

**JOHN TOLAND,**  
*The Art of Governing by Partys: Particularly,  
in Religion, in Politics, in Parlament, on the  
Bench, and in the Ministry (1701)*

THE  
*Art of Governing*  
BY  
**PARTYS:**

PARTICULARLY,

*In Religion, in Politics, in Parlament,  
on the Bench, and in the Ministry ;  
with the ill Effects of Partys on the Peo-  
ple in general, the King in particular,  
and all our foren Affairs ; as well as on our  
Credit and Trade, in Peace or War, &c.*

*by Jo. Toland.*

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— *En quo Discordia Civēs  
Perduxit Miseros ! Virg. Ec. I.* —

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En quo Discordia Cives  
Perduxit Miseros ! Virg. Ec. 1.

### *Editor's Introduction*

To make this edition useful to scholars and to make it more readable, I have done the following:

1. inserted and highlighted the page numbers of the original edition
  2. not split a word if it has been hyphenated across a new line or page (this will assist in making word searches)
  3. added unique paragraph IDs (which are used in the "citation tool" which is part of the "enhanced HTML" version of this text)
  4. retained the spaces which separate sections of the text
  5. created a "blocktext" for large quotations
  6. moved the Table of Contents to the beginning of the text
  7. placed the footnotes at the end of the book
  8. formatted short margin notes to float right
  9. inserted Greek and Hebrew words as images
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## Table of Contents

- [Dedication to William, III, King of England, Scotland, France, and Ireland.](#)
  - [CHAP. I. The Author's Apology and Design.](#) p. 1
  - [CHAP. II. The Art of Governing by Parties in Religion.](#) p. 11
  - [CHAP. III. The Art of Governing by Parties in Politics.](#) p. 31
  - [CHAP. IV. The Art of Governing by Parties in Parliament.](#) p. 56
  - [CHAP. V. The Art of Governing by Parties on the Bench.](#) p. 79
  - [CHAP. VI. The Art of Governing by Parties in the Ministry.](#) p. 92
  - [CHAP. VII. The ill effects of Parties on the People in general, and the King in particular.](#) p. 116
  - [CHAP. VIII. The ill Effects of Parties on all our foren Affairs.](#) p. 141
  - [CHAP. IX. The only Remedy against all the Michief of Partys, is a Parlament equally Constituted.](#) p. 164
  - [Conclusion.](#) p. 176
  - [Faults of the Press to be thus corrected.,](#) p. 181
  - [Endnotes](#)
-

TO WILLIAM, III. KING OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, FRANCE, AND  
IRELAND. ↩

*Statholder of Gelderland, Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, and Overysse.*  
*Supreme Magistrat of the two most Potent and flourishing Commonwealths in the*  
*UNIVERSE.*

May it please your Majesty,

*It has bin always counted the greatest Happiness of Princes to be acquainted with the Sentiments of their Subjects, for want of which the best of 'em have often taken wrong measures, which made their Actions produce very dioffernt Effects from their good Intentions: not that the People affect to [page] hide their Thoughts (their complaints being generally represented louder, than the Grievances own'd to be hard) but Flatters are ready to persuade Kings that nothing can be amiss during their Reigns; evil or insufficient Counsellors dare not reveal the bad Consequences of their own unapprov'd Ministry; and, where a Nation is divided into Parties, that side, who is in possession of the Royal Favor, will suffer none to approach the Throne that wou'd discover the severities they exercise on [page] their Adversaries. 'Tis not to be doubted, SIR, but you have all the Information of this sort, that a Prince of such finish'd Wisdom and Experience can judg necessary; yet the writer of the following Treatise cou'd not think it unbecoming his Duty to present it to your Majesty, having there, with all possible Freedom and Impartiality, presum'd to lay before you the true state of your Subjects as to their Contrary Interests and Affections. It will easily appear (but principally, tis hop'd, to your Majesty) [page] that the chief aim of the Author was to do the most acceptable service to his Country in this critical Juncture; and yet he questions not but one sort of people will be displeas'd with him for having don Justice to your unparalle'd Zeal for Liberty (a Thing so unusual with crown'd Heads) and which they are as sorry shou'd be known, as usable to conceal: while another sett of Men will be still more offended, because he is not an humble Prostitute after their Example, and for touching on those miscarriages whereof [page] they know themselves deserve the Blame, tho tey are ungratefully striving to charge 'em Elsewhere. But if your Majesty is pleas'd to approve of this small Essay, as intended for your Service, he'll expect no ohter Reward but to see a better Reformation practis'd than he was capable to propose; his Happiness being necessartily involv'd in the common Good, and without it no condition of Life being honorable, satisfactory, or secure.*

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[1]

## CHAP. I. The Author's Apology and Design. ↩

IN the prosecution of this Discourse, som people may think that I speak more freely than in Prudence I ought to do ; while others will be apt to censure me as acting out of my Sphere, and meddling in matters which are none of my Concerns : but one thing I dare undertake and promise, that all unbyast Readers will think me Impartial; and I know my self to be neither aw'd by hopes or fears, nor gain'd by Favor or Bribes. Tho' all do not sit at the Helm, yet each Person on Board is equally interested about the preservation of the Ship, and may give fair warning of those Rocks [2] and Shelves which are not apprehended nor observ'd by others. Every Man is bound to assist his Country by his Advice, as well as by his Purse, or the use of his Arm; and as the Collective body of the Government is made up of many individuals, so whatever is propos'd for the Honor, Profit, or Safety of the whole, must still originally proceed from som one Man, whether in the Parliament, Council, Cabinet, or after the manner I presume to do at present: and so the matter is submitted to the approbation or dislike of the greater number. This has been always an allow'd custom in *England* , at which none was ever displeas'd but such as were conscious of their own demerits, and had no stomach to hear their Crimes divulg'd for fear of Punishment or Disgrace. As for so openly telling my mind, 'tis the honestest way of dealing; whereas obscure hints and artificial disguises are generally interpreted beyond what the Author ever intended : for what one seems afraid of saying plainly and directly, is thought by others to be naught beyond expression. Nor am I without that due regard which every one ought to have for his own [3] preservation; but I know where I am, and what I assert. I deliver nothing but the naked truth, which is the strongest, and consequently the boldest thing in the world. I live in a free Government where Men may vent their thoughts secure from the dread of Informers, represent their Grievances, yet not be counted factious, and expect redress without claiming more than their due. We have known Rules and stated Measures of our Actions. Every Man has the same right to his Property as the Magistrat to the execution of his Office: and the meanest Countryman has his action and remedy at Law against the King no less than against any of his fellow Subjects. In these and the like priviledges consists a great part of our Happiness above theirs who at no extraordinary distance from us graon under the yoke of absolute dominion. There the will of the Prince being his Law, the Judges are oblig'd to interpret it solely for his interest without any respect to the Hardships endur'd by private Men when they interfere with the pleasure of their Master. There the people are beggarly and slavish, but the Monarch is Great and Mighty, the [4] prime Nobility and Gentry being reduc'd to depend on his liberality, the Stoutest of the commons forc'd to serve in his Troops for Bread, and all degrees of Persons made the Instruments of gratifying his Vanity, Rapaciousness, or Luft. In the mean time his Clergy, Army ,and Officers of State are finely pamper'd and making a flourishing show, while the rest of his miserable Subjects languish and decay : for he aw's their Consciences by his Priests, Compels their Bodies by his Soldiers, and drains their Purses by his Ministers, who all consequently share the Spoil with him as necessary Tools for his purpose, and a reward of their Iniquity. Now because no complaints dare be heard in *France* or *Denmark* , will any body say that nothing's amiss there? Is their Unity so much to be admir'd, when they must not use their reason to examin, and that they agree even about their Religious Tenets as Men do about Colors in the Dark. Heaven be prais'd this is not our Condition. I write within the reach of no Tyrant; but under the wings of a Valiant, Wise, and Just Prince, who is pleas'd with nothing so much as being circumscrib'd by [5] the Laws, lest for all his upright intentions he should be mistaken in his duty. Whenever therefore he is engag'd in bad Councils (as their is no absolute Perfection of

Men or things) he is no sooner made sensible of his error, but he presently changes his measures, and denies nothing to the Nation which they earnestly desire and think indispensably necessary for their Prosperity and Safety. The many excellent Laws, to which (after som previous hesitation) he has agreed, are an undeniable proof of his good disposition, if we knew how to improve it; witness the Acts for Triennial Parlements, for regulating Trials of High-Treason, concerning Mines and Ores, the late Law for Resumptions, those against Standing Armies, and several besides. It were to be wish'd, I confess, that the extreme Lenity of his Temper did not hinder him from showing greater marks of his displeasure as gainst those who have sometimes unworthily abus'd his favor, exasperated the best part of the Nation against them for breaking their trust, and temted many well meaning persons to have an ill opinion of the public [6] Administration. Seasonable and exemplary Justice on such wicked Men cou'd not fail both of clearing himself from all ill grounded Jealousies, and of effectually discouraging others in the same stations from imitating the vicious courses of their Predecessors. Yet in excuse of this, it must be own'd that such Criminals have not only the secret of evading the censure of the Law, but that they even have frequently grown above fearing his Majesty's animadversion, combining together, and linking themselves into such powerful Factions that none of their number must be touch'd without disobliging the whole Party, which is not always safe tho' never so just. 'Tis observ'd that after good Government is destroy'd, its expiring virtue procures some Credit to the beginning of the succeeding Tyranny; in like manner the general depravation of Morals contracted under the Reign of one or more Tyrants, cannot be immediately reform'd by the utmost vigilance of a virtuous Prince, which makes it no strange thing if som dark clouds are observ'd to eclipse the lustre of his management. He is therefore much to be pitied, if he cannot [7] discern the Men who are not less able than willing to serve him faithfully ; and then only to be blam'd when he industriously picks out the worst, or makes an honest Man turn Knave before he is capable to do his business. Of all the Plagues which have infested this Nation since the death of Queen *Elizabeth*, none has spread the Contagion wider, or brought us nearer to utter ruin, than the implacable animosity of contending Parties. Tho' 'tis a thing never to be expected (nor perhaps so desirable as som may fancy) that all men shou'd agree about all things ; yet it is the most wicked master-piece of Tyranny purposely to divide the sentiments, affections, and interests of a People, that after they have mutually spent their Force against one another, they may the more easily becom a common prey to Arbitrary Power. There have bin many opposite Factions in *England* heretofore, partly occasion'd by dubious Titles to the Crown, partly to restrain the exorbitancy of fom Kings who invaded Liberty, and all Men continu'd uneasie till by Perswasion or Force such quarrels were adjusted. But till the accession of the *Stuarts* to the [8] Imperial Throne of this Realm, we never knew *the Art of Governing by Parties*. It was set on foot among us by the first of that Race, and was dayly improving under his Successor, till at last it fatally turn'd on himself, and depriv'd him both of his Crown and Life. But because this execrable Policy was brought to perfection under *Charles* the Second, I shall display som of its worst effects in his Reign, and the dismal influence it has an all our Affairs ev'n at this time. As soon as this King was restor'd to sit in the Saddle of his Ancestors, he wholly apply'd his thoughts (as he intended long before) to establish Popery and Despotic Power on the ruins of our Religion and Liberty. The revenge he ow'd his Fathers Death, together with the remembrance of his particular Sufferings, contributed not a little to alienat his Heart from all tenderness for the *English* : but he was fixt in his Arbitrary Designs, by the example of Foren Princes; and reconcil'd to the *Roman* Faith by the Authority of his Mother, the importunity of the Priests, and his own vitious inclination. A few of the [9] Nobility, Gentry, and Clergy, who accompanied him in his Exile, knew of his change ; the most quick sighted sort of People at home had violent suspicions of it; but he never thought fit quite to take off the Mask till he came to dy, and that his usual dissimulation cou'd do him no farther service. Popery and Slavery being the two great Blessings he intended to intail upon us and our Posterity, as they were the chief motives

of his Actions, so they are the only Keys by which we can decipher the mysteries of his Reign. He cou'd not hope to perswade or force a compliance from a free Nation, and the Head of the Protestant Interest : what he was not able to compass therefore by open violence, he attempted with much success by secret fraud. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ*. This is the true spring of all those pernicious Divisions, names of distinction, Parties, Factions, Clubs, and Cabals, which have ever since distracted, torn, and very nigh consum'd us. High and Low Churchmen, Conformists and Fanaticks, Whigs and Tories, Loyalists and Rebels, Patriots and Courtiers, with the like opprobrious nick-names, are the abominable fruits [10] of his Policy. My business is not to write the History of his Reign, but to give a succinct account of the Parties he created for our Destruction, and the malignant influence they have at this very time on our Government. Wherefore I shall consider them, as in the first place they respect our Religion, secondly our Politics, thirdly the High-Court of Parliament, fourthly Inferior Court of Judicature, and fifthly the Ministers of State. I'll make no separat head of our Morals, because they were debauched, not only by the pattern shew'd us at Court, but also by a concurrence of many causes to be mention'd under the foregoing Heads. In the next place, I'll briefly shew what ill effects those Parties have now on the People in general, the King in particular, and all our affairs abroad. Lastly, as a prevention or perfect cure of this distemper, I'll offer som advice about the Election of Members fit to Represent and Serve the Nation in Parliament.

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**CHAP. II.**  
**The Art of Governing by Parties in Religion. ↵**

'Tis not more common (nor indeed more natural) for Men to vary from one another in the color of their Hair, the air of their Face, or the measure of their Stature, than it is for them to disagree in their opinions (whether relating to Religion or any other subject) by reason of their different opportunities, applications or capacities, and that things are not plac'd in the same degree of light to all sorts of People. Nobody wonders that he has not the same [12] taste or fancy with others; nay, he'll make allowance for it in eating or drinking, in chusing a Mistress, a House, a Suit of Clothes ; and yet he's apt to be amaz'd or angry that every one is not of the same Religion with himself, which makes him (like the Tyrant of old) for stretching or cutting all the World to his own size. Mens actions are never more inconsistent than in this Point; for they all naturally desire a Liberty of worshipping in that way which they believe to be most acceptable to the Deity, and they think it the highest Injustice to be deny'd this Privilege by any Government; but they are no sooner grown the reigning Party themselves, than they fall to Persecute all that Dissent from them; and so in their several turns, as every Party happens to get uppermost, they tolerat no other Religion, because they think their own to be the best. I am not examining now the Equity or Injustice of this Procedure, but barely relating matters of Fact. The establish'd Church of *England* laid very great Hardships on the Nonconformists [13] before the last Civil Wars; and the Nonconformists paid the Churchmen home in their own Coin with Intereft, when they got the Power into their hands. The Church being restor'd again with the Monarchy , *Charles* the Second was too well acquainted with the Nature of Mankind, to let an opportunity slip which made so much for the Game he design'd to play; and therefore pretending a wonderful Zeal for the Hierarchy, he animated the *Bishops* (who were prone enough to Revenge, on the account of their late Sufferings) to oppress and extirpat the *Presbyterians*, *Independents*, *Anabaptists*, *Quakers* and *Protestant Dissenters* of all sorts. In the mean time, the Compliance of these being fear'd about all things, it was render'd wholly impossible by the hard Terms which were offerd them. He perfectly knew their main Scruples against Conformity, and having a Parliament of the same temper with his Clergy, he got such Oaths, Tests, and Declarations fram'd, as he was sure they could never swallow, which would necessitat them (as in [14] effect it did ) to form themselves in to a separat Party, and, notwithstanding their privat Dissentions, to unite together for their common Liberty against the Court and the Church. All this while he made the Clergy believe that it was his Affection to them which producd those Severities against their Enemies, frightening them from time to time with his Apprehensions lest Presbytery should ever prevail again: nor was he less industrious with the *Royalists*, to keep the *Commonwealth-men* under. And, in order to secure them both, he pretended that they could not invest him with too great a Power , declaring, that no body must expect to partake of his Favor who was not a good *Churchman* as well as a true *Royalist* ; and that all others were Rebels in their Hearts, only waiting for a fit occasion to destroy both Church and State. The Pulpits immediatly founded with nothing else but *Passive Obedience* and *Non-resistance* to all the King's Commands, of what nature soever under pain of Eternal Damnation ; that if our Property, Religion [15] or Lives should be attack'd by him; we must have recourse to no defence but Prayers and Tears; and that Monarchy as well as Episcopacy was of Divine Right, with the like extravagant Doctrins. In short, the poor Dissenters were us'd like Dogs, prohibited to meet together for Divine Worship, expos'd to the Scorn and Rage of the Mob, crowded and starv'd in Jails, som forc'd and som flying into foren Countries, to the inexpressible damage of Trade, dispeopling the Kingdom, and diminishing the Public Revenues. But above all, the *Protestant* Interest was

daily weaken'd by such as most pretended (and most of them, no doubt, design'd) to support it; for the mistaken Zeal of som, and the restless Ambition of others among the dignified Clergy, deluded the Herd of their Admirers. At length the continual Encroachments made on the civil Constitution, under pretence of suppressing *Phanaticks*, and the barefac'd Countenance given at the same time to avow'd *Papists*, (being receiv'd into the chiefest Trust and Confidence) [16] open'd all Mens Eyes, and discover'd the black Designs of the Court. The Laity grew weary of being the Drudges of the Clergy to ruin innocent People, very devout in their way, true to the Liberties of their Country, and the irreconcilable Enemies of Popery. *It is certainly*, says the Duke of *Buckingham* in the House of Lords, *a very uneasy kind of Life to any man, that has either Christian Charity, Good Nature, or Humanity, to see his Fellow-subjects daily abus'd, devested of their Liberties and Birthrights, and miserably thrown out of their Possessions and Freeholds, only because they cannot agree with fom others in Opinions and Niceties of Religion, to which their Consciences will not give them leave to assent, and which, even by the consent of those who would impose them are no way necessary to Salvation*. When the generality of the People began to utter their Complaints in such Language as this, and that the best Men on all sides were for mutually tolerating one another, or coming into a stricter Union, then the subtil King, finding it make for his purpose, would be the first to grant Dissenters [17] Liberty, and even to dispense with the Penal Laws in their favor. By this means he hop'd to *kill two Birds with one Stone*: for by the same dispensing Prerogative he could recall this Toleration at his pleasure; but (what was the main thing aim'd at) he could as well repeal all other Laws, if he were allow'd to suspend any one by his own Authority. He doubted not but the Dissenters would accept of Ease on any Terms, tho' he found himself mistaken: for such of them as happn'd to be Members of Parliament, oppos'd this Suspending Power the fiercest of any, and the Monarch plainly betray'd his own Plot, since he could never be induc'd to confirm their Liberty by Laws which the Parliament seem'd willing to enact; as there was one Bill expresly pass'd both Houses to this purpose, but stoln or mislaid by his order, when he ought to have given it his Assent. On the contrary, when he heard that there was a Project of Comprehension on foot, he ask'd the Archbishop, whether he was for it, who replying, He had heard of such a thing; *No*, said the [18] King, *I'll keep the Church of England pure and unmixt*. But I cannot so well excuse the conduct of the Dissenters in the Reign of his Successor. No Popish Prince in the World did ever suffer Heretics (as they call them) to live peaceably in his Dominions, but when he wanted Power to deal with them: now King *James* not being able to Dragoon his Protestant Subjects, nor to bring them by shoals to *Smithfield*, was resolv'd, in imitation of his pious Brother, to dash them in pieces against one another. All the moderat part of the Church of *England* had endeavor'd to exclude him from the Crown, or to frustrat his tyrannical Designs; and at last the mistaken Zealots themselves, with the high-flyers for Court-Favor and Preferment, whose Bigottry and Violence brought the Nation within an Ace of its Ruin; when they saw all Civil and Military Posts a filling with Papists, and that after they had perform'd his Drudgery, they might turn or burn, as they lik'd, for they were not the Priests he minded to exalt: all these, I say, were now for [19] Resistance, as much as ever they were for Obedience before; nothing was heard but *The Temple of the Lord, the Temple of the Lord*; and their Cry reach'd even into *Holland*. The grateful Prince desir'd no better, being glad at heart to be rid in such a manner of those whose infinit Obligations he never intended to repay; and so he very unexpectedly turns all his Favor towards the Dissenters, whom he mortally hated during his whole Life, and was the principal Author of their Miseries. Tho' this preposterous Kindness cozen'd very few of them, yet who now but they? None more admitted into his Privacy, their former Persecutions solely laid to the charge of the Bishops, who were grown the most rebellious and worst of Men, while just on the sudden a Phanatick was the most loyal and peaceable Creature on Earth, next to a Papist. To crown the Work, he assumes the Power of dispensing with the Penal Laws of every kind, and in spight of all Tests, imploy both Papists and Dissenters in Offices of Trust and Honor. All wise Men saw, that [20] the advancement

