justice, in so far as depends upon *the tribunal of public opinion*, will frequently be done.—*Rule—general*, not to say *universal*.—Whenever, to a motion for special evidence, denial is opposed,—that denial has self-confessed delinquency at the bottom of it. By *the tribunal of public opinion* it ought to be taken as and for *confessional* evidence, and that evidence conclusive: taken as *conclusive evidence*, and *judgment* as for the utmost possible amount of the thus concealed guilt pronounced accordingly.

In this way,—of the useful measures which otherwise might have been brought to maturity, some are prevented from being brought forward so much as in the way of *motion*: and thus far even *conception* is prevented: others, in the instance of which *conception* has not been prevented, are prevented from being productive of the desirable and desired effect; and in this case, and in this way, *abortion* is procured.

To the quantity of effect, produced by those means of *barrenness* and *abortion*, of which, as above, with more or less facility the manufacturing is in the hands of the Minister,—is added that of another set of means, neither the existence nor the efficiency of which depend in any considerable degree, in any direct way, upon any exertion of *his*, but the existence of which, together with that of the system under which they are bred, will of course find on his part a degree of protection proportioned to the service derived from them

by his own sinister interest. To this head may be referred—

I. The avocations produced by the *separate*, and consequently with reference to the public service, the *sinister* interests appertaining to the several professions: viz. those of—1. Lawyers—practising Lawyers; 2. Army Officers; 3. Navy Officers; 4. Diplomats; 5. Governors and other persons in Office, in any of the several distant dependencies.

II. The avocations, specially incident to the situation of the Members for *Ireland* taken in the aggregate.

Thus, to each *particular* interest is the *universal* interest made to give way: and, by these particular interests not only is absence produced on the part of the individuals, but, in many instances, and to a no inconsiderable extent, not only for the accommodation of individuals, but for the accommodation of a whole professional class, is this or that particular business, or class of business put off. Thus, by means of *terms* and *arrests*, it having been originally contrived, by and for the particular interest of the *Lawyer-class*, that during certain periodically-recurring portions of every year, denial of justice should have place,—so it is, that for the incidental accommodation of this or that individual partner in that separate and sinister interest, the whole business of the nation is moreover incidentally put off. And, forasmuch as in their situation of *corruption-eaters*, among Lawyers, the Crown Lawyers—essentially acting partners in the firm of C——r-General and Co.—are constantly in the number of the members,—while *corruption-hunters* are naturally more nu-

merous on the prosperous than on the unprosperous side of the House,—here may be seen another advantage, which the great sinister interest of C——r-General and Co. draws to itself from the cluster of lesser interests with which it is surrounded.

VI. *Interests, by the play of which the numbers of Members present are determined.*

As in the physical, so in this part of the political world, by the conflict and compressure between the *centripetal* and *centrifugal* forces is at each instant, the *locus* of the several objects in question determined.

I. In the physical world have been *observed* physical *attraction* and *repulsion*; to which, by inference and supposition have been added *primæval impulse*.

In this part of the *political* world, behold as analogous counterparts, analogous to those of the physical world, *moral attraction* and *repulsion*: instrument of *moral attraction* and *desire, pleasure*;* productive of a corresponding *interest*, and operating in the character of a *motive*: instrument of *moral repulsion, pain*;† productive also of a corresponding *interest* and *desire*; and, though in a direction opposite to that just mentioned, operating also in the character of a *motive*, and capable of operating with much greater force.

First as to *centrifugal* interests: for, as above, such

* For correctness, include in the import of the word *pleasure*, or rather add thereto, its equivalent in a *negative* shape, viz. *exemption from pain*.

† Include in like manner, or add, its equivalent in a *negative* shape, viz. *loss of pleasure*. See *Springs of Action Table*.

for shortness may be the term employed for the designation of that class of interests, the force of which, as applied to this part of the political world, operates in a *centrifugal* direction, as above explained: interests, the tendency of which is constantly, and the effect but too frequently, to reduce to the state of *an exhausted receiver* the condition of Honourable House: to produce a *vacuum*, of which, in the case of any receptacle of the *physical* kind, it might not be altogether easy to produce so perfect an example. On the one hand, *miscellaneous* interests—on the other hand, *ministerial* interest—interest peculiar to the ministerial side of the House, but more particularly to the case of such of the leading members whose station is on that side. Of the first operation by which the class of centrifugal interests requires to be divided, behold, in the sub-classes thus distinguished, the two results.

Among miscellaneous interests may be distinguished—on the one hand interests of *universal operation*—interests incident to all men as *men*—say for shortness, *universally operating* interests—on the other hand, interests peculiar to *profession* or *office*—say *professional interests*—interests of the *professional* purse; in some cases *interests of the counting-house*: and so, in the case of *office*, *official interests* or *interests of the office*.

For the designation of all or any of these particular interests, in so far as with reference to that portion of the visible business of which the House is the seat, it happens to them to operate in the character of avocations, may be employed the appellation of *centrifugal* or *house-clearing* interests.

To the head of interests common to all men as men

may be referred—1. Interest created by the aversion to labour—say interest of the *pillow*: 2. Interest incidentally created by miscellaneous private business, say interest of the *closet*: 3. Interest created by the love of pleasure taken in the aggregate:—the tendency of the sort of interest in question being in this case *sinister*, say accordingly *interest of the cup of Circe*.

II. Next and lastly, as to *centripetal* interests:—*house-filling* interests they cannot be styled: for, so it is that on no one day was the House ever filled by them.

But for this or that particular interest, operating in the character of a *centripetal* force—operating in a direction *counter* to that of the above-indicated *centrifugal* force—operating in a direction opposite to that in which the force of the above-mentioned confederacy of *sinister* interests acts, as above—operating in a word, in so far as they are effective, in such sort as to produce attendance,—the House would of course constantly, as in fact and experience it is so frequently, be a desert.

Miscellaneous interests,—ministerial interest,—in this may be seen a division, which, as it has served for the cause of absention may with like propriety and convenience be employed for the marshalling of those *rounter-causes* by which a limit is set to the operation of the above repulsive cause.

To the head of *miscellaneous* house-peopling causes may be referred—1. the hope of *strengthening* a man's *own interest*: i. e. preserving or raising the man's station in the scale of *public repute*: of public repute, whether on the ground of appropriate *aptitude*, with

reference to the situation; or on the mere ground of the *power* and *reputation* dependant on it.—2. Hope of *servng a friend*: i. e. rendering good offices to the individual, or class of men in question; whether through sympathy, or in hope of return in the like shape.—3. Hope of *servng the party*, viz. to which, if to any, for the time being it happens to the individual in question to have attached himself. 4. Hope of witnessing an *interesting* debate: say, in this case, interest of the *amphitheatre*.

Well:—and in the whole list of the official causes of attendance—in the whole of the entire list thus professed to be made out—is no place to be found for that cause which consists in a sense of duty?—Candour! what is become of candour?—Charity! what is become of Christian charity? Answer. By neither of these virtues is *misrepresentation* in any degree or shape prescribed:

If, in any degree capable of being taken into account, any such virtuous motive had place,—658 being the number of the members, in whose instance the *right* in effect, and in name the *duty* of attendance has place,—no such phenomenon as that of the House in the state of a desert would on any day have place. Unhappily, in fact and experience, not a Session perhaps was ever seen, in which a number of such universally assumed holidays were not seen to have had place, in that high school of self-licensed truancy and indiscipline.

Among the efficient causes of attendance, remain those interests, the operation of which is confined to the *ministerial* side of the House: those interests, of the operation of which one part of the effect has

already been seen under the head of *Mischief* 3—*Mischief* by securing greater attendance on, and greater effect to, the corrupt side.

By the subordinate, as well as the superior, official situations, may be seen shared the interest of the *sceptre* in its three distinguishable forms, viz. 1. Interest corresponding to the present *pleasure of power*—pleasure derived from the *present* possession and exercise of power.—2. Fear of losing it, or seeing it decrease.—3. Hope of giving increase, or at least stability to it.

In the instance of those, by which the superior situations—say, for greater distinctness, the *Cabinet* situations—are occupied, this interest of the *sceptre* suffices for the most part—suffices, without any such fear as that of eventual punishment in the shape of dismissal—to secure, in a state of tolerably habitual constancy, the fulfilment of the duty of attendance.

In the inferior situations,—but for the wholesome fear last-mentioned, insufficient to secure the bearing of this burthen with any tolerable degree of constancy, would be all the sweets of office. Therefore it is, that, for securing the production of so indispensably necessary an effect,—to the general fear of being deprived of these sweets by casualties applying to the whole party, is, and cannot but be added the special fear, of being eventually deprived of them: deprived of them, even by the superior and regularly protecting hands, should any inexcusable degree of weakness be manifested, in respect of those exertions of self-denial, which are necessary to the opposing an effectual resistance to the attractions presented by the interest of *Circe's cup*,—with or without those other interests, which have been stated as operating in conjunction with it.

But if, even in the case of actual *corruption-eaters*—of those in whose instance those sweets are already in possession, thus faint and unsteady is the operation of those causes, by which a tendency to attendance is produced,—judge how much fainter and fainter it cannot but be, in the several more and more remote situations—of *corruption-hunters* attached to *corruption-eaters* in possession, and corruptionists who are such but in expectancy—considered in their several continually receding situations, viz. of those imaginary *corruption-eaters* in chief—of imaginary *corruption-eaters* in subordinate situations—and of those imaginary *corruption-hunters*, whose melancholy station is at the furthest point of distance.

In the plan in question, as in every other, to the particular cluster of interests, which spring out of his own particular situation, in the instance of every man is added the share he has in the universal interest. But, by this interest alone, unaided by any of these others, would the House, with any tolerable degree of regularity, be supplied with a number sufficient for the carrying on of the business? for the carrying it on in any manner whatever, good or bad? The answer is already given. Not even with the aid of all these separate particular interests is the effect produced, much less by the single power of the share thus possessed in the universal interest.

Not that, in default of all these other interests, produced as they are by the existing causes,—the machine of state would be in any great danger of falling to pieces: kept together in some way or other, no fear but that in that case it would be. Kept together; but how? For its immediately operating cause or causes the

effect would have an interest, or cluster of interests, created for the purpose.

Of such factitious interest, or cluster of interests, would you see an example?—look to the House of Lords. For the giving exercise to that branch of the supreme power,—which is so useful, not only to the high branch, by which it is exercised, but to one still higher,—*three* is the number of persons that has been made *necessary*;—three, and no more the number that has been made *sufficient*. Now, of what persons this *triad*, is it composed? *Answer.* Of the *Lord Chancellor*—of the *Noble Chairman of Committees*—and of a *Prelate*—out of the thirty prelates, Right Reverend and Most Reverend, some one by whom the blessed comforts of religion have just been administered to the congregation so composed. And, of the care, thus taken by each, of his own share in the universal interest, what in these several cases is the immediate cause? In the instance of the *Lord Chancellor*, his office of *Speaker*, with the mass of emolument in the shape of salary, fees, and patronage, attached to it:—in the instance of the *Noble Chairman of Committees*, his salary with its *et ceteras*. Remains the *Prelate*—the only person of the three, for whose benefit, to pay him for the care thus taken by himself of himself, no special immediate interest is created—created in manner as above at the expense of swinish multitude. Obvious is here the contrast, with the sort of injustice which it involves. In excuse for such an irregularity all that can be pleaded is—that the number of the Right Reverend and Most Reverend persons thus loaded—English and Irish together—being *thirty*, a thirtieth part of the time of

the whole Session measures the quantity of the load thus imposed upon any one of them, without special recompense.

From the example thus exhibited in a sphere of superior dignity,—learn, as above, the mode, in which in the similar, howsoever inferior, sphere in question, the immediate interest, necessary to the preserving the machine from falling to pieces, would, in the hypothetical case in question, be created. Power without obligation in the regions above—obligation without power in the regions below—such is the scheme of division and distribution appointed and carried into effect. To the Dives's, the good things; to the Lazarus's the evil things. Propose that, in any such high situation, Noble Lord or Honourable Gentleman should stand engaged thus to take care of his own interest without being paid for it,—Noble Lord or Honourable Gentleman would stand aghast at the injustice.

VI. *Inconsistency of the Non-attendance ad libitum in this, in comparison with the indispensable Attendance in other Offices.*

This, unless that of the Monarch be excepted, beyond comparison, the most important of all offices—the very office, under the eye of which the business of every other office, without exception, is liable to be brought for censure: this—of all offices in virtue of which any business at all is done—(for *sinecures*, acknowledged in that character—*sinecures*, whether *profane* or *sacred*, are not here in question)—this, of all offices of business, the office in which neglect of duty is at the same time more extensive—more habitual—more constant—more

manifest—more manifestly mischievous—more scandalous than in any other?—A sort of riddle this: but the solution comes along with it. Power supreme: power unincumbered with obligation:—situation irresponsible:—in these few words and phrases behold the solution of it.

Look at the situation of the twelve Judges:—look at the situation of the eleven Masters in Chancery. Look at the situation of the Commissioners of the Customs:—look at the situation of the Commissioners of the Excise:—look at the situation of Commissioners of the Navy:—in all those offices, so comparatively narrow in respect of their field of action—so inferior in respect of the extent and importance of their business—where will you see any thing like it?

In the situation of Member of the House of Commons may a man remain for a whole Parliament: no efficient obligation for so much as a single day's attendance—sees M. P. written after his name,—swaggers, and franks letters:—throws upon the shoulders of the swinish multitude the burthen of payment for his private correspondence. This and more is what in that public situation a man may do for his private benefit, without rendering to the public, in any shape whatever, an atom of service.* *Call of the House*:—yes: if so it be that he is within call, and grudges the trouble of sending a false excuse. But more on this head a little further on.

* Some fifty or sixty years ago, sat for Essex a Mr. Luther. Report of the time, 20,000*l.* the expense: staid out his six or seven years, and but once in the whole time took his seat. All this cannot but be more particularly known to Mr. Conyers.

In one point of view more flagrant is this abuse, even than *sinecurism*. By *sinecurist*, as such, nothing at all is done: nothing is there that, so long as that title belongs to him, can be done by him. But if not any thing at all, so neither can any mischief be done by him.—Thus as with *sinecurist*.—How is it with *Honourable Gentleman*? For no one good purpose is he under any *obligation* whatever, to bestow a single moment of attendance: while, for all *bad* purposes, he may attend as often as he pleases.

Sinecures professed being thus disposed of, look through the whole scale of office:—begin at the bottom, end at the top; see whether at any one point in it any such monstrosity is to be found.

Look at the *Exciseman*. Were but a small part of that truantism which is committed by Honourable Gentleman manifested by the Exciseman, dismissal—(unless he had good borough-interest)—dismissal would be his portion, nor that portion undeserved.

Speak of me in the same breath with a fellow such as that? (cries Honourable Gentleman, swelling, strutting, and making up to the glass, to view himself):—*compare me to an Exciseman?—a man of my "PROPERTY?"—a man of my "influence?" and that "influence," all of it so legitimate?* Chair! Chair! Look to the Chair! Sir, is it not *legitimate?* *Have you not told us so?*

Oh yes, Sir! all of it legitimate; the influence of your property, if so it be that you have any, and that property of the right sort. But this property of yours, is it of the right sort?—is it of any sort?—Was it really by property that you forced your way in?—was it not by connexion that you crept your way in?—

and whatsoever it was that brought you in, are you now really worth a groat? No: nor yet half a groat, if your name be Sheridan, or But for proving the species here, one name is enough.

An Exciseman! Compare you to an Exciseman? Sir, if your title to respect were as sure as that of an Exciseman, much surer would it be than it is. Of an Exciseman two things are sure to be true: 1. that in a shape appropriate with reference to the situation into which he has procured himself to be placed, he possesses in some degree the connected qualifications of appropriate intellectual aptitude, and appropriate active talent; for without them he could not be what he is: 2. that, by means of these same endowments, service to the public is—in a certain shape, and a certain quantity—actually rendered by him. In his instance, both these good things are sure to be true:—in yours, which of them?—Sir, neither the one nor the other: no, nor any other whatsoever.

Up now to the opposite end of the scale. Lift up your eyes to the throne:—behold the man that sits on it. In principle or practice, even in that situation, is any such monstrosity to be found? In that situation, few, assuredly, if any, who, if asked, would deny, that in their ever legitimate situation, the power belonging to it is a trust. Here, in this country, by our own Monarch, by our *Prince Regent*, in so many words—while Fox was the word of words—was it not declared to be?

So much for principle. But, here in this case—what unhappily is not true in every case—we have not only acknowledged principle, but in some degree even accordant practice. To papers upon papers does the Monarch give his signature: to papers, not for his

own benefit merely, but for the people's likewise: to papers to which his signature must be given, and is given, or the machine of the state would fall to pieces: to papers for every body's use: not like Honourable Gentleman's signature, for his own use, or that of his own connexions merely, and to save them the expense of postage.

Let there be no misconception. Mark well the point that is here in question. Not the *quality*, not the *goodness*, not the *value*, of the service performed—but the fact—the mere fact—that service is performed: not the propriety of that, which, in cases of attendance is done,—but the fact—the mere fact—of the attendance.

VIII. *Individual Delinquents blameless—who blameable.*

Of the view thus given of the state—not of the *representation*—not even of the *misrepresentation*—but of the *non-representation*—the habitual and established *non-representation*—together with the causes by which it is produced, what is the practical object? On individuals,—considered in the character of persons, in whose breasts, on each or any one of the particular days appointed for business, by sermons as from a pulpit,—to any such effect as that of producing a strict fulfilment of the duty here in question,—any such sense as what is called a *sense of duty*, may, on any reasonable ground be expected to operate? No, no, indeed: as well to the deaf adder,—or to the congregation, to which no minister but *Saint Anthony* ever preached,—might any such sermon be addressed. By any individual, to whom any thing in the way of reproach, or

so much as of exhortation, having for its object the increasing the frequency of his attendance, were addressed,—the answer that would be given—nor that commonly an insufficient one—is altogether obvious. *By no vote of mine*—(would he say)—*by no vote of mine, unless accompanied by an adequate number of other votes on the same side, would any adequate effect be produced. But, with the exception of the Ministry, of no such requisite number can any sufficiently grounded assurance be ever entertained. In their hands is seen and felt a mass of power, of which, to a certain extent, and that a sufficient extent, the efficiency stands assured:—power exercisable at all times:—to the pack which they keep belongs an establishment of whippers-in, to whose voice all such dogs as have a certain collar about their necks are instinctively obedient: to them it does belong to compel them to come in: to them? yes: but to no one else: in their hands is the already sensible and tangible whip: to the Opposition leaders, nothing but the phantasmagoric image of it: to no others so much as that image.*

Under circumstances such as these, where is the individual ever to be found, on whom reproach can ever find room to attach itself with any decided force? “Every body’s business is nobody’s business:” not less true than trivial is that familiar adage.

One case indeed may be assigned,—in which, on some better ground than as above, blame might find spots to fix upon. Suppose an adequate remedy brought to view, and endeavours used for the giving effect to it; on that supposition, what it would be difficult to find, would be—not the person on whom blame—just blame—*would* attach, but the per-

son on whom it would *not* attach, in the event of his omitting to use any endeavour in his power towards the accomplishment of that end. Just blame? Just reproach?—Yes:—but to what effect any such reproach, whatsoever were its justice? *Answer.* To no effect at all, supposing the stream of general and preponderant interest to run in opposition to it. But of this further, when the interests, which concur in shutting the door against every efficient system of reform, come to be brought to view.

IX. Honourable House incorrigible: this Disorder incurable: the Constitution subverted by it.

Well now, note what has been seen:—1. the nature of the species of delinquency in question:—2. the vast—the undeniable mischievousness of it:—3. the impossibility of the mischief's ever finding a remedy in the exertions of individuals on individual occasions:—4. the sinfulness of the sin, in the breast of every individual who, after proof seen of its sinfulness, shall forbear to contribute his best endeavours, by whatsoever sweeping measure may be most surely effectual to purge the House of it: to cleanse the House from it, and if so it be that he himself is of the number of the sinners, thus to bring forth the only fruits meet for repentance. All these things seen, exists there that man, in whose eyes, the wish, to behold the concurrence of the votes necessary to the substitution of appropriate *probity* in this shape to the opposite improbity, brings with it any so much as the minutest chance for its accomplishment?—If

so, too plain indeed will be, if it be not already, his mistake.

On this occasion, as on all others, before you put yourself to any expense in the article of *argument*, look first to *the state of interests*:—think to overcome the force of interest by the force of argument? think as well to take *Lisle* or *Mantua*, by pease blown out of a pea-shooter. The man who hastened to *Rome*, to convert the *Pope* to Protestantism—never let him be out of mind. When the *Pope* has put on Protestantism, look then to Honourable House:—then it is that your eyes shall behold Honourable House, putting on *uncorruption* in the room of that *corruption* which sits now so easy on it. Think then whether there be that imaginable shape, in which *uncorruption* would sit upon Honourable House more gallingly than in that of *universal constancy of attendance!* a shape, under the pressure of which,—unless they respectively gave up their seats,—the *Land Officer*, the *Sea Officer*, the *Diplomatist*, would have to give up their *commissions*,—the *Governor* or other *Office-bearer* in the distant dependencies, his *office*,—the *Lawyer* his *practice*,—the *Official Lawyer* his *office* and his *practice*,—the *Fox-hunter*, for months together, his *dogs* and *horses*,—the *Opera-fancier* his *Operas*,—the *Bond-street lounge* his *lounges*.

Address yourself to the man who sits by *proprietorship*—address yourself to the man who has come in by *terrorism*—address yourself to the man who has come in by *bribery*—address yourself to the man who, through *proprietor*, *terrorist*, or *bribe-giver*, has come

in by *purchase*:—with the exception of some half hundred or thereabouts, address yourself to any one of the 658 ;—tell him that his situation is a *trust*, that to fulfil that trust is a *duty*—tell him that the situation of Monarch is a trust—that the *Prince Regent* has declared it so to be—and that in the hands even of the *Prince Regent* it never has been, nor ever can be, a perfect sinecure;—talk to him in any such strain—so you may if you please, but first prepare yourself for a horse-laugh in your face. *The Prince Regent indeed? yes, to him it is indeed a trust: it is not for him to do nothing but what he pleases. O yes:—duty, and duty enough has he to do: papers upon papers must he sign, when the time comes: it is for that that he is where he is.—Sir, my case—be pleased to understand—is quite a different one. At this time, and at all times, I can do, Sir, and I will do, Sir, as I please. When it is more pleasant to me to go in than to stay out, I go in: when it is more pleasant to me to stay out than to go in, I stay out. This, Sir, it is to be independent: this, Sir, is the duty of an independent Member of Parliament: this, Sir, is the use of a man's being a Member of Parliament.*

Well now, honest reader, what you are supposing all the while is—that principles such as these are but the principles of *individuals*:—principles which, in so far as they are really harboured and acted upon, are but the accidental result of individual profligacy and insolence: principles too, which, in the representation thus given of them, are in the heat of argument more or less exaggerated. Alas! if such be really your thoughts, in sad truth you are in an error: an error which you will be but too deplorably liable to

fall into; should any such expectation be entertained by you, as that on that seat of self-proclaimed honour any real regard for duty—even for acknowledged duty—is to be found. Duty as to constituents? Duty as towards swinish multitude? Oh no: (cries Honourable House) leave that duty to the swine. Duty to Honourable House, yes: on this occasion at any rate, that duty, and no other, is the duty Honourable House knows of.—Now in all this is there any thing of misrepresentation? any thing of exaggeration?—Read now, and judge.

Honourable House has its rules and customs: behold now one of them. Unless forty Members or more are present, business cannot be begun upon:—here you have a rule. But, when Honourable House so pleases, motion having been made and seconded for that purpose, what is called a *call of the House* is made. A day is named—always a more or less distant one—and, on that one day, attendance on the part of all and singular the Members is commanded. Look once more at this *rule*—at this *custom*:—whatever be its name, constituted by this rule or custom, here you have a duty—an obligation established. Established? Aye: and as often as Honourable House shall so please, enforced: for, not a Member is there who, should he fail of paying duty and homage to Honourable House, either by attendance or excuse, may not—would not peradventure—by order of Honourable House, be imprisoned: imprisoned and squeezed for patronage-swelling fees. Well then—in the obligation either to attend or send excuse—here you have not only an obligation, but an

obligation, as often as it shall please the Honourable House, made *perfect*: here you have *indeed* a duty.— A duty? but towards whom? even towards Honourable House, by whom, and by whom alone it has been created,—by whom, and by whom alone, when enforced, it is enforced. But in this very duty—a duty thus created, and no otherwise enforced—in this very duty you have the *abrogation* of all duty as respecting the service at large:—of all duty as towards the people in the character of constituents. Obligation, confined to one particular occasion—which is but *licence* as applied to all other occasions? Thus it is that of Honourable House it is the law—the will—the pleasure—the constantly entertained and frequently declared pleasure—that, in regard to attendance—except in obedience to command issued by Honourable House,—Honourable Members shall at all times do as they please. And this is what was to be proved. Now in this is there any thing misrepresented? any thing exaggerated? As towards constituents, as towards swinish multitude, of obligation not so much as the weight of a feather: not so much as that sort of obligation, the levity of which is recognized by moralists, distinguishing it as they do by the name of an *imperfect* one.

Proposing at the same time that all other things shall remain as they are, and therefore as “they should be”—in or out of the House, suppose then a man to stand up and propose, that on the part of Honourable Gentlemen who risk nothing by it, *attendance*—a duty not occupying half the year—should, for and during so moderate a portion of each

man's time, be rendered as constant and universal, as on the part of soldiers, who, the whole year, and on every day in the year, risk their lives by it:—To any such effect, any such proposal would it be endured? The whole House, would it not be in an uproar? A voice crying, *make a stand! make a stand!* aye, and with echoes too—echoes from both sides, would it not once more be heard, and from the reforming side of the House? To the pious among Honourable Gentlemen would not the preacher of this part of the *Whole Duty of Man* be as surely an *Atheist*—to the political, a *Jacobin*—as if his motion had been for *universal suffrage*? Say, how should it be otherwise—when, by the one measure as by the other, the *best* interests (as the phrase is)—the best interests on both sides—would alike be elbowed out, and made to give place (oh, intolerable thought!) to the universal interest.

No: assuredly not to Honourable House are these arguments, or any part of them, addressed: their interest is to remain as they are and what they are, so long as the injured people and their brave defenders shall behold them sitting there. No: not to the deaf adder—not to that deaf adder, whose deafness has been produced by the charms of sinister interest, will any such charms as can be contained in argument be addressed. The ears which by the voice of honest interest—of that interest, the voice of which is in unison with universal interest—are prepared to listen to arguments, pleading the cause of that interest—these, and these alone are the ears, to which, with any the slightest expectation of their being listened to,

these arguments, howsoever in form, and by compulsion addressed to any other quarter, are, or in sincerity and reality can be, addressed.

IX. *Abdication*—more truly predicable of Honourable House, than of James II.—*Quere, as to forfeiture.*

Think now of *James the Second*. How he governed, everybody knows.—Think how he fled from his trust, and how by Honourable House he was declared to have *abdicated* it. Well then—this trust of his—by what sort of conduct on his part was it that he *abdicated* it?—Till the moment when, for the purpose of the moment, it pleased Honourable House to change the sense of it, *did* not—in every other instance in which an office of any kind is mentioned, *does* not—the word *abdicate* mean giving up *intentionally* and from *choice*? And that tyrant—one of the most tenacious of all tyrants—would any thing short of the most unsurmountable necessity have ever forced him to give up either the office, or so much as a single atom of the power belonging to it?—So much for him whose name was *King*: turn now to him or them whose name is *Legion*. See whether from that time to the present—or say for shortness since the Irish Union—by the vast majority among the Members of the House—the exercise of the whole trust belonging to the House, has it not been *deserted*:—deserted, and if *desertion* be *abdication*, *abdicated*? If, spite of all his endeavours to continue in the exercise of the functions belonging to a trust, a man may thus legally be said to have *abdicated* it—and be dealt with as if he had *abdicated* it,—how much more truly—how much more justly—

where the forbearance to exercise them is most notoriously his own free—his own even licentiously free act? and of any one man, to any number of men?