of Popery was the only thing at bottom, while one Party of Protestants were cajold till they had help'd to ruin the other, and might then enjoy the gracious Favor of being last destroy'd themselves. I am far from blaming the Dissenters for meeting in public to perform their Worship ; whatever was design'd by the King, they were bound to do their Duty whenever they had opportunity: but I absolutely condemn such as made Addresses to him on this account, or accepted Offices in Corporations, which was in plain truth to thank him for governing without Law, and to act by virtue of his Arbitrary Power. 'Tis true, the bulk of Dissenters abhor'd these Proceedings of their Brethren, their Enemies themselves being Judges ; and tho' *Pen, Lob, Allop*, and a few like them, were familiar in his Closet, they were disown'd therein by the best of their several Communions. For my part, setting the Virtues and Failings of both sides in a just parallel, I am of opinion, that neither of them ought to reproach the other, [21] nor unmeasurably to overvalue themselves; I mean, with respect to one another : for as they have each of them been Persecutors and Persecuted, and that the *Church* defended the Protestant Religion from the Pulpit and the Press against *K. James* , as the Dissenters did our Civil Liberty against King *Charles* ; To both of them have hitherto unanimously maintain'd our Religion by their Wealth, Swords and Pens, under the auspicious Conduct of King *William* , the unfeign'd Protector of both. The Body of the Church was always right, and the Dissenters have now got that Liberty establish'd by a Law, which every honest man wish'd them from his Heart before. The People of both sides are dispos'd to be quiet, as long as their Priests will let them: They think not a jot the worse of one another, for not walking the same way to Church on *Sunday* , because they joyn'd company the *Saturday* before to Market: They judge of one anothers Honesty by their Dealings, and not from their Notions : Trade is vigorously carry'd on without distinction: [22] other Protestants dare venture now to settle among us, and not, as formerly, shun our inhospitable Shore: no man is forc'd to inform against his Neighbor, or to disturb his own Relations : both sides are under mutual (and I hope indissoluble) ties of Marriages, Interests, and Friendship; and, in one word, we all enjoy the incomparable Blessings of Unity, Peace, and Liberty. I once met with a Person who profess'd himself amaz'd to find so many *Englishmen*, in the late Reigns, endeavoring to subvert our Constitution ; but, I think, there's greater reason to wonder, that after what has pass'd, there could be found one man, who entertain'd a design of repealing the Toleration : and yet not a few such there be, Men tainted with the old Leven, who maintain a profound Respect for their old Master, and are secret Admirers of the old Whore of *Babylon* . I'll not insist on their ill-natur'd Grumblings ever since this Revolution, nor the little Arts they have cop'yd from the Royal Brothers (and which they have been striving to put in practice these last two or three [23] years) I mean, their attacking the *Quakers* first, as the weakest Party, thinking they'l be abandon'd by all the rest, who sooner or later must expect to fall under the same Condemnation ; but let no man help to fire his Neighbor's House, that loves the safety of his own. At this very time there's more than ordinary Talk of this Affair, and som Cardidats for places in Parlament being exalted with Chimerial Hopes, or thinking to gratify a certain warm Set of Gentlemen, make large Promises of promoting it; but, I dare say, there's no County or Burrough in *England* will chuse them, if once they discover their Intentions. However, it won't be amiss on this occation to put our Church in mind of her Pious Resolutions, and the sincere Vows she made in the days of her Calamity. One of her stoutest Champions against *Rome*, in the last Reign, delivers the Sense of his Party in these words: [1] *The Church of England*, says be, *is so sensible of the Iniquity as well as Folly of that method (of Persecution) that there [24] is no ground to suspect She will ever be guilty of it for the future. They whom no Arguments could heretofore convert, the Court (whose Tools they were in that mischievous and unchristian Work, and by whom they were instigated to all the Severities which they are now blam'd for) by objecting it to them as their Reproach and Disgrace, and by seeking to improve the Resentments of those who had suffer'd by Penal Laws, to becom a united Party with the Papists for their Subversion) has brought them at once to be asham'd of what they did, and to Resolutions of promoting all*

*Christian Liberty for the time to com. And should there be any peevish and ill-natur'd Ecclesiastics, who, upon a turn of Affairs, would be ready to assume their former Principles and pursue their wonted Course; we may be secure against all fear of their being successful in it, not only by finding the majority as well as the more learned both of the dignify'd and inferior Clergy unchangeably fixt and determin'd against it, but by having the whole Nobility and Gentry, and those noble Princes, whose Right it will be next to ascend the Throne, fully possess with all the Generous and Christian Purposes we can desire, of making [25] provision for Liberty of Conscience by a Law . This Passage is not only pertinent to my present design, but a perfect Abstract and Confirmation of this whole Account: Nor do I question in the least, but that, as this Judicious Author observes, the soundest part of the Clergy, and all the Gentlemen of England , will unanimously make good what they have so happily concurr'd with the King, and our late Queen, to establish. [2] Another acknowledges, That the Nation has scarce forgiven som of the Church of England the Persecution into which they have suffer'd themselves to be cozen'd: tho' now that they see Popery bare-fac'd, the stand they have made, and the vigorous opposition that they have given to it, is that which makes all Men willing to forget what is past, and raises again the Glory of a Church that was not a little stain'd by the Indiscretion and Weakness of those who were too apt to believe and hope, and so suffer'd themselves to be made a Property to those who would make them a Sacrifice. A third Author, to name no more, highly extols the Dissenters [26] for their unshaken Behavior under Charles the Second: [3] That Honest People, says he, tho' hated and malign'd by their Brethren, rather than be found aiding the King in his Usurpations over the Kingdom, have chosen to undergo the utmost Calamities they could be made subject unto, either thro the execution of those Laws which had bin made against them, or thro our Princes and their Ministers wrecking their Malice upon them in arbitrary and illegal methods. Now as the Churchmen, who forget this Language, and are for breaking the present Toleration, deserve to be censur'd, so the Dissenters have not been wholly blameless in this Reign; they have shewn but too much Countenance to the late Attempts against the Quakers , which will make others have the less Compassion for themselves, if ever they should fall again under the Lash of their Enemies, which is a thing not impossible. I know they justify their promoting Penal Laws against the Socinians, as if it had not bin for any difference in Religion, but on the account of Blasphemy : but let them [27] read Fox's Martyrology, and they'll find Queen Mary 's Judges made use of that Distinction before them; for they pretended not to burn the Protestants for any speculative Notions, but for refusing actual Worship to Jesus Christ in the Sacrament, which they interpreted a denying of Honor to God, and so to be consequently Blasphemy. They would likewise do well not to ingage one another in public Disputations, nor to accept of Challenges to this purpose from their Adversaries. 'Twas never known that such Meetings produc'd any good effects, where the Antagonists (like so many Gladiators) eagerly contend for Victory, and mind nothing less than the search of Truth. Each Party misrepresents the other in the accounts they give of their Proceedings: besides that, this is the ready way to occasion Tumults, to the endangering the public Peace. 'Tis not Liberty but Licentiousness, and was never intended by the Toleration. If they be not likewise fatally blind, they may perceive the Endeavors which are us'd to draw them into a Paper War, which they ought by all means to avoid. But [28] their most general Failing is, being a little too much Courtiers of late. I know this to be an honest Mistake, partly occasion'd by their fear of the Common Enemy, and partly out of gratitude to the King, for being so instrumental in procuring their Liberty. A great deal is certainly to be allow'd in both these cases, but yet such Pretences may be carried too far ; witness their being last Year almost all for a Standing Army, and for som other invidious points. I heard an eminent Person say, not long since, That the Dissenters were the Tories of this Reign; and, that they made as great Bugbears of France and Popery on all occasions now, as others made in former days of the Monarchy and Church. I have bin the longer on this Head of governing by Parties in Religion , because it enters more or less into all our other Divisions, and has bin not only the chiefest, but also the*

most successful Machine of the Conspirators against our Government, well knowing with what fury Men oppose one another, when they imagin they are fighting for God, and hazarding the Salvation of their Souls. [29] But we must in Justice observe, that King *William* is so far from setting his Subjects together by the Ears about Religion, or making it only a politic Fetch to serve his privat Ends, that on his Accession to the Throne, he (together with the late Queen) summond a Convocation of the Clergy, either wholly to compose our Differences, or to make the terms of Communion with our Church so easie, that very few Protestants, at home or abroad, would scruple conforming with it. The chief Heads recommended in their Commission were, *Convenient Alterations in the Liturgy, Ceremonies, and Canons; the correcting of Abuses in Ecclesiastical by Courts ; the Examination of Persons who were to be admitted into Orders, as well as the removing of scandalous Ministers; and Reformation of Manners in the Clergy and People.* If you know who obstructed such pious Designs, you likewise know who repine and murmur at the present Toleration. But we despair not of yet seeing a better Temper towards the accomna plishing, so desirable a Union, which [30] can never be effected but in the way of Peace and mutual Condescensions : for, as Sir *William Temple* rightly observes, *Whosoever designs the change of Religion in a Contry or Government, by any other means than that of a general Conversion of the People, or the greatest part of them, designs all the Mischiefs to a Nation that use to usher in or attend the two greatest Distempers of a State, Civil War or Tyranny ; which are Violence, Oppression, Cruelly, Rapine, Intemperance, Injustice; in short, the miserable Effusion of Human Blood, and the Confusion of all Laws, Orders, and Virtues among Men. Such Consequences as these, I doubt, are somthing more than the disputed Opinions of any Man, or any particular Assembly of Men, can be worth; since the great and general End of all Religion, next to Mens Happiness hereafter, is their Happiness here .* To conclude this Point; both Parties may safely take the friendly Advice of one not servilely addicted to either, when they consider that *Themistius*, a Heathen Philosopher, being heartily concern'd for the common Good, offer'd such convincing Reasons against Persecution [31] to *Valens* the *Arian* Emperor, that he stop'd his Severities against the Orthodox Christians.

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### CHAP. III. The Art of Governing by Parities in Politics.↵

AS King *Charles* deluded the Clergy into his measures by the fear of *Presbytery* , his next Trick was to divide the Laity in their Politics, and to possess the Royalists with apprehensions of a *Commonwealth*. All the World knows that *England* is under a free Government, whose Supreme Legislative Power is lodgd in the King, Lords, and Commons, each of which have their peculiar Privileges and Prerogatives; no Law can pass without their common Authority or Consent; and they are a mutual check and balance on one another's Oversights or Encroachments. This [32] Government is calculated for the Interest of all the Parties concern'd, which are all the Inhabitants of *England* ; wherfore it depends on their Good will, and is supported by their Wealth and Power. Bur in Absolute Monarchy all things are only subservient to the Pleasure or Grandeur of the Prince, who therfore by force of Arms maintains his Dominion over the People, on whom he looks but as his Herd and Inheritance, to be us'd and dispos'd as he thinks convenient. In opposition to such arbitrary Governments, those have bin call'd Commonwealths, where the common good of all was indifferently defign'd and pursu'd. But tho' they agree in their main end , yet they often differ about the means, in the names of their Magistracies, and som other Circumstances. Thus the two Kings of *Sparta* had no more Authority than a Duke of *Venice* ; and the Statholder of *Holland* has more real Power tho' less State and Dignity than either of them. A Commonwealth, when the Administration lies in the People, is call'd a Democracy, when [33] 'tis solely or for the most part in the Nobility, 'tis then an Aristocracy ; but when 'tis shar'd between the Commons, the Lords, and the supreme Magistrate (term him King, Duke, Emperor, or what you please) 'tis then a mixt form, and is by *Polybius* and many Judicious Politicians among the Ancients esteem'd the most equal, lasting, and perfect of all others. In this sense *England* is undeniably a Commonwealth, tho' it be ordinarily stild a Monarchy because the chief Magistrat is call'd a King. Such as are afraid therfore that *England* should becom a Commonwealth, may be suspected not to understand their own Language, and those who talk of making it one, may dream of turning it into an Aristocracy or Democracy, but can never make it more a Commonwealth than it is already. This is our admirable Constitution. But it will be thought strange, that any Persons fhould be found endeavoring to strip themselves of their Liberty, and to leave all their Posterity enslav'd ; yet experience will not let us doubt that [34] there is any thing so absur'd into which som may not be cheated or corrupted. The several Factions who usurp'd the Government, and maintain'd themselves by military Force before the Restauration, assum'd the Title of a Commonwealth, tho' they were the farthest imaginable from the thing. The People, who smarted under their Tyranny, abhorr'd the very name ever after ; tho' they have given sufficient demonstration since that time, that there are not more passionat Lovers of Liberty on Earth. King *Charles*, who wanted no Cunning, took the advantage of their mistake, and bubl'd us almost out of our Constitution before we perceiv'd it under hand. Every body was afraid of relapsing into the former Confusions; and he dextrously insinuated by his Instruments, that nothing but the increase of his Prerogative could possibly prevent it. All the Dissenters from the Eltablish'd Church were made to pass for Commonwealths Men, nor cou'd a Man escape that Imputation who grudg'd the King any power, tho' never so [35] dangerous, insomuch that all Mouths were stop'd, and the friends of their Country cou'd only privately lament its approaching Ruin. At last the patience of good Men being quite worn out, they begun to complain loudly of their grievances, and the Creatures of Prerogative as loudly oppos'd them, which made them mortally hate one another of course, while the King laugh'd in his sleeves at the sport, and took special care to keep their animosities alive. The charge of Rebellion was urg'd as much by one side, as deni'd by the other; and both made the highest pretences to Loyalty, tho' each of them wou'd wholly Ingross that virtue to themselves. They branded one another with opprobrious Names. In

Parlament they were call'd Patriots and Loyalists, or the Court and Country Parties: but in all other Places they were distinguish'd into Whigs and Tories, being the names of Highwaymen in *Scotland* and *Ireland* ; the Courtiers intending thereby to make the Patriots pass for Presbyterians, and the Patriots reproaching the [37] Courtiers with Popery. Considering all things, 'tis a much greater wonder that the Whigs were not quite destroy'd, than that they had a great while the worst on't, being excluded from all Favor at Court, and doom'd to Hell by the Church, as if Heaven and Earth had combin'd against them. Under color of keeping them under Hatches, a great part of the Protestants were disarm'd, turn'd our of their posts in Corporations, debarr'd from all Offices of Profit or Honor, standing Forces kept on foot, and, not to be too particular, there was nothing so Arbitrary or Illegal which was not encourag'd by the Tories, against the Whigs, tho they might be sure to suffer by it themselves (as plainly they did) at last. The Papists all the while were not only conniv'd at, secretly carest, and allow'd to be very Loyal Subjects, but also publicly tolerated and admitted against Law into Civil and Military Employments. But no Engin serv'd half so well as the deluded or ambitious Churchmen to inflame these differences, and to render [36] that Party odious which they took for Enemies to themselves and the King : for the Clergy can make a sudden and universal insinuation of whatever they please, by reason of their subordinate degrees, and their being posted more commodiously than any Army, one at least in every Parish all over the Kingdom. They publish'd therefore and infus'd every where the orders of the Court, they were very busie, and had no small influence in Elections for Members of Parlament. They Preach'd not only Passive-Obedience and Non-Resistance, but recommended and approv'd all the King's illegal proceedings in taking away the Charters or Freedoms of Towns ; making of unqualifi'd Sheriffs, and packing of Juries to deprive Men of their lives under forms of Law; imposing Arbitrary and Exorbitant Fines on such Persons as did but complain or modestly assert our Rights; the frequent Proroguing and Dissolving o: Parlaments, without giving them time or opportunity to consider the good of the Nation: and, as if all this and a great [38] deal besides were not enough, they ridicul'd the horrid Plots of the Papists against their own Religion, and labor'd to fasten them on their Protestant Brethren. Such as these were the Men who then appropriated to themselves the name of the Church of *England*, but were really the scandal and betrayers of it, mercenary Drudges of the Court, and the publ'd Tools of Popery. But to their eternal Honor, most of those who were eminent for their Learning, Birth, or good Sense, continu'd stedfast to the true Interest of the Protestant Religion, and our excellent Government. Tho the Conspirators and Desertors made a mighty noise, yet their number was contemptible in Comparison of the honest Churchmen, who were not to be frighted or cosen'd out of their Duty. Indeed moderat Men were discourag'd at that time; but they bore it patiently, as became their Character. They were all both Clergy and Laymen made to pass for Whigs, and the Whigs to be all Presbyterians; yet much the greatest and ablest part of those call'd Whigs then, [39] and at this present time, are sincere Members of the Church of *England* : but som will admit none to be a true Churchman, who is for allowing any Liberty of Conscience to others; and if they mean the Church of *Rome* while they pretend the Church of *England* , they are certainly in the right. In *Ireland*, where they had no measures to observe in King *James's* time, the Papists exclaim'd against High-Churchmen, Low-Churchmen, and all Protestants promiscuously, as a pack of disloyal Whigs; which, one would think, shou'd perswade them now to a stricter union, or, at least, to forbear all contumelious distinctions. We may perceive what numbers were gain'd, and what advances were made to arbitrary Power in the late Reigns, by the Addresses and Abhorrences then presented from all parts of *England* , fom thanking the King for dissolving a Parlament, others that he condescended to let any meet, and many encouraging him to summon none at all. There wanted not such as maintain'd the natural and divine right of Arbitrary power it self [40] as well as of Kingship, witness the Publication of *Filmer's Patriarcha* ; and those thought themselves very modest who (with Doctor *Brady* ) made us legal Slaves, affirming that we lost all Title to Liberty or Property by the Conquest of *William the Norman*, and that

any thing possess by *Englishmen* since was from the favor of our Kings, which they might recall at their pleasure. In such perillous times 'tis no wonder if several noble and worthy Patriots lost their lives by privat Assassinations, captious quirks of Law, false and perjurd Evidence; nor was any method thought too dishonest or barbarous to reach those who wou'd otherwise be rubs in the way of their designs. Notwithstanding all these Discouragements, that Party who espous'd the defence of Liberty and Property maintain'd themselves against the craft and power of Lewd and Arbitrary Kings, against a flattering Clergy, a prostitute Ministry, a corrupt set of Judges, a mercenary Army, and Justices purposely chosen to oppress them. There are great complaints [41] now of the Immortality of the Nation, and I wish there were not such just reasons for it: but with all our failings it can scarce be paralel'd in History, that any People under the like Circumstances preserv'd their Liberty. This may well be allow'd for a miracle, tho I must reckon it a greater that any remains of these Animosities shou'd disturb us under the present King, who is no way ingag'd in the treacherous designs of his Predecessors; but on the contrary came generously to rescue us from Popery and Slavery, and to secure us for ever hereafter from those worst of Plagues. Yet there's but too much of these ill humors stirring among us still. Divisions ought carefully to be avoided in all good Governments, and a King can never lessen himself more than by heading of a Party; for therby he becoms only the King of a Faction, and ceases to be the common Father of his people. If he's visibly partial to one Party, and confers on them only all Places of Honor and Profit ; he naturally makes the other Party hate him, who, finding themselves [42] unjustly excluded from Confidence and Preferment, will be incessantly laboring to destroy him as their Enemy and Oppressor. The Matter is still worse if instead of Governing his whole Kingdom, he's actually Govern'd himself by a Party; for they care not in what dishonorable, difficult, or desperat attemts they involve him, to gratifie their revenge on the other side, whom they fail not to represent as Enemies to his Person, or Dangerous to his Government, and they are sure to be treated accordingly. But the worst of all is, when he not only chuses to Govern by a Party, but is given to change sides as he finds it make for his turn, or as either of them happens to outbid the other in executing his projects, or complying with his desires. Then all the Administration grows unsteddy, Councils uncertain, no Union at home, less Credit abroad, and a general slackness in Execution; no body knowing what Party to please, or how to act with security, since what is allow'd by those in present power, may for no other reason be [43] disaprov'd by the others when it coms to their turn to be the Favorits. And such Revolutions are quickly made : for as soon as one Party looles their Credit with the Nation, or refuses to grant any of the Princes demands tho never so unseasonable, they are turn'd off without farther Ceremony, and their mortal Foes advanc'd into the Sadle. If a Man were so indifferent or hard-hearted as to sport with our Calamitys, it were no unpleasant entertainment to consider what miserable handles are taken somtimes when the disgrace of a Party is resolv'd. The Knavery, for instance, or Miscarriage of some few is heavily charg'd on all those of the same denomination, and nothing less can do than wholly to change hands for the opposit Faction ; just as if there were no wiser or honester Men among the Whigs, than those who were lately turn'd out. But as his present Majesty dos not govern by such Arts, so there are not produc'd for an Example ; nor is there any fear of his imploying Tories on this account. As no [44] mortal, tho' incomparable for virtue, or in never so exalted a station, is secure from the censures of Jealous, Weak, and Malitious Persons; so we must not dissemble that even King *William* was calumniated by many to affect this method of governing by Parties that is in Plain *English* of governing by Tricks. The unhappy accidents that gave occasion to this surmise are very accountable : and I question not so to vindicat his Majesty from such an unjust Imputation, that he must stand clear of it in the minds of all his loving Subjects. Pursuant to his Heroic and God-like design, he resolv'd on his first coming here to abolish our infamous distinctions both in Church and State, and intended to receive the good Men of all Parties into equal Favor, Protection, and Trust : not that he design'd to Imploy any who continu'd still a Tory ; that is, who retain'd his



old notions of Passive Obedience, unlimited Prerogative, the divine right of Monarchy, or who was averse to Liberty of Conscience. But thinking that, according to their own [45] declar'd Resolutions, they had quitted such wicked Principles as had lately endanger'd their Ruin, he elevated several of them to the most eminent Posts in the Kingdom. Nor was he too hasty in trusting them, considering that in the latter end of King *James's* Reign they openly acknowledg'd their shame for being made such tools to his Brother and him, pretended a world of sorrow for contributing so much to our past and present misfortunes, and exprest hearty resolutions of future amendment. And, in effect, all differences seem'd to be forgot when the Prince of *Orange* landed. But alas ! the Tories quickly return'd to their Vomit, they fiercely oppos'd the making him King, would have him at most but a Regent accountable to his Father-in-Law, whom they positively refus'd to abjure, us'd their utmost endeavors to restore the Latter, affirming him still to be the rightful King, and allow'd the former to be only a King *de facto*. Notwithstanding this ungenerous Treatment , King *Willam*, a I said before, admitted several of them into [46] his Councils and Ministry, without gaining the Party to his Interest; they appear'd displeas'd with his good Fortune, rejoic'd whenever they heard of his ill Success, and som of them dayly betray'd him by means of those very trusts he had plac'd in their hands. The frequent discovery of their Plots, Correspondence, and Treacheries, with a universal series of design'd mismanagements in every Part of the Goverment, open'd the Eys of all who were unalterable friends to their Country; and they made the K. fo fensible of his own and the Nations most dangerous Condition, that he betook himself to the only proper remedy of saving both, which was by placing the Administration in the Hands of Persons that had oppos'd the late Usurpations, help'd to advance himself to the Throne , and were all their Lives the profess'd Enemies of Popery and *France*. Yet (according to that merciful disposition which is natural to him) he laid aside the Torys, som so Privately, som so gently, and others with so much seeming Reluctancy, that many of the warm [47] Whigs exceeded the Bounds of Decency on that account; they Swore that all Kings were alike, that the Fault lay in the Office and not in the Persons, that every one of them lov'd Arbitrary Power and Consequently Men of Arbitrary Principles, that they had only chang'd the Huntsman but that the Hounds were to be still the same : and that they hop'd for little benefit from having the Whigs prefer'd, believing that either they must do such things as were only fit for Torys, or that they must be soon turn'd out as a parcel of stubborn, opinionative, and uncourtly Fellows, who were strangers to the Art of pleasing Kings, Cheating the People, and enriching themselves. However they were quickly cur'd of their Mistake, the King fell in heartily with the Public Interest, his new Ministers serv'd him faithfully for a considerable Time, and all our Affairs took a better Face both at Home and Abroad, by Land and Sea. But see the Instability of human Councils , som of those surly Whigs grew by degrees the most pliant Gentlemen [48] imaginable, they cou'd think no revenue too great for the King nor would suffer his Prerogative to be lessen'd, they were on frivolous pretences for keeping up a Standing Army to our further Peril and Charge, they filled all Places in their disposal with their own Creatures, combin'd together for their common Impunity, whoever found fault with their Conduct they represented him as an Enemy to the Goverment, and even oppos'd the best of Laws, lest the Torys, as they said, shou'd partake of the Benefit. Surely these Gentlemen, if it were in their Power, wou'd not suffer the Sun to shine on any but themselves and their Faction. But as this Language, this Partiality, this Conduct, were directly contrary to the Principles and Practices of the Whigs (and the Torys themselves will do Justice to the old Whigs) so these Apostats were abandon'd by their former Friends, and left to the support of their own Interest, which appear'd to be so very little with any Party that the King did wisely cashier them. Indeed som People who were well enough pleas'd [49] with this piece of Justice, are yet so weak as to fear lest he shou'd now establish a Tory Ministry ; but this is in good earnest to think him weaker than themselves, since he has already experienc'd both the Inconsistency of a Tory Administration with the Genius of the Kingdom, and their irreconcilable hatred of his own

Person. 'Tis manifest by all his steps that he loves not to govern by Partys, but rather when his Ministers form themselves into Partys, he'll have nothing to do with them any longer: But what need they be afraid ; for supposing the worst (tho I am confident the supposition is absurd ) what can he gain by taking in the Torys, whose Interest can hold no balance with that of the Liberty and Property Men? He may soon be reduc'd to the same straights and uneasiness, as in the first four years of his Reign, and be oblig'd to hear the same ungrateful clamors again: or suppose yet farther, that the Torys (from a sense of the violence of their Nature, and the smalness of their number) shou'd attempt to govern by [50] force, as they did in the late Reigns, then let them remember that they have to do with. Whigs, Men that will neither be frighted nor flatter'd out of their Liberties ; Men that will adhere to their principles in spite of Discountenance, Prisons, Exile, or Proscriptions; and Men, in short, that may be cheated twice, but will make sure work the third time. They have som Fools and Knaves among them, as all great Bodies must needs have, when there was a *Judas* among twelve Apostles : but nine parts in ten of the Kingdom are certainly in the scale of Liberty. Now to leave suppositions, 'tis notoriously known that they were the Whigs themselves who bore hardest on som of the late Ministry, that they were Whigs who wrote all the Books against standing Armys, or for making the Fleet and Militia useful ; and that no Tory cou'd openly oppose the Court but on a Whiggilh bottom, leaving the honor of their secret Conspiracies to their own Principles. But as I have made it plain that King *William* has never yet degraded himself [51] to becom the Head of any Party : so I dare engage he'll never do it the rest of his time, which I pray God may be long and prosperous. Next to our Preservation, his chiefest Care will be to bring us all into the same Interest, which is the only thing that can heal our Divisions. The mischiefs proceeding from the difference of Partys are too much felt not to be known, and I shall have occasion in this Treatise to mention the worst of them: but there's one particularly which is not so easily perceiv'd, yet has as pernicious effects as any of the rest ; and it is that a world of People change their Principles or act in contradiction to them, while at the same time they go under their old denomination, whereby the simplest, and therefore the greatest part of their friends, are frequently cheated. For such a person having bin all his Life reputed a Whig (for example) and still calling himself so, they continue their good opinion of him tho he is the most corrupt Man a live, and is purchafing Wealth or Honor at the [52] price of those Liberties which they intrusted him to preserve. Nay tho somtimes with their own eyes they see him do what they wou'd approve in no other, and cannot defend in him, yet they are apt to imagin that he steps out of the common road with som honest design; and so he is supported by the credit of that Party which he is discrediting or destroying all the while. I need not bring examples of what we behold every day. On the contrary, if one who was a Tory in the late Reigns asserts our common Rights with all the Reason and Vigor that may be ; yet they'll never believe him sincere, and will often oppose their own Interest because promoted by one, who they cannot be perswaded, intends them any good. Thus they run headlong into two extremes, as if no Man once in the right cou'd ever be afterwards in the Wrong, or no Man once in the Wrong cou'd ever com to be again in the Right. The former of these Opinions is as foolish as the latter is uncharitable. But there's one evident Inference to be drawn from [54] those people's mistakes, that *we may be often deceivid in Men, but never in Principles*. Men may go backwards and forwards, but Principles are eternally the same; wherfore the Actions of a Man, and not his Profession, are the best demonstration of his Principles. The warmest opposers of Prerogative in the three last Parlements of *Charles* the II. were either Cavaliers, or the Children of such; and the Liberties of *England* are not a little beholding in this Reign to Torys, I mean to persons so esteem'd, or who perhaps were in reality such before they had better information. But shou'd it be demanded if I wou'd have no distinction made between Whigs and Torys, if I wou'd have them both indifferently taken into the Ministry, or chosen into Parfament ? I answer, in the first place, that those, who, out of privat designs or particular Quarrels, combine together, and enroll themselves into such Factions, ought to be excluded our of all places on all hands.

But I answer secondly, that understanding Whigs and Torys as I have stated [54] those Names in the former part of this Chapter, there can be no balancing in prefering a Whig to a Tory ; that is, a free Government to Arbitrary Power, the Protestant Religion to Popery, *England to France*, and, if I may add one thing more, *King William to King James*. But then it must be remember'd that no great heed is to be given to names or times ; for the best way of discovering the true Whigs is by their actions. Yet one Observation ought to be made, and it is, that as the apostat Whigs of our time deserve to be mark'd with Infamy; so the leading Torys who formerly dipt their hands in the Blood of their fellow Citizens, or who were the principal Agents and Instruments of the Court, ought in my opinion to be excluded out of all Trust. Every body wou'd justly wonder to see those Judges now on the Bench, who then declar'd for the King's Will against our Laws, and implicitly serv'd all his purposes of Impoverishing, Inflaving, or Murdering his Subjects. But wou'd it not be as great wonder to [55] see any of King *Charles's* French Pensionors, or of King *James's* evil Counsellors, restor'd to Favoror Preferment in the present Government, which was set up not only to reform the disorders introduced by those persons, but also to prevent the like for the time to com. But as there is no danger of such a fatal error, so this is spoken only for Caution. Thus I have given an account how the Nation was divided in their Politics, and how both the Parties have bin plaid one against another, the better to subdue or destroy them. It will have this use for the future, that as oft as the like course is taken, we may guess what is meant by it, and consequently be prepar'd for our Defence : for, as the Proverb says, *forewarn'd forearm'd*.

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## CHAP. IV.

**The Art of Governing by Parties in Parliament.** ↩

THE Great Council, or Supreme Legislative Power of *England* is call'd the Parliament ; and as it is by the Wisdom and Virtue of this Assembly that all our Rights are preserv'd, asserted, or enlarg'd ; so it is a known Maxim, that we can never be destroy'd but by a Parliament. Such Princes therefore as aim'd at Despotic Power, left no stone unturn'd to get one to their mind, knowing this to be the certain means of pulling down our Constitution at once: for the people have such a veneration for the Sanctions of their Parliaments, and are so sensible of the [57] Protection they have always receiv'd from them, that they think it almost impossible they shou'd mistake their true Interest, much less be Guilty of such Ingratitude and Treachery, as to join in any base designs against those who honor'd them with being their Representatives. My business at present is not to shew what progress som of our Kings before *Henry VII.* made towards the gaining of Parliaments to favor their Tyrannical Projects, partly by personal Services, or by the Tenures immediatly held of themselves; and partly by the dependencies or retainers of such Lords as seconded their Intentions. But *Charles II.* being still of a piece with himself, had very nigh accomplish'd by Partys, Places, and Pensions, what all the slight or force of his Predecessors cou'd never compass. The same Religious and Politic Factions by which he divided not only the whole Kingdom, but even privat Conversation and Families, reign'd most of all in Parliament. The Zealous Church-men wou'd not [58] stick at granting him any thing (tho never so destructive to the Protestant Religion) on condition he rigorously executed the penal Laws against Dissenters; and the Torys were always ready to make him a Sacrifice of the public Liberty, if he wou'd but assist them to plague or suppress the Whigs: and we may charitably suppose that the Dissenters and Whigs were not behind hand with their Enemies as often as they had opportunity, which was very seldom. It came at length to that pass, that whatever Bill was brought into the House by one Party, was for that only reason fiercely oppos'd by the other, without ever entering into the Merits or Consequence of it; so that the best Laws were got or lost according as they happen'd to be mov'd or oppos'd by the stronger side. But left his Partizans shou'd grow lukewarm or changeable, he fortify'd them in their Principles by the addition of all the places in his disposal ; and when he had no more left to bestow, he brib'd as many as he cou'd of the rest by secret Pensions. [59] The Fools or Knaves of Estates usually din'd with the Chief Ministers and Favorites: while Tables were kept for the poorer sort at *White-hall*, in *Westminster* , and therabouts, that they might be always ready within call. They punctually knew their pay-day, and a great Officer said, that they came about him like so many Jackdaws for Cheese, at the end of every Session. All these joyn'd together like an impenetrable Phalanx, and Voted, says one, as lumpingly in the House of Commons, as the Lawn-Sleeves did in the House of Lords. They never differ'd about their Opinions in the House, notwithstanding that many of them were mortal Enemies, and of quite contrary Sentiments abroad. It were endless to enumerat the mischiefs occasion'd by those hirelings, most of them are remember'd by every body, many of their sad effects are still felt, and they are all the proper subject of a Historian; yet one thing I must not forget in this place, that they constantly over-look'd or [60] occasion'd all the ill husbandry of the Government, that they might have their Share in its Bribery and Profuseness. But the greatest corruption introdu'd in that Reign were the Expences of Candidats at Elections. The Courtiers suppli'd their want of merit with presents and good fellowship, and the charges of the Pensioners were defray'd by the King : which oblig'd the honest and sober Gentlemen to treat likewise in their own defence, lest the Nation should be intirely drunk and bought out of their Liberties. Excepting therefore such Persons as are under this last necessity, I doubt not but all those who buy their

Elections sell their Votes; and, tho I have no great opinion of their virtue in other things, yet I believe in this respect they observe the first precept of Morality, to do nothing to others but what they would have done to themselves. Thus the Men, who ought to reform our Manners, make not only Lewdness, Drunkenness, Bribery, and Prodigality habitual all over the Kingdom; but raise a sort of Civil War, creating quarrels [61] and perpetual animosities in all Countys and Corporations : and the Worthy'st Persons commonly decline to stand for fear of being oblig'd to abhor'd Intemperance, or to ruin their Estates. King *James* the First was so overjoy'd to hear of his great Power when he came into *England*, that he could not forbear exclaiming, *Do I mak the Judges, Do I mak the Bushops ? Than, Godiswaans, I's mak ony thing that pleeses me to be Law and Gospel*. But his Grandson discover'd likewise the secret of making what Parliament he pleas'd, and so consequently of setting up what Government he pleas'd : nor could he have fail'd of thro success, had it not bin for the vast sums he squandred away on his Whores and other Pleasures. I wish there was no reason to complain of such vitious practices about Elections now; but daily Experience as well as the frequent Laws enacted to regulat such abuses, will not let us doubt of the fact. It was a main point gain'd to a Party, if the Sherrif of a County, or Major of a Town was one of their number: [62] for if their Man had miscarry'd, right or wrong he made a double return; and so the matter was refer'd to the Committee of Elections, where Victory was intail'd not on the Justice of the Cause, but the strength of the Party.'Tis a shame to consider the scandalous partiality which is still us'd in such Cases, and how frankly som declare their resolutions before they hear a word of the debate, which makes it a common saying in all Mens mouths, that a *Committee of Elections is a Committee of Affections* : nor is it past the memory of Man since a certain Person swore he would Petition, tho' he had but 20 votes to a 100, because he was sure his Party would bring him in. On hearing sometimes from the Members how Debates were manag'd in the House, I could not forbear thinking that I was reading an Epic Poem, where in the relation of som memorable Battle, a particular account is given of the several Nations engag'd on each side, their Leaders, their Numbers, and manner of Fighting : just so for all the World did they talk of Pensioners, [63] Officers, and Tories on this side; of Republicans, Whigs, and Dissenters on the other. Honors, Preferments, Dependance, or Expectations, were the privat Motives of most, the Interest of their Party was profest by all, and the good of the public minded by none or a very few. But, what makes the Military allusion still more apposit, I was likewise told of a flying Squadron that hover'd about both Armies, and that turn'd the fortune of the day as they were dispos'd to join the one side or the other. So much of this temper is still remaining (as habitual dispositions cannot be chang'd of a sudden) that you may know the several Partys (they say) by their very seats in the House ) of Commons, where they have their peculiar sides and corners. The true Patriots in most public Assemblies (the Men above fears, hopes, or dissimulation) have bin ever so few, that, without taking advantage of the designs or resentments of others, they could never carry any thing. When they oppose the Court (for example) they are join'd first by those who think [64] themselves no less deserving or qualify'd than such as are already in Employments, which makes them peevish and resty till (according to the modish Phrase) they are taken off: and secondly, they are assisted by the real Enemies of the Government; who seek not to mend but to destroy it, which makes them often do great service to the Kingdom only that they may create a little vexation to the King. They are sure of the Courtiers in all Bills for supplys; or granting of Mony for any purpose, because that passing thro their own hands, they know a large shar of it must stick to their fingers ; and they side with them in preserving the present Government, because they flatter themselves with being always the present Ministers. Many of the best Laws are procur'd after this manner, or by the bargains they make interchangably to join for such a Bill desir'd by one fide, on Condition of gratifying the other in one as good. But then how many excellent Laws pass with much difficulty, or are quite laid aside, purely for being [65] mov'd by one of the Parties? was not the very reforming our Coin oppos'd by a Party ? dos not the Bill for making the Militia useful still depend, by reason of the clashing of Parties? are not Parties the