If, for grounding a practical consequence in other places, the word *abdicated*—the great Parliamentary word, which, by the hand of *lawyer-craft* by which this sense was forced into it, Honourable House forced upon the other House—if this word be not of itself yet strong enough, take in hand the word *forfeiture*:—take along with it the word *non-user*:—consult Mr. Justice Blackstone: see whether—be the office what it may—private or *public*—and if *public*, “whether it “concerns the administration of justice or the com-
“*monwealth*”—of two causes of forfeiture, *non-user* be not one:—a cause, yea, and “of itself a *direct* and “*immediate* cause.” In all this is there any thing of *subversion*? any thing of *sedition*? Be it so: but on whom shall fall the punishment? On me? It is not I that have made the *sedition*: all that I have done is to *find* it:—to find it, even where myriads upon myriads have found it before me. I am not the delinquent—the *seditionist*—the enemy of government. I am the informer—the servant of government—the unpaid as well as spontaneous informer—which is more than all informers are.—*Judge Blackstone*—if you want the *seditionist*—in him you have the *seditionist*: his body let Lord Sidmouth take up, and set to rot along with the living ones—unseen and unseeable—in one of his *Bastilles*.

Yes: if Parliamentary doctrine is to be taken for authority, and that authority decisive, who is there—what lawyer at least is there—that does not see, on how

much better and truer ground, than the power of the Monarch in that day, may the power of Honourable House in these our days be deemed and taken to have been forfeited—*forfeited to and for the use and benefit of the people?*

Let me not be mistaken. What I mean here to say is—*not* that the Honourable House is, exactly speaking, a *Corporation*:—*not*, that the instrument, in virtue of which it is what it is, is, exactly speaking, a *charter*: *not* that to the *King's Bench*—the judicatory by which Corporations are purged, and persons wrongfully acting as Members of them, ousted—it belongs to purge Honourable House. No: if to the lot of Honourable House it should ever fall to be *purged*, the judicatory by which the purge is administered must be of a constitution, and above all of a complexion, somewhat different from that of the *Court of King's Bench*. At present, all I mean is—to point the attention of the proper judicatory, whatever it be, to the description, as above, of the *case*, by which, according to Mr. Justice Blackstone, the demand for a purge of this sort is created.

X. The Incurableness of the Disorder—and the consequently incurable corruptness of Honourable House—declared by Hatsell, Chief Clerk of the House.

Is not this yet enough? Of misrepresentation—of exaggeration—of rash and ungrounded, or insufficiently grounded inference—of any such imputed result of audacious hostility,—after what has already been seen, can any charge—any suspicion—still remain? Well then—call in *John Hatsell*. Call in

the man, who, while in his place the chief servant, has long by his works, descriptive of the practice of the House, and published for the use of the Members, been looked up to as the oracle of Honourable House. To a man in his situation—will any thing of hostility—and if of partiality, partiality on the adverse side—be imputed?

Hear then what is said by him of the *Non-Attendance* and its consequences.

“It not being customary of late years” (says he, vol. ii. p. 68 to 72), “to enforce the calls of the House, by taking Members who do not attend into the custody of the Serjeant: in the twenty years that I have attended at the Table,” (date of this second edition, 1785), “there has not occurred a single instance: although at the time of ordering the call, there is always a resolution come to, ‘that such Members as shall not attend at the time appointed, be taken into custody.’ It does not become me to determine, how far this lenity of the House, in admitting every trifling excuse that is offered, conduces to the end proposed—or whether it would not be better not to order a call, than to make it nugatory by not enforcing it.” Such, then, in the thus honestly published as well as declared opinion of the most competent of all judges, was at that time the state of the disorder itself. Behold now what in the same opinion are among the *effects* of it.

“*The controul which the INDEPENDENT Members of the House ought to have over the conduct of the MINISTERS is*” (says he), “ENTIRELY LOST.”

Well—if this be not a subversion of the Constitu-

tion, what else can be? If it be not by this, that what was best in the Constitution of this country was distinguished from what was worst in the worst of other governments,—by this, viz. that a body of men chosen by the people,—so chosen and so circumstanced, as not to be in any state of dependance as towards the servants of the Monarch chosen by the Monarch,—that this body of men, so chosen and so circumstanced, possessed “*a controul over*” those same servants of the Monarch,—by what else was it that this same Constitution was ever thus distinguished? Well then—in the thus declared opinion, of this official and intelligent, as well as assiduous, observer of the conduct of the House,—already, at the time when this was written by him—already in the year 1785—was this “*controul....entirely lost.*” This said—this disastrous truth proclaimed—and this said—by whom? by an adversary—a hostilely partial adversary? No: but by a most faithful, zealously attached, universally respected, and not too sparingly rewarded, howsoever richly deserving—servant.—In what way too?—in the way of speech spoken—spoken in the heat of debate, and without time for reflection?—No: but in a cool didactic and written treatise, the result of the *viginti annorum lucubrationes*—the twenty years lucubrations he had just been speaking of:—and this, republished without alteration, in a *second* edition, after the opportunity taken of receiving any objections; could any objections have been made, to what he had thus been saying in the *first*.

—If then, even at that time—even in 1785—even before the Pandora's box was opened upon it, which was

opened by Pitt the second, and now again and with additions, re-opened upon it—if even then the Constitution was “*subverted*,” in what sort of plight is it now? But, if the subversion—so full of horror in the eyes of Mr. Speaker,* had, at the very time when he was thus giving expression to these horrors, already taken place,—the subversion of such a subversion is it not *restitution*? Is it not among the objects, which by every safe and legal means every true lover of his country ought to contribute his utmost endeavours to the accomplishment of? When *subversion* is the calamity that has taken place, what better can happen to it than to be *subverted*? When *captivity* was the calamity that had taken place, what better could have happened to it than to be *led captive*? By a stronger, suppose a weaker man set with his feet where his head should be: what better could happen to him than to find himself set on his legs again?

Of the declaration made by Honourable House of the forced *abdication of James the Second*, the day is no secret. Of the declaration voluntarily made by the same Honourable House of *its own* voluntary abdication, as above, the day is not more dubious: Thursday, the 10th of May, 1744—there it is.—*Commons’ Journals*—Report that day from “Committee appointed to consider of the most proper methods to enforce a more early and *constant* attendance of the Members upon the service of the House.”... *Resolutions*, five in number: whereof three, and three alone, on the subject of *constancy*,—meaning of course

* Speaker’s Speech. Cobbett’s Debates. June 1, 1809, p. 839.

on the part of every one as well as of every other of the Members. Of these three—all of them together, had they been carried into effect, inadequate—the first and third put aside, the only one agreed to never acted upon:—never from that time till the present: viz. “That no Member do absent himself from the “service of the House, without special leave of the “House.”*

Thus, in the opinion of this faithful servant, but not less intrepid and still unquestioned censor of the House,—the constitution had even then been subverted,—and in the disorder mentioned by him—viz. *non-attendance*—in this free and generally prevailing abdication—the subversion had its cause. Well then—in this same opinion, this cause was it of the number of those which are capable of being removed?—Not it indeed: for with the following note do these OBSER-

* Commons' Journals, Anno 1744, 10th May, p. 685.

“The Committee came to the Resolutions following:—

“Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that the “House be called over within fourteen days after the meeting of “every session of Parliament; and that every Member then absent “be taken into the custody of the Serjeant at Arms attending this “House, unless such Member be employed in the service of the “Crown abroad, or is incapable to attend by reason of want of “health, or some other extraordinary occasion.

“Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that no “Member do absent himself from the service of the House, with- “out the special leave of the House.

“Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that every “Member who shall absent himself from the service of the House “for the space of two months, without the special leave of the “House, be taken into the custody of the Serjeant at Arms, attend- “ing this House.”

VATIONS of his conclude. “ It appears from the Re-
 “ port of May, 1744, how inadequate every measure has
 “ been, that has been hitherto proposed, to prevent
 “ the evil: *nothing can correct it entirely*, but a *sincere*
 “ *desire* in the Members themselves to attend to that
 “ duty, for which they were elected and sent to Par-
 “ liament.” *Nothing* (says he) *can correct it*, but—
 what? a sort of *desire*, the existence of which, to any
 such extent as would be necessary, would be an effect
 without a cause: for, in the situation in question, of
 any such desire, so long as man is man, the existence
 has been shewn to be impossible.

Now of this dereliction of duty—this most delibe-
 rately determined—most perseveringly maintained,
 and still maintained—dereliction of duty—of acknow-
 ledged duty—is either the existence or the cause, or
 the intended perpetuity open to dispute? The exist-
 ence, you see it in the Journals:—the cause of it, is it
 not in the non-existence of *due* dependance, coupled
 with the existence of that *undue* dependance which is
 the effect of it? the perpetuity, is it not secured to the
 disorder, by the nature of its cause? This so deter-
 minately perpetual dereliction of acknowledged duty,
 does it not, of itself, afford an indisputable demand
 for a remedy from without, by which the determination
 shall be put an end to? for a remedy by which the
 cause will be removed?—for the only remedy by
 which, in the very nature of the case, it ever *can* be
 removed?

§ 15. *Representatives — Impermanence of their Situation — its Importance — Objections — their Groundlessness.*

On this part of the field, into a comparatively small compass must be compressed whatever can here be said: by the joint pressure of *time* and *space*, no inconsiderable quantity of matter, that had been collected for the purpose of this section, has, for the present at least, of necessity been extruded.

Utility and *usage*,—to one or other of these heads may be referred whatsoever matter can here find room for the reception of it. *Utility*, as deducible from the unquestionable principles of human nature, as manifested by universal experience; *usage*, a source of argument, the demand for which will be seen to arise—partly, out of the connexion it has with *utility* through the medium of *experience*; partly out of the means of defence it will be seen to afford against adverse prejudices and fallacies.*

* *Shield-note*: a gag for Scorners. On three several subjects, viz. for *Standing Armies* and *demand for Revolution*, as well as *Annual Parliaments*, behold the opinions of *Dr. Swift*:—opinions, not thrown out on the sudden, for a party purpose, or in the heat of debate; but, in a state of retirement, after a long course of *experience* in the very *arcana* of politics, and a long course of *subsequent reflections* on the subject of that experience,—poured forth into the bosom of a most confidential friend. From Balfour's edition of *Pope's Works*, Edinburgh, 1762, vol. vi. p. 133, From *Dr. Swift to Mr. Pope*, Letter V. Dublin, January 10th, 1720-1. "You will perhaps be in-

I. First, as to *utility*.

In the *Plan* itself, from *impermanence* in general, —and, in the way of example, from *annuality* in

“clined to think, that a person so ill-treated as I have been, must, at some time or other, have discovered very dangerous opinions in government:—in answer to which, I will tell you what my political principles were in the time of her late glorious Majesty, which I never contradicted by any action, writing, or discourse.

“As to what is called a *Revolution principle*, my opinion was this:—that whenever those evils, which usually attend and follow a violent change of government, were not in probability so pernicious as the grievance we suffer under a present power, then the public good will justify such a Revolution; and this I took to have been the case in the *Prince of Orange’s* expedition; although, in the consequences, it produced some very bad effects, *which are likely to stick long enough by us*.

“I had likewise in those days a mortal antipathy against *Standing Armies* in times of *Peace*: because I always took *Standing Armies* to be only *servants hired by the Master of the family for keeping his own children in Slavery*; and because I conceived that a *Prince who could not think himself secure without Mercenary Troops, must needs have a separate interest from that of his subjects*:—although I am not ignorant of those *artificial Necessities which a corrupted Ministry can create, for keeping up Forces to support a Faction against the public interest*.

“As to *Parliaments*, I adored the wisdom of that *Gothic institution, which makes them annual*; and I was confident, *our Liberty could never be placed upon a firm foundation until that ancient Law were restored among us*. For, *who sees not, that, while such Assemblies are permitted to have a longer duration, there grows up a commerce of corruption between the Ministry and the Deputies, wherein they both find their accounts, to the manifest danger of Liberty? which traffic would neither answer the design nor expense, if Parliaments met once a year.*”

Well now, who was this Dr. Swift? an “*ignorant, wild, visionary Enthusiast? a Jacobin? an Atheist?*”

particular,—*four advantages—beneficial consequences—uses*, in a word—are stated as resulting: whereof *three* having more particular respect to appropriate *probity*; the *fourth* to appropriate intellectual aptitude, and appropriate active talent.

I. Consider, in the first place, the case of each Member, taken individually.

1. In the first place, the *shorter* the term he has in his seat,—the *nearer*, in cases of imputed misconduct, the term, at which, any mischief produced by such misconduct, may be made to cease;—and, in the way of example to others, the more impressive the sort of punishment, involved in a removal produced by such a cause.*

2. In the next place, by lessening, by the amount of the difference in the length of the term in the two opposite cases, the inducement which a candidate could have to launch out into expenses too great for his circumstances,—lessening thereby the danger of his coming into the House in a *venal* state.

2. Next, consider the case of the *whole House*, taken in the *aggregate*.

3. The smaller the length given to that service, the smaller the length of sinister service, which a corruptly disposed member will have to sell; the smaller, consequently, the length which it will be in the power of C——r-general and Co. to purchase.

4. The greater the number of the parcels, into which the present length of service is broken down,—

* For the difference, in this and all other particulars, as between trienniality and annuality, see Section 16, *Moderate Reform*, &c.

the greater the number of those lengths of service, which, for the continuance of a given length of corrupt service at the hands of a majority of the members, C——r-general and Co. will have to purchase; and thence the greater the chance, that the aggregate number of the masses of the matter of corruption at his disposal will prove insufficient for that pernicious purpose.

5. Of the utility of the proposed transitoriness, in the character of a security for appropriate *intellectual aptitude* and appropriate *active talent*,—the proof, it is imagined, will not be much in danger, either of experiencing denial, or so much as escaping spontaneous notice. By discourses indicative of ignorance or intellectual weakness—by constant silence and inactivity—by absentation or slackness of attendance—by any one or more of these features of unfitness,—in the instance of every Member in which they respectively have place, may his inaptitude, absolute or comparative, be betrayed, and indication given of it to his constituents. In this way, partly by *original* exclusion, produced by self-conscious inaptitude without trial,—partly by *subsequent* exclusion produced after and by trial,—produced, in a word, by the light of *experience*—may the House be cleared:—cleared, not as now, of those natural, and unpaid, and necessary—yet alas! how insufficient—guardians to its aptitude in all shapes, and more especially to its probity—those constituents, in whose faces it so frequently, and always so needlessly, shuts its door under the name of *strangers*—and whom, as such, it *clears* itself of, as the phrase is, in the character of incumbrances and nui-

ances;—but of the multitudes of those real incumbrances and nuisances, with which, in the situation of *Members*, it is, under the existing system, to so great a degree infested: viz. empty-headed idlers, who, in default of all other means of consuming time, drop in now and then,—and, to save themselves from the trouble of thinking, throw themselves into the ever-extended arms of C——r-general and Co.—thus giving their support to misrule—saying, and perhaps fancying, they are *supporting government*: thus, and even without need of being purchased, contributing to the formation of the waste-and-corruption-and-oppression-producing majority; and, at the same time, by the amount of what might have been their share of the spoil, leaving undiminished, and by so much the larger, in the hands of the Arch-corruptionist, the mass of the matter of corruption,—in readiness to be employed in the purchase of such other of the *Members*, in whose instance, on the one hand, the *demand* for the matter of corruption is more importunate; on the other hand, the *return* they are capable of making for it in the shape of pernicious service, more valuable.

Under the existing system, not only have C——r-general and Co. no interest—no positive interest—in the *largeness* of the number of *Members*, endowed with a more than ordinary share in these accomplishments,—but, on the contrary, he has a positive interest in the *smallness* of that number. In addition to those measures which, for keeping the machine from falling to pieces, must be carried into effect, the object he has to accomplish is—the carrying into effect—in number, extent, and value, to the greatest extent practicable—

such others, as shall in the highest degree be conducive to the advancement of his separate interest. Now, for this purpose true it is—that, in a limited number, men provided in the highest degree with these endowments,—as well as at the same time prepared at all times to make the requisite sacrifice in the article of probity,—are on the occasion of the use made of them,—necessary. At the same time, for speech, motion, and occasional penmanship, suppose this number, whatever it be, completed,—this done, every individual above this number is a nuisance: the greater the value of his talents, the higher are his pretensions raised: the higher his pretensions raised,—and the greater the danger lest, by inadequacy of the quantity of the matter of corruption at command, he should be disappointed, and by discouragement driven to the other side: and moreover, the greater the number of these men of pretension,—the greater the danger, lest, by the quantity of time respectively employed by them in the display of their respective pretensions, a greater quantity on the whole might be consumed, than any demand he might have for *delay*, on the score explained in the section on *non-attendance*, could require: in which case they would be proportionable sufferers—sufferers, and to no use—in respect of the *interest of the pillow*.

Annuality of Election forsooth a *wild*—a *visionary* arrangement? *wild* and *visionary*, when, within the view of those by whom it is thus denominated, stands the vast metropolis—its population little less than the tenth part of all England—the great seat and example of *representative democracy*—in which, for so many

centuries past, the vision has been realized? realized, and all the time with such illustrious good effect, and without the shadow of inconvenience?

But here, perhaps, lest argument should be altogether wanting, comes a sudden turn to the opposite side: and now, with an air of triumph, at the bottom of this potential impermanence is shewn eventual permanence: permanence—which, should it ever be actual, will be excessive.

Cases may be shewn (it has been said,)—cases in which, under annuality of election, the same person has been seated for life: here then, (it has been added) where *mutation* has been the object thus aimed at, not *mutation* but *perpetuity* has been the result.

Be it so: but, by this result what is it that is proved? that the potential impermanence is a bad arrangement? By no means: but rather that it is a good one.—Why?—Because, under this instrument of good discipline, so good has been the behaviour of the functionary, that no fault has been to be found in him: no hope of supplanting him conceived by any body else.

And, after all, in the particular instance here in question—in the *Common Council*, chosen by the *Liverymen of the City of London*—of this *potential impermanence*, is it so clear, that any *actual permanence*, in such sort and degree as to have become productive of mischief in any assignable shape, has frequently, if ever, been the result?

In what character is it that impermanence is meant to be established?—in that of an *end*?—an *independent end*?—No surely: but in the mere character of a *means*:—a means leading to an ulterior result in the character of

an *end*: leading in a word to *good behaviour*,—the result of appropriate aptitude in all shapes on the part of the functionary. Well then, suppose the end fulfilled, what signifies it how matters stand with regard to the means?

What?—From the circumstance of a man's being, by the free suffrage of the undisputedly proper judges of his conduct, repeatedly and uninterruptedly—each time by the light of an additional body of experience—pronounced *fit* for his trust,—from this circumstance, standing as it does alone, will you infer him to be *unfit*? Grant that, in some situations, so it may be, that by nothing better than mere *negative merit* on the one part, and on the other part by the *force of habit*—by the property which *habit* has of superseding *reflection*—so it might happen, that a man of inferior merit might, by his continuance in the situation, put an exclusion upon a man of *positive and superior merit*; still, in a situation such as this—a situation covered with a lustre, of which, in its present sordid state, it is not in the nature of the representation to afford an example—small surely is the danger, but that by a swarm of competitors—no expense having place, by the terror of which any man can be excluded—the attention of the electors will be sufficiently called and pointed to the probable degree of comparative aptitude, on the part of the provisionally accepted object of their choice.

But, should the case prove otherwise—or even *for fear* the case should prove otherwise—how easy would it be, by a slight amendment, to provide that after having without intermission sitten for such or such a

number of years, a member should, for the space of one year—or, if so it must be, some greater number of years,—cease to be eligible? and so *toties quoties*.

The argument, which from potential impermanence infers probably excessive permanence—in what circumstance shall we find the source of it? In great measure, not improbably, in the sort of paradoxicality that belongs to it, and the ingenuity and depth of thought, that present themselves as evidenced by it. Here, as elsewhere, dig a little way, you get a paradox: dig a little further, you get the solution and exposure of it.

Give to the observation the utmost credit that can be due to it,—in the way of practice nothing more would result from it, than a *suspension*—such as that proposed. But, a sort of misconception, than which nothing is more common, is—the taking up an observation, the result of which, supposing it ever so well grounded, is but the need of a corresponding amendment to the proposed plan,—and then, without further thought, swelling it out into the shape of a peremptory objection, calling for the exclusion of the plan altogether.

II. Next, as to the question of *usage*.

Supposing, that from sufficient argument, the question of *utility* has received its answer—and that decision in favour of the proposed impermanence,—this being supposed, not improperly may it surely be observed, that to any such question as that about *usage*, any endeavour to find an answer is but a work of supererogation. That for centuries past no such impermanence has had place, is altogether notorious: to what use then, it may be asked, bring forward—even sup-

posing it to have had place—an *ancient* usage, which has had for its opposite a more recent usage?—a usage bearing date in times more remote from, and thence more dissimilar to, our own,—having for its opposite a usage less remote, and less dissimilar?

To this question may be returned two answers:—

1. One is—that, howsoever, in the eye of superior reason, the argument grounded in utility may be more *substantially probative*,—yet, constituted as human nature is—at any rate, at the stage, beyond which the public mind is not yet advanced in this country,—the argument from usage—and in particular from ancient usage—affords a promise of being more *efficiently persuasive*.

2. Another answer is—that, on the present occasion, the argument from *usage* may, when considered in a certain point of view, be seen to come under, and in that way to coincide with, and operate in confirmation of the argument from *utility*. Against the proposed impermanence, objections have been made on the ground of supposed *confusion* and *instability*: and, from words such as these, proportioned to the vagueness—to the confusedness—of the ideas attached to them in the minds of those by whom they have been employed, hath, as usual, been the portentousness of the eventual public *calamities*, brought to view by heated passions and excited imaginations, in the character of *consequences*,—and the intensity of the confidence, with which the eventual arrival of these same calamities has been predicted.

Well then—as to these points, such (it will be seen) as follows, is the state of *facts*. Age after age—a de-

gree of impermanence superior even to that which is here proposed, had place. And, during all that time, of this same impermanence what was the effect?—confusion?—instability?—any thing, to the designation of which any such words could be employed?—No:—but, on the contrary, the very result, which, in the here proposed *plan* is proposed as the *proper end in view*, or *object to be aimed at*: viz. on the part of the *Representatives of the people*, dependance where due—dependance on the people; thence independence where due—independence as towards the Monarch:—on the part of the *Monarch*, dependance where due, dependance on the people—in a word, *democratic ascendancy*.

Thus did matters continue, until—by the *civil wars* produced by contested title as between the Houses of *York* and *Lancaster*—by the successive *conquests*, and states of subjection—abject and universal *subjection*—to which those wars gave birth—by the final triumph of *Henry the Seventh*, his almost unexampled rapacity, coupled with a degree of frugality altogether unexampled—by the vast and altogether unexampled mass of treasure, precipitated from that source into the coffers of his son and successor—by the still more enormous mass of treasure, absorbed from the patrimony of the Church—from a mass of landed property, which, so long before as the year 1362, had been computed to amount to one-third part of the whole kingdom*—absorbed, in a word, principally from the dissolved Monasteries, and at the same time, with a correspondent profusion, scattered abroad by that furious

* See Barrington's Observations on the Ancient Statutes.

and sanguinary tyrant,—so it was that, by the united force of terrific and alluring influence, every such sentiment, as that of independence as towards the Monarch, wanted but little of being eradicated from every English breast.

In regard to the *duration*, coupled with the *frequency* of Parliaments—the following are, in general terms, the results already obtained, from a not as yet quite completed search,—now making by a friend, (on whose accuracy and judgment as well as candour, I have a well-grounded confidence,) into the several authentic sources of information already published, with the addition of others, as yet unpublished, and some of them as yet unnoticed. When the search has been completed, I hope and believe it will be laid before the public in all its amplitude.

I. *As to frequency.*

1. That, from the year 1258, (42 H. III.) down to the year 1640, (16 C. I. c. 1.) the Monarch, in so far as he could be bound by an Act of Parliament, stood bound to hold a Parliament once a year at the least.—Thus far as to the *law*.

2. That, as to the *usage* that had place in pursuance of the law, from the year 1265, (49 H. III.) down to the year 1484, (1 R. III.) beyond which date the search in question has not yet extended—being a period of upwards of two hundred years—small is the number of years, in which a Parliament does not from the documents appear to have been summoned; and in those instances, supposing no such summons to have had place, the omission may with few or no exceptions be accounted for, either by the absence of

the Monarch in a foreign country, (France or Scotland) or by the existence of a civil war in the heart of the kingdom.

Thus much as to *frequency*.

II. Now as to *duration*.

3. That in all that time there is but *one* instance, in which the same parliament appears to have continued for and during a portion of time *so long as a year*: and that in *that* one instance the duration was not so long as thirteen months.

4. That in that time it appears that in a number of instances, within the compass of one and the same year, *two, three, and even as many as four* different Parliaments were held: so that the clause *and oftener if need be*, was not a mere random anticipation, having no ground in experience.

5. That, of what is now understood by a *prorogation*, the earliest instance that has been found, is one which took place, anno 1407 (8 H. IV.); that, in some few instances anterior to that time, it appears as if, during the Christmas or the Easter Holidays, something of an adjournment took place: but that in some even of *these* instances, the Parliament that met was a fresh Parliament; fresh writs of summons having in these instances been issued.

6. That, however, in regard to the question of *impermanence—impermanence* in any such degree as that indicated by the word *annuality*—none of these cases of *prorogation* are material: inasmuch as whatsoever may have been the number of these prorogations, in no instance does it appear that the same Parliament

continued in existence so long as a whole year; *that* one excepted, in which the extra duration was not more than a few days.*

Speaking of the Parliament that was held anno 1407 (8 H. IV.). "*This*" (observe the authors of the *Parliamentary History*, vol. i. p. 306.) "*is the longest Parliament we have yet met with* :—it was continued "*nearly a year, which was an INNOVATION on the*

* Of Parliamentary acts ordaining the annual, or oftener than annual, holding of Parliaments,—by the researches above mentioned *three* other instances have been found, over and above those which are to be seen in the current editions of the Statute Book: these are—1. One in *Henry the Third's* reign, anno 1258, (42 H. III.) seven years anterior to that (1265, 49 H. III.) in which, for the first time, deputies from *Boroughs* were summoned, viz. by *Simon de Montfort*. Reference for this is to *Rymer's Fœdera* and *Annales Monasterii Burtonensis*. 2. One in *Edward the Second's* reign; anno 1311, (5 E. II.). [Lately published *Statutes of the Realm*, i. 165. cap. 29, 34.] These two anterior to those printed in the common Statute Books, viz. among the Statutes of Edward the Third: 3. One posterior to ditto; viz. in Richard the Second's reign; anno 1377 (1. R. III.): for which see *Brady*, and the *Monkish Historian*, *Walsingham*.

Anterior to the year 1265, (49 H. III.) in which deputies from *Boroughs* were first summoned, viz. by the Rebel, *Simon de Montfort*, comes a year (1264,) (48 H. III.) in which Writs are, by the King, sent to the Sheriffs of *Counties*, commanding them to return each of them *four Knights*. [*Brady*—*Parliamentary History*—*Report on the Public Records*.]

In several of the instances in which Parliamentary Sessions, more than one, appear to have been held in the compass of the same year,—the evidence, by which the diversity of the Parliament will be made apparent, consists of divers existing lists, of Members returned to serve in Parliament, in one and the same year, by and for one and the same County, City, or Borough.

“ ancient constitution, taken notice of by several historians as a great blot on this reign.”—There—Honourable Gentlemen—behold in those grave and universally respected Authors of the *Parliamentary History*—the history so much lauded by the late *Judge Barrington*, brother of the above-mentioned existing Bishop—behold in them another set of *Jacobins*, to be added by you to *Dean Swift*,—and to those predecessors of your’s, who, so lately as in the last reign, were so near making a majority in favour of *annuality*. Where, in their view, was the *innovation*?

Of the body of proof thus promised, and already in part afforded, so small is the quantity that would suffice to *repel*—not to say to *transfer*—the imputation of ignorance and wildness—the charge which with such unfortunate and unfortunately groundless confidence, has, from so many quarters, been thrown out.