occasion that mismanagements are not inquir'd into, that the Criminals of their number are not punish'd, that a naturalization dare scarce be nam'd in the House, and that the King knows not on what or whom to depend? But not to lanch into the boundless Ocean of mischiefs proceeding from Parties in Parliament, dos not every body pretend to guess at the reason why the *Selfdenying Bill* is so often talk'd of, and as often dropt ev'ry Sessions ? This Bill makes all those incapable to sit in Parliament, who hold any Office during the pleasure of the Court, because such Men depend on the King more than is consistent with the freedom of a Parliament Man: and if any of them be proof against this temptation (as I am sure there are Men of that virtue) yet still it makes them more suspected than well agrees with their own quiet [66] or reputation. And tis matter of fact that the Gentlemen injoying those Preferments do generally vote together on all occasions, which few will believe to proceed from accident, or any Sympathy in Nature, tho' certain occult qualities may have a great influence on their Judgments. Why such a Bill is oppos'd by the Officers themselves, needs no explanation ; but som will tell you that the other Party press this Bill till those Men are like to be ejected, and that then they let it drop out of hopes to step into their places. However the Representatives may act, the sense of the Nation is for the Bill. But I think there is an obvious expedient without going to extremes, for 'tis possible that the same person may keep his Seat in Parliament and have any place to boot, yet be an Independent and honest Man; for let those Preferments be but conferr'd for life, and the dispute is immediatly at an end. But either the Bill or this expedient must be had; the Nation will never be satisfy'd without the one or the other; and what the [67] honest men in the House cannot obtain at once, they will procure by degrees : witness last Sessions the exclusion of those concern'd in managing the Excise, a clause in an act som years before which incapacitated others, and its believ'd at their next meeting they'll get rid of the Commissioners of the Customs. I will not insist on the splitting or dividing of Offices among several Persons, which us'd to be executed by fewer ; nor mention such useless Employments as rather look like Pensions than Preferments. But I must own that more than once I heard fom of the Men in places complain, that, tho they received no Commands from Court, yet they did not find themselves free Agents, lest they should lose what was their whole subsistance, or that cost them considerable sums; and for this last reason many Gentlemen are not willing to get such places for their Sons, tho otherwise it be their earnest desire to breed them in business. We know by the Event that the two last Kings made Patents void, and bestow'd places (as they fell) [68] during pleasure for promoting their popish and arbitrary designs; which is so inconsistent with King *William's* actual delivering us from Slavery, and his solemn Ingagements to defend our Liberty against all future attempts, that no honest Man can think he ever did it for the same or the like ends : wherfore by reason Matters were extremely unsetl'd at the beginning, and that being a stranger to Mens Characters and Persons, he might reward or intrust enemies instead of friends, he follow'd such measures as were contrary to no Law, and left him room to rectifie mistakes ; but now after 12 years Reign in *England*, 'tis time to take another course, more bonorable for himself and acceptable to his People, Upon the whole, as things have been manag'd, 'tis grown such a matter of suspicion to have a place, that a man is counted dishonest for no other reason in the world, which brings an unspeakable obstruction to public affairs. And when a House of Commons. thus abounds with Officers, the people will be apt to ask such questions as one of 'em [69] did som time ago in the most public manner: as, [4] whether a Parliament filld with Delinquents will ever call themselves to an account, or what account wou'd be given if they should? Whether an assembly of public Robbers will sentence one another to be punish'd or to make restitution? whether it is possible those Grievances can be redrest, which are committed by persons from whom there is no higher power to appeal ? whether there is any hope of Justice, where the Malefactors are the Judges? whether his Majesty can be rightly inform'd in affairs relating to himself or the public, when they are represented to him only by such persons who design to abuse him ? whether the public accounts will be faithfully inspected by those, who imbezzle our Money to their own use? whether the King's

Prerogative can be lawfully maintain'd by such, who only pervert it to their own sinister ends [70] and purposes? whether a Parliament can be a true Ballance, where all the weight lies only in one scale? or whether a House of Commons can vote freely, who are either prepossess'd with the hopes and promises of enjoying places, or the slavish fears of losing them? So much for places. The next thing is how to prevent the growth of private Pensioners. That formerly there existed such a species of monstrous Animals no body doubts; and tho' I know of none among us now, yet they may possibly infect us here: after, and that with the greater hazard, because they are of that kind of venomous Creatures which commonly sting undiscern'd: for (like Cameleons they never appear in their natural colors, but are distinguish'd in the mischief they do by certain Circumstances and Symptoms which are very convincing, tho' they do not always amount to the evidence of proofs. But as for the way to prevent their propagating among us, my opinion in short is, that no remedy can be so proper as *annual Parliaments*: for it will not be worth any Kings [71] while to bribe so many Persons (and be they must always be a great number) that shall be able to gain him any point against the Judgment or interest of the Kingdom; since they are to return so quickly to give an account of their fidelity, under the penalty of shame (as some body expresses it) and to have no further trust. Besides that such payments must come so thick, that the Prince will not only be quickly weary of the charge and change, but likewise be utterly disabl'd from answering their Bills. And this, for the very same reason, is the surest means of preventing Expences at Elections. The Proverb says that men who buy deer cannot live by selling cheap; but if they cannot sell at all, they'll never buy. Some remedies are so adapted by nature to certain distempers, that all others prove tedious, troublesome, or ineffectual; and (let men beat their brains as long as they please) in the cases now mention'd annual Parliaments are the only specific. We have a Statute still in force, *That a Parliament shall be holden ev'ry year once, and more often [72] if need be*; but, as the Duke of *Buckingham* said, Statutes are not like Women, for they are not one jot the worse for being old. The long disuse of this Law is no argument against it, no more than a Man can be justify'd in his Knavery, because 'tis a long time since he was honest. The revival of it makes a sort of Rotation among the Gentlemen into this great School of Wisdom, which a few Persons shou'd not be suffer'd to ingross to themselves. The good Men will in all probability be chosen again, and there ought to be some such speedy method of excluding the bad: whereas to continue the same Persons for several years, is not only an injury to the rest, but the ready way to have most of them corrupted, and to have all of them dwindle into Factions, Parties, and private Animositities. The act for *Triennial Parliaments* is a great step towards this matter, nor has it wanted its good effects. Whatever abuses remain will vanish after the first year they become annual; and 'tis the fault of our Representatives if we do not speedily obtain this Blessing, for [73] the King will as easily grant the one as he did the other. In all well regulated Governments ancient and modern, where there is a frequent alteration of the Representative or Legislative Powers, there are likewise certain times for electing them, and stated Intervals for their assembling and acting. The want of this seems to be no little imperfection in our Constitution, as the establishing of such an order must give mighty ease to the People, without being call'd from their business (as formerly) by sudden or unreasonable summons: and it would beget a greater regularity and steadiness in the public Administration of all domestic and foreign affairs. If any unexpected exigences should require their present help, the King may convoke them *more often if need be*; but then it must be evidently to prevent or redress such inconveniences as cannot wait their annual and fixt period, such as a dangerous Conspiracy, a foreign Invasion, or the like: for otherwise it wou'd only serve to make the members weary of fruitless expensive Journys, and [74] put the Electors to needless Trouble. A farther argument for stated meetings of Parliament, is, that if the House of Lords be a true Judiciary, then 'tis absolutely necessary that it shou'd, like all other Courts, have its proper and fixt seasons of fitting: for otherwise the Subjects are depriv'd of Justice, not being able to make timely appeals, and uncertain when to do so, or if ever they can. But to prevent a thing which we know may happen, no King hereafter can

hinder the Parliament from meeting to dispatch business at the usual time, when the necessity of our affairs at home, and very critical junctures abroad indispensably require it: nor can the whole Nation be kept in suspence, whether the old Parliament should sit, or a new one is to be chosen, which involves all the Gentlemen, and the mean People themselves in a great deal of trouble or expence, and proves extraordinary prejudicial to their business while others are working on the old or the intended new Members, and waiting the favorable time of [75] executing their own projects. But no Government fears a new Parliament but such as deserve their animadversion ; which therefore ought to make the People the more earnest for their meeting. As the Circumstances of things alter, so what was once to good purpose establish'd for the benefit of the Community, may in process of time prove to be of very dangerous and pernicious Consequence ; thus we have Burroughs which were formerly rich and populous (as *Winchelsea* for example) but being now reduc'd to mean villages, there is not still the same reason they shou'd enjoy a privilege of sending members to Parliament. One place, to wit old *Sarum*, has but the bare name of a Corporation left, and it may be truly said of it, that *Cora grows now where Troy Town stood*, there remaining not as much as the ruins of a House to shew it was ever inhabited; yet it sends as many Representatives to Parliament as the richest County in *England*. *Stockbridge, Gatton, Blechingly, Grimsbey, Bramber, Dunwich* , and many more, are of this sort. [76] That these places ought not to send any members, and that their votes may be bought or gain'd by the most indirect methods, every body will confess, but such as despair of being elected where there are more and better Judges of their merit. It being granted therefore that our Representation is very unequal, som have thought of throwing all the Burroughs into the Countys. But not to insist now on the Impracticableness of this Scheme, I conceive (with Deference to better Judgments) that the King may erect new Corporations where Towns are grown to considerable riches and extent, as *Leeds, Hallifax, Manchester, Newbury, Croyden*, and others, som of which had anciently sent members to Parliament, and may now be empower'd (as *Newark* not long since) to elect Representatives. The addition of these new members to the Knights of the shire, and those who serv'd before for larger Burroughs, will quickly disfranchise the Places aforesaid, or always out-vote their members, many of which might approve of this expedient, tho perhaps they [77] wou'd not think decent to appear in it. This is, in my opinion, the easiest way of reducing our Representatives to a due proportion. And to secure it permanent against that common Instability in the Condition of places as well as Persons, there needs but to restrain this privilege to such Corporations as contain a certain Number of Inhabitants, and that pay a certain Sum towards the public charge, to be both specify'd in the act to that purpose. *Henry* the Seventh is often stil'd the *English Solomon*, by reason of those alterations he made in our Ballance; and in som sense he may indeed be counted a new Legislator, tho he never intended us those Blessings which are the effects of his Laws, but purely acted out of privat Interest which greatly detracts from his personal merit. But tho King *William* teems to want no addition to his Glory, having already undergon such infinit hazards, and perform'd so many incomparable actions in vindicating and enlarging of our Liberty ; yet as an accumulation to his own inward [78] satisfaction, and our unequal'd happiness, he cou'd not do any thing more extraordinary, generous, or beneficial, than concurring to fix the annual seasons of chusing and assembling our Parlements, and bringing our Representatives to so desir'd an Equality. Hereby he might be sure to add new vigor to our Administration in general, as he has already don to many subordinat Parts of it ; he wou'd enjoy the Honor of settling the *English* Government, which has been ever hitherto in such a floating and uncertain condition, that People were at a loss by what name to call it ; he wou'd obscure the lustre of fortuitous or ignorant Legislators; render his Person, while alive, the object of all good mens expectations or praise ; and make his name, when dead, universally admir'd, Immortal, and ador'd.



**CHAP. V.**  
**The Art of Governing by Parties on the Bench. ↵**

IN all Political Societies there are Laws promulgat'd and establish'd, to be the general Standard and Measure of every Man's actions, and ordaining express Penalties to be inflicted on the transgressors of the same proportionable to the nature of their Crimes, and to deter others by their example from committing the like Offences. By this means the Wicked are discountenanc'd, repress'd, or extirpated; the Innocent are not only commended and encourag'd, but secur'd in the enjoyment of their Property against all Violence or fraud; and the whole Community is [80] preserv'd in Safety, Honor, and Tranquillity. But as Laws without som Power to put them in Execution, are no more than Canon on a Platform without a Gunner: and that if Men were left to Judge in their own Cases, either they might be too partial to themselves without setting due Bounds to their Passion and Revenge, or, provided they had privat Satisfaction, might be too remiss in making Examples for the benefit of the Society; there are therefore indifferent Judges invested with Public Authority, to decide all Controversies according to the Intent of the laws, and to see Punishment executed on Offenders. In the best Governments, the Legislative and Executive Powers are always plac'd in different hands: for otherwise the makers of the Laws, might intirely exempt themselves from their Jurisdiction, or suit them to their own Advantage; whereas becoming like other Men subject to them as soon as they are ratify'd, and the sentence of the breach to be pronounc'd by other persons, they'll take care at least for their own sakes, that they be [81] calculated for the common good. These public Judges are not constituted barely to hear the Parties, and to read to them the Statutes relating to their several Cases; but also to interpret, apply, and reconcile the Laws, where any Controversie dos arise about their true meaning or Extent. Nor is there any remedy in Nature or Art to prevent such doubts, tho never so much pains be taken in wording them, because, tho many cases may prove in the main to be the same, yet things are so vari'd by Circumstances (not possible to be all foreseen by the Legislators) that no two Cases are ever found to be altogether a like. Wherefore in every Judicatory there is a discretionary (and I may on this occasion say an arbitrary Power) in the Judges to apply the Laws to such different Cases, and to declare to the best of their Skill the meaning of the Lawmakers: but still in using this discretionary Power they must have a regard to natural Equity, by which all other Laws are to be made and interpreted. There's least use of this [82] Arbitrary Power left in the Judges where the Laws are few, short, and plain; but where they are many, voluminous, and intricat, is not only a certain sign of a very unsound Constitution (like a Sick-man's apartment fill'd with Glasses and Gallypots) but there is also most use of this Arbitrary Power left in the Judges both in applying and reconciling them among themselves. 'Tis in making use of this discretionary power that Judges are chiefly corrupted; which is the hardest to be effected where they are many in number, and not more obnoxious to the displeasure, or more dependent on the authority of one Estate than another, where the Supreme Government is log'd in several Orders conjointly, as with us of *England* in the King, Lords, and Commons. Now King *Charles*, and King *James* had our Judges solely at their Devotion on a double Account: for first, wheras before they commonly had their Commissions for Life, they granted none but only during Pleasure, that is as long as they pleas'd them in perverting Justice: [83] and secondly, they would never assign any certain Fund for their salaries, which made them precarious, and liable to the temptation of deserving full and speedy payment. As for the Equity of the Royal Brothers, you may learn it from the Decrees of their Chancellors, who were the Keepers of their Conscience. Their Father before them did by the same arts procure som Judges to declare, that, without consent of Parliament, he might in case of necessity Levy Mony on his

Subjects, and that he was to be Judge of that Necessity. But as if they fear'd that those two hanks were not enough, they cull'd out for their purpose the most stupid, immoral, and illiterat, they cou'd rake out of the Inns of Court. I cannot say they were all a disgrace to the Barr, for som of them seldom appear'd there, but most of them were a Scandal to their Profession. The few honeft Gentlemen they promoted at any time, to gain som countenance to the rest, cou'd do nothing to their minds; and, if likely to live, were soon laid a side, as were all [84] those whom any case show'd the least respect for the Laws, tho in other matters they had gon never so far. Thus was Justice made a mere Property to be bought and sold, and all Judgments given according to directions from Court. They discharg'd Grand-Juries in an illegal manner, and before the usual time; because they receiv'd Presentments against Papists, or for otherwise performing their Duty. They suppress all Books against Popery and arbitrary Power, or that represented any Grievances of the Nation. They inflicted cruel Punishments, and impos'd excessive Fines, not suted to the quality of the Offence, or the ability of the Person. They often refus'd to accept Bail where the Law allow'd it, or requir'd such excessive Bail as amounted to a refusal. They were rather Partys on the Bench than indifferent Judges, threatning, and scurrilously abusing the Prisoners brought before them, or such as appear'd on their behalf. They made no bones of giving Judgment against all the Charters of the Kingdom. They [85] spar'd no Man's Blood which the King or his Ministers had a mind to spill, and favor'd Popery openly; not that they had so much even of errcneous conscience lest as to ly for God, or to do mischief for the zeal they bore to any Religion : but because this was the Will and Pleasure of these King's whose Creatures they were. Now all this was purely the effects of the Nations being divided into Parties : for the Tories supported these Judges as long as their cruel and illegal proceedings were confin'd to the Whigs; not considering that they , who help to set up Arbitrary Power, bring their own Posterity into the same miserable condition with their Enemies : nor can they be sure that the Prince they have gratifi'd shall not forget their Services, and are without all defence against his Tyranny if he shou'd. This happn'd in effect to be the case of our Tory Friends. We related before with what Ingratitude they were treated by King *James* , how they had recourse to the assistance of the Whigs for their deliverance, and even out-did the latter in highly complaining of [86] the violation of the Laws and Liberties of the Kingdom ; so true a guide is nature when premitted to act freely, and that its dictats are not forcibly stiff'd or corrupted. Yet was King *James* no sooner out of the Throne, than several of them seem'd impatient to have him recall'd; but I have lost all Charity for those Men, because I cannot perswade my self but that they saw Popery must be as certain a Consequence of his Restoration, as I wou'd be sure that a Man was resolv'd to drown the Contry of *Holl and* , tho he wou'd make me believe that he only dislik'd the Dykes which I found him laboring to destroy. But to return to the Judges, tho 'tis the business of such as may write the History of those Reigns to enumerat the particulars of their Villany, yet I cannot forbear mentioning that Mr. Baron *Weston*, at the *Surry* Assizes in *Kingston*, after railing in his Charge against *Zuinglius*, *Calvin*, and their Protestant followers in this Kingdom, *They are restless*, said he, *amuzing, us with fears, and nothing will serve them but a Parlament. For my part I know no other Representative of the Nation* [87] *but the King. All Power centers in him, 'Tis true , he dos intrust it with his Ministers, but he is the sole Representative : and I'faith he has wisdom enough to intrust it no more with these Men , who have given such late examples of their wisdom and faithfulness.* These words being prov'd against him by Gentlemen of good Credit, were voted by a Committee of the House of Commons, scandalous to the Reformation, and tending to the subversion of the Goverment. King *James* , who lov'd to make shorter work than his Brother, procur'd a Sentence from them at last that, as a Right belonging to the Crown, he had power to dispense with the Laws, and to Suspend, Stop or disable any or all of them at his Pleasure : *As if it were in the power of the Twelve Judges, Answers King William in his first Declaration, to offer up the Laws, Rights, and Liberties of the whole Nation to the King, to be dispos'd of by him Arbitrarily, and at his Pleasure, and expresly contrary to Laws enacted for the security of the Subjects .*

He adds that in order to the obtaining this Judgment, the King's evil Counsellors did beforehand examin secretly the opinion [88] of the Judges, and procur'd such of them, as cou'd not in Conscience concur in so pernicious a Sentence, to be turn'd out ; and others to be substituted in their rooms, till by the changes which were made in the Courts of Judicature, they at last obtain'd that Judgment. I need not say that som of those Judges were profess'd Papists ; and if we may guess at the Conscience of the rest by their actions, we may without breach of Charity believe that they would never burn for the Protestant Religion who made nothing but Words and Paper of all the Laws in its favor. To make such Men the Judges of Equity and Law, was litterally committing the Sheep to the care of Wolves : and the people had reason to fear them more, than all the Rogues which good Judges were made to prevent. King James's wonderful Politics were grounded on the mean opinion he had of his Subjects understanding, who, he thought, as long as they heard of the word *Law* , and that he did nothing without the opinion of the Judges, wou'd believe all to be safe : whereas they [89] must have a worse understanding than his own, who did not see that this was Governing without any Law or Reason. But in the present Reign we have got an Act of Parliament to continue the Judges for their Lives *quam diu bene se gesserint* , or, as they word it in *Scotland, ad vitam aut culpam*: and to King Willieam's eternal Honor be it remember'd, that there were not so many Men of Ability, Worth, and Integrity, known to be plac'd on the Bench at any time. Great Commendations are given to *Cromwell's* Judges, and to give the Divel his due, he deserv'd well of the Nation in that Particular. But, except the good Sir *Matthew Hales* , they were much inferior to most of those advanc'd since the late Revolution. I believe no age cou'd parallel the two Chief Justices Sir *John Holt*, and Sir *George Treby* ; but since doing Justice to the living is sometimes unjustly counted flattery, I'll only say that the latter (who I hear is lately Dead ) was not only a very Polite and accomplish'd Gentleman, but was also acknowledg'd to be Master of more [90] universal Learning than commonly those of his Profession either can or care to be. Here we may remark the King's good disposition when 'tis fully in his power to ohlige the Nation : for I have made it appear in the forgoing articles that our Religious Politic, and Parliamentary Divisions, are so generally spread that it is not in his power to destroy them suddenly, but having this matter wholly in his disposal, he has remov'd all Corruption from the Bench. Indeed we still want an Act to ascertain som fund for the Salary of the Judges, and there was a Bill since the Revolution past both Houses of Parliament to this purpose: but whether it was for being any way defective or otherwise, that his Majesty refus'd to assent to it, I cannot remember; but I know the reason satisfi'd me at that time. And I make no doubt but he'll consent to any good Bill of this nature whenever 'tis offer'd, which cannot be too soon considering the uncertainty of what may happen after his Death ; and that every precious moment of his Life ought to [91] be improv'd to encrease or secure Felicity. We ought to be the more concern'd about this Point, by reason of its great importance to the preservation of our Lives and Properties, the Peace and Tranquility of the Kingdom: for, as a [5] Man of the late Times has it, *what French Counsils, what Standing Forces, whate Parliamentary Bribes, what National Oaths, and all the other machinations of wicked Men have not yet bin able to effect, may be more compendiously acted by twelve Judges in Scarlet* ; or, as Sir *Matthew Hales* us'd to express it, *by twelve Redcoats in Westminster-Hall*.