Now then, when thus it will have been seen, that no otherwise than by a course of unquestionable tyranny and misrule, was that so much more felicitous, though earlier state of government subverted,—what is the consequence? Even that, as for the benefit of a race of monarchs, a reign of manifest usurpation is regarded as if blotted out of the line of *usage*—so, and with no less propriety, for the benefit of a nation, may a like usurpation, though committed by Monarchs, yet if committed to the manifest violation of the rights of the nation, acknowledged as such by unrepealed laws, in the formation of which Monarchs have concurred,—be considered as blotted out:—a felicitous—and, in that only rational sense, a *legitimate*—course or line of government,—obscured only, but not blotted

out by an infelicitous and thence an *illegitimate* one. In this way, if *imagination* be to be called in, (and why it may not with as much propriety be called in and employed in support of, instead of in opposition to, *reason* and *utility*, let any one say who thinks himself able),—if *imagination* be to be called in—*imagination*, with its favourite instrument, the word *right*, used in a figurative and *moral* sense, that insensibly it may be taken and employed in a *legal* sense—why should not *usage*—usage so long continued, so extensive, and so steady—be regarded as creative of *right*? and *that right* suspended only in its exercise—suspended and not destroyed—by the intervening interval of *wrong*?

If so, and supposing the facts to be what they are here stated to be,—then so it is, that for the claim made to the benefit of short Parliaments, to the ground of practical and manifest utility,—as bottomed upon the relations between interest and interest,—may be added the ground of constitutional right. *Usage*,—is it consigned to disregard? *Utility* remains sole arbiter, and annularity triumphant. *Usage*—is it regarded and consulted? *Right*, is it considered as created by usage? Here then, to the ground of *utility* is *superadded* the ground of *right*.

Two or three centuries of right, followed by two or three centuries of palpable wrong;—is it not time—high time—that *right* should be *restored*—that *subversion* should be *subverted*? *Legitimacy*—*Monarch's legitimacy*—does it stand upon ground so substantial in any case—as *right*—*people's right*—in this case?

In regard to *usage*, considered in the character of a circumstance by which, on the field of government,

it is proposed that conduct should be directed, or at any rate influenced,—in what character, for the purpose of any such application, does it require to be considered?—in that of a *guide*, by whose course our course, as by one sheep that of other sheep, ought blindly to be determined? determined—and that with a degree of deference more and more implicit, the earlier the *times*, and thence the less experienced in themselves, as well as the more dissimilar to our own, the times in which this usage had place?

No assuredly: but in the character of a *source of instruction*:—of instruction, to be derived from an attentive scrutiny into the relations, of what nature soever, observable as between the circumstances of the past time in question, and the circumstances of the present time: as a *store-house*, in which reason may find matter to work upon; not as a *pillow*, on which, without prejudice to security, indolence and imbecility may sleep on and take their rest.

A point which, supposing it true, is to be proved, is—that, in the primæval times in question, not only was the degree of impermanence in question in a state of habitual existence,—but that it had for its *cause*, for its *accompaniment*, and for its *consequence*, that very state of things—that very *democratic ascendancy*, for the re-establishment of which it is here proposed in these latter times.

Assuredly, in the developement of this proof, no great difficulty will be found. For what purpose was it that a *Parliament*—including the assembly composed of Representatives deputed by the people—in a word, a *Commons House*—was wont to be called together by the Monarch?—*Answer*: to get money.

Well: and if, without the trouble of calling together and treating with these deputies, he could, in his view of the matter, have got the money he wanted, would he at the same time have subjected himself to all that labour, and to the risk of finding it to be—what it is sometimes actually proved to be—labour in vain? Not he indeed. That he should have done so, is not in human nature. Well then: so often, and so long, as he was at all this pains to prevail upon the people to supply him with money,—so often and so long did he feel himself as towards the people—as towards the great body of the people—in a state of dependancy; and, for centuries together, this state of dependancy was one uninterrupted state:—a state of dependancy—not as now, as towards a comparatively small confederacy of men,—the majority of them pretending, and falsely pretending, to be Representatives freely chosen by the great body of the people, and themselves acting in a state of corrupt dependancy under himself.—Well:—this then, and nothing more, is what has been meant as above by *democratic ascendancy*: the sort and degree of democratic ascendancy, for the establishment of which it is that the system of arrangement here proposed, under the name of *radical parliamentary reform*, is contended for; the *establishment*,—for which the word *re-establishment* will, it is hoped, be seen to be the no less apposite appellative.

With relation to these *our* times, to both those *other* portions of time the appellation of *old times* belongs without dispute. The appellation of *good old times*—if to either, to which then shall it be given? Shall it be to those later times, when—sometimes for the gratification of the everlastingly conjunct, and mutually

inflaming and inflamed appetites—thirst for money and thirst for power—oppression was constant, universal, and unchecked—waste always unchecked, and, except in those reigns in which frugality was stained by oppression, raging*—and corruption, if less abundant than at present, rendered so no otherwise than by its being, in respect of the demand for it, in so great a degree superseded by the more surely efficient and, to a tyrant hand, the so much more pleasant instrument—viz. terrorism?—Shall it not rather be to *those* old times, in which due dependance was so firmly established in both its indispensable branches—dependance of the Monarch on the people's Representatives—dependance of the people's Representatives, on the people their constituents: due dependance every where; corruption no where; unchecked waste, unchecked oppression, no where?

§ 16. *Moderate Reform—its arrangements—their inadequacy.*

Comprised or comprisable under the denomination of *moderate reform*, what the arrangements, which at different times have been proposed?—

* Prosperous as it was in all transactions with foreign powers, the long reign of Elizabeth (*see Neale's History of the Puritans, by Toulmin*) was a reign of grievous oppression, to all those who would not sacrifice to her thirst for power the religious part of their consciences. Those who, with such undisturbed complacency, view the majority so long since established, little think by how grievous a course of oppression it was obtained. The state of Scotland shews what, had it not been for that oppression, would in that respect have been the state of England.

.. The inadequacy, and little less than uselessness of them, even on the supposition of their being, all of them, brought forward together, and comprised in one proposal, and carried into effect—

.. Much more the inadequacy of them, taken singly, or in any number *less* than the whole—

.. Such are the sub-topics, destined for consideration in the present section.

— Supposing *moderate reform*, in its most perfect shape, thus inadequate,—supposing *radical reform*, as herein above described, the only remedy that presents any tolerable chance of proving adequate,—whence happens it, that by a set of men, professing themselves “*Friends of the People*,” and as such, enemies to corruption,—to corruption—the radical disease, for which *reform* has all along been looked to in the character of the only remedy,—whence comes it, that by these men the adequate remedy has all along been rejected?—the inadequate one, if any, embraced and brought forward?

For a solution of this problem, the source or principle referred to and employed, will be *the state of interests*. But, to shew in what particular way, in the case here in question, the state of interests thus operates—operates in such manner as to oppose an insuperable bar to every proposition for adequate reform from such a quarter, will be the business of the ensuing section.

For a general conception of the aggregate mass, of the distinguishable arrangements, capable of presenting a title, to a place in the system distinguished by the appellation of *The Moderate Reform System*,—take in the first place the following analytical table of the se-

veral proposals for Parliamentary Reform, brought forward in Parliament since the commencement of the present reign:—moderate and radical taken together.*

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Total number of the occasions, on which Reform has been advocated in Parliament | 15 |
| Deduct number of occasions, on which no specific proposition has been brought forward†. | 3 |
| Remains the number of the occasions, in each of which, specific propositions, one or more, have been brought forward | 12 |
| Deduct number of the occasions, on which the species of reform proposed has been <i>radical</i> ‡ | 2 |
| Remains, for the number of occasions on which the species of reform proposed has been of the <i>moderate</i> cast | 10 |
| App. i. pp. 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16.§ | |

* For the immediate subject matter of this analysis, see Mr. Meadly's paper, as reprinted in the Appendix to this work.

† App. p. 5, Hon. W. Pitt, anno 1782; p. 7, Alderman Sawbridge, anno 1784; p. 10, Mr. (now Earl) Grey, anno 1792.

‡ App. p. 4, Duke of Richmond, anno 1780.

§ App. p. 2, Earl of Chatham, anno 1770; p. 3, Alderman Wilkes, anno 1776; p. 6, Hon. W. Pitt, anno 1783; p. 8, Right Hon. W. Pitt, anno 1785; p. 9, Right Hon. H. Flood, anno 1790; p. 11, Mr. (now Earl) Grey, anno 1793; p. 12, Mr. (now Earl) Grey, anno 1797; p. 13, Mr. (now Earl) Grey, anno 1800; p. 15, Hon. T. Brand, anno 1810; p. 16, Hon. T. Brand, anno 1812.

For this system, considered as a whole, the most determinate basis that can be found may be seen in the paper originally printed anno 1793, by the Society formed anno 1792, principally of Whig Members, under the name of *The Friends of the People*, and reprinted (I understand) by Mr. Evans, in his *Parliamentary Reform* pamphlet, just published.

On these occasions, the following are the heads, to which the several proposed arrangements that have been brought forward, have presented themselves as referable.

I.—*Proposed Arrangements applying to the Situation of*
ELECTOR.

I. *Arrangements, giving extension to the Electoral franchise, or right of suffrage, and thus making advances more or less considerable towards virtual universal suffrage.*

1. In the case of a County seat, admitting Copyholders, pp. 12, 15.

2. In the case of a County seat, admitting Leaseholders, p. 12.

3. In the case of the proposed number of *additional Borough seats (or in ALL Borough seats?) admitting Householders at large*, pp. 12, 13.

II.—*Proposed Arrangements applying to the Situation of*
REPRESENTATIVE.

II.—*giving increase to the number of seats regarded as not venal: viz.*

4. 1. County Seats, pp. 2, 3, 8, 15, 16.

5. 2. County-Division, or Territorial District Seats: viz.—Seats formed by Division of Counties into such Districts, pp. 12, 14, 15.

6. 3. Populous Town Seats, pp. 3, 8, 13, 15.

III.—*applying diminution to the number of Seats regarded as venal, viz.*

7. 1. Suppression without compensation proposed, pp. 3, 7, 13, 15, 16.

8. 2. Suppression with compensation proposed, p. 8.

IV. *Excluding from all Seats a part,—but a part only, and that an indeterminate one—of the number of the Members regarded as sold to the C——r-General, by the circumstance of their holding situations of profit, from which they are removable by him at pleasure.*

12. V. 1. To the at present established *septennial* duration of the power conferred by a Seat, substituting *triennial*, p. 12.

III. *Proposed Arrangements applying to both situations; or rather to that of ELECTOR, and that of CANDIDATE.*

VI. *Diminishing the expenses and other inconveniences incident to Elections.*

1. By causing the Poll to be taken in Districts of small extent, carved out of the Electoral Districts: say *Voting-Districts*, or *Sub-Districts*, pp. 12, 14, 15.

2. By causing the Poll to be taken for *all places on one* and the same *day*, pp. 12, 14.

3. By inhibiting every Elector from giving his *Vote in more places than one*, p. 12.

These six clusters of arrangements—consider them now in their respective bearings upon the state and condition of the two situations in question; viz. that of *Elector* and that of *Representative*: including in the latter case that of *Candidate*, or *proposed Candidate*.

I. *As to that of ELECTORS.*

In the account given of radical reform, taken according to the present edition of it, (see § 5, § 6), four expedients or arrangements were stated as essentially:

necessary, and of the goodness of their title to that character, some presumption it is hoped afforded. These are, 1. *Virtual Universality* of suffrage. 2. *Practical Equality* of suffrage—i. e. practical equality in respect of the quantum of the influence exercised by the several Electors in virtue of their respective suffrages.—3. *Freedom* of suffrage.—4. Thence, as an indispensable instrument of freedom, inviolable *Secrecy* of suffrage.

Consideration had of their mutual relation and relative importance, with as much perhaps, if not with greater, propriety—this order might have been changed, or even reversed.

1. First then as to *secrecy of suffrage*. Upon the effect given to the principle here in question depends, as hath been so often observed, *freedom of suffrage*: freedom, viz. in both its contrasted modes,—freedom as against *terrorism*, and freedom as against *bribery*.

In no individual scheme of *reform*, capable of being designated by the generic term, *moderate reform*,—is any such proposition in favour of *secrecy of suffrage* to be found.

2. Consequently, no such security as is afforded by that principle against *non-freedom*, alias *spuriousness* of suffrage, in whichever of those two modes it is considered.

3. As to *virtual universality of suffrage*. Originally, by those advocates for reform, who, in 1792 and 1793, acted in a Society under the title of the *Friends of the People*,—in the instances of what has herein above been designated by the name of the *householder* plan, no in-

considerable advance was made. But, to the *County Seats* it was not proposed that this extension should be applied: and of the existing County Seats it was proposed (anno 1797), that from 92 the number should be increased to 113:—increased by 25: a little more than a fourth.* Moreover, the leader of that eminently useful association having since put from him an arrangement so effectual,—scarcely does it seem at present entitled to be numbered among the arrangements belonging to *moderate reform*: from the system of moderate reform it seems to have been as it were expelled, and driven for refuge into that of *radical reform*.

Be this as it may,—to the giving force and effect to the *universal interest*, in the struggle which it has to maintain against all partial interests in general,—and in par-

* On turning to the document from which this article in Mr. Meadly's paper, here reprinted, was taken, viz. Cobbett's Parl. Deb. xvii. 128 (Debate of May 21st, 1810), I find, that in the Plan on that day brought forward by the Hon. T. Brand, one proposed arrangement was, that "*the right of voting should be given to all householders paying parochial and other taxes.*" The reason for the mention thus made of it in this place is—that, in that paper reprinted from Mr. Meadly's, it will not be to be found. I hope not to find any other occasion for regretting my inability, (pressure of time considered), to make the like reference to the sources in every one of the other instances. On the other hand, as to this modification of the *householder* plan,—it appears not that it entered into Mr. Brand's design to make application of it, in any other instance than those of the populous and at present unrepresented *Towns* to which it was his design to give seats: to the *Counties*, it seems pretty clear that it was not the design of this gentleman, any more than it had been *Earl Grey's*, that the advance thus made towards virtually universal suffrage should be extended.

ticular against the hitherto irresistible separate and sinister interest of C——r-General and Co.,—the efficiency of virtual universality would, it has been shewn (§ 7, 8.) be altogether precarious,—without the assistance of *freedom*, and thence of *secrecy* of suffrage. Hence it is, that without that shield to *freedom*,—by whatsoever plan, whether the above-mentioned householder plan or any other, any advance were made towards virtual universality of suffrage,—it would be matter of some uncertainty, whether, with reference to the universal interest, service or disservice would be the effect of it.

4. Lastly, as to *practical equality of suffrage*.

Reference had to the existing state of things,—towards the sort of equality here in question, an advance—nor that an inconsiderable one,—would be made by *virtual universality of suffrage*,—on the supposition, that full effect would be given to *virtual universality*; even supposing that, were it possible, no separate attention to *practical equality* would be paid. Still, however, without such separate attention, the most effectual provision that on that supposition could be made for *practical equality*, would remain in a state very far from complete. Take for example *New Sarum* and *Gatton*: by the application of the principle of *virtual universality* to those two boroughs respectively—those same two boroughs still continuing to fill each of them a parliamentary seat—the contrast which the state of those two seats of snug proprietorship would, in respect of *equality* as between the effect of one right of suffrage and another—the contrast, which the state of those two seats of snug proprietorship would form

with the state of Yorkshire, for example,—would be no less striking than at present.

In any all-comprehensive advance made towards this species of equalization, would evidently be included the breaking down of the several Counties, each into two or more *less extensive* Electoral districts.

In no edition of *moderate reform* have I been able to observe any such decomposition advocated. By *Mr. Brand*,—whose edition, together with that which was once *Earl Grey's*, may be stated as being the two by which the advances made towards *radical* reform were most extensive,—this decomposition is indeed distinctly brought to view, but no less distinctly is an *exclusion* put upon it.

But, in the section (§ 10), in which *bribery* and *terrorism* are brought together and confronted,—it has been shewn how, as well by the *vote-compelling* as by the *competition-excluding* operation of it, the seductive force of terrorism is increased: increased by and in proportion to the geographical extent possessed by an Electoral district:—in proportion to remoteness from the Poll-book,—*expense* and consumption of *time* by *journeys* and *demurrage* will have been seen to be increased, thence to a proportionable extent *exclusion* put upon such Electors, in whose instance the *repelling* force of those inconveniences is not overcome by the *compelling* force of terrorism; *oppression* and *spuriousness*, in the case of all those, in whose instance to the pressure produced by the expense and labour of the journey, is added the obligation of contributing by their suffrages to the advancement of a Candidate,

to whose advancement they are absolutely or comparatively averse.

Out of the *six* above stated clusters of proposed arrangements proposed by moderate reform, such then is the inefficiency of the *three first*: viz. 1. those having for their object, or professed object, the giving *extension* to the *Electoral franchise*; 2. those having for their object, or professed object, the giving *increase* to the number of seats regarded as *not venal*; 3. those having for their object, or professed object, the *diminution* in the number of seats regarded as *venal*:—and in these three groups will be found comprised all those which have immediate relation to the situation of *Elector*.*

* Taking the Representation upon its present footing,—one feature it possesses, which in the way here in question is eminently prejudicial,—and in the instance of which, whatsoever use it may have had, has for centuries been in great measure, if not altogether, obsolete.

This is, all over England,—in the case of the Counties without exception—and in the case of the Boroughs, with no more than five exceptions—the having *two* seats, filled by *one* such territorial *Electoral district*. To this sort of duplicity I know not whether any rational cause has any where been assigned. Was it *for* provision against *sickness*? Was it that, in their negotiations with the Crown, the *fidelity* of each Agent might find a safeguard in that of the other? Note, that by the want of the *press*, and even of the *pen*, the negotiations in question were rendered comparatively secret and unchecked.

Suppose each County divided,—though it were into no greater a number of districts than *two*, with a seat allotted to each,—here would be some advance made towards *practical equality* of suffrage as above explained: here would be some advance, but that advance still far from adequate.

Under *moderate reform*,—it appears not that, even this first step

II. *Next, as to what regards the Situation of the REPRESENTATIVE Body and its MEMBERS.*

In relation to this part of the Election system, *three* in number are the arrangements which, in the present

towards the equality in question, has ever found favour among the advocates of these modes.

By *Mr. Brand* in particular,—by *Mr. Brand*, whose edition of *moderate* reform seems to *have* come nearest to *radical*,—the idea of thus dividing Counties is brought forward and rejected.

But, in the circumstance by the consideration of which this rejection is stated—stated as having been produced,—I cannot, relation had to the great end as above explained, discover any determinate inconvenience.

The result which, in the speech ascribed to that gentleman, is stated as the ultimate inconvenience, is—that, on such a plan, some inhabitant of a *Town* comprised in the *County*,—in contradistinction to some inhabitant of the *Country* part of that same *County*,—would be generally returned. So far the Honourable Gentleman. But, under a system of *free* suffrage, supposing the result to take place, no inconvenience can I find in it. Neither the inhabitant of the country part, nor the inhabitant of the town part would be chosen, unless by the majority of the Electors he were deemed fitter than any other person they could choose: and, so long as they chose the fittest person that was to be had, whether a town or the country were the seat of his residence—would, for any reason I can see, be a matter of complete indifference.

In the next place, no cause can I discover adequate to the production of that same result.

“*The freeholders of the Town,*” (says *Mr. Brand*), “*would uniformly prevail over the freeholders of the County, because they could almost always outnumber them at an Election.*”—Yes, at present, while the only territorial districts, viz. the *Counties*, are, most of them, with reference to this, not to speak of other purposes, so excessively extensive. Yes: under the *existing* state of things.—Scarcely, however, it should seem in the state of things which he

edition of *radical* reform, are proposed as so many essential arrangements, necessary to the establishing in that quarter the union of *due independence* with *due dependance*: viz. 1. *Exclusion of Placemen* from the right of *voting*; (leaving them always in possession of the right of *speech* and *motion* :) 2. Measures, such as shall be necessary, for the securing on the part of each Member a constant and punctual *attendance* on the service of the House: 3. *Impermanence* of the situations respectively occupied by the Members in virtue of their respective seats: viz. that degree of impermanence which corresponds to and is produced by the *annual* recurrence of the Election process.

Observe, on this occasion, the object and use of these several proposed arrangements.

1. By the *first* of them, a correspondent degree of *independence*, as towards C——r-General, is produced on the part of the Members *individually* considered.

2. By the *second* of them,—besides the additional sureties afforded for *intellectual aptitude* and *active talent*,—a *remedy*, in the nature of a *check*, is provided: provided, against that disorder, which, in addition to the improbity it gives birth and assistance to, on the part of Members *individually* considered,—gives birth

himself proposes: *Hertfordshire*, for argument sake, he supposes to be divided into *four* districts. But, so small is the extent of that county,—divide it into four practically equal districts, and, in a central spot of each, place the *Poll-booth*,—small indeed would be the number of the Electors that, by remoteness from that spot, would (one should think) find themselves practically excluded from the exercise of their right of suffrage.

and support to the various *devices*, by which C——r— General and Co. contrive to give increase to the *aggregate* of the effect, produced by the aggregate mass of the matter of corruption in their hands: viz. by keeping out of the House, on the several particular occasions, a number more or less considerable of the Members, by whom, if present, a check more or less efficacious might be opposed to their particular measures.

3. The *third* has for its object—the giving the necessary strength, to those ties by which the dependance of Representatives on their constituents is established.

Arrangements belonging to the general head in question, *three*: the *two first* for due *independence*, the *third* for due *dependance*.

Observe now what appears to be the habitude of *moderate* reform, as towards these several last mentioned proposed arrangements.

1. In relation to the *first*, it seems rather difficult to say, whether, in what has been proposed, as above, *Moderate* Reform, considered in its present state, ought or ought not to be considered as taking any part.

For the purpose of shutting the door of the House against actual corruption-eaters—persons actually sitting with the bread of corruption in their mouths—a proposition, as above noticed (viz. in § 13), was indeed, in one instance (anno 1810), brought forward. But, by the Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Brand) by whom, on that occasion, it was brought forward, it was, on the next occasion (viz. anno 1812), abandoned.

On this occasion, supposing its title to a place in the budget of *Moderate* Reform admitted,—a simple reference to what (in § 13) has been said on the subject

of its inadequateness may here suffice. By the place it leaves to the *domini*, among the corruption-eaters,—while the acknowledged *fures* are excluded,—the principle, instead of being *reprobated*, is *approved* and *confirmed*.

2. As to the second point, viz. *Attendance*. Of the disorder, produced by the violation of this duty—the fulfilment of which forms a necessary preliminary to the performance of every other,—in no one of all the several proposals, included in the *Moderate Reform* system, are any symptoms to be found, indicative of any the slightest glance, as having ever been directed towards this object: to the disorder itself,—nor consequently to any arrangement, considered as presenting the prospect of a remedy. On this subject, *Moderate Reform*, in every one of its editions, maintains the most completely uninterrupted silence.

3. As to the *third* point, viz. *Impermanence*: impermanence of the situation of Representative, as constituted by *annuality* of Election.

As to this matter, for the purpose of reducing to its *minimum* the length of the term, and thence raising to a corresponding *maximum* the degree of *due dependance*—of dependance, on the part of each Representative, as toward his Constituents,—under *radical* reform, the comparatively short time indicated by the word *annuality* is insisted upon as above; viz. the reduction, of the at present established long term indicated by the word *septenniality*, to the dimensions of this short term.

On the other hand, on the occasion of the reduction, which, in some degree or other, both editions of

particular reform concur in proposing,—moderate reform insists at stopping at the stage indicated by the word *trienniality*.—*Triennial Parliaments* it admits of and calls for: against *annual Parliaments* it insists on shutting the door.

That, in comparison of annuality, the remedy indicated by *trienniality* is inadequate,—and in what respects and degrees it is so,—are questions, the answers to which may afford matter for a separate section.

Remain two proposed arrangements, the utility of which, as far as they go, is here admitted: but, in relation to which, the doubt is—whether having, as far as appears, been deserted by the men who at one time were their advocates, and who still continue to belong to the denomination of *reformists*—viz. *moderate reformists*,—they can with propriety be at present regarded as having a place in the moderate reform system: whether, from having in former days been *sound, practical, and necessary*, they may not, in the eyes of existing *moderation*, have become *wild and visionary*. These are, 1. The *Householder Plan*, as above-mentioned:—an article of the number of those which apply more especially to the situation of *Electors*. This, as far as it goes, is an advance made towards *virtually universal suffrage*: and, in that character, has been mentioned, as an arrangement, which,—though not completely adequate,—might, by *radical reformists*, for the present at any rate, be acceded to without much reluctance.

But, by a *radical reformist* it could not be refused to any Electoral District;—to any part of the population: whereas, by *no Moderate Reformist*, by whom it

has ever been advocated, does it appear that the application of it has been proposed—any further than to such *Town Electoral Districts*, as upon his plan were proposed to be established: at any rate, to some of the *Counties* in their capacity of *Electoral Districts*.

Lastly, as to the plan for exclusion or reduction, of the expense, delay, vexation, and disorder, at present attendant on, or incident to, the Election-process: viz. 1. Voting by districts. 2. Carrying on the process in all places on the same *day*. 3. Arrangements to prevent the same person from giving his vote in or for *places* more than one.

Neither of the second, nor of the third, of these proposed arrangements do I find any mention in my own Plan (drawn up anno 1809) as herein printed. Regarding at that time their importance, as being,—howsoever in an *absolute* view considerable,—inferior, in a comparative sense, viz. as compared with the others herein brought to view,—it has never yet happened to me to apply to either of them any considerable portion of attention: useful and unexceptionable,—in so far as practicable,—such is the character in which they have, on each occasion, presented themselves to a cursory glance.

In regard to *voting by districts*,—in the ensuing Plan of Radical Reform it may be seen presented in a shape rather more determinate, it is believed, than in any of the Moderate Reform plans:—nor, in any one of them, does it seem to present itself in a form sufficiently *determinate* for contrast and discussion.*

* For the sake of distinction and clearness of conception,—for any such districts as, for the purpose of the more commodious

§ 17. *Trienniality inadequate;—Annuality necessary.*

Comes now what remains to be said on the subject of *impermanence*.

The conflict is between *annuality* of Election and *trienniality*.

I. Compare then the two degrees of impermanence—in the first place with a view to appropriate *probity*.

1. In the event of misconduct, the remedy is by a

collecting of the votes, may be proposed to be carved out of the *Electoral Districts*, I employ the appellation of *Sub-districts*: understanding all along, by *Electoral Districts*, those which correspond to, and in number agree with, the number of the *seats*:—or, in contradistinction to the *Electoral Districts*, these *Sub-districts* might be termed *Voting Districts*.

To express what is here expressed by *dividing the country into districts* (some of them, in the ensuing Plan, *Territorial*, others *Population*, Districts),—the phrase employed by an Honourable Gentleman* is, “*making the Returns by Districts*.” to express what is here expressed by *voting*, or *collecting the votes* in *Sub-districts*, to be called *Voting Districts*, he says, “*taking the Votes by Districts*.” The occasions,—for speaking of the *Districts* which, upon the *Plan* in question, would have to correspond with the number of the *seats*, presenting themselves so continually,—hence the necessity of providing a *name* to speak of them by. As to the phrase employed by the Honourable Gentleman,—though the propriety of it may be considered as unexceptionable, yet, as it affords not any *name* for the *thing* I had such frequent occasion to bring to view, it could not, on every occasion, be rendered applicable to *my* purposes: nor indeed, till after some little expense in the way of *attention*, was the state of things which it presents brought within my view.

* Mr. Brand—Cobb. Deb. xvii. 131.—Anno 1810, May 21.

better choice. In the case of annuality, behold here promptitude maximized; in the case of trienniality, degree of promptitude, no more than one-third of what it is in the other case.

2. So, in respect of discontinuance of choice, or, in one word, *removal*, considered in the character of *punishment*, operating in the way of *example* to others.

3. In respect of *expense*, whence, in case of excess and consequent pressure, *temptation to venality*. In the case of *annuality*, behold here the temptation to expense *minimized*: in the case of *trienniality*, the temptation *thrice* as great.