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**CHAP. VI.**  
**The Art of Governing by Partys in the Ministry. ↩**

AT length we com to the great Spring, Management, and refuge of all Party-making and Factiors, I mean the Ministers of State. Under a Prince that loves to Govern by the Division of braver Citizens, his Officers are generally cull'd out of a Party, or at least for pretending to be of one; they are to create Partys where yet there are none, and to keep the differences on foot among those already made to their hands. No Ecclesiastic ever boasted of a greater change in his spiritual Faculties since he had receiv'd the indelible Character, than these wou'd perswade us to happen in their [93] understandings as soon as they are admitted into the Secrets of Princes. Such as before were thought at most to be only on a level with their Neighbors (and claim'd no more themselves, but were glad to be allow'd so much ) once they get footing within the Court, becom sawcy to their Betters, despise their Equals, and trample on their Inferiors. All of a sudden they have a wondrous Gravity in their Looks and Motions; affect the wise Grimace and considering Nod; grow perfect strangers to their old acquaintance; and must be approacht by none without a world of Ceremony, which nothing can excuse but a Bribe. But they value themselves above all things on their profound skill in the *Arcana Imperii*, and tho, in the ordinary actions of Life, they possess a very moderat share of Reason ; yet they pretend to be absolute Masters of what they call *Reason of State*. Our Ministers of late years have made no less noise about this same Reason of State, than the *Italians* did in the beginning of this last age, and for som time before : when in reality [94] Reason of State is nothing else but the right reason of managing the affairs of the State at home and abroad, according to the Constitution of the Government, and with regard to the Interest or Power of other Nations. Our Reason of State abroad is to keep *England* the Head of the Protestant Interest in particular ; and to hold such an equal Balance among foren States in general, that none of them grow great enough so to gain on any other as that we may com to be losers by it. Our Reason of State at home, is to administer the Government for the good of the Subjects according to the known Laws of the Land, and sutable to the nature of our fundamental Constitution. But among corrupt Ministers, and above all other's *Charles II's* Tory Ministers, Reason of Stare has ever bin, what *Boccalin* defines in his *Advertisements from Parnassus*, a *certain peculiar Law of their own, which is contra ry in all things to the Laws of God and Man*. Their Reason of State abroad is generally betraying, our State at home; and their Reason at home is [95] to cheat the People as much as they can. Their deepest Policy lies in the Invention of little Tricks, which they take abundance of pains to conceal ; and if the King or themselves fall in danger of being brought into Descredit or Distress by such mean artifices, then he that finds out som new Trick to shift Affairs, or to ward the present blow, what a celebrated Statesman must he be esteem'd ever after ! and his reputation is up-held, tho the speedy discovery of his jugling or bungling shou'd reduce matters into a far worse condition than they were. *They love to fish in trobl'd waters*, says a certain [6] Author, *and they find all disorders profitable to themselves. They can flatter the humor of a misguided Prince, and increase their fortunes by the excesses of a wastful prodigal. The Phrensie of an Imperious Woman is easily render'd propitious to them, and they can turn the Zeal of a violent Biggot to [96] their advantage. The treacheries of false Allies agree with their own corruptions ; and they fear nothing so much as that the King shou'd return to his people, and keep all things quiet, so they almost ever render themselves subservient to such as wou'd disturb them.* And that I may add a great deal in few words, Tricks are so much practis'd , encourag'd, and authoriz'd among them, that a Minister, who shou'd regulat his Conduct or Intrigues by the moral Rules of Prudence, might pass for an honest Man, but wou'd be counted a very sad Polititian. All the villanys of all kinds that we

have hitherto shown to have bin acted in Church or State, in Parliament or on the Bench, with innumerable others which I have neither time nor occasion to mention, were contriv'd, manag'd, and put in execution by the Ministers of our late Kings, of whom som principal Men are yet alive, and in the undisturb'd possession of what they got by selling their Country; a noble instance of the mildness of this Reign ! *K. William* in every Paragraph of his Declaration justly charges those [97] evil Counsellors with all the mischiefs he came over to redress, nay he says much worse things of them than I have laid to their charge in this whole Discourse. Yet so far were any of them from being punish't that none of them was ever question'd, to the no small amazement of all *Europe*. His enemies were not wanting to insinuat that the old Rogues were spar'd, to encourage a new Gang to tread in their steps. But the malice and falsity of this suspition is notorious: first, because his Majesty has once or twice turn'd off his own Ministers, when they gave Subject of complaint to his people; and secondly, because King *James's* Judges were not hang'd, which in fact appears not to have bin omitted to incourage other Judges by their Impunity. But shou'd he, according to the present surmizes, take any of those very persons into his Councils, then som body else must be found to justify him ; for, I confess, I have not one word to say in excuse of such extraordinary proceedings. There are able and honest Men enough among the reputed Whigs and Torgs, that have never [98] yet forfeited their Reputation; and, besides the public actions of the old Ministers which are known to all mankind, there are yet worse Machinations against our Religion and Liberty, which the iniquity of the late times wou'd not bear to com abroad, nor did they seem necessary in this Reign. But if the fortune of *England* is to be committed again into the same hands, it may be reasonably suppos'd they shall not want a due warning of their Danger. But to leave particulars, let's consider a little the management of Ministers under good and bad Princes all over the World. To begin with the latter, the Ministers are commonly chosen out of that Party who owes a revenge to the other, and consequently will oblige the King with any thing, on condition he gratifies their Passion against their Enemies. But when either this Party, by their own Violence and the Knavery of such Tools, coms to be odious to the Nation; or when the Ministers are disown'd in their tricks by those very people that first set them up: then the Prince makes his Court to the other Party [99] who are now becom the strongest, and chosens som popular Men among them for his Confidants and Counsellors. Nevertheless this party-business is all the while but a mere blind for matters go on just as they did; where one left off, the other begins : in Tory out Whig, in Whig out Tory; but you must all serve the same design, if you wou'd merit or retain your Employments. Their Pulses are felt by Men of Experience; and, if any doubt remains of their complying disposition, they must promise beforehand, or all their zeal for a Party will not signifie a straw. But this one mischief is inevitable, that they are supported a long while by the credit of their Party, who can't immediatly discover the cheat ; and are loath to quit them when they do, for fear of power's falling into the hands of their Enemies, thinking it more adviseable to bear with the failings of old Friends, than to stand at the mercy of known Foes. And the Ministers on the other hand improve this humor so well, that they are before every Sessions of Parliament perpetually buzzing in the ears of [100] their Party, that they are all to be turn'd off for their sakes; and that, this, and that, and the other Man of the opposit Faction is to be brought in: wherfore they must vigorously stand by them now, and oblige the King in his present desires, which therwise wou'd be granted by their Enemys. There is a place in the world where this is a common practice, and where Ministers are even temted to be Knaves by the countenance they expect from their Party; tho if no such place had bin, yet whoever writes methodically on any Subject may lawfully suppose all possible cases. Another piece of Policy among som Princes is to take obscure persons into their Favor or Ministry, and suddenly to raise them to plentiful or rather monstrous fortunes : for such Men will do certain mean things, in which persons of better Rank or Souls will scorn to be employ'd ; they'll do other things which may not be always safely intrusted with Men that have a great Stake or Interest in their Contry; and they call it ingratitude to refuse any thing

to a Prince to whom they are oblig'd for their [101] Estates or Honors, and on whom they depend for a Protection, it may be, from common justice. Ministers chosen for such rare qualifications are the fittest to distribute Pensions to som, Places to others, to tempt one by a drunken bout or a Song whom no Employment cou'd seduce, and to become all things to all Men that they may gain from. But the best of Princes are not secure from the ill effects of those Cormorants, Bloodsuckers, and Harppys. They excuse themselves for their faults to the people, as if forc'd to act against their inclinations by their Master; and they attribute all his good deeds to their own persuasion and influence. Base prostitutes ! thus to rob their Benefactor of his Glory, and to own they are Men to be aw'd themselves into wickedness. They likewise falsly tell the Prince, that no body will serve him if he suffers any of his Ministers (tho never so criminal) to be punish't; whereas wise and honest Men will the sooner accept employments, and be content to undergo the trouble (for a trouble it is to all who make [102] a conscience of their Duty) as long as they are permitted to act for the good of their Contry: but if the King shou'd go about to put them on any indirect measures, they'll either happily divert him from such an ill resolution, or honorably resign their Places and merit the applause of all good Men. But ill Ministers, depending on this indemnity by prescription, value not a rush what the world says of them, knowing they must fall softly at last, and make as good a figure as the best with those Estates they have rais'd by such vile and unjust means. This encourages them universally to follow the same practices, and notwithstanding the allegations against them be as clear as the Sun, yet there's not a Man of them oblig'd to refund. 'Tis the strangest paradox in nature, that any good Prince shou'd be infatuated with such a maxim as this of never suffering his Ministers to be toucht, when the meanest Artificers are responsible not only for their deliberat faults, but even for their involuntary mistakes. I shall never [103] have don if I enter not the particulars of their base, infolent, and desperat actions. But yet I must not forget how industrious they are at all times to terrifie and nickname those who dare find fault with their management, or that endeavour to stem the Tide of their mercenary Administration. In the late Reigns none was counted Loyal who did not promote their designs; and whoever blames them in this, they'll have him taken for *an enemy to the Government* : nor wou'd they speak amiss if they always meant their own, as I believe they do. But none are truer friends to his Majesty, than such as most vigorously oppose the Men who thus plainly abuse him. They are heartily for *the present Government*, tho not always for *the present way of governing*. How often have the Ministers deceiv'd our Kings in the accounts they gave them of the sense of the Nation, and making them believe how generally their own Conduct was approv'd, which is not sometimes discover'd to be false is till it proves too late to apply a remedy: for Kings are mostly so beset by [104] those Locusts in their Palaces, and excluded to such a degree from all Commerce with the rest of their Subjects, that they can scarce be counted Creatures having any use of their Organs, seeing with their own Eys, or hearing with their own Ears. Then they have not only their little Spies, Trepanners, and Informers, in every corner of the Nation; but they have likewise their Coffeehouse and Chocolat Apostles, to magnifie with nauseous and repeated flatteries their Parts, Learning, Justice, Moderation, and Wisdom: these have their set hours for this new kind of preaching ; and are more Zealous to spread lies from behind a Table, than others are sometimes in propogating truth out of the Pulpit. The Poets too strive with all their might to outdo one another, not in Composition, Elegance, or Stile ; but in their forc'd Encomiums of those who keep the Purse, especially if it be a Poetic Ministry, as there has bin such a Poenix not long since in som part of the world. But of all their ways of abusing the King, what seems the most [105] impudent to me is that they must be hir'd forsooth to accept of their Preferment's : I mean when Men in considerable Posts, nay Men who fill three or four great Posts at once, must yet be farther gratifi'd with annual Pensions, or vast Sums of Money on particular occasions and this be call'd a reward of their Services. Heretofore with us in *England* , and at this present in all good Governments on Earth, great Places have bin esteem'd natural and sufficient rewards to the Learning, Valor, or any other Excellence of

those who were most capable to discharge them; and Pensions or other Gratuities us'd to be confer'd on such deserving Men on whom there were not Places enough left to bestow. But our Ministers (for we must somtimès take notice of them, lest we be thought partial by others ) som of our Ministers, I say, were not content with such additional Presents of Mony to supply the defect of their Places in rewarding their Merit, but have procur'd to themselves unreasonable and exorbitant Grants of the forfeited Estates in [106] *Ireland*, tho the Nation was at that time, as it still continues, overwhelm'd with Debt, and the Government in present and urgent need of Money. 'Tis true the Parliament has with no little difficulty since resum'd those Lands (as I hope they'll do the *English* Grants this Session) and apply'd them to the use of the public, where they are like to reach a very great way, notwithstanding all the excepting Clauses of the Act. But how many more of our Debts might have bin paid, if this course were taken from the beginning, wheras now the Rents of several years are dropt into those Gentlemens Pockets? And yet when all's don, I am fully perswaded, that if the King had not bin deceiv'd as well in the value of the Grants, as in the Merit of som of the Grantees; and that if he had given a moderat share of them to Men of known Desert, and more proper Objects of his Liberality, 'twou'd have bin so far from disgusting any, that every body wou'd have applauded his Justice and Generosity. Now in general of all Ministers, there's a vast difference [107] to be put between a Prince that governs a Party by them, and a Prince that's govern'd by them to a Party, As for the first, I have said enough concerning such a one already in the person of *Charles* the II. and God be prais'd we labor now under no such Grievance, tho we yet suffer the miserable effects of his King-craft. As for a Prince under the influence of his Ministers, he cannot be properly said to govern, but rather to be govern'd according to the various passions of his Officers and Favorits : for 'tis plain that all applications for Justice, Favor, or Preferment is made to such at home; and that the Ambassadors, and Agents of foren Princes (instead of considering the Prince's Judgment, or what is due to the Interest of the State) make it their chief business to study the humors of those about him. But let us suppose a King (tho we need make no suppositions, when we have actually one of our own) who neither governs by Parties, nor is govern'd to any Party by his Ministers ; yet it is out of his power (tho never indu'd with [108] so much caution and penetration) not to be frequently deceiv'd abus'd, and endanger'd by their Tricks and selfish Ends, of which we need not alledg any examples after what is already said in this Chapter and before. Nor need I inculcat how without his knowledge they may correspond with foren Princes, to his irreparable Disgrace, and the Damage of the Nation. Every body understands the Power of *French* Gold in all the Courts of *Europe*, and that it has no where more prevail'd than once in *England*. The same Monarch who brib'd King *Charles* and King *James's* Ministers, and who made Pensioners of themselves, is still alive ; he has more reason now to fear the strength of *England* than ever, and therefore we may rationally believe will leave nothing unattempted to gain Intelligence or Interest in our Court. With all the faults of the apostat Whigs, I don't believe they cou'd ever be reconcild to *France*, tho they might not scruple so much to scrape for a fortune at home : but the old Tory Ministers have not only [109] bin guilty of that practice formerly, which they may as well be now or at any time hereafter ; but they are throly verst in this mystery of Iniquity , they remember all the necessary steps and turns to be taken in it, and their friends on t'other side the water know better how to deal and traffick with these than any other. If it shou'd ever happen therfore that his Majesty show'd any intentions of puting himself and us into the hands of such a Ministry; he wou'd do well to consider, whether, besides all the other inconveniencies to be justly apprehended from such an unexpected proceeding, there be not likewise more of *French* advice in it than he is aware. They are greatly mistaken who think the Actions of any Prince will be excus'd by laying the Blame on his Ministers: 'tis a common manner of speaking indeed, but at botom a modest way of censuring the Prince himself, who, if he did not approve their Conduct, might easily make a better choice. We find all things laid to the charge of evil Councillors in his Majesties [111] own *Declaration* ; yet King *James* was

justly depos'd, and his Councillors ought as justly to have bin hang'd at that time, instead of being at any time since or now prefer'd. *Machavil* says very truly that the wisdom of a Prince never takes beginning from the wisdom of his Council, but the wisdom of the Council always from the wisdom of the Prince. If therefore our future Kings either want the mind or the ability to chuse the fittest persons into their Ministry to serve the Nation, the Parliament will be oblig'd to recommend such as shall be answerable to the Public for their actions: and yet do nothing herein, but what (as has bin often prov'd) their Ancestors have commonly practic'd : for the Lord Chancellor of *England* the Lord High Admiral of *England*, the Lord Treasurer of *England*, the Lord Chief Justice of *England*, and all the Officers that have the name of *England* added to them, were formerly nominated (as a late Author tells us ) by the Representatives of the People of *England* assembled in Parliament. Nor wou'd it be any [110] wonder shou'd they resum this Power, if ever the worst Ministers of the late Reigns, the declar'd Enemys of the present Government, or any of those evil Councillors so dreadfully describ'd in his Majesties *Declaration*, shou'd be thought the only Men fit to serve him : while those are neglected or distrusted who invited him hither, plac'd the Crown on his Head, maintain'd him ever since on the Throne, and faithfully serv'd him against all his Enemys both at home and abroad. This liberty I use with him (and which is no more than Free-men may and will use, let officious flatterers tell him never so much to the contrary ) is wholly intended for his service and advantage. I shou'd not have told him half so much truth, had I follow'd a certain Ministers cautious admonition ; for 'tis a Maxim with most of that sort, that *all Kings whatsoever would be arbitrary* : but as I believe som exceptions may be found to this Rule so had it bin never so clear a demonstration, I shou'd have the more strenuously asserted our native Liberties; which made [112] me reject that Gentlemans slavish advice with scorn and detestation. The picture of corrupt Ministers was never so well drawn to the Life as by the great Colonel *Sidney* in the 25th Section of the second part of his *Discourses concerning Government*. He shews there that the Senats of free Governments are not so subject to venality, as the Courts of Princes, where Bawds, Whores, Buffoons, Players, Slaves, and other mercenary people, are (according to him) most prevalent. He asks a question, which every one may resolve for himself, whether the *Cornelit Junii, Fabii, Valvii, Quintii, Curii, Fabritii* , and others who most preprevail'd in *Rome* after the expulsion of the Kings, or *Sejanus, Macro, Narcissus, Pallas, Icetus, Tigellinus, Vinnius, Laco, Agrippina, Messalina, Lollia, Poppea* , and the like, were most subject to the basest vices? and whether it were more easie to corrupt one or two of those Villains and Strumpets, than the Senat and People of *Rome, Carthage, Athens, or Sparta* ? After a large Discourse on this Subject, [113] he coms at last to sum up the Character of evil Ministers, charging them with the most detestable traffick in procuring or disposing of Preferments, with Rapine, Violence, Bribery, Fraud, and all kinds of Navish Dealing. *These things*, says he, *are inseparable from the life of a Courtier ; for as servil natures are guided rather by Sense than Reason, such as addict themselves to the service of Courts, find no other Consolation in their misery than what they receive from sensual pleasure, or such vanities as they put a value upon : and have no other care than to get mony for their supply by Begging, Stealing, Bribing, and other infamous Practices. Their Offices are more or less esteem'd, according to the opportunitys they afford for the exercise of those virtues; and no Man seeks them for any other end than for Gain, nor takes any othe r way than that which conduces to it. The usual means of attaining them are by observing the Princes humor, flattering his vices, serving him in his Pleasures, fomenting his Passions, and by advancing his worst designs ; to create an opinion in him that they love* [114] *his person. and are intirely addicted to his Will. When Valor, Industry, and Wisdom* *advanc'd Men to Ofices, it was no easie matter for a Man to per swade the Senat he had such Qualities. As were requir'd, if he had them not. But when Princes seek only such as love them, and will do what they command, 'tis easie to impose upon them; and because none that are good will obey them, when they command that which is not so, they are always incompast by the worst. Those who follow them only for Reward are most liberal in professing Affection*