N. B. By the *secrecy of suffrage*, here proposed as an arrangement essential to the utility of radical reform, the temptation to expense being altogether, it is believed, taken away,—if this be admitted, the advantage attached to annuality on this score will, as to a considerable portion of it, be to be left out of the account.

Under annuality, for the purpose of corruption-hunting, scarcely would it be worth the while, of a man deficient in probity, to offer himself a second time to choice, thereby exposing his character to scrutiny: at any rate, small, as above, is the price which C——r-general would be at the same time able and willing to give to him;—prompt the time at which his power of doing mischief might be put to an end.

Under trienniality, *three years* is the term for which every man may sell himself to any body:—three years, the term for which his service may be bought by C——r-general:—three years, the time given to him to remain in a complete state of *independence* as to

wards *constituents*; thence in a state of complete *dependance* and mischievous obsequiousness, as at present, as towards his *purchaser*. Trampling on his duty—doing the work of political uncleanness with greediness, during the whole of the two first years, with a part more or less considerable of the last,—just at the close of the term—(adequate active talent being supposed to be in his possession)—by some dashing and momentary display in the exercise of the art of popularity-hunting, the corruption-hunter may have promised himself—and perhaps not altogether without success—the satisfaction of thus atoning for his past misconduct, in the eyes of a never-with-sufficient-universality-or-constancy-attentive, and thence for ever too indulgent, people.

Even under a system of *radical* reform—of reform in all other particulars such as here proposed—in all other particulars (suppose) perfect—such in here and there an instance may, in this particular, be the result of an unfortunate choice once made. But, in other particulars,—for want of this or that other of the features essential to completely efficient reform—whether it be virtual *universality* of suffrage, practical *equality* in respect of the effect of the right of suffrage, or *secrecy*, and thence *freedom* of suffrage,—suppose the system so constructed, as that it shall be in the power of any individual to secure to himself the perpetual command of a seat;—on this supposition,—if by indolence, by unpopularity, or by any other cause, it should happen to him to have become disinclined to occupy the seat in his own person any longer,—there remains the seat, which he may find him-

self in a condition to give or sell to this or that other Honourable, by whom the like pernicious use may be made of it: and so—Parliament after Parliament—so long as the seat continues in his hands.

Exactly in this case would the Representation continue to be,—supposing *that* mode of *moderate* reform adopted, of which the reduction of septenniality to trienniality is the principal, if not the only, feature.

II. Next as to appropriate *intellectual aptitude* and *active talent*.

In the case of annuality,—in the event of deficiency—absolute or comparative—in respect of these endowments—both or either of them,—in the case of annuality, behold here, as above, *promptitude* of the remedy *maximized*: in the case of trienniality, promptitude no more than *one-third*.

Here then is a three years' term,—during which a man, whose appropriate talents are, all of them, with or without his probity, either in his *acres* or his *purse*, may fill a seat with useless matter as at present:—matter at best useless, and naturally prone to become worse than useless: for, generally speaking—(though, alas! in one way, exceptions are not altogether wanting)—the more destitute a man is of *natural* dignity of character—of natural title to estimation and respect—the stronger his inducement to sell himself to C——r-general;—purchasing in exchange *factitious* *dignity*, in the shape of baronetcy or ribbon,—for self, or for relative, friend, or dependant, in any one of those, or of some other more substantial shapes. And howsoever, for no more than a single vote, with whatsoever constancy and punctuality repeated, the least va-

luable of these implements may be deemed too great a price,—yet, if by one such article bestowed upon one individual, seats more than one should be to be commanded, the bargain may here and there be, by both parties, found a convenient one.

Referable to this head, comes now an objection ascribed to Mr. Brand. Under annuality, the term not long enough for gaining the requisite stock of *experience*: under trienniality, the term long enough.*

Answer. 1. In this respect, during the whole of the first year, *annuality* and *trienniality* are exactly upon a par. Under *annuality*,—in the election of the *second* year, every Representative, who has served the first year, will, in respect of presumable aptitude, have, in this respect, the advantage of every candidate or proposed candidate, who has not as yet served. And by this consideration, in default of determinate considerations pleading on the other side, it seems natural that the choice of the Electors should be determined.

But by the bye, in either case, of what avail is *opportunity* of acquiring aptitude, any further than as the opportunity is improved? And, under the existing system, unless it be on the part of a dozen or two, where is the *motive*? See above, in various places.—And what accordingly the *disposition* and the *habit*? See the Section on Attendance.

* Cobbett's Debates, xvii. 131.—May 21, 1810.—“ Annual Parliaments would be found exceptionable, from the shortness of the period, by leaving the representative too little accustomed to business to be competent to his duties in that House.”

2. The idea of detaching *speech* and *motion*, on the one hand, from *vote* on the other; and by that means securing, even on the part of the ministerial side, a supply, so much more to be depended upon than at present, of appropriate aptitude in the shape of *active talent*—this idea not having entered into the design, nor perhaps into the conception, of the Honourable Gentleman,—on this supposition, the comparative smallness, of the quantum of intellectual aptitude possessed by such of the Members as have votes, will not have presented itself to his view. On the supposition of radical reform, the men for whose decision the arguments on both sides are presented, will be a set of men, who have no interest in a wrong decision: and, in default of *self-formed* judgment, the opinion from which *derivative* judgment will, in their instance, be derived, will, in that state of things, wherever in the balance of reason and argument, the scales hang tolerably even, be most naturally the opinion delivered by the members of Administration:—by those members, to whom not only *speech* but *motion* is proposed to be so extensively and uniformly secured.*

* Cobbett's Debates, xvii. 130—May 21, 1810.—*Hon. T. Brand.*
 —“ Other gentlemen might consider other objections to the existing state of the representation of the people of more importance, and particularly that respecting the duration of Parliaments. Upon this question he had bestowed much and earnest attention, and he found it one of *enormous difficulty*, but of *extreme interest* and equal importance. Septennial Parliaments had a tendency, from the length of their term, to weaken the relation between the Elector and the Representative, and to shake the de-

In the imputation meant to be conveyed by the words *wild*, and *visionary*, and so forth—(for by Ho-

“ pendance of the one upon the other ;—while Annual Parliaments
 “ would be found not less exceptionable, from the shortness of the
 “ period, by leaving the representative too little accustomed to
 “ business to be competent to his duties in that House, and from
 “ the too frequent recurrence to the troubles and contests of Par-
 “ liamentary Elections. *The one term was too long to please the peo-
 “ ple ; and the other too short to satisfy the Members.* He, for his
 “ own part, would be inclined to take a *middle course* between the
 “ extremes of Annual and Septennial Parliaments, and to recom-
 “ mend *Triennial* Parliaments ; which, without the evils of either,
 “ would possess all the advantages of both.”

Advantage to the Member?—Yes : plain enough : advantage to the people still to seek. But mind this—Members’ interest set in the balance against the people’s interest, and the scales, it should seem, hang even.

Consider, however, *where* this was spoken. The supposition that, when set against the interests of those trustees of the people, the interest of the principals should suffice to make the scales hang even—hazarded in that place, a supposition to any such effect, was it not a daring one ? By the Honourable Gentleman “ the question” had been “ found”—thus frankly, he confesses—“ one of *enormous difficulty, but of extreme interest and equal importance.*” Of enormous difficulty?—of extreme interest?—O yes : no doubt it had. But the difficulty? where did it lie?—In the “ *interest.*” And in *what* “ interest ?”—in the interest of the *Members.*

All this while let it not be forgotten, that—to keep out *improbability—corruption-hunting* improbity—is the capital object.

As to appropriate *active talent*, a case may be conceived, in which, taken in a certain degree of abundance, the effect of it may, upon the whole, be found—not only not of a beneficial, but, in some respects, and in a certain degree, of a positively prejudicial, nature. The desire to take a share in the speaking part of the business, or even in the writing part—suppose it to be to a certain degree extensive and intense, an inconvenience of a sort above-noted on another occasion, *viz.* useless and excessive consumption—*waste*, in a word, of so

nourable Gentlemen the charge of finding sense for their eloquence has, along with so many other burthens, been left to us of the swinish multitude)—in the number of these conjecturable imputations, on this occasion likewise, are we to place the charge of tendency to produce *disorder*? But if to Parliamentary Elections of any sort a charge of this sort attaches, it must assuredly be to Elections of that sort, which would have place under the system of virtually universal suffrage. Under that head (see § 8.) the proof, it is hoped, will be found tolerably sufficient

precious an article as *time*—disposable official time—may be the result. This considered—only for the sake of giving increase to the number of the individuals duly qualified to become objects of choice, and thence increasing the probability of the best choice—is aptitude, in respect of *that one* of the three elements, an object to be desired and aimed at.

Not so, in regard to appropriate *intellectual aptitude*, considered as distinct from appropriate *active talent*;—in respect of this element, inconvenience not being, either in the shape of *waste of time*, or in any other shape, liable to be produced by any degree of abundance,—*excess* cannot here by any possibility find place.

On the other hand, only in the event of its prevailing to a certain *extent*, will *deficiency*,—even in respect of this great,—and to a certainty innoxious endowment,—be productive of any *practical*—of any thing more than a *theoretical*—a *hypothetical*—in a word, of any *real*—inconvenience. On the part of a decided majority of the population of the House—say on the part of the great majority—suppose, for argument sake, that, in every instance, the votes respectively given are on the right side,—on this supposition, it matters not whether the rectitude has for its cause a right *self-formed* judgment, a right *derivative* judgment, or even (supposing it concealed from public eye) the most perfect imbecillity of judgment:—imbecillity,—kept, in this last instance, in the path of rectitude by the hand of *Chance*.

that, in no instance, under that system, or mischief,—in any of the shapes in which the term *disorder* is ever employed for giving expression to it,—would there be any reasonable ground for apprehension. But, if not even on the supposition that the widest possible extent were given to the right of suffrage, still less on the supposition of any less narrow extent: and if not in any one year, then not in three successive Elections for three successive years, any more than in one such Election having place in the first of these same three years.

If, in either case,—viz. in case of *annuality*, or in case of *trienniality*,—under radical reform—or even, to go no farther, under virtually universal suffrage,—tendency to disorder were worth a thought,—rather on the case of trienniality than in the case of annuality should the thought be bestowed.—Why?—For this plain reason:—because, the longer the term in the seat, the greater the value of the seat; the greater the value of the seat, the stronger the incitement in both situations,—that of Candidate and that of Elector; the stronger the incitement, the greater the temptation to disorder in every shape.

On this occasion likewise, if it be worth while, look once more to experience. During the ancient period above-mentioned—while Parliaments were changed, not merely every year, but oftener—from impermanence, even when carried to that degree,—in any such shape as those which are included under the head of *disorder*,—in what instances does inconvenience appear to have ever had place?

Nay, but, it may be said, no wonder. During all

that period, parliamentary service was a service of burthen:—not, as now, of profit: the object was not to get into it, but to keep out of it.

Answer. Yes, accidentally, but not uniformly: especially considering that in those days the servants were paid for the service, and that by the proper hands—their masters: and as to disinclination, it was, unless by accident, disinclination—not on the part of servants, as toward the service—burthen and pay together—but on the part of the masters, as towards the expense of paying for it. As to the statute of Henry the Sixth, though by it great *concourse* is proved—great *concourse* the state of things, *competition* the probable cause of it—*disorder*, instead of being proved, is disproved.

Well, if this *ancient* experience will not suffice—and small indeed to the present purpose must be confessed to be its value—look to ancient and modern experience combined in one—linked together in a long and uninterrupted chain, having for its last link, *present* time. Look to the Metropolis:—look to the *City of London*:—look to the *Common Council*:—Electors the whole body of the Liverymen, in number several thousands:—Elections annual:—Districts, in which the Votes are taken, *Sub-districts*. In what shape was disorder ever seen *here*?

Nay, but (says the adversary) *this sample of yours is not a fair one. Your universal-suffrage men—or even your Householders—speak of them in the same breath with the London Liverymen? men who are not only Householders, but such substantial Householders?*

I answer—not in the poorest classes, any more than

in the richest, will *disorder* in any shape have place, where no *cause* of disorder in any shape has place: and, by the means so often brought to view, every imaginable cause of disorder has been shewn to be removed. Even in the present disastrous times—under the pressure of such unexampled cause of irritation—in the vain hope of obtaining mercy and relief at the hands of their oppressors—what multitudes have we not seen collected together—multitudes in ten times the number that would ever be present at any such Elections as those here in question;—and yet—to the sad disappointment of those tyrants, by whom disorder below is so eagerly looked for, as a pretence for, and thence an instrument of, tyranny above—not a spark of disorder visible.

Will not that suffice? Look then to Westminster; number of inhabitants, 162,085:—number of Electors, at least 17,000.—Voters, not distributed among *Sub-districts*, but driven all together—all into one and the same Poll-booth; compared with the case of *annuity*, existing interests rendered the more stimulating by the superior value of the object of competition, and by the rareness of its recurrence. Freer from disorder in every shape is it possible for Election to be, than (see p. cxxv.) in this great city, its population—part and parcel of the contiguous population of more than a million—it has been for these *ten* years past?

Well—to secure, and for ever, the same undisturbed tranquillity all over the three kingdoms,—nothing on the part of Honourable House but the *will*—so it be but sincere—is necessary.

On the ground of general principles, were the advantages on the side of *annuality* ever so slight—or even altogether wanting—especially when it is considered that under the original system not only was it actually established but the good effects of it were even at that time so manifest and undeniable—on this ground, ere with any colour of reason, or pretence, or any hope of the reputation of sincerity, *trienniality* can continue to be set up in preference to it, can it be otherwise than that some grounds—some specific and determinate grounds—must in support of such alleged preference, be produced?

Towards the close of the reign of Charles the First, (16 C. I. c. 1.) at the opening of the Long Parliament—the so often repeated and so long observed engagement, for the annual holding of fresh Parliaments, having been so long and so continually violated as to have become in men's conceptions obsolete,—*trienniality* was, for the *first* time, established by law instead of it. *Trienniality*, and not *annuality*? Why? Because at the commencement of the struggle Parliament did not feel itself strong enough to exact any thing more: to exact the restoration of the original and so thoroughly approved but unhappily so long despaired of state of things.

In Charles the Second's time, (16 C. II. c. 1.) the legitimacy and despotism, which led to the Revolution, having for four years been reseatd on the throne,—the provisions extorted from the piety of the father being found too efficient, were repealed: these repealed, others, the merit of which consisted in their inefficiency, substituted.

In William's time, (6 W. and M. c. 2.) the inefficiency of the provisions dictated by Charles the Second having been so fully and so superfluously proved by experience, others less inefficient were substituted. Here too however, instead of being *annual*, the duration was made *triennial*. Triennial? Why? because by this time the value of a seat to the occupant was pretty fully understood: and, for the giving to it the utmost duration, and thence the utmost value which at that time had ever presented itself as endurable, the two above-mentioned precedents furnished Honourable Gentlemen—the Honourable Gentlemen of those days—with a pretence.

Comes the new dynasty of the Gwelfs, and now one of the first acts of the first of them (1 G. I. c. 38.) was to poison the constitution of the country: of that country, the voice of which had called him to the throne. Most probably the scheme was in the greater degree, if not exclusively, the scheme of the Honourables among his advisers: the benefit to them being as manifest, as to the ill advised Monarch it was problematical. Their *constituents* had seated them for three years; they seated *themselves* for four years more. An analogous retaliation would have been another Gunpowder plot, not contrived only but executed. How long shall *principals* continue bound by chains of iron, *trustees* by nothing but cobwebs? According to these men, to such a degree was the nation adverse to the new King,—all the Official Establishment, added to all the Army and the majority of the Peerage, would not, without the continued service of these Honourables, have sufficed for his support. Well then—if it was so—(not that it was so)—what was he

better than an Usurper, fenced about by this guard of petty tyrants? The Monarch was no usurper: he was fairly seated. Not so Honourable Gentlemen. What shall we say of their successors? successors seated by the original sin of their forefathers: seated by the same breach of trust.

Remains one short observation, by which much sad matter is brought to view. In the situation in question, only in proportion as it contributes to strengthen the ties of their dependance, is impermanence, and thence annuality in comparison of trienniality, of any use: only therefore in the case, and to the extent, of that portion of the whole population of Honourable House, who are in any degree dependant for their seats on the good opinion of the persons styled their constituents: and how small that minority is, which is composed of the persons whose presence is not a nuisance and an insult to the whole people of the United Empire, let them say to whose industry the melancholy secret has been revealed. Before the Irish Union, anno 1798, according to the *Friends-of-the-people Society*, of the 558 Seats, by Patrons, 154; seats filled, 307; not known to be so filled, 251; known majority of sham Representatives, 56. Since the Union, anno 1812, according to Mr. Brand, of the 658 seats, by Patrons (i. e. single Patrons acting as such in severalty) 182, seats filled 326; add ditto, filled by compromise between 40 pair of Terrorists, seats filled, 80:* total 406 and more: Representatives

* The passage, as reported, not being altogether clear of ambiguity, here follow the words:—"above forty persons returned on either" (each?) "side, by that which was denominated a compromise."—*Cobbett's Debates*, xxiii, 102, May 8, 1812.

not known to be sham, 252, and no more: known majority of sham Representatives, 154, and more.

§ 18. *Interests adverse to adequate Reform—Support given by them to Moderate, to the exclusion of Radical: Tories—Whigs—People's-men.*

A sort of paradox—a sort of riddle—here presents itself. Behold it in the following train of conflicting circumstances.

Of the function of the Members of the Commons House as such—Representatives sent, or supposed to be sent, by the body of the people, to officiate in the character of their Trustees and Agents, sole use the securing on the part of the servants of the Monarch a due dependance on the will—on the supposition that the will will be governed by the interest—of the whole body of the people. Seductive influence of the Monarch and his servants, a *bar* to that use. *Removal* of this bar the proper object of every change that under any such name as that of *Parliamentary Reform* can be proposed. The mode of Reform called *Radical*, as above explained—this the only change by which that removal can be effected, *Moderate Reform* a change altogether inadequate. Such the state of things which, (not to speak of other eyes) to the eyes of the set of men in question has been all along lying open.

Now as to the line of conduct pursued by them under and in relation to this same state of things. Among the professed advocates for Parliamentary Re-

form, on the part of the confederacy of leading men, styling themselves (for, at the formation of the confederacy thus they actually did style themselves)—styling themselves *Friends of the People*—and, at that time, by one great preliminary service of unspeakable use, really acting as such—on the part of *these* men, and in particular on the part of such of them as are or have been in possession of seats in that same House, a declared *hostility* towards every *adequate* plan of reform—an exclusive preference given to that altogether *inadequate* one. Under the state of things thus described,—in the repugnancy between profession and practice—professions so universally kept up by so vast a body, composed of men of the most respectable characters, in the highest walks of life—in this repugnancy—in this sort of inconsistency—lies *the riddle*.

Here then we have the riddle. In the *state of interests*, on the part of the body of men in question—in this source and no other—will the *solution* of this riddle, by any person whose curiosity may happen to have sent him in quest of it, be to be found.

Follow now the sub-topics under which the matter of this section will be found.

- I. Sole clue to political conduct, interest.
- II. Tories—Whigs—People's-men:—General coincidence of interests as between Whigs and Tories.
- III. Particular points of Radical and efficient Reform, by which the joint interests would be affected.
- IV. Reforms to which they would be equally irreconcilable, though contributing nothing to democratic ascendancy.

V. Country Gentlemen—Opposition of their particular interests to efficient Reform, and thereby to the universal interests.

VI. Options—Compromises—Experiments—Postponements.

VII. Uses of this exposure,

I. *Sole clue to political conduct, interest.*

In this public situation, or in any other, be the *individual* who he may, have you any such wish as that of possessing either a clue to his conduct in time past, or a means of foreknowing his conduct in time future? Look to the situation he is in, in respect of interest.—Have you any such wish in regard to an *aggregate body*? Look still to interests:—look to the situation which the whole or the majority of that body are in, in respect of interest.

In the case of an individual *unknown* it is your *only* clue: in the case of a body—meaning the governing part of it,—except in so far as, by accident, the view taken by it of its interests may have been rendered erroneous by weakness,—it is a sure one.

Yes: in this one short phrase, *the state of interests*—every man has at hand a glass, in which,—when set up in the field of *morals*—and more particularly in that compartment of it which embraces *politics*,—any man, who is not afraid of seeing things as they are, may at all times see, what it will not at all times be equally agreeable to him to see. Where the object or objects which it presents to his view have some thing more or less of unpleasantness in them—

where the effect of them is to check the vivacity of that swaggering and strutting pace, which when in their vibrations before a looking-glass, pride and vanity are so apt to assume,—nothing is more natural than that the eyes should have a tendency to close themselves. But, on this occasion, let a man's eyes be closed by him ever so fast, in those same eyes at which it began will the compression terminate: it will not communicate itself to any other.

In the case of a man, by whom a public situation in any way efficient is occupied,—the correctness of the conception which he himself has of what is passing and about to pass in his own mind,—and in particular of the *springs of action* by which his own conduct has been and is in a way to be determined,—is to the public at large, a point as indifferent as it is unascertainable: but, to that same public, a conception as correct as can be formed in regard to these same springs of action,—and the share they have respectively had, and are in a way to have, in the production of the several effects, is frequently a matter of no inconsiderable importance.

In the view of giving what facility it may be in my power to give to an inquiry of this sort, in the hands of any such persons *as may*, by whom the need of engaging in it may happen to be felt, I will accordingly in this place, notwithstanding the repetition involved in them, venture to submit two *rules* or *directions*: the one positive, the other negative.

1. POSITIVE RULE.—*To satisfy yourself before hand, what, on a given occasion, will be the course a man*

will take, look to the *state of interests* : look out for, and take note of, the several interests, to the operation of which the situation he occupies stands exposed.

2. **NEGATIVE RULE.**—*In your endeavour to satisfy yourself, what, on the occasion in question, is the course he will take, pay no regard whatever to professions or protestations* :—to protestations, by whomsoever made, whether by the man himself or by his adherents : never to professions and protestations, directly made and in that very shape ; still less, to professions and protestations muffled up in any such disguise, as that of a storm of indignation poured forth upon the malignant and audacious calumniator, by whom any such expectation is held up to view, as that the conduct of the men in question will on that occasion or any other, be in any degree likely to receive its direction, from those *springs of action*, on the *predominant* force and efficiency of which the preservation of every individual is every day of his life dependant.

A case,—in which, by the application of the above rules, it may here and there happen to a man to be led into a conclusion, more or less erroneous,—is that of an *individual*. For, in the case of an individual, the most correctly framed general rules will every now and then find themselves put to a fault, by the un conjecturable play of individual idiosyncracies.

Far otherwise is it in the case of a body of men ; more particularly in the case of a body, the motives of which are in so great a degree open to universal observation as those of a political party. The larger the body, the more unerring the indications afforded by those rules.

Take for example the case of *universal suffrage* and the late Duke of Richmond. By what tolerably intelligent mind, knowing nothing of him but that he was a *Duke*, could any such expectation have been entertained as that of finding in this Duke an advocate—a zealous and persevering advocate—for universal suffrage. Yet, by this or that incident in the interior of his life—some temporary heart-burning for example between this great Aristocrat and his Monarchical cousin—the apparent mystery might perhaps have been—may still perhaps one day be explained,—the paradox removed, the riddle solved.

Accordingly, that there shall never again be a *Duke*, in whose instance universal suffrage shall find a zealous advocate—is a prediction, which the observation of that one case should suffice to prevent a man from being forward to utter : and so in regard to each of the several features, essential to *radical*, i. e. to *efficient*—parliamentary reform. But that there never will be a time, in which *all* Dukes, or so much as a majority of the fellowship of Dukes, will under any other impulse than that of fear, join in the advocating of any such arrangement, may without danger of error be pronounced with unhesitating confidence.

So in the case of the *Whigs*, considered with a view to radical Parliamentary Reform. That, among those Members of Parliament, who at present, on the occasion of a party-question, are in the habit of voting in and with the party so denominated, there are not *any*, who, at *any* time, will be found advocating this only efficient bulwark against the ocean of ulterior misery with which the country is threatened—is a prediction

happily no less improbable than it would be uncomfortable. But that by any other impulse than that of *fear*—by any impulse other than that by which the conduct of their more prosperous antagonists, *the Tories*, will be directed—neither the whole body, nor so much as the majority of the numbers of the party in question, will ever be engaged in any such self-denying course,—is a prediction, which, by a short glance at the state of the interests bearing upon the situation in which they stand, any man may feel himself compelled inwardly to join in, as well as warranted in uttering, with an unhesitating, howsoever melancholy, confidence.

That by an absolute Monarch—not only *under* him, but even *in the place of him*—a representative democracy should be established—this, even this, is upon the cards. By no other means, could so heroic an act of beneficence be exercised:—by no other means, could so vast and unperishable a treasure of love and admiration be collected and laid up:—by no other means, could so novel and striking a manifestation of talent and genius be displayed:—by no other means, could even so vast a mass of power be exercised: power exercised, and for ever, over posterity: a power, with reference to which, the vainest and most selfish of despots—Lewis the Fourteenth—recognized, and foretold, what those who came immediately after him experienced—his impotence.

Of voluntary surrenders of *monarchy*—surrenders made into the hands of expectant and Monarchical successors, there is no want of examples: not even in modern;—not even in European history: *Charles the Fifth*

of *Germany*, Monarch of so many vast Monarchies:—Christina of Sweden ;—Victor Amadeus of Savoy ;—Philip the Fifth of Spain :—here, in so many different nations we have already four examples. But, on the part of an *Aristocratical* body, of the surrender of any the minutest particle of power which they were able to retain, where is there as much as any one example to be found ?

II. *Tories—Whigs—People's-men*:—*General coincidence of interests as between Whigs and Tories.*

To this purpose at least, all—and to every other purpose almost all—in whom in all its several forms Parliamentary Reform finds opposers, may be considered as belonging to the class of *Tories*.

To this same purpose, all by whom, to the *exclusion of radical reform*, moderate reform is advocated or supported, may be considered as belonging to the class of *Whigs*.

In respect of all the several elements belonging to the system of radical reform,—and in particular according to the edition here ventured to be given of it, it has been seen what,—with the exception of a certain confederacy of particular and sinister interests—are the exigences and demands of the *universal interest*—of the interest of the whole people. Those by whom that universal interest is advocated, may, for distinction sake, be termed *People's-men*.

Now then, so it is that, in respect of these same matters, *Tories* and *Whigs*—both parties (it will be seen) acting under the dominion of the same seductive and corruptive influence—will be seen to possess the

same separate and sinister interest:—an interest completely and unchangeably opposite to that of the whole uncorrupt portion of the people.

That which the Tories have in *possession*—viz. the matter of good—the object of universal desire in all its shapes:—the matter of good—the whole of it, by the relative situation of C——r-General and Co. on the one part, and the Members of both Houses on the other part, converted into matter of corruptive influence—the Whigs have before them in *prospect* and *expectancy*.

I. In the first place, as to *waste* and *corruption*, *corruption* and *waste*.—Of the *Tories*, it ever has been, and ever will be, the interest—to keep that portion of the substance of the people, which is expended in waste and corruption, as great as possible: so of the *Whigs* likewise. Under *non-reform*, this quantity will be left untouched: under *moderate reform* the reduction in it, if any, would be *minimized*: under radical reform, it would be *maximized*.

In the next place, as to *seats*.—Of the *Tories* it is the interest, that the power belonging to the seats which they have at their disposal—that therefore in number as well as value the seats themselves—should remain undiminished. On the part of the Whigs, so far as concerns the seats at *their* disposal, behold the self-same interest.

Partly to *propriety*, partly to *terrorism*—(not to speak of bribery); to terrorism, as well of the *competition-excluding* as of the *vote-compelling* species—are the *Tories* in the greater proportion indebted for *their seats*. To the same instrument of subjection—to the

same extinguisher of freedom—without any ascertainable difference in respect of proportions—are the *Whigs* indebted for *their* seats.

Of the *Tories*, in respect of their seats, it is the interest to be *absentees ad libitum*: absentees for the purpose of half the effect of corruption as above explained: absentees—for the purpose of private interest, dissipation, and idleness. On the part of the *Whigs*—with the exception of that corrupt purpose, in which none but those in power can be partakers—still the same sinister interest.

Among the *Tories*, it is the interest of all persons who have seats at command, to enjoy, clear of *obligation*, the full private benefit of those situations, and of the *power* they confer: clear of obligation in every shape, and in particular, clear of all such obligation as that of possessing any the smallest grain of *appropriate aptitude*. In respect of interest, the *Whigs*, if taken individually, will be seen to be in that same case.

Not having in possession, nor in any tolerably probable and near expectancy, any share in the existing mass of the matter of corruption;—no public money at their disposal—no peerages, no factitious dignities;—hence so it is that,—setting aside their respective masses of private property,—in the power attached to the seats they possess in the two Houses—but more particularly in the most efficient of the two—they behold the sole efficient cause of whatever pre-eminence they can hope, as a party, to possess in the scale of influence. In the eyes of the people at large the sort of corporate union they have been wont to maintain among themselves, presents itself to them as securing to

them a sort of chance, of entering, once more, on some unknown occasion, be it for ever so short a time, into the possession of efficient and profitable power. In that auction, at which by greater and greater manifestations of obsequiousness, the favour of C——r-General must, by all competitors, be at all times bid for,—impossible as it is for them—incompatible with their distinctive character—to outbid, or so much as to come up to the present occupants,—it is not in the nature of things, that any possession, which it may be supposed possible for them to attain, should be of any considerable continuance: of any continuance beyond that of the longest of those short-lived ones, which past experience has brought to view.

But if ever, as a body, the Tories go out altogether, the Whigs as a body, being the only formed body in existence, must come in: come in—and, being a body, come in together. Here then, such as it is, is a chance: and the thing of which it is a chance being, so long as it lasts,—a mass of power never much less, and now not at all less, than absolute,—thus it is—especially to those of them who elsewhere have nothing but this chance—thus it is that, being their every thing, were it even much less than it is, it could not be prized at any thing less than the full value. And, the smaller the portion which is thus left to them, it being their all, the more rather than the less pertinacious, will be their determination to preserve it undiminished.

Thus, without any need of *concert*—most probably therefore without any instance of actual concert—has a sort of *tacit co-operation* been kept up between the

two contending parties: an alliance in form but defensive, but in effect but too offensive, against the people and their interests.

III. *Particular points of Radical and efficient Reform, by which the joint interests would be affected.*

In regard to *seats*, by the interest of the *Tories* it is required, that as well in respect of the *number* of seats in their possession, or within their grasp,—as also in respect of the *value* of those several seats—taken in all the *elements* of which in such a case *value* is susceptible—things, if in the sense of particular and sinister interest they cannot be made *better*, should at any rate continue as they are. Without any the smallest difference, all this may it not be predicated of the interest of the *Whigs*?

1. As to the *number* of these seats.

Of the particulars above brought to view in the character of arrangements included in the *present* edition of radical reform, the following will be seen to concur in lessening the *number* of the seats in the possession of the present possessors; meaning by present possessors not merely the existing individuals, but moreover all others whose possession will be the result of the same causes.—These are—1. *Virtual universality of suffrage*; 2. *Practical equality of suffrage*; i. e. practical equalization of the quantities of population and territory respectively comprised in the two proposed sorts of Electoral districts, viz. *population* and *territorial* districts; 3. *Secrecy of suffrage*; thence, 4. *Freedom of suffrage*.

As to the particular means by which this general

effect will be produced, they will not be far to seek. By the *virtual universality* in conjunction with the *practical equality*, the present possessors, together with those who would have been their successors, would be excluded from the *proprietary seats*: by the same causes, with the addition of the *secrecy*, and its fruit, the *freedom*, all those to whose possession either *terrorism* or *bribery* would be necessary, would in like manner stand excluded:—excluded as well from such seats as they are now in the habit of filling, as from all such other seats, to the acquisition of which those same modes of seduction would be found necessary.

All seats being thus laid open to all Candidates, self-proposed and proposable,—whatsoever advantage would remain to the existing occupants, would be the result—either of habit on the part of Electors, or of good reputation, already acquired, in respect of the several elements of appropriate aptitude so often brought to view: of which reputation the evidentiary cause might be either of a *direct* nature, consisting of service already performed in this same line of public service, or of a *circumstantial* and *presumptive* nature; the presumption derived, from virtue, manifested or supposed to have been manifested, in other parts of the field of action, public or private: among which that negative sort of virtue, which consists in the innoxious and unoffensive application of the matter of opulence to the use of the possessor and his particular connexions, is in little danger of being overlooked or undervalued.

II. As to the *value* of these same seats.

Impermanence of the situation—necessity of constant attendance—exclusion from official situations,

unless on condition of losing the right of voting—by the conjunct operation of these several arrangements, would the value of all seats be reduced: reduced in the instance of all seats without exception, by whomsoever occupied: the reduction therefore attended with a correspondent sensation of *loss*, in the instance of all existing occupants of such seats.

As to those Members, who in the existing state of things, add to the profitable possession of official situations, the not altogether useless, though not additionally profitable right, of exercising control over, and sitting in judgment on, themselves and one another, in the character of Representatives of the People,—the effect which the change would have in their instance, would be the obligation of making their option between the assurable possession of the profitable office, and whatsoever chance they might respectively have of obtaining the unprofitable vote.

1. *Virtual universality* of suffrage—2. *Practical equality* of suffrage—3. *Freedom* of suffrage—4. *Secrecy* of suffrage—under the head of arrangements applying more immediately to the situation of *Elector* have these four articles been conjunctly brought to view: under the head of arrangements applying more immediately to the situation of *Representative*, the three following: viz. 1. *Impermanence* of situation—say, as particularized by the word *annuality*. 2. Efficient obligation to *constancy of attendance*. 3. *Exclusion of Placemen* from the right of *voting*—though not from the right of speech or that of motion.

By the set of arrangements thus applying to the situation of *Elector*,—by these would the existing

seats be slipt from under the individuals by whom, when not otherwise more profitably or pleasantly occupied, they are at present filled: by the set of arrangements thus applying to the situation of *Representative*, would be stript off a great part—who shall say in what sad proportion the greater part?—of the value, which, but for so merciless a defalcation, might have been found attached to such newly furnished seats, as by the operation of the first-mentioned set of arrangements, would be substituted to its existing ones.

Annoying—lamentably annoying—would all these several innovations be to the Tories:—little less so would they be to the Whigs. Sole difference, the difference between possession and expectancy,—and *that* confined to the option which, in so far as office is concerned, would be to be made, as above, between vote and office.

IV. *Reforms to which they would be equally irreconcilable, though contributing nothing to democratic ascendancy.*

By *trienniality* alone, next to nothing, if not absolutely nothing, would be done.

Even by *annuality*, little more: the application of it would in England be confined to the small number of Cities and Boroughs, in which the number of individuals participating in the right of suffrage, is considerable enough to operate as an antidote, more or less efficacious, to the poison of corruptive influence.

TABLE, shewing, on a rough calculation, from Mr. Oldfield's History of Boroughs (first edition), the respective Numbers of Electors in the several Cities and Boroughs in England, the Parliamentary Seats of which are ordinarily regarded as open to competition: also (from the second edition of that work) the Number of Counties, Cities, and Boroughs in Ireland, regarded as being in that same condition: together with a like Calculation of the Population, as well as the Numbers of the Voters in the instances undermentioned.

| ENGLAND. | | IRELAND. | | | |
|---------------------|--------|---------------------------|---------|------------------|----------------------------|
| | | Places. | Voters. | Popu- lation. | MEMBERS returned Freely |
| 1. Westminster | 17,000 | | | | |
| 2. London . . . | 7,000 | | | | |
| 3. Bristol . . . | 6,000 | | | | |
| 4. Norwich . . . | 3,000 | | | | |
| 5. Gloucester | 3,000 | | | | |
| 6. Coventry . . | 2,400 | | | | |
| 7. Liverpool . . | 2,300 | 1. Cork (County) . . | 20,000 | 416,000 | 1 |
| 8. York | 2,235 | 2. Tyrone (County) . | 20,000 | | 1 |
| 9. Southwark . . | 1,900 | 3. Tipperary (County) | 12,000 | 170,000 | 1 |
| 10. Lancaster . . | 1,800 | 4. Galway (County) . | 4,000 | 140,000 | 2 |
| 11. Worcester . . | 1,700 | 5. Cavan (County) . . | 3,000 | 81,000 | 1 |
| 12. Nottingham | 1,700 | 6. Limerick (County) | 3,000 | 170,000 | 1 |
| 13. Hereford . . | 1,200 | 7. Waterford (City) . | 3,000 | 110,000 | 1 |
| 14. Durham . . . | 1,200 | 8. Dublin (University) | 441 | | 2 |
| 15. Exeter | 1,200 | 9. Dublin (City) . . . | | 190,000 | 2 |
| 16. Hull | 1,180 | 10. Roscommon } | | 86,000 | 1 |
| 17. Lincoln . . . | 1,100 | (County) . } | | 86,000 | 1 |
| 18. Leicester abt | 1,000 | 11. Kildare (County) . | | 60,000 | 1 |
| 19. Yarmouth . . | 787 | 12. Sligo (County) . . . | | 60,000 | 1 |
| 20. Bridgenorth | 700 | 13. Carlow (County) . . | | 44,000 | 1 |
| 21. Ipswich . . . | 623 | 14. Drogheda | | 20,000 | 2 |
| 22. Shrewsbury | 600 | 15. Meath (County) . . | | 4,000 | 1 |
| 23. Maidstone . . | 600 | 16. Carrickfergus . . . | | | 2 |
| 24. Southampton | 600 | 17. Monaghan (County) | | | 1 |
| 25. Abingdon . . | 600 | | | | |
| 26. Reading . . . | 600 | | | | |
| 27. Tewksbury | 500 | | | | |
| 28. Barnstaple . . | 450 | | | | |
| 29. Stafford . . . | 400 | | | | |
| Electoral Districts | 29 | | | | |
| Seats 61. London | | | | | |
| having 4; Abingdon, | | | | | |
| but 1. | | | | | 22 |

MR. OLDFIELD'S RECAPITULATION.

(Part II. Vol. IV. p. 300, Ed. 1816.)

Members returned by 87 Peers in England and Wales 218
 by 21 Peers in Scotland 31
 by 36 Peers in Ireland 51

Total returned by Peers 300
 Members returned by 90 Commoners in England and Wales 137
 by 14 Commoners in Scotland 14
 by 19 Commoners in Ireland 20
 Nominated by Government 16

Total returned by Commoners and Government . . . 187

Total returned by nomination 487

Independent of nomination 171

Total of the House of Commons 658

Two arrangements might be mentioned, by which, taken together, more—much more—would be done, than by *annuity* taken by itself: viz. 1. *Exclusion of Placemen's votes—speech and motion*, as proposed, reserved: 2. *Universal constancy of attendance*, supposing it really effected.

By neither of these arrangements, would any the slightest ground be afforded for the imputation of *Jacobinism*: by neither of them would any the slightest advance be made towards the restoration of democratic ascendancy: by neither of them would any extension be given to the right of suffrage.

Still, however, in whatsoever degree efficient,—deplorably short of adequate would be the above pair of remedies, without the addition of that other, which in the late reign was so near being applied, viz. the limitation to the prerogative in respect of the right of creating Peers. Part and parcel of the legitimate influence of property when swollen to a certain bulk, is that of conferring on the possessor a sort of *right to a Peerage*: a sort of constitutional, customary, half-legal right; subject of course to the universal condition of being in league with the party in power at the time being. Thus it is, that on one side or the other, all the families in the three kingdoms, within whose field of vision this highest lot in the inventory of corruption is included, are everlastingly enlisted in a state of irreconcilable hostility with the universal interest. If neither *Pulteney* nor *Pitt the first*—each the first man of his time—could withstand the temptation of this bait, think how it must be with the herd of fox-hunters! Within the circle thus marked out, suppose

one man proof against the force of the enchantment—suppose this one miracle—comes the next generation, the miracle is at an end. And, while the as yet uncoroneted class of seat-owners and irresistible terrorists—proprietors of seats by descent or conquest—are thus held in corrupt thralldom, by a coronet with no more than four balls on it,—the already coroneted proprietors of the same fractions of the integer of despotism are kept in the same state of fascination by coronets of superior brilliancy.

In the last reign but one, a never renewable concurrence of circumstances gave to reform in this shape the concurrence of two out of the three branches of the legislature. In the minds of the Peers of those days, the consideration of the defalcation, to which the value of the honour would be subjected by every increase given to the numbers of the sharers—this interest, minute as it was, obtained by the advantage of proximity, the prevalence over the remote, but so much more valuable interest, in respect of which that order of men are sharers with the whole body of the ruling few in the profit of corrupt misrule. Taught by so long a course of intervening experience, the Peers of present time are better calculators. By the Lords temporal, Jacobinism—by the Lords spiritual, Atheism—would be descried, in any attempt to defalcate any the smallest atom from that part of the mass of corruptive influence which operates in this shape.

As to the *exclusion of Placemen's votes*,—scarcely more fully entitled to its name was the celebrated *self-denying Ordinance*, by which—with the exception of *Cromwell*—the Members of *Charles the First's Long*

Parliament were reduced to the same sad dilemma, of making each of them his option, between two incompatible offices. In that way was corruption at that time rooted out, because there existed a *Cromwell*, and there existed *Puritans*: neither in that way—nor, much it is to be feared, without convulsion, in any way—will corruption at this time be rooted out: for we have now *no Cromwell*: we have now *no Puritans*.

Oh, but this is nothing but your own surmise—your own ungenerous and groundless surmise: one of the fruits of your own selfish, and wild, and visionary, and Jacobinical and Atheistical theory.

Good gentlemen—if I am indeed so ungenerous as to behold men as the Almighty made them,—and as they must be, on pain of ceasing to exist—if such is indeed my theory,—it is neither in any respect without its sufficient warrant in the universally, and necessarily, and undeniably prevalent principles of human action,—nor yet (for so it happens) without its grounds, in the shape of special evidence, applying to this particular case.

To the Whigs—these securities against corruption—securities, as far as they went, so efficient—to the Whigs would they any one of them be enduring?—Not they indeed.—*Annuality*—with all its *wildness* and *visionariness*, annuality would be far less intolerable. How should it be otherwise? By *Exclusion of Placemen's votes*, prospects would be destroyed: by *obligation of attendance*, ease would be transformed into hard labour: by limitation applied to the number of the Peerages, the triumph of *property* over *probity* would be arrested in its course.

Exclusion of Placemen's votes might be submitted to by such of them by whom indolence or want of talent would be recognized as excluding, in their own instances respectively, the slender portion of endowment necessary, and in the case of all but the few leaders sufficient, to the earning of the pay thus to be earned; but, in every eye without exception, the most visionary of all imaginable visions, would be *that*, by which the fulfilment of incontestable duty—though in the field of time not covering near so much as half the year—(see Report, 27th March, 1817, p. 20) were to be regarded as either practicable or desirable.

As to what regards *constancy of attendance*,—the proof, as shewn already under that head, stands upon your own Journals.

As to what regards the exclusion of Placemen's votes, I call in *Mr. Brand*. To the nerves not only of *Whigs*, but of *Whig Reformists*, (of course altogether *moderate Reformists*) so intolerable was found to be the odour of this instrument of purification, on the only one of the two occasions on which *Mr. Brand* executed the originally announced design of an annual reproduction of his proposition for parliamentary reform,* he found himself obliged to leave out this most efficient and unobjectionable of his proposed arrangements: and even then—such had been the offence taken, at the injury done to the party, by propositions admitted on the former occasion in favour of the people—from 115 against 234, his numbers were reduced to 88 against 215.†

* Cobb. Deb. xxiii. 99 to 106, May 8th, 1812.

† Ibid. anno 1810. xvii. 164; anno 1812, xxiii. 106: 161. "He"

On this same occasion, another too efficient proposition, omitted by the same Honourable Reformist, was—that for the taking of the votes in parochial or other such small districts.

On this same second and last occasion, in a word, every thing that had been before proposed was reduced or altered to that for the abolishing, in some way not mentioned, the proprietary seats, and the giving an increase to the number of the County seats: to the number of the sources of that terrorism, by the consideration of which, the mind of Charles Fox had, as above, (section 8), been repelled from the idea of that measure.

Note, that from their giving in the first instance the support of their votes to a proposed arrangement of reform, it follows not by any means, that Honourable Gentlemen have any the smallest liking to it, or any the slightest intention to continue their support to it: even from *speeches*—nay even from *motions*—in support of it, neither can conclusions in affirmance of inward favour and intentions be drawn with any certainty: for, by maturer reflection, operating upon intervening experience,—further and true lights shewing the falsity of the lights by which they had at first been guided,—original deviations from the path of consummate wisdom lie at all times open to correction. Witness *Earl Grey*, and *Lord Erskine*, and *Mr. Tierney*, with *et ceteras* upon *et ceteras*.

(Mr. Brand) “was ashamed thus to delay the House before empty benches; he expected a more full attendance of those Members who usually voted on the same principles with himself.”

On these occasions, as on all occasions, one object at least, if not the only object, is—to make display of numbers, and thus strike terror into ministerial bosoms. That object accomplished or abandoned—the expedient has, well or ill, performed its office, and, like a sucked orange, is ripe for being cast aside.

Not in any such degree exposed to error are the conclusions that present themselves from the opposite course. When, upon any measure of reform, an Honourable *back* has been turned,—expect, ye good men and true, to whom disappointment is a treat—expect to see turned again, if with a smile, towards reform in that or any other shape, the Honourable *visage* that belongs to it.

V. Country Gentlemen—Opposition of their particular Interests to efficient Reform, and thereby to the universal Interest.

To the interest of the great Landholders—whether in the situation of *Country Gentlemen*, employing their influence in the providing of seats for themselves or their connexions,—or in the situation of Peers, conferring, in the character of *Patrons*, seats on any but themselves—radical reform, would it not be generally and undeniably prejudicial in a variety of ways?

1. Of the circle,—filled by those in whose eyes the perpetual vision of a *coronet*, suspended over their head in the aërostatic region, occupies the place of the *Labarum*, or the *New Jerusalem*,—mention has just been made.

2. In virtue of the principle of *practical equality of suffrage*, the Counties, in the character of territorial

Election Districts, would—most, if not all, of them—require to be broken down and divided. To the class of persons in question, what in this respect would be the consequence?—that a gentleman, who in an entire county beholds at present an Edom over which he may cast forth his shoe, would find this *integer* reduced to a *fraction*:—a fraction, corresponding to the number of the Electoral Districts into which the county would be divided. Say that for procuring to him, as before, a *seat*,—the fraction, in which the greatest part of his territorial property is situated, would suffice. So far, so good: his station in *the House* would remain unchanged. But the *County*—from his importance in the *County*—from every part of his influence but that immediately and exclusively attached to his seat in the House—a defalcation, proportioned to the number of the fractions, would be produced.

Of the Electoral Districts into which the county is divided, let four, suppose, be the number:—from each of them one seat to be filled. On this supposition—in the field of his present dominion, instead of *one* joint potentate, he would have *three* to share with him:—instead of one *Pompey*, each *Cesar* would have three *Pompeys*.

3. Even in that one of the four supposed fractions, in which his territorial demesnes were principally or exclusively situated;—his possession even of the *one* seat in question might lose much of its present security.

Once more, in the force of *terrorism*—of *competition-excluding-terrorism*—does not a *Knight of the Shire*

behold his surest dependance? If yes, then proportioned, as above shewn (§ 7, 8.)—proportioned to the extent of that same shire—is the pressure of that force.*

VI. *Options—Compromises—Experiments—
Postponements.*

For my part, if it depended upon me, gladly would I give up annuality,—if at that price, even though it were confined to the Population Districts, I could obtain the householder-plan, accompanied with secrecy of suffrage:—compensation given for proprietary seats, and even for close boroughs. I feel, as sensibly as any one of them can do for any other, the plague which it would be to Honourable Gentlemen—year after year, as regularly as the year comes—to set, each of them, his stewards to drive to the poll-booth his

* Of the existing system of representation, that part which regards the counties, found (as hath been already seen, § 7, 8.) no very strenuous admirer in the person of *Charles Fox*. To that most powerful advocate of the cause of the people, the denomination of *Lackland* belonged with no less propriety, than to the Monarch to whom we are indebted for the first of our *Magna Chartas*: nor, either in Wiltshire or elsewhere, have any seats been observed among the appendages of *Holland House*.

By the Sheridan of Sheridans, support (I am just informed) was given, not only to annuality of Parliaments, but to universality of suffrage. Time would not allow me the satisfaction of digging up the speech, in which, by a title still clearer than that of *Charles Fox*, this so long his first assistant proved his right to a place among the advocates of the wild and visionary system—ringleaders of the swinish multitude.

This service I understand has been performed in the lately published pamphlet of *Mr. Evans*.

portion of the swinish multitude:—I feel still more sensibly the plague which it cannot but be to be so driven:—in no instance, by the idea of uneasiness, considered as having place in any human breast—Honourable, any more than swinish—and not outweighed by greater satisfaction elsewhere,—is any such sensation as that of satisfaction, ever produced in mine. Quantity of corrupt matter the same in both cases,—by the reproduction of it every year instead of once in every three years, much would be lost to individual comfort, nothing gained to public security:—security against oppression and legalized pillage. Nothing will I conceal,—nothing will I exaggerate. Even by the exclusion of the whole number of *corruption-eaters*,—supposing their places filled by an equal number of *corruption-hunters*, nothing more than the difference in effect between fear of loss and hope of gain would be gained. No: nothing more than that difference: but, whether that difference would be slight and inefficient, let any one judge, after making the case his own, and asking himself which would be the greater—his grief on losing his all, or his joy on doubling it. Always, at the expense of the least suffering possible, would I obtain the good I look for. Many men *deserve* reward:—no man *deserves* punishment. When a surgeon cuts into a limb, is it because the patient has *deserved* the smart?—No: but that the limb may be healed. Reward *is*—punishment is *not*—a thing to be *deserved*.

For my own part—not much should I want of being satisfied, for and during the short remainder of my own life—could I but see the quondam *Friends of*

the People repent of their repentance: repent of it, and no more said: it would be too hard upon them to ask them for the reasons of it. But freedom!—freedom!—wheresoever given—by whomsoever given—all suffrages must be *free*—or they are worse than none. *For* and *with* the people the thing might surely be done,—with the *Friends of the People*—and those not friends in name only—for their leaders.

VII. *Uses of this Exposure.*

Of this display of the state of interests—of this exposure, melancholy as it is—melancholy and inauspicious, but not the less necessary—what now is the practical use?

Answer. 1. That those who, on looking into themselves, have the satisfaction of beholding in themselves merit sufficient for the purchase of a stock of popularity of the true and everlasting fabric, ample enough to afford adequate compensation, not only for the supposed lost seats, but for the reduction in the vulgarly estimated value of those new ones, to which they might look with such well-grounded confidence,—that these men, if any men there be that can behold themselves in this description,—happy enough as they would be not to need the adding to the stock of their other merits the merit of self-denial,—may come forward,—come forward, and, instead of sitting with folded hands to see us crushed, or lending their hands to the work of crushing us, condescend to head us, and lead us—us of the swinish multitude.

2. That those who, to a stock of merits in other less assured shapes add a supplement of sufficient

strength in the rarest of all shapes, *self-denial*—pure and genuine *self-denial*—may join those others in the same generous course.

Yes, peradventure, here and there, at one time or other, may be found a few such superior minds. Such was the Duke of Richmond's: he did not scoff at *universal suffrage*: he advocated it. He himself framed—he himself made public—a plan of Reform, —and that plan was founded on it.

Yes—in this or that House—nay even in each House, to-day or to-morrow—may be found here and there a few such eccentrically generous minds: and these the people will have for their leaders: and these their leaders will be adored:—in life-time they will be worshipped: and, after death, passing through death to immortality, they will be immortalized.

But, to be thus immortalized, they must have been transfigured into *People's Men*:—*Whigs* they would be no longer, but *Renegados*.

3. That, when these refined spirits are thus drawn off, and lodged in their proper receptacle, the heart of an adoring people, the power of the *caput mortuum*, which they will have left behind—the weight of it at any rate in the scale of *authority*—may find itself reduced to its true and proper amount.

As to these last—whatsoever arguments, grounded on the principle of general utility—on the respective relations of the two rival modes, the *moderate* and the *radical*, to the universal interest—whatsoever arguments of this only genuine stamp it shall have been their good fortune to have found—will, on this occasion as on others, like all other arguments drawn from

the same clear fountain, operate, and tell with their due and proper weight. But the argument in the shape of *authority*—the argument which, being composed of the alledged *self-formed* judgment of the supposed *closely thinking few*, seeks to supply, as it were from an inexhaustible fountain, matter for the *derivative* judgment of the *loosely thinking many*—of this argument, in proportion as, the state of their interests being laid open, the direction in which the prevalent mass of interest operates is seen to be adverse to the only efficient mode of reform—of this instrument of delusion, the force and efficiency will evaporate.

Arguments of that only genuine stamp being inaccessible to them—none such, on their side of the case; being afforded by the nature of the case—what then will be their resource? *Answer.* Henceforward, as till now, silence, storm, or fallacy. But, of the stock of such arms as the arsenal of *fallacy* offers to their hands a part not altogether inconsiderable—and that among the readiest at hand—has already been brought out:—brought out, pre-exposed to a damping atmosphere, and thus rendered unfit for use.

In all this truth, unwelcome as it cannot but be, mark well—there is nothing of *vituperation*. Employed on this occasion, vituperation would be as ill-grounded as it would be useless. Man is a compound of *nature* and *situation*. Such is the force of *situation* here, no probity of *nature* can ever have power to resist it. If these men were to be stoned, how many are there among us who, upon trial, would be found entitled to cast the stones? That which, in this be-

half these men do and forbear to do,—what is there in it which those who are most angry with them would not—with few exceptions indeed—do and forbear to do in their place? Thus sad—and, but for the silently increasing strength of their own minds, hopeless—is the condition of the people. Every thing, that in any shape has *power* at its back, is either *Whig* or *Tory*. The *Tories* are the people's avowed *enemies*. Man must change his nature, ere, to any radically remedial purpose, the *Whigs*—the great body of the *Whigs*—can be their *friends*.

In so far as, to the receiving on any occasion protecting assistance at their hands, real sympathy is necessary,—it may now be imagined, whether, by the great body of the people, any such affection can ever be reasonably looked for from the body of the *Whigs*.

Happily, to the receipt of such assistance to a certain degree, on most parts of the field of government except this all-embracing one, no such feeling, it will be seen, is in that quarter necessary.

Between that aristocratical confederacy and the great body of the people, in respect of most matters of detail separately taken, the community of interests may be stated as being commonly to a certain degree sufficient for their purpose.

On no occasion, under the ever increasing weight of the yoke of oppression and misrule, from any hand other than that of the Parliamentary *Whigs* can the people receive any the slightest chance—(talk not of *relief*—for that is at all times out of the question,) but for *retardation of increase*.—As to *liberty of speech*,—to all such purposes, every where *out* of the House it is

already gone. In the House, the Whigs still have—and probably for some time longer will continue to have—possession of that instrument, without which no resistance can be made. In the sort of struggle, faint as it is, which from time to time, the Whigs contrive to summon up strength enough to maintain against the ever overbearing force of their antagonists,—scarcely any way without serving in some way or other the interest of the *people*, can they so much as *endeavour to serve themselves*.

Not that by such hands, abuse in any shape can be *eradicated*: for the benefit of the eventually succeeding Nursery-men, each *stool* must be preserved: meantime, however, even by such hands there is scarce an abuse but may be clipped.

The time, will it ever come,—in which on the one hand, so intolerable will have become the system of misrule—so grievous the yoke of despotism,—on the other hand in the eyes of the Whigs so plainly hopeless the chance of their ever being, though it were but for a moment, taken into power,—that in their calculation the value of their share in the *partial* and *sinister* interest will no longer be greater than that of their share in the *universal* interest? The time, will it ever come, in which, in each man's estimate, the system of misrule and oppression will have swollen to such a pitch, that, on the occasion of the sacrifice made of the universal interest on the altar of despotism, he has more to fear in the character of a victim, than to hope for in the character of priest? This will depend—partly on the degree of precipitation or caution, with which the system of despotism proceeds on in

its course,—partly on the joint degree of discernment and public feeling which shall have place on the part of the Whigs. But the great fear is—lest for their saving themselves and the country together, the time may not already be too late.