to them, and by that means rise to Places of Authority and Power. The Fountain being thus corrupted, nought that is pure com from it. These mercenary Wretches having the management of Affairs, Justice and Honor are set at a price, and the most lucrative Traffick in the World is thereby establish'd. Eutropius, when he was a Slave, us'd to pick Pockets and Locks ; but, being made a Minister, he sold Cities, Armies, and Provinces. And som have undertaken to give probable reasons to believe that Pallas, one of Claudius's manumis'd Slaves, by theses means brought together [115] more Wealth in six years, than all the Roman Dictators and Consuls had don from the Expulsion of the Kings to their pas age into Asia. The rest walkt in the same way, us'd the same arts, and many of them succeeded in the same manner. Their Riches consisted not of Spoils taken from Enemys, but were the base product of their own Corruption. They valu'd nothing but Mony, and those who cou'd bribe them were sure to be advanc'd to the highest Office's; and, whatever they did, fear'd no punishment. Like effects will ever proceed from the like Causes. There is a great deal more to this purpose, and more home, in that Section, very much diserving every Man's perusal; but too long to be transcrib'd in this place, and too well exprest to be better don by any other.

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## CHAP. VII.

**The ill effects of Parties on the People in general, and the King in particular.** ↩

I Need not add much more, having spoke so largely already of the ill Effects which Parties have on the People, by dividing them in their Principles and Interest, which weakens their Power, corrupts their Morals, and at last dissolves the Government it self. That a worse mischief cannot befall any Nation than Divisions and Factions, is attested with one voice by the experience of all Men and Times; yet few places are exemt from this Distemper, tho som are more inclin'd to it by their Constitution than others. I won't enter into the Debate whether [117] Commonwealths or Monarchys are most subject to Seditions, nor make any parallel of the Advantages or Inconveniencies in the several Forms: but in this mixt one of ours, there is a Disproportion somwhere that occasions such frequent Quarrels, to the composing of which every one ought to lend his helping Hand. All the Men of Parts among us, instead of doing effectual Service to their Contry, are becom perfectly useless to it; or, which is much worse, they are made the Instruments of its Ruin by turning those Forces against one another, which by nature were intended for our Glory and Defence both at Home and Abroad. They act for the most part out of privat Interest or Revenge, either making a shew of their Abilitys in order to be fear'd or courted by the other side; or imploying their whole vigor against those whom they hate or envy, which is the certain Way to perpetuat our Differences. in the mean time no Quarter is given on any hand to those who will not inrol themselves in som Faction, but [118] are dispos'd to bring things to an intire Union, or at least to hold the Balance so even betwixt the Parties that they may not destroy one another. These Men of Peace and public Spirit are in matters of State branded with the name of *Trimmers*; and, with respect to their opinions in Religion, they are call'd *Latitudinarians*: hated, as I said, by all the Rest, but particularly persecuted by those designing Men who find their account in the Dissentions of others, lest their Moderation and calm Admonitions shou'd undeceive the World, and so put an End to this detestable Trade; for tho many act in good earnest from a true or mistaken Perswasion, yet most are prompted by privat Views of Revenge or Interest, while they delude others to their assistance by the specious pretence of Principles and Conscience. That worthy Gentleman therfore was surely in the right, who, last Session of Parlament, openly said in the House of Commons, that all Parties in the Church were Hypocrisy, which was the same Thing with Knavery in the [119] State. This Consideration shou'd bring us to cooler Thoughts and better Temper, both with regard to the time past and to com. *While we conspire together*, says the Earl of *Clarendon* in one of his Speeches to the Parlament 1660, *to put all old Names and Terms of distinction into utter oblivion; let us not find new names and terms to keep up the same, or a worse Distinction. If the old reproaches of Cavalier, and Roundhead, and Malignant, be committed to the grave; let us not find more significant and better words to signifie worse things.* But if the exhortations of that great Man had so little good effect, that they cou'd not prevent the contumelious nicknames of Whig and Tory, I can not hope to succeed betrer; yet this shall not hinder me from discharging my Conscience, and paying that Duty which I am bound to my Contry. I might here display the tragical Consequences of Parties in all Regions of the world, the known story of the *Bianchi* and the *Neri*, the *Guelphs* and *Ghibelins* in *Italy*, the *Veneti* and *Prasini* under *Justinian*; [120] I might pathetically describe the Barbarities they perpetrated on one another, their secret Murders and Assassinations, openWars and Slaughters; Robberies, Plunders, and Devastations; the intire Ruin and deplorable Catastrophe of Families, Cities, and Contries; the confusion of all tyes and obligations of Kindred, Marriage, Love, Friendship, Neighborhood, or Commerce: I might inlarge on such dismal Themes as these, cou'd I

suppose there wanted foren Examples, when we have suffer'd at home in Epitome whatever of this sort has bin any where known in the world. Yet notwithstanding the multitude of our former distinctions, and the care incumbent on us in these dangerous conjunctures to accomodat all differences, there is a fresh Division lately grown up among us, I mean the New and old *East India Companies* ; which tho seeming at first sight to regard but a few Merchants, have not only miserably divided the capital City of this Nation, and consequently all the Burroughs by reason of their [121] dealing there, but they are so universally spread that Whig and Tory, and all other Parties, are swallowed up by them; not abolish'd (which were to be wish'd) but shelt'd under these new Names. They have already introduc'd a most pernicious custom, unknown and believ'd impossible before in *London* , the corruption of Elections by privat Entertainments, publick Feasts, and Bribes. This is now as notoriously practic'd there as at *Stockbridge* ; and both Parties interest themselves in all manner of Elections, threatning even to turn off their Workmen if they will not vote as they would have them. They are both indeavoring who shall ingross the Court, that is all the public advantages and premiuns for lending Mony, to themselves. They are both laboring to exclude one another, and all others, from the greatest part of our foren Trade ; and, for ought we know, it may com at last to such a pass at home that people may scruple to deal with any that is or is not of this or that Company, as their Interest or [122] Affection may byass them. I will not dispute now how prejudicial or advantageous the *East India* Trade in general may be to this Nation, which parts of it are better or worse, nor what may be the fate of it from the Separation or Union of the two Companies : neither will I relate the Birth of the New Company the faults objected to the Old, nor what these retorted on their Adversarys. But supposing what you will of the Original of the New, yet according to the old saying, *Quod fieri non debuit, factum valet* ; tis one of those things which cannot be undon, without undoing us all. Nevertheless tis commonly known that several Members of the Old Company have bin publicly menacing, for a year past, that they wou'd pay the New Company back their Mony, and for the same advantages of Trade lend as much to the Government at 5 instead of 8 *per cent* interest. The pretence indeed is to lessen the public Charge, but their way of paying the national Debts is by ruining the Credit of the Nation. [123] 'Twas always a maxim in Government not to exasperat too many a a time, tho never so guilty ; and if the Members of the old Company have bin such clogs on the Wheels since the erection of the New, how much more will the latter be so, considering that they are a great deal more numerous; and that not only they and their Families, but all others who trade with them, will think themselves nearly affected ? The Bargain with them was deliberat and above-board, transacted with the same Forms and Solemnity as other Acts of Parliament; but if it shou'd on any pretence be made void, the mischiefs are innumerable that wou'd follow. Foreners hold our Parliamentary Faith to be sacred and inviolable, which encourag'd them to com into most of our Funds, and to be as much concern'd as our selves about the preservation of the present Government: but if the Overtures of the old Company shou'd be once receiv'd, or indeed encourag'd, there's an end of all our Credit with other Contrys. But the [124] greatest mischief will be the inevitable ruin of our Credit at home, for no body will ever part with their Mony again to the Government on any terms, be the premiums never so great or temting, since the Parliament may as well break their Ingagements at one time as at another, and instead of reducing the Interest from Eight to Five, they may with as plausible pretences bring it from 5 to one, or, what is more effectual, not pay a Groat of the Principal, which will better discharge the whole Debt instead of a Part. I dread to think, after such a manifest violation of the public Faith, what wou'd becom of us if we shou'd happen to fall into any urgent or indispensable necessity of raising Mony, whether to oppose an Invasion at home, or to maintain a Fleet or Forces abroad, which the present circumstances of *Europe* do not render unlikely to happen very quickly. If the late King *James* , the suppos'd Prince of *Wales*, or any other pretender, shou'd offer to make good all the Funds, and to restore [125] what had bin thus unjustly transfer'd, 'tis not impossible but that those, who thought themselves already

injur'd, and such as fear'd to undergo the same condition, wou'd prefer their privat Interest to the public Safety. But what involves all other Evils in it self alone, this is the certain way to bring us at one Stroke under that Slavery we have ever so barvely resisted, and those be made the Instruments of establishing Tyranny who have bin hitherto the Guardians of our Liberty. There is no other public Credit in *England*, but that of the Parliament. The Bankers, and all concern'd with them, well remember King *Charles II's* shutting up the *Exchequer*. But if a Parliament shou'd once break their Contracts with us to whom shall we fly for a remedy? If our Liberties be invaded by them, of whom shall we seek Protection, or who shall be afterwards trusted with disposing of the public Revenues. None but Fools will be deceiv'd by the pretence that the five *per Cent* project will be establish'd [126] by Act of Parliament: for besides the reasons I have already offer'd that Parlements, no more than privat Men, shou'd not break their words, and that if they do they must no more expect to be trusted than privat Men, with the other mischiefs to be apprehended) it is likewise very sure that Iniquity may be establish'd by a Law, and that no Sanction whatsoever can make Injustice to be a Virtue. I need not add that the Old Company themselves wou'd be equal sufferers in all the consequences of such an Infraction of Credit, wherof the least must be that they had no security why their five *per Cent*, and Liberty of Trading, might not as well be transfer'd to others who offer'd more or less, as occasion requir'd. But as experience is the Servant of Wise Men, and the Mistriss of Fools, we may observe that the like attemts have bin made many hundred years ago in *Agypt, Greece, Italy*, and other places, not only for reducing the Interest due [127] from the Public, but even to discharge the Debts of privat Persons, as if the way of enabling 'em to pay Taxes to the Government, had bin to defraud their Creditors. The best and wisest Men ever oppos'd these Proceedings, as destructive of all Equity, Faith, and Property, and occasioning Complaints, Revenge and Seditions. On the other hand, such as were obnoxious to the Laws, hated for their Villanies, overwhelmed with Debt, and that favor'd or affected Tyranny, were always for diminishing or rescinding of Debts by particular Laws, wherby they pretended to ease the People, but indeed design'd at bottom to destroy all public Faith, and to get large shares in the dissolution of the Government : such were *Manlius, Catilin*, and especially *Julius Caesar*, at that very time that he was projecting the ruin of his Contry's Liberty. I shou'd exceed the bounds I propos'd to my self, if I wou'd produce all the examples of this kind which occur in History, with [128] the Judgments of honest and prudent Men upon them. But it is observable, that as privat Debts were never but once remitted in the beginning of the *Roman Commonwealth*, no complaint being ever receiv'd afterwards on this occasion except, in a very urgent Conjunction, and then the Creditors were paid out of the common Treasury rather than be depriv'd of their Debts, or stipt of their Property by a Law: so on the other hand, the Debts of the public, tho' never so great and burdensom, were never discharg'd or lessen'd by any Law, which strict observation of their Faith and Justice never let 'em want Money on any occasion, and made the richest Citizens think their Wealth safer with the Government than in their own hands. It will not be amiss to hear what Doctrin one of their chief Magistrats has preach'd on this Occasion : I mean *Cicero* , who discourses largely of it to his Son, and among other things he says, that [7] [129] *It must be the principal care of him, who is at the head of the Government, that every one be secur'd in his Property, and that the Estates of privat Men be not diminish'd under pretence of a public good. Governments and Cities ( says he) were constituted chiefly for this very reason, that all Men might enjoy their own for the Men associated together by instinct of Nature, yet it was in hopes of preserving their Goods that they invented the Fortifications of Cities.* Then, after shewing what care ought to be taken for maintaining the Credit of the Treasury, and that the people shou'd be charg'd as little as possible with Taxes, or that in case of necessity they be punctually [130] inform'd of their danger, and convinc'd that without bearing som burden they cannot be safe in any thing; after recommending Frugality and Moderation to the Ministers of State, and the avoiding of superfluous Expences or squandring the publick Money, he coms to speak of those who pretended to ease the

people, sometimes by an Agrarian Law or levelling Estates in Land, and at other times by diminishing or rescinding public and privat Debts. [8] *Those Men*, says he, *shake the foundations of the Government, in the first place dissolving Concord, which cannot consist with this way of taking mony from som, and giving it to others: then, secondly, there's an end of all Equity, if Man may not keep his own; for ( as I said above) it is essential to a Community or City that it be free, and not under any doubts or fears about the Safety of their poßeptions. But neither do such persons obtain that reputation, which they imagin to get by this project so pernicious to the Government: for he that loses his right, becoms their [131] enemy, and he to whom it is transferr'd seems only willing to receive it, and particularly conceals his joy about their lessening the debts, lest he shou'd be thought unable to pay; whereas he that receives the injury both remembers the affront, and openly professes his resentments. But shou'd those be the greater party, who wickedly receive what is unjustly taken away from others; yet are they not therefore of greater consideration: for these things are not to be judg'd by number but weight.* Afterwards [132] he says, [9] *What reason is there for this compounding of the public Debts, but that you shall buy Lands with my Mony, you keep the Land and I lose my Mony. Wherefore all care ought [133] to be taken that no Debts be suffer'd to grow which may indanger the Government. This may be prevented several ways: or if it shou'd happen, yet the rich must not lose what is rightly theirs, nor Debtors gain what is the Property of others. For nothing more firmly supports a Government than Credit, which cannot subsist unless there be an indispensable obligation of paying what they ow. This compounding for debts has never more vehemently urg'd than in my Consulship. All sorts and degrees of Men were in Arms and Camps about it, to whom I resisted in such a manner that this extraordinary mischief was rooted out of the Commonwealth. There was never a greater debt owing, nor any better or easier paid; for the hope of defrauding being taken away, there follow'd a necessity of Payment. But indeed this ( Cæsar) who is now a Conqueror, but was then subdu'd, put these things in execution which he had before projected, tho his own Interest was no longer concern'd: so great was his inclination to do mischief, that he wou'd take pleasure in it for mischief's sake, the he had no other inducements. Therefore all those, [134] who have a hand in managing the Government, should abstain from this sort of Liberality which takes from som to give to others; and before all things, provide that every one may keep his own by the equity of Law, and public Judicatories; and that the meaner sort be not Circumvented for want of Power, nor that the wealthy be obstructed by the envy of others from keeping or recovering their Rights.* I need make no application of these passages to any of the Parties concern'd, nor to the Bank of England, or the other Funds, which seem all to be involv'd in the same destruction. But if we may compare Antient with Modern instances, there is not a more ready or surer way at this time of distinguishing the certain Friends or Enemies of our free Government, than by observing who are for maintaining the public Faith, and who for breaking it on any pretence whatsoever.

BUT they are not the People alone who suffer the ill effects of being divided into Party's; their Magistrats, or the Administration [135] of their Government, is dangerously affected by it, as, with us in England, the King is always under very ill Circumstances on such occasions: but principally when those Factions are of his own creation, the better to gain some undue power above the Laws, or in order to any other indirect end; for 'tis never for any public good, that Princes have recourse to those unmanly shifts, but for something which cannot bear the light, something that can never receive a common Approbation, and must therefore be forc'd from one part of the Nation by the deluded or corrupt assistance of the other. Such Kings, as I said before, are rather the Ringleaders of petty Clubs, than the Fathers of great Nations; and gain nothing at last, for they are as much hated by one side as lov'd by the other, and have no security against their Enemie's becoming one time or other the stronger Party to their unvoidable dilgrace or deitruction. Mary Queen of Scots, and Charles the First, of England, ow'd [136] their unquiet Lives and tragical Deaths to their governing by Parties:

*Charles* the Second was for the same reason hated at Home, despis'd Abroad, distrusted every where, and intang'd in such difficulties as made his Reign sometimes violent, precarious at other times, and always uncertain. King *James* the Second, for preferring the smallest party in his Dominions, not only to the greatest, but also to every one of the rest, brought them all to unite against him at last, and is now reduc'd to live on Charity in another Contry. Nor can any King of this mold reasonably promise himself a better fate, since every thing he undertakes by his Favorits will be obstructed by their Enemies ; and if he happens to have sincere Intentions, yet they must be suspected of course by those who are afraid to be trepan'd by his Artifices. And, besides all these or other domestic mischiefs, there is a door hereby open'd to his Enemies Abroad, who will be sure to foment such discords, and to grant secret [137] or open assistance to the Malcontents on proper occasions. But what's worst of all, if a King is not constant to one Party, but apparently given to change, both will be apt to joyn against him at last, as one to be rely'd on by neither, and that has no real affection for any side, but purely acts for his own privat Ends, which makes him cajole the one or the other, as they happen to have more Power or Credit in the Kingdom. In one word there's no Oracle more certain than what Sir *William Temple* tells us, was pronounc'd by Mons. *Gouville*, ramely, That [10] *a King of England, who will be the Man of his people, is the greatest King in the World; but if he would be some thing, more, by God he's no longer any thing*. Above all things therefore the King shou'd study to gain [138] the general Love of his Subjects, which is a surer pledg of their Obedience than any Oaths or Engagements of what nature soever, of greater security than the strongest Cittadels or Armies. No Artifices of Malcontents, of Unquiet or disaffected Persons, can make the People weary of the present Government, when they know the King is careful to preserve their Civil and Religious Liberties, to promote Trade, incourage Industry, to Reward liberally, to Punish severely, and to Reform Manners. And since I am on this Head, I must own, that I wish there were an effectual Amnisty or Act of Indemnity past this insuing Session. Many pretend no other reason for continuing in the Interests of the late King, but having never bin pardon'd. I wou'd not be mistaken ; there have bin general Pardons with glorious Preambles, but all clogg'd with unforgiving Clauses. There was a Time when it was necessary for King *William* to enquire who were his Enemies, and I fear he found [139] such Tampering then, as shews necessity enough for Oblivion now. But it is not fit I shou'd insist too much on this Hint. Som Whigs may probably stand in need of this Grace, tho not in such numbers as the Tories; and if his Majesty shall think it proper to grant one, I hope it will be (as the Bishop of *Salisbury* words it) according to the compass of Royal Clemency, and such as will let his most inveterat Enemies see that they deserve to Tenderness if they remain so. If there be Men who never ought to be forgiven, they shou'd be excepted by name : for otherwise tis unavoidable but multudes must think themselves destin'd for Punishment, who are not the Persons concern'd and all these will naturally be endeavoring to subvert the Government, as the only way to preserve themselves. Such pardons (tho' seldom given by Tyrants) have bin always easily obtain'd in free Governments ; for if the Disaffected are thereby reconcild, the grand [140] point is gain'd; but if, after so much Indulgence and Lenity, they shou'd enter on any new Practices, they deserve to be doubly punish'd, for their Treason and Ingratitude.