Already a Lewis, G—— will before that time have been made a Ferdinand. Individuals or bodies—without means of communication, nothing effectual can be done by any two parties for mutual defence. Between mind and mind, sole instruments of communication these three:—the *tongue*, the *pen*, and the *press*. By the *pen*, without the aid of the press, nothing effectual can in these days be ever done. Of what will be done, and that without delay, for the depriving the people of the use of the *press*, an earnest has been already given: given in the here several times alluded to, but elsewhere too little noticed, decision of the House of Commons. As to the *tongue*, under one of the late liberticide Acts, two London *Aldermen*, sitting at Guildhall, have sufficed to put an end to all public use of *that* instrument, on this or on any other part of the field of politics. In this state is *civil liberty*. In *Liverpool*, already has the arm of persecution been raised against the *Unitarians*. In this state is *religious liberty*.

The heart is pierced through and through with the melancholy truth. Yes: all that rule—all that even think to rule—are against the people. Causes will have their effects. Sooner or later, unless a change takes place, the people—the people, in their own defence—will be against all that rule.*

* A parting word or two, respecting the pamphlet lately published by Mr. Evans. Time forbidding all examination of it with

my own eyes, the following is the result of a report made to me by an intelligent friend. With little or no exception,—historical facts, authorities, arguments, nay even proposals—in favour of *radical* reform : conclusions—conclusions alone—in favour of *moderate*.—Historical facts and authorities, many and important ones : many which, could I have found time for the gleaning of them, I should not have failed to add to the number of the notes above distinguished by the name of *Shield Notes* : I say *Shield Notes* : the others—for want of room—and with much more of satisfaction than regret—being omitted.

Under these circumstances, it cannot but be my wish that every person into whose hands this too long work may fall, may yet add to it the pamphlet of Mr. Evans.

Another word or two on the *mode of treating* the subject.

In the section on *impermanence*,—to the duration expressed by the word *annuality*, the objection made by Mr. Brand, on the score of want of experience, will have been seen. Of the argument so employed on that occasion by the Honourable Gentleman, the *source* being the same, viz. *the principle of general utility*, as that from which, on every part of the field of politics my own arguments are drawn on all occasions,—to that argument, so far as regards the legitimacy of the *source*, it was accordingly impossible that any objection could be entertained by me. The sort of business in question be it what it may,—in the choice of a functionary for the performance of it, *appropriate aptitude*—aptitude with reference to that same business—being the term by which the *end* properly belonging to the subject—the proper and all-comprehensive end—is brought to view,—*appropriate probity*, *appropriate intellectual aptitude*, and *appropriate active talent*—each of them with reference to that same end—are on all occasions the terms employed by me as capable of serving, when taken together, and as serving accordingly, for giving expression to all the several constituent *parts or elements* so often mentioned of that fictitious whole : endowments, by the possession or non-possession of which, in so far as in each instance the matter of fact is capable of being ascertained,—whatsoever be the function in question,—and whosoever the person chosen for the exercise of it,—the propriety or impropriety of the *choice* may be, and ought to be, determined. In the setting up of this particular standard, as the

standard suited to the nature of the particular subject, may be seen one instance of the application made of the above-mentioned leading principle—the *principle of general utility*. In the standard of comparison thus set up, may be seen the basis of the annexed Plan : and, on the occasion in question, to this same standard (it may be seen) did the discernment and judgment of the Honourable Gentleman in question conduct him likewise :—the case being such, that in the position in which he stood, not only did the *subject*,—but the *side* in which in relation to that subject his position was,—admit of his drawing his argument from that same clear and quiet source. From that same source,—as on all occasions, so on this,—were of course drawn the arguments which it fell to my lot to find on the other side. Between the one and the other, the reader, the state of whose mind in respect of interest leaves him at liberty to form an unseduced and unbiassed judgment, will have had to decide.

To find so much as a single instance in which the question was argued upon such ground, as well as with such temper—all logic, no rhetoric—was a real treat to me. Had all the arguments, from that as well as other quarters, (I speak of the Assembly, not of the individual) been of the same *temper* as well as from the same *source*,—the ensuing *Plan* shews not only the *source* from which, but the sort of *temper* in which, and in which alone, every thing which came from me on the subject would have come.

In preserving while thus occupied that same cool and quiet temper,—in preserving it from beginning to end,—not any the smallest difficulty did I ever experience : as little should I experience in discussing with any person that same question, point by point, so that the arguments were on both sides drawn from that same source. In that same temper, from that same source, in that same course of argument, by that one Honourable Gentleman was that one step made : but, in any sort of temper, on that same ground, in that same course of argument, and on that same side, to take another— at any rate to take many such other steps—so it were upon *terra firma*—and not in the region of air and clouds—would not, I am inclined to think, by any Honourable Gentleman on that same side be found an altogether easy task : not even by the Honourable Gentleman in question, who of all *moderatists*, in so far as he seems to be at liberty to give expression to his own sentiments (for it has been

seen under what a yoke he has been working), seems to be least remote from *Radicalism*.

In respect of temper, is there a reader to whom the cause of the difference observable between the *Plan* itself and the *Introduction* to it is an object of any the least curiosity? I will answer him without disguise. For *any* eyes that could find patience to look at it was the *Plan* itself designed. A few exceptions excepted—(and those alas! how few!)—for swinish eyes alone this melancholy *Introduction*,—not for Honourable ones. Against interest—against a host of confederated interests—what can argument do?—Exactly as much as against a line of musketry.

A last word on the new oppression to which we are now doomed, viz. the *suppression of petitions*:—the closing up of that channel, through which, under the protection of the *Bill of Rights*, from that time down to that of the present Session, we possessed, all over the kingdom, the means of knowing one another's thoughts on the subject of our common interests.

Framed by that masterly hand, which is so consummately adequate to every work it undertakes—(ah! would the times were such, as allow it to undertake none but good ones!)—framed by this exquisite hand, I see just come out a set of arrangements, admirable as they are new, for giving the most efficient and timely, the most in every way commodious, publicity to the proceedings of the House. The first specimen has just reached my hand:—but, from amidst these flowers,—a snake, how can I help seeing it? lifts up its head and threatens me:—“Any *petitions*, or other proceedings, which may occasionally be printed by special order, might follow as a Supplement or Appendix to the Votes, not impeding their daily delivery, and be printed and circulated afterwards with due diligence, according to their length.”

Any petitions?—yes: and therefore any petitions, even for *Parliamentary Reform*—even for *Radical Reform*—even for the wild and visionary reform—may henceforward be printed, so it be by special order. But, for dissemination of any such visionary matter, in its whole extent, or in any considerable portion of its extent, any such special order, will it be generally obtained?—Was there any design that it should? Till now, even of those visions was the *substance* in use to be inserted in the Votes: and thus, on so easy a condition as that

of putting on the uniform of prescribed respect, petitioners, in all parts of the United Kingdom, might, without fear of adding to the troubles of Mr. Attorney-General, have had the possibility of coming to the knowledge of one another's minds.

By a former decision,—so perfectly pretenceless, and here more than once alluded to,—seeing the use of the press interdicted to petitions for reform—seeing that clause of the Bill of Rights, which regards petitions, thus, in part, already repealed by a decision of the House of Commons,—how can any eye, how averse sœver, avoid seeing another wound, and that a still more desperate one, now given to the liberties, which, by that so much celebrated, but alas! how vague and imperfect, law, were in part professed—in part intended—to be secured?

So far as concerns the new matter added, admirable as these new arrangements are,—since the day on which, in addition to the power, the talent requisite to the making of them found its way into the Chair from which they issued, has there ever been a time in which the demand for them did not exist? No: but not till now has the demand been so imperative for this,—the final—suppression of all pernicious visions.

Addition—compression—acceleration—to whatsoever has been done in any one of these ways, never was applause more sincere than that which has here been paid: as to postponement—so far as necessary to the acceleration of the essence, postponement of the mass at large is a small price paid for a great benefit. But suppression—saving special order or special motion—suppression thus final,—and, among the matters suppressed, the matter of all petitions—and, among these petitions, all petitions for reform—here lies the evil:—and a more portentous one, where shall it be found?—

Economy, forsooth, the motive! O rare Economy!

From the suppression of the whole quantity of matter proposed to be suppressed, the greatest quantum of expense, upon and out of which a saving, to a greater or less amount, can by possibility be made, 2,000*l.* a year:* and, out of this aggregate mass, what would be the greatest amount of saving that could be made by the suppression of petitions alone? A few hundreds a year, or perhaps only a few score. But the sum thus to be saved by the suppression of

* Report—27th March, 1817,—on printed Votes, &c. p. 3.

petitions—suppose it to amount to the *whole* of the 2,000*l.*—which, however, is impossible. For this 2,000*l.* would any man, who was not an enemy to English liberties, be content to sell so valuable a portion of them as this? To sell *this*—now that so many *others* have so lately been torn from us? *This*, on the preservation of which depends perhaps the only chance yet left to us for the recovery, or the preservation, of any of the others?

If, of all places imaginable, the place chosen for the seat of economy—and such economy!—must be the Chapel of St. Stephen—once the great sanctuary of English liberties,—might not even *there* some more proper source or object for it be found? Suppose, for example, under the head of expense, the saving made were made of or upon the money so regularly consumed, in that same place, in the periodical pampering, performed at the expense of the people upon their self-styled Representatives:—upon these sometimes self-styled servants of the people, while so many of their masters are perishing every day for want of necessaries?

By the first glance, at the first specimen of the new arrangement in company with the *Report* by which it was explained, was the suspicion in question awakened:—within the compass of *ten* days, behold the confirmation it has already received from experience.

Since this beautifully, and, in every part but this, irreproachably, commodious regulation has been acted upon,—*five* instances of Petition for Reform have occurred: in *one* of them alone has the *printing* been ordered: in every other of the four instances suppression has been the result. In the one instance in which the printing was ordered, how came it to be ordered?—Because, on the part of the Member by whom it was presented, there was a real desire no such suppression should take place. In the four other instances, how happened it that the petitions were thus suppressed?—Because, in the instance of the Honourable Members by whom they were respectively presented, either there was an opposite desire, or whether the petition was circulated or suppressed was a matter of indifference.

Last date of the first Number, viz. 45, of the paper printed upon the new Plan, under the title of "*Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons*,"—24th April, 1817. In this number, p. 392, follow two articles in the words and figures, following:

“ 36. Reform in Parliament, &c. Petition of *Wolverhampton*, presented.”

“ 74. Reform in Parliament, &c. Petition of Persons residing in *Andover*, presented.”

That this was the first paper printed in pursuance of the new arrangement, appears from the two articles following, viz.

“ 76. Votes and Proceedings of the House,—Resolution of 29 March, as to a more convenient method of preparing, printing, and distributing them, *read*.”

“ 77. Ordered, That the Votes and Proceedings of this House be printed, being first perused by Mr. Speaker, and that he do appoint the printing thereof, and that no person but such as he shall appoint do presume to print the same.”

(N. B. To no such effect as that of either of these two last articles has any article appeared (down to the 3d of May) in any succeeding number of these Votes.)

Votes, &c. No. 48. 25 April, 1817, p. 396.

“ 31. Taxation and Reform of Parliament, &c. Petition of Provost, &c. of *Linlithgow*; to lie on the Table.”

Votes, &c. No. 47. 28 April, 1817, p. 400.

“ 37. Retrenchment of Expenditure, Reform of Parliament, &c. Petition of Inhabitants of *Dunfermline*, relating thereto: to lie on the Table.”

In this same No. 47. p. 400, note the following articles:

“ 38. Academical Society of London,—Petition for permission to continue their Debates; to lie on the Table and to be *printed*.— [Appendix No. 4.]”

N. B. Members stated as belonging to the Universities or Inns of Court: one of them a Member of Honourable House. Society close: No swinish multitude: class thus favoured, the gagging—not the gagged. Privileged orders, partaking or preparing to become partakers, in the separate and sinister interest. It required the undaunted zeal of Mr. Recorder Sylvester to find any objection here.— See *Morn. Chron.* 3d May, 1817. *Proceedings of the London Sessions, May 2d.*

To manifest his respect for the principles and interests of Honourable House, what is it that the generous hardihood of the learned

Gentleman would not be ready to do—yea, in the very teeth of Honourable House?

“ 39. Distress, and want of Employment,—Petition of Inhabitants of Birmingham; to lie on the Table, and to be printed. [Appendix, No. 5.]”

Distress great; about Reform, nothing.—Useful ground afforded for the new job: for diverting from the only remedy the attention of the suffering people; for leading them to suppose that their distresses are really an object of regard; and, as of course, for giving increase to influence.

Votes, &c. No. 50, 1st May, 1817, p. 412.

“ 20. Reduction of Taxes, Reform of Parliament, &c. Petition of Inhabitants of *St. Ives* (Hunts), &c.; to lie on the Table, and to be printed. [Appendix, No. 7.]”

In this *one* behold the instance—the only instance—in which after presenting the Petition, the Member moved that it be printed. This Member was *Sir Francis Burdett*.

The only inducement which Honourable House can have to submit to any such measure as this of its own Reform—this sole inducement being composed of the desires of the people as made known to one another as well as to Honourable House—which Reform never can take place, but in proportion as the particular interest of Honourable House is made to give way to the universal interest—is it now in human nature, that by Honourable House, any thing should be omitted, which in the eyes of Honourable House can consistently with the rules of human prudence be done towards the prevention of so unpleasant an effect?

That, in this or that instance, for some time after the introduction of the new arrangement, no resistance should be made to a motion for giving to these applications, how unwelcome so ever, the before-accustomed circulation—is altogether natural: especially when, by any such resistance, such a pressure as that which it would be in the power of *Sir Francis Burdett* to apply, would have to be encountered. Yet even already out of *five* Petitions, is the extinguisher dropped upon *four*: this under the *green tree*, judge how it will be in the *dry*?

Why load the Parliamentary press with any such useless trash? These

petitions—either they agree with one another, or they disagree. Do they agree? from some one manufactory do they all come. Do they disagree? the greater the disagreement, the more conclusive the proof of wildness—of visionariness—of the impossibility of doing any thing that shall be generally satisfactory to the swinish multitude.—Behold here an argument, ready to serve, and to prevail—and at all times—for the suppression of that which is to be suppressed.

Has no such plan of suppression been ever formed,—or, one having been formed, will Honourable Gentlemen prevail upon themselves to relinquish it?—Nothing can be more simple or unobjectionable than the remedy:—Standing Order, that every *Petition* that has been received shall be *printed* of course, and in due course. On motion duly made, suppose an order to this effect refused:—of the justness of those suspicions, which, consistently with any regard for the public welfare, could not be suppressed, would any such refusal fall any thing short of the most conclusive proof?

That which, in each instance, is given as and for the *Petition* of such and such persons, might it not be proper that by some of those tokens, which every where else are in use—(for example, the insertion or omission of inverted commas)—information should be given, whether the matter so printed be the very *tenor* of the *Petition* in question, or only the *purport*? the *Petition at length*, or an *abridgment*?—an abridgment compressed to any degree of compression, from the *minimum* to the *maximum* inclusive?—the discourse, in a word, of the exactly ascertainable persons whose discourse it purports be; or the discourse of some other person, neither ascertained, nor by any person, except those who are in the secret, ascertainable?

Good Sir Francis (through this channel I now address you, it being the only channel through which it is in my power to reach you)—*Good Sir Francis*, look at the Appendix to the Votes, 1st May, 1817, p. 8—look at the Paper, No. 7, in which may be seen enveloped, in the above-described cloud, the account of the *St. Ives'* *Petition*, printed at your instance. Tell us, on your approaching Commemoration Day, to which of all the above described descriptions we are to refer it.

12th May, 1817.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE information contained in the ensuing paper is in so high a degree apposite and instructive, that the temptation to reprint it in this place could not be resisted. The hand by which it was drawn up was that of *Mr. Meadly*, author of the *Memoirs of the life of Dr. Paley*, and other works. To the favor of that gentleman, the author of the present tract was some years ago indebted for a few copies: and, by the want of acquaintance with his present address, is precluded from the faculty of requesting his consent. No bookseller's name being in the title page, it could not have been intended for sale: and in proportion as this reprint may have the effect of giving increase to its publicity, the generous desigus, which gave birth to so much well-applied labour, cannot but be promoted.

A SKETCH

OF THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR A

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

IN THE

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE,

INTRODUCED INTO THE PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN

FROM 1770 TO 1812.

LONDON:

PRINTED IN THE YEAR

1812.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, May 14th, 1770.

THE EARL OF CHATHAM, in moving an *Address to the King*, to desire he would dissolve the present parliament, stated, that, "instead of depriving a county of its representative," alluding to the case of Mr. Wilkes, "one or more members ought to be added to the representation of the counties, in order to operate as a balance, against the weight of several corrupt and venal boroughs, which perhaps could not be lopped off entirely, without the hazard of a public convulsion."*

* "Purity of parliaments," said his Lordship, in his answer to an address of thanks from the city of London for the above declaration, June 1st, 1770, "is the corner stone of the Commonwealth: and as one obvious means towards this necessary end, to strengthen and extend the natural relation between the constitution and the elected, I have publicly expressed my earnest wishes for a more full and equal representation, by the addition of one knight of the shire in the county, as a farther balance to the mercenary boroughs. I have thrown out this idea with the just diffidence of a private man, when he presumes to suggest any thing new in a high matter. Animated by your approbation, I shall continue humbly to submit it to the public wisdom, as an object to be most deliberately weighed, accurately examined, and maturely digested."

And again, in a Letter to Earl Temple, April 17th, 1771, he said, "Allow a speculator in a great chair, to add that a plan for a more equal representation, by additional knights of the shire, seems highly seasonable; and to shorten the duration of parliament not less so."*

* Almon's Anecdotes of the Earl of Chatham, 8vo. II. p. 84. and Addresses from the Court of Common Council to the King, 1760-70. 167-8.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, March 21st, 1776.

ALDERMAN WILKES moved, "that leave be given to bring in a bill, for a just and equal representation of the people of England in parliament;" which being seconded by Alderman Bull, was opposed by Lord North, and lost without a division.*

* "My idea," said Mr. Wilkes, "in this case, as to the wretched and depopulated towns and boroughs in general, I freely own, is amputation. I say with Horace, *fastidus ramos amputans, feliciores inserit*.—I will at this time, Sir, only throw out general ideas, that every free agent in this kingdom should in my wish be represented in parliament; that the metropolis which contains in itself a ninth part of the people, and the counties of Middlesex, York, and others, which so greatly abound with inhabitants, should receive an increase in their representation; that the mean and insignificant boroughs, so emphatically stiled the rotten part of our constitution, should be lopped off, and the electors in them thrown into the counties; and the rich, populous trading towns, Birmingham, Manchester, Sheffield, Leeds, and others, be permitted to send deputies to the great council of the nation.**

* Wilkes's Speeches, 1766. 8vo. p. 54-71.—Parliamentary Register, 1776. III. 432-442,

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, June 2d, 1780.

The DUKE OF RICHMOND was introducing his bill to restore annual parliaments, to procure a more equal representation, and to regulate the election of Scotch peers, when he was prevented from proceeding by the alarming riots in Palace-yard.*

* By his Grace's bill it was intended to enact and declare, "That every commoner of this realm, excepting infants, persons of insane mind, and criminals incapacitated by law, hath a natural, unalienable, and equal right, to vote in the election of his representative in parliament. That the election of members to serve in the House of Commons ought to be annual. That the manner of electing the Commons in parliament, and all matters and things respecting the same, be new-modelled according to the present state of the kingdom, and the ancient unalienable rights of the people. That the number of members in the House of Commons being 558, the total number of electors should be divided by that, to give the average number of those, having a right to elect one member."

"My sentiments on the subject of parliamentary reform," said his Grace, in a Letter to the High Sheriff of Sussex, Jan. 17, 1783, "are formed on the experience of twenty-six years, which, whether in or out of government, has equally convinced me, that the restoration of a genuine House of Commons, by a renovation of the rights of the people, is the only remedy against that system of corruption, which has brought the nation to disgrace and poverty, and threatens it with the loss of liberty."*

* Parl. Reg. 1780. XV. 359-366.—Authentic Copy of the Duke of Richmond's Bill.—Letter to William Frankland, Esq.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, May 7th, 1782.

THE HON. WILLIAM PITT moved, "that a committee be appointed to enquire into the state of the representation in parliament, and to report to the House their observations thereon." He was seconded by Alderman Sawbridge; but Sir Horace Mann moving the order of the day, it was carried by a majority of twenty—

Ayes 161—Noes 141.

and the original motion lost.*

* Mr. Pitt said, "he would not in the present instance, call to their view or endeavour to discuss the question, whether this species of reform or that; whether this suggestion or that was the best; and which would most completely tally and square with the original frame of the constitution;—it was simply his purpose to move for the institution of an inquiry, composed of such men as the House should, in their wisdom, select as the most proper and best qualified for investigating this subject, and making a report to the House of the best means of carrying into execution a moderate and substantial reform in the representation of the people."*

* *Parl. Reg. 1782, VII, 120-141.—Wyvill's Political Papers, I. 442-480.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, May 7, 1783.

THE HON. WILLIAM PITT moved, "That the most effectual and practicable measures ought to be taken for the better preventing both bribery and expense in the election of members to serve in parliament.

2. "That whenever it shall be proved before a select committee of the House of Commons, duly appointed to try and determine the merits of any election or return for any place in the kingdom, that the majority of the electors had been guilty of corrupt practices in such election, it will be proper in all such cases, that such place shall from thenceforth be disabled from sending representatives to parliament; and that such electors as shall not (by due course of law), be convicted of any such corrupt practices, shall be enabled to vote at the election of the knights of the shire in which such place shall be situated.

3. "That in order to give further security to the independence of parliament, and to strengthen the community of interest between the people and their representatives, which is essential to the preservation of our excellent constitution on its true principles, it is proper that an addition should be made to that part of the representation which consists of members chosen by the counties and the metropolis."* Mr. Henry Duncombe seconded the motion, but the *order of the day* being moved by Mr. Powys, was carried,

Ayes 293, Noes 149.—Majority 144.

* Mr. Pitt gave notice to the House, that if the above resolutions were carried, he should then move for leave to bring in a bill to provide for the dis-

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, June 16th, 1784.

ALDERMAN SAWBRIDGE moved, "That a committee be appointed to enquire into the present state of the representation of the Commons of Great Britain in parliament."* He was seconded by Alderman Newnham; but Lord Mulgrave moving the previous question, it was carried,

Ayes 199, Noes 125.—Majority 74.

* Mr. Sawbridge went at large into the state of the representation in various parts of the country, and asked "whether such a system as that which at present prevailed could be called a fair, an equitable, or a satisfactory one? His object would consequently be to have all the light which could be thrown upon the subject, collected under the inspection and cognizance of the House, that they might see whether any thing farther ought to be done or not, and then what the specific remedy ought to be. His motion bound the House to no species of reform, but merely put the matter in progress, and would serve to convince the people of their sincerity, on a subject where so much expectation had been raised." A similar motion of the Alderman's, on the 12th of March preceding, had been rejected by the former parliament, 141, against 93.†

* Parl. Reg. XV. 186-213. XIII. 295.

abling of such places from sending members to parliament, in which the majority of electors shall have been proved guilty of corrupt practices; and a bill for the better securing the independence of parliament.†

† Parl. Reg. 1783. IX. 688-736.—Wyvill's Pol. Pap. 253-5. 636-675.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, April 18th, 1785.

THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT moved, "That leave be given to bring in a bill to amend the representation of the people of England in parliament,"* which being seconded by Mr. Henry Duncombe, the House divided,

Ayes 174, Noes 248.—Majority 74.

* "His plan," Mr. Pitt observed, "consisted of two parts: the first was more immediate than the other, but they were both gradual. The first was calculated to produce an early, if not an immediate, change in the constitution of the boroughs; and the second was intended to establish a rule by which the representation should change with the changes of the country. It was, therefore, his intention to provide in the first instance, that the representation of thirty-six of the most decayed boroughs, which should be disfranchised on their voluntary application to parliament for an adequate consideration, should be distributed among the counties, and that afterwards any which might still remain of a similar description, should have the power of surrendering their franchise, and the right of sending members be transferred to such large and populous towns as should desire it."*

* Parl. Reg. 1785. XVIII. 42-83.—Wyvill's Pol. Pap. 372-442.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, March 4th, 1790.

THE RIGHT HON. HENRY FLOOD moved, "For leave to bring in a bill to amend the representation of the people in parliament," and was seconded by Mr. Grigby; but Mr. Pitt threatening to move an adjournment, the motion was withdrawn.*

* "My proposition," said Mr. Flood, "is that one hundred members should be added, and that they should be elected by a numerous and responsible body of electors; the resident house-holders in every county:—resident, because such persons must be best acquainted with every local circumstance, and can attend at the place of election with the least inconvenience or expense to themselves or the candidate; and householders, because, being masters or fathers of families, they must be sufficiently responsible to be entitled to franchise. They are the natural guardians of popular liberty in its first stages, —without them it cannot be retained.*

* Parl. Reg. 1790. XXVII. 196-218.—Wyvill's Pol. Pap. II. 536-563.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, April 30th, 1792.

MR. GREY gave notice of his intention of moving, in the next session of parliament, for a reform in the representation of the people; when **Mr. Pitt** declared his decided hostility to the measure, and was supported in it by several members, who were usually hostile to his administration.*

* At a general meeting of the **FRIENDS OF THE PEOPLE**, associated for the purpose of obtaining a parliamentary reform, April 26th, after approving of and adopting unanimously, an address to the people of Great Britain, on the objects of their association, it was resolved,

“ That a motion be made in the House of Commons, at an early period in the next session of parliament, for introducing a parliamentary reform.

“ That **Charles Grey, Esq.** be requested to make, and the **Hon. Thomas Erskine** to second the above motion.

Signed by the unanimous order of the meeting,

W. H. LAMBTON, Chairman.”*

* **Parl. Reg. 1792. XXXII. 449-498.**—Proceedings of the Friends of the People, 19, 20.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, May 6th, 1793.

MR. GREY presented a petition from certain persons, members of the SOCIETY OF FRIENDS OF THE PEOPLE, stating with great propriety and distinctness the defects which at present exist in the representation of the people in parliament, which they declared themselves ready to prove at the bar ; urging the necessity and importance of applying an immediate remedy; and praying the House to take the same into their serious consideration.* Mr. Grey declined bringing forward any specific plan of reform, and moved "for the appointment of a committee to take the petition into consideration, and report such mode of remedy as shall appear to them proper." The Hon. Thomas Erskine seconded the motion, and, after two days' debate, the House divided,

Ayes 41, Noes 282.—Majority 241.

* The petitioners, in concluding, thus forcibly recapitulated the objects of their prayer.

"That your honourable House will be pleased to take such measures, as to your wisdom may seem meet, to remove the evils arising from the unequal manner in which the different parts of the kingdom are admitted to participate in the representation.

"To correct the partial distribution of the elective franchise, which commits the choice of representatives to select bodies of men of such limited numbers as renders them an easy prey to the artful, or a ready purchase to the wealthy.

"To regulate the right of voting upon an uniform and equitable principle.

"And finally to shorten the duration of parliaments, and, by removing the causes of that confusion, litigation, and expense, with which they are at this day conducted, to render frequent and new elections, what our ancestors at the Revolution asserted them to be, the means of a happy union and good agreement between the king and people."*

* Parl. Reg. 1793, XXXV. 375-532.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, May 26th, 1797.

MR. GREY moved for “leave to bring in a bill to reform the representation of the people in the House of Commons,”* and was seconded by the Hon. Thomas Erskine. On a division there appeared,

Ayes 93, Noes 258.—Majority 165.

* Mr. Grey proposed that, “Instead of ninety-two county members, as at present, there should be 113: instead of two for the county of York, for instance, two for each riding, and so in other counties, where the representation is not proportionate to the extent of soil and population: that each county or riding should be divided into grand divisions, each of which should return one representative, and that the right of election should be extended to copyholders, and to leaseholders for a certain number of years. That the other members should be returned by householders; that great towns should require a greater number of electors to one representative; that the country should be divided into districts, and no person permitted to vote for more than one member; that the poll should be taken through the whole kingdom in one day; and that the duration of parliament should be limited to three years.*

* Parl. Reg. 1797. Vol. II. 577-657.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, April 25th, 1800.

MR. GREY moved, "that it be an instruction to the committee appointed to consider of his majesty's most gracious message respecting the union between Great Britain and Ireland, to take into their consideration the most effectual means of providing for, and securing the independence of parliament."* Mr. Tierney seconded the motion, which was rejected on a division,

Ayes 34, Noes 176.—Majority 142.

* After objecting to the increased influence of the crown, which might arise from the introduction of 100 Irish members, in the present state of the representation, Mr. Grey said, "Although I do not agree that it is necessary for those, who disapprove of any specific plan, to propose a substitute, I am ready to state what I consider calculated to remove some part of the inconveniences which we apprehend. I would suggest that forty of the most decayed boroughs should be struck off, which would leave a vacancy of eighty members. I should then propose that the ratio, on which Ireland is to have 100 representatives, should be preserved: and the proportion to the remainder 478 would give us 85 members for that country. The county elections would give 69 members, and 16 remain to be chosen by a popular election, by the principal towns. By this motion it is only intended to keep parliament in its present state, to prevent it from becoming worse."*

* Parl. Reg. 1800. II. 347-377.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, June 15th, 1809.

SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, moved, "That this House will early in the next session of parliament, take into consideration the necessity of a reform in the representation."* Mr. Madocks seconded the motion, and the House divided,

Ayes 15, Noes 74.—Majority 59.

* "My plan," said Sir Francis Burdett, "consists in a very few, and very simple regulations, and as the disease we labour under has been caused by the disunion of property and political right, which reason and the constitution say should never be separated, the remedy which I shall propose will consist in reuniting them again. For this purpose I shall propose,

"That the freeholders, householders, and others, subject to direct taxation, in support of the poor, the church, and the state, be required to elect members to serve in parliament.

"That each county be subdivided according to the taxed male population, and each subdivision required to elect one representative.

"That the votes be taken in each parish by the parish officers; and all elections finished in one and the same day.

"That the parish officers make the returns to the sheriff's court to be held for that purpose at stated periods; and

"That parliaments be brought back to a constitutional duration."*

* Cobbett's Parl. Deb. XIV. 1041-1071.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, May 21st, 1810.

THE HON. THOMAS BRAND moved, "That a committee be appointed to inquire into the state of the representation of the people in parliament, and of the most efficacious means of rendering it more complete, and to report the same with their observations thereupon to the House."* He was seconded by
 , and, on a division, there were,

Ayes 115, Noes 234.—Majority 119.

* Mr. Brand stated, "that he did not mean to touch the right of voting for county members, except by letting in copyholders, and assimilating the mode of voting in Scotland to the practice of this country; but that, whilst he left the right of voting so far untouched, he should propose to disfranchise the boroughs, in which the members were returned upon the nomination of individuals, and, as the numbers of the House would be diminished in that proportion, to transfer the right of returning such members to populous towns, and to apply any surplus to the more populous counties; that he would recommend the duration of parliament to be made triennial, together with a concurrent arrangement for collecting the votes by districts and parishes. And that, with a view to the independence of parliament, persons holding offices without responsibility should not be suffered to have seats in that House."

* Cobbett's Parl. Deb. XVII. 123-164.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, May 8th, 1812.

THE HON. THOMAS BRAND moved, "for leave to bring in a bill to repeal the act 31 George II. c. 14. and to entitle copyholders to vote for knights of the shire."* **The Marquis of Tavistock** seconded the motion, and the House divided,

Ayes 88, Noes 215.—Majority 127.

* Mr. Brand said, "he would also propose to get rid of nomination, and to throw the representation of the close boroughs into an enlarged representation of the more populous counties. One part, therefore, of the plan which he had in view, was to bring in a bill for the abolition of those boroughs, and the consequent appropriation of a more extensive suffrage to the more populous counties, from whence an equalization of members to the different parts of the empire would arise. He did not wish to make any innovation, but rather to restore to the constitution what the great innovator, Time, had taken from it."*

* Votes of the House of Commons, 1812, No. 80.—Morning Chronicle, May 9, 1812.—Cobbett's Parl. Deb. XXII.

FINIS.

CATECHISM, &c.

§ 1. ENDS to be aimed at on the occasion of Parliamentary Reform.

QUESTION 1. What are the *ends*, to the attainment of which a system of Parliamentary representation, and Parliamentary practice, ought to be directed?

Answer. Many might here be mentioned. But, whatever be their number, they may be brought, all of them, under one or another of three expressions, viz.

1. Securing, in the highest possible degree, on the part of Members, (that is to say, on the part of the greatest possible proportion of the whole number) the several *endowments* or *elements of aptitude*, necessary to fit them for the due discharge of such their trust.

2. Removing, or reducing to the smallest possible amount, the inconveniences attendant on *Elections*.

3. Removing, or reducing to the smallest possible amount, the inconveniences attendant on *Election Judicature*.

Question 2. What are these *endowments* or *elements of aptitude*?

Answer. They may be comprehended, all of them, under one or other of three expressions: viz. 1. *Appropriate probity.* 2. *Appropriate intellectual aptitude.* 3. *Appropriate active talent.*

Question 3. What is to be understood by *appropriate*, applied, as here, to endowments?

Answer. In the case of each such endowment, that modification of it, which is, in a particular manner, suitable to the particular situation here in question, to wit, that of a representative of the people,—deputed by a part, to fill, in the character of a trustee or agent for the whole,—a seat in that assembly, to which belongs one out of three shares in the legislative department of government, together with the right and duty of watching over the exercise of the two others, viz. the administrative and the judicial.

Question 4. What is to be understood of *appropriate*, as applied to *probity*?

Answer. On each occasion, whether in speaking or delivering his vote,—on the part of a Representative of the People, appropriate probity consists in his pursuing that line of conduct, which, in his own sincere opinion, being not inconsistent with the rules of morality or the law of the land, is most conducive to the general good of the whole community for which he serves; that is to say, of the whole of the British empire:—forbearing, on each occasion, at the expense either of such general good, or of his duty in

any shape, either to accept, or to seek to obtain, or preserve, in any shape whatsoever, for himself, or for any person or persons particularly connected with him, any advantage whatsoever, from whatsoever hands obtainable; and in particular from those hands, in which, by the very frame of the constitution, the greatest mass of the matter of temptation is necessarily and unavoidably lodged, viz. those of the King, and the other members of the executive branch of the government,—the King's Ministers.

Question 5. What is to be understood here by *appropriate*, as applied to the endowment of *intellectual aptitude*?

Answer. Forming a right judgment on the several propositions, which, either in Parliament, or out of Parliament, but if out of Parliament, with a view to Parliament, are liable to come before him: and, to that end, in Parliament forming a right conception, as well of the nature of each proposition, considered in itself, as of the *evidence*, adduced or capable of being adduced, whether in support of it or in opposition to it, and the observations thereon made, or capable of being made in the way of *argument*, for it or *against* it, as above.

Question 6. What is to be understood here by *appropriate* as applied to *active talent*?

Answer. Talents suited to the due performance of the several *operations*, which, in the course of his service, in or out of the House, but more particularly in the House, it may happen to a Member to be duly

called upon to perform, or bear a part in:—for example, *introducing*, or endeavouring to introduce, by way of *motion*, any proposed law or measure which he approves: delivering a *speech* in support of any proposition which he altogether approves;—or in opposition to one which he altogether disapproves:—proposing an *amendment* to any proposed law or measure which he approves in part only:—drawing up, or helping to draw up, a *Report*, concerning such or such matters of fact, for the inquiring into which it has happened to him to have been appointed to act as Chairman, or other Member, of a Committee;—putting relevant *questions*, concerning matters of fact, to persons examined before the House, or any Committee of the House, in the character of *witnesses*.

§ 2. *Means*, conducive towards these
Ends.

QUESTION 7. What are the *means*, that promise to be most effectually conducive to the accomplishment of the above several ends?

Answer I. In the first place come those which have, for their end or object, the securing, in the highest degree of perfection, the several *endowments* or *elements of aptitude*, requisite on the part of Members, as above.

These are—

1. Exclusion of *Placemen* in genera. from the right of sitting in the House, in the quality of *Members* entitled to *vote*.

2. Seating in the House *Official persons*, named by the King, from each department, *without* right of *voting*, but with right of *speech* and *motion*, subject at all times to restriction or interdiction by the House.

3. Elections, frequently, viz. annually renewed: with power to the King to ordain a fresh Election at any time.

4. Speeches (made in the House) correctly, completely, and *authentically*, taken down, and regularly, and promptly *published*.

5. Constancy, punctuality, and universality, of *attendance*, secured.

Answer II. Next comes the *means*, which have for their end the removing or reducing to their least possible dimensions, the *inconveniences* attendant on *Elections*, and *Election Judicature*.

For shortness, that which is proposed, let it be stated as done.

6. In each Electoral District, the number of the Voters is uniformly large.

7. Each Elector's title, *payment* made to a certain amount to *certain taxes*:—the evidence of such title, a duplicate of the *Collector's* receipt; the paper (call it the *Voting-Paper*), *delivered*, or else *transmitted* (for example, by *post*), to the returning Officer; in case of transmission, the Elector having first written upon it, according to directions printed on the Voting Paper itself, the name of the Candidate for whom he means to vote.

8. When performed by *delivery*, the voting is *secret*.

To establish the genuineness of the Collector's signature, and the sufficiency of the same, the Voter presents his voting-paper to the Returning Officer, in presence of the Agents of the Candidates. The shortest glance suffices. Its admission is signified by marking it with a stamp. The voter is thereupon presented with a ticket, which, out of the sight of every person, he drops, through a slit, into a box, marked with the name of the Candidate for whom he means to give his vote. Penalty on forging the signature of a Collector, or personating a Voter: to enforce it, each voting-paper is retained. Delivery not to be performed by proxy: for in that case a

known friend of one of the Candidates might require to be the proxy, and thus the design of secrecy would be frustrated.

9. To insure secrecy, as well in the case where the voting is performed by transmission, (viz. by post), as where it is performed by delivery, the voting-paper contains a promise of secrecy, signed by the Voter, and conceived in terms of such strength, that without offering an affront to him, neither a Candidate, nor any one on his behalf, can request the breach of it. Not that even by this means the assurance of secrecy can be rendered altogether so perfect in the case of transmission, as in the case of delivery, as above.

Marks in lieu of names are not admitted. They would be incompatible with secrecy. A vote is of little value to him, who, not being as yet able to write, grudges the trouble necessary to the learning to write his name.

10. Members' seats, say, for example, [600], whereof, for example, two-thirds—say [400]—seats for *territory*: and the remainder, say [200]—seats for population.

11. To form the *Territorial* Electoral districts, the whole soil of Great Britain and Ireland is divided into, say [400] districts, as nearly equal as is consistent with convenience resulting from local circumstances. One Member is chosen for each. Not that, with reference to the end in view, if, by accident, here and there, one should be found not above half the size of an average district, and, here and there another as much as twice the size, the inequality would be material. Parishes compose the elementary portions. No parish is divided.

12. The *Population Electoral Districts* are composed of certain Towns, the population of which amounts to a certain number of souls or upwards.— Say, merely for illustration, 10,000:—precision might be given, on examination of the *Population Returns*. Each of these Towns fills one or more seats, in proportion to its numbers: but in such sort, that the whole number of seats thus filled does not exceed the 200. Such inequalities as in this case would be unavoidable, would here also be, to every practical purpose—immaterial. But such as they are, once every 50 or 25 years they might receive their correction.

The principle of *Equality* has not any claim to anxious regard, any otherwise than in as far as, by a departure from it, the degree of perfection, with which the grand end in view is attained,—viz. appropriate aptitude on the part of such portion of the House as carries with it the power of the whole,—would, on this or that occasion, receive a sensible diminution. For local interests, the provision made is on this occasion sufficient, if whatever inequality has place, to the prejudice of any such particular interest, is the result,—not of design, but accident.

The three Capitals, London, Dublin, and Edinburgh, would thus possess that ascendancy which is their due: due to them, not merely on the score of population, but also on the score of appropriate information and intelligence.

13. For the seats corresponding to these *Population Electoral Districts*, voting, otherwise than in the most surely secret mode, viz. by *delivery*, need not be admitted.

14. On the part of persons possessing the one qua-

lification required as above, such circumstances, as would be apt to present themselves in the character of grounds of disqualification, need not be regarded. *Aliens*, for example, would be admitted: but to such a degree would they be out-numbered, that though they were all enemies, no sensible practical mischief could ensue. *Females* might even be admitted: and perhaps with as little impropriety or danger, as they are in the Election of Directors for the government of the 30 or 40 millions of souls in British India.

By all the inequalities and other untoward results put together that could have place in the above plan, no practical mischief could be produced, equal to that which, on the present plan, a single pocket borough is sufficient to produce.

On such occasions as the demarcation of the Territorial Districts, and the fixation of the Population Districts, or their respective numbers of seats,—*human reason* would, in many instances, have no application. In those instances, the decision might be made by lot.

§ 3. *Means*—their *Uses*, with reference to their respective *Ends*?

QUESTION 8. These several *means*, in what way are they conducive to their respective *ends*?

Answer. For greater distinctness,—in the instance of each one of these *means*, ask rather, in the first place, to which of those ends it is conducive, and then in what way or ways it tends to be productive of that effect.

By understanding, in the instance of each means, in what way or ways it is *conducive* to this or that *end*, it will be understood in what way or ways it is of *use* with reference to such end, and thus far what are the *uses* or good effects of the particular arrangement thus operating in relation to that end in the character of a *means*.

Question 9. So then the several arrangements in question have, each of them, for its object, neither more nor less than this, viz. the being, in the character of a *means*, conducive, in some way or ways, to the accomplishment of one or more of those ends?

Answer. Such is indeed, in every instance, their *direct* and primary object, and their principal use. But, in the instance of most of them,—further, and as they may be termed *collateral*, *uses* or *good effects*, and

those of no mean importance, may be seen resulting from them, as of course.

Question 10. What are these *collateral* uses or good effects?

Answer. For greater clearness it seems better to defer this statement till after the *principal* and direct uses of these same means have been brought to view.

Question 11. And so, to be satisfied, and justly satisfied, with the several proposed arrangements, nothing more is necessary, than to see, in the instance of each, in what way or ways it is conducive to this or that one of those ends?

Answer. Assuredly: unless, from the employment given to each or any of them, such or such *bad* effects should be shewn to be likely to take place; bad effects, the amount of which, taken all together, would be so great as to outweigh the sum total of the *good* effects above spoken of.

§ 4. Means conducive to aptitude in Members:—1. Placemen not to vote, nor be seated by Election.

QUESTION 12. The exclusion proposed to be put upon the votes of Placemen, to which of the above ends does it promise to be conducive?

Answer. To *probity*,—appropriate probity.

Question 13. In what way?

Answer. In this way. By keeping the right of voting out of the hands of persons possessing other situations, to which,—in the shape of money, power, reputation, and in other shapes,—advantage in large masses is attached,—together with expectation of further and further advantage, in the same and other shapes,—all liable to be taken from them, without reason assigned, and at the King's pleasure:—persons thereby so situated, that, speaking of the generality of them, it is not in the nature of man that they should not, on all ordinary occasions, be in the habit of sacrificing, and continue disposed to sacrifice, in so far as depends upon each man's vote, the general interest of the empire and their public duty in every shape, to the desire of preserving such advantageous situations: to that desire, and thence to the desire and necessity

of conforming themselves to the will of the person or persons, be they who they may, on whom their continuance in such situations depends.

Nor should any such disposition appear wonderful, when it is considered, that even the worst King and the worst Minister having, on many points, the same interest with the body of the people, it is not in the nature of man, that they should harbour any such intention, or any such wish, as that of doing, on any occasion, any act that may be, in any degree productive of injury to the general interest, except in so far as it may happen to this or that particular interest of their own to be served by such act: and that,—so long as they content themselves with doing no other sort of mischief than what has been commonly done already,—they stand assured of support, not only from each other, but from the multitude of those, in whose eyes the standard of right and wrong is composed of nothing more than the practice of “great characters,” that is, of any characters whatsoever, in “high situations.”

§ 5. Means, &c. continued. II. Placemen seated by the King, with Speech and Motion, without Vote.

QUESTION 14. Seating official persons, from the official departments, without votes, but with the right of speech and motion, subject to restriction or interdiction by the House, to which of the ends does this arrangement promise to be conducive?

Answer. To *intellectual aptitude*—appropriate intellectual aptitude.

Question 15. In what way?

Answer. In this way. On the part of the King and his Ministers, it being all along matter of necessity, to secure for their measures, either the co-operation, or, at least the acquiescence of the House, it will be all along their interest, and therefore naturally their endeavour, to find out and station in the House such persons, as, being furnished with the requisite degree of obsequiousness as towards his will, are in an eminent degree distinguished by the talent of persuasion, including that sort and degree of appropriate *intellectual aptitude* which is necessary to it. This intelligence, be it what it may, the House may at all times be thus made to have the full benefit of, and at the same time, without having its decisions perpetually exposed to be turned aside into a sinister course, by the weight of so many dependent votes, expressive—not of any will of

the voters, guided by any opinion of their *own* concerning the general interest, but of the will, guided by the particular and thence sinister interest, of the King, or of some minister, or of some private and unknown favourite of the King's.

By this means the King and his ministers would possess at all times what, at least in their own view of the matter, is the best chance, for obtaining, and maintaining, in the House, the only *honest* kind of influence, viz. *the influence of understanding on understanding*: and that purified, viz. by the preceding and following proposed arrangements taken together, from that *dishonest* kind of influence,—the exercise of which is, on both sides, in the relative situations in question, inconsistent with appropriate probity,—viz. *the influence of will over will*.

Question 16. But, is it not necessary, that every man, who proposes a law or measure in the House, should have a vote to give in support of it?

Answer. No more than that every Advocate who makes a motion in the Court of King's Bench should have a vote to give in support of it on the Bench.

In the business of judicature, to the giving to the justice of the case the benefit of such appropriate intelligence and active talent as may be afforded by the Advocates on both sides, it has never yet been thought necessary or so much as conducive, that the Advocates on either side should take their seats on the Bench, each of them with a vote equal in its effect to that of any of the Judges.

§ 6. Means, &c. continued. III. Elections frequent, annual.

QUESTION 17. The proposed frequent renewal of Elections, to which of the above ends does it promise to be conducive?

Answer. To all three: and in the first place to *probity*.

Question 18. In what way?

Answer. In divers ways.

1. On the part of each member taken individually: viz. in case of transgression, by the prospect of eventual exclusion; and that speedy, to wit, at the next Election, at furthest within a twelvemonth:

2. On the part of the whole House, taken collectively: viz. by reducing, to so small a quantity, the length of sinister service, which it would be in the power of the King or his Ministers, to purchase, at the hands of any one Member: and increasing at the same time the number of such lengths of service, as, ere they could secure the commencement or continuance of any sinister course of government, they would find themselves under the continually recurring necessity of purchasing, out of the whole number of members.

3. By reducing, in so great a degree, whatever

inducement a Candidate would have, on the occasion of a contest, to launch out into any such expense, as, by straitening his circumstances, might, in the hope of obtaining an indemnification, engage him to place himself in a state of dependence on the King, or this or that set of Ministers; whether Ministers in possession or Ministers in expectancy, making in this respect no difference.

Question 19. In what way does this means promise to be conducive to *intellectual aptitude* and *active talent* ?

Answer. By perpetually holding up to the view of each successful Candidate, now become a Member, the near prospect of a fresh Election, on the occasion of which it may happen to his constituents, to have the choice, of the same or any additional number, of rival candidates: for all whom the encouragement will be greater and greater, in proportion as, on his part, any feature of unfitness, absolute or comparative, has, in either of these two shapes, been manifested; viz. whether by discourses indicative of ignorance or weakness, by constant silence and inactivity, or by absention or slackness of attendance.

§ 7. Means, &c. continued. IV. Speeches authentically and promptly published.

QUESTION 20. To which of the above ends does the correct, compleat, authentic, and constant taking down, and regular publication, of all speeches made in the House, promise to be conducive?

Answer. To all three.

Question 21. In what way does it promise to be conducive to *probity*?

Answer. 1. By impressing upon each man's mind the assurance, that by the public in general, and by his own constituents in particular, he will, thence forward, and then for the first time, *be judged of*, and in the only way in which, in his situation a man can be rightly and justly judged of, *according to his works*: held up, according to his deserts, to *esteem* or *dis-esteem*, for every thing which he *has* said, and not, as happens but too often at present, for saying that which he had not said.

2. In so far as concerns veracity and sincerity, by operating as a check upon those misrepresentations, which, for the purpose of the moment, are so apt to be hazarded, under favour of the at present indispensable rule, which precludes reference to anterior debates: misrepresentations respecting the speaker's own

opinion ;—misrepresentation respecting facts at large ;
 —misrepresentations respecting the speeches of other
Members: misrepresentations, sometimes resulting
 from carelessness and temerity, sometimes accom-
 panied with insincerity, or in other words, with wilful
 falsehood.

Question 32. In what way does it promise to be
 conducive to *intellectual aptitude* ?

Answer. In the several ways following ; viz.

1. By furnishing to each Member, on the occasion
 of each motion, a correct and compleat view, of
 whatsoever *evidences* and *arguments*, have, on the oc-
 casion of the same motion,—or any other past motion
 so connected with it as to afford either evidences or
 arguments justly applicable to it,—been brought for-
 ward : thereby, so far as they go, furnishing him with
 better and safer grounds on which to found his opi-
 nion, his speeches, if any, and his vote, than can be
 furnished by any other means.

2. By impressing upon each man's mind, that as-
 surance of being judged of according to his *words*,
 which has just been brought to view, in the cha-
 racter of a security for appropriate *probity*. For, the
 more correct the judgment which he is assured will
 be passed upon that part of his *works*, the stronger
 the motive which he has for making whatsoever exer-
 tions shall appear to him to be necessary, to save
 him from the dishonour, of being found wanting in
 point of appropriate *intellectual aptitude* ?

3. By furnishing the only compleatly efficient
 means, for detecting and pointing out the existence

and successfully counteracting the influence, as well of the *misrepresentations* above mentioned, as of those rhetorical *fallacies* and devices, the efficiency of which depends partly on the irremediable *uncertainty*,—in which, in the case of word-of-mouth discourse, the *identity* of the words in which they are conveyed remains involved,—partly on the want of the time, requisite for searching out, and bringing to light the errors and false judgments which they seek to propagate and inculcate.*

4. By keeping out of the House such persons as, on the ground of experience, shall, either in their own judgment, or that of their Constitutional Judges, have been found unable to abide this test.

* On the subject of these *fallacies*, some loose papers were, at the writing of the above paragraph, lying on the author's shelves. Not long ago,—to serve as a sort of appendix to some others, in which somewhat greater progress had been made, on the subject of the *Tactics of Political Assemblies*, they were, by the author's friend, *Mr. Dumont*, put into that French dress, in which, by the same able hand, so many other uncompleted works of the author's have been made to appear so much to their advantage. Copies of this work are in London, probably some of them in the hands of the Foreign Booksellers: but, owing to some accident, none have yet been seen by the author of these pages,—1. *Fallacies of the Ins*: 2. *Fallacies of the Outs*: 3. *Either-side Fallacies*:—in the original, these were the general heads. One general character belongs to almost all of them: and that is *irrelevancy*, *irrelevancy* with relation to the particular subject, be it what it may, to which they are applied. It were truly curious to observe, in how large a proportion these are the materials of which Parliamentary and other political speeches—not to speak of other political works—are composed.

§ 8. Means, &c. continued. V. Attendance, punctual and general, secured.

QUESTION 23. Constancy and punctuality of attendance, on the part of each Member, and thence of the whole House, to which of the ends does it promise to be conducive?

Answer. To all three ends.

Question 24. In what way to probity?

Answer. In sundry ways, as follows; viz.

1. In relation to this point, whatsoever indication can be afforded, by the correct and compleat taking down and *publishing* a man's *speeches*, as above, it is only through the medium of his *attendance*, and in proportion to the *constancy* of his *attendance*,—to wit, in the only place in which they can be spoken,—that any such speeches are, or can be afforded.

2. When, on this head, such is the state of *law* and *custom*, as, on each occasion, (with the exception of such of the Members, whose constant obsequiousness to the will of the *Arch-tempter*,—not to say the C—— G——, —together with the whole of their support on every occasion, is secured by the dependance of their situations) leaves it altogether at a man's option whether he will attend or not—in this case, by simply forbearing to attend, at the

place where, in point of *moral duty*, his attendance is due, it is, on every occasion, in the power of any man, and every man, to afford to the Arch-tempter, and that without either shame or danger, exactly *half* the support which, without such shame and danger as he could not perhaps have brought himself to expose himself to, he could not have afforded, by attending and voting on that side:—and so, in the case of any particular improper and pernicious measure, to which, on the score of any particular sinister interest, whether of a party or altogether private nature, he finds himself exposed to the temptation of shewing undue favour: thus, whether it be by leaving unopposed what he ought to have opposed, or by leaving unsupported what he ought to have supported, doing effectually by his absence, exactly half the mischief, which, howsoever desirous, he durst not have done in case of his presence.

Question 25. In what way to intellectual aptitude?

Answer. The more frequent a man's attendance, the greater his experience; and the greater his experience, the more perfect is that branch of his *intellectual aptitude* which consists in an acquaintance with the nature of his business, whatsoever it may be.

Question 26. In what way to active talent?

Answer. The more frequent a man's attendance, the greater will be his experience: and, be the business what it may, the greater his experience in the examination and management of it is, the greater will

be his expertness at it:—that expertness, which is, at the same time, the effect of active talent, and the cause of it.

Question 27. Considering how thin, except on extraordinary occasions, the attendance is at present, what reasonable expectation can there be of any thing like an habitually universal attendance, and by what means can it be secured?

Answer. On the part of a Trustee or an Agent, whose duty can not be performed but at a certain place, absention from that place is a neglect which involves in it every other, and against which forfeiture of the Trust is, as soon as it takes place, an effectual as well as gentle remedy. Let but the operation of Election recur with the proposed degree of frequency, it brings with it of course this remedy, together with a time of trial, sure to recur at a stated and never long distant period. For insuring the efficacy of this remedy, in the instance of every such Member to whom the continuance in his seat is an object of desire,—and thereby for securing in every such instance a degree of constancy and punctuality of attendance, equal at least to what is seen in any of the *Offices*, there can need but one thing more, which is—an equally sure and effectual *notification* of every such act of transgression, as it takes place.

To this purpose a regular and authentic publication, of two Tables of the following descriptions, would obviously suffice:—

Table I. DAILY-GENERAL-ATTENDANCE TABLE: exhibiting, for each day, the name of every Member

present at any time of the sitting, together with the part taken by each, on each question on which there has been a division.

N. B. If, to the present tedious, inconvenient, and inadequate mode of division, were substituted the prompt, convenient, adequate, and obvious mode of giving in names, each man giving in his name, for instance on a card, without stirring from his place, divisions would of course be much more frequent than at present, and the knowledge, obtained by the constituent, of the political conduct and character of his representative, proportionally more compleat.

Table II. ANNUAL-INDIVIDUAL-ATTENDANCE TABLE: exhibiting on every day of sitting throughout the year, for the instruction of his constituents, the conduct of each Representative, in respect of *attendance, vote, and speech*: with the grounds of *excuse*, if any, for each default, in case of non-attendance.

N. B. On extraordinary occasions, for party purposes, instances have now and then been known, on which Tables of the nature of the above-mentioned *General-Attendance-Table*, have, without authority, been printed and disseminated by individual hands.

If the security thus afforded were found not sufficient,—punishment, in the pecuniary shape, combinable with reward in the same shape, might, in the most simple and effectual manner, without need of prosecution, or intervention of lawyers and lawyercraft, be employed to strengthen it: employed,—viz. by a law framed upon the principle of that class of laws which are said *to execute themselves*.

On his Election, each Member *deposits* with the

Clerk a sum of money : say (merely for illustration), £400.