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## CHAP. VIII.

## The ill Effects of Parties on all our foren Affairs. ↵

WE com now to consider the ill Effects of Parties on our foren Affairs ; and 'tis very certain that every thing attemptd abroad to our Prejudice or Dishonor, has proceeded from an opinion that our Broils at Home leave us neither Force nor Leisure to right our selves. For examples hereof, I shall never forget the Menaces of certain People to call those to an account who advis'd the sending a Squadron to the *Mediterranean*, in the year 1695, tho' the Consequence was very honorable and advantageous to the Nation : and the like Speeches [142] were utter'd at the going of the last Squadron to the *Baltick*, tho' the glorious progress of the *Swedish* King's Arms be wholly owing to that seasonable and powerful Assistance ; for hereby he was enabled in so short a space to beat two Kings and a formidable Emperor, to speak nothing of shewing our strength in those Seas, which makes our orders rever'd, our friendship courted, and our displeasure dreaded. This Spirit of Contradiction between the Parties may be exemplify'd in a thousand other instances; and tho in many cases it proves dangerous to the Nation, yet I wou'd Charitably hope that so detested a mischief 'is not always intended, tho particular Resentments do often insensibly procede to a general Discontent. But if we continue thus divided at Home, catching at opportunities and using advantages over one another, how is it possible for us to exert our Power abroad, either to keep the Balance of *Europe* equal, or to secure the [143] Protestant Religion ? As for the Balance, we must undoubtedly do our best to preserve it steady, or if the rest of *Europe* falls into one Scale, we muft soon be deprest by the irresistible Weight ; and if we stand by, as unconcern'd Spectators, till this work is don, the greatest favor we must expect from our Neutrality, will be, like *Ulysses* in the Cave of *Polyphemus*, to be last devour'd, which is but a miserable and unmanly Consolation. In the present juncture of Affairs the thing most to be fear'd is a Union between *France* and *Spain*, which of course destroys not only all or the best part of our Trade, but also our Liberty, and that of all the rest of *Europe*. The House of *Austria* was not near so powerful formerly, by reason of the Divisions in *Germany*, as such a Union will render the House of *Bourbon*, there being no distinct Sovereignty now in *France* , and the *Spaniards* not able of themselves to be troublesom if they wou'd. And that the *French* will lose no opportunity of effecting it, past and present [142 - repeated] Experience will not let us doubt; for they never yet stuck at any League or Treaty, when once they thought themselves able to break it, Wich shou'd make all others joyn together to take it out of their power. They have bin ever observ'd to have great and aspiring Thoughts, to which they are inclin'd by the extent and fruitfulness of their Territories, the multitude of their People, and consequently the immense Revenues of their Kings, by which they are enabled to keep vast numbers of Troops always on Foot, the Goods and Persons of their Subjects being intirely at their disposal. Nor have they ever fail'd to make use of this mighty power ; for at all Times they have bin incroaching on their Neighbors, restless in their Actions as well as their Humors, and constant disturbers of Mankind, without ever being able to set any bounds to their Ambition. *The French* (says the Baron. *D'Isola* in his Buckler of State and Justice) *covet Harbors in Spain, Leagues in the Empire, Factions in [143 - repeated] Poland, Wars in England and Holland, Passes into Italy, and the sovereign Arbitrage every where. Their Quiet consists in the Trouble of all others, and their Advantage in the public Calamities.* Wherefore it will be always the Interest of *Europe*, but above all others of *England*, to oppose the *French* Designs, it having bin an uncontroverted Maxim with us hitherto, that *France must never be suffer'd to grow too great.* How much less therefore are their projects to be encourag'd by us, in actually giving them any Help, or denying effectual Assistance to their Enemies. They have bin faithless in their Promises and Treaties, as may be prov'd by a



thousand Instances : insolent, imperious, barbarous, and inexorable Conquerors ; but in adverse Fortune the most abject, obsequious, and servil flatterers in the World. The way to preserve our Trade, to maintain our Sovereignty in the Seas, or to assert our Title to the Kingdom of *France* , is not to enable them to extend their Dominions any where ; but least of all into the [144] *Netherlands*, the *Mediterranean*, or the *West-Indies*. We do at present, as we have for som years past, find the sad effects of *Charles* the Second's betraying the Nation by helping them to Models of Ships, Carpenters, Timber, and Officers to train up their undisciplind Seamen, and to teach 'em the Art of Rigging out their Fleets : whereas, 'tis well known that Queen *Elizabeth* wou'd not let *Henry* , the Fourth, tho' her intimat Friend, build any Ships of Force without her Permission. But by whatever steps the *French* arriv'd to their Greatness, must not abandon ourselves, but rather endeavor with all our might to bring down their Pride, or at least that they do not grow still stronger and stronger, till it be out of our power to cope with them; and this will infallibly happen, if we suffer their present Conjunction with *Spain*. 'Tis true, that in consideration of our Trade, we must avoid as much as may be a War with the latter, and if they be abus'd by the *French*, or [145] opprest by their new King, we ought to give them all possible assistance: but if they join with the *French*, we must not hesitat to oppose them, since it is much better to have one branch of our Trade interrupted for som Time, than to have all Commerce for ever destroy'd. I shall hint at the means of stopping the progress of the *French* Greatness, after I have briefly consider'd the other Maxim we have in relation to foren Affairs, to keep *England* the head of the Protestant Interest all over the World. I hope I need not spend many words to perswade *Englishmen* that Popery in general is an extract of whatever is Ridiculous, Knavish, or Impious in all Religions ; that it is Priestcraft arriv'd at the highest Perfection; that it contains peculiar absurdities never known in any other perswasion; and that it is the most insolent imposition that ever was made on the Credulity of Mankind. I might here truly represent the mischievous influence of this abominable Superstition on the Morals [146] and Understandings of its Professors ; how it subjects 'em to all manner of Tyranny and Oppression ; drains their Purses, as well as deprives them of their Reason; how most of its Doctrines are calculated for the advantage of the Priests ; what authority these exercise over the Laity ; their Idolatry, Hippocrisy, Licentiousness, and Cruelty: but I shall only say with one of our own Contrymen, [11] *That if either Blasphemys against God, or Tyrannys over Men; if either the defacing the Ideas of the Deity, or corrupting the principles of Virtue and moral Honesty; if either the subverting the foundations of natural Religion, or the overthrowing the most essential Articles of the Christian Faith; if either the most avow'd and bold affronts offer'd to Heaven, or the bloodiest and most brutal outrages executed against the best of Men : if all those be sufficient to preclude a Party from the benefit of Liberty due to people in religious matters; I am sure none have reason to challenge it in behalf of the Papists, nor cause to complain if it be deny'd them.* They have not only constantly refus'd to tolerat any other Persuasion, but, wherever they are Masters, they have murther'd, massacr'd, and exterminated with Fire and Sword all that dissent from them on any score : nor was it ever known that any popish Prince forbore persecuting his Protestant Subjects, or kept any Faith with them, when he thought he might do it without running any risk; for they are made to believe that nothing must obstruct the advancement of Holy Church. And here we may resolve Sir *William Coventry's* subject of admiration, which I question not but he knew himself very well, tho he thought it safer at that time to let others divine than for him to express it. [12] *I cannot hinder my self* (says he ) [148] *from a small digression, to consider with admiration that the old Lady of Rome, with all her wrinkles, shou'd yet have charms able to subdue Great Princes; so far from handsom, and yet so imperious ; so painted, and yet so pretending. After having abus'd, depos'd, and marther'd so many of her Lovers, the still finds others glad and proud of their new Chains. A thing so strange to indifferent judges, that those, who will allow no other Miracles in the Church of Rome, must needs grant that this is one not to be contested ! She sits in her Shop, and sells at dear Rates her Rattles and*



*Hobby-horses, whilst the deluded world still continues to furnish her with Customers.* · But the Reason is plain, for the Clegy of *Rome* , on condition that Princes establish their Power and extirpat Heresie, makes them arbitrary over their Subjects, and by virtue of their influence on the Consciencs of their Votarys, they maintain this unjust Power as long as Princes support their Usurpations over the Laity. Whatever occasion the Prince has for Mony, the Priests [149] can make it the Cause of the Church; and what the unlimited Power of the former cou'd not discover, the spiritual Authority of the latter can ealily produce, and make it be granted with a willing mind. Such as these are the advantages by which Princes are temted to espouse the *Roman* Superstition : for tho som Protestant Princes have actually set up arbitrary power, and others have made large steps that way, yet the principles the Reformation are naturally against it ; because the more knowlege any people have, the more they value Liberty, which makes them of course the less dispos'd to be slaves, and therefore averse to Popery, which of all Tyrannys is the most irrational and insupportable. As it is harder therefore to bring Protestants under the yoke than Papists, so it is more difficult to introduce Popery into a Commonwealth than into a Monarchy. A Commonwealth is never in Love, and so not to be seduc'd by fine Women; a Commonwealth is never a Minor, nor subject to the doating of [150] old Age; a Commonwealth has no Favorits, and cannot be deceiv'd by Ministers to a Party ; a Commonwealth cannot marry a Popish Queen, nor be brib'd in the whole, which makes it difficult or useless to corrupt any part ; when a Commonwealth is stubborn it cannot be poyson'd or assassinated ; and the people are not disturb'd by dubious Titles to the Succession, which in several places intirely alters both Religion and Government. These are so many dispositions wanting to favor the machinations of the Papists, which is the reason, that, when they despair'd of seeing the Royal Family restor'd, they were so earnest with *Oliver Cromwel* to make himself King; not caring who wore the Crown, on condition there were som Monarch on the Throne. And yet so besotted are som people by Education, Custom, or privat Interest, that they are often heard to say they wou'd rather see *England* an absolute Monarchy than the most glorious Republic, as in the late Reigns they were taught to say that they wou'd [151] sooner be Papists than Presbyterians. 'Tis well known that som great Men have quitted the Potestant Interest on such worldly and wicked motives and that Princes begin of late to find out this secret of governing more than ever. The Elector of Saxony has quitted his Religion for the Crown of *Poland*, and constituted a Popish Statholder to protect the Confession of *Ausburg* in his own Contry. There is a Popish Administrator in *Curland* during the Minority of the present Duke; before the King of *Denmark* had set a Popih Governor over his capital City of *Copenhahagen* , many people talkt doubtfully of his Religion: but I hope the King of *Prussia* was unjustly suspected on the account of this new Dignity; and that the ninth Electorat is no byass on the Duke of *Hanover*. We all know the barbarities executed on the Reform'd both in *France* and in the *Palatinat*, with the dangers that threaten them in many other places of *Germany* : from which 'tis very plain that we must now take vigorous [152] measures, both to keep the Balance of *Europe* stedly, and to preserve the Protestant Interest. The Empire and *France* are the two great contending Powers, and, tho we are less than either of them, yet we have often thrown the Scale on what side we pleas'd; and seem'd to make the greatest figure of all, in being arbiters of their Disputes, and the disposers of their Fate. Time was when the common Good requir'd our opposition to the House of *Austria*, and the same reason calls for us to side with it now against that of *Bourbon*, which for a considerable time has bid fairest for the universal Monarchy. As King *James I.* was cajold by the arts of *Spain* , so the late Kings were becom Pensioners to *France* , and cou'd not head the Reformation abroad, when they were laboring with all their might to set up Popery at home. But now we have a King who is known to be a zealous Protestant, bound by no ingagement or inclinatinations to either of these Potentats, except as he finds himself directed by the Cause of Religion and Liberty. [153] The only Men that would have us to continue unconcern'd spectators, are such as wish to see the *French* King powerful enough to impose what King on us he pleases, and perhaps

to provide for us as he has don for *Spain*, But all others, of all Orders and Conditions, are for a War, even the Merchants themselves, who well know that it is much better for them to suffer som short interruption in any part of their Commerce, than to lose at once to a barbarous enemy all they have already got, and the hopes of ever getting any more. Wherefore I believe that no Force can be thought too great to be given the King by Sea, which is our natural Element, a sure Protection to our Trade, and the best way to annoy our Foes either by bombarding their maritim Towns, ravaging their Coasts, destroying their Harbors, and burning their Ships, with the like Actions best perform'd this Way. But the Fleet must be under som other regulations and management than for several years past, or [154] the success will be fatal, and the people unwilling to ingage. What the united force of the *Dutch* and us may perform in the Ocean, *Mediterranean* , and the *West-Indies*, is not hard to imagin. As for raising of Money, there is no question to be made but the Nation is richer than ever, and the People will readily advance the necessary sums, on condition they be first convinc'd of the necessity; next secur'd in the Credit on which they have lent so much before; and, lastly, be perswaded that what they give shall be apply'd to the uses they design. 'Tis too ungrateful a Theme to revive the memory of our past Mismanagements, tho, I am afraid, the Impunity of those who have so wickedly impos'd on the public, may encourage themselves and others to procede again in the same cursed practices : Nor is there any thing that damps the Spirit of the Nation more, than to see what vast fortunes have bin rais'd during the last War, and while the Nation was run so terribly in debt; not only by the [155] great Officers, but even by the most beggarly, obscure, and worthless wretches in subordinat or inferior Employments. But we shall be eas'd of a vast charge if the Parliament approves of the project of som Merchants (successfully try'd before by the *Dutch* ) which is that on the Government's bearing the Tenth part of the charge, or thereabouts, they'll fit out a sufficient number of Ships of Force, on condition they be let loose on the *West Indies*, and not under the necessity of receiving orders from our Ministry, but to act where and when, as often and as vigorously as they can against the Enemy: nor cou'd such an undertaking fail on many accounts, especially considering the assistance of Men, Ammunition, Provisions, and Ports, they must receive in these numerous Settlements we have already in *America* ; all which, and a great many other conveniences, were wanting to the *Dutch*, when, in the Infancy of their state, their Merchants made a piratical War on the *Spaniards* in the [156] *East- Indies* , where they beat both them and the *Portugueze* then under one and the same Government. But the Scheme of this important business will appear in a better light, when offer'd to public Consideration by the Persons concern'd. I must only hint to my Readers by the way, that supposing this project be encourag'd (for of its practicableness there can be no reason to doubt) then we are at Liberty to act with all our united Force in the Ocean, in the Mediterranean, in the Baltick or whersoever besides there may be occasion in *Europe*, without being oblig'd, as heretofore, to send any Squadrons to the other World. As for the Land-Forces to be imploy'd by us abroad in case of a War, I am not sure that the Parliament will be for any, the bent of the Nation being altogether to have the Sea for our share and Province of Action but if it should be found necessary to send Troops to *Flanders* , or elsewhere, we may for our Mony hire as many *Switzers*, *Germans*, or *Danes* as we [157] please, and at a much easier rate than *Englishmen* will serve. Besides that hereby all the Disputes, Difficulty, or Envy of Disbanding them is avoided, being to be paid and disarm'd in another Contry, where, if they should be unwilling to disperse, we are in no danger to be hurt by them. Nor let any person think that the premisses are in the least inconsistent with what has bin lately urg'd against keeping standing Armies on foot in time of Peace. I was one of that opinion, and like to continue in it as long as I retain any regard to Liberty, which will be as long as I live, or am capable to make a true use of my reason: but no Body sure was ever so weak as to think, that in time of War whether we were to offend others or defend our selves, we cou'd do either of these without a sufficient Force of one sort or other. And here I would put certain Persons in mind of our Militia, with which they made no little noise during the contest about the Army, but after it was once [158]

disdisbanded, we heard no more of Arming and Training all the Freeholders and Men of Property in *England*, which at that Time was the modish Phrase. The making of our Militia useful has bin hitherto oppos'd by two sorts of Men, such as are neither for this nor an Army, because they would leave the Nation expos'd to their Friends on t'other side the Water ; and those who are for keeping us undisciplin'd and contemptible to shew the necessity of Mercenary Troops. I shou'd be sorry to rank som People, of whom I have still a good opinion, with either of these Parties; but be this as it happens, I am confident the Parliament will allow no other new Forces but the Militia (as it is, or may be made) in *England*. Now to return, if this be a digression; we have an opportunity put into our hands, which we rather slipt, I hope, than neglected of late, to our great Danger and Infamy, I mean to make good terms for the Protestants abroad. This is always expected from *England* as the [159] Support and Head of the Reformation nor was it forgot even by the Usurper *Cromwel*. We need not question but that the Emperour, if we think fit to insist on it, will remit of his severity against his own Subjects in *Hungary* , *Bohemia* , and Elsewhere: he can obtain the same thing of the Elector *Palatin*, and in other places of *Germany*; and reasons of State at Home, as well as the necessity of our present Assistance, must induce him to this good Disposition. But if there shou'd be a religious War, the Protestants will have Recourse to the victorious King of *Sweden* , as a second *Gustavus* , and Guarantee of the Treaty of *Westphalia* : for which Reason we ought as little to see that Prince stript of his Dominions in *Germany* , as suffer the *French* to keep possession of *Flanders*. If it be objected that the united powers of *France* and *Spain* are formidable , that the Discontented are numerous at Home, and that our Allies abroad are Uncertain ; to begin with the latter, we are sure at least of the *Dutch*; who are as hearty Enemies to *France* and as Zealous friends to the [160] Protestant Religion, as can be wisht. As for the Rest, let us remember that Queen *Elizabeth*, when the Papists were more numerous than both they and the Jacobites are now, without any foren Allies but those who subsisted by her Power, in daily fears of her Life from bloody popish Assassins, and the Queen of *Scotland* pretend a better Right to the English Crown; yet this incomparable Queen *Elizabeth* reduc'd her rebellious Subjects of *Ireland* to Obedience, kept all things quiet at Home, supported the Infant States of *Holland* , the King of *Navarre* , and the Protestant Princes of *Germany*; she made War on the King of *Spain* in *Europe* and the *Indies* , promoted the Reformation at Home and abroad, chose the ablest and wisest of her Subjects into her Ministry, and in all other Respects deserv'd that veneration which is gratefully paid to her Memory. If under such circumstances these glorious Archievements, and more than I have mention'd, were perform'd by a Woman, how much greater exploits may we promise our selves from the present King, considering [161] our Advantages above that Time. In effect, all the powers of *Europe* are now at a stand, The *Dutch* wait with Impatience the Resolutions of our Court, the two mighty contending Powers expect to have their Fate decided by the Oracles we shall please to utter, the Northern Crowns are ready to embrace our Interest, the Princes of *Italy* will declare when we encourage them, and even the Pope of *Rome* will take his measures from the Parliament of *England*. This peculiar Greatness of being the Umpires of Princes, and inclining the Balance to the side we favor, is owing to our happy situation, the Liberty of our Government, our immense Trade and Wealth, but above all other causes to the noble Genius of our People, notwithstanding what is no less impertinently than scandalously urg'd to the contrary in a Libel lately publisht, intitul'd, *The true born Englishman*. 'Tis a frange way of making Court to the King to perswade him that his Subjects are not fit to be trusted, which [162] is given for a reason why he imployes so many Foreners ; nor has my Lord *Portland*, the Hero of his Panegyric, any great reason to be thankful to the Author. What he says of our mixt Origin discovers his igrorance, as well as his Malice, no race being counted the worse for that, but rather to improve. There never was any Contry, worth contending for, without such a confluence of many Nations. The Inhabitants of New *Holland* may boast long enough of their pure Genealogies, without ever being the more esteem'd ; and those Nations in *Europe*, which are known to have the least of mixture, are the most

inconsiderable and contemptible. What reflects on the last Parliament will not be left uncensur'd by the present ; and the Justice of no wise Nation can ever suffer the Reputation of any privat Man to be so handl'd as we find Sir *Charles Duncomb*: for the party who laugh at it to day may be serv'd in that manner themselves to morrow, since there are Poets, Wits, and hackny [163] Pens enough to be hir'd on all sides. But I have said too much perhaps on this Subject: and therefore I shall conclude this Chapter with an Answer to those who like a War the worse is the Court bę for it, as suspecting they must have som privat ends to serve by it, and not design the Benefit of the Public. For my part I dislike no good Thing let the Courtiers be never so much for it, besides that the War cannot be the worse for their concurrence, whatever it may be for their Management, since it is not impossible for them to be sometimes in the Right, and that it is always in our power to keep them to their good Behavior if we please. But after all, I don't find that the Ministers are for a War, whatever may be the Sentiments of the King, who can never have any separat Interest from his People.