A computation is made of the greatest number of days in the year during which it is probable the House will sit;—say, as before, 200. Each day of attendance, on entrance, the Member *receives back*, from the hands of a Clerk appointed for that purpose, £2 : and, at the end of the year, if the number of days of sitting has fallen short of the computed number, £2. is returned for each day whereby it has so fallen short.

If the aggregate, of the sums thus forfeited on each day, were divided among the Members attendant on that day, the force of *reward* would thus be added to that of *punishment*.

Of the many opulent, and thence idle incapables, who, at present, while the *House* is left empty, crowd the *list*, some would probably, even on the proposed plan of representation, obtain, by means of the illustration shed around them by their opulence, a probationary year, with little or no intention, or at any rate without any persevering habit, of regular attendance. The superfluity of these idle favourites of fortune would, in this way, afford a not altogether unwilling supply, to the exigences of the more assiduous and less opulent. And here would be emolument without corruption : *pay*, for, and in proportion to, honest *service*.

In this way the *penalty* for non-attendance, with or without the *reward* for *attendance*, might, by the light of experience, be increased or reduced at pleasure.

Question 28. The arrangements above proposed,

are they to be considered as being, when taken together, sufficient to insure on the part of the population of the House, a degree of *probity*,—appropriate probity,—sufficient for all occasions?

Answer. Against so vast and perpetually increasing a mass of the matter of temptation and corruption, constantly and indispensably lodged in a single hand, no remedy that promises to act as a preservative, can safely be considered as superfluous.

Suppose the plan established, and *that* to its utmost extent,—it would still be necessary to watch over the *matter of corruption* in whatsoever part of the system it is lodged,—to purge the system of it where it is useless and needless by the whole amount of it,—and to restrict the quantity of it—in cases where,—although in a certain quantity, it may for such and such a specific purpose be found necessary,—yet in any greater quantity, not being necessary, it is purely and simply mischievous.

Whatsoever is either *good* in itself, or thought to be so, is capable of being employed in the character of *matter of reward*: and whatsoever is employed in the character of matter of reward, becomes *matter of corruption*, when applied to a *sinister* purpose: when applied to a man, in such manner as to direct his endeavours to the doing *good* to the *one* or to the *few*, at the expense of preponderant *evil* to the *many*.

Of the matter of reward, with or without title to reward, nothing ever is or can be bestowed by the King, that is not bestowed at the expense of the people.

Title to reward is—adequate *service* rendered, or in some shape or other about to be rendered, to the

public : and of the matter of reward whatsoever is bestowed without such title, established by such proof of title as the nature of the service is susceptible of, is bestowed as matter of *favour* : and, besides being bestowed in *waste*, whatever is bestowed as matter of mere favour operates as matter of *corruption*, by the expectation of it.

Of the matter of corruption applied to the purpose of corruption,—Peerages, bestowed not only without extraordinary public service, but without public service in any shape, or so much as the pretence for it, constitute a conspicuous example.

In the shape of a peerage, the *matter of corruption* is capable of being employed to the corrupting of those, whose opulence suffices to preserve them from being corrupted by it in any other shape. County Members and Borough Members together,—the occupiers of no inconsiderable part of the whole number of seats, are held by the King in a state of invisible, perhaps, but not the less corrupt, less constant, or less efficient dependence. In one House by peerages, in the other by advancements in the peerage, the pretended independence of Judges is converted into dependence.

In the reign of George 1st, a Bill for restraining the employment of the matter of corruption in this shape, passed the House of Lords. Since that time, the quantity thus employed has received a prodigious increase. The reign in which the Bill was thrown out of the Commons, was the same, in which a set of Representatives who had been elected by their constitu-

ents for three years, were engaged and enabled to elect themselves for seven years ; thus vitiating the constitution by a poison of new invention, under the effects of which it has been labouring and lingering ever since.

§ 9. Inconveniences incident to Elections, and Election judicature.

QUESTION 29. What are the inconveniences attendant on Elections ?

Answer. They are so various,—and dependent, many of them, on such various contingencies,—that it seems scarce possible to make a compleat enumeration of them. The principal of them will, however, it is supposed, be found comprehended under two heads: viz. 1. To Candidates, expense and vexation: 2. On the part of Electors and *persons at large*, loss of time (a loss which is of itself equivalent to so much expense) idleness, drunkenness, quarrels, mischief to person and property on the occasion of *riots*.

Question 30. What are the *sources* of the expense ?

Answer. These will vary, according as the expen-
diture of money in such or such a way is permitted or prohibited by law, and in case of prohibition, according as the prohibition is followed or not followed by compliance.

Here follow some of the principal items—

1. Given, with a view to the Election, though antecedently to a vacancy, and thence penalty-proof,—

entertainments: instruments of corruption, defying all limitation, as well in point of number as in point of expense.

2. Previously to the Election, expense of drawing up and publishing advertisements, in newspapers and hand-bills.

3. At *previous meetings*,—and on the *Election day* at the place of Election,—expense of engaging persons to attend as *Clerks*, and make minutes of proceedings.

4. In the case of *distant votes*, expense of conveyance, with or without refreshment, during the journey, to and from the place of election.

5. Money, or money's worth, given for votes; whether directly, in the way of bribery, to the voters themselves, or indirectly to other persons having the command of votes in the way of influence.

6. In the case of a *scrutiny*, Expenses of Counsel, Attorneys, and other Agents, employed in the attack and defence of the disputed votes.

7. Occasional law-suits; produced by the uncertainties which, to so great an extent, hang over the titles to Election right, and the intrigues employed for the creation, preservation, or destruction of such rights.

Question 31. What are the inconveniences attendant on Election Judicature?

Answer. Expenses, vexations, and delays.

Question 32. Wherein consist the expenses?

Answer 1. In fees to Counsel: viz. for Opinions, and, in case of a trial before an Election-Committee

of the House of Commons, for attendances, day after day, at the Committee.

2. In money paid to witnesses for expense of journeys and loss of time.

3. In fees to Attorneys and other Agents, for carrying on the cause, as above.

4. Occasionally, in the expenses of suits at law, concerning such offices as, in the case of seats for Boroughs, confer the right of voting on the Election of Members, or, in some way or other, the means of influencing such Elections.

Question 33. Wherein consist the vexations ?

Answer 1. In that burthen of attendance which falls upon the Members (fifteen in number), of whom the judicatory is composed:—2. In those vexations which, on that occasion, in the shape of anxiety, candidates experience, or are liable to experience:—3. And in those which fall upon such witnesses, in whose instance such compensation money as happens to be allowed to them, as above, is, or is thought to be, more or less inadequate.

Question 34. Wherein consist the delays ?

Answer. In the stop so frequently put to the business of the House, by the anxiety of Members to avoid serving on these judicatories. On the occasion of the sort of Lottery, by which the fifteen who are to serve on each cause are determined,—to avoid being thus impounded, they have frequently been known to absent themselves, in such numbers, as not to leave

in attendance the number necessary to constitute a House.

2. In the length of time, during which, in case of an *undue return*, the *Electors*, instead of the person who in their eyes, is most fit, see their share of power exercised by one who, in their eyes may be, to any degree unfit: and the *Candidate*, whose right it was to be returned, loses the benefit of that right.

§ 10. Election inconveniences—Means for their removal.

QUESTION 35. In what way do the abovementioned means promise to be conducive to the removal of the inconveniences, attendant, as above, on Elections and Election-Judicature?

Answer. As to *expense*,—by striking off at one stroke all expenses whatsoever; except such as are comparatively inconsiderable,—such as those incurred in the publication of advertisements by the Candidates, and those incurred incidentally on the occasion of previous meetings.

To render this effect apparent, the slightest glance at the abovementioned sources of expense will suffice.

1. *Loss of time, idleness, drunkenness, and riots*, have for their cause *large concourses* of people, with entertainments given to Electors by Candidates, or their friends. But, any such large concourse of people will have no object: nor (votes being secret) will any man be at any such expense in giving entertainments, the receivers of which may, for aught he can know, be composed, in as large a proportion, of his adversaries, as of his friends.

2. The expense of conveyance and refreshment, in the case of distant voters, will be struck off altogether. For, there cannot be any pretence either for offering or receiving money on that score, when the utmost effect, that could be expected from the longest journey, may equally be produced by a paper put into the post.

3. As to Lawyers, Clerks, and other Agents, neither on the occasion of the collecting the votes at the place of election, nor on any such occasion as that of an Election-Committee of the House, can there be either use or room for any such assistance. All that the Returning Officer will have to do, is—out of the boxes denominated from the several candidates, to count the number of *voting-papers* that have been put into each box; observing only whether the sum mentioned by the Collector as received, be really in each instance either equal to, or greater than, the minimum required by the law to constitute a qualification.

As to vexations,—such as those from the obligation of serving on Election Judicatories, and from the delays attendant on such judicature,—there would be no such vexation, because there would be no such judicature: and there would be no such judicature, because there could be nothing to try:—unless, by possibility, and that without probability, any such offence should be committed, as, by the Collector, a refusal to sign and deliver the duplicate receipt on the *Voting-Paper*;—or, by a Postmaster, a suppression of a multitude of such papers at the Post Office; or,

by a Returning Officer, a false return,—respecting this or that one out of a small number of matters of fact, all of them simple, and in their nature either of themselves notorious, or easily made notorious.

For the purpose of punishment, prosecutions for any such offences would of course be left to the established dilatoriness, of the technical mode of procedure pursued in the ordinary Courts. But, for the purpose of applying an immediate parliamentary remedy to a false return, a single day's sitting, of a Grenville-Act Committee of the House of Commons, would suffice.

Question 36. If, in the instance of each Elector, the disposition made by him of his vote were thus to be placed altogether out of the reach of the public eye,—so that a vote may be refused to the most worthy, given to the most unworthy of all Candidates, and that without danger, and consequently without fear of shame,—might there not be too much reason to apprehend, that considerations of a purely selfish nature would become generally predominant?

Answer. No: not to any such effect, as that of seating a Candidate really and generally deemed less worthy, to the exclusion of a Candidate really and generally deemed more worthy: which effect is the only practical bad effect the case admits of.

If, indeed, matters were so circumstanced, that by voting in favour of a candidate deemed by themselves comparatively unworthy,—or, to cut the matter

short, in favour of any candidate whatsoever,—it were possible for the majority of the Electors in any district to obtain, each of them for himself any considerable private advantage, which, by the open mode of voting, he would be deterred from aiming at—were this really the case, it were certainly too much to expect, that they should, the greater part of them, commonly forego any such advantage: and,—if such sacrifice of public interest to private, were accordingly repeated in a considerable proportion of the whole number of Electoral districts,—the inconvenience to the public service, might be found sensible and considerable.

But when, by the shortness of a man's time in his seat, and the multitude of the persons, to each of whom, at the hazard of being betrayed by any one of them, and this without any tolerable assurance of his giving his vote in favour of the briber, the bribe would be to be offered,—when by all these means together, the obtainment of a seat by bribery is rendered, as it would be, to so unprecedented a degree improbable, it does not seem possible to divine by what means a candidate, generally deemed the less worthy, should obtain an effectual preference, to the exclusion of one generally deemed the more worthy.

On the other hand, in the case of the *open* method hitherto in use, the effect of it is, on every occasion, to force Electors,—and *that* in a number to which there are no limits,—to give their vote in favour of the less worthy, to the exclusion of the more wor-

thy, candidate,—on pain of suffering, each of them, some personal inconvenience, to the magnitude of which there are no limits.

And this power,—which, by means of some such relation as those between Landlord and Tenant, between Customer and Dealer, between employer and person employed, in a word, between Patron and Dependent, men of overswaying opulence possess and exercise, over men less favoured by the gifts of fortune,—this power of *forcing* men to vote against their consciences, has been termed “the legitimate influence of property,” and spoken of as that foundation stone, by the removal of which “the subversion of the constitution,” would be effected.

If,—in the event of his voting in favour of him, who, in his estimation, is the *less* worthy candidate, in preference to him who in his opinion is the more worthy candidate, a man sees no prospect of advantage to himself,—nor of disadvantage in the contrary event, it seems not too much to hope and expect, that his vote will most commonly be in favour of that candidate who, in his opinion, is the *more* worthy candidate.

If conscience will not do this, it will do nothing. But assuredly, the less deeply men are *led*, or lead themselves, into *temptation*, the more likely they will be to be *delivered*, or to deliver themselves, from *evil*.

The less it is that the law expects from every man, the less it will expose itself to disappointment. *Less*, than the disposition to do good,—so far as it is to be

done by serving the public, in such cases and in such cases only, in which it can be done without an atom of loss or other inconvenience to himself,—cannot surely from any man be expected.

Question 37. Any such mode of voting by a mixture of writing and printing, is it not,—in comparison of the good *old* mode of voting, practised by the *wisdom of our ancestors*, viz. voting by word of mouth,—an *innovation*, and that a signal one?

Answer. In one point of view it is an innovation—in another, *not*. Considered as an art in general use, the *art of writing* must,—to whatsoever purpose applied, and consequently when applied to any such purpose as this,—be acknowledged to be an innovation, and that a very signal one: then comes the art of *printing*, which, especially when considered as an art in general use, is a still more sweeping one. These arts being innovations, it cannot but be an innovation, to apply them—whether to the purpose in question or to any other purpose. But if these be innovations, they will not, it is hoped, be placed in the class of mischievous ones.

On the other hand,—if in this, as in other matters, the wisdom of our ancestors be considered, as consisting in the employing, for each purpose, at each point of time, the best and most convenient method in their time known and practicable,—there is not, in the mode of voting here proposed, any innovation at all, much less a mischievous one.

Our ancestors employed the most convenient mode

practicable, in employing the *word-of-mouth* mode: *we*, their posterity, employ the most convenient mode practicable, in employing the *written* and *printed* mode.

Thus doing, we may, therefore, be said, and with truth, to take the wisdom of our ancestors for our guide.

§ 11. Collateral advantages, referable to the situations of Electors, Placemen, Lords, &c.

QUESTION 38. These, that have been mentioned, are they all the *advantages* resulting, or all the *uses* derivable, from the *means* above proposed to be employed, for securing the several elements of aptitude on the part of Members ?

Answer. Far from it. Various collateral advantages may be seen resulting, in case of the employing of these means.

Question 39. What are the *classes of persons*, by or through whom these collateral advantages would be received ?

Answer. They are various : and in particular five descriptions of persons may be mentioned in this view : viz.

1. Parliamentary Electors, by whom, under whatsoever denomination, viz. by their votes, Members of the House of Commons would be seated.

2. Members of the House of Lords.

3. King's men, whether in or out of the House : that is to say, the persons occupying, under the King, the principal public offices.

4. The higher classes of the people taken at large.

5. The lower classes of the people taken at large.

Question 40. In what particular *ways* does the employment of these means promise to be serviceable, in the instance of these several descriptions of persons?

Answer. 1. To *Parliamentary Electors*, as such, it promises increase of *appropriate intellectual aptitude* :—
 2. To King's men in the House, and to their respective subordinates, in or out of the House, increase of appropriate aptitude, in all the several points of aptitude, viz. probity, *intellectual aptitude*, and active talent :—
 3. To Members of the House of Lords, increase of intellectual aptitude, and at the same time increased security for probity :—
 4. To the higher classes at large, increase of probity and intellectual aptitude :—
 5. To the lower classes at large, increase of comfort, viz. by increase of kindness and courtesy towards them, on the part of the higher classes ;—and on their own part increase of appropriate intellectual aptitude from the habit of appropriate discussion.

Question 41. What are the several *parts* of the plan by which those several advantages promise to be produced?

Answer. 1. That which seats Placemen in the House from the several *departments*, with every right but that of voting :—
 2. That which provides for the correct and complete taking down, and immediate and regular publication, of all *speeches* made in the House ;
 3. And that which gives uniformly extended *numbers* to the voters in the several Electoral Dis-

tricts,—*liberty* to all their votes,—and *regularly frequent* recurrence to the Elections.

Question 41. In the case of Electors, in what way do the promised collateral advantages promise to take place, and from what means?

Answer. From the correct and complete publication of all speeches made in the House, the Electors would, as well as the Member, be gainers, by so much as each man pleased—as many of them as pleased—in the article of *intellectual aptitude*—appropriate intellectual aptitude.

Of the probity of his Representative, so far as indicated by his attendance,—and, in case of his attendance, of his probity and intellectual aptitude, in so far as indicated by his vote,—and, in case of his speaking, of his probity, intellectual aptitude, and active talent, so far as indicated by his speeches,—every Elector that pleased would, on every occasion on which he pleased, possess the most complete and correct evidence that the nature of the case admitted of.

Question 42. In the case of *Placemen*, in what shapes, and by what means, do the promised collateral advantages promise to take place?

Answer. By the tendency, which such a situation would have, to raise to a maximum, in their respective breasts, the several *endowments*, or elements of aptitude abovementioned, relation being had to the business of their respective offices.

The beneficial influence of the arrangement would not confine itself to the case of those *superordinates* in

office, who, in virtue of it, would be seated in the House: it would extend to their respective *subordinates out of the House*.

Take first the case of the superordinates, seated in the House, and by official duty, and the proposed *Attendance-Tables*, rendered constant in their attendance there.

1. *Probity*, appropriate probity, will, in their instance, have for its aid, the continual *scrutiny*, actual or impending, to which they will remain subject:—subject, with full power of giving, to themselves and to one another, whatsoever support can be afforded by *speeches*,—that is, by *evidence* and by *argument*,—but without that power of self-support, deserved or undeserved, which a confederated body of men,—linked together by one common interest, and that a sinister one,—afford to themselves and one another by their *votes*: men who, while they are Co-partners and Co-defendants by their *offices*, are fellow Judges over each other by their *votes*.

2. To *intellectual aptitude*,—appropriate intellectual aptitude,—on the part of official persons of the same descriptions, the arrangement promises increase:—viz. by rendering it to them matter of increased necessity, to obtain and retain correct and complete information, respecting the whole mass of business habitually transacted in their respective offices; lest,—by want of correctness, completeness, or promptness, in the answers given by them to questions put to them in the House, from time to time, in relation to such business,—any deficiency on their part, in point of appropriate official intellectual aptitude, should stand exposed.

Take next the case of the several *subordinates*, *not having seats* in the House.

1. *Probity*,—appropriate probity,—increase in this endowment will, in *their* instance, have, as will be seen, for its immediate cause, the increase of both endowments, viz. probity and intellectual aptitude, as above, on the part of their respective *superordinates*, *having seats* in the House.

1. As to *probity*,—be the office what it may, the more correctly, completely, and generally, the business of it is understood, the more difficult will it be for improbity, in any shape, on the part of a subordinate, to profit by any undue protection, which any superordinate in the office might happen to be disposed to give to it: and, the more *correct* and *complete* the *information* is, which the superordinate possesses in relation to the business of his subordinate, the more effectual will be the degree of *vigilance*, be it what it may, with which it may happen to him to be disposed to look into their conduct in this view.

2. Again, as to *intellectual aptitude*,—appropriate intellectual aptitude,—be the species of *information* what it may, the more *frequently* any such superordinate in office is liable to be called upon in the House to furnish it, the more frequently will he thereby be obliged to address himself to this or that subordinate, for information, in relation to such parts of the business as happen to be more immediately within the sphere of action of such subordinate: and, the more frequently and *suddenly* any such subordinate is liable to be thus called upon, the more cogent will be the motives, by which he will find himself urged to obtain

and retain the most complete mastery, which it is in his power to possess, of the business in question: lest, in respect of this element of official aptitude, any deficiency should eventually come to be exposed.

3. As to *active talent*,—appropriate active talent,—by whatsoever means, in these several situations, the arrangement in question promises to be conducive to the increase of appropriate *intellectual aptitude* by the same means, and in the same proportion it promises to be conducive to *this* more immediately efficient element of official aptitude.

On the part of official men of both descriptions, it moreover promises to secure, in another way, a more and more ample measure of appropriate active talent, as well as intellectual aptitude: viz. by keeping out of the respective offices all such *unfit* persons, as,—either in their own opinion, or in the opinion of those to whom it belongs to judge,—are unable to abide such close, and continually impending, scrutiny.

Question 44. In the present state of things, are not the business and conduct of official men, in the several departments, open in this same way to this same sort of scrutiny?—and, such information as comes to be wanted, is it not continually called for, and obtained, from them, in and by the House?

Answer. To a certain degree, yes: but not upon a plan approaching in any degree to the character of a complete and adequate one.

In the *superior* departments, such as the Treasury, the several Offices of Principal Secretary of State for Home Affairs,—of ditto for Colonial and Foreign

Affairs,—and of ditto for the conduct of the War,—in the Military department, the Admiralty, and the Ordnance, it is matter of accident whether the persons responsible in the first instance shall be in the House of Commons, in the House of Lords, or in neither: while, in several of the *subordinate* departments,—such as the Excise and Customs, the Stamp Office, the Assessed Tax Office, the Navy Office, the Victualling Office, and others,—so it is that, in pursuance of the partial, insincere, and reluctant system of purification that has been employed,—it has, by positive law, been made impossible for any person, acquainted with any part of the business, to occupy a seat in the only House of Parliament that would otherwise have been accessible to him: as if there were any thing either pernicious, or inconvenient, or so much as unusual, in a man's having a seat, in an Assembly in which he has not a vote.

Question 44. In the instance of any one of these departments, is there then ever any *ultimate* deficiency in respect of such information, as, in the judgment of the House, is proper to be collected and brought to view?

Answer. Not much perhaps, if compared with that which is *actually called for*: but much, if compared with that which *ought to be called for*, and would be called for, if the means of obtaining and calling for it were thus prompt, easy, and complete,—in the degree in which, on the proposed plan, they would be.

In this or that department that might be mentioned,

the Navy Office for instance,—the business of the office is a chaos, inclosed in a dark labyrinth, of which no clear and comprehensive view has ever yet been taken, so much as by any of the persons habitually at work in it.

And, even in the case of such information as, on such points on which it is called for, comes to be actually given, the degree of *promptitude*, with which it is at present furnished, is apt to fall very short of that with which it might and would be furnished, if the persons, by whom or under whose direction it were to be furnished, were constantly under the eye, and at the command, of the House: and many are the instances, in which *that*, which does not come *promptly*, and almost at the moment at which it is called for, might, for any use that is or can be made of it, as well not have come *at all*.

And, though to answer its proper and intended purposes, it is altogether necessary, that the matter of such information should be put in a *written* form,—yet, to every one to whom Jury trial is known, it is manifest, how uninstrusive and unsatisfactory a dead mass of written evidence frequently is, in comparison of what it would be, if the import of it were upon occasion explained and elucidated, and the *correctness* and *completeness* of it secured,—by apposite questions put on the spot by word of mouth, followed by immediate and unpremeditated answers, and with further questions in case of need suggested by those answers: and so on till every obscure point were made clear:—exactly in the same way as, for the conducting of his own private business, in the bosom of his own

family, every head of a family obtains such information as he happens to stand in need of, from his own children or his own servants.

Question 45. In the case of the House of *Lords*, by what means do the promised advantages promise to take place?

Answer. By means of that article which provides for the correct and compleat *taking down*, and immediate publishing, of all *speeches* made in the House of Commons.

Question 46. In what way does it promise to be productive of those advantages?

Answer. 1. In case of a Bill, or other measure, sent up from the Commons to the Lords House,—it promises to be productive of a degree of appropriate intellectual aptitude as yet unexampled, by furnishing the Members of that House,—upon whose decision the fate of every proposed *law* (not to speak of other incidental and miscellaneous measures) depends,—a correct, compleat, and authentic representation of the several *arguments*, by which it has been supported and opposed.

2. In the same way it tends to secure, in the same superior quarter, an increased degree of appropriate *probity*—for, when all the several arguments, which, in the case, for example, of a proposed law, have been adduced in favour of it,—when all these arguments have been consigned to determinate words, and those words committed to writing, together with all the arguments that could be found capable of being urged

against it on the other side,—in this case, the more satisfactory and cogent the arguments in favour of it appear, the more difficult will it be for any Member of the Upper House to find out and set in opposition to it, any arguments that will bear the test of the public eye; or, for the whole House, without any warrant afforded on the ground of reason, to venture, howsoever uncongenial it may be to particular interests or favourite prejudices, to reject it.

Question 47. In the case of the *higher classes* at large, by what means do the promised advantages promise to take place?

Answer. By means of that article which provides for the *frequent* recurrence of Elections,—in conjunction with that which prescribes, in relation to the several seats, an increased and nearly uniform *extent* to the *numbers* of the persons sharing in the Election franchise.

Question 48. In what way?

Answer. In both ways, viz. in the way of *intellectual aptitude*, and in the way of *probity*.

1. In the way of *intellectual aptitude*,—appropriate *intellectual aptitude*—it promises to improve the texture of their minds, by bringing within the reach of a much greater number of them than at present, the prospect of a place in the most efficient seat of government; such place being, at the same time tenable, not absolutely, but only upon such terms, as, after the first year, will leave to each man little hope of his being continued in it, in any other event than that

of his having made manifestation of distinguished *active talent*, or at least *intellectual aptitude*: and, by thus giving increase to the number of competitors, giving proportional increase to the exertions made by each, in the hope of manifesting his superiority over the rest.

2. In the way of *probity*,—appropriate probity,—by rendering it the interest,—of every man, who sets before his eyes any such prospect, at whatsoever period of his life it may be his hope to see it realized,—to lay a foundation for such hope, by an uniform and constant course of *kindness* and courtesy, as well as of *justice*, towards all persons in whom the success of his exertions may be in any degree dependent: and, in particular as towards the *lower classes*, which, of necessity, are every where the most populous ones.

In the present state of things,—a Borough-holder, or a man of first rate opulence, who, by weight of metal, is looked upon as able to sink every bark that should dare to steer the same course, commands the seat, without need of paying any such price for it.

Question 49. In the case of the *lower classes*, by what means do the promised advantages promise to take place?

Answer. By means of the article last above mentioned. It being, to so considerable an additional extent, as above, the interest of the *higher classes*, to maintain, in their intercourse with the lower classes, an uniform and constant course of justice, kindness, and courtesy,—hence, by each individual of those higher classes, in proportion as his conduct is

fashioned by that interest, the feelings of the lower classes will be respected, and their interests consulted, and treated with regard.

Out of the virtue of the higher classes, thus cometh forth the comfort of the lower.

Question 49. These collateral advantages, are they *all* that can be stated, as likely to result from the plan, in case of its being adopted, and in proportion as it is adopted?

Answer. If the question be confined to the plan itself, meaning the arrangements of which it is composed,—then so it is that to one or other of the above five heads, whatsoever beneficial results can be stated as likely to be produced by the plan, would, it is supposed, be found referable.

But, if the *principles*, by which these have been suggested, are found to be those which belong to the nature of the case—if in the list of objects brought to view in the character of *ends* proper to be aimed at, none are included but such as have a just title to a place in it, and all are included that have any such just title,—let this be supposed, and by means of these principles, the plan will, in this case, be found capable of being applied to an *additional* and perfectly distinguishable use: to wit, the serving as a *test* or touchstone, by which the eligibility of every *other* plan, that has been, or that can ever be, brought forward, may be tried.

In the persons of Members,—in the persons of the Representatives of the People—is it conducive,—and if so, by *which* of the several arrangements contained

in it, is it conducive, to *probity*, to *intelligence*, to *active talent*?

By all of them put together, is it thus conducive in a sufficient degree?

The same questions, with regard to the several classes of *placemen* belonging to the executive branch of government?

The same questions, with regard to the *Lords*, without whose concurrence nothing, in the way of legislation, can, on any occasion, be done.

The same questions, with regard to the several *inconveniences* attached, in the existing state of things, to Elections and Election Judicature?

Such are the questions, by the application of which the eligibility, absolute and comparative, of *any and every other plan*, would, it is supposed, be rendered pretty clearly apparent.

Strong and sound may that plan be pronounced; that shall have stood examination, upon these interrogatories: self-convicted of insufficiency, the plan that shall have shrunk from the test which they afford.

The *arrangements* themselves can no farther be of use, than in proportion as they are adopted. But,—although they should not, any one of them, be adopted,—yet the *principles* on which they are grounded, and by which they were suggested, might still, in this way, be found to be not altogether without their use.

THE END.