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[164]

## CHAP. IX.

### The only Remedy against all the Michief of Partys, is a Parlament equally Constituted. ↩

IN the fourth Chapter I have given som Arguments for stated annual Parlements; I have there likewise declar'd my Thoughts about the best way of making our Representation equal, of preventing Bribery or Expences at Elections, and the Growth of privat Pensioners. But till such or better methods are legally establish'd, we have no hopes of preserving our ancient Constitution, our Liberty and Property, the Protestant Religion, or the present Government. Had these thoughts bin publish'd (as they were intended ) before the late Elections, I shou'd have Offer'd som Advice to the Electors to [165] send those to represent them who would do themselves Honor, Service to their Contry, and deserve the Praise and Imitation of Posterity. I hope in a little time we'll all have good reason to say that they have made such a desirable Choice, which encourages me to add in this place a point or two of the highest Importance, which I purposely omitted in the fourth Chapter, and which, in my opinion, might go very near to bring our Parlements to the most perfect Constitution. The first of these is the Qualifying Bill, som years ago past by the Commons and rejected by the Lords. Certainly none ought to be chosen for a County but such as have either in Possession or Reversion a considerable Estate in it ; nor for a Burrough, except he be Residant, or that he has som Estate in the County in present or Expectancy. That Bill provided none to be chosen Knights of the Shire under five hundred pounds *per annum*, nor for Burroughs who had not two hundred pounds *per annum* somewhere within the County, with certain Conditions [166] in favor of mony'd Men. And indeed how can it be expected that such as are perfect strangers to a place shou'd understand the Grievances of it, or, grant they be truly inform'd, will they be so earnest or so much concern'd to redress them, as those that have an Interest on the Spot ? I am apt to believe it was not the Reason of the Thing, but the difficulty of otherwise passing the Bill, that allow'd any Dispensations for mony'd Men without Land, and who consequently have no firm pledg in *England* to answer for their Behavior; but may, like Sir *William Brown* the other day, remove their Effects into another Contry in four and twenty hours, and follow themselves the next Night. The Doors of the *Roman Senat* (as of all others well constituted among the Ancients) was shut against those who had not an Estate to a certain value, on diminishing or spending of which they were removable out of the House by the *Censors* , and to be degraded from their Nobility. But to manifest the eternal Power of Reason and good [107] Sense, long after their Liberty was destroy'd, and that Beggars, Slaves, Players, Buffoons, Soldiers, and Barbarians, were created Senators by the tyrannical Emperors; yet under *Trajan* a good Prince, who wou'd have restor'd the Commonwealth but that he durst not for the Army, the Senat actually resum'd their ancient privilege of restraining all Elections in Assemblys of Trust to Men of Estates in their Contry. The manner is finely exprest by *Pliny* the younger (one of their Body) to his friend *Nepos* ; and because it dos not only relate to this Qualification by Land, but also to expences at Elections, I shall here insert the whole Letter both in *Latin* and *English*.

[168]

#### *C. Plinius Nepoti . S. Lib, 6. Ep. 19*

Cis tu pretium acceffifse agris, precipue suburbanis ?

*Causa subita caritatis, res multis agitata fermonibus, proximis Comitiiis honeftiffimas voces senatui expresst, Candidati ne conviventur, ne mittant Muner a, ne pecunias deponant, ex quibus duo priora tam\_aperte quam immodice fiebant : hoc Tertium, quanquam occult*

*aretur, pro comperto habebatur. Homulus deinde noster usus vigilanter hoc Confensu Senatus, sententia loco postulavit ut Consules Desiderium universorum notum principi facerent, peterentque, fecut aliis vitiis, huic quoque providentia sua occurreret. Occurrit; nam [169] sumtus Candidatorum fedos e infames Ambitus Lege restrinxit ; eosdem patrimoniū tertiam partem conferre iuffit in ea quæ solo continerentur : deforme arbitratus (ut erat) Honorem petit illos, urbem, Italiamque, non pro patria , sed pro Hospitio aut stabulo, quasi pe*

*Concursant ergo Candidati certatim: quicquid venale audiunt, emit ant ; ut sit quoque plura venalia, efficiunt. Proinde si panitet te Italicorum prædiorum, hoc vendendi Tempus tam Hercule quam in provinciis comparandi, dum iidem Candidati illic vendunt ut hic emant, Vale.*

[170]

*Caius Pliny to Nepos,  
Health.*

Do you know that the price of Lands is risen, especially near this City. The cause of this sudden dearness, which is the subject of much Discourse, did at the last meeting of the Senat occasion several most excellent Speeches, Importing, That the Candidats at Elections shou'd neither Treat, nor make Presents, nor lay out any Mony. The two first of these Abuses were not less excessively than openly practic'd ; and the third, notwithstanding the care us'd to conceal it, was a thing taken for [171] granted. Now our Friend *Homulus* , having diligently improv'd this unanimous Agreement of the Senat, mov'd for a Resolution that the Consuls shou'd be order'd to acquaint the Prince with the desires of them all, and to pray him, that, according to his usual vigilance, he would correct this as he had other disorders. The Emperor Assented: for he put a stop to those base and infamous Expences of the Candidats by a Law against Canvassing, and oblig'd them to qualify themselves by laying out on Land a third part of their Estates ; esteeming it a very shameful thing (as indeed it was) that such as are desirous of this Honor shou'd live in *Rome* and *Italy*, not as in their Contry, but as in a Lodging, or like Travellers in an Inn. The Candidats hereupon out-bid one another every where, and buy up whatever they are inform'd is to be sold : isoómuch that many now part with their Lands who did not think of doing it before. If you are weary [172] therfore of your Farms in *Italy*, this is certainly your Time of putting them off to Advantage, as well as of buying in the Provinces; while the Candidats are selling there to purchase here.

Farewel.

LET this example be follow'd, and we shall quickly see the good Effects of it in the Parliament, from whence they will naturally spread themselves all over the Nation. I will not insist on the necessity of it now more than ever, the reasons being obvious to Men of any Consideration ; but this I dare venture to Prophecy, that if the present Parliament will not do themselves the Honor of passing the qualifying Act, that the next may think it the highest duty they ow to their Contry. It were likewise to be wish'd that the Elections in Burroughs should be all brought on one foot thro-out the Nation; wheras now som are chosen by a select [173] number, som by all the Inhabitants, and others by those only who pay Scot and Lot. This is a constant spring to furnish Matter for Petitions, and I have seen my self at Comittees, Precedents alledg'd on both sides for one and the same Place, which makes Elections uncertain, and to depend wholly on the Number and Affections of a Party. The fairest way, in any unprejudic'd man's opinion with whom I ever convers't, is to make all those to be the Electors who pay to Church and Poor ; but this (as all the rest) is submitted to the Wisdom of his Majesty and both Houses, my purpose being only to shew the necessity of a Uniformity

in this Case, without determining any thing as to the Manner. Something has bin don in former Parliaments both for preventing undue Elections, and unqualify'd Persons getting into the House ; yet since that time, Experience has shewn, that more effectual methods are still wanting. I am not sure that what I have briefly offer'd in this and the [174] Fourth Chapter may be sufficient for this End, or that they'll go any great way towards it ; but were I master of such Laws as shou'd infallibly provide for the choice of those Men whose Character I approve, they shou'd be *Persons of known Integrity and a clear Reputation, able as well ambitious to discharge their Duty; temperat and industrious, not unreasonable spenders or savers ; true to the cause of Liberty and the Protestant Religion ; independent of the Court in Places, Pensions or Expectations ; neither violent Abettors of the late Kings, nor the stubborn Opposers no more than the slavish Prostitutes of his present Majesty ; but moderat in all Times, and as much for the Toleration now, as then against Persecution ; Men of a peaceable disposition, not sworn to any Party or Faction ; such as have competent Fortunes to secure 'em from Suspition or Temtation, to maintain their Character untainted and always the same.* From such as these, or the likest them that can be found, may we reasonably expect all those Laws [175] which are yet wanting to improve and settle our civil Constitution, to bring us into a better Temper or Union in all our differences, to make the Militia useful, restore the Reputation of the Fleet, increase Trade, encourage Manufactures, maintain our Glory Abroad, reform our Manners at Home, and render us at once the Terror and Envy of the World. Such as these will not be frighted out of their Duty by the Frowns, nor brib'd by the Favors of a Monarch; as they won't be seduc'd by the general Applause, so they cannot be mov'd by popular Hatred; they'll own the rightful Cause when attended with the most unreputable or dangerous Circumstances, and in all conditions prove constant as well as affectionat Lovers of their Contry.

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### Conclusion. ↩

I Could say much more on all the foregoing Heads, and perhaps with greater advantage to the Subject and my own Reputation; but in this strange conjuncture of Affairs 'tis the most I cou'd do in a few days Retirement, nor was that little Time without som interruption. Provided the matter has in any degree the Effects intended, I shall be the less concern'd for any want of Art which Haste may occasion in the performance; and if this Parliament be of that healing Disposition which all true Patriots most heartily desire, something may be offer'd that may not be altogether impracticable nor unsatisfactory [177] towards abolishing those fatal Distinctions of Whig and Tory, and making us at least bear with one another in Religion where we cannot agree. Such a piece must be without all Resentment, or shewing any more approbation of one side than another. 'Tis confest I have bin oblig'd to follow somewhat a different Conduct on the present occasion, because the Parties are not yet calmly dispos'd to an Accommodation, but rather more violently inflam'd than for a long while past ; nor wou'd it be difficult were it as safe or seasonable, to discover by what Intrigues, and to serve what Ends their Heats are reviv'd. Tho both Factions are in several Things to be equally blam'd, yet I believe there's no Body who dos not imagin one of 'em to be more in the right than the Other : and I have not disgu'd in this whose Discourse, which of 'em has most Reason in my Opinion; tho without palliating their faults, or charging those unjustly whom I hold [178] to be most in the wrong. Did I follow my natural Inclination I shou'd be always for a Neutrality, and I promise to be a very indifferent Judge when the critical Opportunity presents it self; but when there's a Sedition in the City, I think (with *Solon* ) it ought to be capital for a Man to remain an unconcern'd Spectator, but that he shou'd be necessitated to ingage on the side he most approv'd, as the fittest means to appease the Tumult, or to keep the best Party from being over-powr'd. I shall end with one passage of *Roman* History very applicable both to the prefont Factions, and likewise to the unthankful part I bear in hoping to reconcile them. Som Veteran Legions were the firm adherents of *Julius Cæsar*, and yet after his Death did considerable service to the common Cause of Liberty against *Antony* ; but they became insolent by this new Credit, and were for making use of it to as bad purposes as when they were the Creatures of the Tyrant. *Cicero*, who (making a due Allowance for Times and Persons ) ingag'd in the same work that I do now, yet expected so little good Effects of his Indeavors that in one of his Speeches, he had these Expressions. *What! are we to have no Apprehensions of the Veterans ? for certainly they have no desire themselves to be fear'd. But in what part will they take my Severity ? for they have heard many false Things reported of me, and were told a world of storys by villanous Informers. And yet, as you are very true Witnesses, I have always promoted their Good by my Opinion, Interest, and Eloquence. But they believe wicked persons, they believe turbulent fellows, they believe the creatures of their own Faction. 'Tis true they are Brave, yet somewhat too fiercely valuing themselves on the memory of those things they have lately don for the Liberty of the Roman People and the Safety of the Commonwealth, and they are indeavoring to turn all our Councils to the strengthening of their own Party . Indeed I fear not their Policy, tho I dread their violence. But if I shou'd [180] likewise escape such great Dangers as these, yet do you think that my Return can be safe ? for when I defend my self by your Authority and after my usual manner, and shew both my Love and Constancy to the Commonwealth, then Shall I have Reason to fear not only those who hate me, but those also who envy me.* [13]

FINIS. ↩



**Faults of the Press to be thus corrected.** [↩](#)

Page/Line - Errors - Amendments

Page 5. Line 4. their - there

6.-4. Jeolousies - Jealousies

34.-19. Under hand - Undermin'd

41.-1. Immortality - Immorality

43.-7. Unseasonable - Unreasonable

ib.-10. Sadle - Saddle

81.-19. their - there

90.-10. distroy - destroy

94.-*ult* . Reason - Reason of State

99.-2. choses - chuses

103.-1. no - on

110.-5. *Machiavil* - *Macchiavil*

111.-1. resum - resume

114.-*ult* . theses - these

115.-17. diserving - deserving

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## Endnotes ↩

- [1] Som Reflections on a Discourse, call'd, Good advice to the Church of England.
- [2] Reflections on his Majesties Declaration for Liberty of Conscience.
- [3] The ill Effects of Animosities.
- [4] Danger of mercenary Parlements.
- [5] Author of the *Growth of Popery* .
- [6] A just and modest vindication of the proceedings of the two last Parlements of King *Charles* the Second.
- [7] In primis autem videndum erit ei, qui Rempubicam administrabit, ut suum Quisque teneat ; neque de Bonis privatorum publice deminutio fiat. -- Hanc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, Respublicæ civitatesque constitutæ sunt : nam etsi duce natura congregabantur Homines, tamen spe Custodiæ Rerum suarum Urbium præsjia quærebant. *De officiis, lib. 2. cap. 21.*
- [8] Ii labefactant fundamenta Reipublicæ, Concordiam primum, quæ esse non potest cum aliis a., dimuntur, aliis condonantur Pecuniæ : deinde Æquir tatem, quæ tollitur omnis, si habere suum cuique non licet. Id enim est proprium ( ut supra dixi) Civitatis atque Urbis, ut sit libera, & non follicita suæ Rei cujusque custodia. Atque in hac pernicie Reipublicæ ne illam quidem consequuntur, quam putant, Gratiam : nam cui Res erepta, est Inimicus; cui data est, etiam dissimulat se accipere voluisse, & maxime in Pecuniis creditis occultat suum Gaudium, ne videatur non fuisse solvendo. At vero ille qui accepit injuriam, & meminit ac præ se fert dolorem suum. Nec, si plures sunt ii quibus improbe datum est, quam illi quibus injuste ademptum est, idcirco plus etiam valent; non enim numero hæc judicantur, sed pondere. *Idem Ibidem, cap. 21 .]*
- [9] Tabulæ vero nove quid habent Argumenti, nisi ut emas mea Pecunia fundi meum tu habeas, ego non habeam pecuniam ? Quamobrem ne sit æs alienum, quod Reipublicæ poceat, providendum est, quod multis Rationibus caveri potest : non, si fuerit, ut locupletes suum perdant, Debitores lucentur alienum. Nec enim ulla res vehementius Rempubicam continet quam Fides, que ele nullá potest, nili erit necessaria solutio Rerum creditarum, Nunquam vehementius ætum est, quam me Consule, ne solveretur. Armis & Caitris tentata Res ab omni Genere Hominum & Ordine : quibus sic restiti, ut hoc tantum Malum de Republica tolleretur. Nunquam nec majus æs alienum fuit ; nec melius nec facilius diffolutum est: fraudandi enim Spe sublata, solvendi necessitas consecuta est. At vero hic nunc victor (tunc quidem victus ) quæ cogitarat ea perfecit, cum ejus jam nihil interesset : tanta in eo peccandi Libido fuit, ut hoc ipsum eum delectaret Peccare, etiam si causa non esset. Ab hoc igitur Genere Largitionis, ut aliis detur, aliis auferatur, aberunt ii qui Rempubicam tuebuntur ; inprimisque operam dabunt, ut Juris & Judiciorum æquitate suum Quisque teneat : & neque Tenuiores, propter Humilitatem, circumveniantur; ne que locupletibus, ad sua vel tenenda vel recuperanda, oblit Invidia. *Idem ibidem cap . 23. 24.*
- [10] Un Roy D'Angleterre, qui veut etre l'homme de son peuple, est le plus grand Roy du Monde; mais s'il veut etre quelque chose davantage, par Dieu il n'est plus rien.
- [11] Some Reflections on a Discourse, call'd, God Advice to the Church of *England*.
- [12] Character of a Trimmer.

[13] Quid! veteranos non veremur ? nam timeri se ne ipsi quidem volunt. Sed quonam modo accipient Severitatem meam? multa enim falsa de me au lierunt, multa ad eos improbi detulerunt. Quorum commoda, ut vos optimi testes estis, semper ego sententia, Antoritate, Oratione firmavi : sed credunt Improbis, credunt Turbulentis, credunt suis. Sunt autem fortes illi quidem, sed propter memoriain rerum, quas gesserunt pro populi Romani Libertate & salute Reipublicæ, nimis feroces, & ad suam vim omnia nostra Consilia revocantes. Horum ego Cogitationem non vereor, Impetum pertimesco. Hæc quoque pericula tanta si effugerc, fatisme tuum Reditum putatis fore? Cum & vestra autoritate & meo memore defendero, & meam Fidem Reipublicæ Constantiamque præfitero ; tum erunt mihi, non solum hi qui me oderunt, sed illi etiam qui invident, extimescendi. *Phillip. 12.*